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
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS IN THE PRESENT POWER CONFLICT

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS IN THE PRESENT POWER CONFLICT

SUMMARY

The World Federation of Trade Unions, founded in 1945 almost simultaneously with the United Nations and inspired by the ephemeral unity prevailing in the final months of World War II, was intended to serve as a world force promoting unity and understanding between national labor organizations and furthering international peace and cooperation. Within its first year, however, the governing bodies and Secretariat of WFTU were for the most part taken over by the USSR and the federation was largely reduced to a sounding board for propaganda in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives. The Soviet elements have concentrated on the use of WFTU as a propaganda instrument and have played down the non-political trade union objectives which the Western affiliates sought to stress.

The USSR's ability to utilize the WFTU as an effective propaganda instrument derives from the preponderant voting power enjoyed by the pro-Soviet elements in the WFTU and the intrenchment of key Communists in the Secretariat. Its preponderant voice in WFTU governing bodies has been the result of the working alliance between the Soviet and satellite trade unions and the Communist-dominated unions in France, Italy, and other countries and of the enrollment of virtually the entire industrial populations of the Soviet-oriented nations as union members.

While the USSR has utilized the WFTU to great advantage as a propaganda platform, it has so far been unable to use the WFTU effectively as a means of promoting international labor disorder and is not permitted to do so under the present WFTU constitutional structure. The autonomy of national labor organizations, insisted upon by the non-totalitarian unions and written into the WFTU Constitution, protects the national organizations from being compelled to follow federation policies.

The almost free rein given the USSR for propaganda has been checked to some extent recently by the growing opposition of the Western trade unions to what they now recognize as a perversion of the original purposes of the federation. Their efforts to make their own views penetrate to the unions behind the Iron Curtain, however, have rarely succeeded.

The underlying East-West division in the WFTU came to the surface when the Western trade unions sought to discuss participation in ERP and the Eastern trade unions refused. Subsequently fifteen Western trade unions set up a provisional organization in London to assist ERP and thus provided the nucleus for a possible new labor federation. The impasse on ERP within the federation was temporarily resolved

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and of the Navy have concurred in this report; the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army and of the Air Force had no comment.



Note: The information in this report is as of 27 May 1948.



by Soviet acquiescence in February 1948 in the right of each national affiliate to determine its own attitude toward ERP and by the subsequent Soviet agreement, at the May WFTU meeting in Rome, to curtailment of the General Secretary's powers and elimination of his use of WFTU machinery to oppose ERP. These concessions reflect the importance which the USSR attaches to the WFTU and its desire to hold the federation together, even at the cost of at least temporarily reducing its usefulness as a Soviet propaganda instrument.

Although these concessions to the views of Western labor appear for the time being to have averted a split, they have failed to satisfy all of the demands of the Western organizations for basic reforms. Additional Soviet concessions would probably be the price for maintaining WFTU unity beyond the 1948 meetings. The USSR may be expected to continue its efforts to save the WFTU from permanent schism threatened by the increased opposition of the Western trade unions. Whether such efforts will be sufficient to achieve their purpose is still problematical.

While the ultimate fate of the WFTU is difficult to foresee, the present alternatives are that the federation will either break up following a Soviet failure to carry out the basic reforms demanded by the Western trade unions; or the USSR will make concessions sufficient to keep them within the organization, though at the cost of materially reducing its propaganda value for Soviet objectives. The Western trade unions, in any case, are unlikely to be satisfied with anything less than modification of the present fundamentally pro-Soviet orientation of the WFTU.



THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE

UNIONS IN THE PRESENT POWER CONFLICT

The World Federation of Trade Unions was born in the final months of World War II and its early activities reflected the unprobed and ambiguous unity of the Allied war effort. Soviet, British and American trade union leaders, meeting in London, initiated the steps which led to the establishment of the federation. The collapse of the common enemy, however, removed the galvanizing force which had held together the federation's heterogeneous parts. Subsequently, in the face of increasing East-West tensions, the national affiliates moved steadily apart. Moreover, within its first year, the USSR obtained control of most of the WFTU governing bodies and of the Secretariat and succeeded in transforming the federation into a virtual sounding board for propaganda supporting Soviet foreign policy objectives.

In terms of sheer numbers of labor organizations and of workers included, the World Federation of Trade Unions is the largest and most comprehensive trade union international in history. It is composed of 67 national trade union centers with an estimated membership of 71,500,000 in 58 countries.* It dwarfs the now defunct International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) which never claimed more than 22,000,000 members. It has contrived to hold under one banner the cautious British Trades Union Congress (TUC), the crusading CIO, and the totalitarian Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) with 27,000,000 regimented workers. It has, in its three years of existence, succeeded in enrolling every important national trade union center with the exception of the American Federation of Labor and the Argentine Confederation of Labor.

The largest bloc in the membership is Communist-controlled, a consequence of the fact that in the USSR and its satellites the entire industrial population of the nation is regimented into state-controlled trade unions. This mass induction of workers has inevitably swelled the membership of the Communist trade union centers. While the graded voting required by the WFTU Constitution prevents complete reflection in WFTU governing bodies of this preponderance of Communist unions, the USSR, with the support of the Communist unions in the West, commands a decisive majority of

^{*}The WFTU, unlike the International Labor Organization (ILO), is exclusively a workers organization. The ILO is a Specialized Agency of the UN made up of representatives of governments, employers, and workers. Although the two organizations occasionally deal with the same issues (e.g., freedom of association, trade union bargaining rights, etc.), their interests are distinct and contact between them has been informal and usually has been effected through key labor leaders who happen to be members of both. The USSR is not a member of the ILO and opposes participation on the ground that the inclusion of government and management prevents the organization from properly representing labor interests.



votes in the WFTU Congress and is generally able to muster a majority in the General Council and the Executive Committee.*

Nevertheless, the WFTU is by no means the effective instrument of Soviet policy that is sometimes represented to be. Its efforts to enforce uniform world labor policies have been consistently handicapped by the large degree of autonomy accorded to the national trade union centers, by the lack of effective enforcement machinery, and by the divergent orientation of the national centers.

The more conservative Western unions would never have affiliated with the WFTU had not the all-important "autonomy clause" been written into its constitution. This guarantees the autonomy of the national trade union centers while providing no effective machinery for compelling them to execute decisions of the governing bodies. A national affiliate which chooses to reject such a decision must transmit to the Secretariat within 90 days a report setting forth its reasons for so doing, but the provisions for subsequent disciplinary action are vague and cumbersome. An affiliate may be expelled only for: (1) "serious and persistent violations" of the Constitution or of rules and decisions of the Congress or General Council; (2) persistent non-payment of dues. Expulsion requires a two-thirds majority of the Congress, which neither the Communist nor the Western unions could separately attain in the present composition of the Congress.

The divergent orientation of the national trade union organizations, implicit at the outset, was brought into the open by the Marshall Plan, the Soviet consolidation of Eastern Europe, and the formation of the Cominform. Each of these developments imposed mounting strains on WFTU's shaky constitutional unity. These divisive forces have been intensified by the federation's preoccupation with propaganda and political activity. The IFTU, to which the Soviet unions never belonged, enjoyed the support of the powerful international craft unions known as the international trade secretariats.** Although the WFTU originally hoped to absorb these secretariats, it has been unsuccessful in reaching agreement with them on terms of their incorporation, and, from the Western point of view, the federation has to that extent lacked the mortar and cement of trade union activity for strictly economic ends.

Soviet Exploitation of the WFTU.

It is often assumed that the Communist power in the WFTU is a source of Soviet strength and support in Communist-influenced unions outside the USSR. The actual basis for Soviet strength in these unions is that, independently of the WFTU, the USSR directly controls and influences powerful national labor organizations such as the Italian CGIL and the French CGT. The Kremlin exercises domination not through the WFTU but through direct control both of Communist "cadres" within these unions and of key labor leaders like Louis Saillant (France), Benoit Frachon (France), and

^{**} The International Transport Workers, the International Metal Workers, and the International Miners are craft internationals of this type.



^{*}See Appendix I: Organization Chart of the WFTU; and Appendix II: Basis of Representation in the WFTU Congress. The Executive Bureau is an exception. Its "window dressing" composition—the President (British), 7 Vice Presidents selected on a national basis, and the General Secretary—has made it less subject to Communist control. It has frequently been manned by a non-Communist majority.



Giuseppe Di Vittorio (Italy). Were the WFTU to be dissolved tomorrow, the Soviet power to dictate to these unions would be unchanged.

The influence of Soviet Russia in the WFTU, as distinct from its direct control of Communist trade unions within the national organizations, has been covertly exercised through the WFTU General Secretary, Louis Saillant. From his headquarters in Paris, Saillant, who is also a secretary of the French General Confederation of Labor (CGT), has disseminated WFTU resolutions, sent out WFTU investigating commissions, and headed WFTU delegations attending international conferences (including UN meetings). While Saillant constitutionally possessed these broad powers, he consistently abused them by exercising his authority in a manner calculated to promote Soviet objectives. Moreover, in several matters of vital importance to the Western national affiliates, he took unilateral action without consultation. Under his direction the Secretariat has consistently given greater emphasis to WFTU political and propagandist activity than to measures aiming at the economic and social improvement of union members.

The WFTU, in fact, serves the USSR principally as a sounding board for its propaganda. Through this medium the USSR can project its political and social aims west of the Iron Curtain and agitate issues embarrassing to the Western powers. The WFTU in the eyes of the working class symbolizes the striving of the workers towards "solidarity" and thus provides an unexcelled means for the dissemination of Communist ideology. In the propaganda struggle between the Western-oriented and Communist elements in the WFTU, the Communists have shown themselves more effective and adroit. They packed the permanent WFTU Secretariat at the outset with followers of Saillant. They selected for agitation political issues which had a surface appeal to a wide non-Communist group. WFTU resolutions, especially those drafted in the earlier period, included repeated professions of faith in "democracy" and protests against the "remnants of Fascism," and this ambiguous vocabulary often proved deceptive to the Western trade unionists who were frequently unaware of the pro-Soviet orientation of resolutions which they endorsed.

During the first two years of the WFTU's existence the USSR exercised its working control in the federation with moderation in an evident desire to avoid alienating the TUC and the CIO. None of the federation's political resolutions, however, were permitted to reflect unfavorably on the USSR. In contrast, many resolutions were sharply critical of US and British actions, particularly those dealing with colonies, racial discrimination in the Canal Zone and South Africa, and labor conditions in Puerto Rico.

The WFTU has been an extremely effective agency, from the Soviet standpoint, in carrying propaganda to the populations of colonial and dependent areas. The colonial peoples have furnished a fertile field for Communist labor organizers because of the prevalent illiteracy and the widespread exploitation of native labor. As a consequence of these factors, the WFTU Secretariat has influenced colonial peoples with its propaganda to a far greater degree than it has the more literate workers in industrially developed areas. It is also becoming evident that WFTU investigating commissions, in



the colonial areas and in politically unstable areas like Indonesia and Iran, represent a potential instrument for political penetration.

Saillant's early attempts to use the Secretariat to promote Soviet aims were largely held in check so long as Lord Citrine (UK), first president of WFTU, and Sidney Hillman (US), his close friend and collaborator, were active in the organization. After Citrine's resignation and Hillman's death in the summer of 1946, the assertion of the Communist propaganda line through the Secretariat became bolder, and the Communists consistently took the offensive.

WFTU activity in Germany in 1946 and 1947 furnishes an outstanding example of the use of the federation for Soviet propaganda. Then, as at present, the USSR envisaged a unified Germany labor movement under Communist leadership as a most important means of securing economic control of Western Germany. The WFTU Secretariat actively promoted the efforts of German Communists, supported by the USSR, to set up a central German trade union organization which could be recognized as a WFTU affiliate. Trade Union representatives from each of the four zones were invited to attend the meeting of the WFTU General Council in Prague in June 1947. The Council at that time passed resolutions calling for establishment of a WFTU liaison bureau in Germany and accepting affiliation of the German trade unions on condition that the zonal labor groups should be united in a central organization. The WFTU Secretary General subsequently exerted every effort to implement these resolutions, and set up a liaison bureau in Berlin with the open support of the Soviet authorities. This bureau was prohibited from functioning in the US Zone. However, Saillant's efforts to call an all-German trade union congress with the aim of establishing a Communist-dominated central labor organization have so far been blocked by continued disagreement between Soviet and Western members of the Allied Control Council regarding the conditions under which German labor should be unified. Plans for a central organization of the type desired by Saillant were set aside by the German unionists themselves when, at an interzonal meeting in Dresden in February 1948, they substituted a "Central Council" in which the delegates from the US and British zones would hold a majority.

The aggressively pro-Soviet orientation of the Secretariat under Saillant was even more unmistakably shown during the visit of a WFTU Commission to Korea in April 1947. After touring both Northern and Southern zones, Saillant, as chairman of the Commission, concluded that "greater freedom of organization" existed in the Soviet-controlled zone. This time, however, his criticisms of US military administration drew a sharp dissent from the CIO and TUC members of the group, who denied that a labor movement could be free in the presence of armed Soviet troops.

The propaganda offensive of Saillant against US and UK policies encountered more serious resistance at the November 1947 meeting of the WFTU Executive Bureau in Paris. The CIO requested that the WFTU place the European Recovery Program on the agenda of the Executive Bureau meeting scheduled for February 1948. In the face of the bitter opposition of Saillant and the Italian CGIL, acting as spokesmen for the Soviet bloc, the Bureau voted to discuss ERP. But as February approached, it became





clear that the Communist coalition was determined to postpone the scheduled meeting and block consideration of ERP. Early in February the British TUC transmitted an ultimatum to Saillant demanding that the meeting be held. It was rejected by Saillant without even the formality of a vote of the nine members of the Bureau. Only the vigorous protests of the CIO and the TUC leaders to V. V. Kuznetsov, Chairman of the Soviet Central Council of Trade Unions, effected a reversal of this action and secured agreement to proceed with the discussion at the Executive Committee meeting subsequently held in Rome during May 1948.

THE US AND THE WFTU.

It was the aim of Sidney Hillman (US) to use the WFTU as an educational medium to promote unity and understanding between the respective national labor organizations and, through labor, to influence nations toward peace and international cooperation. The CIO has contended that through its WFTU connections it can carry US views to the working classes of all nations more effectively than embassies and diplomatic missions whose contacts are largely restricted to influential persons at the top of the social scale.

The record of the past three years, however, indicates that US labor, as represented by the CIO, has on the whole been unable to hold its own in the WFTU. The relatively ineffective role which it played during the greater part of this period was a consequence of:

- (a) The schism in the US labor movement and the abstention of the AFL from WFTU which reduced the weight of US influence in international labor councils.
- (b) The indecision and defensiveness of the CIO, until recently, in expounding the US position. This attitude was induced by the presence in CIO executive councils of representatives of unions under Communist influence (constituting about one-fourth of all CIO unions and including the United Electrical Workers, the International Longshoremen's Union, the Furriers Union, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, and the Farm Equipment Workers).*
- (c) The lack of preliminary coordination between the views of US unions and those of the government. This failure to coordinate weakened the presentation of US views at international labor conferences and correspondingly increased the advantages enjoyed by the totalitarian countries. The USSR already enjoyed a marked advantage at these conferences because of the fact that the Soviet AUCCTU and the other Eastern European trade unions are virtually governmental departments. There can be no serious conflict between these unions and their governments and no possibility of a union's endorsing a resolution criticizing its own government.** By contrast, the trade unions of the Western nations habitually and freely share in general criticism of conditions prevalent in their own countries.

**The "self-criticism" of Soviet industrial officialdom, including the trade unionists, is limited to suggestions for improving techniques of production.



^{*}At its October 1947 Congress in Boston the CIO leadership adopted a more militant line in support of ERP and in opposition to Communism. The housecleaning of Communist unions within the cio, begun at that time, is still under way.



- (d) The inability of CIO to carry its point of view to the working masses behind the Iron Curtain because of the censorship exercised in Communist countries.
 - (e) The lack of effective US labor representation in the WFTU Secretariat.

In the perspective of these developments, an estimate can be made of the relative value of the WFTU to the US and the USSR in the present power conflict.

The USSR has derived substantially greater advantages from the WFTU as a world forum for its propaganda than have the US and the UK, and it has been particularly successful in exploiting the issues of colonialism, racial and religious discrimination, cartels, and suppression of trade unionism. While the Western unions have exercised a restraining hand in the drafting of resolutions on these issues, too often the restraints have been more editorial than substantive. Until ERP became an issue, the TUC and the CIO showed little initiative in propagating their own views through the WFTU. Although the USSR itself, for tactical reasons, has often taken a conciliatory position in WFTU councils, it has consistently encouraged the Communist trade unions outside the USSR to adopt aggressive and belligerent attitudes toward the Western powers.

On the other hand, the autonomy guaranteed to its national affiliates prohibits the WFTU, as now constituted, from being effectively used as an instrument of direct action for the execution of Soviet foreign policy. The WFTU would be powerless to carry out a general strike, sabotage, or boycott in countries where the national organizations resisted. Where the Communists have already gained control, the USSR can issue its orders directly to its Communist agents within the unions without using the WFTU as an intermediary.

EAST-WEST DIVISIONS IN THE WFTU.

The growing tension between the East and West has seriously undermined the unity of the WFTU. The exaggerated political and propagandist role which the Communists have imposed on it despite repeated warnings from the Western unions has made WFTU extremely vulnerable to disruptive international issues. In November, 1947, the Marshall Plan became the immediate issue which threatened to split the organization. The resistance offered by the Communist-dominated Secretariat to CIO's effort to obtain WFTU endorsement of the ERP precipitated the convening of an independent trade union conference at London in March 1948. At this conference labor groups from fifteen western nations set up a Trade Union Advisory Committee to implement ERP and serve as a possible nucleus for a new federation. While the London Conference did not bring about the withdrawal of the CIO and the TUC, it indicated that the federation had reached a turning point and would soon have to make critical decisions which it had long sought to evade. A Soviet concession in February 1948 acknowledging the right of each national affiliate to determine its own attitude toward ERP somewhat reduced the tension between the two groups. A split was averted for the time being at the May 1948 meeting of the WFTU in Rome when the Soviet trade union leaders yielded to the Western demand for curtailment of the powers of the General Secretary and for restriction of his right to participate in activities outside the federation. By these concessions the USSR showed unmistakably its desire to maintain



an undivided WFTU and to preserve its contacts with the non-Communist labor groups of the West.

PROSPECTS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE WFTU.

The existence of the fifteen-nation Trade Union Advisory Committee confronts the WFTU with a continuing threat of secession by the Western trade unions under the leadership of the CIO and the TUC. This threat may be made good at the Paris meeting of the Executive Committee in August 1948 or at the Brussels WFTU Congress in December if the critical issues dividing the Eastern and Western blocs are not resolved. The Soviet concessions to the views of Western labor, while substantial, still fall short of satisfying all the demands of the Western organizations for basic reforms and have merely brought about an uneasy truce and agreement to resume discussion of remaining East-West differences at the subsequent WFTU meetings this year. In order to retain WFTU unity after these meetings, the USSR would probably have to pay the further price of: (1) faithful adherence to the Rome agreement to curtail Saillant's activities; (2) admission of the anti-Communist Force Ouvrière to membership; (3) cooperation in negotiations to bring the international trade secretariats into WFTU on terms satisfactory to their desire to retain a large measure of autonomy; (4) acceptance of the Western concept of an impartial WFTU dedicated to the international interests of labor as opposed to the national political interests of its participating organizations.

Although ERP has so far been the most controversial issue dividing the national trade union movements in the WFTU, it may not precipitate a final break. Those British and US labor leaders who have taken the initiative in pressing toward a showdown with the USSR on ERP are reluctant to make this issue the occasion for a breakup. Should they elect to split, they would prefer to base their action upon a non-political trade union issue such as the failure of the WFTU General Secretary to bring the international trade secretariats into the organization.

The effect of an East-West division in the WFTU would be not only sharply to separate the national labor organizations East and West of the Iron Curtain but also to widen and perpetuate the internal splits between Communist and non-Communist elements of labor movements in presently contested areas. An Eastern-oriented WFTU could be expected to retain, in addition to the hard core of the USSR and its satellites, the French CGT, the Netherlands EVC, the Communist and left-wing Socialist elements in the Italian CGIL, the Latin American labor groups still affiliated with the dwindling CTAL, and a miscellany of rapidly growing native labor organizations in the colonial and dependent areas. The British and US labor bloc would probably carry with them into a new Western trade union international the WFTU affiliates of the Benelux countries (with the exception of the minority Communist EVC in the Netherlands), secessionist non-Communist organizations in France and Italy, and the national affiliates of Scandinavia, Australia and New Zealand. The trade unions of the Near and Middle East, India, and China would probably split into Right and Left labor organizations. In Latin America, where a three-way division is appearing in labor ranks, trade unions opposing the CTAL and cooperating with the US (like



the Mexican CTM) could be expected to join the Western bloc while a third group might attach itself to a new continental federation sponsored by Argentina.


Prediction as to the ultimate fate of the WFTU is difficult at this time. However, the alternatives implicit in the current situation are: (1) the federation may break up as a consequence either of Soviet failure to meet the principal remaining Western demands for WFTU reforms or of Soviet failure to carry out promised reforms; or (2) the USSR may continue to make whatever concessions may be required to retain the Western trade unions and keep the federation intact. In the latter event, the USSR will be confronted with a WFTU which, from its point of view, will possess a greatly reduced propaganda potential. While continued Soviet efforts to prevent a break-up may be expected, the Western trade unions are not likely to be satisfied ultimately with anything less than modification of the present fundamentally pro-Soviet orientation of WFTU.



APPENDIX I

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE WFTU

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE				EXECUTIVE BUREAU			
(Meets at Least Twice a Year)			l	(Meets About Every 3 Months)			
Chairman:		Saillant (Fr)		Pre	sident:	Deakin	(UK)
Members:							
USSR	3	India & Ceylon	1	Vic	e-Presidents:	Rosenblum	(US)
US & Canada	. 3	Africa	1	_		Kuznetsov	(USSR)
UK	2	West Europe	1	İ		Jouhaux	(Fr)
France	2	South Europe	1			Di Vittorio	(Italy)
LA	2	Central Europe	1			Chu	(China)
Middle East	1	SE Europe	1			Toledano	(Mex)
China	1	Scandinavia	1	Ì		Kupers	(Neth)
Australasia	1	Trade Depts	3	Ger	n Sectry	Saillant	



GENERAL COUNCIL (71)

(Meets Once a Year)

Smaller replica of WTUC.

Each delegation has same voting power as in WTUC.

Chairman: Executive Committee Chairman

SECRETARIAT

Gen Sectry: Saillant

Asst for Press: Faline (USSR)

Asst for Colonies Cope (US)

and Mandates:

Asst for Trade Depts: Schevenels

(IFTU)

The WFTU constitution provides for three interim governing bodies. The General Council governs between sessions of the World Trade Union Congress. The Executive Committee directs WFTU activities and carries out Congress and Council decisions between sessions of the Council. The Executive Bureau governs between sessions of the Committee.



APPENDIX II

BASIS OF REPRESENTATION IN THE WORLD TRADE UNION CONGRESS

"Affiliated trade union organizations shall be represented at the Congress on the following basis:

Up to 250,000 members:

For members in excess of 250,000 and up to 5,000,000:

For members in excess of 5,000,000 and up to 10,000,000:

For members in excess of 10,000,000 and up to 15,000,000:

For members in excess of 15,000,000:

1 delegate

1 delegate for every 250,000 members or majority fraction thereof

1 delegate for every 500,000 members or majority fraction thereof

1 delegate for every 1,000,000 members or majority fraction thereof

1 delegate for every 2,000,000 members or majority fraction thereof

In addition, each affiliated trade union organization shall be entitled to appoint an additional representative for every 250,000 members or majority fraction thereof up to 1,000,000 members. Such additional representatives shall be entitled to speak in the Congress but shall have no vote."

(Article 4: III, WFTU Constitution)



APPENDIX III

NATIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE WFTU, REPORTED MEMBERSHIP AND PRESENT EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

(In order of size of membership reported to First World Trade Union Congress, Paris, October 1945)

COUNTRY	ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	
USSR	Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU)	27,124,000	V. V. Kuznetsov	
UK	Trades Union Congress (TUC)	6,600,000	Arthur Deakin	
USA	Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)	6,000,000	Philip Murray	
Italy	General Confederation of Labor (CGIL)	5,200,000	Giuseppe di Vittorio	
France	General Confederation of Labor (CGT)	5,100,000	Leon Jouhaux (CGT/ FO) Benoit Frachon	
	Christian Confederation of Workers (CFTC)	750,000	Gaston Tessier	
Czechos- lovakia	Central Council of Trade Unions (ROH)	1,500,000	Antonin Zapotocky Evzen Erban	
Rumania	General Confederation of Labor	1,267,000	Gheorghe Apostol	
Sweden	Trade Union Confederation	1,087,000	Axel Strand	
Poland	Central Committee of Trade Union	s ¹ 1,011,000 ¹	Casimir Rusinek	
Mexico	Confederation of Workers (CTM)	1,000,000	V. Lombardo Toledano (suspended) Fernando Amilpa	
Hungary	Trade Union Council	888,000	Staphane Kossa	
China	Association of Labor (CAL)	800,000	H. F. Chu	
Australia	Council of Trade Unions	625,000	A. E. Monk	
Yugoslavia	United Syndicate of Workers & Employees	622,000	Djuro Salaj	
Cuba	Confederation of Workers (CTC)	558,000	Lazaro Pena	
Belgium	Federation of Labor (FGTB)	500,000	Louis Major Paul Finet	
Denmark	General Confederation of Labor	500,000	Eiler Jensen	
Nigeria	Trade Union Congress	500,000	Nat. A. Cole	
India	Trade Union Congress	456,000	S. A. Dange	
	Federation of Labor	408,000	Maniben Kara	

¹ The Central Committee of Polish Trade Unions (KC-22) now claims a combined membership of 2,556,395.





Norway	Federation of Trade Unions	400,000 Konrad Nordahl
Bulgaria	General Workers Trade Union	385,000 Rajko Damianov
Austria	Trade Union Federation	350,000 Johann Boehm
Canada	Congress of Labor (CCL)	300,000 Pat Conroy
Finland	Trade Union Federation (SAK)	260,000 Emil Huunonen
Switzerland		250,000 Robert Bratschi
	Association of Protestant Trade Unions	10,000
Colombia	Confederation of Workers (CTC)	200,000 Victor J. Silva
Netherlands	Federation of Trade Unions (NVV)	170,000 ' E. Kupers
	Unity Trade Union Council (EVC)	170,000 Berend Blokzijl
	d Federation of Labor	168,000 A. W. Croskery
Brazil	United Workers Movement	150,000 Roberto Moreno
Palestine	Federation of Jewish Labor (Histadruth)	150,000 S. Z. Rubashev
	Palestine Labor League	5,000
T	Federation of Arab Trade Unions	3,000 Salim Quasim Haj
Ireland	Trade Union Congress	145,000 Gilbert Lynch
Ecuador	Confederation of Workers (CTE)	100,000 G. Maldonado Jarrin
Spain	Basque Workers Solidarity Union	100,000 Manuel Robles Aranquiz
	General Union of Workers (UGT)	31,000 Trifon Gomez Luis Delage
\mathbf{Egypt}	Trade Union Congress	78,000 Mohammed Y. A.
		El Modarrek
	Congress of Industrial & Com-	60,000 Ahmed El Masri
Union S.	mercial Unions	
Africa	Trades and Labor Council	70,000 Jerry Calder
Guatemala	Confederation of Workers (CTG)	50,000 Victor M. Gutierrez
Uruguay	General Union of Workers (UGT)	40,000 Enrique Rodriguez
Puerto Rico	General Confederation of Workers	30,000 Colon Giordiano
		Barreto Perez
Lebanon	Trade Union Federation	25,600 Mustafa El-Ariss
Panama	Trade Union Federation (FSTP)	25,000 Luis Avila
Luxemburg	General Confederation of Labor	22,500 Antoine Krier
	Free Trade Union Federation	10,000 Joseph Frapport
Iceland	Federation of Trade Unions	22,000 Herman Gudmundsson
		IIIOSOII

¹The Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV) has made substantial gains since 1945 at the expense of the Communist-controlled EVC and other unions, and it now claims 330,000 members.



Ceylon	Trade Union Federation	20,200	S. A. Wickremasinghe
Albania	Federated Syndicates	20,000	Tuk Jakova
Syria	Workers Congress	17,600	Subhi Al-Khatib
Cyprus	Trade Union Committee	13,200	A. Ziartides
Jamaica	Trade Union Congress	10,000	Ken Hill
Sierra Leone	Trade Union Congress	10,000	Isaac T. A.
			Wallace-Johnson
Trinidad	Trade Union Council	10,000	Alfred Gomez
British	Trade Union Council	6,200	Alfred A. Thorne
Guiana			
Gambia	Gambia Labor Union	5,000	E. F. Small
Gold Coast	Railway African Employees	3,000	
No. Rhodesia	Mine Workers Union	3,000	Brian Goodwin

NATIONAL AFFILIATES PROVISIONALLY ADMITTED BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL

AT PRAHA, JUNE 1947

Iran Greece Tunisia	Central Trade Union Committee General Confederation of Labor ¹ Workers Union of Manie	Reza Rousta Demetreos Paparigas	
	Workers Union of Tunis	Hassem Saadaoui Georges Poropane	
Belgian Congo Trieste	Confederation of Trade Unions Central Trade Union Committee	Andre Wynant Renato Rizzoti	

INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATES

Confederation of Workers of Latin America	(CTAL)	V. Lombardo Toledano
International Federation of Trade Unions	(IFTU)	Walter Schevenels
International Confederation of Christian Workers	(ICTU)	Gaston Tessier
		P. J. S. Serrarens

¹ The General Council itself did not reach final agreement on the admission of this pro-Markos faction of the Greek Labor Confederation (GSEE) but the WFTU Secretariat and the Soviet-oriented trade unions within WFTU have extended *de facto* recognition to it.

Although the IFTU formally ceased to exist 15 December 1945 when its General Council voted for dissolution, an IFTU liquidating committee still functions. Schevenels, former IFTU General Secretary, is a WFTU Special Assistant in charge of relations with the International Trade Secretariats.

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