

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

10 APR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT: Proposal for Surfacing an LRI Prototype
as Cover for the OXCART Program

1. The OXCART program initiated in 1959, has during the ensuing years and up to the present time progressed through the development and initial construction phase and, surprisingly, through an entire year of flight testing and flight training without a single exposure or significant security breach which resulted in attracting public attention to the program.

2. This accomplishment becomes even more remarkable when it is appreciated that practical considerations have forced us to adhere to a pattern that is widely known and associated with the U-2 program and involving such elements as Lockheed, Kelly Johnson, [REDACTED] etc.

3. This record, which has exceeded our most optimistic expectations, was not established through fortuitous circumstance and at least passing recognition should be accorded those who have had responsibility for the security of the program since its inception.

4. With the advent of the R-12 procurement, it should be recognized that the program cannot be contained in the same manner as in the past. More than 7,000 persons in industry already are either fully or partially cleared. In addition, the increased frequency of flights will almost inevitably result in an incident under circumstances that we may not be able to control. The magnitude of the program in itself negates any effort at complete concealment, and there is already

*There are trying to reverse
the President's decision made
on the R-12 in Feb - supported
strongly by CIA*

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an awareness in the aviation industry that Lockheed is engaged in a highly classified project of a unique nature. (A summary of examples of this awareness has been prepared by the Security Branch, OSA, and is attached at Tab A.) It must be assumed that public exposure is only a matter of time and steps must be taken now to prepare to meet this contingency and to protect the OXCART phase of the program.

*Check in
not needed
to be done
connected to*

5. In addition to concealing the true mission of the OXCART vehicle and plausibly ascribing to it a different purpose, there is the more difficult and potentially explosive political problem of explaining and justifying the limited competition procurement of the aircraft and the secrecy which cloaked its development. The possible political connotations of the latter will almost certainly not go unnoticed by those Members of Congress who are unwitting of the program, and the resultant clamor for investigation could quickly get out of control unless effective measures are taken beforehand to cope with such a development. The current TFX controversy has further compounded and accentuated this aspect of the problem. To a lesser degree, but still of considerable concern, is the anticipated reaction of the technical press and possibly some components of the aviation industry itself.

6. Our success to date in protecting the OXCART/AF 12 programs from public exposure is cited as an argument in favor of continuing our present policy without change. Under this concept we would not voluntarily surface any part of the program until forced to do so by some untoward incident or compromise.

7. Conversely, it is argued that such a course deprives us of the selection of the time and circumstances of such surfacing and also deprives us of the psychological advantages inherent in a voluntary surfacing as opposed to a situation in which it will be obvious to everyone that we are being forced by circumstances beyond our control to explain belatedly a program which we would have preferred to conceal from public view.

Why

8. Whichever course is selected--i. e., controlled or uncontrolled surfacing--the problem of providing a plausible cover story is the same. The elements of the cover story would be identical



fact - it could be an alternative

in each instance; however, it seems logical that the plausibility would be significantly enhanced if the surfacing were voluntary. On balance, we conclude that a controlled surfacing offers advantages which outweigh the benefits deriving from our present policy which is becoming more untenable with the elapse of time and increased tempo of operations. *Desoy*

9. The cover story which will be employed in surfacing the AF-12 portion of the program must contain as many elements of truth as possible, short of jeopardizing the OXCART version. With this as a primary consideration, it becomes more and more obvious that the best solution is to surface the long-range interceptor prototype, the first one of which will be available by approximately mid-July 1963.

10. It is proposed that the Defense Department announce that a prototype of a long-range interceptor developed by Lockheed Aircraft Company for the USAF will commence flight tests at Edwards AFB on or about 5 July 1963. Whether the LRI, currently designated the X-22, will go into full production will depend on the decision of the Secretary of Defense which, in turn, will be based on the results of a major study and evaluation of further AF interceptor needs currently underway at the Pentagon and due on the desk of Secretary McNamara early in June.

11. The announcement will further state that the LRI prototype is the result of a limited design competition between Convair and Lockheed in 1959 which resulted in the selection of the LAC design using the Pratt and Whitney J-58 engine. The stringent security measures applied to the development program from its inception resulted from a decision by the previous administration to deny to the Soviets critical information on our future air defense systems which could vitally affect their decisions with regard to offensive weapons systems and countermeasures. The program was reviewed by the present administration in 1961, and the decision was made to continue development of the aircraft under the same rigid security policy then in effect. *Desoy*

12. Armament is provided by the Hughes Aircraft Corporation and is a version of the ASG-18 long-range radar and GAR-9 air-to-air missile. This system has been undergoing tests in a B-58 at Edwards AFB for the past two years.

13. Performance figures on the LRI will not be revealed, and beyond this announcement the high security level that has characterized this development will be continued in order to protect performance information.

14. There remains the question as to the timing of the controlled surfacing. It would be desirable to have available, at the time of the announcement, a prototype which could be displayed at Edwards AFB. This would require a delay in surfacing the LRI at least until mid-July 1965. Assuming that the Senate TFX hearings will have been concluded by then, this would have the added advantage of surfacing under a more favorable climate than presently exists. If the disclosure were made in the midst of the TFX hearings, any effort by the Senate Committee to avoid its introduction into the controversy would be almost painfully obvious and probably futile.

15. Conversely, if we delay the surfacing, it is with the attendant risk that an incident may occur in the interim which would accrue from a controlled surfacing.

16. In either case, it is proposed that no mention will be made [redacted] unless [redacted] itself is compromised by the nature of the incident. If the latter should occur, the activity will be described as a highly classified research program under the sponsorship of the Department of Defense with control and test operations being supervised by the Department of the Air Force. No further disclosures will be made.

17. At the present time there are twenty-one Congressmen briefed on OXCART. They are primarily members of the House Armed Services and House Appropriations Committees, and members of the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations Combined Subcommittees (See Tab B).

18. One favorable aspect of the program lies in the fact that it will be extremely difficult for any Congressman to make a partisan political issue of the subject. The limited design competition and rigid security policy were established during a Republican administration and endorsed and continued by a Democratic administration. Nevertheless, it appears highly desirable that prior to any announcement:

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being made some additional key members of Congress be fully briefed on the OXCART program. In this way it might be possible to quell any Congressional conflagration even before it started. Such briefings probably should include Senators McClellan, Dirksen, Mundt, and Goldwater, and Representative Halleck. It might also be advisable to solicit the recommendations of those Congressmen already briefed as to what other measures we might undertake to achieve our objectives with Congress.


19. It is not anticipated that the aviation industry in itself will constitute a major problem; however, it would be prudent to be prepared to brief the top men in certain aircraft corporations if there were indications of an unfavorable reaction. The technical press may attempt to make a cause celebre of the announcement, but in the absence of strong reaction from the industry and Congress, it is believed that the critical comments will be short-lived.

20. It should be noted that at present we have an agreed inter-departmental contingency plan for OXCART which has been reviewed and approved by such august bodies as the Special Group and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Although a number of persons have expressed reservations as to the plausibility of this plan, which relates the vehicle to an airborne satellite launch system, should an incident occur tomorrow we would have little choice but to proceed in accordance with the approved plan.

21. Recommendations:

a. That the Ad Hoc Cover Committee be convened as soon as possible to consider the proposed surfacing of the LRI as a cover mechanism for OXCART.

b. That the Committee resolve and make a recommendation on the timing of the surfacing.


HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)

Attachments A & B

[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Research)

SUBJECT : Project OXCART
(Awareness in Aviation Industry)

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. The OSA Security staff has invited to my attention the attached summary of examples of the increasing extent of awareness in uncleared industrial circles of Project OXCART.
3. Recently, it seems that almost daily a new indication appears that in the aviation business circles more and more people are putting two and two together regarding this Project. As touched upon in the attached, the sources interviewed mention that even without actual leaks of classified information there are enough indicators available to support a calculated estimate of the nature of Kelly Johnson's endeavors. Some of the "estimates" are right on the target.

4. The possibility of leaks can not be discounted, of course. In this regard as at 13 March 1963 the following number of persons were cleared for OXCART:

CIA
 Other U. S. Government
 Total U. S. Government
 Industry (Fully & Partially Cleared)
 Total Cleared

[REDACTED] *has many
 cleared
 since
 1960*

5. With KEDLOCK coming along it must be anticipated that the problem of containing information concerning the existence and status of OXCART and, of course, KEDLOCK, will be that much more difficult to handle.

6. OSA Security is "beefing up" its staff and in addition to monitoring the security of these programs will

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endeavor to react promptly to plug up leaks and "too close to the truth" speculations. You may desire, however, to invite to the attention of the Director, the information highlighted herein to ensure that he is aware of the climate in which we are endeavoring to protect these ultra-sensitive activities.

7. I have encouraged all elements of this Office to vigorously address themselves to this considerable problem to ensure that our maximum effort is riveted upon the best possible solution.

[REDACTED]
COLONEL, USAF
Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

Attachment, as stated

[REDACTED] (23 March 1953)

Distribution:

- Copy 1 & 2 - DD/R
- 3 - AD/OSA
- 4 - DAD/OSA
- 5 - PS/OSA
- 6 - [REDACTED]/OSA
- 7 - DD/OSA
- 8 - OD/OSA
- 9 - CD/OSA
- 10 - ID/OSA
- 11 - ADMIN/OSA
- 12 - DD/Sec
- 13 - [REDACTED]/OSA
- 14 - [REDACTED]/OSA

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

1. North American Aviation, Los Angeles, California

Admiral John B. Pearson, USN (Ret.) VP (Development and Planning) North American Aviation, Los Angeles, California, advised in April 1962: Incidental to his responsibilities with NSA (monitoring all military activities within aircraft industry) he concluded a full year before that Kelly Johnson, LSC, was developing a supersonic Mach 2.4 - Mach 3, long range, high altitude (30,000-85,000 feet) aircraft which would probably be twin engine and have a dual mission, reconnaissance and intercept.

Basis for conclusion:

a. Evaluation of United States Government's defense needs.

b. Recognizing the need and realizing that the F-108 program has been cancelled, he noted that no overt mention of a replacement was being made.

c. The infrequent appearances of Kelly Johnson during the past two years was an indication that he was actively engaged in a new program.

d. After the cancellation of the F-108, he determined that several of the people who were working on the GAR-9/ASG-19 in Hughes Aircraft were working on a hush, hush program. When he speculated to an old friend at Hughes that there was probably no current use of the GAR-9 unless Kelly Johnson was building something at Lockheed, the old friend was noticeably startled and changed the subject which Pearson took as another clue.

e. It was common knowledge that the J-58 program at Pratt & Whitney was continuing as a production effort, with no published customer or use.

f. A budget analyst at North American advised that the previous year's budget failed to identify uses for \$150 million.

Admiral Pearson at the conclusion of the discussion observed that the primary need in his opinion to preclude

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further disclosures of confirmation of the Lockheed program would be the publication of a cover story for Kelly Johnson. He also suggested the possibility of considering briefing some aviation editors such as Marvin Miles of the Los Angeles Times.

2. Cross Country News, Fort Worth, Texas

Cross Country News article of 31 January 1963 (aeronautical newspaper published at Fort Worth, Texas):

"LOCKHEED SST SAID IN X STAGE. A HIGHLY GUARDED SECRET MAY BE REVEALED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT, BURBANK IS EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE A NEW SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT, OFF THE DRAWING BOARDS, EVEN IN THE X STAGE LOCKHEED OFFICIALS SAY NOTHING. NO DETAILS CAME WITH THIS TIP, FROM SOURCES CONSIDERED VERY RELIABLE.


"HOWEVER, IF THE LOCKHEED SST IS FLYING, OR ALREADY FOR FLIGHT TESTS, IT MAY EXPLAIN WHY MURDER HALABY, CHIEF OF THE FAA, ASKED THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT ADVISORY GROUP, TO SLOW DOWN ON THEIR \$1 BILLION DOLLAR PROJECT. GOAL HAS BEEN TO HAVE A US SST FLYING BY 1972. FRANCE AND BRITAIN ARE IN A JOINT VENTURE, EXPECTED HAVE A 1,400 MPH PASSENGER PLANE OPERATING BY 1970. THE US IS EXPECTING TO TEST THE 2,000 MPH RS-70, THIS SPRING.

"LOCKHEED MAY INDEED REPEAT THEIR SLOGAN "LOOK TO LOCKHEED FOR LEADERSHIP", IF THEY BREAK THE WORLD MARKET WIDE OPEN WITH THE SST IN 1963."

3. Martin Co., Denver, Colorado

William Clegern, Assistant to Director, Advanced Technology, Martin Co., Denver, Colorado. During the week of 28 January 1963, Mr. Clegern in discussions before a group pointed out several areas in the design field in which his company had no particular interest. He observed that it might interest the group to know that Lockheed was working on a follow-on vehicle, a "super U-2" that would fly in excess of 100,000 feet at a speed of 3.2 Mach.

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In an interview on 11 February 1963, he observed that he recalled a reference made to Kelly Johnson's plane by an unrecalled source during a visit to the Los Angeles area in November 1962. He indicated that his position with the Martin Company includes future planning. He reasoned:

1. The United States needed a follow-on to the U-2 since satellites could not provide the photographic resolution possible with manned reconnaissance aircraft.

2. That the new plane would have to reach a speed of Mach 5 and fly at 100,000 feet.


3. By studying the Government budget he came to the conclusion that the project budget for the next fiscal year would be approximately \$600 million.

Convair, Fort Worth, Texas

Mr. Robert Wimer, Vice-President of Convair, Fort Worth, was interviewed on 19 February 1963. He observed that it is his opinion that it is generally known in the aircraft industry and particularly on the West Coast that Kelly Johnson is involved in the manufacture of an advanced aircraft probably designed for the same purpose as the U-2. He stated further he has heard from many individuals that the aircraft is flying. He believes he heard speculation that it was flying at Edwards Air Force Base. Mr. Wimer further stated that representatives of systems vendors who travel considerably spread rumors, speculation, etc., throughout the industry as to what other aircraft companies are doing. He indicated that this type of individual was the prime source of his awareness.

He mentioned that the advanced state of development of the U-33 is another item which has caused considerable speculation in the industry.

He mentioned that it was significant to him that when all of the officials of Lockheed took up their stock options recently (published information) that Lockheed was indeed in a healthy financial position.



North American Aviation, Los Angeles, California

Colonel John J. Smith, (AF Retired), Chief of Requirements, and members of his staff Messrs. Julius Braun, ex-Major General, USAF, and Colonel. Jamie Wallace, ex-Major Colonel and Thomas Collins, ex-Major, North American Aviation, advised on 18 March 1958 that they had deduced that Kelly Johnson had a plane using two J-50 engines, with a range of about 1000 miles with an altitude of 150 to 100 thousand feet; point design ram jet were employed, or 90 to 100 thousand feet if accelerated ram jets were used. They speculated that the wings are made of stainless steel about 65 feet long and the plane has been flying since the fall of 1952. It was the opinion of this group that the plane was started about the fall of 1959, and the Hughes H-37 is tied in with the plane. According to this group the plane is probably a two seater and the program has a budget of about \$200 million.

The process of their deductions was as follows:

- a. Colonel Smith had experience in the early U-2 project; it was apparent for him that the need for an advanced version was existent. While in the Air Force, he had tried to kill the ASG-13 and due to the dropping of the F-103, he believed that the ASG-13 may have some other application or it would have been similarly dropped.
- b. They observed that the funds allotted to developing the J-50 engine did not seem to them justified unless there was some high altitude airplane available in which to utilize the J-50.
- c. They also were aware Hughes Aircraft personnel were on a special clearance list which supported their conclusion that the ASG-13 was involved.
- d. They concluded that it appeared to be about \$200 million not specifically accounted for in the Government's budget and such an amount would not normally be made up of a number of small items, but had to include a major project.

Some of the better LAC engineers are known to have left their normal work and gone into a hush, hush project.

3. Usage of liquid hydrogen and oxygen is published in secret documents available to NAA including destination of shipments, quantities, etc. It was observed that a considerable amount was going [redacted] which they knew did not use much, if any. Consequently, they concluded it must be [redacted] supporting the opinion that a flight test program must be underway.

[redacted]

4. Indications of subcontracting for precision valves for apparently LAC front organizations and such valves would have no other application than for this type plane.


5. North American Aviation, Los Angeles, California:

A weekly information summary for the week ending 15 March 1968 prepared by the NAA Programs Staff for distribution to NAA executives. The summary included the following paragraph:

"WHILE STUDY OF HIGH ALTITUDE RECON AIRCRAFT (S) AFSC WAS BEING DIRECTED BY HQS USAF TO IMMEDIATELY PREPARE A DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR A HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, THIS EFFORT WAS INITIATED AT HIGH LEVEL AND IS APPARENTLY BEING PUSHED BY GENERAL LEHAY. WE UNDERSTAND \$2.8 MILLION HAS ALREADY BEEN ALLOCATED TO THIS PROGRAM. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT KNOWN AS YET, BUT WE BELIEVE THIS AIRCRAFT STUDY WILL CALL FOR LONGER RANGE AND GREATER SPEED AND ALTITUDE THAN THE CURRENTLY FLYING LOCKHEED RECON AIRCRAFT. LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS BEEN DOING FIELD WORK IN THEIR HYPERSONIC RESEARCH PROGRAM APPLICABLE TO THIS REQUIREMENT AND IS NOW FOLLOWING UP ON THIS NEW PLANNING STUDY. IN ADDITION TO LOCKHEED, BOTH BOEING AND REPUBLIC ARE REPORTED TO HAVE CURRENT STUDY EFFORTS AIMED AT THIS REQUIREMENT."

[redacted]

Officials of NSA involved were interviewed on 18 March and produced a file entitled, "Lockheed Project". It contains notes dated May 1961 indicating that Lockheed is expected to be developing a very high altitude, 130-140,000 ft. aircraft, utilizing the ASG-18/GAR-9 for AEW, Reconnaissance and high-altitude communications. It was pointed out that the above type of information was pieced together by bits picked up by the staff. It was also concluded that the J-88 engine had some new use for a high altitude plane to justify the funds put into it. The same was true of some existing purpose of the ASG-18 at Hughes Aircraft.



[REDACTED]

BRIEFED ON
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH PERSONNEL ~~SECRET~~ FOR OXCART
(AS OF 10 APRIL 1963)

1. During the period October 1960 to October 1962 the following members of Congressional Committees have become aware of the existence of Project OXCART during intelligence briefings conducted by the DCI and/or DDCI:

House Armed Services Committee

Carl Vinson
Frank Osmer
Melvin Price
Robert Wilson
Leslie Arends
Charles Bennett
George Huddleston
Edward Hebert

Mr. Robert Smart, Chief, Counsel and Staff Director of this Committee has been formerly briefed on the program.

House Appropriations Committee

Clarence Cannon
George E. Mahon
~~John Fisher~~
Gerald R. Ford, Jr.
Harry R. Sheppard

Senate Armed Services and Senate
Appropriations Combined Subcommittees

Richard B. Russell
Carl Hayden
Harry F. Byrd
Leverett Saltonstall
John Stennis
Mike Mansfield
Milton R. Young
Senator Robertson

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Mr. William Darden, Staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee has been formerly briefed on this project.

2. On 16 January 1963 the DCI found it necessary to apprise Senator Symington of Project "O".

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