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PROPONENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF TOTAL
ESPIONAGE

Following is a translation of an article by F. Sergeyev
in the Russian-language journal Znamya (The Banner),
No 12, Moscow, December 1964, pages 210-229.

Nobody gets pleasure from dissecting the souls of traitors. But every instance of treason, no matter how seldom such cases occur, is always instructive. They make it possible to judge what sort of persons are recruited by the enemy and to learn our mistakes in selecting individuals for membership in units which are of interest to enemy Intelligence. We are now speaking of an officer who served with Soviet troops abroad. We will only use the first letter of this traitor's last name because his family, which had no part in his foul actions, still lives among us.

The former officer of the Soviet Army, Lieutenant Colonel P. was shot two years ago. But he began to die earlier -- five years before this, during the time when he began to collaborate with American Intelligence. He died a little each day from his fear of discovery, from self-degradation, from self-alienation. Each day, he would put on the overcoat of his uniform and report for work, greeting his comrades. But he was their enemy. The information which he collected and passed to American Intelligence worked against the very country which he served. During monthly meetings with his chiefs from American Intelligence, he received instructions together with envelopes containing the Judas pay he was given in return for his notes. But things didn't reach the stage of passing notes at once.

During 1958, while stationed in Vienna, P got involved in a love affair with one Emilia Kohanek without the knowledge of his family and comrades. She was just right for P.: She made no claims on him, asked no questions, was obliging, and (P., of course, didn't notice this) she was shrewd. The Lieutenant Colonel didn't hide from her his admiration for the "bright" life of Vienna, for the show windows of extensive shops, for the splendour of luxurious restaurants. When he was transferred from Austria to a city in East Germany, Emilia began to write him. She didn't miss the opportunity to send a birthday card reminding him of the happy days they had spent together in Vienna. Other times, her letters were sad, but all sounded sincere; She did not conceal her desire somehow to meet again to reminisce about old times, "to relive the past", if this was agreeable to P. All this seemed so convincing that Emilia succeeded in getting P. to agree to a secret meeting. It was arranged that Emilia would travel to West Berlin and that P. would arrange for temporary duty orders to the East German capital.

After he arrived in Berlin, P. changed into civilian clothes and secretly left his station for the Western Sector in order to meet his loved one. Emilia Kohanek failed to appear at the prearranged place. But there were others there: Two hefty American Military Police agents arrested P. When they were done with him, it was not P. who returned to the East German capital, but the American agent "Max". "Max" told the following story during subsequent interrogations:

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"On the day we had set, I arrived on temporary duty in East Berlin, from where I went to West Berlin without the authorization of my commanding officers. However, rather than Kohanek, two unknown men in civilian clothes approached me at the prearranged spot and presented credentials of the criminal police. After telling me that I was in the area of some sort of secret installation, they invited me to go with them. I lost my head, got into their car, and, after a few minutes, was at the headquarters of the American military police. During the interrogations, which lasted six hours, the Americans told me that I had been caught red-handed as a Soviet spy and that, should I refuse to cooperate with them, I would be sent to the West. Moreover, they told me that, since I had crossed the zonal border without a pass from my commander, they had every reason for either telling the press of my escape from the USSR or for returning me to the Soviet authorities as a person who had asked the Americans for political asylum. Either way, my family would have suffered. Having no way out, I accepted the proposal to become their agent."

From his fitness reports, this traitor seemed to be practically a living angel. But, as sometimes happens, the people who wrote the reports were aware of his true character. They failed to give timely attention to his negative qualities, which could be dangerous under certain conditions. It was known that P. was egocentric and secretive, that he lacked common, everyday courage in relations with his comrades, that he was a obviously weak individual. All these qualities, taken within the context of the complicated situation in which he worked, attracted the attention of "hunters" and made him a target of American Intelligence. And he was weak, surrendered, and became a traitor.

"The American Intelligence officer who recruited "Max", Lieutenant Colonel Sharnhorst (really Gary Grosman), told him that it would be his job to collect information on our armed forces and, more precisely, to betray our state secrets. His chiefs gave him secret writing materials, code books concealed in a hollowed-out spinning bobbin, and communications instructions. And he worked for them until he came to the attention of the organs of State Security. And this is how it happened:

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Russell August Lenzhelli worked at the US Embassy in Moscow. As a diplomat, the father of three children, and an attentive husband, he led what seemed to be a completely decorous life to those around him. Every morning he would set out for work at the Embassy; in the evenings he would familiarize himself with the city and, on nice days, he would take excursions with his family. Nothing, it seemed, would indicate that, besides his administrative and managerial duties, for which Lenzhelli was accredited to the Embassy, he had other concerns. But a number of Lenzhelli's actions convinced State Security that his official position was merely a cover for other functions.

✓ Once, during the summer, a special miniature container holding instructions and money meant for an unknown American intelligence agent, was found to have been left by Lenzhelli under the handrail of a stairway leading from Lenin Hills to the Moscow River. Lenzhelli covered this "operation" by an innocent stroll with his wife and children.

And thus the innocent family man came under even closer scrutiny by the Chekists. He continued to stroll about the city during office hours, when he should have been at the Embassy. Frequently, his wife accompanied him. Clearly there was a purpose behind this -- the wife served as a lookout for the intelligence officer. The behavior of the American woman showed this. Once, stopping his car, Lenzhelli boarded the Metro with his wife and rode back and forth along a rather complicated route without any clear

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purpose. Such behavior might seem odd to the uninitiated -- after entering a car on the Metro, Lenzhelli would suddenly jump off, pulling open the already closing doors, and run to another platform. But the professionals had no doubts: Lenzhelli had detected surveillance. After finally getting off the Metro, he approached a bus stop and stood next to a Lieutenant Colonel. For an instant, their arms and hands touched. A small package suddenly appeared under Lenzhelli's arm. This Lieutenant Colonel was the same "Max". Up to this time, nothing was known of his relations with Emilia Kohanek, about his trip to West Berlin, or about his subsequent meetings with American Intelligence officers. P. was now placed under observation together with Lenzhelli.

A documentary film has been made entitled Shova po chernoy trope (Once More Along the Black Path). Some scenes in this film are taken from the Lenzhelli-"Max" affair, though the episode concerns another of their meetings -- in the entrance of the "Astoriya" restaurant (now called the "Tsentrallyy") on the corner of Gor'kiy and Nemirovicha-Danchenko streets in Moscow.

The camera shows a crowd of Moscovites strolling along Gor'kiy Street. A young man has his arm around a girl; an old man is opening a package of cigarettes; two men are conversing near the window of a book store; finally, we see the hurrying feet and shoulder boards of a Lieutenant Colonel and then a full view of his face. Something is bothering the officer. The camera moves only infrequently to the other people -- the Lieutenant Colonel is the center of attention. He approaches the door of the restaurant and glances inside. It is clear from his expression that somebody is late for an appointment. He nervously paces the sidewalk.

An automobile of foreign make slowly moves along an alley. Stopping the car, the man behind the wheel gets out and offers his hand to a lady getting out the other side. The camera takes in the entire scene. Then it zeroes in on the hand of the man; he hugs the woman tenderly around the waist and, with quick fingers, takes something, a small packet, from the pocket of her jacket. The pair enters the vestibule of the restaurant and "Max", with whom we are already acquainted, rapidly follows them.

A long-range shot (for obvious reasons), taken through the large glass door of the restaurant, shows a public telephone. Apparently, the Lieutenant Colonel and the man who has just driven up want to use the phone at the same time. What's this? The same packet, which we saw in the hands of the foreigner a moment ago, is now held by the Lieutenant Colonel. But they don't seem to know one another. In any case, the camera, which has had them in view the whole time, didn't notice that they greeted each other or gave any other sign of recognition. And they separated like complete strangers. But we already know, as they say, that they have met before "behind the scenes". "Max" told all about this during the investigation: "In April 1958, Sharnhorst introduced me to an American Intelligence officer, who used the pseudonym "Daniel", in Berlin. This was done in case I were to be sent back to Moscow. "Daniel" gave me a private telephone number in Moscow and two set phrases to be used to call him to a meeting...."

The people filming this documentary had no doubts that this P. was a traitor and that Lenzhelli was the person to whom P. was passing espionage information.

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But this is not enough. It was necessary to catch the criminals red-handed. The "sincere indignation and perturbation" expressed by certain American diplomats, when they are accused of unlawful activity, is well known. Irrefutable proof is necessary. And it was gotten quickly. As usual, at 8 o'clock in the morning, Lenzhelli left for the bus stop on Kutuzovskiy Prospect on his way to the Embassy. "Max" was waiting for him at the bus stop. Standing in different places in line, they got on the same bus. A Chekist jumped on the bus after them. At the moment when Lenzhelli moved toward the exit, passing the Lieutenant Colonel, the two exchanged packages unseen by the other passengers. The Chekist gave a prearranged signal to his comrades, who were waiting at one of the stops. On leaving the bus, Lenzhelli, together with the package which he had received from the spy, was instantly ushered into their car. Two stops later, "Max" was also arrested red-handed. Thus ended the short-lived collaboration of "Max" with American Intelligence.

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In their book The Invisible Government, the American journalists D. Weiss and T. Ross write that "US embassies around the world have secret floors or departments where CIA missions are located. Each mission is headed by a chief and includes several intelligence officers. CIA employees are included among State Department or diplomatic personnel. This is their "cover". Is further proof necessary of the indisputable fact that, following the example of Nazi Germany, the ruling circles of the United States have transformed their diplomatic apparatus abroad into a tool of espionage? In crude violation of generally accepted standards of international relations, the Central Intelligence Agency is increasingly subordinating American diplomatic representations to its own interests.

If this is characteristic of the US diplomatic service in other countries, it is particularly so with regard to the American Embassy in and military attaches in the Soviet Union. What are the facts? There are as many as you want. What relation to the conduct of diplomatic functions can the following lines from the diary of a diplomat possibly have?

"8 January, Monday: Drove to the southern edge of the city in search of anti-aircraft batteries, but found nothing in the new regions. 12 January, Friday: Drove all morning with Tornal and Abbel through the southeastern part of the city in new areas. Didn't see a single anti-aircraft battery, but collected some good information about the locality. 20 January, Saturday: Bush and I drove for three hours through a snow storm in the eastern and southeastern parts of the city; spotted three anti-aircraft batteries. 27 January, Saturday: Because of poor visibility we didn't carry out any reconnaissance; wrote two letters and a report on the location of the anti-aircraft batteries in order to have them ready for the diplomatic touch. 28 January, Sunday: Got up at 10, had breakfast, then took the Metro to Ring B, strolled for an hour in the area of Frunze Academy; didn't see anything new if you don't count the old calvery stables where several horses are apparently kept. 15 February, Thursday: Tornal and I carried out discreet observation in the industrial regions in the northern part of the city, but failed to locate a single anti-aircraft battery. 24 March, Saturday: Tornal and I checked the presence of anti-aircraft batteries, two of which have been removed. An industrial enterprises is under construction at their old location".

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These lines are taken from the personal diary of a former US military attache in Moscow, Major General Robert Crow. The diary, which was lost by the unfortunate general and eventually was made public, can be called sort of a "bible" for American intelligence officers. In it, Crow had written "our intelligence organs must constantly seek to discover and report both the strong and weak points of the enemy. Our attack must be directed to the enemy's weak spot. Although the military services are primarily concerned with the question of weapons and methods of waging battle, we must understand that this is total war and it must be fought using all means. We can win this game if we organize an attack of a political, psychological, economic, and subversive character. We must understand that it is permissible to hit below the belt...." Indeed, Crow not only was without scruples when choosing where to strike, but was not adverse to collecting the most elementary types of information. For example, during a trip to Yasnaya Polyana, he noted the numbers of military vehicles and located military equipment; when visiting Postov-on-Don, he determined that "the bridge across the Don is the best target in the south of Russia", and the like. Crow operated rather crudely: he was caught several times with the goods and, as a result, became the center of an international scandal. One would think that Crow's incident would serve as a warning to the people at the US Embassy in Moscow. But no: as they say, the leopard can't change his spots. Here are only a few of the facts:

1954: Lieutenant Colonel Howard Felchin, the assistant military attache, and Major Walter Makkinin, the assistant air attache, were expelled from the USSR for collecting military information during trips within the country. They got into trouble by losing their notes and even the original copy of their intelligence assignment.

1955: Assistant military attaches John Benson, Captain William Stroud, and Captain Walter Mule, who were actively engaged in collecting military intelligence information, were declared persona non grata.

1956: Assistant air attaches Hubert Tensey and Captain Charles Stokkel, who repeatedly attempted to penetrate areas where military units are located, airports, and other military targets, as well as the border zone in the area of Brest, were expelled from the USSR.

1957: Assistant military attaches Paul Uffelman and Lieutenant William Lewis, who were arrested in Leningrad while photographing defense enterprises, were declared persona non grata.

1958: Military attache, Colonel Clyde MacBride and seven other employees of the offices of the Military, Air, and Naval attaches were found guilty of the same activity. [REDACTED]

1959: Embassy attache Russell Lenzhelli, who was caught red-handed during a clandestine meeting with an American spy, was asked to leave the Soviet Union.

1960: Air Attache, Colonel Edmund Kerton, and his assistant, Major Irving MacDonald were expelled from the USSR for repeated attempts to penetrate areas occupied by military and military-industrial targets. When they were arrested, a film containing photographs of military aircraft and defense enterprises was found on them.

And this is what took place in October 1962 in Leningrad. Workers V. A. Nikitin and M. A. Nikolayev, the chief of a life-saving station, Al Val'ter, and a diver, L. M. Kravchenko caught a suspicious person in the vicinity of a military target. He was acting strangely -- sometimes talking to himself and then suddenly beginning to play with the lapels of his jacket. The workers summoned the Militia. They told their prisoner

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to unbutton his raincoat and jacket, where they found a small black instrument and white cloth pouches skillfully concealed on his chest. The farther they went the more they discovered. The pouches turned out to contain diagrams, charts, maps, lists of notes; the pocket of the coat held binoculars and some sort of small ear phones were attached by tape to the cloth pouch of a microphone, from which fine wires ran to the black instrument.

The prisoner turned out to be the assistant US Naval Attache, Raymond Smith. He carried plans of the ports of Leningrad and Tallin, on which marks had been made, giving the precise locations of moorings, gasoline tanks, repair shops, and enterprises related to port activities. The intelligence officer's portable recording apparatus held a tape with almost two hours of recording on it -- Smith had dictated the results of his observations during a stroll in the area of the military targets. In addition, Smith was found to be carrying a miniature Minox camera, containing an exposed film of an intelligence nature, and high-power binoculars, which permitted him to observe interesting installations from a great distance.

Following Raymond Smith, his namesake Edgar Smith, the Assistant Air Attache, was caught in the beginning of 1964. Together with two employees of the US and British air attache offices, Edmund Evetina and Commander Anthony Davis, he was trying to carry out reconnaissance of military targets in the Tula area.

The unscrupulous use of the diplomatic service by American Intelligence was shown by the scandalous case of Richard Jacob and his colleagues, who misused their official positions. A secretary-archivist at the US Embassy in Moscow, Richard Karl Jacob was caught red-handed when he was taking espionage reports, hidden by the traitor Pen'kovskiy, from a secret cache. At the same time, Soviet State Security organs found that other employees of the American Embassy had a part in this case. Extraordinary facts were uncovered: in anticipation of a prearranged call from the spy, Second Secretary of the US Embassy, Ralph Jones, and Attache Hugh Montgomery stood watch for hours at the telephone; at the first signal, the Embassy doctor, assistant Air Attache Alexis Davison rushed to a light role with the spy's mark; assistant agricultural attache Rodney Karlson maintained personal contact with the spy and received stolen material from him. It seemed that almost all the inhabitants of the Embassy building on Chaykovskiy Street were engaged in a single endeavor -- servicing the spy Pen'kovskiy. In league with their husbands, the wives of the diplomats also actively supported secret contacts with the traitor, using children's playgrounds on the boulevards of Moscow and embassy clubs, diplomatic receptions, apartments, and even washrooms for this purpose. And although, in accordance with the rules of diplomatic immunity, none of these people appeared on the docket in court, where Pen'kovskiy and his English partner Grevill Wynn ended up, the world learned how many unusual "diplomats" the CIA used to direct the American Embassy in Moscow.

We live in an enormous and very beautiful country, offering any foreigner a tourist route to satisfy the most diverse tastes. We have much of interest to offer admirers of antiquities. A trip through the USSR can afford great pleasure to the art connoisseur and to people who are interested in nature, hunting, fishing, and touring by car. Of course, this does not exhaust the interests of travellers -- increasing numbers of people from all over the world want to see with their own eyes the first Soviet socialist state in history.

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True realization of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence has resulted in the appearance of many new phenomena, unknown to us during the personality cult, and among these is foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. Foreign tourism is growing; each year; more and more countries are participating and the number of guests who visit us is increasing. The state is showing them greater attention on the theory that the more people who see the Soviet Union with their own eyes and get to know its people, the more difficult it will be for bourgeois propaganda to spread all sorts of cock-and-bull stories about the aggressiveness of the USSR and about its desire to unleash a new World War. Motels and camping sites, hotels and sanatoriums, pensions and museums, theaters and concert halls serve our foreign guests. Tourists are received with traditional Soviet hospitality and we hope their time in the USSR will be well-spent, that they will see and learn much. Most tourists, on their return home, correctly and kindly tell about the Soviet Union and its people, about their cares and hopes. And this helps to strengthen mutual understanding and trust among peoples, to convince people that peaceful coexistence is not a "tactical move" and not a "Communist propaganda trick", but a natural objective process in the development of international relations in the modern world.

Is this not why tourism has become a target of attack for those who are opposed to peaceful coexistence? Imperialist intelligence takes a two-sided position with regard to foreign tourism in the USSR: on one hand, they try to use it as a loop-hole to carry out intelligence activity and, on the other, they try to discredit the idea of tourism itself. Exploiting cases when their agents and intelligence officers have been caught in our country, they hope to frighten honest people out of their desire to visit the Soviet Union and to get to know the life of its people. Placing agents among the tourists, American intelligence would like to provoke Soviet authorities into changing their position with regard to foreign guests, into the establishment of barriers against this human influx which unites countries with different systems.

But, no matter how ingenious the approaches taken by the CIA leaders, they cannot force us to go to extremes. We have, once and for all, freed ourselves from the suspicion which poisoned our lives in former times. This does not mean, however, that, when doing away with the vestiges of the personality cult and the situation of manifold distrust which went along with it, a narrow-minded complacency and paring about have taken its place. To the contrary, the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU and the new Party Program have taught us to tell our real friends from our enemies. The whole world knows that the great strength of the Soviet state, its scientific and technical advances, its prowess in such great accomplishments, say, as space research, give our imperialist enemies no peace. In the political, economic, and strategic fields, imperialist circles are extremely interested in penetrating our many secrets. Let us recall that Allen Dulles was thinking specifically about tourism when, during an address at a dinner of the Aeronautical Institute in New York, said as early as January 1960 that "at the present time, the outside world can obtain more information inside the Soviet Union than in the past. This is particularly true of information concerning the development of the Soviet economy....". How this is actually accomplished can be easily seen in cases when State Security organs have uncovered American spies visiting the USSR with tourist visas and trying to lose themselves in the mass of people who sincerely want to become acquainted with our country, with its expanses, its beauties, and its people.

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In this influx, however, there appeared a shabby Renault automobile, driven by a 30-year old ship's machinist from Amsterdam, Ebert Reydon, and carrying Lou de Yakher, a 25-year old merchant marine navigator, as a passenger. Tourists are tourists and their itinerary was generally typical of all automobile tourists: Uzhgorod - Kiev - Khar'kov - Zaporozh'ye - Yalta - Odessa - Kiev - L'vov - Uzhgorod. If you take this route, you can see the beauty of Kiev rising from the ashes, green Khar'kov, the gigantic Dnipro, the unforgettable nature of the Crimea with its remarkable resort cities, and ancient L'vov. Sitting around a camp fire at a camping site in the evening, you can spend many hours in pleasant and interesting conversation. And there's much to photograph -- in the cities, the steppes, forests, and coastal regions.

All this is possible But Reydon and de Yakher were least of all interested in antiquities and landscapes. They were not attracted by hearty get-togethers around campfires and by the opportunity of getting to know the "Russian miracle", about which there are now so many rumors not only in their native Amsterdam, but in ports near and far which they have visited. Too often, Reydon and de Yakher tried to deviate from their itinerary, too evident was their desire to get into places where Soviet citizens do not wish to allow indiscreet, foreign eyes. The passengers of the shabby Renault had a reason for such behavior. Their return was awaited not by the relatives and friends who usually fling themselves glibly on friends returning from distant lands. American Intelligence residents, who had outfitted them for their espionage voyage, waited for the seamen. Long before their trip to the USSR, Reydon and de Yakher completed so-called "training" trips. Here is what Ebert Reydon had to say about them during the investigation following his arrest:

"We also drove to the port of Rotterdam. The purpose was to practice photography from a moving car and also to give a detailed description of an American destroyer at anchor in the port. De Yakher and I", continued Reydon, "studied albums of photographs showing various military targets: rocket and radar installations, various types of tanks, jet planes, special vehicles for hauling rocket equipment. They showed what a rocket base, an airport, a tank storage field should look like. I recall that most of the photographs came from military and air parades in Moscow."

The American intelligence officers outfitted the "tourists" with unusual care and, it must be said, with considerable foresight: four cameras, dozens of color and black-and-white films, a supply of telescopic lenses for long-range photography, compasses, powerful binoculars, portable transistor radio receivers, and many other things which might be useful in carrying out their espionage mission. And their mission was very specific --- "We were to try", said de Yakher after his arrest, "to penetrate an airport and automobile plant in the region of Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'ye and, for this purpose, they showed us maps drawn on tracing paper, of the supposed locations of these targets. We were given similar assignments with regard to Uman and Belaya Tserkva... In the region of one village, the name of which I can't recall without checking my notes, we were to find and photograph an enterprise which was supposed to produce rocket fuel... In the area of Uzhgorod-L'vov, they ordered us to locate, describe, and photograph railroad lines, trains passing through and being formed there, bridges, radar installations, high-voltage transmission lines, and also branch automobile roads leaving the main route...." And so on and so forth.... The spies familiarized themselves with photocopies of the Crimean coast, with a chart of the port of Odessa, and were even advised to go to a picture gallery, from which they could most safely secretly photograph the installations at this port.

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In actuality, fulfillment of this mission was not so simple as were the "training trips". In one instance a militiaman returned Reydon and de Yakher to the road when they tried to turn off to a point, shall we say, "not listed in the tourist guide". Another time, employees of "Inturist" explained that there is no easy access road to the village with the name "which is difficult to remember". On the third, fourth, and fifth tries, they simply told them that "foreign tourists are not allowed". Nevertheless, the uninvited guests were able to compile espionage notes which were far from unimportant to our security. A customs check at Uzhgorod turned up a diary in the possession of de Yakher. He had jotted down colorful notes such as "___ km - radar tower to the left, ___ km - viaduct, ___ km - airport on the right, ___ km - convoy of military vehicles, ___ km - turn to the right to a forbidden zone".

The search of these two tourists was a rather unpleasant process for our customs men. It doesn't enter their heads to search the thousands of honest and well-meaning foreigners who pass daily through control points on the Soviet border. But Reydon and de Yakher were so nervous at the customs house, behaved so suspiciously, that they attracted attention. There's no point in saying that there's no smoke without fire

We'll skip the details of the espionage episode of Reydon and de Yakher, which are, perhaps, not without interest -- how they fell in the laps of American Intelligence, how, in particular, the "tender-hearted Yankees" came to those carefree seamen, how they convinced them that an espionage voyage to the Soviet Union would be little more than a recreational trip, similar to one that Reydon had taken previously in Shanghai. In this article, we are interested in something else: American intelligence persistently tries to use every possibility for espionage against the USSR.

In the western countries, there are many people who passionately hate our country. One of these is Adolf Werner, who once headed a department in the store of the Schneider firm in Karlsruhe. He joined the National Socialist Party as early as 1940 and remained in it until 1945, until the moment when the Americans captured him. Up to this time, Werner served for a fairly long period of time in a "Death's Head" infantry brigade of the SS, fought against our country, received first and second degree Iron Crosses, and, when the Soviet Army smashed Hitler's military machine, barely had time to escape to the West. During the postwar years, he turned to journalism and, from time to time, published travel notes in the West German press about trips in various countries, mostly, in the capitalist world.

The Americans didn't lose sight of Werner. Convinced that his Nazi past was sufficiently forgotten and his name as a journalist firmly established, they suggested that he make a tourist trip (with the Americans paying the bill, of course) to the USSR for the purpose of writing "travel notes". This is how it was at first only, however. Later, as Werner admitted during the investigation, the representative of American Intelligence, Johnson (really Bauer) didn't hide the fact that he expected Werner to provide information of a military-intelligence nature. In particular, Johnson-Bauer insisted that Werner "travel slowly through the USSR, be observant and attempt to locate and describe military targets, airports, military units, radio stations, radar installations, movement of troops, and also bridges and other structures". However, according to Johnson and other American intelligence officers, who prepared Werner for this trip, this "can be done easily and would involve no danger". Nevertheless, they provided the spy with a special ball-point pen before his departure and explained how it is used. "During instruction", said Werner later "I wrote several secret writing notes for practice. And when they developed them for me, I saw the words I had written". To ensure that Werner's trip would go without serious incidents, the Americans gave him a special address: "Sweden, Sanatorium Agra, Titsina, Elke Khannelora Detmers", to which he was to write every week and send hypothetical post cards from "Adi".

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In his own Volkswagon, Werner and his wife, Hermina, set out across Austria, Hungary, and Rumania to the Soviet Union. Soon, in the region of the highway from Kiev to Kharkhv, Werner was arrested while taking photographs of military equipment. An examination of their baggage found an espionage diary. Between the lines of ordinary text were hidden notes written with the pen described above. "Inpart of the city a radio tower" "Ina radar installation". "In...saw soldiers of the air force". "At kilometer numberanother radar installation." "Trucks numberscarrying troops with black arm patches".

Nothing could help Werner and his wife: not their intelligence instructions, nor their ball-point pen for secret writing, nor the address in Sweden. Having been found in the act of espionage, they were sent to court and tried.

Life shows that American intelligence officers experienced in hostile actions against the Soviet Union "have forgotten nothing, but have learned nothing.

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Speaking about the CIA building in Langley, we should mention one item which is of great importance for the entire system of American espionage. The authors of the book The Invisible Government write about this as follows: "Among the special structures is a scientific laboratory the construction and equipping of which cost 200,000 dollars. Here the CIA is perfecting some of its miniaturized types of weapons and is developing invisible inks, special explosives, and other devices. One of the really astonishing instruments at Langley is the electronic brain, which stores and issues mountains of information which arrives at headquarters.... This brain is called 'Walnut' and was developed especially for the CIA by IBM. A necessary document is planned before the observer with the help of the photo-tape operation of the 'Intellofax.' The 'Walnut' and the 'Intellofax,' unlike man, operate without error."

These so-called silent services constitute technical means of intelligence. The development of such means leans on the entire technical might of the US, as well as on the principle of sparing no dollars!

First among the chief means of technical intelligence, undoubtedly, is aerial intelligence. Immediately after World War II, special aerial units of the CIA began systematic flights along the Soviet border, and they later tried to penetrate Soviet air space. In May 1960, the magazine Electronica gave interesting data in this regard: Since April 1950, the US had attempted 81 times to penetrate the air space and territorial waters of the Soviet Union. The magazine noted with unconcealed regret that in all cases the violators were met by the defenders of the Soviet borders and that 20 of the aircraft-violators did not return to their bases.

In 1954, a special extensive program of aerial photography of Soviet territory began which involved the use of high-altitude drifting balloons and spy planes. The first attempts to penetrate for intelligence purposes the air space of the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp with the use of the balloons were undertaken in 1956. But despite the expenditure of vast funds, the calculation on the balloons was not justified. The air defense covered the Soviet sky well. Then the stress switched to the use of strategic aircraft: jet aircraft which were modifications of the B-47 bomber, as well as reconnaissance variations of the B-52 and B-58 bombers. The Americans created two types of high-altitude aircraft, the Lockheed U-2 and the Martin RB-57D, specially for reconnaissance flights.

The Soviet people know from the materials of the trial of the pilot-spy Gary Powers, who was shot down over Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960, how well planned the "sky espionage" was. The intelligence services spared no efforts to obtain photographs of Soviet military objectives. The CIA heads were supported in this matter by the heads of American

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diplomacy. Christian Herter, US Secretary of State at that time, reported to the Senate not without reason that "the benefit derived from aerial reconnaissance justifies the risk involved." It should be considered that the technical equipment of the "sky spies" permits them to obtain photographs from high altitudes. Life thus described the capabilities of the apparatus on the notorious U-2: The parking place of motor vehicles is empty when the camera shutter clicks. However, the developed negative clearly shows the tracks of the motor vehicles which were there before the photograph was taken. A person reading a newspaper in his garden is not visible to the pilot flying at an altitude of 40,000 feet. But the camera in the aircraft takes a picture in which one can read the headlines of the newspaper in the person's hands."

The CIA is not satisfied with this and continues to perfect the means of "sky espionage." At Edwards Base (in California), tests were held in 1964 the purpose of which, as the Associated Press reported, was to "take high-quality spy photographs during flight at a speed of 2,000 miles per hour."

Following the aircraft reconnaissance was the cosmic reconnaissance which was begun in recent years. The CIA, with the help of the American Air Force, is developing reconnaissance satellites (by 1962 the US had launched more than 100 satellites of various types, including 40 of military significance). The plans for such satellites were given various names: Big Brother, Sentry, etc. In 1959, the Sentry plan was divided into two programs: Midas -- satellites for the long-range detection of ICBM launches; and Samos -- spy satellites for the reconnaissance of ground targets (aircraft bases, ICBM bases, industrial objectives, the sea fleet, etc.). A special aerial photo apparatus either automatically or on command from the ground photographs ground objectives from an orbit 220 km in height, distinguishing objects one meter in length. For a 15-year program from 1960 to 1975 it was planned to launch 117 such spy satellites (49 in 1960-1964, 38 in 1965-1970, and 30 in the following 5 years).

Another type of technical equipment used by the CIA is radio intelligence, or the system of "long-range ears." It consists of a network of radio-monitoring posts along the border of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other socialist countries. They are engaged in radio intercept, paying special attention to communications among units of the Soviet Army in order to disclose the location and chief tactical and technical data of Soviet radar stations, guided-missile direction systems, radio-navigation systems, antiaircraft defense facilities, etc. Radio intelligence is conducted both from the ground and from aircraft of the U-2, RB-57D, RB-47, RB-52, and RB-58 types which make regular flights along the Soviet borders.

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The central point of important technical facilities is the NSA, the most hush-hush American intelligence service. But, as is known, a secret sooner or later becomes known. William Martin and Vernon Mitchell, employees of this agency who recently rejected their American citizenship and asked the Soviet Union for political asylum, said that the NSA is studying top secrets of each state -- the ciphers and codes for secret communication. More than 10,000 employees of the agency occupy a building the size of which is smaller only than the Pentagon. Equipped with modern machinery and instruments, including large electronic computers, and using more than 2,000 intercept posts, they record all the coded reports and reports sent in open text of almost all the countries of the world, including Turkey, Italy, France, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and others.

"In September 1958," Martin and Mitchell reported at a Moscow press conference, "an American C-130 crossed the Soviet border from Turkey and trespassed into Soviet Armenia. This aircraft did not return. The US government, as usual in such cases, reported in a 'cover' story that the aircraft had allegedly been gathering scientific data and had violated the Soviet border by accident. The US maintained that the C-130 had been shot down over the territory of the Soviet Union for no good reason. In the second half of the day, at Gen John Sanford, the director of NSA, in speaking on the internal radio broadcasting network of the agency, demanded that the employees refrain from discussion of any questions regarding the flight of the C-130." Moreover, a highly-placed employee of the agency told Martin that on board the C-130 were electronics specialists and equipment for intercepting the signals of Soviet radar stations.

The American intelligence services are literally doing everything to learn Soviet military-technical secrets. Here is one such example.

"The Russian commercial liner Aeroflot had just landed and the workers of the Vienna airport boarded the plane to clean it up before the return flight," says E. Tuily in his book. "While the aircraft was being readied, a man in a dark suit approached the man who collected the sweepings and unnoticeably gave him money. After this, the collector gathered the sweepings from the Soviet aircraft, put them in a hand cart, and guided it to his room. Suddenly this man appeared there and claimed the box containing the sweepings from the Soviet aircraft. He put the box in the back seat of the car and went home. Behind a closed door he carefully examined them: torn magazines, paper napkins, empty bottles, bread crusts, broken plates, and a bent clothes hanger. Several days later, the hanger was delivered to one of the large offices at CIA headquarters in Washington. The person who signed the receipt for obtaining the hanger was delighted. For many months they (American intelligence services - F. S.) had worked to gather information on a new Soviet long-

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range bomber. They had gathered much information on the aircraft but were unable to learn anything about its range and bomb load. However, they knew that the shavings which remained after mechanical processing of the wing were melted and used to manufacture a special type of clothes hanger. Finally they had such a hanger. With the help of spectro and chemical analysis, the experts were able to learn what type of metal alloy was used to manufacture the hanger. With this formula at their disposal, the CIA determined from what the bomber wing was made, and little was needed after this to calculate the range and bomb load of the aircraft."

The American intelligence services could flatter themselves with the success of this experience. However, to the chagrin of its agents, the hanger had not been made from the shavings obtained in processing the bomber wing. Nevertheless, it is important to note the scrupulousness with which the American intelligence services gather information which interests them, as well as the many hopes which they entrust with their "silent services," which the vast American monopolies give to the CIA.

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Somewhere in the CIA archives is a photograph of the spy Ian'kovskiy which is not needed now by anybody. A similar photograph is gathering dust in the safes of British intelligence. Both photographs were taken on the same day and hour, at the same place, by the same photographer, and, evidently, on the same film. The difference consists only in the fact that in one frame the spy was photographed in the uniform of an American army colonel, and in the other, in the uniform of a British colonel. One can imagine a pathetic picture of recruitment: Two full-dress uniforms were laid out before the spy as if promising him dual protection. Posing before the lens, the traitor dressed in the uniform of one, then the other, state, calculating on which horse it is more profitable to mount. Of course, each side in this unusual spectacle, which occurred in London at a secret abode of British intelligence, secretly felt that the main catch would fall to them. But the recruiting agents were pursuing a, so to speak, higher political goal: This masquerade, in the conception of its organizers, symbolically personified a new stage in the development of an American-British intelligence alliance.

In 1947, Allen Dulles wrote in a memorandum in honor of the future American intelligence services that the newly created intelligence organization, the CIA, must become a "universally recognized organ which maintains ties with the central intelligence services of other countries." Sixteen years later the same Dulles, who has already been dismissed from leadership of the intelligence services, noted in summing up the results of what has been done that "one of the most gratifying features of our intelligence activities recently is the increasing cooperation between the American intelligence services and their

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corresponding organizations in all countries of the free world which are united with us...."

Of course, the ex-chief of American intelligence has in mind the union under the flag of NATO, SEATO, and other blocs of forces which are operating against the socialist camp. The Atlantic union of intelligence services exists just as does the Atlantic military-political bloc of governments and general staffs. And just as the US is the leader in the bloc of governments and staffs, the CIA, which is expending every effort not to let the reins out of its hands, plays the main role in the intelligence alliance.

Since the very beginning of its existence, the CIA has tried to take in hand the intelligence services of England, West Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, and Canada in order to use their resources in the interests of implementing their own strategic plans. Ties with the CIA are quite extensive. In the staff of the high command of the NATO armed forces in Europe there is a Special Intelligence Administration. Under the central organ of the Atlantic strategy there is a "Permanent Group of the Military Committee of NATO," and in Washington there is a "European Coordinating Committee" for exchanging intelligence. Dominating the coordinating administration which directs underground activities against the countries of the Warsaw Pact are the CIA and the Intelligence Department of the US Department of Defense. Intelligence services also exist in the command staffs at "theatres of military activities" of NATO -- North Europe (Norway, Denmark), Central Europe (West Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, England), South Europe (Italy, Greece, Turkey), and the Mediterranean command (the Mediterranean Sea and the straits).

In 1949, American intelligence services acquired the right to assign their representatives to intelligence organs of NATO countries. Moreover, the US has bilateral intelligence agreements with the governments of a number of states. In 1957, combined commissions of representatives of American and British intelligence services, which had existed during the war, were restored. A joint intelligence center is operating in London, the so-called "Joint Intelligence Bureau" of three countries -- the US, England, and Canada. There is also a "Japanese-American Committee on Security Matters." When there is no agreement on cooperation, the CIA practices an "exchange of information." Such are the varied forms of control of the CIA over the intelligence services of the countries which belong to the main imperialist blocs -- NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and the OAS. Actively used for intelligence interests, of course, are various types of international subversive organizations supported by American intelligence services, such as the "Committee of Free Europe," the "Anti-Communist League of Asian Peoples," the "Inter-American Conference for the Protection of the Continent," etc.

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A special place in this total offensive of American intelligence services has been occupied and continues to be occupied by the long, complex, and highly contradictory relations with the intelligence services of West Germany. It is well known that in West Germany immediately after the war, the Americans secured for themselves the intelligence organization of General Reinhardt Gehlen. This name again appeared recently on the pages of the Western press in connection with the "sensational change" in the leadership of the German espionage organs. In order to judge what is being concealed behind this fuss, we will look into some facts.

Gehlen is one of the odious products of the brown Reich, a person who always presents, and most probably is presented, in a halo of mystery. In the 10 years after the war, the Western press did everything to create more of a haze around this personality and to make him, and at the same time the West-German intelligence services restored by him, a dark and also a romantic glory which arouses interest, admiration, and fear in the man in the street with a weakness for sensation. Utilized here are falsifications of his biography and the dissemination of stunning legends about noble origin, about the former "general from espionage," about the fantastic present life of the "man behind the scene", the "doctor," "Number 30," "Schneider," the "man without a face," and God knows what else.

However, Gehlen's past differs little from the past of many reared under German militarism. The dizzy career of the chief of modern German espionage was preceded by an ordinary officer's biography. He was born in 1902 in the family of an ober-lieutenant in the Kaiser's army, he was too young to appear in World War I, he trained in the Reichswehr, and he became an officer and an adjutant. He served for one year as adjutant of the first deputy chief of the general staff of the ground forces and later continued his service in operations headquarters under General von Manstein. In 1940, Captain Gehlen was communications officer between Army Commander-in-Chief von Brauchitsch and Gush, commander of the 4th Army, and the tank groups of von Goth and Guderian. Adjutant and staff duty brought Gehlen no military glory, but instead it expanded his ties in the higher circles of the Wehrmacht and determined his future career. Judging by everything, Captain, then Major, then, during the offensive against the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel, Gehlen was that intermediate figure who organized both the military caste and the Nazi-Gestapo environment. As a true national-socialist and not an outsider from the SS which stuck to the military uniform, but a regular soldier by heredity, he was on good terms with both the generals and the Reichsfuehrer clique. From Brauchitsch he transferred to adjutant to General Halder, and from Halder, to the operations headquarters of the general staff, where Heusinger appointed him leader of the "East" group.

In the spring of 1942, Colonel Gehlen held the post of chief of the

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department of "Foreign Armies of the East" in the general staff of the ground forces. The new leader of front line intelligence made no attempt to undermine Admiral Canaris, chief of the Abwehr, although in his position he could be considered his colleague and not his subordinate. The senior and junior colleagues shared spheres of influence whereby Gehlen used in every way possible the experience, ties, and advice of the admiral. Thus, at the advice of Canaris, he engaged not only in the traditional collection of information in the sphere of the interests of the armies to which he was attached, but also in thorough secret-service activities in the East, the organization of sabotage and underground propaganda against the Soviet Union, and also intra-army counterintelligence and police tracking of the personnel of the German staffs and units. Thus, the ordinary army intelligence department under Gehlen's leadership became a powerful, essentially independent intelligence-sabotage anti-Soviet organization supported by its own police service. Gehlen was flexible. With all his ambition, he did not ignore or avoid any of his superiors. He cooperated with both Canaris and Himmler, and thereby operated his strengthening secret service well through all the troubles of internal dissensions. Hitler and Himmler valued the activities of his secret service, which was free of legal and moral norms and which ruled in occupied territories without mercy even for its own regular intelligence officers, less for the military prisoners and civilian population. As is asserted in the biography of Gehlen, who was called by Himmler's men the "Grey Hand," it was his spy service which carried out the entire operation with the traitor Vlasov and his people. It is not surprising that Gehlen, resourceful and gifted not only in espionage but also in maneuvering on the higher level, was able on the complete defeat of Fascist Germany to retain in his control the nucleus of the secret police, its connections, and, apparently, the main documents. He was a "prisoner" not as a war criminal who deserved the rope long ago but as one who enjoys luck and the waiting mercy of the victors, in the role of a potential collaborator whose services the victors undoubtedly needed. Gehlen had considered beforehand the trend of the post-war policy of American imperialism in relation to its military allies. All the secret advances of the American intelligence services toward Canaris, Himmler, and the "general opposition" were well known to him, but he did not get mixed up in such dangerous contacts before it was time. When the time came, he brought to American-British reaction a ready-made organization which depend on him completely and was ineffective without him. This permitted him to escape the noose. After gathering the archives of his department, Gehlen surrendered to the American authorities and asked to be put in touch with the heads of the intelligence services.

Tully states that "in Washington the government understood well that an extremely important military prisoner had fallen into the hands of the Americans. Gehlen was immediately put to work. He worked for 18 months to systematize his materials on the Soviet Union and to compile indexes and

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master indexes in the English language for their use by American intelligence. He was then given the task of creating a small army of secret agents. He was allocated several million dollars and was asked to head espionage in the Soviet zone for the benefit of the US."

A new, extensive spy organization sprang up under Gehlen's leadership. Its staff was located in Pullach, near Munich, and for several years the spy network served as the chief weapon of American intelligence in subversive activities against the Soviet occupation troops in Germany and against the young German Democratic Republic.

In the history of the secret war there have been previous instances of cooperation of intelligence services of two or several countries (for example the US-England and Germany-Italy-Japan). But not once did it reach the point where the intelligence organization of one state (in this case the Hitlerite state) on the whole, with all its live and dead inventory, transfer to the services of another country (the US). The creation of this unprecedented "symbolism," as we saw it, was not unnatural. To say nothing of the sympathy of long duration of American intelligence heads for the experience of the German intelligence services, the union of Reinhardt Gehlen and Allen Dulles after World War II met the urgent interests of the most reactionary monopolist circles of the US and West Germany. In all this they had their own, imperialist logic: Because the American imperialists had taken a course toward the "anticommunist crusade," they simply needed the help of the former services of Hitlerites, their black experience, their practices, and methods. Such figures in Nazi intelligence as Gehlen understood perfectly that it was the American militarists who restored and retained their apparatus. Allow humiliation, service, toadying work under any colonels and generals from across the ocean, but to make up for it there in the perspective of changing in the future from servants to "junior partners," then to the role of equal partners, and later, simply independent colleagues in the near future. In brief, the end justified the means, Gehlen played a large game with a long-range goal. Everything that he did, going first from lackey to "junior partner" of Allen Dulles, repeated in miniature the game of Adenauer. He also for a short time was simply a servant of the US but later gathered the strength and became an independent figure in military and political relations.

Gehlen operated with the cunning and insidious modesty characteristic of him. From June 1945 to early 1950, his organization existed on funds of the US military intelligence, and then the CIA began to subsidize it. The exact amounts of American funds spent by Gehlen are not known, but competent people have evaluated them at 20 million marks (5 million dollars per year). The correctness of this evaluation can be judged by comparing it with the 1956 budget, when Gehlen's service was transferred to West Germany and received 23.1 million marks per year, or a little less than

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6 million dollars. Let us remember that the intelligence service of Canaris spent 31 million marks in 1943, or 11.7 million dollars. After 1956, Gehlen's budget began to grow fast, and in 1963 it reached 58.1 million marks (more than 14 million dollars). The Bonn intelligence machinery now receives more funds than Hitler spent for the intelligence services of Canaris at the height of World War II.

Thus, Gehlen and his revanchist inspirers deftly twisted their overseas patrons around their little fingers, using their patronage and millions of dollars to retain and restore the Hitlerite military intelligence services, already more powerful and under a new, modern mask. The West-German government did not need any additional forces when it decided to legalize Gehlen's organization and change it officially to the "Federal Intelligence Service" (BfV). This is also unprecedented. Those who nursed Fascism, evidently, for good reason are celebrating the victory in such a long game with American intelligence, the nature of relations with which is now determined not by Washington but by Bonn. The memory of the mask with which Gehlen escaped with the help of the Americans can be retained eternally by him and his descendants. But the cause is first and foremost. There is no junior partner. There is an intelligence system whose activities must be seen with apprehension by Allen Dulles and his successor, John McCone.

Of course, both intelligence services remain partners in anti-Soviet matters. But the "Federal Intelligence Service" is a successor of the Abwehr just as is the Bonn state -- a continuer of the expansionist schemes of the Third Reich. Today the point is turned toward the East, tomorrow it can be turned toward the West. This has happened in the past. That is why contradictions are evidently rending the heads of American intelligence. Who is better, a new head of West-German intelligence or the old chief, who is crafty but who owes his life to his protectors? The US now supports the old chief. When voices were raised in 1963-1964 concerning the necessity of "removing Gehlen," the Americans insisted that he remain in his post.

Such are the relations now within the intelligence alliance in the Atlantic association. The law of the jungle is now operating here more strongly than in any other field of political life of the Western world. Years pass and mankind will learn the truth about the "inter-family life" of what one would think are very solid imperialist alliances. How monolithic the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis appeared, how many joint bloody actions were undertaken by this Axis against the cause of peace and against all mankind, how enthusiastically and unanimously Admiral Canaris and General Ritter cooperated in organizing the putsch of Franco against the republican government in Spain! But in Czechoslovakia, from the time of the now famous Black Lakes, supersecret archives of the Hitlerite intelligence services were recovered and the entire world learned that the so-called Axis was not so solid. It turns out that

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Canaris and Himmler conducted intelligence operations not only against their military enemies but also against their loyal accomplices. It is learned that the Gestapo had to follow not only the participants of the opposition and the partisans, but even Count Chiano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Fascist Italy, and later Mussolini himself! Is there any reason to suggest that these same laws of the jungle do not also exist in the present alliance of the imperialist world? Of course they exist, and we do not have to wait long for exposure of the present discord and contradictions. They are being revealed each day, and there is no need to sink to the bottom of new Black Lakes for the facts which characterize the mutual discords in the camp of the partners. The Western press from time to time generously presents them, sometimes in pursuit of sensation and sometimes for other secret reasons the analysis of which there is no sense in spending time.

We have spoken above about the disclosures made by the two workers of NSA, Mitchell and Martin, in 1960. They revealed to the world certain secrets of the intelligence activities of the US government. Among these secrets is espionage against their own allies. Here are certain excerpts from statements by Mitchell and Martin: "From our work experience at NSA, we know that the US is successfully reading the secret correspondence of more than 40 countries including its allies.... The NSA has a "Hello" department which studies the codes and ciphering system of the US allies and neutral countries.... The American government has gone so far that it has begun to recruit agents from among those who serve its allies.... The US government gave money to a cipher clerk working in Washington in the embassy of one of the allied countries for information which helped to decipher coded telegrams of this ally."

This was confirmed in a statement by former NSA employee V. Hamilton, who stated that he worked in the "Hello" department and that "this department is engaged in deciphering correspondence of countries of the Middle East, including Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Greece. All their correspondence is intercepted by a branch of NSA in Cyprus. Intercept stations are also located in Beirut and on Crete. All the intercepted telegrams are sent by radio through Tangier to the US, where we deciphered and translated them." Hamilton said that "all conversations between military units of Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey were intercepted by NSA regardless of the text -- clear or coded." Hamilton also maintained that NSA is working to reveal the codes of other allies of the US.

In 1961 on the pages of four newspapers -- the French Combat, English Daily Herald, Turkish Cumhuriyet, and Italian Giustizia -- there appeared letters which were similar in content by an anonymous employee of American intelligence services. The author of the letters also reported instances of espionage by the US against their own allies.

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In particular, he sent to the four editorial boards photographic copies of a bulletin of American intelligence of 13 July 1959 which contained intelligence data on British troops in the Middle East. Similar information on the armed forces of West Germany was reported in a document of 22 January 1960.

"The US," stated the respectable Dutch newspaper De Telegraf on 9 March 1964, "is conducting espionage not only against the communist and enemy countries. It is also conducting espionage against its NATO allies." The newspaper quoted from a book by Sancho de Gramon entitled The Secret War and published in 1963. The author presented examples of US intelligence activities against Holland.

If these are the facts which characterize the attitude of American intelligence toward states which are allies of the US, what is its attitude toward capitalist countries which do not belong to NATO? Much is known about CIA activities against the legal government of India, Ceylon, Cyprus, Burma, Brazil, Cambodia, and other states. In other words, the doctrine of "total espionage" has been adopted by American intelligence officials from 1945 and his accomplices with all its attributes. As Allen Dulles stated many times in demanding that his subordinates gather information "about all countries," life is such that it is necessary to conduct "espionage all against all." Old history is being repeated in a new way.

There is a concord of Western intelligence services, of course, but the contradictions among them, just as among their governments, are not ceasing. In the present situation of hegemony of American imperialism, the main line of these contradictions passes between the CIA and all the other bourgeois intelligence services, especially between the CIA and the BND.

Quite recently, on 29 August 1964, the French journalist George Anderson published in Combat an article under the expressive title "The German Secret Service Turns Away From Washington." Anderson wrote that "the rivalry between Paris and Washington in the struggle to create with Bonn a political, diplomatic, and strategic axis has entered a new phase and threatens to spread to one difficult sector which can ensure final victory. We are not speaking about Adenauer's note or his telephone talks or about the Munich plot against Erhard-Schroeder, but about the reform and new leadership of the German espionage organs.... Little by little the BND organization (Federal Intelligence Services), headed by Gehlen, has absorbed the MWD organization (counter intelligence) which is responsible for military security and for protecting the Bundeswehr, and it has severely limited the rights of the Federal Organization for Protecting the Constitution. Until now, only the BND was subordinate to the chancellor through the mediation of his state secretary, which was Globke. Recently, without any of the publicity characteristic for such

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operations, which are connected with the Abwehr (intelligence), the Bonn Council of Ministers made organizational changes. Henceforth the BND will not be subordinate to the office of the federal chancellor but will be under Heinrich Krone, "who is responsible in the government for complex planning and for the coordination of national defense." Everybody knows that Krone is one of the closest friends of Adenauer, whom he would prefer to have as his successor.... Even after the federal government took this organization under its control, the former Abwehr, known as a very efficient organization in the field of exploring the ground and gathering information in East Europe, constantly supplied valuable information to its colleagues in London and Washington. These two capitals fear that henceforth the invisible army of General Gehlen will turn its back to them and engage in activities detrimental to them -- working for the cause and axis dear to the heart of Adenauer, Strauss, and their friends."

There is nothing surprising about this, of course. It makes no difference whether Gehlen or Krone heads West-German espionage. This cannot even be considered as the first sign of a departure from subordination of the revanchist organization nurtured by the Americans. You must reap what you have sown. The discord with the West-German militarists constitute merely a very vivid manifestation at the present stage of the effect of all those wolf laws within the wolf's camp. Precisely that which was stated in the Party Program occurs with strict regularity: "The main contradiction of the present world -- the contradiction between socialism and capitalism -- does not relieve the deep contradictions which are tearing apart the capitalist world."

Although the crushing defeat of Goldwater shows that the American voter favors peaceful coexistence and opposes war, we cannot but consider the fact that Goldwaterism represents a real danger and that it signifies an intensification of Fascist tendencies in right-wing circles of the US. The process of becoming more conservative, of course, cannot but involve the most reactionary formation of the governmental apparatus -- American intelligence services -- and the intelligence services above all are close to very extreme anti-Communism. This is their food, their fuel, their motive power.

We have covered the brief history of the creation, formation, and endless reorganizations of the contemporary system of American total espionage. In all the fuss and shock which befall this system, it would be naive to see only attempts to improve organizational form and methods. These shocks are necessary, they are dictated by the facts of life, independent of Dulles or McCone. The series of failures, miscalculations, and scandalous exposures are the result of the fact that any total expansion, including total espionage, is resisted by the mighty wall of the socialist camp which endures each and every assault. It is invincible, no matter how much dirt, poison, or bile is thrown on it by

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the numerous "theoreticians" and apologists of American imperialism. Hundreds of books are sent overseas which attempt to clarify or deny a particular failure in the activities of the CIA and other organs of American intelligence. But all the authors of these "works" agree on one thing: The socialist camp by its nature is such that no means and methods of sabotage and espionage in the struggle against the bourgeois states has a great and lasting effect on it. One cannot argue with this. Hitler and his spies came to a bad end as will their successors.

There is no force in the world capable of changing the tide of history. Many who sought to turn back the wheel of history have been dumped. A similar fate is in store for the successors of the Hess doctrine of "total espionage" from Langley. Against them stand the logic of history and the tireless revolutionary vigilance of the Soviet people and of all progressive mankind.