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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ORE 55-49

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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Communist Doctrinal Basis and Growth.

Although the first major step in the growth of Communism as a political force occurred as a result of the Russian October Revolution of 1917, the doctrinal basis of Communism had its beginnings as early as 1848 when Marx and Engels published the Communist Manifesto. Although these two men were by no means the first propagators of a new social order based upon state or society-controlled ownership of national resources and means of production, they discarded the compromise of democratic evolution and, for the first time, "scientifically" developed a theory of social revolution.

There are several Marxian axioms, the understanding of which is necessary for an appraisal of the present Communist doctrine. By and large, these are propositions that have remained unaltered by successive theorists. It is true that Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and even Tito have changed the interpretation of Marxist theories, have enhanced the importance of some, relegated others to the background, and created new ones. Essentially, however, Marxism remains based upon the Communist Manifesto, the theses of Marx' Kapital

Note: This report is in process of coordination with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. It contains information available to CIA as of

and the various other writings of both Marx and Engels.

a. Orthodox Theory.

(1) Marxism.

The most important pillars of the edifice of Marxian thought are the principles of dialectical materialism, the economic interpretation of history, and the doctrine of the class struggle. Deeply affected by the Hegelian methods of dialectics, but supplanting its historical slanting with materialistic interpretation, Marx reasoned that nothing was established once and for all, that every development had its climax which would be followed by decay, and that it is beyond anybody's power to retard this sequence. The object of this system of reasoning was to disprove the prevailing idealism and replace it with a material view of civilization. Civilization, Marx reasoned, has created certain conditions, not so much through influence of ideas, as through actual facts of life.

This dialectical thought process opened the way for a new interpretation of history. Measurable material forces, Marx claimed, exclusively determine the development of human affairs. If such forces have grown up within an established system, conflicts are bound to arise which, in the end, initiate a social revolution. The victory of such a revolution would impose new (economic) principles upon society and change the whole complex of civilization. In other words, these forces would work themselves out by way of a dialectical process or, by the "conflict of contradictions" or opposites inherent in nature and society, resolve themselves into a new and "higher" status.

The conflicts producing the stimuli for such conflicting processes in human society do not stem from ideas per se, but operate in terms of the changing forces of production (tools, machines) which place men in certain relations with other men (production relations). It is these relations which determine the social, political, and intellectual processes of life and, therefore, will result in a defined relationship between the classes. The nature of this relationship cannot help but lead to a series of continued class struggles, for "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."

The fundamental cause of all class struggles is to be found in the economic structure of capitalist society. Marxist economic theory arrives at the conclusion that the value of all commodities (goods) is determined by the quantity of human labor expended on their production (the labor theory of value). The only source of a capitalist's profit, therefore, lies in the excess of labor-time he forces labor to work beyond the hours needed to produce the necessities such as food and clothing, required to maintain the labor (the theory of surplus value). Capitalist profit, accordingly, varies in direct proportion to the amount of time the laborer is forced to work beyond that required to earn the subsistence wages he is paid for his labor-power (the theory of exploitation).

Marx thereby sets forth a series of premises which he utilizes to explain how the capitalist structure will collapse. Because of constant

technological advances and the competition of fellow-capitalists, he says, the capitalist is compelled to turn into additional capital ("save" and "invest") the greater part of the surplus value he has wrested from his workers (the theory of accumulation). This constant increase in the machines (capital) diminishes the capitalist's profit (which varies solely with the amount of labor power exploited). The capitalist compensates for these smaller profits not only by constantly increasing the exploitation of his employees, but also by cheapening commodities through increasing the size of industrial plants and units of control (corporations, holding companies, trusts, cartels). In this life-and-death struggle of competition, the capitalists tend to destroy each other by concentrating capital into fewer and fewer hands. This development of highly mechanized large-scale industry inevitably creates large-scale unemployment — a permanent "surplus population," as well as the transfer of countless small and medium-sized capitalists into the proletariat, who gradually become more and more impoverished and miserable.

In the advanced stages of capitalist development, recurrent crises or depressions are created as a result of the inability of the masses to buy the ever-increasing flow of goods. These crises are periodic, inescapable, and of increasing severity until they finally culminate in a breakdown of the capitalist system: a breakdown produced by the system's own economic contradictions and by the revolt of the increasingly miserable proletariat.

The class struggle is not only an economic but also a political conflict since the state is primarily an organ of class-coercion on behalf of the "ruling" class. In modern capitalist society the political and economic conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has reached the stage where the productive power of society has outgrown the system of private property. The exploited proletarians can liberate themselves from the yoke of the bourgeoisie only through the direct seizure of the (bourgeois) state power and the transformation of the capitalist to a socialist system. This development is inevitable inasmuch as the capitalist system is doomed to fall because of the "contradictions" inherent in it.

In order that a new social and economic system may be achieved and capitalism destroyed, a struggle to the death between capitalists and workers will ensue because the capitalists, according to Marx, will not give up their prerogatives. Therefore, once the workers have succeeded in overthrowing a capitalistic regime, they must not rest on their laurels but must establish a "dictatorship of the proletariat" which, representing the workers' interest, will see to it that all the remnants of the bourgeoisie are liquidated. Only after this has happened will the transitory "socialist" period be replaced by the final stage of the development, the Communist "classless" society. The task of the state under a proletarian dictatorship, which is essentially the elimination of opposing elements, will then have been completed and under Communism the state will "wither away."

(2) Leninism.

Lenin conceived methods and tactics designed to implement Marxian theory. Marx had remained a theorist with little concern for the practical execution of his ideas except in very general terms. Lenin prevented any moderate faction from compromising with bourgeois elements, carrying out politically and organizationally what Marx had demanded in principle. Lenin also adapted Marxism to changed socio-political conditions as well as to its use in Russia; Marxist theory was based upon revolution in the most highly developed industrial nations while the Russian Revolution occurred in an economically undeveloped country.

Lenin's main contributions to both the nature of the Soviet state and the development of international Communism are the following:

(a) A single disciplined and united party must be organized to implement the theory and postulates of revolution. This party must be the vanguard of the working class. It must select its members with care and be the political leader of the working class. It is to be a "Party of a class, and therefore almost the entire class (and in times of war, in the period of civil war, the entire class) should act under the leadership of our Party as closely as possible." In other words, the Party is also an "organized detachment of the working class."

(b) Even more important, the Party is the instrument of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat inasmuch as it is the highest form of the proletariat's organization. Incompatible with factionalism, continuously

strengthened by the purging of opportunists and deviationists, the Party is bound to become the monolith upon which not only the Communist movement is built but is also to be the state which it will create or has created.

(c) With the help of the Party, the doctrine which brought about its establishment must be carried to the masses. The importance of grievances will be used when opportune, but the belief in the secular religion of the Communist ideology must be inculcated, for "without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement."

(d) Marx based his theories upon the social, political, and economic consequences of capitalism in individual countries. Lenin developed the thought by taking into consideration the developments during the second half of the nineteenth century. He looked upon capitalism not as a national phenomenon but as a "world system of financial enslavement and colonial oppression." This imperialism he regarded as the "highest stage of capitalism." This would be followed, he concluded, by social revolution and the collapse of capitalism. "Imperialism is the eve of socialist revolution."

A country can be imperialistic without having highly developed industry; therefore, revolution, according to Lenin (as contrasted with Marx's concept) need not necessarily occur in industrially developed countries. Lenin came to the latter conclusion with reluctance because for many years he had looked upon industrialized Germany as the country where revolution was imminent.

(e) As against Marx' multi-national concept which was not negated by his stress on proletarian solidarity throughout the world, Lenin created the concept of the world divided into two camps: that of oppressors, and oppressed. Therefore, Lenin developed strategy and tactics to be applied in the struggle of the oppressed against the oppressors both on the national and international scale. Herein lies the most pronounced difference of Marx' and Lenin's character: Marx was a theoretician, Lenin a practitioner of revolution. Lenin's theses about strategic and tactical leadership are more than a mere implementation of a doctrine; they are doctrine themselves.

When Lenin died in 1924, the Russian Revolution was just beginning to be consolidated. The position of the Soviet Union, built upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrinal bases, was weak. At this point, Stalin began to reinterpret Leninism for the main purpose of strengthening the USSR internally as a base of revolution.

(3) Stalinism.

Since Lenin's death, new and unforeseen problems in the Communist world have arisen which have required modification and extension of Communist theory. Stalin has been credited with all of these developments. In some instances he has adopted the theories of Lenin, Marx, and Engels to the current problem; in many instances he has evolved new theories as the new problems arose. In the main, Stalin has, with ruthlessness and singleness of purpose, eliminated all oppositional elements, and modified all doctrine which conflicted with the following four objectives:

(a) To establish permanently his personal power and the pre-eminence of his views in the Soviet Communist Party;

(b) To make the Soviet Communist Party the absolute and undisputed instrument of ruling the USSR;

(c) To achieve pre-eminence of the Soviet Communist Party throughout the Soviet orbit as well as over all Communist parties in the world;

(d) To establish the USSR as the only Communist power center from which can be undertaken the conquest of other parts of the world to be pressed into the Communist orbit.

In order to attain these ends, Stalin has introduced various revisions of Marxist-Leninist theories. His main contributions to the modification of the doctrine are:

(a) Precedence must be given to building socialism in the USSR. This is discussed at greater length under "Trotskyism", page 10 .)

(b) As a corollary: The foremost task of the foreign (non-Soviet) Communist Parties is to defend and support the USSR in this "building period" in order to prevent capitalism from crushing the Soviet state; this is referred to as the "Bolshevization" of Communist parties.

(c) Collectivization of agriculture is a major requirement in the consolidation of power in a Soviet type of state and must be achieved rapidly and ruthlessly. Stalin has formulated a detailed plan for preparing a country for collectivization and has outlined the methods to be followed in achieving this phase of socialism. These techniques are now being applied in the Satellites.

(d) In colonial areas, Communist cooperation with bourgeois groups and parties is permissible and recommended, provided the Communist Party retains undisputed leadership, and provided that the bourgeois groups are nationalistic and anti-foreign.

In addition, Stalin has initiated the formulation of the theory of unification of national states in preparation for the formation of the monolithic World Communist State. This provides for the eventual in-

corporation of the Satellites into the Soviet Union. In the present stage of development, the theory calls for common economic and political structures, to be followed by a common social structure culminating in a common language — Russian. With the "dying away" of national languages, other national differences will disappear, and nations, as known in the capitalist world, will cease to exist.

As symbolized by the three pillars of Communist development, the line from theory to national revolution, and from there to world revolution seems logical enough. Interpretation of basic doctrine is flexible and opportunist; but this does not mean that the doctrine as a factor may be disregarded.

Important as the differences between the theories of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin may be, for the West they must be regarded as one concept out of which revolutionary strategy and tactics will be developed and implemented.

b. "Deviationist" Theory.

(1) Trotskyism.

Trotsky's disagreement with Stalin's interpretation of Marx and Lenin has resulted in a modified Communist theory which is actively, but ineffectively, propagated by a small group of adherents. Affiliated with the Fourth International, the national Trotskyite Communist groups, while professing much in common with Soviet Communism, nevertheless are in bitter opposition to the Stalinist leadership in both the USSR and the People's

Democracies. Trotskyism is the first modified Communist doctrine opposing Soviet doctrine which has persisted in any force; Titoism is the second.

Against Stalin's belief that it was necessary to consolidate the power of the Communist Party in one country - the USSR - before proceeding with the world revolution, Trotsky contended that Communism could never be achieved in one country as long as hostile, capitalist governments existed elsewhere. Therefore, the task of the USSR was to promote world revolution, and only after it had succeeded would it be in a position to transform the USSR and other countries into a genuine Communist society.

The conflict between Stalin and Trotsky involved a difference in timing and not a theoretical schism over the ultimate objective of the revolution. As a matter of fact, Stalin himself has modified his thesis that "socialism is possible in one country" by stating that "the final victory of socialism is possible only with successful revolutions in at least several countries" and that "the task of the victorious revolution consists in doing the utmost attainable in one country, for the development, support, and achievement of the revolution in all countries."

Although this difference of opinion between the two men and their followers was an important reason for their conflict, another essential factor was their struggle to succeed Lenin. Such other issues as the problem of the position of peasants in the revolution were marginal.

The importance of Trotskyism is not that it represents a theory superior or inferior to Stalinism (in some respects Trotskyism is even less

compatible with Western concepts than is Stalinism), but that it helps to discredit the practice of Communism in the USSR and that it challenges the Soviet-Communist myth of infallibility.

(2) Titoism.

Although Titoism at present is the only other important Communistic element in opposition to Soviet Communism, it has little in common with Trotskyism other than its hatred for the Soviet Union. As a potential force combatting Kremlin Communism, Titoism is far more important than Trotskyism because it challenges one of the most vulnerable Stalinist concepts — the subservience of national interests to the Soviet state. The fact that Titoism is represented by a nation and a regime in power adds immeasurably to its prestige, both in the Communist and non-Communist world.

The theoretical tenets of Titoism are not as yet fully developed. Basically, however, the Tito regime believes that there must be complete equality among all Communist nations. The USSR is willing to concede this in theory, but not in practice. Furthermore, Titoists regard Communist theory (Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism) as a flexible guide to the application of Communism in a specific state, not as a strict dogma which must be applied in every detail regardless of the local conditions. This the Soviet Union will concede neither in theory nor in practice.

Titoism greatly surpasses Trotskyism in its potentialities for the alienation of Communists from the Soviet Union. Titoism has

developed in several Communist parties outside the Soviet orbit. However, it has yet to become an effective force in any area other than Yugoslavia. Its support among Communists at present stems mostly from party intellectuals. In the Satellites, the charge of Titoism is levelled against any element which the Soviet Union wants to eliminate. Usually it is difficult to substantiate the charge of collusion with Tito, or the charge that these leaders advocated a Tito-like policy for their respective parties.

2. The Communist One-Party State.

The Bolshevik attitude toward the function of political parties determines the structure of the Communist one-party state. Stalin, in "Problems of Leninism," explains that "the Party is part of a class, its leading part. Several parties, and consequently freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes, the interests of which are contradictory and irreconcilable. . . . .Hence, in the USSR there is no ground for the existence of several parties, and consequently for the freedom of these parties. In the USSR there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party."

However, during the period of socialist transition, other parties are tolerated and used by the Communists until Communist control is strong enough to warrant the elimination of the other parties. This elimination is accomplished by mergers of parties with the Communist Party, purges of strong leaders in the opposition parties, and various other minor measures, which

culminates in undisputed control for the Communists.

In a coalition government, where the Communist Party must tolerate other political parties, there are certain key positions which Communists consistently seek to control. Likewise, once a one-party state has been established, these positions are given to the most trusted leaders who are under constant surveillance by the executive organs of the party. Because of its control of the repressive instruments of the state, the first Communist target is the Ministry of the Interior. Next are the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Education.

There is a tight intermeshing of organization and function between the party and government organs in a Communist one-party state. Roughly, it can be stated that the Party determines policy (very often on minor as well as major matters) and the corresponding government unit executes the policy and carries out the administrative details related to it. Control of the government apparatus in the Soviet Union, the most advanced form of a Communist one-party state, is diffused through three organs of the Central Committee:

1. The Orgburo
2. The Politburo
3. The Secretariat

(The functions of these organs and their relationship to other Party bodies are described in "National Party Organization", page 40.)

A graphic representation of the operation of the central governmental apparatus in a Communist one-party state shows the constitutional organs

subject to two different and distinct chains of command that meet at the top. The ministries operate under orders from the Council of Ministers and report back to them. At the same time, the ministries are subject to constant supervision by Party organs.

The salient features of a Communist one-party state are the undisputed supremacy of the Politburo in the formulation of policy, the frequent resort to "interlocking directorates" (called in the Soviet Union sovmestitelstvo) in staffing agencies, and the dual subordination (i.e., to both Party and superior governmental agencies) of the organs of the constitutional administrative apparatus. Sometimes the Party even publishes important economic directives in its own name. More often, the Council of Ministers is associated with the party in issuing important directives.

The use of "interlocking directorates" is seen in Stalin's position as head of the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Orgburo, and the Council of Ministers. Similarly, all but two other members of the Politburo are also Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. "Interlocking directorates" are advantageous because they safeguard Party control against challenge, they economize on personnel, and insure coordination between policy-making and policy-implementing agencies.

The dual subordination of the agencies of the "constitutional" government results from the need for specialized Party control over specific activities. Thus a government agency is controlled first by its superior

governmental department (such as the Ministry of Internal Security), by a superior constitutional body (such as the Bureau of the Council of Ministers), and, in addition by the appropriate Party section. Party administrative philosophy prefers dual subordination to fusion between the Party and the constitutional organs because it facilitates separation of control and administrative functions.

Thus, in a Communist one-party state the actual and ultimate power rests with the Politburo, often in the hands of the Secretary General of the Party, although the fiction of at least partial autonomy for the constitutional organs of government is maintained.

3. Inter-relationship of Communism with USSR Foreign Policy.

After a brief period during which the interests of a world Communist revolution were held pre-eminent, Soviet leaders have consistently relegated the world Communist movement to the role of an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. They have rationalized this course by saying that the ultimate truimph of Communism demands that Communists throughout the world subordinate every other consideration to the "defense" of the Soviet Union — Communism's main bastion. At present, the Kremlin, in an all-out effort to maintain its control over the world Communist movement in the face of the challenge of Titoism, is trying to isolate Tito and is purging other parties of nationalist tendencies.

The relation between the Communist concept of the place of the Soviet Union in history, and their broad theory of history in general, is not made entirely clear in any of the classical Communist writings. Lenin's Theses on the Conclusion of a Separate Peace of January 1918, however, offers a first suggestion on the character of the Soviet State and country as the great capital asset of the Communists in the World Revolution. It is made clear that considerations of self-determination for smaller areas, such as Finland, must be entirely subordinate to the survival of the Soviet Communist State. A common factor underlying all matters of policy is a regard for the Soviet Union as the main force in the "Army of the revolution," and not based upon mere patriotism or national expansion, even though they may be cloaked in the language of nationalism. The defeat of the Soviet Union would be decisive for the course of Communist history, whereas all other Communist defeats would be merely lost skirmishes.

The establishment of a Communist state, which must not only conform to international standards for the conduct of nations, but which is also the base of the World Communist movement, presents an obvious problem of coordination and organization. The Communist International (Comintern) was the temporary solution of this problem. It was a league of Communist parties, having a Secretariat in Moscow and governed by a Central Executive Committee with full executive powers between the meetings of its infrequent

Congresses. Its Congresses, and its Central Executive Committee, were always dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This provided a solid link in personnel and organization between the Soviet Union and the members of the Comintern. There was always extensive interlocking authority, through leading personnel, between the Council of People's Commissars (the cabinet) of the Soviet Union, the Politburo, and the Central Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern).

An international organization of Communism, to give common direction to Communist activities in all countries, is very necessary in periods of sharp antagonism. It is not so much needed in periods when collaboration with "liberal" and "progressive" elements in other countries is predominant. The Comintern was, therefore, an essential instrument immediately after the Russian revolution. It was scarcely needed in the time of the People's Front in 1935 to 1939, and in the period of the alliance against Hitler, from 1941 to 1945. The period of the Nazi-Soviet alliance was too short for any complete reorientation. The directing organization of the Comintern had become so unnecessary after 1935 that abolition of the top organization structure (the USSR claimed this liquidation to be complete abolition of the functions of the Comintern) was simply a gesture, convenient to suggest the loyal acceptance by Communism of the collaboration against Nazism.

Although the lower administrative machinery of the Comintern probably

was never abolished it has been tentatively concluded that it was absorbed by the Bolshevik Party Secretariat. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of World War II, the need for a central directing union, at least in name, was again evidenced. Therefore, in September 1947 nine Communist parties comprising the USSR and the Satellites (less Albania, France, and Italy), set up the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). Theoretically this organization was to be the clearing house for exchange of information among member parties. Practically, it is used by the USSR as a front to direct, not only the eight member parties (Yugoslavia was expelled in 1948), but also Communist parties in other areas. Soviet direction of the international Communism movement can thus be camouflaged under the name of the Cominform, an organization of supposed equals. In fact, however, it must be kept in mind that the USSR directs the international Communist movement chiefly through its diplomatic consular and economic representatives abroad.

In support of Soviet objectives, the following general lines are the principal tasks of foreign Communists at the present time:

(a) In the Satellites: to integrate their countries with the USSR's military, political, and economic interests.

(b) In Asia: to advance Soviet influence and weaken that of the Western Powers by armed force or other means in China, through a puppet government in Northern Korea, propaganda in Japan, and by attempting to subvert nationalistic and anti-colonial movements in Southeast Asia. This program is to be applied when possible in the Near East, Latin America, and Africa.

(c) In Western Europe: to undermine the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact by propaganda attacks, political agitation, calls for reduction of armaments, and whenever possible, by strikes and disorders.

(d) In all areas: to pledge the readiness of Communist parties and their followers to support the Soviet Union in case of war, and, at the same time, to carry on the Soviet "peace offensive." This propaganda campaign is designed to advance Soviet influence among war-weary masses by depicting the Soviet Union as peace-loving and the US and its allies as aggressive warmongers.

II. NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTIES

1. Membership, Recruitment, and Training.

a. Membership.

(1) Class.

The membership of the Communist parties is not necessarily identical with the class whose interests it purports to represent, the proletariat. While the supporters of Communism, outside the Soviet orbit, are predominantly workers and landless peasants, the history and development of the parties reveal that only in some instances has it truly represented the working class whose spearhead it claims to be.

Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism have considered the Communist parties to be the spearhead of the revolutionary proletariat, i.e., of the industrial workers who are singled out as the most reliable and loyal followers of the ideology. Second, rank the landless peasants; and third, the intelligentsia. The weight of these groups, however, varies in different countries. In such industrialized nations as Germany, the industrialized proletariat constituted the main force of Communism in Lenin's time. Both the peasantry and intelligentsia were predominantly anti-Communist. In France, next to the workers, a considerable number of "bourgeois" intellectuals were enlisted; in postwar

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-y, large sections of dissatisfied peasants made possible the temporary gains of Communism during 1947 and 1948. In China, support for Communism was derived mainly from the peasants. It should be added that western trade unionism is not necessarily an instrument Communism can use for its own purposes. In fact, recent events such as the establishment of a non-Communist International Trade union - organized in opposition to the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions - have shown that Lenin was justified in fearing that economic trade unionism would adjust the workers to capitalism rather than destroy it.

(2) Leadership.

As in all one-party states, the Communist parties, wherever they are in power, are kept low in membership so as to constitute an elite responsible for leadership. Selectivity is also the practice in non-Communist states even though to a lesser extent. Where Communism is not in power, the party will be opportunistic and admit, temporarily, many candidates which may at a later date be purged.

The leaders must demonstrate a rather high intellectual level because the party is, in Leninist terms, a guiding elite of professional revolutionaries capable of a "scientific" analysis of the Marxist dialectics and the historical process from capitalism to a

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classless society. Only this understanding enables the party correctly to interpret and apply its principles. While the original leaders of the party were chiefly from among the intelligentsia, and bourgeois intellectuals have continued to be admitted into leading party positions here and there, they have been ousted, with minimal exceptions, as soon as leaders with proletarian backgrounds were developed to replace them. (See study of leaders in Appendix.)

(3) Stability.

Membership grows rapidly in times of economic depression, but drops off when the party suffers a major defeat or supports measures which even the non-political recognize as promoting Soviet rather than national interests. Such losses of membership have occurred throughout Western Europe because of the CP campaigns against the Marshall Plan and the NAP. It has been estimated that the party is sure of only 5 percent of its members. Except for this "hard core" there is usually a constant shift of membership, the average member leaving the party within three years of joining, while a complete turn-over occurs within a five to seven-year period.

Lenin stressed the necessity of maintaining a "hard core of revolutionaries" to guard the continuity of the movement. The more widely masses are drawn into the party, the more stable this small group of militants must be.

(4) Strength.

The global membership, estimated at twenty million, is no indication of the party's strength which is also manifested in (1) the Communist's enthusiasm for a "cause" similar to religious fervor which makes an active zealot of every member combined with the discipline that permits no difference of opinion to weaken the party's effectiveness, and (2) the party's ability to influence non-members. This latter was illustrated in the 1946 national elections in France where a Communist membership of about 800,000 polled a vote of 5,475,000. Not only from organized "front" groups among the youth, women, and labor is this strength drawn, but also from the following unorganized elements:

(a) Concealed members who spread Communist doctrine but are unknown for deceptive purposes;

(b) follow-travelers who support the Communist program but do not join the party;

(c) sympathizers who entertain kindly feelings towards the party, protect its views but do not join;

(d) opportunists who cooperate with the party for their own selfish reasons and advantages but do not join for the same reasons;

(e) confused liberals who believe it possible to work with the Communists for social ends although they are the first eliminated

when the party comes to power, as indicated by the suppression of Social Democratic Parties in Europe; and,

(f) well-meaning citizens who are deceived by Communist propaganda. (See Membership and Electoral Potential, Appendix.)

b. Recruitment.

Recruitment is a matter of prime interest and planning to the CP because (1) the party is aware that size strength are its main guards against suppression and (2) a history of membership fluctuations and periodic "purges" of the inactive or suspected elements requires constant replenishment of these losses. However, as previously indicated, the CP has never aimed at size. The bulky, hard-to-manage numbers other parties strive to attain in order to exert influence are replaced in the CP by a militant, deployable membership trained to provide leadership for the masses. That this system works is impressively illustrated in the USSR where a CP membership of 6 million holds a population of 200 million under complete control and in all the other countries dominated by a Communist party.

A chief medium for recruitment is propaganda slanted to foster unbelief in the ideals of democratic, Western society, and to

build up the belief that Communism will eliminate poverty and achieve many of the aspirations of the "underdog" by freeing him of competition. To this end, Communist propaganda is prolific and widespread. The Communist press has universal circulation, underground if need be, in which case it is distributed in devious and ingenious ways. Songs, flamboyant posters, slogans, picket lines bearing popular appeals on their banners, even street fighting, have proved to be effective means of attracting prospects. A successful act of insurrection, as in Czechoslovakia, brings in a heavy band-wagon type of recruitment.

(1) Contacts.

Clubs devoted to literature, music appreciation, foreign affairs, sports or even those of a purely social character are often used to influence mass groups. All of these finally get around to include discussion of the ideology of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin through the clever manipulation of the leaders. It is from such groups that "front" organizations grow, often without the knowledge of some of their members. Among individuals attracted by the Communist program are:

(a) the economically down-trodden;

(b) persons pre-disposed to Communism through personal frustration;

(c) the young, whose spirit of contradiction, fired by criticism, makes it seem somehow glamorous to be a Communist. Thus many

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[illegible] which have become dominated by the party and the powerful WFDY (World Federation of Democratic Youth) is a major instrument of Communist action;

(d) racial and minority groups sensitive to discrimination, such as the negroes of the United States;

(e) people of colonial areas whose interest in and knowledge of Marxism is negligible but whose ambitions for national independence are exploited by the party;

(f) people with a liking for the conspiratorial atmosphere of Communism, its secrecy and reckless disregard for life; these are often of a combative nature, with a touch of inferiority complex, or paranoiac mentality.

(g) idealists lured by Communism's apparently religious terminology which offers scriptures to study, [illegible] of Marxism, a hierarchy, missionaries, excommunication for heresy, public confessions of sins, a center which relieves devotees from personal decisions, a final reward for sacrifice, and a saviour abroad with paradise achieved "on a sixth of the earth's surface."

(2) Indoctrination of Recruits.

Experts pick out for special attention those persons found susceptible to the Communist ideology and program. These prospective members are subjected to a calculated, methodical indoctrination which

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includes a study of political and philosophical works selected to develop the belief in the student that western democracy is incapable of progress or improvement. Linked to this is an interpretation of an "international ideal" which merges the national interests of the USSR with the doctrines and policies of the Communist parties all over the world until they become identical. Caution is taken not to reveal doctrines likely to revolt a beginner. When "party loyalty" replaces the principles which first attracted him, the recruit is sufficiently "developed" for membership and training.

c. Training.

All mature and organized Communist parties have integrated educational and training programs designed to create a well-disciplined army capable of specific duties, able to keep its collective mouth shut, naturally sympathetic with the workers, with knowledge of the use of fire-arms and how to direct a crowd, and with devotion to the revolutionary cause. This training may be roughly divided into three categories, i.e., general, on-the-job, and institutional, in all of which discipline plays an important role.

(1) Discipline.

The Communist Party member accepts a rigid discipline quite unknown to democratic parties. Once the party has handed down its decisions, it allows no deviation. Not only those in the public eye are forbidden to

dissent, but even the least of the members must accept in detail the rulings of the party or be subjected to reprimand, suspension, or expulsion. The active Communist must adhere to conspiratorial rules which affect his whole life. No matter how much idealism, opportunism, adventurism or lust for power goes into the making of a Communist, the stronger motivation of Marx-Lenin-Stalin ideology offering a Utopian solution for every political, social, or philosphical problem is needed to make him accept this rigid discipline. The longer he is under this discipline, the less he is able to think in any but Communistic terms. He permits no criticism of his views but is "victimized" thereby and misunderstood by "class enemies" who are any persons not sharing the party's point of view.

(2) General Training.

All members receive general training which in some countries is the only effort ever made to bring political education, however biased, to the masses. While Marxist doctrine, Soviet propaganda, and an international point of view are the basis of this instruction, Communism as applied in the particular country with special techniques to be used there are emphasized. Myriads of "study circles" dealing in a wide range of subjects including literature, history, science, economics,

problems of youth, women, and farming, all as interpreted by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, are set up. This general training takes on unique aspects in certain countries. In Chile the party at one time taught its members to read and write before launching them into doctrine, and then after electing some of them to the Legislature, the party taught its legislators parliamentary law. Some of the more than 200 rural schools in Italy are socialized farms where the novices do the work, then advance to the town schools where they live in the homes of fellow Communists. In Belgium each old member takes on a recruit to train. A special re-indoctrination school in Czechoslovakia admits only old members whose fervor has cooled. Cuban schools are so well organized that one of them is used for observers from other Latin American countries, while in Argentina, no formal organized instruction in theory is attempted but experts lecture to Communists on street fighting, commando tactics, and the use of firearms.

When the student in general training aspires to greater authority and responsibility in the party, he is given further training "on-the-job" or in CP institutions.

(3) On-the-Job Training.

Much effective on-the-job training is accomplished by experience gained in penetrating labor unions, clubs, schools, and even governments, where Communists are ordered to assume what Lenin named

"leadership of the masses" by working long hours on the legitimate programs of the groups. They take any job, attend all the meetings, out-wait the opposition in order to pass resolutions after the majority goes home, introduce party campaigns, and keep at it until Communist control of the organization is gained. Conferences held prior to scheduled meetings work out in great detail the tactics to be used. These trainees become acquainted with the organizations, and make themselves familiar with very phase of their operation in order to be ready for quick, decisive action at the exact moment the party asks for it. They are often assigned to the staffs of high officials or sent on international missions while developing mastery of their jobs. Good leaders can use their groups for demonstrations, picketing, recruiting new leaders for the CP press, or for spreading propaganda. They work hard to gain the confidence of their associates and are very successful in obtaining elective offices. Thus, for example, 111 Communist officials are among the 170 elected officers of the US Maritime Union although there are less than 500 Communists in the 80,000 members.

(4) Institutional Training.

Most top-flight Communist leaders attend schools in the USSR at some time. Each national party at one time was assigned a quota by the former Comintern which paid the traveling expenses to Moscow, a function now performed probably by the Soviet Communist Party since that

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organization has apparently taken over Comintern duties. According to former students in Moscow who have since left the party, the Central Committee of each national party chose the individuals to attend Soviet schools from among those members who had been active in the party for at least five years and had an elementary knowledge of Communist theory. Although most of the information concerning the operation and curricula of these schools is dated before World War II, it can be presumed that this important method for indoctrination and training of Communists still exists. While these schools may have changed their names and may now be emphasizing different phases of training, a brief description of the most important ones before 1939 will be useful.

(a) The Lenin Institute.

The Lenin Institute was the most important of the Soviet schools to train Communists. Although called a school for political training, many of its courses were of a purely military nature, which was not illogical in view of the Communist definition of war as an extension of political conflicts. At one time, ten percent of the students were Russians; the rest were foreign Communists later to be assigned to work in international phases of the party such as the International Section of the Soviet CP, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

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or the national parties. The NVD was said to have had priority in the disposition of these students and concerned itself with part of their training.

The courses were taught in five languages, English, French, Spanish, German, and Russian, and dealt in political, economic, and military subjects, stripped to the utilitarian objectives of ways and means of attaining the party's goals and providing it with leadership.

Political courses included studies of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, with some attention to those of a few other Communist writers. There were courses on the official history of the Bolshevik Party, but most concentrated on basic ideological concepts. Courses in political warfare included techniques of other parties and methods of consolidation of power. In the former, certain techniques of Communism which have been successfully employed by specifi-- parties were studied; e.g., the French Party excelled in infiltration of the armed forces, the German Party in organization, and the Chinese Party in guerrilla warfare; therefore their methods became a standard for the classes.

Military courses were many and detailed. The revolutionary military section of the Lenin Institute can best be described in the words of an American ex-Communist leader, Gitlow, who studied there.

"There is no other school in any part of the world that

gives such a thorough, well-rounded training in the methods of fomenting revolution, gaining power, setting up a dictatorship, and handling the forces of opposition. During the three years the student remains there he is drilled and trained in military science, espionage work and sabotage. The course includes organization of combat groups, how to induct people into their formations, and the training techniques which must be used."

(b) Far Eastern University (The Communist University for the Working People of the East).

This was commonly called the Stalin University and was founded in 1919 in Moscow. It was reported that until 1929 Stalin himself taught courses there on questions of Leninism and colonial problems. Both Soviet citizens and foreigners of oriental descent were trained there except the Chinese who attended the Sun Yat Sen University. The Far Eastern University faculty consisted largely of members of the Comintern.

(c) Academy of Red Professors.

This school was strictly for intellectuals and required seven years of intensive study with emphasis on theory. The training was designed to make the approximately 200 students major political strategists. The students were not chosen from the national parties but from the elite of a preliminary two-year course; therefore, a Red professor was nine years in the making.

(d) Sun Yat Sen University.

About 5000 Chinese were said to attend the Sun Yat Sen

University. The students were formed into special Red Brigades when enrolled and were given the best military courses the Party had to offer, with emphasis on guerrilla fighting.

(e) The Frunze Military Academy.

While a main school for training the soldiers of the USSR, it is said to have had a special sabotage division for carefully screened international Communists.

(f) The Mid-European University.

This school catered to Communists from the Balkan countries, and to a specified number from Europe, the US, and Canada. The US Communists sent many negroes there. It has a student body of some 2,000 Communists and was known as Stalin's pet school where he began laying plans for a Pan-Slavic bloc of Communist nations as early as 1926.

(g) Communist Schools in the US.

There is a chain of Communist schools stretching across the US bearing such honored names as The Abraham Lincoln School, The Walt Whitman School, the Samuel Adams, and the Jefferson School of Social Science. Some of these schools have gone underground after being named as subversive by the Attorney General's office. The Daily Worker describes these schools as "part of the continuing process of recruiting and training new youthful forces for leadership in the CP."

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(h) The Jefferson School of Social Science.

This is the biggest of the US schools and enrolls 3,000 students annually at its location in New York on the Avenue of the Americas. Entrance requirements do not exist and fees are very low. Students are obtained from the Party (about half of them carry party cards) and "front" groups. Advertising, articles in the party press, and word-of-mouth promotion in legitimate universities and unions are used to attract other students.

2. Communist Party Organization.

The Communist Party is a well-disciplined, highly trained elite corps of revolutionaries who seek to gain and maintain control of a government through either legal and parliamentary, or subversive and revolutionary methods.

The Communist Party is the "vanguard", the "organized detachment" of the proletariat. Its purpose is to exercise ".... systematic and organized leadership in the struggle of the working class." It recognizes no authority other than its own. This concept of a single, all-powerful party is the negation of party in the Western democratic, parliamentary sense of the word. But in a Communist state only the party of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin is fit to forge the way to the classless society of the future.

The Party can fulfill its various tasks only,

> ". . .if it is organized in the most centralized manner, only if iron discipline bordering on military discipline prevails

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> in its and if its Party center is a powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers, and enjoying the universal confidence of the members of the party." (Lenin, 2)

All Communist parties, therefore, adhere to strict discipline and follow certain basic principles of organization, which were set forth by Lenin and interpreted by Stalin.

a. Principles of Organization.

(1) "Democratic Centralism".

The cardinal principle according to which the Party is organized is described officially as "democratic centralism." This doctrine, expounded by Lenin when the Party was still an underground, revolutionary organization, emphasized the necessity for centralized control, "democracy" emerging when the Party became legal. Then free elections by ballot could determine the policy of the National Party Congress. This, however, is as far as the "democratic process" goes: the decision of the majority of the members of the National Party Congress is binding upon all, no question can be, or is, entertained. After a decision has been reached, no vocal minority is permitted. The Central Committee prescribes the methods to be followed in elections, and usually restricts the voting to a single list of "approved" nominees, even in the election by the congress of members of the Central Committee.

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It is apparent that any "democracy" within the Party is overshadowed by the personal control of its leaders and by the tremendous centralization of power. The purpose of this centralization has been summarized as follows:

> In order to function properly and to guide the masses systematically, the Party must be organized on the principle of centralism, having one set of rules and uniform Party discipline, one leading organ --- the Party Congress, and in the intervals between congresses --- the Central Committee of the Party, the minority must submit to the majority, the various organizations must submit to the centre, and lower organizations to higher organizations. Failing these conditions, the party of the working class cannot be a real party and cannot carry out its tasks in guiding the class.

(7) Discipline.

Communists have been taught to believe that their Party can be an effective instrument for the winning of the proletarian revolution only if "unity of will" prevails, and that this cannot be achieved without the practice of "iron discipline" among Party members. Stalin has elaborated this principle as follows:

> "... Iron discipline. . .presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline. But after a contest of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary condition without which neither the Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable."

If "iron discipline" did not prevail, factions would develop, resulting in ". . .the breaking up of the unity of will, the weakening and disintegration

of the dictatorship."

Discipline is maintained by means of specific punishments for particular infractions of Party statutes and directives. For such breaches, for non-payment of dues, mishandling of funds, or for conduct reflecting adversely on the Party, a member may be punished by reprimand, suspension from office or membership, or by expulsion.

The executive authority of the organization concerned decides such cases, but convicted members may appeal to the next higher echelon. Only the Central Committee can order expulsion; its decision may be appealed to the Central Commission or to the National Congress.

More important and altogether more persuasive is the disciplinary influence exerted by those agencies that maintain a constant surveillance of all the activities, associations, ethics, and ideological attitudes of all members. This work, whether it be done by such regularly constituted Party organs as the Control Commissions, or by such informal agents as the militants, "watchers," and traveling inspectors, preserves the Party's purity against deviationism, and its integrity against factionalism.

(3) The Cadre Principle.

One of the most important aims of the Communist Party is to develop a highly trained and reliable cadre. A cadre is a small nucleus of fully indoctrinated, trusted members who have a monopoly of policy-making and organizational direction. Although this "living framework" is

constantly revitalized through the replacement of old members, it is sufficiently stable to assure organizational continuity, ideological orthodoxy, and discipline.

b. Organizational Structure.

The pattern of organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has, with slight modifications, been imposed on all other Communist parties.

The basic unit in the hierarchy is a group of at least three reliable members, known as "cells," or "primary party organs." Organized in factory, mine, village, cooperative farm or university, these bodies are charged with the duty of propagating the ideas and policies of the Party. Although from the cell level upward the committees and congresses are elective, each organ, elected by those immediately beneath it, has full power over its subordinates. Thus, while there is the appearance of representative expression, the lower Party organs actually serve as convenient instruments for carrying out the "party line."

The leading organs of an overt national party are: the National Party Congress, Central Committee, Control Commission, Political Bureau (Politburo), sometimes an Organization Bureau (Orgburo), and a Secretariat controlling the activities of a group of administrative departments

(1) The National Party Congress is the supreme organ of the Party. Its delegates are elected by regional congresses in proportion to the numerical and strategic importance of each region, and according to rules and

and [redacted] as prescribed by the Central Committee. The statutes of most [redacted] provide for a congress every two years, but the actual convocation by the Central Committee is usually much less frequent. (The last All-Union Congress of the CPSU was in 1939.)

(2) The Central Committee* is the leading organ of the Party in the intervals between Congresses. Numbering between 25 and 60 members, plus alternates (or candidates) who have a consultative vote only, the CC is responsible for the elaboration of the Party policy, the enforcement of the statutes, and the execution of the program - in short, for the whole operation of the Party. It directs its political and organizational work, controls its finances, and represents the Party in its dealings with non-Communist organizations. The CC comprises most of the important Party leaders, and is hence the arena in which significant personal struggles and clashes on policy occur.

Because of its size, the CC is called into plenary session by the Politburo only two or three times a year. Between sessions, the Party is run by the theoretically subordinate bodies of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat, which are elected from the CC membership

. In addition to its general policy-making and executive functions, the CC convokes national congresses and conferences and submits to these congresses the program which the Politburo has drafted. Finally, the CC is

* May also be called the "National Committee," as it is in the US and Brazil.

responsible for the maintenance of discipline and the decision to expel any Party member. Most of the work put out in the name of the Central Committee is actually done by other bodies such as the Politburo, Secretariat, and Orgburo.

(3) The Political Bureau Politburo (sometimes called Executive Committee, Directorate, National Board) consists of a few top leaders who really direct the Party.

Specificially, the Politburo is charged by the CC with the direction of party affairs in the intervals between sessions of the larger body. It is responsible for the preparation and supervision of the political line. Members of the Politburo habitually assume direct supervision over the most important administrative departments of the secretariat. Occasionally, as in China, Japan, and Yugoslavia, smaller organizational units have been formed within the Politburo.

(4) The Organization Bureau Orgburo, when it exists (as it does in the USSR, Bulgaria, and Italy), is technically a subcommittee of the Central Committee. It is responsible for the elaboration and promulgation of the Party's organizational policies. The most important function of the Orgburo is to supervise the selection, training, and assignment of functionaries throughout the Party.

Many national Communist parties apparently omit the Orgburo.

In that case, policies affecting organization are probably determined by the Politburo, and the current business of organization is handled by the Organization Department of the Secretariat.

(5) The Central Control Commission is elected in most countries by the National Congress, and supervises the maintenance of discipline and the execution of the Party line. Its importance is traditionally very great. In the CPSU the Control Commission operates through boards on the top levels of all Party and governmental interests; it has groups for heavy industry, light industry, naval affairs, food and trade, education and public health, foreign relations, and many others. The boards ensure the enforcement of Party decisions, investigate the work of all Party organizations, and prosecute those accused of violations of Party statutes and discipline.

In some parties the power of the Central Control Commission is apparently limited. It may be charged merely with financial supervision. In Italy, it apparently serves as a court of appeal from decisions of lower party organizations. In any event, since the problem of security is a delicate one and an internal security system is generally unpopular, the work of the Control Commission is always camouflaged.

(6) The Secretariat consists of a Secretary General and one or two Vice-Secretaries elected by the National Congress. It directs the current administrative business of the Party.

For the administration of specific areas of Party interest, the

Secretariat maintains various departments, which fall broadly into two categories those concerned with the internal affairs of the Party, such as finance and organization, and those which administer Party affairs touching the life of the country, such as labor, agriculture and agitation-propaganda.

The Secretary-General, because of his close supervision of all Party activities, is usually the most powerful of its leaders. Stalin drew his initial authority from this source. The Secretary, as well as the heads of the most important administrative departments, is always a member of the Politburo.

(7) The Administrative Departments, which are most obviously essential to the operation of the party machine and the achievement of its political program are:

(a) Organization.

This department is responsible for administrative questions surrounding the establishment, reorganization, reallocation, deactivation, and regrouping of Party organizations; also, for the machinery and techniques of recruitment, selection, distribution, and promotion of functionaries. When a Party has no Cadre Department, as is usually the case, the Organization Department also handles personnel matters.

Organizational matters involve not only the Party itself, but the structure and activities of auxiliaries, fronts, and fractions as well. The Organization Department must work very closely with other administrative departments (e.g., Youth, Women's, Labor, Agitprop), which are

concerned with various Party Front and auxiliary groups, in order to carry out the Party program and to draw as many sympathizers into the Party orbit as possible.

(b) Cadre.

Although every Communist Party has its cadre, most parties have no separate cadre department. When one exists, it has two general functions: (1) it is responsible for the collection and collation of personnel statistics of the Party; (2) it plays a large part in the selection, training, and promotion of functionaries in the maintenance of party esprit.

(c) Agitation and Propaganda: Agitprop*

This department is responsible for the preparation and dissemination of agitprop materials and programs on a national scale (such as the national Party newspapers) and to lower Party organs, whose agitprop work the national department supervises. Its activities include the organizing and supervision of the Party school system, and the publication of various party newspapers and other printed matter.

Other administrative departments of considerable importance include Labor, Colonial Affairs, Finance, Youth, and Women.

Subordinate to the central directing machinery are region, district, and cell organizations. The territorial organization reflects closely that of the national party.

* In Communist terminology, "agitation" refers to recruitment activities. "Propaganda" refers to the continuous indoctrination program for Party members.

3. Organization for Secret and Underground Activities

The organization of a Communist Party lends itself easily to secret and underground activities. The secret activities, arising from and conditioned by the nature of the party's general approach to political questions, are woven into the normal and overt activities of the Party and are usually carried on within the framework of the Party's overt organization. When a Communist Party is outlawed, its underground activities can be undertaken through the existing forms of organization to illegal conditions.

a. Organization for Secret Activities.

The secret activities of Communists are facilitated by certain characteristics inherent in the organizational structure of all Communist Parties:

(1) The Cadre Principle.

The cadres hold the professional secrets of the Party and use the lower Party rank and file as mere instruments in carrying out their policy. Thus, even under conditions of legality, the significant aspects of Party work are tightly sealed off from the rest of the Party.

(2) Intra-Party Police Organs.

Communist Parties generally maintain intra-Party police organs, which are frequently identical with the Cadre Department and the Control Commission, and which are designed to preserve ideological and security control. Thus there usually exists a confidential corps of Party "detectives" who perform counter-espionage duties. Clearly, the existence of such a Party

police force must be concealed, not only to prevent knowledge of the extent to which these activities leak in to non-Party sources, but also to avoid alarming Party members.

(3) Front Organizations.

The relationship of the activities of a Communist party to its front and auxiliary organizations is in many ways parallel to the relationship of the cadre to the party. Both relationships involve a highly trained select group, who through this training and the use of secrecy maintain control over the respective larger organization. A Communist party constantly directs its fractions, i.e. small units of party members, into non-Communist mass organizations in an attempt to gain control of the organization. In all these cases of penetration the major problem is to conceal Party control and influence over the fronts, fractions, and other groups.

It is thus apparent that the secret activities of Communist parties are an organic part of Communist political methods. They rest on the Party's attempt to maintain internal control, and to convert part of the masses to Communism without actually preaching it.

b. Organization for Underground Activities.

A Communist Party prefers to operate as a legal political party in order that it may better carry on propaganda and recruitment. It will, therefore, fight desperately to maintain its legal status, and, once driven underground, will make every effort to regain legitimacy. When it is outlawed, however, it is not particularly handicapped because the same form of

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organization serves for both legal and illegal conditions and because the cadres can be trusted to underground activities.

(1) Discipline and Security.

The maintenance of discipline and security by special Party organs (Control Commission, Cadre Commission, and other specialized sections) is a traditional feature of Party organization which can be conveniently adapted to underground conditions. (The main factor which endangers the successful preservation of discipline and security in the Party underground is that, in the course of extremely severe police action, morale may disintegrate and result in factionalism, mass defections, and penetrations.)

Discipline under illegal conditions means not only strict adherence to the political and organizational direction of the center, but also rigorous conformity with underground security rules governing the conspiratorial behavior of cadre and militants. A functionary who has betrayed Party secrets under severe police pressure is punished by the competent organs of the Party for a breach of discipline, with no regard for extenuating circumstances.

(2) Cell System.

Systematic exploitation of the cell member's normal outside contacts for propaganda and recruitment purposes is an all-important task when the Party is underground. The importance of illegal cell activity is intensified by the fact that intermediate echelons are usually reduced to

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skeletons; hence, for practice purposes the Party underground often consists only of the center and the numerous "front line" cell organizations.

(3) Conspiratorial Experience.

Through the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has shaped the organizational policy of all foreign Communist Parties, and has passed on its own considerable experience in underground work. Throughout the years of its existence, the Comintern exhorted and obliged its sections to prepare adequately for periods of illegality. The conditions created by Nazi occupation in World War II contributed much to the understanding of the fundamental problems of illegal activity.

c. Organizational Problems: Adjustment to Illegal Conditions.

The party going underground must find means of carrying on maximum activities without risking exposure to the police. To this end, a reorganization of the bureaucratic apparatus is necessary.

(1) Reduction of Party Apparatus.

The extent of reorganization is determined by the size of the legal Party, the severity of repressive action upon it, and general policy considerations. A small or underdeveloped Party apparatus cannot be drastically reduced; a mass Party may find it necessary to run the risk of preserving an extensive organization. Within the limits of such considerations, action may be take along the following lines:

(2) Consolidation of Territorial Organizations.

The territorial organization of the Party, particularly in a large country, can be conveniently consolidated and reduced. Staff personnel may then be utilized with greater economy, and the Party may concentrate on communications with the center. All levels of territorial organization (region, district, subdistrict and section) may be reduced simply through unification of the various staff commands, and the combining of their original areas of jurisdiction.

The Party center may be less affected by the process of consolidation, since a large Party may need a large central organization. On the cell level, consolidation is not practical; although for security reasons, cells must be broken up into small units if they are to escape police attention. Hence, at the same time that territorial organizations may decrease in number or disappear altogether, the number of cell organizations in the Party underground may grow.

(3) Reduction of Staffs.

In addition to the consolidation of territorial organizations, the number of staff positions throughout the Party is usually reduced in the underground. The local Party committees are apparently strongly affected by this. According to a Comintern instruction, the committees of illegal Parties should, as a rule, consist of no more than

five people each and a secretary should take the place of the executive bureau. In practice, the composition of illegal Party committees appears to be more elastic, depending on prevailing conditions. Sometimes they are eliminated entirely and the actual organizational and political work is assigned to the executive-administrative apparatus.

(4) The Command Function: The Triad System.

Consolidation of territorial organizations and reduction of staff personnel can, in some cases, be combined with a special organization of the command function observable only in underground Parties. According to this system, groups of three functionaries may be established at all echelons, from the national down to the cell level, with the two-fold responsibility of supervising and directing the Party work, and maintaining vertical liaison among them. In this latter capacity the triads represent the live chain of command in the illegal Party. Whenever observed, these triads have consisted of specialists for: (a) political work; (b) organizational problems; and (c) agitation and propaganda for labor union work.

The triads, however, do not necessarily replace whatever other Party organizations may remain effective. They are sometimes merely superimposed on the illegal Party machinery in order to direct policy. Triads at national and territorial levels have been known to direct the work of the various administrative and executive departments and commissions of the Party. However, it cannot be clearly determined at present to what extent the national triad may combine executive command with policy-making

functions. Theoretically it remains responsible to the Politburo, but in fact it may become the actual leadership of the Party. The triad principle may been be applied to cell organization. Cells can be constituted as three-man groups, each member recruiting and directing another group of three who are not cell members and who comprise sub-cell basic units.

The triad represents an effective concentration of the command function in the hands of a comparatively few individuals. It permits greater centralization and compartmentalization.

(5) Compartmentalization.

Maintenance of tight compartmentalization is an organization and security problem of the first order, since it is necessary to prevent the police from learning too much when Party members or functionaries are arrested. Compartmentalization is applied to Party operations as follows:

(a) Party and Military Branch.

Whenever an underground Party is in a position to create a military organization, the latter's staff composition is kept distinct from the Party's political mechanism. The two structures merely coordinate on policy and recruitment problems at their highest echelons.

(b) Party and Auxiliary (Front) Organizations.

As in legal periods, various Party auxiliaries remain connected with the Party through interlocking staff personnel only. They function as independently as possible.

(c) Party and Auxiliary Illegal Organizations.

Party organizations, or teams for the performance of such specialized tasks as espionage, sabotage, clandestine penetration of police and other government agencies, and liquidation and terror groups, are established as largely independent and self-contained groups even in legal periods. They are maintained on this basis in times of illegality.

(d) Internal Party Compartmentalization.

Within the political mechanism of the Party proper, the desired effect can be achieved by the following measures:

(i) Elimination of horizontal liaison. No cell and no territorial organization is permitted to maintain contact with any other Party organ operating on the same level. Liaison may only be conducted vertically with the designated functionary of the superior Party organization, whose task it is to direct the lower organizations under his jurisdiction.

(ii) Restriction of contacts. The fewer comrades a functionary knows and meets in the course of his work, the better.

(iii) Functional restrictions. An attempt is made to define closely the job of each functionary and t. prevent him from learning anything pertaining directly to his work.

(6) Election of Party Committees.

The reorganization applied to the illegal Party organization may not always be extensive, and the direction of the Party may actually

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li[illegible] in the hands of the national and territorial committees and their administrative organs. When this is the case, the election of Party committees represents an organizational problem. The Comintern advised its member Parties that in an underground situation Party elections should take place in restricted conferences and should be conducted in such a way that even the conference members would not know who was elected.

(a) Election of Central Committees.

Electing a CC at a conference abroad is one way of circumventing anti-Communist laws. Another possible way is convoking a smaller national conference.

(b) Territorial Party Committees' Electoral Commissions.

There is some evidence that special electoral commissions are created under illegal conditions for the purpose of electing members of territorial Party Committees.

(c) Co-optation.

Co-optation is the process whereby members of a specific committee (e.g., Central Committee) appoint Party members to vacancies of that committee without the usual party elections.

(7) Party Organizations Abroad.

When repressive measures become severe, the central Party organs and special support centers often are established abroad and work from the outside into the "illegal" territory. The types of central

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organizations transferred to, or set up on, foreign soil are:

(a) Central Committee and Central Departments.

The Central Committee and its administrative-executive apparatus (Politburo, Secretariat, Departments, Control Commission) may be partially or completely transferred. The central organs abroad must perform not only a command function but must also provide the Party at home with propaganda and indoctrination material, printing equipment, funds, specialists in underground work, a central repository for files and archives, training facilities for the cadre, communication services, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and financial support for exiled Party workers. In short, the central Party organization abroad becomes the chief operational support center for the home Party. (It must therefore frequently create new types of auxiliary and administrative organizations.)

(b) Foreign Bureau

There is evidence that in some instances a Foreign Bureau has been set up. This is a central administrative-executive agency charged with the direction of support functions such as communications, production, and distribution of press propaganda. While, theoretically, the supervision of the Foreign Bureau rests with the Central Committee, there have been cases where the Bureaus have been the real directing centers.

(c) Regional Support Centers

The apparatus of the Central Committee abroad may prove unable to handle all its workload, particularly when it must extend into a country with long frontiers. Consequently, the command and support function may have to be decentralized, and several support centers, operating from various countries into sectors of the homeland, may be created. Coordination with the Central Committee may be effected through the assignment of CC members to the regional centers.

(d) Party Organizations for Emigrants.

Special Party organizations for exiled Communists may be created. They render assistance to exiles and carry out the indoctrination and training functions of basic Party organizations. They also furnish personnel for special underground assignments (couriers, border guides and the like.)

Party organizations for emigrants should not be confused with front organizations created by the Party abroad. The latter, sometimes set up instead of special Party organizations for emigrants, serve political propaganda purposes from which the home Party may benefit. They are convenient money-raising instruments for the Party under the pretext furnished by the Front's ostensible purpose.

(e) Special Service Organizations.

The Party Center abroad usually has to create special organs to facilitate communications with the homeland. Communications may

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[illegible]ssited through a border-crossing mechanism either under direct control of the center or manipulated by a regional support station. The production of printed materials and their distribution via special communication routes may have to be entrusted to a separate organization, usually referred to as a Technical Service or Apparatus.

4. Auxiliary Organizations

An auxiliary Communist organization is one whose control by the Party is usually disguised by placing prominent non-Communists, or those who scrupulously disguise their party affiliations, in the nominal positions of leadership.

Communist auxiliary organizations comprise all the front organizations which attempt to group together large numbers of social, economic, and political segments of a population to further Communist aims. There are, of course, varying degrees of Communist control of these units. Many organizations exist which contain Communist membership, but, for the most part, are not controlled by the Party. Only those organizations which are utilized by the Communist Party for major Party activities will be considered in this discussion of auxiliary organizations.

Communist parties, whether weak or strong, place great emphasis on setting up and utilizing auxiliary organizations. For a weak party, the auxiliary groups serve primarily to further Communist propaganda, to acquaint particular elements of the population with the Communist program, and to recruit outstanding individuals for membership in the party. In

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a strong party, the front groups will actively campaign for Communists to be elected to parliamentary positions and will contribute funds for the printing of Communist propaganda.

It has become increasingly difficult for the Communists to disguise their control of these organizations. The general public is now much better acquainted with the Communist program and can identify at least the prominent Communist leaders. The usefulness for Communist purposes, however, does not end when an organization has been "unmasked." Although non-Communist adherents to such slogans as "peace" and "labor unity", may dwindle, the enthusiastic activities of the front groups stimulate at least the confirmed Communists to greater activity.

The most useful classification of auxiliary organizations is one which lists them according to groups of population to which they appeal. Most of the organizations have both national and international counterparts but for brevity only the international units are mentioned here.

a. Labor.

By far the most important auxiliary groups which Communists either control or seek to control are the labor organizations. The Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions attempts to weld both Communist and non-Communist unions into a cohesive unit to support Soviet policy. Since the withdrawal of the Western non-Communist unions from the WFTU, Communist organizers have increased their activities in what they call the

Trade Departments: international organizations of workers by crafts. Thus, while the British TUC has discontinued its affiliation with the WFTU, the WFTU continues to attempt to establish contact with British labor through affiliation of British metal workers, lumber workers, and others with appropriate "international trade departments." Further organizational development of the WFTU is indicated by the establishment of a permanent liaison presently in Peiping, to facilitate Communist penetration into the Far East.

b. Intellectuals.

The past year has witnessed a revival of Communist interest in intellectuals. In the fall of 1948 in Poland, the USSR organized, on an international level, as many intellectuals as would give active or passive support to the propaganda line of the Soviet Union. Superimposed on this organization of intellectuals has been the Soviet "peace propaganda campaign," which has led to the formation of Communist-controlled national "peace committees," with a directing "Liaison Bureau" in Paris. So far, the peace congresses (heavily attended by intellectuals) and the peace committees have been used primarily as propaganda vehicles in an attempt to recoup the recent Soviet losses in European mass support.

c. Other Organizations.

Other organizations now controlled by the Soviet Union which exploit various social groups are the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Federation of Democratic Women, the International

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Association of Democratic Jurists and the International Organization of Journalists. Additionally, in certain areas, Communists have attempted to organize the peasantry, although since the war these national organizations have never been amalgamated into an international unit.

Front organizations of this type play an important part in the consolidation of Communist power. Communist Party membership in countries with Communist regime must be kept relativey small, with a high degree of political consciousness and activity. Front groups can penetrate into groups who engage in little political activity, acquainting them with the Communist program and ferreting out possible dissidents. Recently, an increase in front work, particularly with regard to women, labor, student, and peasant groups, has been noted in the Far East, partly to aid in the consolidation of the Chinese Communist regime, and partly to develop avenues of contact with Far Eastern non-Communist areas.

III. COMMUNIST TACTICS (General)

1. Political.

a. Parliamentary Maneuvers.

For the Communists, as for the Nazis, participation in a freely elected parliament has always been primarily for the purpose of subverting democratic government. In pre-Hitlerite Germany the Communists often combined with the Nazis in the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet to cause situations which would discredit the parliamentary system and hasten its disruption. At the same time they used the parliamentary rostrum as a principal stage from which to advertise their claims and program.

Postwar Czechoslovakia affords an illustration of the Communist attitude toward, and exploitation of, parliamentary system. Czechoslovak Communists first demonstrated their essential contempt for parliamentary government by contriving to delay the transition to parliamentary processes for nearly six months after liberation of the country, in order to prolong the emergency system of government by decree. This gave them more opportunity to push through certain parts of their program. They permitted the convocation of a Provisional National Assembly on 28 October 1945 only after President Benes had warned them that he would sign no more decrees after 1 September.

Their attitude toward parliamentary elections was demonstrated

on the eve of the first postwar election which was held 26 May 1946. For the purpose of intimidating the electorate with a reminder of Soviet power to intervene, they were party to a plan to permit the movement of a large body of Red Army troops across Czechoslovakia from Austria to Germany on 22 May. The plan did not succeed because President Benes, upon learning of it, acted firmly to cancel it. Communist unwillingness to acquiesce in the free trend of the electorate was still more strongly demonstrated in the February 1948 coup, which found much of its immediate motivation in an anticipated decline of Communist strength in the imminent elections--a development which the coup forestalled.

During the two-year life of parliamentary government (1946-1948), the Communists often attempted to use extra-legal and extra-parliamentary means to force the adoption of legislative measures which would strengthen their hold on the country. An example of this was the attempt of the Communist-controlled Ministry of Agriculture in the winter of 1946 to force the adoption of six decrees designed to increase state control over farmers and pave the way for collectivization. Knowing that these decrees would be blocked by the non-Communist parties, the Ministry distributed drafts of them to local Communist-controlled branches of the United Farmers' Association before introducing them in the National Assembly, in order to generate "popular" pressure for their adoption.

At that time the Assembly was still powerful enough to defy such Communist tactics, and its Agricultural Committee refused to consider the decrees and censured the Minister for resorting to "unconstitutional action." Thereupon, at the instigation of the ministry, Communist-dominated farmers' commissions made protests to the Assembly in person in an attempt to force the latter to reverse its stand.

b. United Front Tactics.

Postwar Czechoslovakian history similarly illustrates Communist united front tactics. The Czechoslovak united front was primarily a Communist creation, though the other parties agreed to it. Creation of such a front was insisted upon by the Czech Communist leaders in Moscow at the time of President Benes' first visit to the Soviet capital in December 1943, when the groundwork was laid for a postwar government of both the Moscow and London emigre groups. The Communists' ulterior aim in insisting upon a united front was that of using it as a facade behind which to outmaneuver and eventually subvert the other parties. In practice they also used it as an apparatus by which, through skilled manipulation, they could force their own minority demands upon the other parties.

This was accomplished in the following manner. Within the united

front (called National Front) of all the parties, the Communists induced the Social Democrats and the National Socialists (the latter really a liberal centrist party) to join with them in a narrower coalition called the Socialist Bloc of Workers. Owing to the betrayal of social-democracy by the left-wing Socialist leaders, headed by Fierlinger, the Social Democratic Party became completely subservient to the Communists, who were thereby able to outvote the National Socialists in the Socialist Bloc. The decisions of the Bloc (actually Communist decisions) could then be presented to the other parties as the decisions of the dominant bloc, so that the Communists were in a position to force their acceptance as part of the program of the entire National Front.

This strategy succeeded only part of the time, and in November 1947 the Communists sought to create a more dependable majority for themselves in the National Front. To this end they demanded the broadening of the Front to include representatives of political organizations other than parties—namely the trade unions, the youth movement, the farmers' union, and the partisans. This proposal was vetoed at that time by the other parties.

c. Coalition Tactics.

Since the war Communist tactics in participating in coalition

governments have been determined by the internal situation in a given country and by the status of Soviet-Western relations. During and immediately following the war, Communist policy, reflecting Soviet-Western amity, called for collaboration with other parties in coalition governments. As tension between the East and West has mounted, Communists in countries outside the Soviet orbit have been forced out of the governments and into increasingly bitter opposition; within the orbit, they have gradually dropped the fiction of coalition governments and have taken over more direct and exclusive control of these countries.

The Communists in many European countries directly after the war participated in coalition governments. As a long-range objective they hoped to gain enough strength to wrest control from the other parties; short of that objective governmental participation offered them an opportunity to influence both internal and foreign policies to increase their prestige and thus increase their mass support. At the same time, however, the Communists bolstered their position in labor and front organizations and sometimes used extra-parliamentary pressure against the governments in which they participated. These tactics, along with the increasing East-West tension, eventually forced the Communists out of every government in Western Europe.

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In orbit countries where they have been in a minority, the Communists have used bogus coalitions as the means to take control of all branches of the government, eliminate political opponents, transform the social and economic structures of the countries, build up non-governmental structures to facilitate their control, and force extremely pro-Soviet and anti-Western policies upon all other parties.

d. Merger of Parties, Blocs.

The ultimate goal of Communists is the single-party state under Communist rule; elimination of competing parties is therefore of first concern. The means used vary from simply declaring all other parties abolished (as in Russia in 1919) to various tricks for getting other parties to renounce their own independent functions (as has happened in most of the Soviet satellite states since the war).

One of the first steps in the elimination strategy is usually the application of pressure on the other working-class parties to form a united front with the Communists and then to merge with them. With the aid of betrayal by some of the other party leaders who are secretly Communists, the merger is accomplished amid a great fanfare symbolizing the "unification" of the working-class movement. In the resultant monolithic party, the former Socialists are thereafter eliminated as unreliable

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(which they are, insofar as they represent in part the patriotic interests of their country in contrast to the Communists' invariable subordination of national interests to the requirements of the power politics of the USSR), and the party leadership becomes, in practice, completely Communist.

This pattern of post-liberation relations between the Communists and the Social Democrats was followed most clearly in the case of Poland, where the Communists found the left-wing Socialist leaders willing allies in 1944 and inveigled the latter into becoming partners in a united front for electoral purposes in November 1946. Then, in December 1948, aided by the capitulation of the weak Socialist leader Cyrankiewicz against the wishes of the majority of his party, the Communists maneuvered the Socialists into an agreement to merge, which resulted in complete absorption of the party and relegation of most of its leaders to unimportant positions.

2. Mass Action.

Communists rely on the support of large numbers of the population who are either non-members or relatively untrained party members incapable of playing leading roles in the insurrection. The technique of making use of these elements to further Communist ends is known as mass action.

Mass action may be both legal and illegal, and in addition to the positive objective of promoting the Communist cause, it also has the negative aim of demoralizing sizeable segments of the population in order to neutralize what Communists term the "counter-revolutionary forces."

The types of mass action which Communists employ are extremely varied, ranging from the simple distribution of propaganda leaflets to organization of squads of armed street fighters directed to seize a strategic objective in the case of an armed insurrection. Types of mass action are grouped under the following broad categories: Communist-sponsored Congresses (Peace, Youth, Women); Communist propaganda; demonstrations and picketing; strikes, both political and economic; general strikes; street fighting and riots; and preparatory techniques for the armed uprising.

Seldom do any of these types of mass action occur alone. Strikes are some times combined with demonstrations and with picketing and very often lead to rioting and street fighting. Furthermore, few of the techniques listed are exclusively Communistic, although Communists more consistently and enthusiastically make use of them.

The theory of mass action was developed in detail by Lenin, and has been the subject of Communist studies ever since. The Sixth World Congress of the Third International (in 1928), for example, called for the proletarian party to lead the masses in a frontal attack against the bourgeois

state by the organization of mass action. "Such mass action includes strikes, strikes in connection with demonstrations, strikes in connection with armed demonstrations, and, finally, the general strike combined with the armed rising against the government authority of the bourgeoisie."

a. Demonstrations.

Communists regard demonstrations as an opportunity to call public attention to their program, to train Party members in the discipline of demonstration and in the technique of influencing large groups of people, and also as a morale builder for the Party members, giving them the impression that the Party is an active, fighting organization. Since all Communist parties (with the exception of the Titoists and the Trotskyites) are completely subservient to the Soviet Union, most of the large-scale demonstrations are staged primarily in support of some Soviet objective. If it is a demonstration motivated by purely local conditions, the scope of the grievance is usually broadened to include support of the USSR.

Communists avoid direct identification of the demonstration and the cause with the Communist Party, thus attracting to the demonstrations those elements who may sympathize with the objectives, but who are either antagonistic or apathetic toward the Communist cause.

Demonstrations may be staged: (a) locally; (b) simultaneously at separated points of a large metropolitan center; (c) nationally, in

all areas where the Communists have sufficient strength to organize them or (c) internationally, such as international "peace" demonstrations. Once it has been decided that a demonstration will occur and its scope has been determined, details such as slogans, posters, speeches, and literature are selected by the Politburo of the respective CPs. These decisions are made known to Party functionaries in the regional organizations, in the various labor unions, and in front group factions. The decisions can be communicated by special mailed instructions, by radio, (either legal or clandestine), or by publication in the Party journals. Instructions for the annual May Day demonstrations, for example, are published in the Party journals several days before the date of the demonstration. These announcements are written in conformity with the slogans published (and broadcast) by the USSR. In executing instructions, Communist leaders apply techniques learned by participation in similar past demonstrations, or which they have been taught at Party schools.

There are many considerations involved in the staging of a demonstration. The issue or occasion must be decided upon, and the type of gathering (parade, indoor or outdoor meeting) determined. The date must be selected to avoid competing events. If the demonstration is to be an indoor affair, a hall must be rented; if it is to be an outside demonstration or a parade, a permit must be secured from the proper police authorities. Then, efforts must be divided between the careful financing

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and planning of the affair and the recruiting of "mass" attendance. Both of these must be successfully accomplished if the demonstration is to be successful. The former includes the development of a well-balanced program of speakers, music, or entertainment; the planning of decorations for indoor gatherings; the preparation of slogan placards to be hung on the walls or carried in the parade. Imagination and a sense of dramatization are necessary for effective mass appeal. Every available channel of eye and ear must be put to work to recruit an audience from as many persons as possible; not only must the party be thoroughly aroused to action but also the affiliated organizations must be stimulated into participation.

If the affair is to be successful, attendance must be good, and every part of the program effective: the speakers, the ceremony, the color, and the entire staging of the dramatic performance.

Specific Communist procedure for organization of a demonstration is as follows: cell and district leaders will assemble the demonstrators in their own neighborhoods. They will provide sufficient Communist literature and placards. The demonstrators will assemble and then parade through the central part of the city. If a large number of organizations participate, their places in the parade line will have been predetermined.

There are, of course, many adaptations of this technique dictated by local conditions. In countries where the Communist Party is weak, there is usually not more than one designated gathering center.

Local conditions may allow the Communists to stage disturbances with the police. If trouble is expected, Communists organize "defense groups," usually consisting of five men strategically placed either among the crowd or at its edge. Their assignment is to take advantage of the action of the police, or to start fights with individual police officers with the objective of urging the mass to overwhelm the police. This occurs most often after incendiary speeches have aroused the anger of the masses and prepared them for such action.

In such cases, instructions call for the disarming and disabling of the police. The "defense groups" usually carry concealed light arms such as lead pipes, blackjacks, spiked sticks, or small firearms. They have been known to throw marbles under the horses of the mounted police and to slash the horses with tiny, concealed knives. Large numbers of placards carried by demonstrators are nailed to solid sticks, for use against the police in case of a riot or hostile anti-Communist elements.

The following examples typify instructions issued to Communist defense groups:

"Members of the Defense Corps in action at demonstrations must be divided into groups to surround the Communist speakers. The defense corps members must face outward as they surround the speakers in order to be more effective in combatting the action of police officers trying to get to the speakers.

"Members familiar with the use of clubs and brickbats are to arm themselves with these and other blunt weapons but all members not experienced in the use of such weapons are not to attempt to arm themselves but to use their fists instead and should try to take the clubs away from the police officers and use them on the police.

"Under no circumstances are clubs to be used in an 'individualistic or terroristic manner.' Their sole use is for the defense of the speakers.

"When the members are hoisting the speakers to their shoulders, they should see that they are close to a wall or some background that would leave one side less to defend. Also, the defense members are instructed to divide themselves into two groups, one directly circling the speaker and the other circling around the speakers at a little distance, the objective being to work as many of the workers in between the two defense groups as possible to form a sort of cushion and force these workers into action. The moment the police make an attempt to break up the meeting and seize the speaker, the defense corps members are instructed to shout and yell. If one group of police consisting of, say, six officers, makes an attack upon a speaker, a cordon of workers is supposed to stop the police groups by getting them sandwiched in between defense corps members."

b. Picketing.

Picketing is frequently used by the Communists as a mass action technique, particularly in the crowed urban areas of the United States. If Communists set up a picket line, the objective is chiefly propaganda — to acquaint a segment of the population with the question at issue and to present forcefully the Communist point of view. Setting up of picket lines also provides experience in mass action for local Communist organizers — experience which may be useful in more disorderly situations later.

Attempts are made to establish picket lines in the most conspicuous places available. The local Communist press usually announces the time and place of formation of the picket line and in an accompanying article will give the slogans to be used. These slogans link the particular local problem with the larger issues of the day, thus attempting to secure the widest possible following. Pamphlets outlining the Communist program are distributed to persons in the vicinity of the picketing.

Communists usually attempt to keep their picketing orderly and only in rare instances does violence occur.

c. Street Fighting.

Communist paramilitary forces ordinarily are not adequately armed to carry out large-scale street fighting. Therefore, in order to achieve

their objectives in the face of forces possessing superior arms, they must resort to deceptive stratagems.[1]

Communist planning for street fighting takes into account the fact that the Communist groups probably cannot achieve superiority in arms and equipment, at least not at the outset of the insurrection. The entire Communist paramilitary apparatus is organized so that arms may be procured and hidden secretly. Preparation and training for street fighting can take place under the guise of other organizational work. For example, clubs will be organized which will engage in calisthenics, shooting, cross-country marching, map reading, or similar paramilitary activities. Under the cover of the club functions, lectures are given on the use of firearms, handgrenades, bombs, mines, and gas. The calisthenic clubs teach ju-jitsu and the disarming of police pickets.

(1) Organization.

Preparations for street fighting usually take place within the existing Communist organization. Special secret sections of the Party are often organized for specific tactical work in street fighting. For example, in Germany, in the latter part of 1932, there were such groups designated as Z- and T-groups. The Z-groups entered hostile organizations to gain information and influence from within. Intelligence so obtained was used to plan attacks on opposition party meetings and demonstrations.

[1] Cf. IV, 2, b.

T-groups (terroristic) were given sabotage missions. They were formed into units of five men who were to take the initiative in street fighting. They were specialists in hit and run tactics designed to disrupt Nazi formations.

The T-groups were assigned special duties in street fights. In one instance, they formed a roadblock against police intervention while a street battle was in progress against the Nazis. In another case, they mined a Nazi parade route.

Cases are known in which T-groups placed snipers on roof tops commanding the route of a Nazi parade. A barricade consisting of three coal cars was erected and when the Storm Troopers marched into the blind alley the snipers opened fire. A streetcar commandeered by the Communists was sent careening into the milling street throng.

(2) Procuring Arms.

Although Communists do not expect to obtain arms and equipment in equality with the forces which oppose them, nevertheless they are constantly attempting to acquire material which will aid them in insurrection. Communist workers at munitions factories, for example, will smuggle out small quantities of arms and arms parts. These are then hidden, often in the houses of individual Party members. Because of the security problem, Communists rarely risk the storage of arms and ammunition in large, central supply dumps. As the moment for the insurrection approaches, Communists may raid government supply dumps in an effort to obtain armaments.

Communists are extremely ingenious in making arms from readily available materials. In Germany, for example, when firearms and explosives were found to be ineffective, Communists used accessible chemicals. Instructions were to pour strong ammonium chlorides, sulphuric acid, or similar chemicals on the police as they jumped from cars. Bottles filled with gasoline, benzole, or other inflammable liquids were thrown into armored police cars. Gasoline-soaked burning rags were also thrown into vehicles. As the police cars attempted to move out of the area, the resulting drafts fanned the flames. Perforated milk cans were used to spread combustibles inside of police stations, municipal buildings, and barracks. This kind of tactics requires careful advance placement of the attackers along the streets.

d. Riots.

Riots of planned origin are used by the Communists to make impossible the legal functioning of the authorities, create excitement and mass hysteria, and drive the mass instinct to destruction of public and private property. The Communists will also use spontaneous riots whenever possible for their own purposes and will channel the rioters accordingly. Planned riots will be used to spread unrest and to sabotage wide areas for the purpose of discrediting the authorities in power.

The methods for riots and street fighting are not essentially different. If any distinction exists it is contained in these criteria: rioting may be less violent than street fighting; individuals who are rioting may not necessarily use firearms; rioting is often more localized

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...t fighting; rioting is a technique used primarily to create disorder, whereas street fighting may have as its objective the capture of certain areas, buildings or centers, for specific Communist purposes.

Riots are used by Communists to call attention to their cause, and to create disorder and discontent without rendering the Communist Party vulnerable to physical and legal action. Riots also serve to train Communists, as well as to arouse persons apathetic toward the cause.

A typical Communist-instigated riot occurred in Montevideo, Uruguay at the Trocadero theatre in 1948. The police investigation provides a good illustration of the preparation for an execution of a riot which took place as a Communist protest against the showing of the film, "The Iron Curtain".

Two days before the riot, the leading members of the Uruguayan Communist Party met at their headquarters and outlined the plan of action. It was decided that the disturbance was to take place on a Saturday night at 10:... Communist-led brigades were to stroll along the sidewalks in the vicinity of the theatre and then were to concentrate in front of the theatre at the agreed hour. Other Communists were to station themselves in the ...eat...

The incident began when some of the spectators in the theater noticed a penetratingly bad odor. At the same time, two women and one man left their seats in the fourth row of the lower orchestra and hurried outside. This was the signal agreed upon. Almost immediately more than

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[redacted] persons who had stationed themselves in front of the theatre chanted slogans like "Down with Yankee imperialism", "Long live the Soviet Union", and "Democracy — Yes; Fascism — No."

Part of the group inside the theatre created disorder and confusion among the spectators by stomping heavily on the floor, and shouting and whistling loudly. This was synchronized with similar action outside the theatre. The mob broke into the auditorium and rushed through the aisles shouting and gesticulating violently. Before the police were able to quell the riot, the glass panels on the doors at the entrance had been broken, many seats had been damaged, the rugs had been burned with acid, and the screen had been destroyed by a pail of pitch which was thrown against it. Beneath the chairs of the fourth row the police later found several small glass tubes which contained the residue of the chemical which generated the odor.

Riots require the congregation of sizeable groups of people, and, therefore, an especially vigilant police force can usually prevent them. In Chicago, for example, during the depression, the police methods were quite effective against Communist agitators. Where police measures are expected, Communists try to conceal the fact that a large group of people is going to congregate, usually by having small groups "wander" into the area, arriving at precisely the same moment.

Spontaneous riots, of course, cannot be stopped by pre-arranged counter measures. A few militant Communists can turn a highly charged situation into a riot. Hence, in spite of highly vigilant police forces,

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Communists often succeed in precipitating a mob disorder.

Communist tactics are highly flexible. This is especially true in their instigation of riots. Therefore, no attempt has been made to exhaust the situations which might lead to Communist exploitation of potential mob violence.

e. The Armed Uprising.

A Communist-inspired armed uprising may be carried out either independently by Communist parties with little or no outside help, or as an aid to, or in consequence of, an advancing Red Army.

In the Marxist interpretation, armed uprising is the revolt of the masses against a reactionary regime, aimed at seizure of power by the revolutionary ranks. It is, also, the first phase of civil war. A differentiation must be made between armed revolt and civil war. During a revolt, it is impossible to maintain a coherent line of demarcation between the revolutionaries and their opponents. The revolutionary groups are scattered, unequal in armament, and not free from wavering elements. The opposing "bourgeois" forces, being in control of police, armed forces, and sources of supply, are in a far better position to create favorable conditions. On the other hand, in a civil war the fronts would be more clearly drawn, both politically and geographically.

Before seizing power, the revolutionary elements do not prepare for civil war as such but for armed revolt, where the "front" is everywhere,

where both sides are threatened everywhere, or are supported on all sides. Therefore, armed revolt is not merely the struggle between two organized armies which are isolated from the rest of the population but is rather a fight between two segments of the entire population in which there are no "outlookers"; all are participants: even women, old men, and children.

In his treatise on "Revolution and Counter-Revolution," Marx set forth the following rules for armed revolt:

1) An uprising should never be attempted unless there is firm resolve to endure all its consequences.
2) Once the revolt has started, the offensive must be taken and action must be resolute. Defensive action is the death of any armed uprising.
3) Clear and simple rules for the struggle should be established, the most important of which is "courage, courage and more courage."
4) Numerical superiority should be attempted because "the armed forces that must be fought have all the advantages of organization, discipline and traditional authority on their side." In his article "Advice of a Stranger", Lenin wrote that "a great superiority of forces must be concentrated at the decisive place and the decisive moment."
5) Anti-Communist forces must be surprised as long as their troops are scattered.

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Different from "ordinary" war where the final victory counts, the victory of the revolution may well depend on the initial successes of an armed uprising. If it is quelled, the pending civil war may be prevented and the uprising liquidated.

(1) Preparatory Techniques.

(a) Long-range Preparation.

Training in preparation for an insurrection is directed by an armed forces committee and by its sub-committee, which instructs the members in the use of arms. Rifle, sporting, and hunting clubs are organized for this purpose, often under the sponsorship of a labor union. An attempt may also be made to have Communists join the National Guard, both for purposes of infiltration and as a means of acquiring practice in the use of weapons.

(b) Preliminary Action Practice.

Preliminary action practice, essential for the development of eventual combat units, is organized through creation of "defense groups". These units take part in demonstrations, mass meetings, parades, marches, or picket committees. They may act as a protective force against the police, or may help to transform any of these forms of mass action into a riot. They may also assume leadership in any temporary occupation of government buildings or, in time of mass unemployment, in the occupation of relief stations and in the sacking of food stores. All such operations, while serving a specific purpose, are intended to give the "defense groups" practice.

(c) Procuring Armament.

Communist groups trained for insurrection are expected to procure for themselves a considerable amount of the necessary armament. Each member of the group is left to his own devices to obtain a revolver, gun, or rifle. A certain quantity of arms is usually secured through direct purchase, or is taken over from rifle, sports, and hunting clubs. Souvenir arms brought home by war veterans are reconditioned, and usable surplus army stocks are procured. If sufficient small type armament cannot be obtained in this manner, the best armed groups will then be instructed to carry out raids on hardware stores, National Guard posts, and supply stations. In addition, each group is taught to make bombs, hand grenades, and "Molotov cocktails." The hiding of arms and ammunition is generally left to the initiative of the various groups and their commanders.

Since the striking power of the groups and the consolidation of their conquests depend, to a large extent, upon their equipment, it is considered desirable to provide them with a certain amount of heavy equipment. In countries adjoining the Soviet Union, such equipment can be smuggled across the border, often with the help of Communist-controlled maritime and dockworkers' unions. In more distant areas, arms may also be smuggled by placing Communists in strategic jobs in commercial aviation.

(d) Direct Preparation.

When the situation in a country becomes such that, in the opinion of the leaders of the party, an armed uprising for the purpose of

seizing power has become feasible, or, in case of war, if such activity would be of aid to an advancing Red Army, the party will create an underground paramilitary organization. The Armed Forces Committee might then be reinforced by specialists from Moscow. This Committee will plan a program of action and prepare for the insurrection.

Groups will be organized for combat, consisting of five men, with a sixth in command. It is felt that, in action, no man can command effectively more than five, and that, in the preparatory stages of an uprising, the group-of-five system is best because of concealment advantages. (The group of five is called a command. Five groups headed by one commander is a company, and five companies thus formed under one command is a battalion. A numerical combination beyond that is considered impractical for this type of fighting, although with the development of speedy communications, later innovations may have been made by Communist leaders.) In addition to the five-man combat units, special groups may be formed for the purpose of operating captured radio stations or newspaper plants. Special groups may also be created to capture the principal leaders of the government. (This capture is usually accomplished in the early hours of the morning.)

(2) Role and Use of Mobs.

The modern planned insurrection has become a specialized affair; it generally required specific elements for specific missions:

(1) the mob, organized and led by professional rabble-rousers, to fight, fraternize, and demonstrate, to fill the streets and create the impression of insuperable strength; (2) the shock troops, trained military forces to combat loyal armed forces at strategically vital points; and (3) the technicians, to decommission vital utilities or to divert their use to the insurrection. A fourth element, the famous personality, is also a useful but not essential force in insurrection.

The purpose of using mobs in the insurrection varies widely in differing circumstances. The use of the mob creates for the insurrection the myth of the common will, it gives the uprising the appearance of popularity, it draws in the politically inert, and swells the chorus to deafening proportions. The weight of numbers apparently united in a common purpose can hypnotize a people, unite them behind the demagogue, cause them to sacrifice their individual wills and reasoning and to follow blindly. In addition mob-soldier fraternization may cause the disintegration of an organized armed force, the loss of its will to fight.

The mob may also be used as a screen behind which the professional insurrectionists may move with relative impunity; it may be used to capture the symbols of power after the power itself has fallen.

The use of the mob has its difficulties. Once armed, it must be disarmed. It is undisciplined and difficult to control; when set in

motion it is a weapon of chaos and power for the would-be revolutionaries. But its place in the insurrection is as old as society itself. Sometimes, indeed, it is the mob itself which sets the insurrection in motion.

The particular mob action which starts a revolution generally gains its initial successes because everybody, except a few "reactionaries," agrees that reform must come, and almost nobody realizes that it is revolution instead of reform that is coming. This opening act of revolution also gains popular support because there is generally at the time some special cause for discontent (such as shortage of food).

There is one important reason why some quite ordinary act of mob violence generally proves to be the start of revolution. It is helpless incompetence revealed by the governing class in the emergency. This incompetence has long been a fact, but it is advertised in a particularly spectacular way by the circumstances of the first outbreak.

Ordinarily when the action by the mob has a decisive effect on the course of insurrection it is because it is led to the decisive act by professional crowd leaders acting on orders from insurrectional commanders. The mob's activities are carefully planned and the whole procedure, far from being a spontaneous outburst of violence, is the exact opposite. On such occasions mob violence is used simply for strategic purposes or because more effective forces, such as an army movement, or a legislative decree, are not available at the moment.

Mobs whose actions are decisive in revolutionary crises are always tools.

(a) The Mob as a Political Weathervane.

The mob is an excellent instrument with which to test the direction of political winds, to determine when the time for insurrection is ripe. Probably no chapter of modern history gives one clearer insight into the power and behavior patterns of the revolutionary mob than the March insurrection in Petrograd in 1917. This was one of those extremely rare instances when the people were able to demonstrate in a conclusive manner that the state no longer had the assent of the governed. Without any direction, even without any incitement to rebellion, the people of Petrograd won for their cause almost the entirety of the state's armed forces. This incident is worth a critical examination.

By March 1917, the war effort had created an utter disruption of Russia's economic life. Transportation had virtually broken down; the large cities were faced with serious coal and bread shortages. The garrisons in such towns as Petrograd could hardly be called soldiers. Trained cadres had been all but exhausted by the incredible casualties which the Russian Army had suffered since 1914. Most of the officers were young and inexperienced, the private soldiers were raw recruits and formed in draft battalions. Long years of adversity had undermined the discipline of the army as a whole, bad treatment had given the private soldier a common cause with the civilians, the officers had lost faith in the conventional military virtues. There was no coordinating command, no

[redacted], no desire for action.

There are, then, several specific uses to which the mobs can be put. They may be used for fraternizing with the government's armed forces for the purpose of neutralizing them or winning them (Paris, 1871; Petrograd, March 1917).

The mob may also be formed into and used as the insurrectional armed force if the conditions and duration of the uprising and the universality of its appearance are sufficient (Moscow 1905). They may be used as the instrument of chaos by whose destructive actions the powers of the government are somewhat paralyzed, and whose actions form a screen behind which the organized forces of insurrection may work with relative freedom from detection (Bogota, Colombia, 1948).

They may also be used purely as an instrument of intimidation, as indeed almost always occurs where mass participation is extensive and the regime weak.

(b) Limitations.

There are several limitations and inconveniences in the use of mobs in an insurrectional operation. One of the greatest masters of insurrectional technique of the twentieth century, Leon Trotsky, put the question of limitation in this manner: "You can inquire of all the passengers as to what type of car they like to ride in, but it is impossible to question them as to whether to apply the brakes when the train is at full speed and accident threatens. If the saving operation

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is carried out skillfully, however, and in time, the approval of the passengers is guaranteed in advance." In short, Trotsky believed that popular assent to insurrection is a necessity, but that popular participation is an impediment, that the people should delegate the powers of insurrectional tactics to the leaders.

This was in strong contrast to the theories of Dzerjinski, Sverdlov, and probably Stalin. "In order to get possession of the state," said Dzerjinski on the eve of insurrection, "we must hurl the masses against the government." However, Trotsky won his point and all the practical work of organizing the insurrection was done under his direction. The masses, the unemployed, and the deserters who milled through the Petrograd streets by the hundred thousands in those November days unwittingly served as Trotsky's screen for the movement of shock troops and technicians.

Two clear lessons emerge concerning the use of unorganized mobs: first, the desirability of encouraging acts which will prevent the mob from turning back; second, that conduct of mob action is controllable to a predictable extent only when the mob can be broken up into small, manageable groups.

(3) General Scheme of Seizing a City.

The following general scheme of seizing a city has been developed by the Communists:

(a) Seizure of police headquarters, including the police commissioner and other leading officials (e.g., the Mayor). Police commissioner, mayor, and other officials usually made to sign or read a statement in support of the Communists.

(b) Seizure of the City Hall.

(c) Seizure of the power houses for purpose of paralyzing all transportation and industries dependent on power.

(d) Seizure of the main railway stations, bus terminals, airports—including derailing of trains, and overturning of buses to impede the government forces.

(e) Seizure of the chief communication centers: telephone, telegraph, radio.

These measures are intended to paralyze the government and its forces, and to serve as a psychological weapon to create panic and disorder among the population. A maximum effort is expended against the so-called "living forces." A "living force" is an available armed force which has not been infiltrated or demoralized and on which the government can absolutely rely.

Once a city has been seized, a new military organization is set up to hold it, recruit more men, and lay plans for the seizure of neighboring centers. All remaining resistance is liquidated as rapidly as possible.

The seizure of a city or the staging of a Communist uprising would be almost impossible without the element of surprise. The Communists frequently stage a number of trial mobilizations before they make their genuine effort. The government, responding to these false alarms, will become weary and may thus be unprepared when the real attack takes place.

The actual insurrection usually occurs in the early morning hours and groups strike their pre-determined objectives simultaneously.

3. Communist Party Intelligence Activities.

a. Introduction.

The Communist Party, if it is to be effective as a political and revolutionary organization, must have quantities of factual information in order to: (a) make a reasoned estimate of its own capabilities in relation to the more or less hostile environment in which it operates, and of the resources of the organized forces which oppose it; (b) devise a practical plan of action in the light of external conditions and of internal capabilities; and (c) dispose its forces in the most economical way for carrying out the plan, adjusting its tactics to changing conditions.

The Party must know what areas are most immediately important upon which to work; what possibilities are open there; what political, economic, and other circumstances will have a bearing on the success of its plans; what obstacles in the form of individuals, groups, or governmental agencies it will encounter; what the strength and weaknesses of the opposition are; what support it can expect to raise from among the neutral masses; and what issues may be exploited most profitably.

b. General Organizational and Operational Principles.

General organizational and operational principles followed by the Party in the procurement of intelligence include the following:

(1) A clandestine intelligence procurement program is not undertaken without justification. The need for secret information must be great to justify the risk involved to Party personnel and prestige.

(2) Organised Party intelligence networks are set up separate from the political mechanism for reasons of security. There may be some individual contact with the lower ranks of the political apparatus, but it is kept to a minimum, and direction passes down the chain of the network itself from a functionary in the top level of the Party. Personal contact within the net, such as between the net and other Party organisations, is kept to a minimum. Personnel involved in intelligence procurement stop their overt Party activities and in some cases may withdraw their Party membership altogether.

(3) Communications and meetings are carefully screened by strict security measures and by the use of cut-outs (intermediaries), letter-drops (selected locations for passing information), and couriers.

(4) The first instrument of procurement is the Communist who has penetrated a hostile organisation or who works in an organization selected as an espionage target. There may be some systematic "planting" of informants, but the basis of Party organisation lends itself quite naturally to the simple recruitment of informants who are already "on the inside." The penetration agent is also a more efficient instrument for the procurement of intelligence than the outside informant, who must depend on personal observation.

c. Overt Intelligence.

To agitate with profit, and to conduct its political manoeuvers with skill, the Party requires volumes of precise information.

Many of the Party's information requirements can be met by the exploitation of overt sources. The Party machine, including its auxiliaries,

fronts, and circles of sympathizers, is an information system and at the same time an action organization. From the individual member of a factory cell--who reports to his cell secretary on conditions of work in his factory, on the political inclinations of his fellow workers, and on their grievances, needs, and attitude towards the leaders of their unions--to the Central Committee member who sits in the national parliament and who reports to the Political Bureau on matters of high governmental plans and activities, the Party apparatus is one of individual reporters.

Much information is passed along the channels of the political apparatus in the form of periodic statistical, organizational, and personnel reports made by the secretaries of committees on the various territorial levels. Such periodic and routine reports, funnelled into the Organization Department or Cadre (personnel) Department of the Central Committee, provide much of the basic information requirement. They may be supplemented by special studies and surveys on particular problems of economics, social conditions, or politics.

Some Parties have set up special research or economics departments to direct information collecting efforts on the overt side, to make analyses, and to process reports for the benefit of the policy-making elements of the Party.

The network of Party newspapers, reporters, and correspondents constitutes an invaluable information service. Communist reporters and correspondents, like those of any political affiliation, normally have ready

access to repositories of data. They know where to go for information, and they usually have at least some "inside sources" which may be tapped for some of the information the Party must have.

d. Covert Information.

Covert intelligence includes such information as: intimate data on hostile personalities; "inside" details on the plans and capabilities of hostile political parties; information on the plans and activities of the police, security services, armed forces, and the internal administration of government offices as well as data on industrial capacities and developments and on technical progress.

It is often difficult to distinguish between the numerous Party operations directed at the collection of overt data and the Party's clandestine procurement program. The two activities overlap, and individuals are often found to be engaged in both. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Party sometimes organizes special secret intelligence operations and nets for the procurement of necessary information which it cannot obtain openly.

e. Communist Intelligence for USSR.

In addition to its occasional direct intelligence effort, the Communist Party can generally be relied upon to assist Soviet intelligence agencies operating abroad. Such assistance is usually in the form of personnel and facilities. The Party provides the Soviet representatives with members and sympathizers who are willing and able to serve as agents, couriers,

cut-outs, and technicians for particular Soviet-directed intelligence operations. Party seamen and other waterfront elements are particularly suited for clandestine communication services.

In an emergency, the Party may furnish money, technical equipment, and communications facilities. Refuge, escape facilities and safe-conduct, safe meeting places, and false documents may also be provided for members of a Soviet network in case of necessity.

The product of direct Party intelligence operations in matters of especial interest to the USSR is also passed on to Soviet intelligence. Special operations may be taken up by the Party's intelligence system at the request of the Soviet intelligence representatives. At times, information procured by the Party is used to verify the accuracy of that obtained by Soviet intelligence operations.

General security considerations, however, dictate that intelligence groups organized and controlled directly by the Party should be carefully insulated from the activities of the Soviet intelligence systems. Thus, the exposure of one of them will not endanger the operations of the other. The diplomatic risk in the exposure of Soviet intelligence activities is obvious, and it will usually enforce a studiously secure separation from compromising personal or organizational connections with any branch of activity of the local Communist Party.

Many factors bear upon the extent, the methods, and procedure that direct Party intelligence efforts will follow. The current political line,

organisational and operating tactics and plans, the attitude taken toward the Party by the government and by other groups, the effectiveness of civil security controls, the availability of capable personnel, and many other internal and external circumstances all influence the way in which the Party will organise, plan, and direct its own intelligence operations, if it undertakes them at all. Such complex influences make it most difficult to anticipate, at any one time, how and where the Party may be expected to engage in intelligence operations.

At times, assistance to Soviet intelligence needs and operations takes precedence over those of the Party. This is particularly true when the USSR believes its security imperiled. The findings of the Royal Commission in Canada, based on the testimony of Igor Gusenko and other investigations, demonstrate that at least a large part of the Party's intelligence activity consists of gathering technical and industrial information.

f. The Communist Party Intelligence Apparatus.

It is difficult to detect Party intelligence nets at work because of the thorough security, both organisational and operational, which is put upon them.

(1) Control.

Two types of basic organised cover are available for the exercise of controls (a) the net may be planned and directed secretly by the ordinary departments and offices of the political apparatus along with all the other, overt, activities, which they support; (b) a net may be set up

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and operated independently of the overt political apparatus, with contact and control carefully maintained only at top levels. Generally, the personnel in this second type of organization have no ostensible connection with the Party. They are drawn from among the ranks of those who have no record with the police, or from among sympathisers who are not known, as such, outside the organization. Occasionally, a Party member who has formally, and with some publicity, severed his Party allegiance, will show up as a member of a Party intelligence net. Obviously, such persons are particularly useful against hostile political groups, which may accept them into their own ranks, because of their alleged defection from the Communist cause.

Control of Party intelligence activities is usually to be found centered in some office at the headquarters level of the Party. Security there is usually strong, the handful of leading Party functionaries having been tested over long years and their loyalty having been strengthened by a lifetime of indoctrination and by their personal stake in the future of the Party. The Secretary General, as well as the responsible heads of the Organization or Cadre Departments, are believed to be frequently concerned with the organisation and control of Party intelligence operations. With their card files, indexes, wide contacts, and comprehensive knowledge of the personnel, deployment, and organization of the Party, the Organization and Cadre Department heads are in a good position to plan operations, to

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select suitable recruits, and to give detailed operational directions. They have also had a long conspiratorial experience; many of them have been trained in the USSR, and they have acquired considerable organizing skill.

When these functionaries are too busy with other matters or are too exposed to police surveillance, the job of directing intelligence work may be entrusted to other personnel. Such Communists specialize in clandestine work ("illegal work" in Communist parlance). They have had special training in it or have a natural aptitude for it. In some Parties, such a peculiarly talented person has been charged with the control of all clandestine work, which includes items other than intelligence.

(2) Targets.

The coercive instruments of the state (armed forces, police, security services), the state administrative apparatus, and hostile political groups are the chief intelligence targets of the Party. These are the organized powers that will prevent or hinder a Communist revolution, and they must be smashed or made useless if the Party is ever to succeed.

Except when such concerns become of strategic importance to a Party engaged in direct military effort, the industrial or technical espionage it undertakes seems to be primarily for the benefit of Soviet intelligence agencies rather than for its own use.

Clandestine and controlled penetration of the target organization is the basic plan of Party intelligence operations. It is effected by

individuals or groups who are secret members of the Party or of one of its auxiliaries. They are supported, guided, and controlled by special personnel. Penetration follows the line of least resistance. Wherever an opportunity is presented it is likely to be taken. Advantage is taken of personal friendships, and professional and social contacts. Secret Party members join hostile organizations; they are elected, appointed, or find employment by themselves in governmental institutions. Defectible elements inside the target organization are subverted (bribed, coerced, or converted).

It is even simpler to penetrate the armed forces. Secret members are drafted or they enlist. In addition, the Party generally organizes youth organizations and youth fronts to attract and subvert young persons who are liable to military duty. In the 1930's special attention was paid to relief organizations and to youth labor organizations, such as the CCC in the United States. Party interest in the maritime industry is partially accounted for by the fact that the merchant marine is drawn upon heavily by the navy during an emergency. From among such elements potential recruits for Party intelligence work can be scrutinized, screened, and picked.

Direction and control of penetration of the armed forces rests with a secret organ set up at the national level, often called the "Military Committee" or "Anti-Military Committee," with a network of directing functionaries at lower Party echelons. The functionaries may control the system of cells that has been built up in the Army directly (but through secure cut-outs) or indirectly, through the local Party political organiza-

tions closest to the military unit involved.

Intelligence procurement, however, is only one of several purposes behind the Party's military work. The central directing organ, such as the "Military Committee," also administers the ordinary political and agitation-propaganda activities of Communist members of the military. It is at least of equal importance that as many members as possible get some training in the use of arms and in infantry tactics, that the morale and efficiency of the army be reduced as far as possible, and that the Party extend its political influence by organizing cells of newly recruited members.

Direct penetration operations into the armed services is supplemented, as it is in the case of hostile political groups, by subverting ordinarily loyal elements. It is a common practice to employ young women members of Party youth organizations to act as "bait". They frequent public places around a military or naval installation, picking up service men as the opportunity arises, and attempt to interest them in Communist ideas.

Government agencies concerned in one way or another with the administration of the armed services are also profitable targets for penetration, more usually with the intent of getting control of the military from within than of procuring intelligence. Penetration at this high level, of course, is particularly feasible when the Party has become a major political force, provided it is not otherwise hampered in its political activities. It can use members who have been elected to public office, or its patronage, or other political influence to secure the appointment of secret members and

sympathizers to key positions. The postwar history of several European countries has shown that a numerically large or strategically important Communist vote will be seized upon to put Party members into cabinet or other positions. Then more and more Communists will be given jobs in which intelligence and subversive activities can be practiced on a large scale in relative safety.

During periods of "revolutionary calm," when the Party is on the defensive, or when it is concerned mainly with extending its political and organizational influence, its "military work" is likely to be aimed chiefly at organizational and agitation-propaganda activities. The intelligence function is usually relegated to a secondary position at such times.

On the other hand, when the Party arrives at the conclusion that it is about to enter upon a period of revolutionary possibilities, or when it is actually engaged in revolution, civil war, or military resistance, then it can be expected to put much of its effort into collecting military intelligence. It will, in such a "revolutionary situation," systematize its penetration and organize a special military intelligence service.

The use of a special clandestine Party auxiliary directed towards the penetration of the enemy armed services for intelligence and subversive purposes during a Communist revolution is illustrated by the activities of a Party in Southeastern Europe:

(a) When the Party emerged from resistance activities following the war, large numbers of its experienced guerrilla fighters were drafted into the armed services, police, and security services of the state.

(b) In order to ensure their continued allegiance and the organizational control which the Party had over them, and to draw as many new men into its machine as possible, the Party set up a special auxiliary organization, consisting entirely of Communists in the services, plus a directing skeleton of functionaries drawn from the political apparatus.

(c) In effect, the military organization was a separate Communist organization, with an "interlocking directorate" with the Party proper. It had its own Central Committee, consisting of a few responsible functionaries of the Party's Central Committee, plus a responsible functionary for each of the several regions into which the Party divided the country for its own administrative and organizational convenience. The regional heads of the auxiliary were each responsible for the direction and control of members of the auxiliary whose military, police, or other units were stationed in the region.

(d) Within the Army, the members of the auxiliary were organized into three-man cells. The leader of each cell in a command (i.e., platoon or company) was responsible to another functionary who directed two or more additional cell leaders. For security reasons, these cell leaders were the only persons under his control with whom he had any contact. The same

principles of control and limited contact were repeated up the chain of the military command to the brigade level, at which point the responsible leader of the Communist auxiliary was responsible to the regional Party functionary, who was ordinarily not a member of the Army, but a functionary of the regional committee of the political apparatus of the Party. His contact with the leader of the brigade auxiliary was carefully screened by the use of one or more cut-outs.

(e) A Party member who was about to be called into service reported that fact to the leader of his cell in the political apparatus. Notice was then passed up the channels of the Party proper to the regional organization in the area in which the prospective recruit was to serve. Here, it was passed by the regional head of the auxiliary to the appropriate brigade head, who, in turn, passed it down through the channels of the auxiliary. Finally, the new recruit was met at his station, and drawn into one of the cells of the auxiliary.

(f) Members of the auxiliary were engaged in acts of sabotage, agitation and propaganda, drawing in sympathizers where practical to do so, and undermining the morale of the other troops. When the Party began its revolution, they attempted to subvert their fellow soldiers, and organized several mutinies and mass desertions.

(g) By reporting from personal observation and by stealing documents, members of the auxiliary kept the Party informed on personalities,

strength, disposition, morale, and equipment of the troops; armaments and installations; technical and mechanized equipment; supply; plans and operations of units; and on security regulations.

An example of a military intelligence organization under Party control, created under conditions of resistance warfare, is furnished by another Communist Party in the Balkans during World War II:

(a) The Party organized, controlled, and directed a resistance army that fought the German occupation. It had to set up an organization for the procurement of military intelligence.

(b) Since the Party was illegal and had to operate underground except in areas which it controlled by its own arms, it had to make some provision for counter-intelligence against the police and security agencies of the occupying power. It also had to provide for other clandestine services behind the enemy lines: a secret communications system, an escape and safe-house system, preparation of false documents, and a program of sabotage. All of these clandestine activities, in addition to the strategic and tactical intelligence functions, the Party put under the control of a special organization of Information Centers.

(c) The Central Information Center, set up directly under the Central Committee of the Party, was the organizing and controlling center for Information Centers set up in each of the regions of the country. The regional Centers directed district Centers, each of which, in its turn, had several city or village Information Centers under its direction.

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The two-man intelligence groups at the base of the net carried out actual operations.

(d) At each level of organization, the head of the Information Center was also a member (usually the Political or Organization Secretary) of the local Committee of the (underground) Party's political apparatus. For the functioning of the Centers, however, direction was taken, not from the political committee, but from the next higher Information Center.

(e) As the strength of the Party's army grew and it took over increasingly wider territories, the duties of the Information Centers likewise expanded. Each center was then divided into four sections, one for each of these functions: (1) military espionage and control of the political security of the resistance army; (2) espionage directed against the Gestapo and against the intelligence and security services of the puppet government; (3) sabotage, preparation of false documents, and intelligence missions into enemy-held territory; (4) clandestine communications: a courier system.

(f) Each major command of the resistance army had its own tactical military intelligence organization. These operated largely in the actual combat zone, but they also sent missions into enemy areas on occasion. The network of the Party Information Centers also operated in all three zones, and in the zone of combat it paralleled the intelligence organization of the resistance army. In higher commands, the unit intelligence officer was also the responsible functionary of the corresponding Information Center.

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(2) With the beginning of [illegible] operations after the Party victory, each Information Center was assigned a special guerrilla unit, made up of hand-picked Communists. These units protected the personnel and the installations of the Information Centers and carried out whatever liquidation or other strong-arm missions were thought necessary by the Information Centers, which by now had begun to concentrate on civil security duties, but which could not yet afford to compromise their security by overt coercive activities.

g. Industrial and Technological Intelligence.

The procurement of industrial and technological intelligence by a Communist Party is facilitated by the fact that the cells are concentrated in industrial establishments, technological research centers, and maritime centers. The cells are always useful for the spotting and recruiting of agents. Experience has shown, however, that this potentiality has been more often exploited by Soviet intelligence agencies directly than by the Communist Parties themselves. The interest of the Soviets in industrial and technological matters is obviously more immediate than that of the Party. Occasionally, however, the Party has engaged in such operations for the benefit of Soviet intelligence. A Central European Party did so in the early 1930's. The organization was set up, staffed, and controlled by the Party. The intelligence product was forwarded to representatives of the Soviet intelligence.

(1) The "Industrial Reporting" organization was established by the Party to procure industrial and technological intelligence and to keep the Party informed on labor-management relations for organizational and agitation use. It was responsible to the Central Committee of the Party, but was organized as a separate network independent of the political apparatus below the top level. The country was divided into several regions, and the Industrial Reporting chief for each of these had several subsidiary nets of agents.

(2) The agents of the Industrial Reporting organization recruited sympathizers and members of the Party and its auxiliary to steal plans, make photographs, write reports, and compile statistics on industrial and technological developments and processes at their places of work. Armament plants received special attention.

(3) The product of these informants was passed up the network through the regional chiefs to the national chief. At the national level the organization had facilities for collating and evaluating the information and for photographing documents. Much of the product was then turned over to Soviet intelligence representatives.

h. Training.

Party members received professional training for intelligence work before World War II in special Soviet schools. Intelligence agencies in

the USSR achieved thereby not only the expert training of key personnel slated to work for Soviet intelligence directly, but also a considerable degree of professionalism among the personnel assigned to work under the control of the various national Parties. Since there has been no evidence to show that the national Parties are presently operating their own intelligence schools, it is reasonable to conclude that such training is still being carried out within the USSR or, possibly, in satellite areas.

i. Communist Counter-Intelligence.

The Party must protect its cadres and organizations from the effects of penetration by agents and informants of the police and of hostile intelligence agencies. It must also preserve strict ideological and organizational discipline and operational security. This is of prime importance when the Party is illegal and is forced to operate underground. To cover these needs, the Party charges a particular office or organ with responsibility for defensive security. These must not be confused with the organs set up to handle the direct intelligence functions. Unquestionably, the experience that some Party members gain in the course of their work in one or another of the internal security organs may fit them for service in the direct intelligence organization when the latter is actually put into operation. Nevertheless, the existence of a security organization is not of itself proof that the Party is engaged in offensive intelligence activities.

The Party organs usually charged with the maintenance of internal security are the Cadre (personnel) Department and the Control Commission. The functions of the two overlap and vary from one Party to another. The Control Commission (or Security and Discipline Commission, as it is sometimes called) seems to be devoted chiefly to investigating the efficiency of other Party organizations and the efficiency and political reliability of Party functionaries. It may initiate an investigation as an outcome of a routine analysis of internal reports, or in response to allegations made by one member against another, or at the suggestion of the Cadre Department. The Control Commission is traditionally the "high court" of the Party, and it hears cases in which it may have had a hand in the preparation of charges. It passes sentence on offenders of Party discipline and security, including the sentence of expulsion.

The Cadre Department (or Commission) has broader functions. It collects and collates biographical information on all functionaries--data on their political, personal, economic, religious, educational, and occupational background--and it collects reports made by their superiors and other associates on the way in which they have handled their jobs. It selects, assigns, and deploys the militants as best to suit their talents and the interests of the Party. It may also be explicitly charged with the preservation of internal security. To this end, it keeps a close check on the accuracy and truth of the biographical data. It may also arrange for surveillance of members suspected of treasonable connections and take testimony of the suspect's associates.

Parties that have no Cadre Department either assign the personnel function to other appropriate organs (such as the Organization, Youth, Women's, Labor Department), or center it within one of these, the Organization Department being the most likely spot. The investigative function in such a case is also given over to one of the other offices or to one of the Party's auxiliaries, the Youth organization being frequently assigned the task.

In some cases, special commissions may be appointed to investigate the security of individual Party members and entire Party organizations.

4. Subversion in the Armed Forces and the Police.

Any armed force which the Communist Party does not control is considered by the Party to be a mortal enemy, and therefore the subversion of the armed forces and of the police receives a top priority. It should be noted that the police force is usually the first although not necessarily the most important target. In the eyes of the Communists, military organization is the strength of the ruling classes and it is, therefore, the responsibility of the forces of revolution to attempt infiltration long before the actual hour of insurrection. Also, according to Marx and Lenin, preparations must be made to achieve a "superiority of forces" to be "concentrated at the decisive place at the decisive moment" (Lenin). The Communists realise that the "armed forces which must be fought have all the advantages of organization, discipline and traditional authority on their side; unless greater counter-forces can be mobilised against them, defeat and annihilation are inevitable" (Marx).

Realizing that from a military point of view, the revolutionary forces stand no chance in comparison with their opponent, the Communists believe that they must make up for their lack of training, organization, and armament. This can be done, they reason, not only by numerical superiority, but first of all, by methodical infiltration. The Party, therefore, places the greatest importance on the Ministries of Defense and Interior which usually supervise the armed forces and the police.

The methods by which the Party seeks to attain its objectives are varied. More than one of these methods, however, may be employed simultaneously, dependent upon the country and the particular situation involved.

a. Infiltration at High Levels.

Infiltration is desirable chiefly because Communists in high offices can hire their own personnel for key posts and arrange for both subversion and intelligence collection. The activity of the French Communist Party in employing the method of infiltration before World War II is of interest as an example of these techniques. Only after the USSR was attacked by the German Army in June 1941, did the French Communists begin to take an active part in the war against Germany. They began to infiltrate French resistance groups and by the end of the war had effectively penetrated large portions of the movement. Thereupon they disseminated highly exaggerated propaganda about the prominent role played by the Communists in the underground and demanded a voice in the postwar

government of France. The Communist Charles Tillon was appointed Minister for Air in De Gaulle's provisional government (1944-45). During his tenure, the French air forces were extensively infiltrated.

b. Capture of Control Positions.

Although the standard procedure for capturing control positions has some similarity with the foregoing method, it differs somewhat in that it is designed to capture key posts without disturbing the top level positions. This tactic may be applied to police organizations. The main effort of infiltration is directed toward the middle and lower echelons. Attempts are made to convert them to Communism so as to drive a wedge between the higher and lower levels. This method has been successfully used in France and pre-Hitler Germany.

In the armed forces the non-commissioned officer is an important Communist target. He is more easily accessible to Communist revolutionaries than commissioned officers and can be of infinitely greater value than the private, who is untrained in leadership.

c. Infiltration into the Ranks.

The methods for infiltration into the ranks apply equally to armed or police forces. This method requres two phases of development: (a) instilling the Communist ideology in the minds of soldiers or policemen; and (b) recruiting those individuals who seem "ripe" for party or espionage work.

Methods used for Communist infiltration in the ranks include

exploitation of grievances; spreading of defeatist spirit; and attempts to destruction of loyalty and patriotism by undermining the beliefs in a nation's traditional ideals. Primarily, the objectives of infiltration are to paralyze the armed forces before they are called to strike against Communism, or before Communism comes to power. A Communist regime would not rely upon an armed force which was organized under non-Communist leadership. It would first liquidate the officers' corps, then purge the non-commissioned officers and, finally, mold the rank-and-file according to the prevailing Communist formula. It is understood that any such Communist-reorganized army would be under more or less direct orders of the Kremlin and of the Soviet Army.

1. Theory of Revolutionary Action.

Communist theoreticians have developed a sizable body of doctrine on the general aspects of revolution and revolutionary activity. Specific theory, however, is somewhat scanty in the published material, and there is good reason to believe that Communist writers have gone little further in the development of the theory of revolutionary activity than is readily available from published works. Communist theory, for example, calls for the use of mass action, for agitation, and for sabotage; but the manner in which these plans are to be executed is left to the judgment and experience of the local Communist groups.

One of the reasons for the sparsity of detailed theoretical treatment of revolutionary action is the complex nature of the political-social-economic problems involved. To develop broad and general plans for a revolutionary situation is relatively easy, but to draw up specific requirements in the day-to-day developments of revolutionary action might easily lead to mistakes and misguidance. To interpret and plan revolutionary activity primarily in terms of past experiences in other areas would handicap the movement of rigidity.

As a German Communist pointed out in the late twenties, "Revolution in various countries, or in the same country at various times, always takes place under new conditions. For this reason it is impossible to devise any general formulas for methods to be applied during revolt; it

is impossible to compose a 'directive for revolution' in this sense. Rules to be applied in any case must of necessity be extremely general. The significance of these 'rules' lies in the fact that they can shed light on the nature of uprisings, that they may permit proper insight into the problems of uprisings and thus provide a key, a method for practical evaluation." The detailed check list for the process of insurrection, therefore, is lacking.

To a large extent, then, interpretation of the events leading to an insurrectional situation depends upon the judgment of the Party leadership. The timing of violence bears a relationship to the political astuteness, training, courage, and amount of information possessed by the national leaders. When attempting to anticipate the moment for Communist violence, consideration must be given to the fallibility of the Communist interpretion of the political events. History has shown that Communists have misinterpreted the political and economic climate of an area as frequently as they have judged it correctly.

a. General Theory.

The Communist theory of revolution rests on the basic premise that Communist ascension to power is impossible without violence. Lenin developed this thesis at some length (in State and Revolution):

> "There is no denying that the state is the organ of class domination, or that class antagonisms are irreconcilable. But what is forgotten is this: if the state is the product of the

irreconcilable character of class antagonism, if it is a force standing above society, and increasingly separating itself from it, then it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible, not only without violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power, which was created by the ruling class in which this 'separation' is embodied." (emphasis added)

Once the inevitability of violence is established, there are certain concrete methods prescribed for the development of Communist parties to a point where they are capable of precipitating an insurrection.

Two general conditions have been set forth as prerequisites for revolution: (1) preparation of the proletariat for its dictatorship; and (2) the existence of a general crisis in all ruling and in all bourgeois parties. In order to achieve the first of these general conditions, Communist theoreticians emphasize that the proletariat must be trained and educated to take over the organs of state power. As Lenin explains:

"The proletariat needs state power, the centralized organization of force, the organization of violence, both for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the exploiter and for the purpose of guiding the great mass of the population — the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie, the semi-proletarians — in the work of organizing Socialist economy . . ."

The second general condition, a prerequisite to a "revolutionary situation," concerns the lack of capability of the "upper classes" to rule. As a result, they would "pass through a government crisis of a degree which would draw even the most backward masses into politics (a symptom of every real revolution is a rapid, tenfold and even hundredfold increase in the number of members of the toiling and oppressed masses — hitherto apathetic — who are capable of waging the political struggle), weaken the government and make it possible for the revolutionaries to overthrow it rapidly." (Lenin)

In preparing the proletariat for its role in the revolution, the Communist Party is constantly engaged in a process of educating and training this class. In developing the techniques for mass action, minor preparatory demands are made and demonstrations, strikes and agitation are carried out, in the same manner, but on a smaller scale than if the insurrection were imminent. "Every strike and every other mass action must be made use of in order to stimulate the revolutionary feeling among the masses, in order to encourage the masses, in order to organize them better, in order to weld them together to united fronts and to create a million strong revolutionary army. . .it is. . . a question of organizing a continuous militant movement. . .in every case to appeal to broad masses. . ." (Kussinen).

2. Insurrection, an Art.

Communist doctrine teaches that insurrection is an art which must be studied and practiced in anticipation of its use and is different from the conventional technique of war. In the words of a German Communist:

"In armed revolt the 'front' is everywhere. Both combatant parties are threatened from all sides, and at the same time are supported on all sides, because everywhere they are surrounded by friends and foes of the revolution. Whichever side cannot draw the logical conclusions from this fact will be beaten and annihilated, according to Langer.

"The broad masses of the working people, including women, old men and children will not play the role of non-participating, curious onlookers but must be engaged in active participation; they will attack the enemy wherever they encounter him and beat him by whatever means are at their command."

This entire struggle "is not a purely military affair but a political fight. The indivisibility of the military aspect of the struggle from the political aspect is one of the basic characteristics of armed revolt." The principle rule of insurrection, according to Lenin, is that an "audacious and determined offensive must be waged. The first success must be won, and that one must proceed from success to success, never ceasing the offensive against the enemy, taking advantage of his confusion."

The winning over of the masses at the moment of armed revolt is not merely a matter of verbal and written agitation, but depends essentially

upon the degree of success attained in the early armed attacks. In order to assure those vacillating elements "who always follow the strongest force and who always veer to the safest side" it is necessary, according to Karl Marx, to gain "constant new victories, even though they be relatively unimportant, and to publicize these victories among the masses, as widely as possible, in order to maintain moral equilibrium."

Marx established definite principles for the conduct of the revolutionary class during revolution:

"First of all, an uprising should never be attempted unless there is firm resolve to endure all its consequences. In revolt one deals with highly uncertain quantities whose value may change from day to day. The forces which must be fought have all the advantage of organization, discipline and traditional authority on their side; unless greater counter-forces can be opposed to them, defeat and annihilation are inevitable. Secondly, once a revolution has started, the offensive must be taken and action must be resolute. Defensive action is the death of any armed uprising; the battle will be lost before it has begun. The opponent must be taken by surprise while his troops are scattered; there must be constant new victories, even if they are not significant; the moral superiority of the first successful uprising must be maintained; those vacillating elements who always follow the strongest force and who always veer to the safest side must be attracted; the enemy must be forced to retreat before he can con-

concrate his forces in a counter-thrust; in short, to quote Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary tactics known so far: 'Courage, courage and more courage'."

c. Timing.

The conditions necessary for a revolutionary situation cannot, of course, be completely fulfilled when the decision to launch an insurrection is taken. For this reason, the actual moment when hostilities begin depends on the judgment of the local Communist leaders. Communists recognize that some unusual act such as a parliamentary crisis, an isolated act of violence or a general strike often is the immediate cause of an insurrection.

"Timely action is of decisive significance in armed revolution, and the choice of the precise moment is one of the most important problems of the strategy, the art of revolution. It is up to the political leadership to appraise the situation and to determine the proper moment for overt action. In armed revolt, as in any other struggle, the chances for success are spasmodic. They come and go, if they are allowed to slip by."

d. The Offensive.

Once the "insurrectionary career" has been entered upon, however, Communists must "act with the greatest determination, and act on the offensive. Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare new successes, however small, but daily; keep up the moral

ascendant which the first successful rising has given to you; rally those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse and which always look out for the safer side; force your enemies to retreat before they can collect strength against you. . . In armed revolt retreat is always coupled with heavy sacrifices. Retreat from a revolution, once it has begun, inevitably leads to ruthless extermination by the white terror of the revolutionary class's best forces, regardless of whether retreat followed on the hell of frenzied battle or whether the armed workers capitulated without a struggle. Counter-revolution knows no mercy." (Stalin)

Lenin, in his critique of the 1905 Moscow uprising, berates the leaders of the strike action for not forcing the offensive and developing the struggle into an armed uprising. None of the organizations which called the strike was prepared to lead an uprising. "The strike grew into an uprising, primarily as a result of the pressure of the objective conditions that were created after October 1905." Then, the unorganized street crowds, quite sporadically and hesitatingly, set up the first barricades without orders from the organizations. The mass proletarian struggle then developed from a strike to an uprising. In 1905, according to Lenin, the proletariat sensed the change in the "objective conditions" of the struggle before the leadership. Practice marched ahead of theory: "A peaceful strike and demonstrations immediately ceased to satisfy the

workers; they demanded more resolute action. The instructions to set up barricades reached the districts exceedingly late, when barricades were already being erected in the center. . .But even this did not satisfy them — they demanded active measures. . .but they failed to receive instructions for resolute mass action." Lenin concludes: "We should have explained to the masses that it was impossible to confine ourselves to a peaceful strike. And now we must openly and publicly admit that political strikes are inadequate; we must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favor of an armed uprising and make no attempt to obscure this question by talking about 'preliminary steps'. . .The impending revolutionary action must take the form of a desperate, bloody, war of extermination."

On the other hand, it is "senseless" to want to force the struggle, "to accelerate it, to whip it forward, precisely because the struggle is inevitable."

The proper evaluation of the fighting spirit of the masses is possible only if the Party organizing the uprising is in close, day-to-day contact with the masses, constantly active among them, living their life, and, to quote Lenin, "has become merged with the masses." In other words, the Party must be firmly rooted in the masses, particularly at the points where the everyday life of the masses is lived, i.e., the factories and plants, the unemployment bureaus and the workers' district.

e. Superiority of Forces.

Lenin wrote: "A great superiority of forces must be concentrated at the decisive place at the decisive moment."

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From a military point of view, the suppressed class stands no chance in comparison with the opponent. "The armed forces which must be fought have all the advantages of organization, discipline and traditional authority on their side; unless greater counter forces can be opposed to them, defeat and annihilation are inevitable." (Marx). Hence the suppressed class must make up for its lack of training, organization and armament by numerical superiority.

However, it is the over-all situation and not that prevailing at local points, which is decisive for the beginning of the struggle -- the moment chosen to start the armed rebellion. On a country-wide scale the power ratio must naturally be favorable to the rebels before the contest can begin.

The term "superiority" does not necessarily mean that the proletariat must be superior in armament to the opponent in order to begin a successful rebellion; that superiority may be caused by the diversity of elements not usually employed in "common" warfare.

In nearly all attempts at insurrection the same phenomenon could be observed: after the presence of national defense battalions became known, troops of workers assembled from all nearby towns, more or less poorly organized but ready to go into action against these battalions. This converging from all sides created the necessary superiority at the decisive spot where the opponent had taken position.

f. The Principle of Concentration of Forces.

The principle of concentration of forces means that in armed rebellion the revolutionary party must know how to assign its entire machine, all its work, and all its forces to the armed conflict. It does not mean that every party member must actually shoulder a gun and participate in the physical fighting, although all should be ready to do so. The entire activity of the Party during rebellion should, however, exclusively serve the interests of armed combat.

In the hour of rebellion, the Party of the proletariat becomes a martial party. Consequently, the entire Party, not merely a part of it, must be firmly grounded in the conduct of war. In the Party there can be no divisions of functions, such as between statesmen and generals. Every Party member must be both "political" and "military."

The concentration of proletarian forces in armed struggle should be characterised above all, by the simultaneous commitment of forces on a country-wide scale and by mutual support of various areas of rebellion.

g. The Element of Surprise.

Although the element of surprise is very important in staging rebellions, especially when the enemies' troops are scattered, these moves must not be such as to surprise the proletarian elements. Under no circumstances must the surprising of the enemy be permitted to lead to the isolation of the fighters. "The masses must realize that they are entering an armed, desperate struggle, with much bloodshed ahead." Communists believe that surprise is possible to

a limited extent—as to the exact time of the beginning of the fighting; as to the resoluteness and tempo of action on the part of the revolutionary masses; and as to tactics in the various combat episodes.

b. The Armed Forces (Dispersal, Disarming, and Prevention of Concentration).

The technique of revolution provides for the prevention of concentrations and the dispersal and disarming of the opponent's armed forces. It should be the aim of the revolutionaries to defeat the enemy even before the formation of a regular front. If a front is formed, however (for example, if because of inadequate political work among the peasants in certain rural areas a condition favorable to counter-revolutionary activity is created), everything should be done to harass the enemy on such a front. He should be left with as little space, manpower, and material as possible, all of which are vital to the development of an army; in no case must the enemy's hinterland be left "clear"; behind the enemy's front the forces of revolution must always be active and seek disintegration of hostile strength.

The proletariat must wage an energetic, ruthless battle for the vacillating elements of the armed forces. It must strive to win over to the militant proletariat as many of the armed forces personnel as possible.

Lenin cites some examples of the "most desperate, violent battle between the reactionary forces and the Revolution for the vacillating military" during the rebellion of the Moscow proletariat in December 1905. "The Government resorted to the most diverse and desperate measures to keep the wavering soldiers on its side: flattery, bribes, distribution of watches, money, etc.

The soldiers were given brandy, they were deceived, intimidated, locked up in the barracks and disarmed, and those who were considered the most unreliable were torn from the midst of their comrades by force and treason." The reason the Government succeeded in keeping the upper hand with the soldiers was, according to Communist interpretation, that the revolutionaries did not know how to counter "the desperate, brutal measures of the Government with an equally active and ruthless struggle for the vacillating military"; and that, specifically, they hesitated to aim their bombs at the counter-revolutionary officers (who incited the soldiers against the people) and to exterminate them.

A document distributed in the streets of Moscow during the days of the Moscow "December Revolution" set down the missions of the "battle for the military": "Draw a sharp line between your acknowledged enemies and your involuntary, accidental enemies. Destroy the former, spare the latter. Spare the infantry insofar as possible. The soldiers are children of the people and do not attack the people of their own free will. They are being incited by their officers and superiors. Every officer who leads soldiers in the slaughtering of workers will be declared an enemy of the people and an outlaw. Kill him, wherever you encounter him. In combat with the police proceed as follows: Whenever possible, kill all superiors up to the rank of Kommissar. Disarm and arrest all supervisors and kill those known to be particularly vicious and brutal. As for ordinary policemen, disarm them and make them serve you instead of the Government."

2. Practice of Revolutionary Action

a. Military Instruments Used.

(1) General.

Communist use of military forces and weapons is no less scientific than the military science practiced by modern armies. Communist practices reveal the principle of integrating all elements of force which can be applied, just as an army and the industrial power of a nation are mobilized for war. There is, however, no rigid rule that has and can be applied insofar as Communist use of military instruments is concerned. The principle to be applied, from the Communist viewpoint, is embodied in the following statement by Lenin: "To have at the decisive moment, at the decisive point, an overwhelming superiority of forces — this law of military success is also the law of political success."

The exact nature of the military instruments is determined by the specific conditions existing at the time and place of the revolution. These include the locale of operation, the time of year the insurrection takes place, and whether the society is industrial, agricultural or nomadic. Terrain, climate, and the size of a country are also influencing factors.

The instruments available for use in the seizure of state power are usually of the same type. First, there is the power of an organized and trained revolutionary army, whose personnel may be drawn from either the government armed forces or from the civil population, or

both. Second is the quasi-military force, without the formal organization of an army; and the guerrilla and partisan units.

(a) Armed Forces.

In the very few instances where Communists have gained power through the use of a formally organized army, this army has followed more or less orthodox patterns with regard to organization, functions, and methods. Communist possession of a well-organized and equipped army is rare, and if it does exist, it follows the known techniques for the use of armed force.

(b) Quasi-Military Forces.

The development of quasi-military groups has been emphasized by the Communist Party. The potential of such groups can be relatively great, as has been demonstrated in Italy, France, and Germany. A number of these formations now in existence such as the partisan groups in Italy are largely an outgrowth of World War II.

A quasi-military force is usually organized in a country through the formation of Communist cells in which militancy is both encouraged and demanded by the Party, followed by the formation of additional cells along more functional military lines. For example, in the armed forces, or in unions in heavy industries, until the stage is reached where members of the union may be organized along strictly military lines, such forces may be considered to be quasi-military forces.

In the early stages of development, the organization of the quasi-military force is very loose, in many respects being largely a "paper" organization, with a staff composed of trusted Party militants.

As the organization progresses it becomes more formalized, embodying what is in effect a functioning general staff, transmitting its orders to components of the force.

Such forces develop also along other lines, as in the Italian Communist Party's quasi-military organization which is commonly known as the Apparato. The Apparato has a military head who is responsible to the Italian Communist Party for military action. This leader has a staff organized into recognized military staff sections, personnel, intelligence, operations, and supply. The Apparato is organized by regions, each regional command having jurisdiction over Apparato personnel in its area.

(2) Strategy and Tactics.

In a situation in which the Communist Party has not been able to seize the power of the state by political means, it is possible that power may be seized through armed action. This method was studied extensively by Communist and Soviet leaders in the period from approximately 1920 to July 1941. Although there is not yet available complete and confirmed evidence on the strategy and tactics of quasi-military forces such as were developed and used by the Soviet Union, there exists sufficient information from which certain deductions may be made concerning the use of such strategy and tactics. Much of this information is interwoven with the political, propaganda, labor, espionage, and cultural aspects of Communism. Therefore these aspects also have a bearing on the organization and use of armed forces.

(a) Communist Tactical Doctrine.

It is the custom of the Communists to hold critiques after each insurrectional effort in order to diagnose the action and its results and to formulate general principles to be observed in future attempts. Until 1923 these conferences were held openly, but thereafter the strictest security measures were observed, and information concerning them became difficult to obtain.

Communism's experiences with insurrections were communicated to the neophyte leaders primarily through the elaborate training school system maintained in the Soviet Union, the principal institution having been the Lenin Institute in Moscow.[1]

This and several other schools of revolution typified one method of disseminating the lessons learned from the critiques. Party manuals summarising lessons learned in critiques are distributed to Party members.

A German Communist attempted to synthesise the broad principles of the conduct of revolution in general and the insurrection in particular. His tenets bear a striking resemblance to certain of the recognised principles of warfare: (1) the choice of the right moment; (2) concentration of forces; (3) the attack at any cost; and (4) prevention of the concentration of the enemy.

(b) Specific Tactics Against Armed Forces and Police.

From these general principles another German Communist formulated specific tactics to be used against most of the coercive

1) Cf p. 32.

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apparatus of the bourgeois state. From the Communist point of view the most dangerous element of this apparatus is the armed forces. His formulations described how the proletariat will be able to dominate the regular army, the fleet, the various police organizations, and the voluntary military organizations (leagues).

"The Regular Army:

"The regular army, if it is not demoralized, is the most powerful arm available against the proletarian revolution. It is obvious that the army operates to the best advantage in the fields and in the daytime. Fighting within the cities, especially at night, hinders the operations of the various units. These units as listed below are to a greater or lesser degree dangerous in the Communistic fight:

"Infantry:

"Constitutes the majority of effective personnel; it uses fire power as well as the bayonet; it takes over buildings and quarters; it mops up insurgent territory and occupies conquered positions.

"The weak points of this arm, which the Communists must know how to use, are:

"Their firearms can be used within the cities only at relatively short range.

"At the beginning of the battle, the peculiarities of the town are little known from the point of view of using them for operations (difficulty of orientation).

"There is always the danger of being attacked by hidden insurgents (in basements, on roofs, in windows, or in attics).

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"The infantry is composed principally of peasants and workers. This mass is not interested . . . . in defending the ruling classes or the middle classes; as a result of this, fraternization and agitation can demoralize the company and swing them over to the side of the insurrectionists. The necessity of operating by little groups in the street, which are not any longer under direct command, causes certain groups of soldiers to cease to be reliable. With a little good work . . . it is relatively easy to swing them over to the Red side. There is also the necessity of putting out of combat the commandant.

"Artillery:

"This arm . . . . is the one which makes the most impression on the masses. However, the material danger to the insurgents who know how to make use of cover is quite insignificant. There are the same possibilities of disorganising here as we saw in the case of the infantry.

"Armored Cars:

"These are very dangerous to the insurrection. To fight them the insurgents would use: Artillery, if they are in possession of any; hand-grenades and high-powered bombs thrown under the tanks and cars in groups of 5 or 6; ditches which are both wide and deep enough to go across the street (width, 1½ meters to 3 meters; depth 1½ meters to 2 meters).

"Cavalry:

"This arm is the most vulnerable in street fighting. Also its role in case of insurrection is insignificant.

"Aviation:

"An aerial reconnaissance can only give important results if the insurgents from the beginning have applied only the most elementary means of camouflage.

"Chemical Weapons:

"The best offense against chemical arms is the seizure of apparatus by insurgents (gas tanks and equipment) and the destruction of personnel.

"Fleet:

"The artillery of the fleet can be used by the government only for the purpose of firing on certain buildings or quarters. However, the crews from the fleet, if they are behind the government, can be used as forces of infantry in the form of small detachments. The Communists must look to the disintegration of these elements."

"Police Agencies"

The Lenin School taught a few precautions to be observed in attacking police stations or posts:

"Police forces are notoriously unreliable (from the Communist viewpoint) for insurrections. Consequently, the city's riot squad, sure to put up a fight, is studied. If it is on three shifts, the weakest one is picked for attack. If there is suspicion that police officers are alert to what is brewing, the advice is to telephone them on

a phony pretext to learn whether they are at home or on duty."

Communist tacticians listed some of the advantages of the insurrectional troops: familiarity with the city, ease of orientation, awareness of existing conditions. In short, they have the means "to insure themselves of a rapid attack, to appear unexpectedly, to execute successful raids, etc."

(c) General Tactics.

Conclusions which would serve as a rule in establishing a plan of insurrection which have been stated by the Communists include:

"Among the troops whose thoughts are counter-revolutionary, we are to disarm them by a surprise attack. In those units where there exists a Communist cell having some influence on a portion of the soldiers, we must organize the insurrection so as to eliminate the commandant and later on use these soldiers against those units which have not yet been demoralized.

"In the case there the surprise attack has not been successful, these troops must be kept in their barracks and must be prevented from approaching the city. In this case, we must use barricades, we must organize the siege of the barracks and cantonments until such time as the insurgents will have formed their armed forces and reinforced any conquered positions.

"If regular troops have entered the city to fight the insurrection, we must apply the tactics of barricades, keeping them thus on a front and at the same time organize to attack them from the rear, from the windows and rooftops, organize fraternization and thus

demoralize the soldiers."

In addition to a general strategic plan embracing the entire country, there should be a detailed tactical plan for each city which would indicate, among other things:

"a. An appreciation of the circumstances and the relation of the forces within the town itself.

"b. The date the insurrection is to be set in motion.

"c. The principal objectives where the insurgents must succeed.

"d. The distribution of forces among various objectives.

"e. The missions the detachments must accomplish after executing their primary mission.

"f. Some indication of alternative conduct to be followed in case of failure of one detachment or another.

"g. Measures to be taken to prevent loyal troops from other cities or regions from coming in.

"h. The formation of regular units of the Red Army during the course of the fighting.

"i. The organization of communications during the insurrection.

"j. The location of the general military commander and other commanders.

"k. A social map of the city indicating favorable quarters according to their social character.

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"l. The detailed disposition of and degree of loyalty within the police organization and military associations which are counter-revolutionary.

"m. The location of armories and the force of their guard.

"n. What counter-measures the forces of the city may logically employ.

"o. Information on garages, automobiles, trucks, etc., belonging to the state which will be removed.

"p. The use, during the insurrection, of urban lines of communication.

"q. The personnel and armament of the revolutionary forces."

The attack on a city is visualized as beginning in the suburbs in the early morning in a general and concentric attack on the central quarters, with diversionary attacks to begin in other quarters. While the main attack is going forward, special reconnaissance squads recruited from soldiers, young Communists, and specially trained Communist scouts (Pioneers or Red Falcons) would ascertain the distribution of government forces at ammunition magazines, bridges, passages, railroads, etc., and who would also attack and disarm small groups of soldiers, organize revolts in the troops, and circulate rumors favorable to the

insurgents. The intelligence missions were to be partially fulfilled by women and children.

Instructions on street fighting gave emphasis to the maintenance of communications and liaison both laterally and from the front to rear, by telephone, couriers on foot, or using motorcycles and automobiles.

Emphasis was placed on offensive operations, but the defensive action was to be based on the following principles.

"a. To gain time in concentrating forces and resources with a view to taking the offensive.

"b. To contain the adversary to certain points so that the main blow may be struck at others.

"c. In order to maintain lines of communication and occupied points.

"d. To maintain the disposition of those units which are resting."

The primary objective of the Communist tactical doctrine is that of overcoming the government's armed forces by a combined assault and fraternization technique. Their tactics are based on probing the enemy's weaknesssses and exploiting them to the utmost. Planning, surprise, and the maintenance of communications for maximum coordination

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are stressed. A weakness of Communist technique lies in its tendency toward standardization which, in turn, may easily lead to advance knowledge of procedures.

The plan for fighting government forces may take varied forms. There may be a general offensive with the object of conquering an area. There may be an offensive directed against strategic points with the object of controlling an area without physically occupying all of it. There may be a purely defensive action of the barricade type. These actions may be used singly or in various combinations. As elsewhere, local situations will govern the tactics. An open, general offensive designed to occupy and capture an area or city may deviate only slightly from orthodox warfare.

It is a characteristic of city and house fighting that the function of control is extremely difficult, so that the individual soldier must be thoroughly trained in the operation. (United States Army Field Manual 31-50 comments that such fighting requires "the highest degree of initiative, skill, cunning, and courage on the part of the . . . individual soldier").

(d) The Internal Assault.

When the attack originates from inside the city and is an uprising in the proper sense of the word, the tactics will differ to some extent in that the insurgent forces are able to go directly to the points they wish to assault, and often even arrange their dispositions before the assault is begun. In this way the objectives may all be taken simultaneously.

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form gangs of workers armed with rifles and hand grenades who will march on enemy positions and on the officers' training schools and surround them."

Actually, Lenin's plan was not executed because the masses in Petrograd staged a successful spontaneous uprising.

(e) Attack on Key Objectives.

Often the situation will be such that it will not be necessary to fight to occupy the entire town. The insurrection can be consummated by attacking one or several key military objectives in town, which will automatically eliminate resistance. This is more likely to be the situation when the revolution enjoys wide popular support.

The Bolshevik rising in Petrograd, for which Lenin had planned a grand assault, is an instance where capture of a specific objective, the Winter Palace, was the only major armed engagement necessary to assure the capitulation of the government. Kerensky had made the mistake of assembling his government at a single point and trying to protect it with the meager forces available. By 7 November 1917, Trotsky's seizure of the city's technical services, combined with what Neuberg later referred to as "scouting action," gave the insurgents control of Petrograd without casualties. One school of thought maintains that the capture of the Winter Palace and the government therein was an entirely superfluous gesture since the government was isolated and hence incapable of governing; yet even were the Winter Palace to be considered a mere symbol of power, its capture was necessary, for the capture of such symbols of power has an important psychological effect.

(f) Guerrilla Action (General).

Fighting the armed forces of the government may be carried on by guerrilla action, with the purpose of demoralising government forces. Obviously, where the aim is victory through demoralization, revolutionary conditions must exist to an extreme degree before such tactics have even a chance of succeeding. At the same time, guerrilla warfare is the only practical means of fighting organized government troops when the latter's strength is relatively unimpaired.

The soldier's discipline and training show to best advantage when he has a definite and visible enemy to combat; sniping, attacks on individuals or small groups of soldiers by a foe who strikes suddenly and disappears into nowhere does not offer the organized military force a target, it nags him and saps his morale, deprives him of his will to fight. Therein lies the advantage of guerrilla action. In Moscow, December 1905, the rebels combined barricade tactics with guerrilla warfare so effectively that they won the city from the garrison, and held out until fresh government troops, with heavy artillery, were brought against them from outside. Small, swiftly moving squads ambushed police patrols to get their arms. Posters were prominently displayed for the instruction of civilian fighters: "Do not form clusters, but attack in small groups with lightning speed; Do not entrench in fortified positions but use thoroughfares and street corners to fire a volley and disappear again; Build barricades to hamper troop movement rather than for defense."

These principles are still basic doctrine. They were used in Germany during the early 1920's and as late as July 1932.

The success of underground resistance movements in occupied countries, for example, the Chetniks, Tito's Partisans, the Ustaci in Yugoslavia, and the French Maquis, indicates that tactics of guerrilla fighting have a universal application.

(g) The Soviet Partisan Movement in World War II.

Since World War II the Soviet Union has sponsored meetings of Communist-controlled partisan organizations in order to control and further indoctrinate and strengthen such partisan organizations. Lessons in military tactics, which can be used for guerrilla warfare, have been published in Party propaganda distributed to Communist Party members. Diagrams and sketches have appeared in French Communist Party propaganda—a sketch showing a small infantry unit in the attack, the under portion of a US tank momentarily exposed as it crosses a small rise in the ground, and advice on how to seek the best firing positions from cover or concealment.

During World War II partisan activity provided a great deal of assistance to the Soviet Union. Although this partisan activity occurred in the years 1941-45, it demonstrates Soviet-Communist methods of guerrilla warfare.

Organization.

In the fall of 1941 when the German forces had already seized a considerable slice of Russia, the Council of Peoples' Commissars passed,

under Stalin, a decree providing for the creation of a partisan movement in the rear echelon of the enemy forces. The center of the partisan movement was established in Moscow. Appointed to head the Central Staff (CSPD) was P. PONOMARENKO, the Secretary of the CKVKP (b) (Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party-Bolsheviks) of Byelorussia, who occupied the position until the end of 1943.

The Central Staff of the Partisan Movement was directly subordinated to the CKVKP (b) (Stalin). On a military level it was likewise closely coordinated directly with the Red Army General Staff, and indirectly, with the Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). In theory, the coordination of these agencies at a top level was to provide complete harmony of policies and operations. In practice, however, it resulted quite frequently in friction, antagonism and, occasionally, in hostile rivalry between the General Staff and the NKVD.

The mission of the CSPD consisted of organising partisan activity in the rear of the enemy armies, both within the USSR and in outlying territories. The purpose of the partisan movement consisted not only of operations of a purely strategic nature, but also of political, diversionary, and terroristic activity on a large scale.

For the organisation of these activities, the CSPD was supplemented by the following sections:

a. Intelligence and reconnaissance

b. Diversion and terror (including sabotage, provocation, etc.)

c. Propaganda

d. Liaison and communications

Several schools and training courses were established under the Central Staff for the purpose of training leaders and rank workers in political, diversionary, and terroristic methods and tactics. Attention was devoted almost exclusively, in view of the urgent need for immediate action, to practical questions. The course lasted from one to three months in most cases, after which period the student was considered qualified. One Central Staff school existed for more thorough preparation of personnel with a two-year training period; only the 1943 class was ever graduated, however. Among the graduates were partisan leaders with training in all aspects of underground activity.

Each school and training course specialized in one particular phase of work, such as propaganda, diversion, sabotage, intelligence, radio, etc. Personnel consisted chiefly of former NKVD workers, militia men and Soviet administrative employees evacuated from enemy-occupied territories. Their families were usually forced to remain in the rear. The teaching staff in each case was determined by the nature of training. For example, intelligence and reconnaissance were taught by Soviet intelligence agents; NKVD officers were used as instructors for diversion, terrorism and sabotage; propaganda was taught by officials of the propaganda apparatus of the CKVKP (b).

The occupied territories were divided into sectors of partisan influence, with a staff for each, subordinated directly to the Central Staff in Moscow, for example, SPD Kalininskoi Oblasti, and SPD Byelorussia.

All partisan organs, involved as they were in a system of cross-channels and more or less two-way subordination, carried out a practically parallel series of missions along the lines of intelligence political and terroristic work; particular autonomy was enjoyed by the Special Groups and the NKVD. All partisan organs established their own underground groups among the local civilian population in the enemy-occupied territories which were used almost exclusively for operational work in conformity with instructions issued by the corresponding partisan organs. These underground groups may be classified structurally according to the following types:

a. "3-5" Groups, a type employed chiefly by the Komsomol. Each Group consisted of three to five men, with one contact man whose duty was to make his way at regular intervals into partisan-controlled territories, find the instructor and receive all instructions from him.

b. Chain-type groups, employed chiefly by partisan detachments. These groups, which varied extensively in number, were organized according to a system whereby each member knew only the individual by whom he was recruited and one member in turn recruited by himself.

c. NKVD groups, organized according to the agent system, whereby a resident chief was appointed for each sector and placed in charge of separate groups of agents.

d. Underground groups of the ordinary type, consisting of any number of members up to 30, each of whom was informed as to the identity of all other members in the same group.

A smoothly functioning system of liaison and communication existed between the partisan movement, the Party and the NKVD in the enemy rear and the Central Organs in Moscow. Principal means of communication were radio and aviation for the transmission messages, intelligence reports, directives and the like. Personnel were transported to and from the enemy rear by air exclusively. Planes landed in assigned areas of partisan activity on landing strips specially constructed by partisans.

Diversion.

The Soviet Command devoted considerable attention to the work of partisan organs along diversionary lines. Partisan diversion played a predominant role in the activities of the Soviet underground in enemy-occupied territory; its significance, while primarily military, extended as well into the political and economic sphere.

The CSPD threw an enormous amount of materials, money, and manpower into the field for the purposes of diversion, sacrificing in many cases some of their most able workers in the line. Losses, to be sure, in time and life were proportionately heavier than in any other line of partisan activity.

Means of Diversion:

Diversionary work was accomplished primarily by means of explosives, which, like all other supplies and materials, were delivered by air to the area of partisan activity. Those materials were also smuggled into cities and areas under enemy control, usually with the aid of well-camouflaged couriers, disguised as peasants travelling from rural districts

to town. Weapons and explosives were concealed in wagons and carts, in sleigh runners, in milk cans, under women's clothing, etc.

Explosives were used to prepare toluene and ammoniac mines weighing anywhere from 0.20 to 45 or 50 kilograms. These mines were set off by a time mechanism with special electric or mechanical fuses.

Among ready-made war materials used for diversionary work the following were most frequent:

a. Magnetic mines - English and American models, with slow-action fuses. (In 1944, a Soviet-made magnetic mine appeared, copied almost exactly from the American model. English and American delay fuses continue to be used however.)

b. Thermite grenades - used chiefly for incendiary purposes. Outstanding for force and effectiveness.

c. Phosphorous pills - likewise used for incendiary purposes. The user had a good chance to reach security, in that the pills burst into flame only after a specific time interval.

In addition to the above, other materials were also used, however to a lesser extent, due to limited effectiveness: Glass-sand powder, gasoline tanks, and toluene candles with incendiary wicks.

Basic diversionary work, in particular that which involved conspiracy, was accomplished largely by means of the magnetic mine, which by virtue of its convenient form and delayed action, proved to be the most effective and practical type of material.

Operational Methods of Diversion.

Every diversionary mission was preceded by meticulous reconnaissance for the purpose of studying the target and the surroundings, checking the amount of material available, and determining the most favorable time for accomplishing the act. Reconnoitering was usually done by persons not initiated into the subsequent phases of the mission. Then, on the basis of all available data, a plan was drawn up with the participation of the persons who were picked to carry it out.

As soon as the plan of action was composed, the diversionary material was immediately brought to the appointed spot, or as near as conditions permitted. Material was selected according to the nature of the target and the circumstances under which the act must be accomplished. Thus, for blowing up a railroad track at the moment when a transport should pass, or for demolishing a highway, heavy toluene mines with electric or automatic mechanical fuses were used. These mines were installed at the prescribed points and left there. Most important military transports were destroyed at railroad stations by means of magnetic mines installed in advance near the station.

In the former instances the chief purpose was destruction of roadbeds and tracks, while the transport merely represented a convenient medium for the explosion. The executors themselves had no knowledge of what the transport contained.

Diversion in factories, warehouses, bases, gasoline dumps, tank parks and motor pools, as well as theaters and other public places, was accomplished

with magnetic mines, time mines, thermite and phosphorous. In most cases, the explosives were brought in ahead of time, sometimes several days in advance; there were cases, to be sure, of explosion being produced immediately after the installation of the material. For example, a diversionist entered a theater with a briefcase containing several magnetic mines, with the fuses set in advance. Ten minutes before the explosion, he left the theater, having placed the briefcase under the seat.

In another instance, a movie-house electrician connected a magnetic mine with electric fuse to the motion picture projector. This he did during the morning. In the evening, when the house was full, the lights were dimmed, the projector turned on, and the explosion occurred.

Power lines and telephone networks in the enemy zone were demolished by means of small thermite grenades, and in the Zone A by means of saws and axes

After accomplishing large-scale diversion in the area of enemy control, the executor, if he were under suspicion, or generally in danger, withdrew into the partisan-controlled zone. When further activities required his presence in the area regardless of security threats, another method of retreat was followed, whereby a different member of the same underground group withdrew instead of the executor. The other member, probably a non-participant or only a partial participant in the recently accomplished diversion, may have been under suspicion himself; or, he may have tried to draw attention away from the real culprit by leading the enemy to believe he was the guilty person. As soon as he had thus placed himself in a

dangerous position, he retreated into the partisan-controlled area, leaving the rest of the underground group free to continue operations, unimpeded by persecution, and the executor remained in the shadows.

Sabotage.

It is clear that this diversion represented all the military aspects of partisan activity, directed toward weakening the enemy's material strength and potential in key spots, destruction of enemy personnel, and consolidation of partisan control by direct means.

The primary purposes of sabotage, on the other hand, consisted of encouraging discontent among the local population, incurring the wrath of the enemy, undermining his authority, and inciting reprisals, which in turn, further provoked the population and promoted a spirit of resistance. The effective maintenance of this vicious circle, which could be brought to the point of self-perpetuation by a minimum of effort on the part of the partisans, was the result of sabotage.

A correlated purpose of sabotage was the organic preservation of the Soviet system in its fundamental structure, which was often as in the case of farming technique and agricultural organization, a task in which the enemy occupational authorities unwittingly assisted. The wide network of agents which enveloped the enemy administration needed only to profit by existing policies and to provide the necessary correctives wherever such policies did not conform completely to partisan aims.

Thus, by contrast to diversion, the methods of sabotage were of an indirect nature, with political and economic considerations taking precedence over the military.

Sabotage activities were initiated by all of the partisan organs. These include the NKVD, SPD, Brigades, partisan detachments, Party and Komsomol centers, and special groups. The leading role in the delineation and initiation of most missions, was, however, performed by the Party organizations at Oblast and Raion levels, a fact which further emphasizes the political significance of this type of work.

Sabotage missions were executed mainly by local inhabitants. A strenuous attempt was made to enlist persons occupying key positions of responsibility. Interpreters and advisers attached to the military administration and the economic apparatus were usually unfavorably disposed toward the new regime; even such persons as may have suffered under the Bolsheviks or been violently anti-Communist saw that the Nazis intended to preserve the existing conditions of slavery in Russia, merely changing the slogans and exploiting the people for their own ends. As a result, many such employees could be drawn into the network of partisans, and they made good use of their opportunity for committing sabotage in the corresponding agencies and institutions.

The number of saboteurs among the local population was swelled by an influx of special partisan agents into key institutions. These agent-saboteurs were usually left in the area in the wake of the Red Army where they posed as political persecutees, enemies of Bolsheviks, former concentration camp inmates, ex-Bulaks, and Red Army deserters. The Germans on the whole were inefficient in the matter of distinguishing genuine persecutees from the small contingent of imposters who were

numerically vastly inferior to the mass of people who hated the Soviet regime so violently that they welcomed the invaders as liberators in the first months of the war.

Agent-saboteurs equipped with falsified documents penetrated the occupational administrative apparatus and the local administrative agencies. For example, many Oblast administrative chiefs, bourgomeisters, village overseers (starosty), doctors, agricultural technicians, and local chiefs of police were active partisan sabotage workers.

Mention should also be made of the sabotage work done by former members of the Communist Party and the Komsomol who remained in the occupied zone either intentionally as genuine refugees or under force of circumstance.

These people were usually recruited by the underground groups after they had already obtained employment on their own initiative in important agencies. Recruiting was done by threatening to expose their past to the German authorities unless they consented to cooperate with the partisans.

Women played a particular part in sabotage just as they did in certain phases of diversionary work. On the pretext of amorous inclinations, they entered into the confidence of prominent enemy officials, whom they induced by "friendly advice" to carry out various missions. The officials in question rarely realized that they were being used, or that their subsequent actions fitted into a plan which was not apparent in the beginning.

In addition to the types of workers described above, the CSPD sent out trained saboteurs whose duty was to remain in the field and to direct sabotage on the spot.

Sabotage was carried out in all areas of the occupied territory; however, like diversion, it was concentrated in the areas of enemy control.

Terror.

In partisan usage, terroristic acts refer to assassination of important persons or groups of persons.

Terroristic acts were carried out on the initiative of local partisan organs or in special cases, by direct order from Moscow (CSPD).

Terroristic activity was largely conducted by the NKVD from the Oblast level on down, with the other partisan organs usually playing a secondary part.

The majority of missions were executed by former NKVD workers, or Party members who had been subjected to special training in terroristic methods and operations under the CSPD school system in Moscow and other large cities. Only in exceptional cases were local inhabitants employed for this type of work, and even then, their functions were usually of an auxiliary nature, whereby they lent indirect assistance to the person committing the act.

The Seizure of Objectives.

Operations involving the seizure of specific objectives, such as communications, utilities, and supply depots differ from fighting the armed forces of the government in that the purpose is not to defeat an armed force but rather to take possession of a physical object or series of objects. This may obviously involve fighting, but it is the occupation that matters, and unnecessary fighting is to be avoided if possible.

Such objectives as telephone and telegraph systems, railroads, electric power stations, water and gas works are highly complicated machines capable of being operated only by highly skilled personnel. Therefore, unless the purpose is to destroy, rather than utilize such objectives, the personnel assigned to take them must be of a different type entirely from those able merely to fire a rifle. These men must be specialists and technicians, and their recruitment often presents a major problem to Communist forces.

There are four different methods by which key objectives may be taken. One, the most obvious and safest, is by prior infiltration of revolutionary personnel, so that when the insurrection occurs, the use of the objective automatically passes to the rebels.

A second method is by means of the general strike.

A third and obvious method is the taking of the objectives by direct assault, a method which may or may not be advisable, depending on the circumstances. Where the insurrection begins with a degree of surprise, it often happens that the objectives are only lightly guarded or completely unguarded, so that a handful of armed men may overcome any resistance with ease.

The fourth method is the capture of the assigned objectives by an "invisible army," a method perfected by Trotsky.

Trotsky described such an operation as follows: The operational seizure began at two o'clock in the morning of 7 November 1917, when small

parties of Petrograd rebels, coordinated under an over-all plan, occupied simultaneously, or in prearranged order, the railroad stations, electric plant, munitions and food stores, the waterworks, the telephone exchange, the state bank, the large printing plants, the telegraph station, and the post office. Trotsky based his tactics on the theory that the insurrection is an art; technical experts are required to start it and they alone can stop it. He had gathered together about 2,000 men, a mixture of soldiers and sailors (many with technical skills) and civilian technicians, and had selected a special staff to lead them: Antonov-Ovsienko, the leader and a former Czarist officer; Podvoisky, a civilian; Krylenko, a soldier; and Dybenko, a sailor. The small groups were organized according to their skills in reference to the objective to be taken. All were selected for aggressiveness and complete reliability.

The intensive preparation of these small, tightly organized assault squads has been described as follows:

"Trotsky's Red Guard had been rehearsing in the very center of the town during the past ten days prior to November 7. Antonov-Ovsienko, it was, who organized these tactical exercises, this sort of dress rehearsal of the coup d'etat, in broad daylight, wherever the streets were thronging with movement, and around buildings which were of the greatest strategic importance in the governmental and political strongholds. The police and military authorities were so obsessed by the idea of a sudden revolt by the proletarian masses and so concerned with meeting the danger, that they failed to notice Antonov-Ovsienko's gangs at work.

"Amid such widespread disorder, who should notice the little group of unarmed workers; the soldiers and sailors who wandered about in the corridors of the telephone and telegraph exchanges, in the Central Post Office, in the Government offices and general headquarters, taking note of the arrangement of the offices and seeing how telephones and lights were fitted? They visualized and remembered the plan of these buildings and studied the means of getting into them suddenly and at a moment's notice. They reckoned with their chances of success, estimating the opposition, and looking for the places of least resistance, the weakest and most vulnerable places in the defensive organization of the technical, military, and secretarial services of the State. In the general confusion, who should notice some three or four sailors or a couple of soldiers or stray workmen wandering around some buildings, going in or climbing the stairs; people who did not even look at each other when they met? No one even suspected these people of obeying precise and detailed orders, of carrying out a plan or of undergoing exercises directed against the strategic points in the state's defense. Later the Red Guards would strike effectively because they had conducted their invisible maneuvers on the very ground where the battle would shortly begin. Trotsky succeeded in getting hold of the plan of the town's technical services. Dybenko's sailors, aided by two engineers and engine room artificers, mastered the underground gas and water piping, the electric power cables and the telephone and telegraph system. Two of them explored the drains under the headquarters of the General Staff.

"The isolation of the whole district or even a more group of houses had to be made practicable within a few minutes; so Trotsky divided the town into sections, determined which were the strategic points, and allotted the work, section by section, to gangs of soldiers and skilled workers. Technical experts were necessary as well as soldiers. The capture of the railway station in Moscow was allotted to two squads consisting of 25 Latvian soldiers, 2 sailors, and 10 railway men. Three gangs of sailors, workmen and railway officials, 160 men in all, were ordered to take over the Warsaw station. For the capture of other stations, Dybenko assigned a number of squads of 20 men each. A telegraphist attached to every squad controlled movements on the railway lines. On October 21 and November 3, acting under orders from Antonov-Ovseienko who was in close touch with the maneuvers, all the gangs rehearsed the capture of the railway stations, and the general rehearsal was perfectly well ordered and precise in every detail. On that day, three sailors went to the Main Electricity Plant near the port; the Plant, run by the city's technical services, was not even guarded. The manager asked the sailors whether they were the men whom he had asked the commander of the square to send to him. He had been wanting a guard for the last five days. The three sailors took over the defense of the Electric Plant, in case of insurrection, they said. In the same way, a few gangs of engine room artificers took over the other three municipal plants."

"In order to overthrow the modern state," Trotsky had said, "you need a storming party, technical experts and gangs of armed men led by engineers."

The Stalin Synthesis.

Trotsky's tactics were applied on a city scale, Mussolini transposed them to a nationwide scale, and both Hitler and Stalin endeavored to apply the pattern to a world-wide scale. The Nazis, of course, failed; but Stalin has built, through the system of Communist Parties in all countries, a corps of insurrectional technicians trained to seize the technical apparatus of a nation at a signal from Moscow if conditions are favorable.

An example of how this organization is to work is contained in the alleged instructions given at the Lenin School in Moscow for the capture of such cities as Chicago. Communist operations are performed not by paratroop technicians but by local Communist organizations. The airborne troops are to be the army of occupation.

The plans call first for a high degree of preparation and a thorough knowledge of the technical services of the city, down to the most minute detail. The organization and routine of the police is studied minutely. Lists of politically "undesirable" citizens provide for the liquidation of some and the use of others while their families are held hostage. Squads assigned to capture each objective are trained in each particular operation. Their final instruction will be the announcement of the hour and minute for the strike.

To prevent calls for outside help, communications are interrupted immediately. Railroads are wrecked several miles outside of the city,

either by sending out unmanned locomotives or by blowing up incoming trains. Armed squads seize and hold the airports, awaiting incoming troops.

Captured radio stations order a general strike after power plants are seized. The mayor , chief of police, and all leading officials are immediately captured. The mayor is "persuaded" to read a previously prepared proclamation over the captured radio. If he refuses, which means his immediate death, someone with a voice similar to his reads it.

The entire operation takes 48 hours, at the end of which time a previously selected government is in operation.

The Essential Nature of Seizure.

The role of the technical facilities of the state are vital to government. These must be seized by the insurgents in all cases where the government does not readily abdicate and hand them over, or where the workers in these installations may be hostile to the new revolutionary government. The well-organized uprising will take pains to allocate personnel to positions giving control of the technical facilities before the operation, or, as a very minimum, strike at those facilities immediately so that surprise will provide their capture intact. No government, revolutionary or otherwise, is safely entrenched without complete control of the technical apparatus of the state.

Arrest or Assassination as a Coordinated Tactic.

Although arrest or assassination alone does not accomplish the coup, except under rare circumstances, there is no question of the necessity of

including the personnel of the government. Not only do these people possess varying degrees of actual power, but, perhaps more important from the viewpoint of the public at large, they are symbols of power and of the state. Thus, even after Trotsky's Red Guards had captured Petrograd, they still found it necessary to capture the Winter Palace and secure a written deputation from the ministers before they could convince even the leaders of their own Party that the insurrection had succeeded. No violent insurrection or coup succeeds unless the ruling figures are arrested, killed, or driven into exile.

Often, the entire success of the plot will hinge on a successful assassination or arrest, as in the case of the Revolt of the German Generals in 1944. Many of the key figures necessary to the plans offered their cooperation (or their benediction) only on the proviso that Hitler was dead. When the bomb intended to kill him failed, the insurrectional machine ground to a creaking halt and many of the pivotal figures deserted the cause. Conversely, in September 1940, when the entire country of Rumania was in the hands of the rebels, it was not until King Carol had actually signed his abdication that the battle was considered won.

In the event arrest is to be used to neutralize or eliminate the governmental leaders, the following aspects are pertinent:

Aside from the fact that a man awakened from sleep is ordinarily not sufficiently alert or perpared to offer resistance, there appears to be something psychologically demoralizing about being attired in night clothes while facing a well-armed man. The average person whose prestige rests on his public impression will ordinarily take pains to avoid any embarrassing situation in public and when he is taken off guard, he is, to a certain extent, morally disarmed and humiliated.

The Technique of Assassination and Terror.

In certain situations, particularly where the revolution attempts a change in the ruling class, the governmental leaders will be considered implacable foes and a menace to the revolution as long as they live. Here, murder or assassination replaces arrest. This method also has the advantage of creating terror and thus breaking the resistance of those leaders who are spared.

Assassination requires careful planning. There should be several sets of alternative plans in case the first one fails, as well as a plan of action in case of failure of the entire operation.

The first task of the mass terrorist is to destroy group solidarity, which he accomplishes by labelling as social crimes all acts with which he disagrees. Propaganda, which publicizes terroristic acts so as to make the

populace more amenable, has often been employed by the Communists. Surcease is offered if the populace accedes to the terrorists' demands, namely, joining the Communist Party.

b. Political instruments used. The case of Czechoslovakia, where a Communist coup d'etat was carried out in February 1948, illustrates this type of Communist maneuver.

A principal determinant of the timing of this coup — probably the main determinant — was the steady decline of Communist prospects in the forthcoming elections (scheduled for May 1948) together with the Communists' increasing difficulties in outmaneuvering their fellow-parties in the National Front, particularly the Social Democrats. At a meeting of the Communist Central Committee on November 27-28, 1947, the party head, Klement Gottwald, served notice that the Party would not acquiesce in this trend of affairs. He raised the accusation that the other parties had been penetrated by secret agents of reaction and were conspiring to bring about an early governmental crisis in which a government of technicians, omitting the Communists , would be formed.

The succeeding steps leading up to and through the Communists' seizure of power were the following:

(1) Abandoning all pretense of hoping to gain a majority in the forthcoming election, the Communists prepared a grandiose program of radical legislation, going far beyond anything agreed to by the parties within the National Front. The program left the non-Communist parties with

only two alternatives: to accept this program which would have completely undercut their influence, or to resign from the government.

(2) Attempting deliberately to provoke the other parties to choose the second alternative, the Communists in February 1948 arranged for monster meetings of their adherents. A national congress of factory councils was called for February 22 to demonstrate for Communist demands for further nationalization. A national congress of the Communist-controlled farmers' commissions was called for February 29 to demand the enactment of Communist-sponsored agricultural legislation that had been steadfastly rejected by the non-Communists. Both congresses were to press for acceptance of the draft constitution sponsored by the Communists, to which the other parties were opposed.

(3) At the same time the Communists continued to strengthen their hand in the security police (which they controlled at the top), and prepared the Workers' Militia for action. Large-scale replacements were made of non-Communist personnel in the Security Corps; activity of agents provocateurs on the local level was increased, and discoveries were made of alleged "reactionary" plots. These moves convinced the moderate parties that the Communists were determined to use all available means to gain an absolute majority in the elections.

(4) By this means the Communists provoked the National Socialists (the leading moderate party) into taking the initiative against them. In an

effort, apparently, to sidetrack the debate on the Constitution, the National Socialist Party introduced the issue of Communist control of the police at a meeting of the National Front on February 5 — with the additional aim of forcing a showdown with the Communists which would either force them to back down or provide the pretext for holding elections immediately. The National Socialists introduced the police issue in the Cabinet on February 13. They demanded that the Communist Minister of the Interior rescind an order for replacement of all regional Security Corps officers by Communists. When the Communists evaded this demand, the National Socialists withdrew from the government, precipitating a cabinet crisis.

(5) The Communists seized advantage of this crisis to create mass disturbances and seize power. They declared they would not consider re-forming a government with the National Socialist ministers who had left. Their methods of forcing the appointment of a predominantly Communist government included: (a) prevailing on the Social Democrats to support them; (b) holding mass demonstrations to intimidate the moderates; (c) seizing by force all government offices and preventing non-Communist employees and even ministers from attending to their duties; (d) searching the headquarters of the National Socialist Party through the security police, on charges of an anti-state plot; (e) preventing all non-Communists, including President Benes, from broadcasting by radio to the nation; (f) breaking up meetings of non-Communist parties and seizing their printing

[redacted]

plants; and (c) letting it be understood that the USSR stood ready to intervene against reappointment of a moderate government. In the latter connection, it is noteworthy that the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Valerian Zorin, arrived in Prague on February 19, ostensibly on other official business, and remained there throughout the crisis. It seems indubitable that his remarks to various Czech government officials played a part in influencing President Benes and the moderates to capitulate.

The result of these pressures was that President Benes appointed a predominantly Communist cabinet on February 25.

(1) The Pattern of Communist Participation in Coalition Governments Since the War.

Communist participation in coalition cabinets with bourgeois parties has become an integral part of Communist tactics since World War II. The nature and purposes of this participation have been determined by two factors: the internal alignments facing the Communists within a given country and the demands of Soviet foreign policy at a given moment. These factors, in turn, have varied according to two types of countries:

(a) Non-orbit, where Western influence is ascendant and the Communist chances for obtaining control are limited; in these countries, the Communists have participated only in genuine coalitions in which the Communist Party has been merely one among several equal or stronger parties;

(b) Orbit, where Soviet occupation or predominance has assured Communist domination of a bogus coalition in which other parties have only nominal equality.

After the German attack in June 1941 had brought the USSR and the West together as Allies, developments in both types of countries followed a similar pattern as Communists everywhere emphasized the necessity for the joint efforts of all parties and groups against fascism. The Communists took part in all-party national committees which later became national governments. They propagated nationalist slogans, contributed to national resistance movements, and denied their dependence on Moscow, a change symbolized by the formal dissolution of the Comintern in 1943.[1]

In the period immediately following liberation and Allied occupation, the Communists continued this policy of participating in coalition governments. On an international level, Big Three agreements called for the formation of governments representing all democratic elements in the defeated and in some of the liberated countries. Internally the Communists were too weak outside the orbit to seize power and not strong enough inside the orbit to carry out their program. Moreover, in contrast to the prewar Communist policy of non-participation in cabinets

[1] However, despite this emphasis on unity, it should be noted that the Communists tried wherever possible to build up their own forces, sometimes even at the expense of the fight against fascism. In Yugoslavia and Greece, for example, Communist-led partisans fought rightist groups as well as Germans and Italians. The problem of armed Communist groups continued to vex the governments and occupation forces in France and Italy following their liberation.

or of parliamently alliances with other parties (Popular Fronts)[1], the Communists apparently decided that it was more advantageous to work as a governmental party — rather than in opposition — in order to expand their national strength and influence the country's foreign policy.

The history of Communist participation in coalition governments since the war has reflected the transition from the wartime Soviet-Western alliance to the gradual widening of the chasm between East and West.

In non-orbit countries, as a result of the stresses which East-West tensions, together with internal developments, have caused in Communist relations with other parties, the Communists have been pushed out of the former coalitions and into increasingly bitter opposition to their respective governments. As relations between the USSR and the West have deteriorated, the Communists have had to consider the alternatives of coalition or of opposition. The other possible alternative, a coup d'etat, has now been precluded at least in Western Europe, both because of internal weakness and because of the serious international repercussions of such a move. By the summer of 1947, the Communists were forced out of every government in Western Europe. In October 1947, as a result of Moscow's

[1] Although the Communists foreswore taking part in bourgeois cabinets, they did not preclude participation in cabinets in which the "working class parties" had a majority, as in the case of local German governments in 1923. However, it should be noted that Communist weakness and the reluctance of the other parties to give Communists cabinet posts made the question largely academic before the war. Spain, where the Communists did take posts in 1936 represented a special case because of the civil war.

insistence at the meeting of the Cominform, the French and Italian Communists had to give precedence to the Soviet campaign against the Marshall Plan rather than to their local aspirations. They have since attempted to redefine their nationalism in more openly pro-Soviet terms, have become more anti-Western, and seem determined to force the political situation into a Left-Right dichotomy in which they hope to assume the leadership of a leftist coalition.

In the orbit countries, worsening East-West relations accelerated Moscow's desire to consolidate its position in the territories under Soviet influence. As a result, the Communists gradually dropped the fiction of coalition government, and general Communist predominance has been or is being transormed into exclusive Communist control. At the Cominform meeting of October 1947, it was decided that even the bogus coalitions in which the other parties had only nominal autonomy were to be replaced by unified mass People's Fronts under Communist direction. The tempo has varied from country to country. In Czechoslovakia the formation of a bogus coalition was not possible until after the Communist coup of February 1948. In Northern Korea and Eastern Germany, Communist tactics have been conditioned by the possibility of eventual union between the Soviet and Western Zones and by the desire to maintain contact with parties in Western Zones and to build up the impression that Soviet Zone parties were representative of the whole country.

Since the Tito rift in June 1948, Soviet Cominform goading has pushed the Communists into assuming more active and exclusive leadership of the mass popular fronts. The obligatory orientation of all parties toward the USSR has been given greater emphasis. At the same time, the Tito affair has highlighted the question of how far Moscow can dictate Communist tactics generally and with respect to the organization of Communist control. It is important to note that Yugoslavia was the only country of any size in Eastern Europe where the Communists gained power mainly by their own efforts. In other orbit countries, the prevalence of Moscow-trained personnel who arrived in the wake of the Red Army and the dependence of Communists on the USSR for the attainment of power have made it easier for Moscow to determine the nature of Communist activity in these coalitions.

V. COALITIONS IN NON-ORBIT COUNTRIES.

The high point of postwar Communist participation in non-orbit coalition governments came in the period immediately following the war when the Communist parties were operating as "national" parties in a period of comparative Soviet-Western amity. Not being strong enough to assume power, the Communists identified themselves with specific national tasks on which they could work jointly with other parties: for example, purges in various countries under fascist and collaborationist influences, the struggle in Belgium and Italy against the monarchy, and reconstruction everywhere.

By thus operating as a national party within a bourgeois coalition, the

Communists hoped to reap several benefits.

(1) They hoped to increase their mass support for the first post-liberation elections. They wanted to take advantage of the "respectability" they had gained by their disavowal of revolutionary aims, by their work in the resistance movements, and by Soviet prestige that came with victories in the war. They aimed at widening their appeal among middle-class and agrarian elements. In this period when reconstruction was a national issue, they did not want to alienate the support of non-Communist working-class elements. Moreover, when British and American troops were still present, as for example in France and Italy, the Communists felt the necessity of convincing the US and Britain that the Communist Party was not revolutionary in order to insure participation in the postwar elections in which they expected to make gains.

(2) The Communists, by their very presence in the government, were able to influence foreign policy. The other parties were obliged to weigh the consequences for social stability and international prestige should the Communists be forced into opposition. Such considerations were particularly important in the case of France, for example, during the Moscow discussions on Germany in March 1947. While the Communists might not have expected to orient toward the USSR countries in which they were still a minority, they may have hoped at least to neutralize these nations in the rising East-West conflict. Moreover, participation in the cabinet opened up to the Communists sources of information and new avenues of espionage regarding foreign policy

matters. It should be noted that the Communist attitude toward assuming the responsibility for foreign policy has depended on the individual situation. Thus, in Italy, during 1946 and 1947, the Communists showed no predilection to accept any blame for the peace treaty being negotiated.

(3) They attempted to infiltrate whatever ministries they did procure and to use their position in the government to enhance the position of the party. The tempo of their operations depended on the opposition they met from the other parties. Perhaps the best example of Communist infiltration was provided in Czechoslovakia, which, though in the Soviet orbit, before the coup d'etat in February 1948 resembled the non-orbit countries politically. Here the Communists placed their men in the army, the secret police, and in economic positions which facilitated the execution of the February coup.

(4) In several instances the Communists tried to correlate their participation in coalition cabinets with proposals for United Fronts with Socialist parties in the hope of being able to establish Communist supremacy over the working class. Such unified action was aimed at enhancing leftist parliamentary strength against the center and right and — although their attacks against the Socialists at the time were muted — to dominate Socialist policies and to wean the Socialist rank-and-file from its leadership. However, Communist policy in this connection has varied

considerably. The United Front did not last long in France. In smaller Western European states, the Communists were not anxious for such unity since it often meant that they would be subordinated to the more powerful Social Democrats. Moreover, it should be noted that since their elimination from the Western European governments, and following the formation of the Cominform, Communist professions of a desire to re-enter various coalition governments have been accompanied by strong attacks against the Socialists.

As long as the Communists have considered participation in the government efficacious for the achievement of these aims — and while they have been too weak to seize power — they have often been willing to attenuate temporarily both their political and economic objectives. While they have been especially anxious to receive cabinet posts such as those of the Interior, Justice, National Defense, and Information, which would place them close to the sources of power and persuasion in a modern society, they have been willing to accept less. Thus in France, their apprehension over the initial successes of the all-Socialist Blum government in January 1947 and their general fear of being isolated led the Communists to accept a National Defense post hedged by restrictions, along with relatively unimportant ministries. In addition, actuated by the desire to prolong their participation in government, the Communists have temporarily laid aside certain aspects of their economic program. In France and other countries, for example, they tempered their insistence on nationalization

when it seemed that pressing the issue might split the coalition.

Communist tactics, however, have usually been subtle. When Communist cabinet ministers have voted for measures which were at variance with their stated aims, the Communists have agitated against these measures in other ways. For example, early in 1947, French Communist ministers ostensibly supported the government program on price reduction, while the Communist-led General Confederation of Labor carried on extra-parliamentary agitation against it. Thus along with their activity in the government, the Communists have attached primary importance to organizing mass support outside. They have been especially eager to secure control of the trade-unions and to create fronts or infiltrate already existent mass organizations of all types — women, youth, war veteran, peasant, cultural societies. Strikes or the threat of strikes have been used to exert pressure on the government. The front organizations have participated in demonstrations to show alleged popular approval of Communist demands. Another Communist mechanism for potential extraparliamentary use has been the national committee such as the anti-De Gaulle "vigilance committee" in France, which may represent the equivalent of the action committees used by the Communists in the Czech coup. These Committees were formed following Communist exclusion from the government in France and apparently have not gained mass support.