

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

To re-examine the outlook for South Africa in the light of present racial tension.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The recent wave of racial disturbances in the Union of South Africa has reinforced our view that in that country the years ahead will be characterized by increasing tension, culminating eventually—probably after considerable bloodshed—in the end of white domination. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that the white minority, with all the powers of a modern state at its disposal, and with a firm determination to use them, will be able to maintain its dominance for the next few years. (*Para. 22*)

2. Despite their number, the Africans are presently too weak and disorganized to mount a broad and sustained campaign of resistance in the face of the means of coercion available to the white community. Nevertheless, localized strikes, boycotts, and other manifestations, touched off by some specific grievances or incidents, will probably flare up more frequently over the next few years. The more activist non-white elements are likely to turn to terrorism. Africans outside the Union will probably find means of furnishing at least small amounts of arms

and other material support to the Africans within the Union. (*Paras. 11-15, 23*)

3. Continuation of internal strife in this manner will further increase racial tensions in the community and magnify the difficulties of maintaining white dominance. It may provoke a number of Asian-African states—and perhaps others—to adopt economic sanctions against South Africa. It will lead to some local economic dislocations within the country, and will further reduce South Africa's ability to attract the investment capital, both foreign and domestic, which is needed for the country's continued prosperity. (*Paras. 24-25*)

4. At present the rather substantial structure of influence which the Communists had established within the leadership of the older non-white political movements in South Africa appears to have been hard hit by recent events. Since the development of a new apparatus will probably have to be started at the local level, it cannot be accomplished rapidly. The Communists will be hampered by the absence of reliable and numerous African cadres.

Over the longer run, however, with their conspiratorial skills and their ability to get material support from the Bloc, Communists may come to exercise important influence within the protest movement in the Union. (Para. 16)

5. Although the white community generally supports the government's efforts to stamp out African dissidence, recent events have aroused increased misgivings, even within the dominant Nationalist Party, as to the moral, economic, and international implications of the government's *apartheid* policy. Within another year or two, the growth of this feeling will probably begin to force some easing of the government's more onerous racial restrictions, but no comprehensive accommodation to non-white aspirations is likely. Probable government concessions

are likely to have no more than a temporary calming effect, and probably will only stimulate pressure for further change. (Paras. 17-21)

6. Growing world disapproval of its racial policies will probably push South Africa into an increasingly isolated and controversial position in international affairs. There is at least an even chance that it will be forced out of the Commonwealth if it carries out its plans to become a republic. South Africa will almost certainly be a target in the UN for the growing number of Afro-Asian members, but it is unlikely to withdraw unless sanctions are voted against it. Given the vehemence of both Afro-Asian and South African feeling, the Western powers will find it increasingly difficult to avoid offending one side or the other. (Paras. 26-27)

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

7. The recent wave of racial disturbances in South Africa has dramatically illustrated the growing bitterness of the conflict between the determination of the Union's substantial white minority to maintain its traditional dominance and the growing restiveness and assertiveness of the African¹ and other non-white elements of the population.

8. As a nation based on the concept of white supremacy—with some three million whites ruling over a total population of about 15 million—South Africa has long had the seeds of racial discord within it. This has been especially so since its development into a modern industrial state in which Africans and

other non-whites represent an essential portion of the urban labor force.² These inherent strains have been intensified since 1948 by the Nationalist policy of *apartheid*, under which a single-minded and determined effort has been made to tighten up and systematize the loose body of customs and regulations through which racial segregation and the white monopoly of political and economic power had previously been maintained.

9. The Sha-peville riot of March 1960, in which 67 Africans were killed, was a direct consequence of a civil disobedience campaign, and aimed primarily at the highly unpopular pass system on which control over the urban Africans is largely based. It was followed by an effective stay-at-home strike in the Cape

¹ The term used here to identify the black South Africans of Bantu ethnic origin. *Afrikaner* is the term applied to the white Afrikaans-speaking descendants of Dutch (Boer) settlers.

² See Annex A for summary of essential background data.

Town area. In the 10 months prior to Sharpeville eight other outbursts of violence had taken place. Although all were more or less spontaneous flareups touched off by some local incident or grievance—e.g., police liquor raids, the forced removal of Africans from their homes, the banning of a popular leader—they gave additional evidence of how close the tempers of many urban Africans were to the boiling point.

10. These disturbances not only reflected underlying conflicts but themselves contributed materially to an increase of tension. For the whites they have aroused as never before the spectre of anarchy and destruction. Among the Africans and other non-whites, the harshness displayed by the government in suppressing any manifestations of protest has almost certainly provoked resentment and even desperation. Meanwhile, South African race relations has become even more a *cause célèbre* in the eyes of the world.

II. NON-WHITE PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

11. Despite the relatively large numbers involved in the disturbances of recent months, South Africa is still far from the point of a mass uprising by the 12 million non-whites who make up 80 percent of its population. Active discontent exists primarily among the three million or so urban Africans, who include the best educated and most politically conscious of the Africans in the Union and are the most heavily burdened by the government's racial restrictions and by economic hardships. There is little indication of unrest among the approximately three million Africans working on white farms. However, there have been occasional disorders in the native reserves, where another three million Africans live under the sometimes tenuous authority of government-approved tribal chiefs and one cannot assume that rural Africans will remain quiescent. The Indian and Colored (i.e., mixed blood) minorities, although their social and economic status has diminished under *apartheid*, still remain more privileged than the Africans and generally are more passive.

12. Even among the urban Africans there is little likelihood that a broadly based, closely integrated, and sustained campaign of resistance can soon be developed in the face of police countermeasures. The pre-Sharpeville African political protest organizations which had never really succeeded in developing a broad, organized following, have now been disrupted by the police crackdown, leaving the urban Africans for the moment leaderless and cowed. Over and above the problem of re-creating leadership and organization, these Africans lack the weapons to stand up against the police. In addition, the fact that most of them live on a hand-to-mouth basis severely limits their ability to sustain strikes and boycotts for any extended period.

13. Nevertheless, sporadic manifestations of African unrest will increase in frequency as time goes on. During the next year or two these will probably continue to take the form of more or less spontaneous local flareups, in most cases resulting from specific economic or social grievances rather than from any political motivation. As some semblance of African leadership re-emerges, discontent is increasingly likely to involve strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations designed to bring pressure on the white community, with the object initially that of forcing removal of onerous racial curbs but with an underlying demand for political and civil rights eventually becoming more prominent. Many such strikes and boycotts will lead to at least temporary layoffs among African workers in other areas and industries and will accordingly tend to increase the economic strains contributing to tension and unrest within the African labor force at large.

14. Given the temper of the urban African masses and the determination of the government to crush all opposition, violence will probably figure prominently in most manifestations of African unrest. The jailing of the older and more moderate leaders and the need to operate illegally will probably bring forward a more radical and activist leadership element, operating to a large degree underground. The Africans will probably recognize that they would have little hope of develop-

ing an effective armed resistance movement against the government's overwhelming strength even if they were able to smuggle in arms. However, the activists among them will probably be increasingly tempted to turn to the deliberate use of terrorism, regarding it as the only effective means, other than economic pressure, of reinforcing their demands.

15. The growth of a spirit of resistance among South Africa's urban Africans—which in time will probably spread to the reserves—will be stimulated not only by the accumulation of local grievances but by the example and encouragement of the emerging states of black Africa. In addition to their efforts to bring international pressure against South Africa, the new African states will almost certainly broaden their efforts to provide direct encouragement and support to the Africans of the Union. South Africa has thus far been fairly effectively sealed off from the rest of the continent by the white-controlled territories of Angola, Southern Rhodesia, and Mozambique, and the delivery of large-scale assistance, whether by sea or by land, is unlikely in view of the great distance and security barriers involved. However, Africans outside the Union will probably find means of furnishing at least small amounts of arms and other material support to the Africans within the Union.

16. For the present, the rather substantial structure of influence which the Communists had established within the leadership of the older non-white political movements in South Africa appears to have been hard hit by the post-Sharpeville police crackdown. Since the development of a new apparatus will probably have to be started at the local level, it cannot be accomplished rapidly. The Communists will be hampered by the absence of reliable and numerous African cadres. Although the new African leadership likely to spring up within the Union will be anxious to get help from almost any source, it will probably prefer to get it from other African nationalists. Nevertheless, the Communist Bloc will seek to exploit non-white unrest within South Africa and sooner or later is likely to find

means of re-establishing contact with dissident elements. Over the longer run, the Communists, with their conspiratorial skills and their ability to get support from the Bloc, may come to exercise important influence within the protest movement in the Union.

III. REACTIONS IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY

17. Following the Sharpeville incident, the government moved swiftly to crush any resistance to its authority. It mobilized the civilian reserves to supplement the military and the police in maintaining order. It forbade all public gatherings. It declared a state of emergency giving the government vast powers unhampered by the usual legal restraints. It arrested virtually all known non-white political leaders and their leading white supporters. It banned the principal non-white political organizations and their publications. Although the pass system was briefly suspended for tactical reasons, it was soon reimposed, and thousands of pass delinquents have been rounded up in urban areas, either to be sent to jail or banished to the reserves.

18. The government's prompt reaction has been supported by a large majority in the white community, which for the most part was badly shaken by the eruption of African emotionalism and violence. Such feelings have been particularly strong among rural Afrikaners from whom the Nationalist government and its *apartheid* policy have obtained their principal support. Even those whites who felt that *apartheid* was being pushed too rigorously accepted a need for stern measures to enforce order. Following Sharpeville, available stocks of firearms in the cities were quickly bought up by apprehensive whites. Although the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd on 9 April was the act of a demented white man, it has at least temporarily reinforced this tendency to close ranks behind the government. Likewise the excesses of the present disorders in the Congo are likely to harden attitudes toward non-whites. With Verwoerd now well on the road to recovery, the government will remain dominated by a vigorous and doctrinaire proponent of *apartheid*. Verwoerd

will almost certainly continue to insist on strict enforcement of racial curbs and will probably seek to speed up programs designed to isolate the African labor force as much as possible from white communities.

19. Nevertheless, the recent wave of disturbances has increased misgivings about the moral and practical validity of *apartheid* as presently applied. Even within ruling Afrikaner Nationalist circles, the small number of intellectuals and churchmen who had previously questioned the direction of South African racial policy has been joined by most of the important business and financial leaders and by the principal Nationalist newspaper of Cape Province. Indeed, one member of the cabinet, Minister of Lands Sauer, has publicly called for a new look at the situation.

20. Such reservations will almost certainly become more widespread as the adverse impact of continued racial tension on South Africa's economy, international standing, and way of life becomes more obvious. There is at least an even chance that within the next year or two effective pressure for an easing of the more onerous racial restrictions will emerge. Since the Nationalists control 101 out of 160 seats in the lower house of parliament, the development of any effective pressure for change will require a breakdown of the strong discipline which Verwoerd has thus far been able to maintain by virtue of his driving and dominant personality, his firm control over most of the party machinery, and the widespread rank-and-file support for his policies. Any significant modification of racial policy would probably necessitate dropping Verwoerd. It might even involve a coalition between the more moderate wing of the Nationalist Party and the opposition United Party, which has long sought such a coalition as providing its only hope of sharing power.

21. Except for a small minority, the white population will probably be willing to offer no more than limited concessions to non-white aspirations. While the Afrikaner-backed Nationalist Party, and the opposition United Party, which derives its principal support from the English-speaking populace, represent

widely differing political, moral, and religious concepts, they are in agreement on the need to maintain white dominance. The opposition of the United Party to *apartheid* has been cast in terms of constitutional, moral, and economic requirements, rather than of opposition to the concept of white supremacy. Such modifications of racial policy as are likely to be adopted—e.g., the relaxation of liquor controls, the easing of the pass regulations, the raising of minimum wages—would remove some sources of friction and thus contribute to a temporary easing of tension. Although such changes would probably be welcomed by most urban Africans, these and possibly later educational and perhaps even political concessions would probably fall well short of African aspirations and expectations at the time. Over the long run, such limited concessions will probably serve only to heighten non-white aspirations and demands.

IV. THE INTERNAL OUTLOOK

22. Thus the outlook is for increasing tension and strife. We continue to believe that the white minority, with all the powers of a modern state at its disposal, and with a firm determination to use them, will be able to maintain its dominance for the next few years. Indeed, the preponderance of military and economic power on the white side,² together with limited concessions, may result in fairly lengthy periods of uneasy quiet. However, the basic struggle will continue, resulting eventually—probably after considerable bloodshed—in the end of white domination.

23. Even though we believe that the whites will maintain their dominance over the next few years, the costs of doing so will increase. Particularly if terrorism emerges as a major instrumentality of non-white protest, the white population will be forced to live under greater strain than heretofore and probably to endure continued restriction of white as well as non-white civil liberties. South Africa's international stature will decline.

² See Annex B for details regarding South African military and security forces.

24. Finally, the continuation of internal strife is virtually certain to have adverse effects on the South African economy. The cumulative impact of strikes, boycotts and disturbances of public order within the country may be appreciable, even though each separate occurrence is short-lived. More serious economic consequences, however, are likely to flow from actions taken outside the country. There has already been much discussion, especially among Afro-Asian nations, of an international consumer boycott of South African goods; Malaya has adopted such a boycott as public policy. The Conference of Independent African States, meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1960, called upon its members to adopt an extensive program of economic sanctions against South Africa. The effect of such sanctions would probably not be great in the strict economic sense, for the proportion of South African national product involved would be very small. On individual producers, however, the impact would be substantial, and the psychological effect on the South African business community would probably be marked.

25. By far the most important economic consequence of unrest in South Africa is the uneasiness which it causes among domestic and foreign investors. During most of the period since World War II, South Africa has enjoyed high prosperity with a steady inflow of foreign investment. The recent crisis led to a sharp drop in the price of South African securities and a serious decline in gold and foreign exchange reserves, indicating some flight of capital. Future disturbances will further reduce South Africa's ability to attract the investment capital, both foreign and domestic, which is needed for the country's continued prosperity.

V. EXTERNAL REPERCUSSIONS

26. Growing world disapproval of South Africa's racial policies will push it into an increasingly isolated and controversial position in international affairs. The new Afro-Asian nations, whose growing numbers give

them an increasingly important voice not only in the UN but in the Commonwealth, will almost certainly make intensive efforts to rally world pressure against South Africa to force a modification of its racial policies. The May 1960 meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers refused to give advance approval of South Africa's continued membership if it becomes a republic, and there appears to be little likelihood that it could obtain the necessary unanimous consent to stay within the Commonwealth.⁴ Indeed, the problem which South Africa presents to the Commonwealth may prove to be one of the most difficult in the latter's history. Although South Africa faces no danger of being ejected from the UN, it is bitter and cynical about that organization and, if the UN should actually vote sanctions against it, would probably withdraw.

27. International controversy over South Africa's racial policies will pose increasing difficulties for the West. The US will be faced by a dilemma. If it cultivates good relations with the South African Government, and especially if it gives that government material support or allows it to purchase arms, it will incur the vigorous displeasure of many peoples and governments, particularly the new African nations. It is possible, for example, that the UN votes of the whole group of African states on a wide variety of issues may be affected. On the other hand, if the US strongly condemns the South African Government, it will deeply offend a staunch anti-Communist friend, and perhaps lose the use of South African territory for space tracking stations, or find difficulties put in the way of using South African ports and airfields. An especially serious problem might be posed if extended racial clashes should occur in South Africa, with heavy loss of life among non-whites as well as whites.

⁴ Afrikaner Nationalists have long been uncomfortable about South Africa's allegiance to the British Crown, and legislation was recently adopted authorizing a referendum, limited to white voters, on its transformation into a republic. This proposal, which will probably be put to the vote this fall, will probably be adopted.

ANNEX A

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

General

1. The Union of South Africa, which was constituted as a single self-governing territory in 1910 and granted dominion status in the Commonwealth in 1931, is an outgrowth of successive Dutch settlements dating back to the 17th century and of later British colonization. The total population of some 15 million includes some 10 million black Africans (officially "Bantus"), about 1.4 million Coloreds (i.e., persons of mixed blood), and close to half a million Indians. However, political, economic and social power remains concentrated in the hands of the country's three million whites. The concepts of white supremacy and racial segregation are deeply imbedded in the life of the country.

2. In its half century of existence, South Africa has developed into a prosperous modern state with a national income of well over \$5 billion a year. Although more than half the population is still engaged in agriculture, with wool and fruits constituting major export cash crops, the country's growth has depended mainly on exploitation of its mineral resources, notably gold, diamonds, and uranium. Particularly since World War II, the industrial sector has also greatly expanded, to the point where it now contributes over a quarter of the national income. South Africa is now self-sufficient in many manufactured items and has developed an important market for those products in neighboring African areas.

3. Although impetus and direction have come almost entirely from the whites, the growth of the South African economy has depended heavily on the availability of a plentiful supply of cheap non-white labor. Some three million Africans derive a livelihood from employment on white farms. Another three million are in the urban areas, some working on a con-

tract basis but many of them more or less permanently employed.⁵ The Colored and Indian elements, concentrated in the urban centers of Cape Province and Natal, play a major role as agricultural, unskilled and semi-skilled laborers, with the Indians also important as merchants. For the most part the non-whites occupy the lower paid unskilled jobs, with the better posts reserved for whites (or in a few cases Coloreds). However, the growth of the economy has made these practices increasingly burdensome, and a continuation of substantial economic growth will almost certainly require a liberalization of labor practices. Even where enough white labor is available, it is sometimes inferior to non-white labor, which is far better educated and productive than native work forces in other parts of Africa.

4. Direct foreign investment has also continued to play an important role in the economy, despite a steady growth of domestic capital resources which has been marked by an increasing participation of Afrikaners—traditionally a farming people—in industrial enterprise. Total foreign investment is of the order of \$4 billion, including a US stake of over a half a billion dollars. Thus the \$1.5 billion fall in South African security prices in the three months ending in March was a serious shock to the South African money market and suggests that sufficient external investment to sustain the recent pace of economic growth will be lacking. The rush by foreign investors to sell South African se-

⁵ The remaining third of the African population in the native reserves practices subsistence agriculture along traditional lines and makes no direct contribution to the economy as a whole, but the reserves themselves have become increasingly dependent on remittances by urban workers.

curities and repatriate the proceeds helped produce a \$96 million fall in gold and foreign exchange reserves in the three months following the Sharpeville incident.

Social and Political Patterns In the White Community

5. The more than half a century which has passed since the Boer War has not eradicated the mutual suspicions and differences in outlook between the Afrikaans-speaking descendants of Dutch settlers, who comprise 60 percent of the white population, and the English-speaking inhabitants of British stock. Under the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church and other organizations, most Afrikaners retain the intense sense of mission inherited from their Calvinist forbearers. There has developed among them a fiery nationalism which regards their success in carving out a nation on the African continent and the principle of white supremacy on which it has been based as divinely ordained. In contrast, most of the English-speaking element are descendants of those lured to South Africa by the prospect of economic opportunity. Although they share a common loyalty to South Africa as their homeland, their patriotism lacks the intensely exclusive quality found among the Afrikaners and is tempered not only by their background of British moral and political concepts but by a greater sense of identification with the Commonwealth and the UK.

6. The political party structure of the Union reflects this ethnic division. The dominant Nationalist Party, which with the aid of considerable gerrymandering holds 101 of the 160 seats in the lower house of the Federal Parliament and controls all provincial assemblies except in Natal, is the chief organ of Afrikaner nationalism, and has worked closely with the Dutch Reformed Church, the Broederband secret society, and other organizations to mold the Afrikaners into a tightly knit group. The opposition United Party is essentially the party of the English-speaking minority. Although it commands more voting strength than its 53 parliamentary seats would indicate, it has lacked vigor and has developed

no clearly defined alternative to the rigorous racial policies advanced by the Nationalist. While critical of the lengths to which the Nationalists have gone in enforcing white supremacy, the United Party and the vast majority of the English-speaking population also consider it essential that white domination be continued. The only voices favoring any radical concessions to non-white aspirations are those of a small body of intellectuals, exemplified by Alan Paton and his tiny Liberal Party and the somewhat larger but still relatively insignificant Progressive Party.

The Policy of Apartheid

7. The principle of *Baasskap* or white supremacy was initially manifested in a collection of customs supplemented by a patchwork of law. Although the status of Coloreds and Indians was clearly inferior to that of the whites, customs, law and their greater adaptability to the modern social and economic order provided them greater opportunity for advancement than Africans. The Africans enjoyed nominal parliamentary representation and the Coloreds voted on the same roll as the whites.

8. Since 1948, when the Nationalist Party came to power, the government's racial policies have hardened. As articulated in Afrikaner Nationalist dogma, the concept of *apartheid*, on which these policies have been based, is an expression, not of racial animosity, but of a profound conviction that the non-white races are "different" in their aptitudes and qualities and their place in the divine scheme of things—that it is in their interest, as well as that of the whites, that their status and contacts with the white community be carefully circumscribed. Nationalist-led parliaments have appropriated sizable sums for primary and secondary non-white education; as of 1958 over half of the African children of school age were enrolled. In the last ten years the state has also provided new and vastly improved housing for half a million urban Africans. However, the proponents of *apartheid* insist that improvements in the status of the non-whites take place within their own communities and that they be sepa-

rated as much as possible from the white community. Their avowed aim is the ultimate resettlement of the bulk of the urban Africans on the native reserves, with factories and other sources of employment nearby, where they can live under their own leaders according to their own customs.⁹

9. In practice, however, the net effect of government policy has been to tighten the constraints placed on non-whites by custom and by their inferior economic status. The principal burden falls on the urban African, almost the whole of whose life is now governed by inflexible regulations and administrative decisions largely administered by local officials and the police. Taxation has been increased, while representation in parliament (three seats out of 163) has been eliminated. Both men and women are now subject to "pass laws" which seriously restrict freedom of movement and often separate families; their education is circumscribed; they may no longer enter "white" universities; their place of residence is prescribed by law; and they may purchase land only in specified townships in the native reserves. Africans may not belong to registered trade unions, are largely prevented from entering the skilled trades, and are forbidden to engage in strikes. With few exceptions, they may not legally purchase or consume liquor, nor, in urban areas, may they brew the traditional "kaffir beer."

10. Members of the two other non-white groups are subjected to lesser but still onerous restrictions. While the Indians are not subject to the pass laws, they are forbidden to cross provincial boundaries without a special permit and are subject to important restric-

⁹Little has been done toward implementing this plan, which is highly impractical as demonstrated by the findings of the government's Tomlinson Commission in 1956. The native reserves, constituting only 11 percent of the country's area, are too small and poor in resources to sustain the bulk of the Africans. From the viewpoint of the nation as a whole, as well as that of the Africans, the scheme would not be economically viable without a massive relocation of industry and communications at immense cost. Indeed the physical resettlement of the bulk of the three million urban Africans in the reserves would itself be a staggering task.

tions on land purchases, and face, in many cases, eventual displacement from residential and business properties. Since they are still regarded as an unassimilable element, they have no vote. The far larger group of Coloreds, who were formerly treated as an appendage of the white race, have progressively lost in status and freedom. In 1956 the Coloreds were denied their long-established right to participate in ordinary elections and were placed on a separate electoral register to elect four white representatives to parliament. Other legislation forbids intermarriage between Coloreds and whites, provides separate Colored schools, forbids Coloreds from entering "white" universities, denies them membership in "white" trade unions, and generally forces them to use separate social amenities and transportation facilities and to live in segregated areas.

Non-White Political Movements

11. Non-white political activity has centered among the urban Africans. Organizations representing Colored and Indian interests were participants in the Congress of the People Movement, a Communist-dominated united front promoting non-white interests. However, most of the Coloreds have tended to identify themselves with the whites rather than with Africans—their social and economic inferiority—and have been relatively inactive in the political arena. Occupying a precarious position as a relatively small, unassimilated minority, the Indians have been generally passive and the chief significance of the Communist-led South African Indian Congress (SAIC) has stemmed from its ability to provide advice and (through donations extracted from rich Indian merchants) financial support to the African political movements.

12. Until it was banned early in April 1960, the African National Congress (ANC) was the most important non-white political organization. Founded in 1912, the ANC had become increasingly active since World War II. It had a large but undisciplined body of followers, particularly among urban Africans, and as an instrument of political power was unwieldy and difficult to direct. Nevertheless, under

the leadership of ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, it had great prestige as the symbol of African aspirations and constituted the principal school for the political education of the African population.

13. In April 1959 there emerged a new and more militant Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), headed by Robert M. Sobukwe, a young lecturer in Bantu languages at the University of the Witwatersrand. It was formed by a group of ANC dissidents who espoused a "Black Nationalist" policy. The new organization was strongly anti-Communist in approach and looked for inspiration to African nationalist leaders north of the Union. It rejected the gradualism and nonviolence preached by the ANC and its Indian and white advisers and urged instead direct and immediate action by Africans to enforce their demands.

14. The PAC was responsible for the anti-pass campaign of March 1960, calling upon its followers to: (a) turn in their passes to police stations as an indication of refusal to obey the pass laws any longer; (b) willingly accept arrest as a consequence; (c) offer no legal defense for their actions and refuse to pay any fines; and (d) "fill South Africa's jails." This strategy was calculated not only to eliminate the keystone of the government's racial policies; it was also designed to remove thousands of African workers from the labor force and thereby threaten South Africa's economy. The PAC leaders clearly indicated that their ultimate purpose was to bring about an African government in South Africa, setting 1963 as a target date. This campaign led directly to the Sharpeville incident of 21 March and to the banning of the PAC shortly thereafter.

Communist Influence

15. Although banned in 1950, the Communist Party of South Africa continues to operate underground. Its hard-core membership is composed principally of whites but includes a few Indians and other non-whites. The predominantly white South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD), formed in 1953, provides the organizational framework for overt Com-

munist activities and has on occasion published a journal entitled *Fighting Talk*.

16. Communists in South Africa direct the bulk of their propaganda toward non-whites and their principal organizational efforts toward penetrating and controlling the non-white political movements. This they have succeeded in doing in the case of the principal Indian organization, SAIC, while the South African Colored People's Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, and the Federation of South African Women are essentially Communist fronts. But the Africans, as by far the largest racial group and potentially the principal locus of political power in South Africa, have constituted the prime Communist target, with the African National Congress (ANC) the most attractive organizational prize. Since about 1952 Communists dominated the ANC's formal organizational structure and policy directives at the national level, although they had little ideological support among the rank-and-file and several local ANC committees and individual leaders steadily resisted the Communist-controlled national leadership.

17. Communist influence within the ANC was exercised in a number of ways: through a few convinced adherents in the ranks of the top leadership; through money provided to the impoverished organization for operating expenses and salaries of the few full-time officials; and through the weekly propaganda organ, *New Age*, which had extensive African readership and which furnished a handy club to batter opposition elements within the ANC. The disinclination of many respectable and moderate Africans to become involved in ANC politics further assisted Communist efforts to determine its policies.

18. In order to win new adherents to their various front organizations, which they induced the ANC to support, the Communists mounted an all-out propaganda campaign against the government's racial policies. However, the Communists carefully eschewed calls for immediate action, instead stressing the need for discipline and for building slowly for the future. They extolled passive resist-

ance, a philosophy which exercises a strong influence on South Africa's Indian community (of which Mahatma Gandhi was a member from 1893 to 1914) and on many of the older African leaders (e.g., Luthuli). The Communists' tactical restraint apparently

stemmed from a well-founded fear that any head-on clash with the government would result in the destruction of the organizational apparatus built up at such great pains over many years. This fear appears to have been borne out in large measure since Sharpeville.

ANNEX B

MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

1. Although all of South Africa's armed forces have a primary mission of assisting in maintenance of internal security, the *South African Police Force* has the chief responsibility in this field. A force of 22,000, it is a generally efficient, well-armed and highly mobile agency. Equipment includes armored cars, machine guns, and individual automatic weapons. Slightly under half of the police are non-whites who are normally unarmed while on duty. These non-whites are carefully selected and would probably remain loyal to the government, except in the case of a full-scale national non-white uprising. As presently constituted the police force is capable of suppressing disturbances and generally preserving order. Organized resistance over widespread areas would tax its capabilities, however, and again require the mobilization of army reserves. The police are strongly disliked by the bulk of the African populace because of their harsh tactics in crushing political protest demonstrations. Moreover, the police force has been charged with the enforcement of the pass laws and other unpopular racial legislation over the years, resulting in the arrest of about one-tenth of the total population yearly.

2. The *South African Army* relies heavily on reserves to carry out its mission of supporting the police in maintaining internal security. The professional force on active duty consists of only 3,200 men, who are concerned mainly with training the Citizen Force and the Commandos. The immediate source of army fighting strength is rather the *Citizen Force* of 14,500. Composed of part-time volunteer offi-

cers and NCO's and enlisted conscripts, it is maintained in an early-ready condition, with personnel assigned to units near their place of residence. In addition, there is a *Commando* organization of 65,000 men organized into 178 small units. The Commandos are a wholly volunteer body especially trained in marksmanship and infantry tactics. Army mobilization requirements have been established to supply 30,000 troops within 30 days, and full mobilization can place 70,000 men in the field in 90 days. Personnel in all three bodies are drawn from the white population alone.

3. South Africa's *Air Force* has 486 aircraft of which 121 are assigned to tactical units. The force is capable of rapid expansion, drawing on civil aviation for equipment and pilots. Personnel strength is about 3,000 whites, of whom 200 are pilots. A reserve force of 4,000 crew members and 5,600 support personnel could be mobilized rapidly. Tactical strength consists of five squadrons, including two jet interceptor units; no bomber-type aircraft are available. Close cooperation with the army is stressed in training exercises, and the air force is proficient in ground support tactics. In addition to its primary responsibility of supporting ground forces in maintaining internal security, the air force shares with the navy (and the British Navy) responsibility for protection of the sea routes around the southern tip of Africa. However, its capability in this field is limited to a single maritime reconnaissance squadron equipped with ASW aircraft. South Africa's skilled airmen have excellent fighting qualities.

[REDACTED]

4. The active list of the *South African Navy* now numbers only six combat vessels (DDE and smaller), two auxiliaries and six service craft. Three DDE's are under construction in the UK. Present manpower is approximately 1,800 backed by a small active reserve of 500; all are whites. The navy lacks any significant offensive power, but has some ASW and mine-sweeping capabilities in home waters. It is currently committed primarily to an internal security role, and during the recent emergency sailors assisted the police in guard duties ashore.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. Communist penetration in both military and police forces is believed to be nonexistent.

[REDACTED]

