CEARE

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/\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*/
BODY
SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF
1993.

## CONTENTS

2. HAITI: THE REGIME'S STRATEGY UNDER UN SANCTIONS



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JIKS ....

IN THE FACE OF THE UN OIL EMBARGO, ARMY CHIEF CEDRAS AND HIS

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ALLIES ARE STRUGGLING TO PLACATE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BUT PREVENT THE RETURN OF OUSTED PRESIDENT ARISTIDE. IF THEY FAIL, THE REGIME MAY ENCOURAGE EMIGRATION IN THE HOPE OF PRESSING THE US TO EASE SANCTIONS.

CEDRAS'S STRATEGY IS TO TRY TO WEAKEN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE EMBARGO BY SHIFTING THE BLAME FOR THE IMPASSE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO ARISTIDE, WHO APPEARS PREPARED TO FORFEIT NEW TALKS RATHER THAN OFFER THE REGIME ANY CONCESSIONS. CEDRAS ALMOST CERTAINLY RECOGNIZES THAT ARISTIDE'S INTRANSIGENCE WILL DELAY AND PERHAPS FORESTALL ANY SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD LEAD TO HIS RETURN. HE HIMSELF IS WILLING TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS TO RESTART THE TALKS. WHICH APE NOW SET FOR SUNDAY IN NEW YORK.

HE INTENDS TO UFFER TO RESIGN AS SOON AS TWO MONTHS AFTER AN AGREEMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR GUARANTEES THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD BE PROTECTED FROM PRO-ARISTIDE MOBS. HE PLANS TO PROPOSE THAT A TRANSITION COMMITTEE, COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE ARISTIDE CAMP AND THE REGIME, SELECT A NEW PRIME MINISTER AND FORM A CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT.

TO FURTHER SHOW ITS WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE REGIME PROBABLY WILL PUT OFF ANY UNILATERAL STEPS TO RESOLVE THE POLITICAL CRISIS. FOR EXAMPLE, MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS ARE LIKELY TO DELAY ACTING ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR SUCCESSION AND ORGANIZING AN ELECTION. THE REGIME PROBABLY WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO TOLERATE THE PRESENCE OF UN-OAS HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS AND WILL ACCEPT REPATRIATION OF HAITIAN EMIGRANTS INTERDICTED BY THE US COAST GUARD.

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN TACTICS

IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THE REGIME IS ABLE TO SECURE ADDITIONAL PETROLEUM, IT ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL DELAY REACHING A SETTLEMENT. CEDRAS PROBABLY BELIEVES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL LINE UP BEHIND HIS TRANSITION PROPOSAL, AND HE PROBABLY HOPES TO DRAW OUT NEGOTIATIONS TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT. IF THE REGIME BEGINS TO BELIEVE THAT INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS IS WEAKENING OR THAT SUPPORT FOR ARISTIDE IS EBBING, IT MIGHT BE EMBOLDENED TO PRESS FOR A GREATER ROLE IN SELECTING A NEW PRIME MINISTER OR SHAPING MILITARY REFORM.

CEDRAS PROBABLY WOULD SHIFT TACTICS QUICKLY IF ANY CONCESSIONS HE OFFERS SPARK A BACKLASH FROM HARDLINERS OR ARMY ENLISTED MEN; HE MIGHT BE FORCED TO REVERSE HIS POSITION OR EVEN BE OUSTED. IN ADDITION, MANY MEMBERS OF THE HAITIAN ELITE PROBABLY ARE ANXIOUS TO END THE POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY, AND THEY MIGHT DEMAND THAT THE REGIME FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT AND BAR ARISTIDE'S RETURN. IF CEDRAS IS DEPOSED, ANY SUCCESSOR REGIME WOULD BE EVEN LESS ABLE TO DELIVER ON A COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.


REACTING TO A BLOCKADE

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IF THE US OR THE UN WERE TO IMPOSE A BLOCKADE TO CHOKE OFF SUPPLIES REACHING HAITI IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE EMBARGO MILITARY LEADERS PROBABLY WOULD ABANDON EFFORTS TO PLACATE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WOULD RAPIDLY ORGANIZE AN ELECTION. THEY ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD EXPEL HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS, REJECT EMIGRANT REPATRIATIONS, AND REMOVE RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION. A HALT IN REPATRIATIONS WOULD EMBOLDEN MANY HAITIANS TO TEST THEIR CHANCES OF REACHING THE US. THE REGIME PROBABLY WOULD USE FORCE TO STOP ANY RIOTING CAUSED BY SHORTAGES RESULTING FROM A BLOCKADE. IN THAT CASE, INCREASINGLY DESPERATE HAITIANS MIGHT CALCULATE THAT THEY COULD QUALIFY FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE US, AND THE OUTFLOW PROBABLY WOULD SURGE.

/\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 \*\*\*\*\*/





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