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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 86.1-66

# Situation and Prospects in Haiti

Submitted by

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Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

27 OCTOBER 1966

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## SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN HAITI

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate the situation and outlook in Haiti over the next year or so, and to consider what might happen in the event of President Duvalier's death or overthrow.

### CONCLUSIONS

A. Duvalier's position still seems fairly strong, despite the sporadic plotting and political tension normal in Haitian affairs. We think the chances are better than even that he will remain in power during the period of this estimate. If he does, there will be continuing political repression and economic stagnation or decline.

B. Duvalier's overthrow would probably have to be largely an inside job, with some key members of the security forces—and especially the Presidential Guard—participating. We doubt that any now in a position to organize such a coup has the will or the courage to attempt it. None of the many small groupings among the divided, bickering Haitian exiles could succeed in overthrowing Duvalier without decisive help from the US or some other foreign government. The Haitian dictator might, of course, die suddenly of natural causes, though he is only 59 and in reasonably good health; assassination is also a possibility, though he takes unusual precautions.

C. Duvalier's departure would probably be attended by some acts of violence in Port-au-Prince and other towns. Whether this violence was limited and sporadic or became widespread and intensive would depend in large part on the manner of his going. The danger of widespread hostilities would probably be greatest in the event Duvalier were assassinated in public. A coup attempt that failed at the last minute could produce equally nasty results.

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D. The most likely successor to Duvalier would be a military junta which might or might not choose to exercise power behind a civilian front. Initially at least, such a government would probably not be stable, and there would likely be maneuvering for power among its members.

E. The two Communist parties are too small and weak to be able to contend for power even in a disorderly situation following Duvalier's departure. We doubt that outside Communist support—from Castro, the Soviets, or Haitian Communist exiles—would be forthcoming on a significant scale. We believe that the Haitian Communists themselves would see their best chance of gaining influence as coming through offers of their administrative assistance to new government leadership rather than through any attempt to seize power on their own, and we think they would act accordingly.

F. In a situation where order had completely broken down, the Organization of American States (OAS) would almost certainly acquiesce in action by the US to evacuate foreign nationals. Any proposal for US or OAS intervention to restore order and establish an effective government, however, would encounter strong opposition within the OAS. Any contention that such intervention was necessary in order to forestall a Communist takeover would be disbelieved by many OAS members unless the supporting evidence was incontrovertible. Whatever the purpose for intervening, the US would face considerable criticism internationally.

G. The initial Haitian reaction to the landing of a US force would probably be favorable, but if a military occupation were at all prolonged, opposition would develop. Nevertheless, the problems in Haiti are such that it might prove more difficult to get a force out than to put it in, as was the case in 1915.

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## DISCUSSION

### I. BACKGROUND

1. Haiti is the most backward country in the Western Hemisphere and one of the most backward in the world.<sup>1</sup> Its resources are poor in quality and underutilized; population pressure is heavy.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps 10 percent of the people are literate in French; the rest are illiterate and speak Creole, a local dialect. Most Haitians are superstitious as well as uneducated; voodoo beliefs are more influential than the country's nominal Catholicism. Standards of health and sanitation, though somewhat improved with foreign aid, are still abysmally low. Malnutrition is the rule, not the exception; malaria, tuberculosis, typhoid, parasitic infestation, tetanus, and syphilis are widespread. The bulk of the population, which subsists by farming small plots of depleted land in the countryside, is politically apathetic.

2. Ever since Haiti became independent (1804), antagonism between mulattoes and blacks has been the most sensitive factor in Haitian politics. The mulatto elite were very few in number; but, because of their virtual monopoly of education, their services were indispensable in the administration of the government and, as a class, they were able to exercise effective control through behind the scenes manipulations, even after it became normal for the President to be black.

3. Haiti has never developed an effective electoral process. Political power has always been acquired and held by military force, overt or latent. Since Haitian Presidents have seldom, if ever, retired voluntarily, a de facto system developed whereby a military junta would depose each President at the end of his constitutional term. His successor would then be selected in back room consultations and this selection would be formalized by duly constitutional processes. In 1957, however, this system broke down because each of the several black leaders who thought himself in line for the Presidency refused to be passed over. After a period of turmoil and instability, the army conducted an election which brought Dr. Francois Duvalier to the Presidency for a six-year term.

4. There is little doubt that the election was rigged, but Duvalier probably did have at least the passive acceptance of the majority of the peasantry. Moreover he had the enthusiastic support of most of the black elite, who saw his election as a revolution against mulatto domination. This meant, however, that

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<sup>1</sup> Statistics concerning Haiti should consequently be treated with reserve; those used in this paper, though the best available, are approximations.

<sup>2</sup> The population in 1965 was about 4.6 million—or some 430 per square mile. Except for Trinidad and Tobago, this is the highest population density in the Hemisphere. Moreover, only about 10 percent of the Haitians live in the towns, and the density of rural population is higher than 1,000 per square mile of cultivated land or pasture.

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some among the mulattoes immediately began to conspire with the disappointed black leaders to unseat him. His position was precarious for a time, and it was partly in reaction to this threat that he took the first steps to transform his regime into a terroristic personal dictatorship. In the course of time he has eliminated or forced into exile every actual or suspected opponent, mulatto or black. Extolling *négritude* and representing himself as the protector of the black masses against mulatto domination and exploitation, he has deliberately intensified racism in Haiti.

## II. THE PRESENT SITUATION

### A. Methods of Rule

5. Duvalier, realizing from the outset that the military establishment was the key to power, proceeded to bring it under control by purging many of its most capable officers and by building up two counter forces—a civil militia and a special sort of secret police. The latter, called the *Ton Ton Macoutes* (Creole for “bogeymen”), serve as Duvalier’s enforcers and informers. To ensure that the military behave, Duvalier severely restricts their supplies of ammunition and their access to heavy arms, keeping the bulk of these in the cellar of the National Palace.

6. President Duvalier has not hesitated to solidify his control by taking advantage of popular superstitions. He has won the support of leading voodoo priests, and has encouraged the belief—held by many in Haiti—that he himself has supernatural powers.

7. The President has made himself both the source of power and the chief administrator of the regime. He delegates responsibility only for minor decisions, but makes it worthwhile for a favored group of government officials and businessmen to cooperate in carrying out his dictates. These “insiders” are not a savory lot in any case; a few of them have connections with the Communists. Even for a country which has seldom known honesty in government, Duvalier has set new records of venality and corruption.

8. In 1961 Duvalier staged elections for a new national legislature, providing his “National Unity Party” a near monopoly of seats. Subsequently he announced that since every ballot had carried the caption, “Francois Duvalier, President of the Republic,” he had been unanimously elected to a second six-year term. In April 1963, near the end of his constitutional term, he easily broke up the customary military plot to oust him. Also in 1963 he managed to overcome several minor invasion attempts by Haitian exiles. In 1964, at the age of 57, he proclaimed himself President for life.<sup>3</sup>

9. In recent months Duvalier, apparently hoping to encourage a renewal of sizable US economic aid, has made a few gestures to give his regime a better

<sup>3</sup> Life tenure was customary during the first 65 years of Haitian independence, but fell into disuse when the last previous President for life faced a firing squad in 1869.

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image. He has ordered *Ton Ton Macoute* leaders to be less arbitrary and more circumspect, and, according to several sources, he has hinted that he might be willing to give up his life tenure and to hold elections. It is highly unlikely, however, that he would make any change that would impair his control of the government.

#### B. The Opposition

10. Among the few people in Haiti who are politically minded, there is still latent opposition to Duvalier and his methods of rule. But such opponents are cowed, nonvocal, and almost entirely unorganized. There are no longer any significant opposition parties; there is however, an underground social Christian movement called the *Personalistes*, and there are two weak Communist parties.

11. The *Personalistes* seem to have no strong organization as yet, but may have 100 or 200 adherents, most of them in Port-au-Prince. The two Communist parties—the Party of Popular Accord (PEP) and the Popular Party of National Liberation (PPLN)—constitute the only internal political opposition with any appreciable degree of training and organization, but lack discipline, are poorly indoctrinated, and are inclined to compete rather than cooperate with each other. The two parties may have as many as 500 members, all told, in Haiti and in exile, and perhaps 2,000 sympathizers, many of them abroad. The PEP is Moscow-oriented and is the generally recognized Haitian Communist Party. The PPLN has ties with Cuba, where some of its former leaders are in exile. Radio Havana, which broadcasts in Creole or French to Haiti two hours daily, has been unsuccessfully exhorting the two parties to unite and build strength for an “insurrection.” Most exiled Haitian Communists are in Europe or Mexico, the largest organization (about 150) being in France. There are, however, probably 70 or 80 exiled Haitian Communists studying in Cuba, the Soviet Union, or other Communist countries.

12. Most non-Communists forced into exile are now living in New York or Miami, with smaller groups in Canada, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic. There are also considerable numbers of Haitian workers living in such countries as the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Bahamas, but these people are not politically active. The exiles' activities have been constantly hampered by divisiveness, discord, and inability to agree on a common leadership.

13. In the New York exile community 8 or 10 of the leaders have grouped their small individual followings into an organization called the Haiti Coalition. It sponsors a half-hour daily shortwave broadcast to Haiti in French and Creole, which sometimes attacks the excesses of the Duvalier regime, but generally refrains from inflammatory content. This program has apparently attracted a sizable audience in Haiti and has caused Duvalier to make repeated protests to the US. His panicky reaction to two small exile incursions in 1964, which occupied the security forces for several weeks, also suggests that he regards the exiles with apprehension. Rumors of exile plans for a new “invasion” in April 1966 produced a characteristic overreaction by Duvalier in the form of

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an order to execute summarily all Haitians caught returning to their country from the Bahamas.

### C. Security Forces

14. The regular Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H) number about 5,000 men. All officers in key positions were handpicked by Duvalier. Originally a constabulary organized by the US Marines, the FAd'H performs coast guard, border patrol, immigration, civil aviation, fire and police, and general rural administrative services, in addition to its military duties. (There is no civil police force.) Ill equipped, poorly trained, and incompetently led, the FAd'H has still had reasonable success in keeping order, perhaps because it has not had to face up to any major challenge. On more than one occasion the FAd'H Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Gérard Constant, has secretly professed willingness to participate in a coup movement, but he seems a weak, plodding figure without the guts for risky action.

15. The largest organization among Haitian security forces is the National Security Volunteers (VSN), a civil militia of about 7,000 created by Duvalier as a counterforce to the FAd'H. These are essentially weekend soldiers, administratively separate from the regular military, but called upon to assist in keeping order and in mobilizing popular support for Duvalier. Duvalier handpicked many of them; their loyalty is directly to him and not necessarily to higher ranking militia officers. The VSN is badly trained and only about a third of its members have firearms, but even those armed only with machetes make a strong impression on the populace.

16. Units of both the FAd'H and the VSN are stationed at the palace under Duvalier's direct control. The FAd'H unit is the Presidential Guard consisting of some 400 men selected specifically for their loyalty. Their commander—at present Colonel Gracia Jacques, a tough, uneducated former mess sergeant—has primary responsibility for Duvalier's safety and is thus in a highly strategic position. The VSN unit at the palace numbers 200-300 men—also carefully chosen.

17. Most feared of all are the *Ton Ton Macoutes*. With no official title or legal status, they function as "secret police" and may number as many as 1,500. Save for strong control at the top, theirs is not a cohesive organization. It is inexpensive for Duvalier to maintain, however, since its members obtain much of their compensation from shakedowns and extortion. Essentially the *Ton Tons* are thugs; some are members, as well, of the Armed Forces or the militia; a few are also voodoo priests. The *Ton Ton Macoutes* concentrate on acquiring information on any internal opposition and on "special assignments"—e.g., murder, assault, and intimidation. Occasionally Duvalier has found it necessary to curb them temporarily; such restraint has never lasted long. The chief of the *Ton Ton Macoutes*, one Luc Desir, handles political interrogation, confinement, and torture at the National Palace, and is noted for utter brutality and ruthlessness.

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#### D. The Economy

18. The level of living in Haiti, long the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, has become still worse under the Duvalier regime. Per capita gross national product (GNP) declined from about \$90 in 1955 to about \$70 in 1965. (The average for Latin America as a whole in 1965 was more than \$300.)

19. The waste of human and material resources in Haiti stems from a long history of mismanagement and neglect.<sup>4</sup> The economic problems are too basic and severe for any quick solution. Yet Duvalier, far from taking any constructive measures to ameliorate them, has usually pursued policies with the opposite effect. Investment has been very low, averaging five percent or less of GNP annually—a rate probably inadequate to maintain the country's existing stock of capital. Duvalier's behavior in relations with the US—and in particular, his blatant diversion of economic aid funds to his own use—caused the termination of most US aid in 1962-1963.<sup>5</sup> And the climate of insecurity and violence in Haiti has contributed to a sharp drop in tourism, once an important source of foreign exchange.

20. Haiti's export earnings, which generate 10 to 12 percent of GNP, have gradually declined since 1962. Coffee produces about 50 percent of these earnings; sugar and sisal, copper and bauxite, the bulk of the remainder. The decrease in export earnings, along with the curtailment of US aid and of income from tourism, have caused a worsening of Haiti's foreign exchange position and have forced a reduction of imports. This has had some immediate impact internally since Haiti has to import all its capital equipment, all its petroleum products, and much of its industrial raw materials and consumer goods—including some basic foodstuffs. On 30 June 1966, the country's short-term foreign indebtedness exceeded its foreign exchange reserves by some \$6 million.

### III. THE OUTLOOK

#### A. With Duvalier Continuing in Power

21. Now 59 years old, Duvalier is in reasonably good health. He appears in public places only infrequently and then under heavy guard. The cowed state of most internal opposition, continuing use of informants and enforcers, and the counterbalancing of security forces all serve to bolster his hold on power. Assassination is an ever-present possibility; he is certainly more hated than many

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<sup>4</sup> Weather too has typically been a difficult and complicating factor. The heavy rains in the wet season tend to leach and erode the soil, and the Haitians know and do little in the way of conservation. Occasionally—as in 1965—there are droughts which seriously reduce agricultural output. Moreover Haiti is in the hurricane belt and was badly hit in 1963 and again in 1966.

<sup>5</sup> US aid at present is limited to a malaria eradication program (US \$2.2 million will be made available for this program in 1966) and a PL-480 Title III food-for-work program, involving US \$1 million in commodities, administered by three American voluntary agencies. Some supplies for disaster relief have also been furnished.

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leaders of government, though harder to get at. The kind of attempt most likely to succeed in killing or deposing him would be one involving insiders—associates of Duvalier whom he continued to trust; further, it would probably need the participation or connivance of some figures in the security forces, particularly in the Presidential Guard. We doubt that this sort of plot or conspiracy is now in process of development.

22. This is not to say that we anticipate a period of tranquillity. As in the past few years, there will probably be plots and rumors of plots—some internal to Haiti, some involving exile groups. Duvalier will probably respond to certain of these with sharp repressive measures. Thus, while we look for more of the turmoil and tension which are normal in Haiti, we think these factors are not likely to cause Duvalier's downfall for some time to come.

23. As long as Duvalier does remain in power, Haiti's political, social, and economic patterns will probably be much like those of the recent past. Duvalier may, from time to time, make new attempts to clothe his government in more civilized garb, particularly when an economic pinch makes foreign aid look especially desirable. But the underlying nature of his repressive, one-man dictatorship will almost certainly stay the same. He will continue to provide order and control to the Haitians—but not much else.

24. Economically, 1967 will be another year of stagnation or decline. Even before the damage wrought by Hurricane Inez, it appeared that the coffee crop now being harvested would be below that of 1965-1966 and world market prices for coffee, as well as for sugar and sisal, are not promising. These factors may be offset somewhat by a current tendency toward an increase in tourism. To the extent that they are not, imports will have to be reduced, since Haiti's foreign exchange and credit position will not permit a trade deficit of any significant size. A lower level of trade in turn would reduce government revenues—customs duties being the source of approximately one-third of such revenues—and probably force some cut in government expenditures.

25. All this is likely to necessitate some further belt-tightening in Haiti and to prevent any improvement from present levels of unemployment and underemployment. Those living in Port-au-Prince and the other towns will probably be affected more than the great majority of Haitians in the countryside. Duvalier may find it more difficult than usual to pay government employees on time, but we believe that in one way or another he will find funds for the security forces. In sum, we believe that these economic conditions will produce further grumbling and disaffection, but that they are not likely in themselves to provide the impetus for a coup.

#### B. In the Event of Duvalier's Departure<sup>6</sup>

26. Duvalier's death, incapacitation, or overthrow probably would be attended by some acts of violence in Port-au-Prince and in the other sizable towns.

<sup>6</sup>This section of the Estimate is in response to specific questions posed to us in connection with contingency planning.

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Whether the violence were limited and sporadic or became widespread and intensive would depend in large part on the manner of his going.<sup>7</sup>

27. The assassination of Duvalier in public would carry the greatest immediate danger of provoking a generally violent reaction. Even this probably would not lead to serious strife in the countryside, but it might cause fighting and bloodshed in the capital and other towns. Such violence might originate with people who have suffered at the hands of the VSN and the *Ton Ton Macoutes*, and seek vengeance; or it might occur between elements of the FAd'H, VSN, and *Ton Ton Macoutes*. It could conceivably lead to fighting between blacks and mulattoes, an unequal contest in which the mulattoes might be virtually wiped out. It could also endanger the 3,500 white foreigners, including some 1,380 Americans, who reside in Haiti.

28. The likelihood of violence would be least if Duvalier died of natural causes in private, so that the key figures moving to take control might have time to decide on a provisional leadership before they announced the dictator's death.

29. The makeup of a successor government would also depend to some degree on the manner of Duvalier's going, but it would depend still more on the relative strengths of the contenders for power. Here individuals would be important as well as groups, and there is no way of knowing ahead of time how some of those in strategic positions might act when the showdown came. There are, however, certain observations which can be made with reasonable confidence about the possibilities for a successor government.

30. Because all political individuals and groups have been so thoroughly repressed, or (if friendly) so sharply circumscribed by Duvalier, we think that an individual or combination from the security services is most likely to take the leading role in a successor regime. Duvalier's system of countervailing forces in these services is keyed to his own command and probably could not long survive him. If the Chief of Staff of the FAd'H were a stronger figure, the regular military would almost certainly take charge once again. They will probably be the strongest contender anyway. There are in the FAd'H some relatively shrewd and courageous figures who might come quickly to the top: e.g., Col. Daniel Beauvoir of the Army General Staff; Major Jose Borges, one of the army's few competent troop commanders, and perhaps Col. Jacques Laroche, the FAd'H Deputy Chief of Staff. Initially, however, a junta of several FAd'H officers would be more likely. The members of such a junta might find it necessary to take in some leaders of the VSN, and even of the *Ton Ton Macoutes*, although that would be distasteful to them.

31. A security forces' junta of this kind might include, as well, a few political figures who have attained a measure of prominence under the Duvalier adminis-

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<sup>7</sup> A particularly nasty situation might be created if a coup effort failed at the last moment and Duvalier carried out his frequent threat that he would respond by ordering those loyal to him to cut down any and all suspected opponents.

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tration. Alternatively, a cabinet member or other administration official might be used as front man for what would actually be a military government.

32. None of these possible junta governments would be stable from the outset. A struggle for power within the junta would almost certainly ensue. This could lead to open violence between the contending factions or to the emergence of a single dictator.

33. The existing political parties of opposition—*Personalistes* on the one hand, Communists on the other—are simply too small and weak to compete for power even in a disorderly situation following Duvalier's departure. The Communists' best chance of gaining influence within a post-Duvalier regime would be in offering administrative assistance to whatever power group emerged on top. Such assistance would be in short supply and urgently needed; offers of help would be likely to be accepted without too particular a security investigation. Thus the few capable Haitian Communists would have a chance to penetrate the Haitian bureaucracy and, from that point of vantage, to exercise influence and to build up their party organizations. We believe that the Haitian Communists themselves would estimate their chances in this way and would pursue this course, rather than attempt to take over the government.

34. We doubt that either of the Haitian Communist parties would receive much outside support for an attempt to seize power. The Soviets would probably counsel PEP leaders to move cautiously and aim for a gradual accretion of political assets. Fidel Castro, whose connections are with the PPLN, would probably use Radio Havana broadcasts to exacerbate any political crisis, at the time of Duvalier's removal or subsequently. He could put a small invasion force into Haiti,<sup>8</sup> but we think it unlikely that he would take this risk any more than he dared take a similar risk during the crisis in the Dominican Republic. He might assist the small number of Haitian political exiles now in Cuba and the Dominican Republic to return in hopes that they could instill new spirit among the Haitian Communists so that they might play a more decisive role at some future time.

35. The exile groups generally are not likely to count for much in the immediate situation after Duvalier. We estimate that none now has the capability—without foreign help—either to overthrow him or to land a large enough force quickly after his downfall to determine the nature of the new government and the course of future events. What the exile groups can do, if there is no

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<sup>8</sup> Cuban air and naval forces have a theoretical capability to put more than 1,000 men into Haiti by sea, air, or airdrop in a few hours' time. This assumes no constraint by need for secrecy or by recognition that US counteraction would probably, at the least, prevent resupply or support of their force. Several thousand people of Haitian extraction live in Cuba, but we have no evidence that the Castro regime has tried to create any military or paramilitary unit from among them.

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restraint on their activities, is to complicate in many ways the already difficult task facing a new government.<sup>9</sup>

36. Because there is such an acute lack of administrative and technical talent among Haitians, in Haiti or in exile, there is scant likelihood that the government which succeeds Duvalier will be much better than the present one. Liberal parliamentary institutions have never been able to survive in Haiti; Duvalier's successors are not likely to have either the will or the ability to establish such a regime in that country. They will do well to establish an orderly and effective administration by the authoritarian methods that are customary there. It is conceivable, however, that a more respectable regime than Duvalier's could be set up.

37. Given Haiti's limited ability to absorb capital and foreign technology, economic and social development would probably remain minimal. Any new regime would probably continue to view Haiti's needs for foreign assistance primarily in terms of financial support for the administration and would resist reforms that would undermine its political control. Nonetheless, the US might gain some leverage over the situation simply by being able to deal with a new group which would be seeking US financial aid and political backing.

38. If the situation following Duvalier's departure became so disorderly as to require military action to protect and evacuate foreign nationals, the Organization of American States (OAS) would almost certainly acquiesce in such action by the US. Even those OAS members generally opposed to intervention are likely to go along, recognizing that Haiti is a special case. It would be remembered, however, that the US military intervention in Haiti in 1915, for the stated purpose of protecting lives and property, turned into an 18-year military occupation. Any proposal for US or OAS intervention to restore order and establish an effective government would encounter strong opposition within the OAS. Any contention that such intervention was necessary in order to forestall a Communist takeover would be disbelieved by many OAS members unless the supporting evidence was incontrovertible.<sup>10</sup>

39. In the circumstances postulated, the Haitian townspeople generally would probably welcome a US military intervention with intense relief, as was the case in 1915, expecting it to reestablish order and security for themselves. If

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<sup>9</sup> Although the administrative services of returning exiles would be useful to a successor regime, they would be likely to cause trouble, as a group, by their pretensions to political or military leadership and their demands for the restoration of expropriated or abandoned property. Some could cause international complications. One group led by Cuban exile Masferrer wants to use Haiti as a base for operations against Cuba. Another group seeking association with Dominican "constitutionalists" in Paris might be disposed to assist them in operations from Haiti against the Dominican Republic.

<sup>10</sup> The Government of the Dominican Republic would be extremely concerned about any protracted period of disorder and confusion in Haiti. Elements among the military and on the political right, if not President Balaguer himself, would be inclined to see the Communist threat as imminent. Thus the Dominican Government would be likely to press privately for the landing of a US force in Haiti, and to seek US assurances, as well as more military aid.

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a military occupation were at all prolonged, however, opposition to it would develop. Whatever Haitians came to power in such circumstances would be bitterly denounced by all the disappointed aspirants for office. A continuing US military presence might be required to sustain the new regime. As in 1915, it would be easier to get into Haiti than to get out.

40. These reactions would be generally limited to the towns and their immediate environs. The remoter peasants would almost certainly remain inert unless and until something happened to affect them directly and adversely.

41. Much of the international reaction to a landing of US forces in Haiti—whatever the reason given—would probably be adverse, particularly that of countries with neutralist or leftist governments. Even a brief US intervention to evacuate foreign nationals might face criticism on two counts. First it would be called a new "imperialist" move, a violation of the Charter of the OAS, and an unjustified interference in the affairs of a small nation. And second, if the force departed quickly when the foreigners were out and the Haitians then went back to chopping at each other, the US would be criticized for saving the whites and not caring what happened to the Negroes.

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