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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Rhodesia—Looking Ahead

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SNIE 72.1-1-77
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RHODESIA—LOOKING AHEAD

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THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the memorandum:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, the National Security Agency, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

Concurring:

The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, Vice Chairman

The Deputy Director for Intelligence, representing the Central Intelligence Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research, representing the Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, National Security Agency

The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration

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The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Abstaining:

None

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force


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RHODESIA—LOOKING AHEAD

PREFATORY NOTE

The draft of this Estimate was completed shortly before Ivor Richard's announcement on 24 January that Ian Smith had rejected the UK's proposals as a basis for discussions, and Smith's subsequent statement to the same effect. Smith himself indicated that his government was not closing the door on negotiations. These developments, in our opinion, do not affect the validity of the SNIE's conclusions nor the usefulness of its discussion.

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KEY POINTS

This paper does not attempt to estimate the likelihood that the Geneva negotiations will be successful. It does look ahead into a time frame equivalent to the "transition period" envisaged in the Geneva negotiations (independence by March 1978) so as to point out the particular problems likely to arise in four cases:

- a successful Geneva-style negotiation, completed in the near future;
- a stalemate at the Geneva talks, accompanied by initiatives from the Smith regime to open its own negotiations with selected black nationalist elements;
- a breakdown, as distinct from a recess, in Geneva-style negotiations, without any attempt by the parties to continue serious talks in other forums;
- a breakdown, followed after some months by renewed international negotiations.

These distinctions have been made to assist analysis; we recognize that success at Geneva would not preclude Smith from attempting his own negotiations in some fashion, nor would failure at Geneva necessarily mean the total absence of discussions among the parties.

Our major point is that whichever outcome might at one stage or another seem most likely, none will provide relief from the need for continuing close US attention to and, if US objectives are to be met, engagement in the Rhodesian issue during the period of this Estimate.

- On the world scene the Rhodesian question has again taken on an importance that transcends the immediate issue. This is in part a result of the Geneva negotiations themselves, but more a consequence of the involvement of the US. If negotiations did break down for all practical purposes, African and Third World opinion would assign to the US much of the blame for failing to press to a successful conclusion, and ensuing events in Rhodesia would precipitously reduce US leverage on the situation.
- On the ground, the next phase in the history of the Rhodesian issue will be one of turbulence, with a potential for violence, regardless of

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the outcome of the Geneva negotiations. Neither the white minority nor the militant nationalists (especially those with bases in the guerrilla movements) are yet psychologically prepared to make the practical adjustments needed to achieve an untroubled evolution of their relationships. In many respects, an agreement would be only a beginning of the process of working out many aspects of these relationships.

- It follows from this that the UK, the "front-line" African governments, and South Africa will remain involved in developments in Rhodesia, however the Geneva negotiations turn out. The USSR (both directly and through Cuba) and, to a lesser extent, China, will also continue to play roles of some significance. In the absence of successful negotiations, and as military operations grow, the Soviet role would become greater, though probably still not comparable to that in Angola. The employment of Cuban military elements would expand, but Cubans would not be likely to be used operationally inside Rhodesia during the period of this paper.
- The major opportunity for limiting the violence and disruption inherent in the Rhodesian situation lies in the interest that front-line governments and South Africa will continue to have in containing the problem. The front-line governments in particular, however, are not likely to focus these interests and develop this opportunity without the good offices of the UK and the US, especially the US.
- The South African government will keep the key to the white side of the problem. In the period of this paper, South Africa's own internal problems will not be such as to compel that government to take a line radically different from its present one, which we believe to be a pragmatic and cautious attempt to resolve the Rhodesian issue in a way that will preserve South African influence in the region while defusing African nationalist militancy. But external developments, especially more overt Soviet/Cuban involvement in Rhodesia, could lead the South Africans to enlarge their military role.
- All of the parties (except, of course, the Soviets and Cubans) believe that they have a legitimate claim to US support of some kind, regardless of the outcome of the present negotiations. In the case of an agreement, the US would be expected by each side to use diplomatic and economic inducements to support both the irreversibility of movement toward majority rule in Rhodesia and the security of the white population. In an extreme situation, either side would hope that the US would at least endorse the use of force to keep the basic terms of an agreement.

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- In the absence of an agreement, the Africans would expect the US to use its diplomatic influence to keep up pressure for majority rule. They would hope, but not necessarily expect, that the US would use economic influence in their behalf by repealing the Byrd Amendment. The whites, in Rhodesia and South Africa, in the absence of an agreement would expect US neutrality and further offers of good offices, on the ground that Smith had fulfilled his "contract."
- The withdrawal of the US from the issue would probably accelerate a breakdown of negotiations for a peaceful resolution and would limit the ability of the US to influence later events in the region.

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DISCUSSION

I. RHODESIA IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

1. The Rhodesian insurgency sputtered for nearly a decade, essentially as an African problem, although it remained on the Third World and UN agendas. The terms of the problem were changed by the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Africa; this development left white-ruled Rhodesia almost surrounded by black states and depending exclusively for support on the government of South Africa and on whatever sympathy the Rhodesians could muster among ultra-conservative elements elsewhere. The guerrilla effort to bring down Rhodesia's white minority regime escalated; this effort now threatens to involve other states—including some outside Africa—and has moved the Rhodesian problem back into the world arena.

—For many black Africans (and others), Rhodesia is the testing ground to determine whether there is any hope for a semi-peaceful resolution of black-white differences in Africa. They will also view the outcome in Rhodesia as "proof" whether the US is actually committed to removing the vestiges of white supremacy in Africa or whether the US is merely giving lip service to the idea in the hope of somehow stopping communist inroads into the area and of promoting a Western-oriented regional economic system dominated by South Africa.

—For the USSR and Cuba, Rhodesia is an arena where these governments are trying to capitalize on their success in Angola. Although a negotiated settlement would not freeze them out of the picture, it would not serve their ends as well as a military resolution in which they could play a major supporting role, to the detriment of US influence.

—For China, the Rhodesian situation poses the dilemma of trying to balance its revolutionary rhetoric against its concern over Soviet inroads in Africa. Peking has insisted that a negotiated settlement may be achieved only when negotiations are backed by victories in the battlefield.

Peking recognizes, however, that reliance on a military course would probably work to Moscow's advantage, and so it has supported Zimbabwe nationalists' participation in the Geneva talks.

—For the UK, a settlement in Rhodesia would fulfill its perceived responsibility for the country, while at the same time creating the hope that London could eventually rid itself of the problem.

—For the US, a successful outcome in Rhodesia would enhance the US position throughout Africa and at least modify the growing belief among Africans that the military route—even if it means closer relationships with the communists—is the only way to solve black-white problems in Africa.

II. THE CURRENT SCENE

2. A month and a half of talks at Geneva has not diminished either the antagonism that exists between Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith's regime and the nationalists or the divisions among the nationalists themselves.

3. Smith, absent from much of the proceedings, showed no willingness to go beyond the settlement terms—the "contract"—he announced last September that he would accept. He seems fully prepared to go on resisting the African nationalists' demands for transfer of power to an interim government on the basis of what Smith contends would be majority rule. He appears to be convinced that a deal can be struck with moderate Africans short of meeting the nationalists' demands. At the same time, the nationalists, even with prodding from the front-line presidents, were unable to agree on a common negotiating position to counter Smith's intransigence, despite their basic unity on the demand that Smith must go.

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4. Smith probably feels under less pressure now to accept a settlement than he did last October. Despite serious and growing strains, Rhodesia's economic situation has not deteriorated in unexpected ways and South Africa continues to facilitate the flow of Rhodesian trade. The nationalists' inability to unite on a negotiating position and the success Rhodesian security forces have had against guerrilla bases in Mozambique have encouraged Smith that he can hold fast to his position for the short term at least.

5. The considerations that brought Smith and the nationalists to Geneva have changed somewhat, however, and a new factor emerged during the conference. Two of the four nationalist delegations, Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) delegation and Robert Mugabe's delegation, representing the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA), formed for negotiating purposes a separate loose alliance called the Patriotic Front. The Front survived the first round of talks, and despite strains, the two leaders maintained a common position throughout and won the endorsement of the front-line presidents. The Front is now showing signs of evolving from a temporary expedient into an extended—but probably not permanent—arrangement. The Front enhanced the stature of its leaders by holding the limelight throughout the negotiations.

6. The front-line presidents were unable to bring unity to the nationalist movement as a whole and to move the British as far as they would have liked to assume direct responsibility for dismantling the white minority regime in Salisbury.

7. Nevertheless, all participants at Geneva recognized that a process was set in motion which cannot be reversed, although it can be halted. But if there is to be a negotiated settlement the participants must come to grips with the hard questions of the shape of the transitional government, the constitutional arrangements for transferring power, and the degree of British involvement in the interim government.

8. Smith's goal now is to contrive a strategy that will relieve outside pressure upon him but will retain for the white Rhodesians the preponderant share of economic and political power, either through the Geneva framework or outside of it.

9. The goal of the nationalists remains to find the means to transfer power to the black majority and to

transform the existing Rhodesian social and political order. They have by no means abandoned the military option, even though they have been disappointed and, in their own eyes, temporarily weakened by their inability to achieve significant gains on the battle field. Aggressive Rhodesian combat operations against guerrilla camps in the Mozambique border area derailed the much talked-about rainy season offensive underscored basic nationalist combat weaknesses, and revealed Mozambique's inability to repel Rhodesian cross-border raids.

10. These developments not only have led to an expanding combat-supportive involvement by several front-line states in support of Mozambique, but opened the door to a wider African as well as communist involvement.

III. BASIC ISSUES AT GENEVA

11. In the broadest terms, a successful negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian crisis would be one that maintained—at least for the short run—the personal and economic security of the white population while setting in irreversible motion the transfer of power to the black majority. It would also need to take into account, even if it could not completely reconcile, the interests of all the participants. Finally, any workable arrangement requires a major role for the UK, the front-line presidents, and South Africa as guarantors.

12. A negotiated settlement must also resolve three major questions:

- leadership of the interim government;
- distribution of ministerial and administrative appointments; and
- control of the defense and police portfolios.


13. On the question of leadership, Smith holds the position that he represents a sovereign government and that the Geneva negotiations are between his government and the nationalists, with the British role limited to that of mediator (and not an impartial one, in his view). The nationalists argue that they are the rightful heirs to Rhodesia, that the Smith regime is illegal, and that it must be replaced by a "neutral" government. These two positions, as they have been shaped so far, are not easily reconcilable; divesting the Smith regime of its symbolic authority and a large share of real power and establishing responsibility for the interim government in "neutral" hands will be essential elements in any agreement.

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14. Polarities are not as strong on the question of the distribution of ministerial and administration positions (with the exception of the defense and police portfolios discussed below). Rhetoric aside, the nationalists can see the wisdom of allowing the whites to retain control of "technocratic" portfolios, and the whites can appreciate the political realities of giving up nontechnical positions and allowing noncontrolling participation where expedient. The key to a successful arrangement on distribution rests with the nationalists agreeing on a formula for sharing government positions among themselves and with the whites.

15. The question of control of the defense and police portfolios carries the most emotional weight of all the questions facing the Geneva participants. Even if the control issue were avoided by having the British or some neutral council manage the portfolios during the transition, the issues of command and composition of the security forces themselves would be a focus of contention. The nationalists and the whites appreciate the coercive power and the political potential inherent in these positions, and they hesitate to put them in the hands of a past or likely adversary.



Furthermore, the players need to agree on the principles for integration of some guerrilla elements into the defense and police structures, and on the role to be assigned to the present security forces, even if working out the mechanics is deferred to the future.

16. There are no assurances that talks, in whatever venue, will not eventually founder. The issues lying ahead are thorny, and no major hurdles were overcome in the September-January period. Mutual suspicion and animosity continue, and these may well sharpen if and when talks resume and the participants again are confronted with the problems.

17. The talks could end abruptly either by Smith withdrawing or by some or all of the nationalists walking out. Smith has threatened (and we believe he means it) to pursue a settlement on his own if the conference moves toward excluding him or the Rhodesian Front from a major role in the transitional period. Smith may decide that he has no choice; the conference showed clearly that white Rhodesian

"management" of the transition process is out of the question. Indeed, Smith may not wait for talks to collapse before trying to convince some of the nationalists (most likely Muzorewa and Sithole, perhaps in association with internal Rhodesian moderates and the party formed by tribal chiefs and others) that they can make a better arrangement independently than they can through continued negotiations within the framework of Geneva.

18. Flanking the prospect of Smith seeking an independent settlement is the possibility that either the nationalists or the Smith regime will reject any serious negotiating track either because of frustration over lack of progress in the negotiations or because they come to believe that they can better obtain their goals or protect their equities on the battlefield than at the bargaining table.

19. Finally, a variant of the above is that the present round of settlement efforts might fail or stall, but that some months in the future there might be a return to the bargaining table as the various parties weighed the costs of military action against the possibility that they might after all get their best deal by resuming negotiations.

IV. OUTLOOK

20. We shall treat the possible Rhodesian developments under four headings (we are not estimating in this paper which of the developments is most likely):

Scenario A: If there is an agreement at Geneva.

Scenario B: If, lacking an agreement, the Smith government makes a strong drive for an "independent" agreement.

Scenario C: If there is no agreement and both sides intensify military operations.

Scenario D: If there is no agreement but negotiations resume after a substantial interval.

Scenario A: If There Is an Agreement

21. Assuming that an agreement produces an interim government, political maneuvering among the black nationalist leaders and groups will intensify. Defining the franchise and determining how (or even whether) to hold elections for a representative parliament and government will become the first order of business for the transitional government.

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22. Although Nkomo is well known inside Rhodesia and his party has an organization from which to build, his base of support lies primarily in western Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa's African National Council is strongest in Salisbury and around a few other urban areas. Although large crowds have turned out to meet Muzorewa on his recent visits to Rhodesia, his real influence over a mass following has not been tested since late 1971.

23. Apart from Nkomo and Muzorewa, however, none of the other nationalist leaders has a proven constituency. We believe few leaders would be able to build a significant political base solely on their personal, factional, tribal, or regional identities. We doubt that Mugabe, Tongogara, Nhongo, Sithole or any of the other ZANU or ZIPA leaders has, outside the external membership of ZANU, a popular following of significant size in Rhodesia.

24. As a consequence of divisions among the political leaders, ethnic ties constitute an initial basis for political loyalties. The various nationalists will quite naturally pursue support in their own home (i.e., subtribal) areas. If they succeed in portraying their own political causes as those of their own ethnic group, and identify opponents by their ethnic groups, tribal politics and intertribal hostility and violence probably would again emerge inside Rhodesia.

25. There are counterpressures. A quest for popular support based upon ethnicity also would lead rival claimants for power to seek political alliances, since no single ethnic group, even if it could be mobilized behind a single leader, is sufficiently large to constitute even a near-majority. Hence, as elections approached, the prospects for alliances or realignments would grow, perhaps mitigating some of the factional bitterness that characterizes the current situation. In this situation, Nkomo would probably enjoy some advantage, since his own ethnic base, though small, is firm and not likely to be contested successfully, if at all, by ZANU or the ANC.

26. The most intense electoral competition would be between the ANC and ZANU, both of whose constituencies lie in Shonaland, albeit often among different subtribes. Coalitions between parties vying for the same constituency will be harder to make and keep than those between more diverse parties.

27. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the political role that the guerrillas would play in a

post-settlement situation, although it would clearly be an important one. ZIPA leaders presumably would have to have a share of political power in the post-settlement arrangements, in addition to their security role. The guerrilla military forces potentially could wield considerable—even dominant—political power by the threat or use of their arms. Whether this potential would be realized would depend on a number of factors—such as the attractions of rival ethnic leaders, whether the guerrillas could remain unified, what arrangements would be made in the settlement agreement regarding the guerrillas' role.

28. All of these uncertainties are intimidating, and any judgment depends heavily on the terms on which a settlement would be implemented. Nonetheless, we believe that a coalition arrangement, including Nkomo as a central but not necessarily the leading figure, would be the most likely result in the circumstances.

29. With regard to white political activity in the wake of a Geneva settlement, Smith's Rhodesian Front (RF), by far the largest and most influential white party, would find it extremely difficult to adjust to the notion of being a minority party in a country run by a black majority. The RF's long-standing constituency support among white farmers has been based almost exclusively on its stiff-backed resistance to political concessions for blacks. Among the RF's far right, a settlement would be considered a sellout, and intraparty strife and defections would almost certainly follow. Indeed, some part of the RF's traditional constituency would simply evaporate through emigration while other portions would fragment.

30. If Smith, or someone with similar views, retained control of the RF, it will be unlikely to seek political alliances with any but the tamest of black groups. New RF leadership, committed to working with blacks toward an effective power-sharing formula, could conceivably take over the party; but the few politically active whites who would be likely to do this would be more likely to shed the RF label with its white racist image in favor of forming a new political party or parties seeking a new, multiracial constituency. The focus of white political activity would be with these groups.

31. Building electoral constituencies, however, depends to a large extent upon how the franchise is defined. Whites and some blacks assume that widening the franchise (that is, the younger and the

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qualified according to education, property, or income), the more susceptible are the voters to simplistic and inflammatory rhetoric, a factor which moderates of both races regard as giving a dangerous advantage to the guerrilla-dominated ZANU/ZIPA. This thinking may serve to overcome some of the ingrained revulsion within the white community against striking a political deal with the less militant nationalists.

32. A successful settlement would also bring on a new set of problems involving the relationship of the Rhodesian security forces to the guerrillas. Apart from the question of the willingness of Rhodesian regulars to remain in the bush—which depends on how a cease-fire arrangement is tied to a settlement—their morale will be severely jolted by any prospect of integrating the guerrillas into the defense structure. This applies to blacks in the security forces as well. They will fear that integration will eventually give way to a guerrilla takeover, with reprisals quickly to follow. Thus the regulars will be torn between remaining in the service, and seeking a more comfortable professional climate say in the South African military or, in the case of the blacks, seeking arrangements with the guerrillas.

33. The police would be called upon to maintain order in a new, complex, and highly charged political atmosphere to which they are not accustomed. Operating in the context of a changing social and political order would create psychological strains as well as put new demands on tribal and personal loyalties. Again, as with the defense forces, morale would also be tied directly to the way in which African nationalist elements are introduced into the police structure.

34. A negotiated settlement that encourages an orderly transition could, with luck, forestall the kind of economic breakdown that occurred in Angola and Mozambique following the Portuguese pull-out. Maintenance and expansion of the key elements of the white-run economic system in Rhodesia with, ideally, a strong program to bring blacks into management and government would be the quickest road to renewed economic growth for both blacks and whites.

35. Even under less than ideal conditions, substantial economic benefits would follow a negotiated settlement:

—elimination of UN sanctions;

—reopening of trade and transport with neighboring black states;

—provision of substantial foreign aid by Western countries to ease the transition to black rule and provide capital for black endeavors, and

—obtaining membership in international finance and aid organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

36. The South African government would view an agreement as a major advance in heading off communist influence in southern Africa by giving renewed credibility to negotiations—as opposed to force—as a means of adapting to new political correlations. Vorster would endeavor to retain and expand South African economic involvement in Rhodesia, both to give the new Rhodesian government a stake in peace and stability in the area and to give the South African government more leverage over it. The net result, in Vorster's view, would be to give Pretoria's long-faltering "outward policy" a new lease on life. Vorster would see an opportunity to encourage new relationships with the US, the UK, the front-line states, and to include a new Rhodesia in a consortium that might eventually expand beyond the immediate area. These hopes may well be exaggerated, but they would be major elements in South African policy.

37. A peaceful settlement would certainly win the support of the front-line states and the Organization of African Unity as long as its aim is ultimately to dismantle the existing Rhodesian social and political order. Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana have strong economic interests in an orderly transition. This is particularly true of Mozambique, which has suffered more than Rhodesia from the border closure last April and from the subsequent increased strains of war.


38. The Soviets and the Cubans would not be frozen out completely by a settlement, but they would have less room for maneuvering to influence the future political orientation of the region. Moscow's ties to Nkomo are not as close as they once were and ties to other nationalists, most notably Mugabe, are only beginning to take shape. During the transitional period the Soviets, in particular, could be expected to maintain close contacts with the front-line states and to seek stronger ties with black Rhodesian leaders, thereby positioning the USSR to move quickly should

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the transitional arrangements fail. The USSR would be unlikely to take steps out of concert with the leaders of the front-line states to disrupt a transitional government, although the Soviets and Cubans could be expected to voice support for the more militant black positions.

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40. Although the US would not in all probability be involved in the day-to-day problems of a transitional period, it would be viewed in many quarters as the prime mover in bringing about the settlement and thus in a general way would be held accountable for its outcome. The US is bound to incur a large measure of the blame for any failures that occur along the way to independence. Moreover, the front-line states, the Rhodesians, and the UK expect the US to provide economic and political support to the transition and the subsequent independent Zimbabwe government. The US stake in making a settlement work thus could be large; already the perception of the US in Africa rests in large part on how the US stands up for its stated commitment to support black majority rule.

Scenarios If There Is No Agreement

41. There are three basic alternatives to a "successful" agreement at Geneva:

- a "partial" or "independent" arrangement reached by the Smith regime on its own with a combination of nationalist leaders and "loyal" black elements inside Rhodesia; or
- no settlement of any kind with anyone, with the Smith regime opting to "go it alone"; or
- no settlement at Geneva, but a resumption of negotiations after some months.

Scenario B: A Partial Settlement

42. A partial settlement most likely would be based on:

- Access to a share of power for black leaders, perhaps with a black deputy prime minister;
- Some enlargement of economic opportunities for blacks, accompanied by modest improvements in social conditions and a somewhat broadened franchise for Africans; and
- An indeterminate transition to majority rule on the basis of a gradually widening franchise.

43. In Smith's view, such an arrangement would fulfill his commitment to work toward an agreement. By widening political opportunities for blacks, he would hope to head off the inevitable charges from Africans and from the international community that Rhodesia was still a white-controlled state. Smith probably believes that Muzorewa and Sithole can be brought into such an arrangement, despite their denials. Both men are suffering serious problems within their respective organizations and with the front-line presidents, and probably have no future if talks collapse. Smith would try to wed Muzorewa and Sithole to the new chiefly-led Zimbabwe United Peoples' Organization (ZUPO). Smith may also be clinging to the idea that he can also wean Nkomo away from Mugabe.

44. Smith would hope to gain at least an appearance of such widespread black Rhodesian support for such an arrangement that the UK, the US, and South Africa would accept his fait accompli. He would also seek Western economic and if necessary military support on the ground that he had brought about a "settlement" on the basis of the UK and US proposals.

45. A partial settlement, if Smith could achieve it, would be supported by South Africa. Prime Minister Vorster and his Afrikaner constituency would view it as a reasonable solution in the circumstances. Thus, South Africa would encourage the US and UK to accept this, and Pretoria would maintain the present level of military and economic cooperation.

46. The Patriotic Front, the guerrillas, and the front-line states would reject outright a "settlement" made by Smith, and there would be widespread international support for their position. Nearly all

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African countries, the Third World in general, some West European nations, and all communist nations would decry it as a ploy to perpetuate the exploitation of Rhodesian blacks by the present white regime. Even if Smith gained the cooperation of some prominent nationalist leaders, the front-line states, particularly Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia, would continue to provide sanctuary for the guerrillas and to forward arms and other aid provided through the OAU's African Liberation Committee by other African nations and the communist countries.

47. Rhodesian military authorities, who are concerned by the prospect of a protracted antiguerrilla campaign, would undertake further, possibly expanded, operations across the border in order to disrupt the external threat to the new regime and give the "independent" settlement time to work, if the guerrillas pursued their own operations as we believe they would. However, the prospect of continued combat activity is likely to impact adversely on the morale of reserve forces in particular.

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A negative reaction from Washington would hearten the nationalist forces and discourage the Rhodesian government.

49. These African reactions would provide additional openings for communist countries to advise and assist a political-military campaign against the white-dominated regime. They would view such assistance as in tune with the general international climate and would see it as ensuring an increase of their influence in Africa at little risk.

50. In general, therefore, it is unlikely that an "independent" or "partial" settlement would solve any of Smith's problems. The guerrillas, with the backing of the front-line states and the OAU, would fight on, and the revamped Rhodesian regime would in all likelihood make no progress in winning acceptance or legitimacy in the international community. Nor would Smith's position with South Africa be really improved: South Africa would again find itself caught between a desire to support Rhodesia and a

sense that the situation is basically unfavorable to its interests. Despite the foregoing, it is clear that Smith is seriously considering an "independent" settlement gambit and that he has taken some preliminary steps in this direction.

Scenario C: No Settlement

51. The possibility that no independent arrangements can be reached remains strong, and either Smith or the nationalists en masse could decide the talks were getting nowhere and walk out. Such an outcome would inexorably lead to an intensification of military operations on both sides.

52. The major theater of operations would be the Rhodesia-Mozambique border, where the Rhodesian security forces have demonstrated their capability to conduct successful cross-border spoiling operations against guerrilla camps and staging areas with virtual impunity. Guerrilla operations launched from Zambia would probably stimulate similar disruptive and punishing raids against border camps in Zambia. President Khama is not likely, officially, to allow guerrilla bases in Botswana for fear of Rhodesian reprisals, but he will not be capable of preventing some use of Botswana's territory by the insurgents.

53. The objectives of the black nationalists would include disrupting rail and road links with South Africa; discouraging whites from remaining in outlying areas; intimidating blacks who are not active in the guerrilla movement; promoting defections among blacks in the security forces; and infiltrating into the urban and industrial sectors to foment discontent, organize protests, and conduct some sabotage and urban terrorism. Demonstrated guerrilla organizational and combat deficiencies, however, will limit their ability to attain these objectives without substantial training and/or external advisory assistance.

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[REDACTED]

55. The effectiveness of the guerrillas will be greatly dependent on the degree of security provided for training areas and forward staging bases in the neighboring countries as well as on the quantity and quality of arms and training the guerrillas receive. Following a complete breakdown in negotiations, the flow of Soviet material assistance to the insurgents would probably increase. To defend Mozambique and the guerrilla bases in the border area against Rhodesian cross-border operations, Tanzanian forces would augment the Mozambican defense units, and units from other African countries might be provided to assist in this function. Tanzania, Mozambique, and probably Zambia would increase their training efforts, and Cuban troops would play a greater role both in training and defense, primarily in Mozambique. Conceivably, Cubans could appear in Zambia if Kaunda should become desperate.

56. Faced with escalation, the [REDACTED] Rhodesian security force would respond quickly and aggressively. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During an escalation, many of these reserves would be called to active duty, and a massive search and destroy effort would be launched inside Rhodesia and across the border into Mozambique in an attempt to neutralize base camps, staging areas, supply depots, and logistical facilities. Raids would be focused on targets in Mozambique; however, it is possible that raids of this nature would also be carried out against insurgent entry points in Zambia and Botswana.

57. Rhodesian security forces do not have the capabilities, especially the manpower, to wage a prolonged counterinsurgency struggle; they would be stretched very thin to defend against the expanded insurgent effort that we foresee as likely by the end of the period of this paper. Rhodesian leaders are aware both of this and of the economic strains that a prolonged war would entail. They therefore will attempt to continue to use their technological

superiority and aggressive tactics based on this superiority, rather than engage in purely defensive operations that would necessitate large numbers of men. Nonetheless, a gradual increase in guerrilla capabilities and especially improvement in the defense of the Mozambican border area through the use of more sophisticated weapons will in time force the Rhodesians to adopt a defensive strategy.

58. The morale of the Rhodesian black regulars and white reservists would be crucial to the success of a "go it alone" policy. Many white reservists might try to evade the extended government call-ups that would be required, and even if they responded would not want to chance risking their lives for a "lost cause." But the major uncertainty would be the attitude of the black soldiers. Blacks represent over 50 percent of the regular army, not including reserves, and 65 to 75 percent of the police force. We believe they would fight until it becomes clear that they were on the ultimately losing side.

59. The key element in the "no settlement" contingency ultimately would be South Africa. The Rhodesian economy is already experiencing negative growth, severe foreign reserve pressures, and budgetary stress. But the state of its economy alone would not be a critical factor during the period of this Estimate as long as guerrilla operations are contained, white resolve maintained, and the South African rail connections kept open. But in the event of a sustained transport squeeze by South Africa, the whites could not long hold on in Rhodesia. Having no other outlets, Rhodesia's export sector, which contributes roughly 25 percent of GNP, would quickly wither. Loss of imports would end military supplies and cut off vital fuel, raw materials, and capital goods to manufacturing and commerce. Heavy unemployment, reduced white living standards, and a dim picture of the future probably would prove disheartening even to those most committed to white rule.

60. South African support for the Smith regime would be decided upon largely on the basis of Prime Minister Vorster's assessment of the affordable political and economic costs of such support. In the interest of protecting the prospects for eventual detente with black Africa and of avoiding possible UN sanctions against his own country, Vorster probably would want to limit South African military involvement to a rear-guard action to prevent a massacre of white Rhodesians. He would not cut Rhodesia's supply lines

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completely, but he could and would manipulate them to support his political policy.

61. There are strong economic arguments which might move Vorster to limit carefully South Africa's help to Rhodesia. For example, at some point Rhodesia's limited foreign exchange holdings would force South Africa to decide whether to assume the burden of helping Rhodesia pay for its foreign arms imports. The option of making arms available from indigenous South African production would not be attractive because of the danger of depleting the stocks of arms held in reserve for its own forces. Again, South Africa's economy is only now beginning to show signs of recovery after two years of severe recession. Domestic demands on the country's limited foreign exchange earnings will rise sharply as recovery proceeds. Looking ahead, moreover, Vorster can almost certainly see the possibility that the Third World majority in the United Nations could move the UN toward economic sanctions against South Africa.

62. Closely related to economic considerations would be calculations of the effects of support for Rhodesia on racial politics inside South Africa. If Vorster believed it necessary to take a public stand against further support for Rhodesia, he might well rest his case on the persistence of serious disturbances among South Africa's urban blacks as well as on economic exigencies. But we do not believe that such disturbances are likely to become so serious during the period of this Estimate that they would have a decisive impact on Vorster's real thinking, one way or another.

63. At the same time, on the political side, Vorster could come under increased domestic pressure to rally to Rhodesia's defense. Many South African whites might conclude that the failure of the Geneva talks proved that Pretoria's detente policy toward black Africa rests on a fallacy. Instead of waiting passively for a final pan-African onslaught against South Africa itself, they would argue that it is better to fight the "inevitable" battles in Rhodesia or even to launch a preemptive strike against Maputo, Mozambique's nearby capital. Although the odds favor Vorster rejecting such a course of action, there is sufficient uncertainty concerning exactly where he stands to consider a dramatic South African reaction a possibility. This possibility would become substantially more likely in the event of significant communist involvement.

64. A collapse of the negotiating process would spark united African support for the guerrillas. The front-line states would try to raise a pan-African military force, and seek increased Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban support if they could not persuade the US and UK to undertake some dramatic counteraction against Smith.

65. The military option would be the only one available to the front-line states; they cannot significantly increase economic pressure against Rhodesia without South African cooperation. An embargo against Rhodesian transport by Botswana is the only economic move left them, but without South African compliance, a Botswana embargo would hurt Botswana more than Rhodesia.

66. The Soviets would lose no time in attempting to capitalize on the situation. Moscow would have to take a number of new factors into consideration, however, in tailoring its involvement in the Rhodesian situation. Unlike Angola, where the Soviets were eventually able to provide support directly to the Popular Movement, in the Rhodesian situation the Soviets would be dependent upon the front-line states—basically Tanzania and Mozambique—to get Soviet arms to the Rhodesian nationalists; the African leaders, therefore, could regulate the extent of Soviet involvement. Moreover:

- In contrast to Moscow's almost two decades of liaison with Angola's Popular Movement, the Soviets have no entrenched, ideologically-based relationship with any of the Rhodesian groups or leaders; Joshua Nkomo is one of the few nationalist leaders with whom the Soviets have had a continuing relationship, but since he now appears to have the support of the West, the Soviets are probably studying the other nationalist leaders and keeping their options open.

- The Soviets undoubtedly recognize that the immediate capabilities of the Rhodesian security forces are far superior to those of the groups that opposed Angola's Popular Movement.

67. Moscow would of course keep an eye on the damage that could be caused to the USSR's relationship with the US. We nonetheless believe that in these circumstances the Soviets would at a minimum provide significant amounts of arms and other equipment to the liberation forces and the front-line states. They have already offered help to Botswana.

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and reportedly have responded to Mozambique's requests for accelerated deliveries. Soviet shipments would be likely to include more sophisticated arms, such as SA-7 missiles, tanks, aircraft, and field artillery, which would require an increase in Soviet and Cuban military advisers. Aggressive Rhodesian strikes deep into Mozambique probably would prompt President Machel to call for communist assistance. Moscow is already showing that it is willing, as it was in Angola, to engage in "naval diplomacy" in support of Mozambique. It also would probably encourage Cuban or other communist forces to participate actively in the military defense of Mozambique and, if necessary, of the other front-line states. We believe, however, that the other front-line presidents would carefully limit the use of these forces to defensive roles. They want to avoid a large Soviet/Cuban presence if they can; they also want to avoid stimulating direct South African combat involvement on the Rhodesian side and increasing the potential for great-power conflict.

68. Cuba's position in this situation would be ambivalent. The Cubans know that the Rhodesians would be a much more formidable opponent than were the FNLA and UNITA in Angola. The prospect of significant casualties in the Rhodesian struggle coupled with ongoing manpower losses in Angola would be unappealing to Havana. But the Cuban leaders could not afford to ignore entirely a request for assistance. The Cubans would readily provide supplies to the insurgents, help train them, give them technical assistance, and perhaps provide defensive forces to protect guerrilla bases in Mozambique. The Cubans would be very hesitant about actually fielding combat units for fighting inside Rhodesia itself, and we do not now anticipate developments during the period of this Estimate that would require the Cubans to make such a commitment.

69. An increase in conventional, as opposed to guerrilla, military operations would alarm Peking because it would increase the opportunity for the Soviets to outbid the Chinese in arms and related assistance. China's experience in Mozambique has probably led it to doubt the short-term ability of the front-line presidents to filter Soviet political influence out of incoming Soviet aid no matter how favorably predisposed those leaders may be to China. China views regional cohesion as the best long-term means to

meet the Soviet challenge in southern Africa and therefore will publicly support the region's leaders.

70. China would maintain and perhaps increase its provision of small arms and related supplies to the OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam while continuing to train guerrilla forces in Tanzania. China would also continue to urge the Africans to unite and to work against the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. China, however, is not in a position to compete with the Soviets in equipping the insurgents and the front-line states.

71. Both the nationalists and the Rhodesian whites would seek Western, i.e., US and UK, military and economic support. The guerrillas and the supporting front-line states would demand that the West either keep out of the resultant stepped-up guerrilla war or support them in their efforts to complete the transition to genuine African majority rule.

72.



Scenario D: Conflict and Resumed Negotiations

74. If events unrolled fairly rapidly during the period of this Estimate, it is possible that before the war had reached the point of involving large-scale external intervention, an effort might be made to resume negotiations, at Geneva or elsewhere. The resumption of negotiations might come about through

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several factors, including (perhaps in late 1977 or early 1978):

- a battlefield stalemate, but with high military costs to both sides and the front-line states, particularly Mozambique and Zambia;
- increasing dissatisfaction inside Rhodesia with the costs of an endless war, and demoralization of the security forces, particularly the territorials;
- continued but cautious and perhaps diminishing South African support;
- continued Western and possibly South African exhortation and support for a settlement.

75. Should Rhodesia be willing to try the negotiating route again, it probably would have to do so with a leader other than Smith, who is the personification of Rhodesian intransigence and perfidy in the minds of the Africans. Nkomo and Mugabe are likely to be the principal if not the only leaders of the nationalist side at that point. The Patriotic Front is likely to have held during the period of conflict without negotiations, although there would be friction if integration of the ZIPA and ZAPU armies were attempted. Muzorewa and Sithole would have become "irrelevant" either through some by-this-time discredited effort to work out an independent, internal deal with Smith, or because they lacked the guerrilla forces to

claim a share of the credits for having brought the Rhodesians back to the negotiating table.

76. The terms of a settlement would probably be harder than before, however, and might require a near-surrender by the whites, perhaps involving the immediate dismantling of Rhodesian security forces. In this event, the Rhodesians would look more favorably upon a strong British presence, and even a Commonwealth role in the security forces.

77. While competition for power between Nkomo and Mugabe, or at least their factions, would ensue, they probably would postpone any sort of destructive showdown until independence or shortly before. The nature and outcome of this showdown remain obscure, but the prospects for Nkomo's leadership and a relatively moderate Zimbabwe government are inversely proportional to ZIPA's strength. We believe that the front-line states would agree to restrain and disarm many of the guerrillas, thus diminishing their leaders' own hard line regarding, and claim to power in, the interim government. Conversely, Mugabe would not necessarily have a better chance at assuming the leadership if ZIPA were not defanged: the guerrilla high command would probably put forward its own candidates. In that case, internecine struggles between guerrilla factions would likely ensue.

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