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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

CUBAN OPPOSITION TO THE CASTRO REGIME

The Cuban opposition to Castro at present includes a large number of groups, both inside and outside Cuba, ranging from organizations of former Batista associates to those of disillusioned ex-supporters of Castro. While the opposition has grown rapidly in recent months, it is not at this time a serious threat to Castro's position.

Despite the disorganization of Castro's opponents and recent increases in the regime's military strength the government is becoming concerned about the boldness of the counterrevolutionaries. In the past it sought to play down public references to internal opposition, concentrating instead on preparing the people for an alleged invasion by American troops or by US-backed Cuban "war criminals." In recent months, however, government leaders have openly admitted that the growing tide of anti-Castroism in Cuba is becoming a force to be reckoned with.

On 28 September Castro publicly called for the establishment of a block warden informant network in cities and towns as another instrument to combat "counterrevolutionary intrigue." In a speech on 15 October, Fidel Castro publicly acknowledged for the first time that Manuel Ray Rivero, once minister of public works in Castro's cabinet and now a leader in anti-Castro circles, was the head of a counterrevolutionary group. National Bank President Che Guevara, speaking in Moscow on 10 December, declared, "Counterrevolutionary terror will be met with equal terror."

Former Batista Associates

While there has been little evidence that ex-dictator Fulgencio Batista is actively trying to regain power in Cuba, several of his close associates who escaped into exile when his government fell were probably the first to establish organizations dedicated to ousting Castro. Such groups usually have formed around one man and consist primarily of mercenaries, opportunists, and supporters of the former dictator. Their effectiveness has been limited by their past association with Batista; they are discredited among other anti-Castro exile groups and have little appeal to Cubans at home.

One of the larger groups of former Batista henchmen operating against Castro from abroad is the Cuban Union of Liberation (UCL), an organization created by General Jose Eleuterio Pedraza, Batista's last military commander. Pedraza's chief political associate is Francisco Cajigas, a wealthy former Cuban industrialist now in Florida. This group, which claims to have approximately 5,000 supporters in several Latin American countries and Spain, was establishing bases in Nicaragua and Panama in June 1960, according to reliable sources. General Pedraza also claimed that he controlled Batista's army of 35,000 men, although their whereabouts remains unclear.

There is no evidence that the Pedraza-Cajigas group has begun to implement its anti-Castro plans or that it possesses the backing and organization


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necessary to achieve real success. Pedraza now is in Canada, where he apparently has little chance of resuming an active role in counterrevolutionary affairs, and he may leave for Portugal shortly.

A second group of anti-Castro exiles generally regarded as having close ties with Batista is controlled by former Cuban Senator Rolando Masferrer. This group, of unknown size, is completely unacceptable to the anti-Castro movement in exile as well as that

Former Castro Associates

Much of the active opposition to Castro consists of disillusioned ex-supporters, many of them former military and civilian leaders of the Castro regime. It includes several dozen groups with varying degrees of formal organization as well as an unknown number of individuals and small bands. Some are based in Cuba, some in other Latin American countries, and some in the United States; all have found their efforts greatly limited by a



within Cuba, because Masferrer and his private army are widely regarded as common criminals as a result of their activities in Cuba during 1957 and 1958. According to a July 1960 report, the Masferrer organization was centered in Miami and was identified as the "Workers' and Laborers' Anti-Communist Militia" (MAOC). The 27-man band which landed in Oriente Province on 5 October and was quickly captured by Castro's forces was sponsored by Masferrer.

lack of coordination, a shortage of money and military equipment, a lack of suitable staging bases, and a failure to come up with a leader possessing a measure of Fidel Castro's appeal.

A further handicap has been the failure of much of the opposition to come up with well-defined political and economic programs which would have sufficient appeal to win support among Castro's present backers. Those groups having adequate

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programs lack the means of communicating them to the Cuban people. Despite reports of increasing discontent among peasants and other low-income groups--the broad base on which Castro's power was built--such disenchantment has yet to become critical.

Efforts to unify the opposition have generally been unsuccessful because of ideological differences, personal feuds, and the desire of many individuals to be the star performer. A fear and mistrust of other groups--which is natural, in view of Castro's known past successes in infiltrating and trapping rebel organizations--is also present in each organization and has hindered their amalgamation.

Perhaps the most important anti-Castro group having its main base in Cuba is the Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP), headed by Manuel Ray Rivero. Well-known Cuban exiles who are associated with the MRP include Col. Ramon Barquin, who headed an arms-purchasing mission for Castro until August 1960; Felipe Pazos, who was president of the National Bank until Che Guevara replaced him; and Raul Chibas, a former rail transport executive under Castro. Jose Miro Cardona, the Castro regime's first prime minister and still a widely respected leader, is often identified with this group. His main concern since arriving in the United States last fall, however, has been to seek means of unifying the anti-Castro forces.

Opposition circles have commented that Ray's organization is growing in strength and effectiveness, but his escape to the United States in mid-November might reverse this trend. MRP forces are included in the counterrevolutionary groups still harassing government troops in the Sierra Es-cambray area of Las Villas

Province, and the group has reportedly begun sabotage activities in Havana and other localities. The MRP also was responsible for the escape in early October of 15 imprisoned associates of former Camaguey Province military commander Huber Matos, who has become a popular symbol of opposition to Castro since his arrest and imprisonment in December 1959.

The largest anti-Castro organization with headquarters outside Cuba is the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD), headed by former Prime Minister Antonio de Varona. Formed in Mexico in June 1960, the FRD attempted to weld the chief anti-Castro groups into a single organization. Although many counterrevolutionary groups did not affiliate with it, the FRD successfully united several of the larger, established organizations.

Included in the organization are: the so-called "Authentic" branch of the Cuban Revolutionary party, an established political party which opposed Batista and joined with Castro; the Movement for the Recovery of the Revolution (MRR), an opposition group formed by former Castro supporters and soldiers who became convinced that Castro had "stolen" their revolution; the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), an anti-Castro organization composed mostly of young professional and university people and reputedly backed by some church officials in Oriente Province; and the Montecristi movement, a clandestine organization of professional and civic leaders.

Former Education Minister Aureliano Sanchez Arango's so-called "Triple A" group--an organization of Catholic and business interests first formed at the University of Havana to fight the Batista dictatorship--was also a charter member of the FRD, but it left the organization following Sanchez Arango's

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withdrawal from the FRD in October and joined his new five-group "United Front for National Liberation."

The FRD's headquarters is in Miami, and components are also active in Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, and other countries of the hemisphere. While most of the organization's activities and manpower are concentrated abroad, the FRD claims it has several thousand adherents within Cuba. The amount and scope of its domestic efforts are not known, but it has been reliably reported that MRR leader Ingenio "Nino" Diaz entered Cuba clandestinely in mid-October with a small armed group and began counterrevolutionary activities in eastern Oriente Province. The FRD was responsible for the airdrop of anti-Castro leaflets on Havana and six other Cuban cities on 12 December.

There is a variety of lesser organizations formed by former supporters of Castro now operating within and outside of Cuba. Most of them are small; have limited appeal, resources, and effectiveness; and serve principally as vehicles for their leaders to enhance their own reputations. Among such groups is the "30th of November Movement" of David Salvador, a former Castro labor official who was seized by the regime in early November, and the group controlled by a former chief of the revolutionary air force, Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz.

Religious, Professional Groups

Leaders of the Catholic Church in Cuba have become increasingly critical of the regime's pro-Communist policies since the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba first spoke out against the Communist "enemy within our gates" in a widely publicized pastoral letter in May. Issuance of other pastoral letters

in early August and mid-November resulted in outbreaks of violence in some areas between churchgoers and government goon squads. There are increasing reports that clergymen and other church officials are giving covert assistance to anti-Castro forces.

The value of church opposition to Castro, however, is more symbolic than real. The church hierarchy itself is divided on the Castro issue, and the government is lionizing a pro-Castro group within the church which calls itself "With the Cross and the Fatherland." Although about 85 percent of all Cubans are nominally Catholics, the church probably is weaker in Cuba than in any other Latin American country. For these reasons, many church officials have sought to forestall the church-state showdown which now appears imminent, fearing that any open and complete break with the regime might lead to a mass desertion from the church by lower income groups.

Considerable opposition to Castro has been manifested among university students, teachers, and professional groups in Cuba. Catholic university students--many of whom are members of the semiclandestine Christian Democratic Movement--were among the first groups to criticize authoritarian controls over student activities and the insertion of Communism into Cuban education.

US Embassy sources continue to report an atmosphere of "smoldering resentment" among the majority of the student body at the University of Havana, stemming from the government's use of police state methods in bringing the traditionally autonomous institution completely under state control. At least 123 of the university's professors have been suspended.

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as "unacceptable" to the new Castro-controlled university governing body, and many others are known to have either resigned or been informally dismissed.

A similar situation is believed to exist in other Cuban colleges and universities. The National Bar Association has openly condemned the government's seizure of the Havana Bar Association headquarters in July, and disaffection within the judiciary over the regime's disregard for constitutional guarantees became public in mid-November when Chief Justice Emilio Menendez and other members of the Supreme Court resigned.

Outlook

The diverse opposition groups are generally aware of their shortcomings and will try to achieve joint action

against Castro. The regime probably will be increasingly harassed by sabotage and terrorist activities, and possibly by attempted incursions by exile groups.

The counterrevolutionary forces still have formidable obstacles to overcome before they can constitute any serious threat to Castro's position --particularly in view of the increasing strength of his instruments of popular repression. The government's 200,000-man revolutionary militia, which has virtually supplanted the traditional armed forces, is controlled by a politically reliable hard core and is daily gaining in effectiveness. Moreover, despite the questionable reliability of some components, the militia's manpower and firepower still greatly exceed those known to be available to Castro's opponents.

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CUBAN AND MIDDLE AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations in Moscow and Havana have resulted in new and more extensive Cuban-Soviet trade and assistance commitments. Details have not been released, but Cuban officials have estimated that trade next year with the Soviet Union will amount to more than \$200,000,000 each way --roughly a third of total Cuban trade. Indications are that this is a reasonable estimate.

In the joint communiqué signed in Moscow on 19 December by Che Guevara and Mikoyan, the USSR expressed its determination "to take all measures within its power" to help Cuba combat US "economic aggression" by providing Cuba with all vital imports it cannot get elsewhere. The Soviet Union also agreed to buy up to 2,700,000 tons of sugar from Cuba if the United States "carried out its threat" not to buy Cuban sugar. Sugar purchases are to be paid for in oil and other Soviet exports and valued at four cents a pound; the world market price is 3.25 cents, and the US has been paying 5.95 cents. It is not clear whether this formula applies to the total amount or

to that in excess of the 1,000,-000 tons the USSR had earlier agreed to purchase in 1961.

In the communiqué Cuba endorsed all the major Soviet foreign policy goals, specifically emphasizing proposals on peaceful coexistence and general disarmament. The Cuban mission, after expressing its gratitude for Soviet economic and technical aid, added that Khrushchev's statement of support was the "most important aspect" of Soviet assistance. The communiqué did not repeat the ambiguous missile threat but instead referred to the USSR's readiness to render Cuba "full support" in upholding its independence in the face of aggression.

The counselor of the French Embassy in Havana believes, however, Guevara's mission in Moscow was a failure. He arrives at this conclusion from information given him by a member of the Guevara mission, who told him that Khrushchev had rejected Guevara's initial request for a \$300,000,000 loan and then also turned down a request for half that amount.

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In an address on the eve of his departure from Moscow on 19 December, Guevara said that the new Cuban-Soviet agreements will help Cuba develop its ferrous metallurgy, oil, mining, and power industries, and that the nearly 100 plants being constructed in Cuba with bloc assistance will provide the foundation for Cuba's small and medium industries.

In an earlier address in Moscow, Guevara told his audience that in the struggle with the United States, Cuba's "principal hope" lies in the force of "the socialist camp" and that the "hand of friendship extended by the Soviet Union shields us from the enemy like an invisible armada."

Havana's establishment of diplomatic relations with Albania and Hungary, announced on 16 and 18 December, leaves East Germany the only bloc country with which Cuba does not have formal diplomatic relations. On his departure from East Germany on 17 December after concluding a five-year trade agreement there, Guevara declared that East Germany and Cuba will establish diplomatic relations "at the proper time ...and with due regard for their mutual interests."

Fidel Castro, in a speech on 20 December, threatened to dump large quantities of Cuban sugar on the world market at sacrificial prices if other sugar producers expand production in an effort to benefit from Cuba's exclusion from the US market.

In his efforts to dissuade the Castro regime from establishing diplomatic relations with East Germany, the West German ambassador told the acting Cuban foreign minister that West Germany has nothing

against the Cuban Government and is neutral on the "Cuban-US quarrel." The American chargé in Havana noted on 16 December that this attitude is widespread among Western governments represented diplomatically in Havana. He said there is probably not a single foreign chief of mission in Havana, with the exception of certain Latin American ambassadors, that has condemned to high Cuban officials the violations of human rights by the Castro regime or criticized its rapprochement with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The chargé referred to a number of ambassadors, including the British, Japanese, and Canadian, as personally sympathetic to the US policy toward Castro, but indicated that the evident policy of their governments is such that "they gladly leave the Cuban situation to us."

On the domestic scene, the Castro regime is meeting continued resistance from a number of sources which, although generally uncoordinated, are becoming increasingly troublesome. Castro himself admitted that the sabotage in Havana's leading radio-TV offices on 15 December destroyed equipment valued at up to \$1,000,000.

[REDACTED] at least seven canefield fires between 6 and 11 December and to numerous other successful acts of sabotage in various parts of the country.

[REDACTED] a case of gross insubordination by a group of some 400 of Castro's vaunted militia, indicates that morale and discipline are serious problems in some units of the "volunteer" militia.

The regime is also having difficulty with Cuba's estimated

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65,000 "colonos," the sugar growers who produce the bulk of Cuba's cane on small to medium land holdings. The "colonos" are apparently resisting efforts to organize them into cooperatives, and all but about 200 of them boycotted a sugar congress convoked on 19 December by Castro.

Central America

In Guatemala, which remains a prime target for Cuban subversion, plotting continues among dissident elements, both military and civilian. Although the majority of the leading plotters are apparently anti-Communist and anti-Castro, there are active extremist groups, probably encouraged and supported by Cuba, which are seeking to exploit the situation and preparing to exert strong pressure on a succeeding regime if and when President Ydigoras is forced out.

where peasants are already being organized by the Communist-controlled labor confederation.

In neighboring El Salvador, pressure from a Communist-front political party resulted on 16 December in the dismissal of all municipal officers who had been elected to office under the regime ousted last October. This is an important success for Communists and other leftists in their efforts to increase their influence in rural areas,