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ROUTING  
FORM

Doc. No.:

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2/2/54

Indicate title of person to take action and that of the originator. Place comments thereunder by numbered paragraphs. Initial in center of page and draw a line across the page and forward. Each recipient is to repeat above procedure until action completed and ready for filing. This coversheet must be retained with enclosure.

TO

FROM

DATE

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Note: a non-negative attitude will permeate the entire proceedings however, these notes are to represent discussion points which are likely to come up and represent the basis of c/pm prior concept. [ . . . ]

C/

Believe this is what Rufus will want to know - once you have an understanding of techniques and are in agreement the rest should come along without too much trouble.

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[ . ]

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3 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: [ - } CALIGARIS Briefing Notes

1. Attached are sterile notes from which [ ] intends to work in the coming meeting with CALIGARIS. Deviation to fit the situation will undoubtedly change the complex of control points, however these notes will be adhered to insomuch as possible.

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3 February 1954

SUBJECT: Briefing Notes

1. Former planning of Indigenous Commander will be utilized as fully as possible, the basis of which being to rearrange the plan to comply with unconventional warfare standards.

2. The major consideration in all alterations in the Indigenous Commander's plans will be to avoid a prolonged siege situation and to avoid placing many assets at the disposal of the tricks of the opposition. To accomplish this we must realize that all key points of resistance should come under our control immediately at H hour. The conditions under our control should be accomplished at each key point of resistance by one of or a combination of the following methods:

a. First Method: Seizure by outside force with mission of support being performed by an inner organization, organized by the Indigenous Commander's personnel from his personnel plus defections obtained through Psychological Warfare persuasion.

b. Second Method: Seizure by an inner organization such as above without the aid of outside forces.

c. Third Method: An inner organization as above to the point of capabilities of control and nullifying the positive action of any areas of resistance until success at other key areas is obtained and consolidated to the point of capability of supporting outside force on arrival to prevent a siege situation.

*Note: Army unit personnel form priority target for detection.*

d. Fourth Method: Blocking strong resistance points from the entire action by organizing strategic surrounding areas for their retarding and harassment, and blocking by specially placed Sab teams.

3. Unless the positive assurance of control of Guatemala City by one of the above first three methods is obtained, no overt move will be made. It is considered there are nine points of resistance at this time:

- a. Guatemala City: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- b. Puerto Barrios: garrison, communications, air facilities, and port facilities
- c. Jutiapa: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- d. Zacapa: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- e. Mazatenango: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- f. Quezaltenango: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- g. Quiche: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- h. Coban: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- i. San Jose: garrison, port facilities, and communications.

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4. It is contemplated that during this first discussion certain portions of the Indigenous Commander's prior estimates of the situation and contemplated needs will arise. The theme to be used on each anticipated subject is to be as follows:

a. A feeling by the Indigenous Commander that on the capture of certain of small outlying garrisons, Guatemala City and other strong points can be expected to capitulate. Recent disclosures have proved that the enemy may approach in efficiency those standards met in other Communist countries. We know that several of the enemy are Soviet trained. Soviet trained active opposition gathers its knowledge thoroughly and employs it at the opportune time only. We must design our mode of attack and preparation for the attack so that a limited bit of knowledge obtained by the active opposition cannot be built into possession of the full details. We are attempting to aid in these standards by utilizing compartmentation within the new target organization between the new target organization and the surrounding partisan forces, between the Guat complex and the outside shock troops and specialists, and between shock troops and specialists for each target and troops and specialists for another target. The entry of shock troops and specialists will be designed as nearly as possible to an infiltration type entry rather than that of regular forces placed along communication routes. Techniques of partisan warfare will be applied to the Indigenous Commander's prior planning and preparations in the best manner to support more conventional military tactics. This technique of combining two types of tactics has proven itself in military history by reducing the number of personnel necessary, lessening hog-tying logistical problems, and utilizing strike mobility, surprise, and tactics making the opposition fight on your terms, at your time and place for which you are better equipped, trained, and mentally adapted to. By the same token infiltration entry by small, light-traveling units avoiding possible military traps by the opposition will negate the enemy's utilization of material they possess concerning us, the extent of which is unknown to us.

~~THEREFORE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE KEY POSITION THE ELITE CORPS FORMING GUATEMALA CITY MILITARY COMPLEX REPRESENTS, GUIDES OUR~~

b. The Indigenous Commander will inquire as to what possible reason could be behind the thought of a military campaign not employing combat aircraft: The utility of bombing and strafing tactics to neutralize any strong point is being shied away from even as a psychological factor by the Group in view of the fact that the very concept of our movement, that of release of persons from oppression, and all of our actions must allow this discontented element to participate in the overthrow of oppression or at least aid by sympathy or nonintervention. Our tactics should veer away from terrorism of this faction and veer towards inviting their participation. NOTE: Writer will employ non-rigidity in the above in the presentation to allow for the following deviation:

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(1) It is admitted that there is a psychological value to the appearance of aircraft. If strafing and bombing aircraft are made available by outside support ~~that is acceptable~~ to the Group, ~~that~~ they can be utilized if the Indigenous Commander's assurances of complete control of that support will be maintainable by Group and Indigenous Commander during operation to the point of not allowing one round to be fired or one bomb to be dropped unless prior Group-Indigenous Commander concurrence is pre-determined. Writer will call upon disastrous personal experiences to point out possible hazards of group air support even when air-ground liaison teams and air force have been strenuously trained and when operating under best conditions. (2) Writer will point out Group's yet-unfirm initial planning on preparations for reserve support under Plan Able or emergency support under Plan Baker and Plan Charlie by Group air facilities.

5. Communications: Indigenous Commander may query the Group's former claim to communications efficiency. The writer's position here will be that of pointing out difficulties experienced in utilization of varied radio trained tactical situations even of the comparatively small enormity if encountered in inter-company raider situations encountered in semi-conventional tactics. The proven reliability of the technical equipment being proposed and the security efficiency that can be maintained should aid in setting the basis of communications plan.

6. Logistical Support: The Indigenous Commander will query methods of getting material in the hands of recipients. Here the writer will outline basic concepts of the logistical support plan as prepared in the rough from which each                      was composed. Without going into the exact method of getting material to the staging site and without being dogmatic on the Choggi system as being the only method. Flame throwers will be dissipated by pointing out lack of portability, wrong psychological effect, and availability. German bazookas will be mentioned as being sought. Special equipment such as silenced rifles, survival kits, Napalm, shaped charges, and canned grenades will be played up.

7. The entire basis of the writer's approach to this conference will be the realization that the Group must follow, both from their groups and our groups standpoint and that side from the known opposition tactics and precautionary measures, that we are coming up against and are faced with the third factor of opposition's trained Communist Tacticians in the field of security, stay behind, subversion, and intrigue which would make our employment of straight military tactics, alone, an issue of doubt. All of us involved must over plan and over prepare and be prepared to "drive the tack with a sledge hammer" in the event the sledge hammer turns out to be a railroad spike.

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8. In the event accord or mutual compromise is apparant at this point the Indigenous Commander will be queried in order to initiate the formation of such organizations we should start preparing specifications on the following:

a. The name and biographical data on the person or persons the Indigenous Commander considers to be the key man or men to be nucleus of the organization within the garison. We should consider a strong executive officer (probably to be chosen by the key man himself if the Indigenous Commander considers feasible). We should choose personalities for Partisan Leaders around which organizations of the surrounding areas can be built. We should determine the personalities most suited for residence radio operators for each specific target. We should choose personalities for leaders of sabotage teams and move them the latter part of March to the staging area which has been selected for the particular area of interest so that graduates of the present training program can be assigned to instruct them. We should pin down the air fields near by the staging areas to which material can be sent to the staging area. The Indigenous Commander should ascertain at this time his ability to operate secure landing at these airfields from the head of the countries concerned, similar to the arrangements for the last similar flight made by the Group. The Indigenous Commander should inform the Group soonest on obtaining the answer to this query if such answer is not available at this conference.

9. The Indigenous Commander will be acquainted with at this point, if deemed feasible by writer, the proposed methods of initiating these first steps and at this time can comment on feasibility at specific instances. Contact of the selected key personality in each area of resistance by one of the graduates of present training, which contact to be instructional in nature, the secu ity of which contact we will guarantee by the techniques of clandestine trade, which contact will be limited to one man in whom the Indigenous Commander has confidence. The reasoning here to be stressed is that the building of the new organization should be comparitively cautious to prevent the recent disclosures to the enemy from contaminating the new organization. This key figure will be instructed to work even within his garrison by using one strong assistant to provide the implimentation of his organizing efforts thereby preventing exposure of himself through too much activity. The key figure will be instructed to organize within the garrison one man to form the necessary organization to negate air facilities (i.e. prevent opposition aircraft from entering the action); one man to form the necessary organization responsible for cutting communications; one man responsible for instructing and organizing special mission details (assassination, destruction or seizure of materials and stock piles, physical submission of garrison troops, etc.); one man as a courier cutout with liaison with incoming resident radio operators: one man for possible courier contact (emergency with Indigenous Commander). In addition, personalities chosen to head area organizations in the surrounding area will be contacted by graduate trainees for instructional purposes to acquaint the area raiders with harassment and retardation tactics and organizational style.

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10. Discussion on reason for compartmentalization of staging training sites and specific locations will be handled.

11. Once Indigenous Commander's assignment February is determined, he will be asked to present financial estimate for discussion.

12. It is the purpose of this conference to reach an understanding with the Indigenous Commander and find personnel and geographical requirements which will initiate a positive forward move in the military field during his forthcoming trip to his home area.

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