

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY ITALY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/491,321

SUBJECT MORO'S VIEWS ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

DATE DISTR. 27 OCTOBER 1961

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED] OCTOBER 1961

Taylor
Rostow
Belmont
R. Johnson
Krysov
Kovacs
Ladd
Malone
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

REFERENCES IN 12674
TDCS-3/491,320

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. DC SECRETARY ALDO MORO PRESENTLY FEELS THERE WILL BE A GOVERNMENT CRISIS PRIOR TO THE DC NATIONAL CONGRESS. HE DOUBTS THAT PRESIDENT GRONCHI'S PROPOSED SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT WILL HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION. THE CRISIS WILL BE CAUSED EITHER BY THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (PRI) OR BY PREMIER AMINTORE FANFANI HIMSELF, WHO MAY RESIGN IF HE FEELS HE CAN RETURN IMMEDIATELY AS HEAD OF A STABLE CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH PRI SECRETARY ORONZO REALE HAS TOLD MORO CLEARLY THAT THE PRI WILL TRY TO POSTPONE A CRISIS AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE DC CONGRESS, MORO HAS GRAVE DOUBTS THAT REALE CAN HOLD OUT AGAINST PRI DEPUTY UGO LA MALFA'S VIOLENT OFFENSIVE. MORO IS NOT TOTALLY CONVINCED OF FANFANI'S STEADINESS AND LOYALTY,

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AND FEELS FANFANI MAY BRING DOWN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT IF IT IS TO HIS ^{1.5(e)} _{3.4(b)(1)} PERSONAL ADVANTAGE. MORO IS ALSO NOT SURE OF FANFANI'S ^{SENSE OF} SOLIDARITY WITH REGARD TO THE FORTHCOMING DC CONGRESS. HE FEELS THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT FANFANI MAY JOIN WITH THE LA BASE AND RINNOVAMENTO FACTIONS, IF IT APPEARS TO BE TO HIS ADVANTAGE, IN OPPOSITION TO MORO AND THE DOROTEI.

2. IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS NOW, MORO HAS NO INTENTION OF WORKING FOR A CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT, BUT WILL TRY TO SET UP AN ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT TO LAST UNTIL THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. WHILE FAVORING A CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT, MORO IS FIRMLY AGAINST IT UNTIL AFTER NEW ELECTIONS AND UNLESS THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI) PUBLICLY STATES IT HAS NO OBJECTION TO NATO AND A PRO-WEST FOREIGN POLICY. HE ALSO OPPOSES SUCH A GOVERNMENT IF IT WOULD SPLIT THE DC. MORO HAS NOT MADE ANTI-COMMUNISM A CONDITION BECAUSE HE IS CONVINCED THAT SUPPORT OF A PRO-WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY WILL EVENTUALLY INVOLVE THE PSI IN POLEMICS WITH THE COMMUNISTS (PCI) AND THEREBY CAUSE A DE FACTO SPLIT.

3. WHILE UNDER A DC GOVERNMENT THE PARTY SECRETARY HOLDS THE POWER SPOT, SINCE HE MUST NEGOTIATE FOR PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT, A STABLE CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT WILL SHIFT THIS POWER TO THE PREMIER. MORO DOES NOT BELIEVE FANFANI WOULD BE A GOOD MAN FOR THIS POSITION BECAUSE HE IS TOO IMPULSIVE, EASILY FLATTERED AND ^{IS} SURROUNDED BY

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YOUNG MEN WHOSE ENTHUSIASM OVERCOMES THEIR GOOD SENSE. MORO HIMSELF WOULD LIKE TO BE PREMIER AND HAVE FANFANI ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC. MORO FEELS HE (MORO) CAN KEEP THE DC TOGETHER AND KEEP THE PSI DOWN. MORO'S SUPPORT OF FANFANI FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO GET HIM OUT OF THE WAY AS A DANGEROUS OPPONENT; IF GIVEN THE CHOICE, MORO WOULD ACTUALLY PREFER ATTILIO PICCIONI FOR THE JOB. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MORO ENVISAGES MARIANO RUMOR WOULD BECOME PARTY SECRETARY. SINCE FANFANI HAS TOLD MORO HE WANTS EITHER TO HEAD A STABLE GOVERNMENT OR BE PRESIDENT, MORO FEELS FANFANI WOULD AGREE TO THE ARRANGEMENT.

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4. MORO IS CONVINCED THAT AFTER FIVE YEARS OF A CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT THE PSI WILL CEASE TO EXIST AS A POLITICAL POWER. SOME TWO THIRDS OF THE PSI WOULD BE WON OVER TO THE DC POSITION AND THE OTHER THIRD WOULD MOVE TO THE PCI. BUT TO DO THIS THE DC MUST REMAIN UNITED. SINCE FEW DC'S REALLY CARE WHAT IS OR IS NOT NATIONALIZED, AND SINCE ALL FAVOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP AT LEAST 90 PER CENT OF THE PARTY UNITED PROVIDED THE ALLIANCE WITH THE PSI DOES NOT ALTER IN ANY WAY PRESENT ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM STATE CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL)

6. [REDACTED] COMMENT: EVALUATION IS REQUESTED OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE. [REDACTED]

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