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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

[REDACTED]

CITE [REDACTED]

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3.4(b)(1)

31 21 1972

DIST 31 AUGUST 1967

COUNTRY-- CHINA/TAIWAN

DOI -- [REDACTED]

SUBJECT-- [REDACTED] STATEMENTS ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, REDUCED MILITARY TRAINING, POOR MORALE, WUHAN INCIDENT, RED GUARDS, POOR HARVEST, AND SOVIET BORDER INCIDENT.

ACQ [REDACTED]

SOURCE -- [REDACTED]

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1. SUMMARY. [REDACTED] WHO SERVED WITH THE [REDACTED] INFANTRY SAID THAT MANY OF HIS COMRADES [REDACTED] IN AMOY [REDACTED] REGARDED THE CULTURAL

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REVOLUTION AS A NECESSARY AND CONTINUING PHENOMENON. [REDACTED] PLA TROOPS MUST OBEY ORDERS AND HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CARRY OUT ORDERS ISSUED BY COMMANDERS IN THE CURRENT REVOLUTION. [REDACTED] MILITARY MORALE AND DISCIPLINE ARE AT A LOW POINT, AND ONLY ONE-THIRD OF THE TIME IS NOW DEVOTED TO MILITARY TRAINING. A POOR HARVEST, POSSIBLY THE WORST IN RECENT YEARS, WAS EXPERIENCED IN THE AMOY

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AREA. A RUMOR CIRCULATING IN AMOY INDICATED THAT THE PLA HAD DEFEATED TWO SOVIET MILITARY UNITS IN SINKIANG.

2. [REDACTED] MANY [REDACTED] PLA COMRADES REGARDED THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS "VERY NECESSARY," ALTHOUGH SOME WERE UPSET BY THE ACCOMPANYING CHAOS. WHEN ASKED WHEN HE THOUGHT THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WOULD END, [REDACTED] SAID "MANY" [REDACTED] PLA COMRADES BELIEVE IT WILL "NEVER END" AND "SHOULD NEVER END" BECAUSE THEY FEAR THAT CHINA "WILL CHANGE ITS POLITICAL COLORING IF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION ENDED."

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3. [REDACTED] THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAD A SHATTERING EFFECT ON MILITARY TRAINING. [REDACTED] HE WAS IN CHARGE OF POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION IN HIS SQUAD, AND HE SAID THAT [REDACTED] ALL PLA UNITS WERE DEVOTING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR TIME TO POLITICAL SESSIONS AND ONLY ONE-THIRD TO MILITARY TRAINING. THIS ONE-THIRD ALSO INCLUDED TIME ALLOTTED FOR PRODUCTIVE LABOR. [REDACTED] MILITARY EFFICIENCY WAS AT A LOW POINT,

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[REDACTED] THE TROOPS ARE BECOMING SLOPPY AND THERE WAS NO DISCIPLINE.

4. [REDACTED] MORALE WAS VERY LOW IN HIS UNIT, AND HE BELIEVED THAT THIS ALSO APPLIED TO THE ENTIRE PLA. HE ATTRIBUTED LOW MORALE TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS DISRUPTIVE POLICIES. [REDACTED]

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MANY PLA COMRADES WERE UPSET BY THE LAWLESSNESS AND CHAOS, AND THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THEIR FAMILIES.

MOST OF HIS FELLOW COMRADES WERE HOMESICK AND SINCE JANUARY 1967, THE PLA HAD REFUSED TO GRANT FIGHTERS LEAVE TO GO HOME.

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A NOTICE WAS ISSUED AT COMPANY LEVEL IN JANUARY 1967 STOPPING ALL HOME LEAVES. THIS MEASURE WAS TAKEN FOR THE SAKE OF

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

ECONOMY BECAUSE THE STATE NEEDED TO SAVE MONEY. HOWEVER, HOME LEAVES WERE SUSPENDED BECAUSE PLA COMMANDERS FEARED THAT SOLDIERS WHO RETURNED HOME WOULD BE UPSET WITH THE CONDITIONS THEY FOUND.

5. A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLICITY WAS GIVEN TO THE "WUHAN INCIDENT." IT WAS OPENLY CALLED A "MILITARY COUP," AND

1.5(c)  
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IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS WAS A MOVEMENT AGAINST MAO.

HIS PLA COMRADES LOOKED UPON THE WUHAN INCIDENT AS "A GOOD THING" BECAUSE IT WOULD INSPIRE OTHERS TO RESIST THE RED

GUARDS AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. HOWEVER, THIS WAS ONLY HIS BELIEF SINCE HIS COMRADES WERE RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER OPENLY.

HE AND HIS COMRADES WOULD HAVE COMPLIED WITH ORDERS FROM COMMANDERS TO ARREST ANYONE, SUCH AS HSIEN FU-CHIH, OR EVEN SUPPRESS THE MASSES BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO CHOICE. PLA

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[REDACTED]

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FIGHTERS HAVE TO OBEY ORDERS, [REDACTED] THEY HAVE NO CHOICE. [REDACTED] HE DOUBTED THAT MANY OR EVEN ANY FIGHTERS WOULD REBEL AGAINST ORDERS FROM THEIR COMMANDERS. [REDACTED] HE COULD NOT OFFER AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT A COMMANDER WOULD REBEL AGAINST HIGHER AUTHORITY OR REJECT CERTAIN ORDERS.

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6. [REDACTED] FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS HIS UNIT HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY TOLD TO SUPPORT THE RED GUARDS. [REDACTED] THERE WERE SPECIFIC ORDERS AGAINST INTERFERING WITH THE RED GUARDS, EVEN WHEN THEY WERE ACTING IMPROPERLY. [REDACTED] HE HAD NEVER SEEN ANY ARMED RED GUARDS, BUT HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT IN SOME AREAS OF FUKIEN THE RED GUARDS HAD STOLEN WEAPONS AND WERE USING THEM AGAINST THEIR OPPONENTS. [REDACTED] THE PLA WAS SUPPORTING THE RED GUARDS IN AMOY.

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7. [REDACTED] THE HARVEST IN FUKIEN HAD BEEN COMPLETED [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IT WAS A POOR HARVEST AND [REDACTED] IT WAS SAID TO BE ONE OF THE WORST IN RECENT YEARS. HE ATTRIBUTED THE POOR HARVEST TO HEAVY WINDS AND PESTS. HE WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF INSECT, BUT HE ASSUMED IT WAS SOME SORT OF LOCUST.

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8. [REDACTED] A RUMOR CIRCULATED IN AMOY IN FEBRUARY 1967 THAT THE PLA HAD DEFEATED TWO SOVIET UNITS THAT HAD TRIED TO 'INVADE'

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[REDACTED]

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SINKIANG. [REDACTED] ONE OF THE UNITS WAS A CAVALRY DIVISION AND THE OTHER WAS A MOBILE ARTILLERY UNIT.

9. [REDACTED] HE WAS ASTONISHED BY THE APPOINTMENT OF CHIANG CHING /MADAME MAO/ AS CULTURAL ADVISOR TO THE PLA. [REDACTED] THERE WAS SOME OPEN CRITICISM ABOUT HER APPOINTMENT AMONG PLA TROOPS.

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[REDACTED] THE HARDEST THING FOR PLA FIGHTERS TO ACCEPT IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS THE SLANDEROUS ATTACKS ON LIU SHAO-CHI'S "HOW TO BE A GOOD COMMUNIST." [REDACTED] EVERY PLA SOLDIER WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE BOOK AND [REDACTED] MOST BELIEVED IT WAS AN EXCELLENT PIECE OF COMMUNIST WRITING.

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10. [REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW VERY MUCH ABOUT PURGES IN THE SENIOR RANKS OF THE PLA. [REDACTED] THERE WERE MANY POSTERS CRITICIZING YEH FEI, LO JUI-CHING AND PENG TEH-HUAI. HE HAD NOT SEEN ANY CRITICISM OF CHU TEH. [REDACTED] LIN PIAO WAS HIGHLY REGARDED BY HIS FELLOW PLA FIGHTERS. [REDACTED] THIS WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT LIN HAD BOLSTERED THE PRESTIGE OF THE PLA.

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11. [REDACTED] THE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE /CYL/ STILL EXISTED AT LEAST AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. [REDACTED] THERE WAS A CYL BRANCH OFFICE IN AMOY.

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12. [REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THE SCHOOLS ARE OPEN IN AMOY,

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NO ONE ATTENDS THEM.

13. [REDACTED] HIS PLA UNIT FULLY EXPECTS THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS TO COUNTERATTACK THE MAINLAND IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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14. [REDACTED] THERE WAS A RUMOR IN AMOY THAT BOTH A PARTY CONGRESS AND A NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS WOULD BE CONVENED NEXT YEAR.

15. [REDACTED] DISSEM-- STATE [REDACTED] CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF  
DAO PACFLT [REDACTED]

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