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TELEGRAM INFORMATION	REPORT TELEGRA	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENC	E AGENCY	30
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States 713 and 714, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an anauthorised p		Secs.
CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION	ON CONTROLS	$\neg$
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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT COUP PLANS AND HESITATIONS OF GENERALS	DATE DISTR. 7 SEPTEMBER 1963	
DATE OF	PRIORITY	
INFO.	REFERENCES IN 15091	
PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON	A Company of the Comp	
	FIELD REPORT NO	
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	The Control of the Co	

1. TOP VIETNAMESE GENERALS ARE STILL CONSIDERING A COUP, BUT THEY HAVE THUS FAR FAILED TO TAKE ACTION BECAUSE THEY WANT TO BE ALMOST COMPLETELY CERTAIN OF SUCCESS BEFORE ACTING AND BECAUSE THEY ARE HESITATING BETWEEN 3 OR 4 ALTERNATIVE PLANS OF ACTION.

CHARACTERIZED GENERALS

AS "ALMOST

TOO INTELLIGENT" THEY SEE THE DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS TOO CLEARLY.

THE BASIC PROBLEM FOR THE GENERALS IS THAT THEY HAVE NO 2. ONE WAY TO OBTAIN THEM WHICH THE GENERALS ARE SERIOUSLY TROOPS. CONSIDERING WOULD BE TO PERSUADE ONE REGIMENTAL OR DIVISION

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INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM





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(MEN STIED IN)		PAGE	2

GENERAL WITH A SECURE TERRITORIAL BASE TO GO INTO DISSIDENCE.

GENERAL WITH HIS FOLLOWERS WOULD MOVE INTO THE REBEL ZONE

AND CALL UPON THE ARMY TO RALLY TO HIM AS CHIEF OF A PROVISIONAL

GOVERNMENT, AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT. COMMENT. WITH

GENERAL LE VAN TY NOW IN THE US AND PROBABLY DYING OF CANCER,

GENERAL MINH IS THE SENIOR GENERAL OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY.)

THE AIR FORCE WOULD NOT BOMB SUCH

A REBEL ZONE.

THE GENERALS CONSIDERED THIS PLAN

WORKABLE, AS BEING MORE SURE OF SUCCESS THAN A PLAN TO SEIZE SAIGON

BY SURPRISE.

COMMENT. THE CHANCES OF SUCH A PLAN SUCCEEDING

WOULD,

BE 7Ø TO 8Ø PERCENT.) ITS PRINCIPAL

DISADVANTAGE WAS THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE BLOODSHED,

AS IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSUMED THAT TROOPS LOYAL TO DIEM AND NHU

WOULD DEFEND SAIGON.

- 3. DID NOT DISCUSS ANY OTHER OF THE 3 OR 4 PLANS FOR A COUP WHICH ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION. DID INDICATE THAT WHILE IS THE PRINCIPAL DAI VIET CONTACT WITH THE GENERALS, WAS THEIR MAIN CONTACT WITH FIELD GRADE OFFICERS.
- 4. TRAN QUOC BUU, PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE WORKERS (CVTC) WAS, A FOLLOWER MORE THAN A LEADER. HE WOULD ONLY ACT AFTER GENERALS HAD ACTED.

THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT EVERYONE SEEMED TO WAITING FOR

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IN 15Ø91

SOMEONE ELSE TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE.

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