


~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. 137
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL



ORE 23-49

Published 18 July 1949

Document No.	
Do Change in Class.	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified	
Class. Changed To	TS S C
Auth:	HR 70-2
Date:	19/01/78
By:	021

DOCUMENT NO. 1
DO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1
X DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 7 Feb 80 REVIEWED: 1PD F75-37

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the information for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

- a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for the Department of State
- b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army
- c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
- d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
- g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

DISTRIBUTION:

Office of the President
National Security Council
National Security Resources Board
Department of State
Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Atomic Energy Commission
Research and Development Board

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ORE 23-49

THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN

CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY	1
THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN	3
1. Historical Introduction	3
2. Formal Program and Policy	5
3. Party Leadership	7
4. Party Organization	9
5. Party Membership	13
6. Capabilities	13
APPENDIX A—Constitution of the Party	15
APPENDIX B—Organizational Notes	17
APPENDIX C—Notes on Membership	19
APPENDIX D—Significant Biographical Data	21

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN

SUMMARY

Although the now banned Tudeh (Masses) Party of Iran purports to be only a home-grown reformist movement of Marxist leanings, it is, for all practical purposes, the Communist Party of Iran. Party propaganda has consistently parroted the Communist line, while the party organization in the field has repeatedly acted to advance the Soviet interest. The party machinery, organized along Communist lines of "democratic centralism," has been dominated from the outset by a combination of veteran Soviet-trained agitators and Marxist intellectuals, most of whom have been comrades in arms ever since they were thrown together in the prisons of Iran during the Reza Shah regime. There is every indication that the Tudeh Party, like the openly Communist parties of other countries, enjoys direct command liaison with the USSR.

The Tudeh Party is significant not only because of its Soviet connections, which make it the logical nucleus for a quisling government should the USSR accelerate its efforts to interfere in Iran, but also because of the head start it has obtained in rousing certain important elements of the Iranian people from their political apathy. The other parties which have sprung up in Iran since the fall of the Reza Shah dictatorship are at present chiefly loose associations of notables, leaving the Tudeh Party as the only political group which has achieved any degree of genuine popular support. Although the Tudeh organization has scarcely begun to organize Iran's vast peasantry, it has made notable strides in the towns, which constitute the principal centers of power and control in Iran. Utilizing the Tudeh-created Central United Council of Trade Unions, the party at one time

had more than 70,000 members—about one-third of Iran's industrial population—and has been particularly active in such key installations as the Iranian State Railway, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and government-owned factories.

Thus far the party has not been completely successful in capitalizing on its opportunities. Its various attempts to obtain power in 1946, culminating in the establishment of the Azerbaijan People's Republic by a Tudeh offshoot, proved premature; the party received a severe setback just as its strength was increasing most rapidly. In February 1949, when membership was believed to number some 25,000 and the party's comeback was far from complete, the Tudeh organization was outlawed by the Iranian Government, and a number of its leaders were arrested (and later convicted) on charges of treasonable activity.

Despite these reverses, the Tudeh Party will continue to be an important factor in Iran's future so long as the lagging of social and economic reform creates a reservoir of popular unrest upon which to draw. While the party has been temporarily driven underground, it will undoubtedly proceed with its announced intentions of carrying on the struggle, although the leadership may eventually feel it wise to set up a new organization ostensibly free of Communist associations. It is hardly likely that the Tudeh leadership has any real hope of gaining power through peaceful means, especially in view of the tight control over electoral processes exercised by Iran's present ruling class. As a more or less conspiratorial group, however, the Tudeh organization is well fitted to further Soviet policy by undertaking sabotage, work stoppages, and

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It is based on information available to CIA as of 15 May 1949.

~~SECRET~~

disturbances at critical points within Iran or by setting up a new group of regional autonomist movements. Although such acts would not constitute a decisive threat to the Iranian

Government if unaccompanied by active Soviet assistance, they could be arranged so as to furnish a pretext for Soviet intervention in Iran.

~~SECRET~~

THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN

1. Historical Introduction.

The Tudeh (Masses) Party represents the culmination of a revolutionary movement extending as far back as the first decade of the twentieth century, when Russian radicals began to use the liberal Iranian press then in existence to attack the Czarist regime and to prepare Iran for radical government. Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917, Communist agent activity in Iran increased. A Soviet Republic of Gilan was proclaimed in 1920 and a Communist-backed revolt took place at Tabriz in 1921. Both of these revolutionary efforts, however, soon collapsed in the wake of the Treaty of Friendship signed by Iran and the USSR in 1921, and the Iranian agents of the USSR turned their attention to the organization of peasant and labor groups along the Caspian coast and at Tehran. These efforts were interrupted in 1929, when the autocratic regime of Reza Shah suppressed the labor movement and arrested some fifty of its leaders, but they were shortly thereafter resumed.

By the latter thirties the Soviet-trained revolutionaries had been joined by a new class of opponents of the Reza Shah dictatorship—Iranian intellectuals, many of whom had become converted to Marxism. The chief member of this element, a persuasive German-educated professor named Dr. Tagi Erani, was arrested along with a number of his followers in May 1937; in the so-called Trial of the Fifty-three * in November of the following year, forty-five of this group were convicted of receiving funds from the USSR and of Communist activity and were sentenced to penal servitude in the Qasr-e-Qajar Prison near Tehran. There, despite strict regulations, they managed to associate with the Soviet-trained agitators who had been previously imprisoned and to obtain newspapers and study materials. Although Erani died in prison, his followers, who had entered Qasr-e-Qajar Prison as

inquisitive intellectuals, emerged as a disciplined band of Communists.**

At the end of August 1941, British and Soviet troops entered Iran, forcing the collapse of the Reza Shah regime. According to the Tudeh Party's own account, its first organizational meeting was held scarcely a month later, on 5 October, at the Tehran home of Soleyman Mohsen Eskandari. The prison-trained group of revolutionaries formed the majority of the party founders; at least three of the five men at the original meeting had come recently from jail, while most of the nineteen men who joined soon afterwards were graduates of the Qasr-e-Qajar Prison, released under a law passed 16 September granting amnesty to political prisoners.

At first set up as the Tudeh Stock Company, the group soon assumed the permanent name of the Tudeh Party of Iran, thereupon devoting 1942 and most of 1943 to recruiting members, establishing a party press, and setting up connections with the labor movement and other front organizations. By early 1943, the party was publishing three daily newspapers in Tehran, had organized some twenty liberal newspapers into a loose federation known as the United National Front (later Freedom Front), and had fostered the establishment of the Central United Council of Trade Unions. By the fall of 1943, when elections for the XIV Majlis began, the party was ready for its first real test.

The party made a strenuous effort in the Majlis elections and demonstrated far greater strength than had been expected, particularly in the north, where the Soviet garrison commanders gave it useful (although less than maximum) support. Nine deputies, including six members of the party Central Committee, were seated under the Tudeh label

** Ja'far Pishevari, one of the older group of prisoners, later wrote of the Erani group: "They learned from us how to resist and endure . . . Doctors and professors who were the intellectuals of Iran acted like trained political warriors."

* Actually, only forty-nine were tried.

~~SECRET~~

(Ja'far Pishevari, later head of the free Azerbaijan regime, was elected from Tabriz but the Majlis refused to seat him), while an additional seven deputies are believed to have been covert members of the party. This small Tudeh "fraction" in the Majlis—more alert, more skilled in debate, and more sure of purpose than the other deputies—was very outspoken in the chamber and did much to obstruct the legislative process. Meanwhile, the Tudeh organization in the field worked to strengthen its hand in preparation for the Soviet-directed attempt to shatter the Tehran government's authority which was made at the end of the war.

At the end of September 1945 a group of Tudeh-backed army officers began a premature revolt in the Khorasan area east of the Caspian Sea. Meanwhile, however, the very active Tabriz section of the party had set itself up as a new and nominally distinct organization, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, and had begun its agitation for autonomy. By the spring of 1946 the Iranian Government was confronted with Soviet-backed autonomous regimes in both Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, new Tudeh agitation in Khorasan and along the Caspian coast, Soviet demands for an oil concession, and strong opposition from the right-wing politicians. The term of the XIV Majlis was ending in confusion, its final sessions left quorumless because of the Tudeh demonstrators massed before its meeting place.

Prime Minister Qavam, enabled to act freely by the adjournment of the Majlis on 16 March, turned first against the so-called reactionary element in the opposition, arresting Sayyid Zia ad-din Tabatabai and General Hasan Arfa and ending the activities of Sayyid Zia's allegedly anti-Soviet National Will Party. Toward the USSR and its supporters, Qavam adopted a conciliatory policy, with an immediate view to obtaining the evacuation of Soviet occupation troops from Iran. In Mazandaran the Tudeh Party proceeded to arm the workers, to take over the government-owned factories, and to police communications. The Tudeh-backed Central United Council of Trade Unions sponsored a rash of unauthorized strikes, Tudeh members seized

factories at Isfahan, and party speakers at Abadan heaped abuse on the government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, all without governmental opposition. In June a preliminary agreement was reached between Qavam and the "Azerbaijan Democratic Government," while Abbas Eskandari, brother of the Tudeh Party leader, was named mayor of Tehran; in August, Qavam named three prominent Tudeh leaders to his cabinet, thus enabling them to place loyal followers in important government posts, even in such former right-wing strongholds as Yazd and Kerman.

The mushrooming of Tudeh influence was soon checked, however. Qavam was already becoming annoyed with the Tudeh Party because of its pressure for ratification of the Soviet oil concession agreement and for specific concessions in the forthcoming elections, and when the powerful Qashqai tribes openly rebelled against the ascendancy of Tudeh leaders in the government, he moved effectively. Quickly making an agreement with the Qashqais, he dismissed the Tudeh mayor of Tehran, forced the Tudeh members out of his cabinet, and stressed the rapid expansion of his own newly formed political party, the Democrats of Iran. With much of the literate population rushing to join the new party and sentiment in favor of the Azerbaijan regime fading, the government became bolder. Within a month after a Tudeh-sponsored general strike took place in Tehran on 12 November, the Tudeh press was suppressed, and on 13 December the Azerbaijan regime collapsed in the face of government troops sent in to supervise the elections there. Some of the Tudeh-dominated factories were occupied by troops, scores of Tudeh and labor leaders were arrested, and in several towns the Tudeh party and labor clubs were closed.

The party reeled before these blows. Its leaders faded briefly from sight and then announced that the party would boycott the coming elections. A period of soul searching followed. Moderate members deserted to the Democrats of Iran, while some of the intellectuals issued pamphlets attacking the radical and "ill-defined and disorganized course" of the party. On 1 January 1947 the Central Committee was replaced by a Temporary Ex-

~~SECRET~~

ecutive Council, and the Tudeh leadership confessed that the party, by encouraging quantity rather than quality, had granted membership to corrupt opportunists and adventurers who had ignored the instructions of the Central Committee and injured the feelings of many of their fellow countrymen.

The party began the long road back by withdrawing into reorganized local cells, which operated quietly and without publicity. However, the national organization slowly began to revive. As early as June 1947 Qavam allegedly offered cabinet positions to the party, and during the fall of 1947—particularly after the passage of a general amnesty bill by the Majlis—members of the old Democratic Party of Azerbaijan drifted back into the Tudeh organization. The *mohajirs* ("emigrants"—supposedly Iranian nationals returning after residence within the USSR), sifting down from the northwest, were especially successful in penetrating the Iranian State Railway. In November the leader of the trade union confederation was released from prison, in December the Tudeh Youth Organization reopened its club at Isfahan, and on May Day 1948 the party's Annual Congress named a new Central Committee, in which all of those who had been dropped after the near-debacle of 1946 were reinstated in power.

The party was not officially represented in the Majlis, but it began to play an increasingly strident role in public affairs through the medium of its revived and revitalized press. During August 1948 the party leaders made a formal presentation of demands to Prime Minister Hajir and during the fall of 1948 its press attacks became increasingly bitter. Meanwhile, the party was obviously gaining strength with each passing month and, by its collection and storage of arms and vehicles, was apparently preparing for some sort of direct action.

The revival of the Tudeh Party was abruptly halted, following the attempted assassination of the Shah on 4 February 1949, when martial law was proclaimed throughout the country, the Tudeh Party was officially dissolved, and some five hundred individuals were arrested on the ground that the party had

been involved in the assassination plot.* On 23 April the trials of some fourteen leaders and seven lesser lights ended with nineteen of them sentenced to terms of one to ten years. On 18 May eight leaders (seven of them members of the Central Committee) tried *in absentia*, were sentenced to death, while nine other party members were sentenced to terms of five to ten years.

Despite these blows, the Tudeh Party continues to represent a significant threat to Iranian stability. By virtue of its broad popular appeal and vigorous organizational methods, it is the only contemporary political organization in Iran which has achieved any real degree of support among the people. Moreover, despite its pretense of being only a national reform movement, the Tudeh Party is, for all practical purposes, the Iranian Communist Party and is unmistakably under Soviet influence.

2. Formal Program and Policy.

Ostensibly, the Tudeh Party is merely a liberal reform organization; the party leadership has taken pains to convey the impression that the party wishes only to effect the social and economic reforms which most Western visitors would admit were necessary in Iran. (A similar tactic was adopted by the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, which took a moderate line until its assumption of power enabled it to start an extremely radical program.) The Tudeh constitution** adopted at the first party Congress (1-12 August 1944) lists as fundamental aims that the party: (1) represents the oppressed classes of Iran; (2) stands for the independence and integrity of Iran as against colonialism; (3) favors international cooperation toward the attainment of world peace; (4) is a partisan of a truly democratic government; and (5) is dedicated to the replacement of outmoded economic systems with a progressive organization beneficial to the majority of the people. The party program calls for freedom of thought and expression, racial and religious equality, universal free elections, reform of the judiciary, and

* The government announced, however, that it would not attempt to prosecute ordinary, rank-and-file members of the party.

** See Appendix A.

~~SECRET~~

repeal of laws unjust to the masses, while the party has also advocated such objectives as the eight-hour day, recognition of the rights of unions, social insurance, protection of mothers and children, and legal and social equality for women. Although most of its platform relates to the laboring classes, it has asserted that it is not merely a party of the workers but the spokesman for 90 percent of the nation. It has repeatedly stated that it works to uphold the Constitution, is in no way opposed to "constitutional laws," and "has no quarrel with the principles of private ownership."

Apparently nothing has angered the leaders of the Tudeh Party so much as the accusation that the party is Communist and has ties with the USSR. Statements in Tudeh newspapers and books stress the democratic, anti-fascist, and anti-reactionary character of the party. The official line is that the party is a native organization, working for the good of the Iranian nation, which is not and will not become Communist; "if our party publishes pro-Soviet articles, it is because the Soviets fight well against the fascists." * In 1947 the

* *Rahbar*, 7 May 1945:

"There seems to be an established opinion that the Tudeh Party is an organ of Soviet Communists . . . Why conduct a one-sided policy? Why think that every communist wants only the incorporation of other countries into the Soviet Union? The Tudeh works for the Iranian nation, for the maintenance of our own constitution . . . If our party publishes pro-Soviet articles, it is because the Soviets fight well against the fascists. We are sure that the Soviet government neither intends to introduce bolshevik government in Iran, nor to occupy Iran."

The pamphlet "Know the Tudeh Party" (Tehran, 1944) contained the similar assertions that:

"The statement that the Tudeh party of Iran has communist connections, a statement that the group of Sayyid Zia [ad-din Tabatabai] are spreading without reason to frighten the merchants and the capitalists, is an error and far from the truth . . . We believe that communistic and socialistic thoughts need special social conditions which do not exist in Iran and if one day a communist party comes into existence in Iran that party will positively not be Tudeh . . . In our situation there are certain ties with the Soviet government and nations . . . [but] we have confidence that the Soviet government, contrary to what its enemies say, has no intention of making Iran bolshevist nor of occupying it."

Tudeh leadership felt compelled ("since the party is neither communistic nor revolutionary") to denounce the "Marxist Trotskyites" within its ranks as representing a "left deviation." ** Since then, however, the Tudeh Party has devoted less energy to denying any ties with the Soviet Union and more energy to attacking the "enemies" of the USSR.

The Tudeh Party's real bias, while veiled in its statement of domestic aims, is made apparent in its published statements regarding the major outside powers. The official attitude of the party toward the US and the UK was at first mild; in 1944 it spoke of establishing a government "on the type of the English and American democracies," while the party leaders then appeared to view the US with a certain amount of good will. However, the party line soon thereafter began to harden, first against the UK and then against the US. Against the British, the Tudeh leaders developed the theme of the "one-sided policy," arguing that the British had maintained dominance over Iranian foreign affairs and Iranian politicians, particularly of the reactionary element, ever since the pre-World War I struggle for influence with Russia, and that a normal balance in Iranian foreign policy should be re-established by development of friendly relations with the USSR, which had refrained from following the old Czarist policy of interference in Iran. In more recent months the Tudeh Party has also attacked the British on specific points, demanding that the Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf, whose ruler is in effect under a British protectorate,

** *Analysis of the Conditions of the Party*, Tehran, 1947. The writer assumes an air of great indignation over the attitude taken by the "Marxist Trotskyites":

"They were a left deviation who wanted to gain control of the party by parliamentary means! They said that it was an aristocratic party and that its leaders were not workers! They said that the workers should have all affairs in their own hands and that they would revolt by founding a communist party. They said that the Tudeh has relations with imperialists but that they are connected with the Comintern. They said that the Tudeh party violated Marxist theories and was taken in by bourgeois democracy! They made use of phrases of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin!"

The writer closes by citing a passage from Lenin against such deviationists.

~~SECRET~~

be returned to Iran; insisting that Iran receive a much greater return from the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; alleging that the British-owned Imperial Bank of Iran is operated entirely for the benefit of the UK; stating that the Shah's visit to the UK in the summer of 1948 was for the purpose of receiving instructions from the British; and repeating the common charge that many of the present "reactionary" leaders of Iran are in the pay of the British.

With respect to the US, the Tudeh Party's initial good-will soon evaporated. Evidently fearing that the US financial mission (1943-45) might succeed in improving the living conditions of the people, the party soon began to launch attacks against Dr. Millspaugh, the director. The Tudeh leader 'Abd es-Samad Kambakhsh asserted in the Majlis that "Dr. Millspaugh was commissioned by certain capitalists to destroy Iran's industries and agriculture and in general the economics of the country, that he might provide markets for those capitalists after the war is over."

From 1946 on, the party organs have parroted Soviet pronouncements about the US, whether directly related to Iranian affairs or not. A party directive of October 1948 ordered that "the US in general and US policy in Iran, with emphasis on the arms credit program in particular, should be the subject of severest press attacks." The party has argued that the plans of Roosevelt have been perverted and altered since his death (and the opinions of his former deputy, Henry Wallace, ignored); has heaped criticism upon US aid to Greece and Turkey and on the Marshall plan; and has flatly accused the US of having an imperialistic policy designed "to enforce American political, economic, and military rule all over the world." *

* Speech by Dr. Radmanesh before Tudeh Central Committee, 27 October 1948. Radmanesh also charged that: "The World War mongers, the Wall Street masters, have started vast propaganda against the decisions of the Potsdam Conference; . . . The American policy of expansion, which was dragging Britain and France along in their search for dollars, prevented the world, destroyed by World War II, from being converted into a really peaceful universe."

The party is most vehement, as might be expected, about US activities in Iran. It vigorously opposed the US arms credit bill which was finally passed by the Majlis in February 1948 and has consistently demanded dismissal of the US military missions to the Iranian Army and to the gendarmerie, alleging that US activities in Iran are part of a plan for creating military bases in various parts of the world and charging that airports are being constructed in Iran under US supervision. According to the Tudeh doctrine, the ruling classes of Iran have decided to serve both the "British and the American imperialisms in Iran . . . let one of them have a free hand in the army and gendarmerie and in the creation of military bases; satisfy the other one by raising the exchange prices, robbing the Iranian oil resources, and giving power to its agents."

It is within this framework that the Tudeh Party explains its approval of the USSR; the party is described as a partisan of friendship not only with the Soviets but with "all countries opposed to imperialism and the wards of imperialism in Iran." However, the character of Tudeh leadership and organization—as well as its attitude in practice—indicate that the party is linked with the USSR in far more substantial ways.

3. Party Leadership.

From the very beginning, the Tudeh Party has been under the complete domination of a relatively small group of men, all of whom have long been linked with the USSR by either Marxist convictions or by actual training in the USSR. The numerically larger element in this group is made up of Iranian intellectuals without direct ties with the USSR; included among the fourteen or more members of this group are at least nine European-educated men who were first attracted to Communism through their advanced studies on the Continent or through association with Dr. Erani, and also a few prominent figures such as the Eskandari brothers, who are related to the Qajar dynasty overthrown by the present Shah's father, the late Reza Shah Pahlavi. The second element in the Tudeh Party lead-

~~SECRET~~

ership is made up of such professional Soviet agents as Ja'far Pishevari, leader of the Azerbaijani regime, who has been active politically since 1913 and who was one of the original supporters of the Bolshevik Revolution; Reza Rusta, who was organizing peasant unions in Gilan as long ago as 1922-23; and Ardeshtir Ovanessian, who reportedly had already graduated from the Young Communist School in Moscow when he was arrested for Communist underground activity in Iran in 1934.

Despite the turbulence of the Tudeh Party's short history, the original group of leaders has remained more or less intact, thus providing the party with remarkable continuity of leadership. In early 1949, nine of the twenty-four surviving founder-members were still on the Central Committee, with others of the original group, notably Pishevari, Ovanessian, and Rusta, unavailable only because they had to drop from sight to evade the police. Seven of these nine survivors, all of whom have been members of the party Secretariat, were members of Dr. Erani's original coterie during the 1930's. A handful of later recruits did gain temporary prominence, but most of them (including three deputies in the XIV Majlis—1944-46—Shahab Ferdows, Parvin Gunabadi, and Taghti Fedakar) have since been removed from positions of prominence or actually dismissed from the party.

As would be expected, a few of the founding members seem to have dropped from sight, presumably as their native abilities or ideological convictions proved inadequate for the demands of leadership, but there is no evidence that any of them were purged from the party. Even after the establishment of the Temporary Executive Council in January 1947, no reliable trained agents were expelled, and although Iraj Eskandari was allegedly subjected to disciplinary action he reappeared a year later as a member of the Central Committee. There is thus no basis for the fairly popular belief that events and the passage of time have altered the nature of the party—a belief fostered by a recent statement of Abbas Eskandari that the party, at first "composed of patriotic young Iranians who felt the need for

a social revolution . . . unfortunately fell under the influence of the Soviet Union . . ."

Although there are occasional reports from the field of disagreements within the leadership between a strongly pro-Soviet bloc and a less radical, more nationalistic group,** the Tudeh Party appears to have enjoyed a greater degree of internal harmony than most Communist parties have experienced. Although the intellectuals in the hierarchy with no direct contact with the USSR—including many individuals who have been well liked and respected in Iranian public life—might be expected to place Iranian interests above those of the USSR, they have consistently been subservient to Soviet direction and have repeatedly neglected the chance to shift from opportunistic agitation to an attempt to push through a specific program of social reforms.

* The same belief is reflected in a recent article by a trained British observer who was in Tehran from 1943 until 1947: "There is no doubt that there was then [in 1942], and still is, a considerable group within the [Tudeh] party's ranks whose left-wing views are not tainted with any subservience to Soviet policy, though they have rarely been able to exert much influence in its councils . . . As the war drew near its close . . . the Russians began to look more closely at the Tudeh party as a possible instrument of policy, [and] the more sincere advocates of reform, if they did not actually leave the party, lost whatever influence they had over its line of action."

L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran," *Middle East Journal*, January 1949, pp. 47-54.

** In the spring of 1947, prior to the arrival in Iran of a WFTU delegation, Dr. Hosein Jodat, the deputy Fedakar, and one Tabrizi appeared to be on the point of attempting to form a more moderate faction in the party, but the arrival of the WFTU party made such a move impractical. On 28 April 1947 Fedakar was dismissed from the party. Later reports of dissension center about Khalil Maleki, who started the short-lived splinter organization, the Tudeh Socialist Party, in January 1948. During the fall of 1947, Maleki reportedly forced a vote in the Central Committee on the question of Soviet direction of the party and there are reports that members of Maleki's faction were meanwhile attempting to gain promises of support from the governmental Ministry of Labor. In July 1948 a Shiraz newspaper stated that Maleki had taken a pro-Tito stand in opposing the Central Committee's policy of cooperation with the USSR, although later, in the spring of 1949, he turned up as one of the defense lawyers in the Tudeh trials before the Tehran Military Tribunal.

~~SECRET~~

Nominally the head of the party is its secretary-general—a post held by Iraj Eskandari from the founding of the party until 1946 and since then by Dr. Reza Radmanesh, until March 1949 an engineering professor at the University of Tehran. However, field reports have suggested that liaison with the USSR and, in effect, over-all control of the party, have been carried on through a secret section, which probably includes Ehsan Tabari, Ghazar Simonian, and Kambakhsh, and may also include Rusta and Ovanessian.

Material at hand suggests that the principal liaison agent with the USSR, and thus the key figure in the Tudeh hierarchy, is Kambakhsh, a member of a family closely related to the deposed Qajar dynasty who studied aeronautical engineering in Moscow during the 1920's, was incarcerated for Communist activity in 1933, three years after his return to Iran as an instructor in the Iranian Air Force, and helped organize the Tudeh Party following his release from prison in 1941. Kambakhsh reportedly went to Moscow via Czechoslovakia in 1946, but is believed to have returned to Iran in early 1948; in December 1948, a deputy to the Majlis from Mazandaran stated that at least twice in the previous six months a Soviet plane had brought in Kambakhsh and a Dr. Jahanshalu to confer with Tudeh leaders.

The pattern established with other Communist and Communist-front parties suggests that in the event of a Soviet-supported internal upheaval, the overt leadership of the party—Dr. Radmanesh and his intellectual associates—would be used as a front during the opening stages of the action but then would be eliminated in favor of trained Soviet agents who had been tested on the revolutionary firing lines and who would be less likely to have any scruples about Sovietizing Iran. Individuals such as Rusta and Pishevari, who have failed to carry out their assignments in the past, would probably not be given major posts. The leadership would probably be entrusted to such men as Kambakhsh, although in the final stage control might well be taken over by any of a number of obscure Iranian-born Communist agents long resident in Moscow,

including such elusive figures as Lahuti, Kavian, and Sultanzadeh.

4. Organization.*

a. *The Party Proper.*

Communist organizational concepts have been applied throughout the structure of the Tudeh Party, the blueprint for which is contained in Ovanessian's short and largely theoretical book, *Fundamentals of the Organization of a Party*, which was first published in the Tudeh newspaper *Rahbar* in 1946. Under the standard Communist concepts of "democracy" and "centralism," which Ovanessian stresses as fundamentals of organization to be followed as though they were "holy laws," the national party organization is a hierarchy on the Soviet model—nominally responsive to the will of the rank and file but in fact tightly controlled from the top.

The basic organization in this structure is the Annual Congress of the party, delegates to which are elected, theoretically on the basis of one for each three hundred party members, by local conferences elected by ordinary party members for the purpose.** The Congress, after theoretically making the major policy decisions for the year, proceeds to name two interim bodies, the Inspection Commission and the more important Central Committee, which functions for the Congress while the latter body is not in session.

The Central Committee, to which about twenty members were named by the Congress of May 1948, conducts plenary sessions about once every three months, leaving the continuous direction of policy to a five-man Political Bureau or Politbureau, selected from its own ranks. The Political Bureau, in turn, names three of its members as a Secretariat, headed by the party's Secretary-General.

In practice, as with the Communist parties of the USSR and other countries, the top leadership is self-perpetuating and virtually

* See Appendix B for a more detailed treatment.

** The size of the two "annual" Congresses held thus far, 164 delegates for the first Congress which met 1 August 1944 and 118 delegates for the meeting of May 1948, do not furnish a reliable indication of actual Tudeh membership.

~~SECRET~~

free to set its own policies. Judging by the two Congresses held thus far, the party Congress, which meets only at the call of the Central Committee, is an occasion for oratory rather than decision-making and is expected to ratify not only the party hierarchy's decisions on policy but also the new slate of Central Committeemen named by the outgoing group. Even the plenary sessions of the Central Committee are sometimes held primarily for the issuance of a policy statement rather than for discussion, as when Dr. Radmanesh in October 1948 delivered a long analysis of the world situation before the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee. Control is centralized in the Political Bureau and in the Secretariat, which performs the day-to-day supervision of all party agencies with the exception of the Inspection Commission.

An elaborate machinery has been set up under the Central Committee, Political Bureau, and Secretariat to direct party activity in the field. At the top of this administrative hierarchy are a number of staff sections with broad functional responsibilities, the most important of them being the Publicity Section, which is responsible for all aspects of agitation and propaganda; the Organization Section, which would appear to be charged with selection, assignment, and promotion of party functionaries; and the Defense and Security Commission (sometimes referred to as the Intelligence and Vengeance Committee), which has the task of defending the party against internal or external attacks. The Publicity Section is a particularly vigorous agency of the party, being responsible not only for the publication of Tudeh newspapers, books, and handbills but also for the maintenance of party clubhouses, schools, and movie houses and the preparation of cell meeting materials. The Defense and Security Commission, which is apparently headed by the party Secretary-General, Dr. Radmanesh, runs the party's courts and is also probably responsible for the other secret police establishments which the party is known to maintain, including a prison in Tehran, an espionage organization, strong-arm squads, and arsenals. In addition to such major staff sections, other bodies

have been set up to deal with special groups in the population, including the Tudeh Youth Organization, the Tudeh Women's Organization, a Peasants' Commission, and a Minorities Commission. It is probable that a Tribal Commission also exists.

Tudeh Party organization in the field is based on the *hauza*, or cell, which contains between four and sixty members normally. There appear to be three types of such cells: the guild or craft type, used to organize such groups as chauffeurs and truckdrivers; the factory type, used to organize all the workers in a given plant; and the area type. There may also be special cells for soldiers, peasants, women, youth, and for members of particularly secret party activities. In places where party membership is high, there is an intermediate organization, comprising between four and twenty-five *hauza*, known as a *rabat*. These essentially local organizations are usually linked with national headquarters by a series of conferences and committees, on the model of the countrywide Annual Congress and the Central Committee, although in certain areas only a skeleton intermediate organization may be in existence. Relations between the Secretariat and the party's local units are supervised by the Tehran Provincial Organization Committee, which maintains contacts with representative regional committees on behalf of the national headquarters.

b. The Central United Council of Trade Unions.

A major position in the Tudeh organization is occupied, for all practical purposes, by the nominally independent Central United Council of Trade Unions (CUCTU), which was organized in May 1943 by Rusta and other Tudeh leaders, many of whom had been active in the labor movement before Reza Shah clamped down on unionism in 1928. The CUCTU organization chart parallels that of the Tudeh Party—including such agencies as a Central Executive Committee, a Secretariat, and an Inspection Commission—and a number of key individuals have held similar po-

~~SECRET~~

sitions in both organizations.* In February 1947, after both the CUCTU and the Iranian Government had invited a delegation from the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) to visit Iran,** Rusta was allegedly removed from his position as Secretary-General of the CUCTU and a new Central Executive Committee "elected" by the government-directed workers, but this switch had no lasting results. Two of the three WFTU observers, a Soviet representative and a Lebanese Communist, censured the Iranian Government for existing labor conditions but made no comment on the CUCTU. The British member of the WFTU delegation, however, reported that the Tudeh Party and the CUCTU were "one and the same party," adding that "all those in the trade union organization called it the Tudeh union."

In the field, the CUCTU and the Tudeh Party have worked closely together in both labor organization and political demonstrations, and in general their fortunes have risen and fallen together. Originally set up in the textile plants of Isfahan, the CUCTU grew steadily in size as the war drew to a close, making particular progress along the Caspian Sea coast, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's installations, and in the state railroad system. Under Qavam's policy of cooperation with the Tudeh Party, a comprehensive labor law was enacted by cabinet decree on 18 May 1946 and during the fall of the same year a Ministry of Labor was established—into which the

* Although the rosters of the Central Executive Committee are not available, Rusta, Iraj Eskandari and Samad Hakimi, all of the Tudeh Central Committee, were CUCTU delegates to the WFTU conference in October 1945, and it is known that other members of the Tudeh Central Committee have also served with the CUCTU.

** The WFTU, at its Paris Conference in February 1947, accepted the invitation, naming a three-man committee consisting of the famous Lebanese Communist leader, Mustafa Aris, as chairman, Petr A. Borisov, as Soviet representative, and Edgar Phillips Harries, as British representative. The committee left Paris toward the end of February and went to Moscow, where it remained for some time. It arrived in Tehran in May 1947.

CUCTU promptly arranged to infiltrate Communist advisors.*** At the height of its power, the CUCTU boasted 186 affiliated unions and approximately 200,000 members.

The CUCTU demonstrated its strength during the summer of 1946, when its members seized the Isfahan factories in defiance of a government order for a forty-day arbitration period and staged a short but violent strike at the Abadan refineries while its demands were being considered by a special commission at Tehran. However, its visions of triumph were short-lived. After the Tudeh members were dropped from the cabinet in October, a new labor federation, the Central Labor Syndicate, was established under Qavam's party, and after the CUCTU had staged an unsuccessful general strike in Tehran in November, the government closed down the labor clubs, arrested or dismissed scores of workers, and set about regaining control of the Mazandaran factories which the workers had seized. On 15 April 1947, while the WFTU observers were still present, Rusta was jailed on charges of embezzling one million rials in union funds and of indulging in various treasonable activities.

Since Rusta's arrest the CUCTU has been in a decline, despite the failure of the government-directed Central Labor Syndicate to attract worker support. Rusta was released in November 1947 on bail of one million rials supplied by Tudeh leaders, but he has neither been tried nor publicly active since then and is believed to be in the USSR. He is probably still titular head of the CUCTU, although there are indications that Dr. Jodat or Mohammad Boggerati of the Tudeh Central Com-

*** During October 1946, after the Iranian Government had asked the French Ministry of Labor to supply three non-partisan French union leaders to advise the Iranian Labor Ministry, Atighetchi of the CUCTU wrote Rusta from Paris stating that he had quietly arranged to have two "comrades" (i.e. Communists) named and hoped to be able to do the same for the third position. The letter was later seized by the Iranian police.

mittee or a man named Rasulzadeh may be in active control.*

The CUCTU has been consistently pro-Soviet in the WFTU, to the October 1945 meeting of which it sent a delegation headed by Iraj Eskandari when the government put Rusta in jail and attempted to provide a delegation of its own. The WFTU recognized the CUCTU as the sole representative of Iranian labor in the summer of 1946, and in June of the following year censured the Iranian Government for "anti-democratic" anti-union practices.

c. Affiliated Organizations.

The Tudeh Party has been involved with a number of other organizations, including several abortive regional groups similar to the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan; the Irano-Soviet Relations Society; the still active Revenge Party, organized in Azerbaijan in 1947; and the Qoran Society, which was reportedly set up as a cover for illegal Tudeh activities in the armed forces. Included among the organizations which have been linked with the Tudeh Party are two more broadly based reform parties which ultimately fell apart as the result of Tudeh penetration: the Anti-Fascist Society, which was founded in 1942 by Mostafa Fateh, the highest ranking Iranian official of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; and the Jangal Party, which reappeared during the winter of 1945 in Mazandaran and Gilan provinces under the leadership of Esma'il Khan Jangali and was represented in the XIV Majlis by Muzaffarzadeh, a deputy from Rasht. The Anti-Fascist Society and its newspaper *Mardum* soon fell under Tudeh control, with the result that Fateh resigned in October 1942. The Jangal Party fell apart during the critical fall of 1946, with the larger part of the membership uniting with the Tudeh Party.

The only splinter party to emerge from the Tudeh ranks thus far is the Tudeh Socialist

* According to a CUCTU statement of 29 January 1948 the organization was headed by an Acting Committee. The CUCTU failed to elect a Central Executive Committee in May of that year, possibly because Rusta's followers wished to avoid an internal struggle with a faction headed by one Sayyid Bagher Emami.

Society, which was announced on 5 January 1948, by twelve moderately important Tudeh leaders with the statement that they did not oppose the Tudeh Party but wished to promote their own slightly different views. This group failed to get the trade union support it sought and vanished within less than a month.

d. Soviet Cooperation with the Party.

A great number of organizational contacts exist between the Soviet agencies in Iran and the Tudeh Party. Although the formal relationships involved cannot be precisely defined, it appears that Soviet guidance is extended to the party through the Embassy, and to a lesser extent through the Soviet consulates and satellite diplomatic establishments, while the more practical types of Soviet support are provided through appropriate Soviet commercial and cultural organizations in Iran. The assistance provided by such organizations is considerable. The Soviet Hospital at Tehran has supplied the party with newsprint; Iransovtrans has supplied weapons and vehicles, has transported individuals, and has maintained courier services; Iranian-Soviet Fisheries Company** has used its boats to smuggle individuals and weapons into Iran; and VOKS and Tass have supplied propaganda material. A number of Soviet organizations have supplied the party with financial assistance, and there is even a report, as yet unconfirmed, that the party receives (via the Czechoslovakian Legation) a monthly subsidy of 2,225,000 rials (\$69,000) in cash or easily disposable merchandise. In Tehran, *mohajirs* have been supplied with second-hand clothing to hawk in the street and have received free meals at the Hotel Gilan-i-No against ration cards issued by the Soviet Embassy. Agents have been supplied for Tudeh organizational work; for example, a Czechoslovakian Communist named Franz Jingar has been active with the party at Isfahan, while a Russian-born agent named Hushangi was at one time the leader of organizational activity at Nowshahr, on the Caspian Sea. Finally, after the party was suppressed early in February 1949, the Soviets made available

** Sherkat-e-Shilat-e-Iran-va-Shuravi.

the facilities of the Baku radio for long statements by the Tudeh Central Committee and the Tudeh Youth Organization proclaiming their intention to carry on the struggle.

5. Size and Character of Membership.

Because of the marked fluctuations which have taken place in the Tudeh Party's strength and the surreptitious quality it possessed even before its recent dissolution, it is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of supporters the party could muster at any time.* The party was clearly never a true mass party; the best available estimates place its 1945 strength at 69,000 rather than at the 200,000 members (most of whom would presumably be also members of the Tudeh Party) claimed by the CUCTU at the WFTU meeting of that year. Despite the party's recovery of ground following its near-collapse in the winter of 1946-47, total Tudeh-CUCTU active membership just prior to the outlawing of the party in the spring of 1949 was probably in the neighborhood of only 25,000, with the hard core of fanatic Communists numbering somewhere between 100 and 500. Some sixty percent of this membership consists of factory and railroad workers, with the remainder scattered rather evenly through Iran's other social classes. The country's predominant peasant population accounts for only about eight percent of the membership total. Tehran probably contains about half of the party's members, other centers of party strength being located at Abadan and Khorramshahr, Isfahan, Mashhad, Qazvin, Ahvaz, and Rasht.**

Although these estimates class the Tudeh Party as a conspiratorial party rather than as a full-grown popular movement, they represent—even in the party's present shrunken state—a notable potential strength at such key points as the oilfields, the railroads, and the factories; and among the intellectual classes. This strength is augmented by the existence of various categories of secret mem-

bers or fellow travellers who might be expected to assist the party openly in any new test. One group is exemplified by the two high-ranking Ministry of the Interior officials in Azerbaijan who suddenly emerged as DPA members in 1945 and by the apparently serious, conservative Anglo-Iranian Oil Company representative at an international petroleum conference who turned out to be a member of the Tudeh Party. Another group consists of a number of intellectuals and socially well-placed opponents of the Pahlevi regime such as Mohammad Taghi Bahar, a poet-professor who is known throughout Iran as the "King of the Poets," and Manuchehr and Iran Teymurtash, whose father was Minister of Court under Reza Shah. Both Manuchehr and his sister are violently anti-court.

6. Capabilities of the Party.

Despite the fact that the Tudeh Party is for the moment officially defunct, with its principal leaders either in prison or in hiding, it continues to represent a major factor in Iran's political future. As a conspiratorial body it already possesses both the leadership and the organization required to set up a quisling government under the protection of Soviet arms. Moreover, although the Tudeh leaders have thus far been frustrated in their efforts to generate a genuinely large-scale popular following, they have succeeded in producing the biggest, the most cohesive, and the best organized of any of Iran's political parties; in a country where constitutional government has just begun to emerge, theirs is the only political organization which has made any real headway in rousing the laboring population from its political apathy. There is little doubt that the party, under its former name or a new one, will resume its organization work at the earliest opportunity, regardless of whether or not it is restored to a legal status.

The speed and extent of the Tudeh Party's revival will depend not only on the repressive action taken against it but also on social and economic conditions within Iran. So long as genuine social and economic improvements lag, the party's internal reform program will have an obvious appeal to all of the politically

* See Appendix C for discussion of membership estimates.

** There is probably also considerable party strength in Azerbaijan, although overt Tudeh-DPA activities have been banned there ever since 1946.

~~SECRET~~

conscious classes except for the more well-to-do, while the party's positive approach and conspiratorial organization will continue to provide an attractive antidote to the sense of frustration which pervades certain sections of the Iranian population today. These appeals, which are counter-balanced somewhat by the individualism of the Iranian and by the distrust inspired by the party's obvious connections with the USSR, are not as yet strong in the hinterland. It is doubtful that the party will be able to wean the major tribes away from their traditional loyalties* or that, in the short run, it will have any notable success in stimulating political consciousness among the peasants who form the preponderant element in the Iranian population. Nevertheless, over the next few years the party may well be able to build up considerably greater strength in the towns, which constitute the principal centers of power and control in Iran.

For the future, the Tudeh Party appears committed to tactics of upheaval, not only because of its Soviet connections but also because of the internal situation it faces. In view of the limited number of districts in which the Tudeh organization would have any real hope of commanding a majority and the tight control over electoral processes exercised by Iran's ruling class, it is doubtful that the party would be able to gain control of the government through peaceful means in the foreseeable future. On the other hand,

* The only exceptions are such traditionally discontented minority groups as the Kurds. Communist agitation among the Kurds appears to have been carried out by Soviet agents directly, however, rather than through the Tudeh organization.

its potential at such key points as the oil refineries, the state railroads, and the state-owned factories makes it ideally situated for attempts either to intimidate the government through political strikes or to provide active assistance to the USSR through demonstrations, riots, and sabotage. Tudeh plans for participation in a Soviet-backed revolt (which are probably already in existence) may well contain provisions for breaking up the party to provide new organizations suited to the necessities of the moment. The party leaders might thus decide to replace the Tudeh organization with regional separatist groups, as they did in Azerbaijan in 1946, or might feel it expedient to set up splinter groups, ostensibly free of the Communist stigma, in order to obtain wider popular support.

Although the Tudeh Party would scarcely attempt to gain power without the active collaboration of the USSR, in such a case the Tudeh leadership would undoubtedly attempt at first to portray its relationship with the Soviets as one of friendly cooperation rather than subservience, particularly in view of the falling off in popular support which resulted from overt dependence on the Soviets in Azerbaijan in 1946. As the party's control was consolidated, however, a period of reshuffling would undoubtedly follow, in which the more idealistic, fellow travelling element in the hierarchy would be displaced and the Communist character of the top leadership revealed. In time, other changes might take place; control of the party might be assumed by obscure Iranian Communists long resident within the USSR.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX A

CONSTITUTION OF THE TUDEH PARTY OF IRAN*

Fundamental Aims of the Party.

1. The Tudeh Party of Iran is a party of the classes who suffer oppression: the workers, the peasants, the liberty-loving enlightened, the tradespeople, and the craftsmen.
2. The Tudeh Party of Iran stands for the independence and integrity of Iran and struggles against any form of colonial policy directed toward it.
3. The Tudeh Party of Iran stands for friendly cooperation with all liberty-loving nations toward the attainment of the rights of peoples and the maintenance of world peace.
4. The Tudeh Party of Iran stands for the establishment of government by the people and for a truly democratic regime.
5. The Tudeh Party of Iran opposes such remnants of the outworn economic regimes of earlier society as pastoral economy and feudalism; it stands for a progressive economic organization, based on the maintenance of benefits for the majority of the people of Iran.

* As contained in *The Tudeh Party of Iran: What Does it Say and What Does it Want?* Tehran, no date, "with the sanction of the Publicity Committee of the Tudeh Party."

The Program of the Party.

1. To struggle toward the establishment of a democratic regime which shall secure all individual and social rights, such as the freedoms of language, speech, writing, ideas, and assembly.
2. To struggle against dictatorial and despotic regimes.
3. To bring to an end the wilful deeds of the police and other public servants against the people.
4. To set up a high court for trying transgressors against the rights of the people.
5. To establish the independence of the judiciary and to effect the legal separation of the judiciary from the executive branch of the government.
6. To eliminate all laws and regulations which have been enacted to the harm of the masses.
7. To revise the compulsory military service law in the interests of the masses.
8. To revise the electoral laws so as to guarantee freedom of voting and of choice for the entire electorate.
9. To establish the complete social equality of all individuals of the Iranian nation without regard to race or religion and to grant religious and educational freedom to the minorities.

~~SECRET~~

MAY 1948 — FEBRUARY 1949



APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATIONAL NOTES

The organization of the Tudeh Party is represented graphically in the accompanying chart. The data included in the chart, as well as the discussion of party organization in the body of this estimate, are mainly based on field reports and Ovanessian's *Fundamentals of the Organization of a Party*, which contains many specific references to the Tudeh Party despite its predominantly theoretical character. Notes to accompany the chart follow.

1. Central Control Bodies.

a. Annual Congress.

Theoretically, the highest council of the party. Delegates chosen, on call of the Central Committee, by regional conferences which are also supposed to draw up recommendations for the program of the Congress. In effect, a rally of party leaders for purposes of ratifying decisions of the Central Committee which, along with the Inspection Commission, the Congress nominally selects. First Congress met 1 August 1944 with 164 delegates. Second Congress met 1 May 1948 with 118 delegates. (Each delegate theoretically represents 300 members.)

b. Central Committee.

An interim committee designated by the Congress to carry on the latter's functions when it is not in session; in practice, the party's real policy-making body. The Central Committee's membership (about ten in the first Central Committee named by the 1944 Congress, twenty in the Committee designated in 1948) is supposed to include representatives of each large district or province, but most of the members are actually resident in Tehran. Plenary sessions are held about once every three months with the Tehran group meeting about once a month. Party practice seems to require that most of the major operational

sections or divisions in the party be directed by a member of the Central Committee.

c. Political Bureau (Politbureau).

A steering sub-committee of the Central Committee, consisting of five key members, which meets several times a week to exercise continuous control over party activities.

d. Secretariat.

The executive or supervisory body of the party, made up of three members of the Political Bureau and including the party's titular head, the secretary-general.

e. Inspection Commission.

A semi-secret body, second in importance only to the Central Committee, which is similarly designated by the Annual Congress. Apparently members of the two committees often exchange places in alternate elections. Controls financial accounts, investigates the conduct of party members, and checks the organization of party agencies.

f. Secret Section.

The liaison body between the Secretariat and agencies of the USSR.

2. Operational Agencies.

a. Publicity Section.

One of the most important and perhaps the most active unit in the party organization. Charged with responsibility for all phases of disseminating the party's message, following the Communist concept of agitation (directed at the general public) and propaganda (directed toward party members). The section is headed by Ahmad Qasemi, a prolific dialectician, and has been highly successful in recruiting talent from the student-intellectual class. Major activities include: (1) Publication of the official party newspaper *Mardom* at Tehran and several provincial papers at such towns as Mashhad, Rasht, Tabriz, Isfa-

SECRET

han, and Shiraz; (2) production of handbills, leaflets, and a considerable number of books through the official Sha'lavar Press, the Atesh Press, and the Taban Press, which is used for CUCTU publications; (3) management of the Cinema Khorshid in Tehran and other movie houses specializing in Soviet films; (4) maintenance of party clubhouses; (5) the running of party schools; and (6) the procurement of study materials and speakers for local party meetings.

b. Organization Section.

An important body according to Tudeh statements, although little is known about its precise responsibilities. Probably charged with personnel management, including establishment of new organizations and the selection, promotion, and assignment of party functionaries.

c. Financial Commission.

The party treasury has had open accounts with the National Bank of Iran and probably also administers secret funds.

d. Defense and Security Commission.

Apparently charged with party police, judicial, and military defense functions.

e. Administrative Commission.

Exact functions not known. May be an administrative channel between various echelons of the organization. Reportedly runs the Information Bureau, which may be the distributing agency for the Publicity Section's output.

f. Membership Council.

Passes on membership applications.

g. Peasants' Commission.

Has not appeared active but is probably designed to set up a farm organization parallel to the CUCTU.

h. Tribal Commission.

Existence of such a body is probable although not established.

i. Minorities Commission.

Has worked most effectively with Armenians

j. Teacher and Student Commission.

The existence of such a commission is suggested by the party's success in the higher institutions of education, although this field may be covered by an agency of the Publicity Section.

k. National Factory Organization.

Little known about this organization. Probably an agency for coordination of Tudeh Party and CUCTU policy on such matters as strikes and attitude toward factory owners.

l. Iranian State Railways Central Organization.

Probably parallel to National Factory Organization.

m. Tudeh Youth (Javan-i-Tudeh).

Has shown considerable activity since 1947. Cells contain 25-40 members. Boys given indoctrination and military training, girls less specific instruction.

n. Tudeh Women's Organization (Tashktlat-i-Zanan-i-Iran).

Not particularly conspicuous for its activity. Has agitated for political rights and economic freedom for women.

3. Local Organizations.

Local organizations of the party consist of the *hauza* (cell) of usually four to sixty members, the *rabat* or grouping of four to twenty-five *hauza*, and the town, district and provincial conferences, each of which has a control mechanism similar to that of the national party. Contact between local parties and the national party is maintained through the Tehran Provincial Organization Commission.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

NOTES ON MEMBERSHIP

1. Strength.

Estimates of the Tudeh Party's strength vary widely. The figures used in the body of this paper—69,000 members for 1945 and 25,000 for early 1949—represent the most reasonable appraisal of the number of individuals who would be willing to assert their loyalty to the party at the risk of incurring reprisals by the government or their employers. The 1945 figure has been obtained from the best field analysis made at that time, that of the US Military Attache in Tehran. The later figure is based on the size of the annual Congress of May 1948. Each of 118 delegates the-

oretically represented 300 members, making a tentative total of 35,400 members. A great number of delegates, however, probably represented groups of less than 300 members, and though the party appears to have grown between the spring of 1948 and early 1949, a total of 25,000 members appears to be the most reasonable estimate of party strength at the time it was outlawed. It is assumed that at any given time most members of the CUCTU were also members of the Tudeh Party, which included, however, a considerable element which would not be eligible for CUCTU membership. Other available figures on Tudeh membership are listed below:

<i>Estimated Membership</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Source or Basis</i>
49,200	1944	Annual Congress had 164 delegates, each theoretically representing 300 members.
69,000	1945	MA Tehran, R-89-45, "The Tudeh Political Party," 27 August 1945.
100,000 (14,000 in Tehran)	1945	Statement of Iraj Eskandari, then Party Secretary-General, British report 5043, 21 February 1945.
40,000 (Tehran only)	1946	Statement of intelligence officer of US Persian Gulf Command, <i>Washington Post</i> , 5 March 1946.
250,000 (claimed) 50,000 (hard core)	H. R. Committee on Foreign Affairs, "National and International Movements, III, Communism in the Near East," Washington, 1948.
75,000	Ebon, M., <i>World Communism Today</i> , New York, 1949, p. 491.
175,000	CIA report, "Tudeh Party," 4 November 1948. Based on calculation of 1,400 cells at 125 members each.
35,400	1948	Annual Congress attended by 118 delegates, each theoretically representing 300 members.
100-500 (Communists only)	OIR Report 4489, "World Strength of Communist Party Organizations," 1 October 1947.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

2. Composition of Membership.

The Tudeh Party's secretary-general in 1945 then stated (British Report 5043, 21 February 1945) that 70 percent of the party consisted

of workers, 20 percent of intellectuals, and 10 percent of peasants. The estimated composition of the party in early 1949, on the basis of 25,000 members, was as follows:

<i>Occupational Group</i>	<i>Estimated Number</i>	<i>Percentage of Party Membership</i>
Labor (Factory, AIOC, railroad workers)	15,000	60.0
Transport workers (excluding railroad men but including taxi, carriage, and truck drivers, who are largely <i>mohajirs</i>)	2,000	8.0
Peasant farmers	2,000	8.0
Artisans (Bazaar craftsmen, rug weavers, etc.)	2,500	10.0
Middle Class (Shopkeepers, government and private clerical employees—largely Armenian)	2,500	10.0
Army	500	2.0
Professionals (Doctors, lawyers, engineers)	100	.4
Intellectuals (Teachers, journalists, artists)	200	.8
Students	200	.8
	<hr/> 25,000	<hr/> 100.0

SECRET

APPENDIX D

SIGNIFICANT BIOGRAPHICAL DATA *

Zia-al-Din ALAMUTI

One of four brothers active in the Tudeh movement, Zia-al-Din Alamuti has achieved prominence primarily as an agitator among peasants and laborers in the Caspian area. Nothing is known of his career prior to 1941, when he emerged (along with his brother Nur-al-Din, a former president of the Iranian Civil Courts) as one of the founders of the Tudeh Party. Alamuti was elected to the Inspection Commission in 1944 and was the Tudeh leader at Chalus in late 1945. He has since been a member of the Central Executive Committee of CUCTU and the head of the Tudeh Provincial Councils for Mazanderan and Gilan, and he is believed to have headed the Peasants Organization of the party. He may have been re-named to the Tudeh Inspection Commission in May 1948. Alamuti was an official of the Iranian State Railways up to 1949, when he was arrested and tried along with other Tudeh leaders before the Tehran Military Court. He was sentenced, on 22 April, to three years in prison.

Ali Bozorg ALAVI

Alavi has been active in the party from the start and is believed to have played an important role in direction of the Tudeh Youth movement and the National Factory Organization despite his lack of prominence as either a public speaker or agitator. Trained in Germany as an engineer, Alavi later worked for the German contractors building the Trans-Iranian Railway and taught in the

"German" Industrial School in Tehran. In 1937 as a member of Dr. Erani's group, Alavi was sent to jail, where he learned Russian and gained material for a book of prison reminiscences, and following his release in 1941 he helped found the Tudeh Party. Alavi was chosen to the Inspection Commission in 1944 and was named to the Central Committee in 1948. Alavi was one of those whose arrest was called for following the attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1949 and he is now presumably in hiding.

Ali AMIRKHIZI

Ali Amirkhizi ranks as one of the Tudeh Party's more effective organizers, particularly in his native Azerbaijan, and has consistently been high in party circles. Born in Tabriz about 1900, Amirkhizi speaks fluent French, Russian, and Turkish and at one time was a teacher in the Tabriz schools. His revolutionary career began under the Reza Shah regime, when he was a member of the opposition Mosavat (Equality) Party and served in prison for alleged Communist activity. Amirkhizi was one of the founders of the Tudeh Party in 1941 and was named to both the Central Committee and the Political Bureau at the second party Congress in 1948. Amirkhizi was the titular head of the party's Azerbaijan organization in 1945, when the drive for autonomy started, and was active in the DPA's subsequent assumption of power there, although the only office he held was that of a member of the Tabriz Municipal Council. He was active in fomenting disturbances in Mazanderan in early 1946. More recently, Amirkhizi has headed a number of organizing teams sent out to the provinces, in addition to being a prolific contributor to the Tudeh press. In May 1948 he secretly led such a group to Khuzistan and in September of the same year he headed a five-man delegation sent to Mashhad and other parts of Khorasan. In November 1948 he at-

* This appendix lists only the 26 individuals most prominently identified with the Tudeh Party at present and does not include data on secret agents or leaders who have dropped out of sight. A more complete listing, containing biographical information on all known Tudeh leaders, will be found in a forthcoming publication of the Department of State, BI 4949, "Leaders and members of the Tudeh Party and certain Iranians engaged in pro-Soviet activities."

CONTINUITY OF LEADERSHIP IN THE TUDEH PARTY

SECRET

NAME OF LEADER	PARTICIPATION IN TOP PARTY ACTIVITIES				PRESIDENT STATUS
	1941-42 MEMBER FOUNDING GROUP	1944 MEMBER CENTRAL (INSPECTION) COMMITTEE	1947 MEMBER TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL	1948* MEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE	1949 CONVICTED BY TEHRAN MILITARY COURT
'Ali Bozorg Alavi		I			
Nur-al-Din Alemuti		P-S			
Zia-al-Din Alemuti		I			
'Ali Amirkhani		P			A
Abol Qasem Asseadi					
Dr. Mohammad Behrani		P-S		P-S	
Mohammad Boqerati					
Abbas Eskandari					
Iraj Eskandari		P-S-G		P	A
Mohammad 'Ali Faridi					
Farrohi					
Ahmad Isfahani					
Hosein Jeshani					
Abdol-Samad Kambakhsh					A
Tagi Makinezhad					
Abdul Hosein Nushin		I			
Ardashir Ovanessian		P			A
Ja'far Pishevari				P-S-G	A
Dr. Reza Radmanesh					
Rasuli					
Rokni					
Reza Rusta		I			A
Ehsan Tabari				P-S	A
Mohammad Yazdi		I		P	
Dr. Faridun Keshavarz					A
Parvin Gunabadi					
Dr. Gholam Hosein Jodati		I			
Dr. Nur-al-Din Khianuri		I			
Ahmad Qassemi		I			
Khalil Maleki		I			
Dr. Gholam Hosein Furutan					
Gholam 'Ali Babazadeh					
Samad Hakimi					(acquitted)
Sharmini					
Mohammad 'Ali(?) Sharifi					

Key: I - Inspection Commission P - Political Bureau
S - Secretariat G - Secretary General
A - Convicted in absentia; still at large

SECRET

*Membership of Inspection Commission named in 1948 not known. Chart contains names of all members of other Party organs named. Membership totals are: Central Committee (1944) 11; Inspection Commission (1944) 9; Temporary Executive Council (1947) 7; Central Committee (1948) 20.

~~SECRET~~

tempted to reconstitute the Tudeh Party in Tabriz but was forced to leave by the police. His present whereabouts are unknown. On 18 May 1949 he was sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by the Tehran military tribunal.

Gholam 'Ali BABAZADEH

Little is known about Babazadeh except that he was named to the party Central Committee in 1948 and is presently unaccounted for in the roundup of Tudeh leaders begun in February 1949. He was a speaker at the first conference of the Railway Workers' Union in the fall of 1946.

Dr. Mohammad BAHRAMI

Dr. Bahrami, a German-trained medical man who was director of the Health Organization of the Iranian State Railways as late as June 1948, is one of the most prominent intellectuals in the party. A member of the Erani group imprisoned after his return from Germany, and a founder of the Tudeh Party, Bahrami shares with Dr. Radmanesh, the party's titular head, the unique distinction of having been named to the party Secretariat in both 1944 and 1948. Despite Dr. Bahrami's high position in the party, his role appears to be that of a policy-maker rather than that of an organizer, since there is no evidence of his participation in party activities in the field.

Mohammad BOQERATI

Little is known of Boqerati, who reportedly took over the leadership of the CUCTU following Reza Rusta's arrest in April 1947, except that he is another veteran of Dr. Erani's circle and of the Tudeh founding group and was named to the Central Committee in both 1944 and 1948. Boqerati was cited in April 1945 for his leadership in Isfahan, suggesting that he may have been the party's original organizer there.

Abbas ESKANDARI

A skilled debater of attractive personality long prominent in Iranian public life, Abbas Eskandari must be reckoned as one of the Tudeh Party circle despite his announced resignation from the party and his subsequent career as a nominally independent deputy in the Majlis. The elder brother of the Tudeh

Party's first secretary-general, Eskandari, was born about 1900 into a branch of the now deposed Qajar dynasty, and despite early success as an official spent the years of the Reza Shah Pahlevi regime in exile, in prison, or in enforced residence in Tehran. He was listed as a Soviet agent as early as 1927. Although Eskandari states that (after helping found the party and after editing the first Tudeh newspaper, *Siasat*, during 1942) he resigned from the party in 1943, he has since continued to further party interests. In 1946 he was appointed mayor of Tehran as the result of a bargain between Prime Minister Qavam and the Tudeh group, and though Qavam later helped him win election to the Majlis from Hamadan, Eskandari voted against Qavam on a vote of confidence and has consistently opposed every succeeding government. He has been particularly outspoken against the British in advocating return of Bahrein to Iran and the cancellation of the AIOC concession. In December 1948 Eskandari informed the US Embassy that he would welcome US economic aid for Iran, but there is no more tangible evidence that any change in his pro-Soviet attitude has taken place. In February 1949 Eskandari was granted a three-months leave of absence from the Majlis and is now presumably in Europe.

Iraj ESKANDARI

Although now resident in Paris, Iraj Eskandari, the Tudeh Party's first secretary-general, continues to be a major figure in the party. A member of one branch of the deposed Qajar line born about 1905, Eskandari studied law in France and then went into practice in Tehran. There he became a member of the Erani group and was imprisoned with the others in 1937. Eskandari was one of the original members of the Tudeh group, along with his brother Abbas and his uncle Soleyman Eskandari (who would have headed the organization but for his premature death) and in 1944 was named secretary-general as well as editor of the Tudeh paper *Rahbar*. In the previous year he had been elected to the XIV Majlis from Sari. He headed the 1945 CUCTU delegation to the 1945 WFTU meetings and was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry

~~SECRET~~

in 1946 as part of Qavam's deal with the Tudeh group. Following the party's reverses during 1946, Eskandari went into a temporary decline; he was not named to the Temporary Executive Council set up in early 1947 and was dropped from *Rahbar*. Nevertheless, he was renamed to the Central Committee (and the Political Bureau) in 1948 and he was one of the Tudeh leaders wanted by the police in their roundup of February 1949. In Paris he has allegedly been active among Iranian exiles and is said to have been planning to set up a French dress shop in Tehran as a cover for Communist activity. On 18 May 1949 he was sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by the Tehran military court.

Dr. Gholam Hosein FURUTAN (or FURUTAN-RAD)

A professor of biology at the University of Tehran, Dr. Furutan was named to the Temporary Executive Council of the Tudeh Party in January 1947 and to the Central Committee in the following year and has been active in the party's Publicity Section. In February 1949 Dr. Furutan failed to heed orders to appear with other Tudeh leaders before the Tehran Military Court and in the following month was dismissed from his post at the university.

Mohammad Parvin GUNABADI

Gunabadi is a leading Tudeh figure in Khorasan, where he was born about 1900 of a family long noted for friendship with the British. A onetime teacher of Persian literature at Mashhad despite a poor education, Gunabadi was named to the Tudeh Central Committee in 1944 and during the same period was a member of the editorial board of *Rahbar*, editor of the Tudeh paper in Khorasan, and (for a time) head of the party's Publicity Section. Gunabadi was an unsuccessful candidate for a seat in the XIV Majlis from Mashhad in 1943-44 but was later elected from Sabzevar. His present activities are unknown.

Samad HAKIMI

Little information is available about Hakimi, a "driving instructor" and onetime member of the Tudeh committee at Pol-e-Safid who was

elected to the party's national Central Committee in 1948. Arrested in 1949, he was one of two Tudeh defendants acquitted by the Tehran Military Court on 22 April.

Dr. Hosein JODAT

Dr. Jodat, a professor of physics at the University of Tehran's Engineering College until his arrest in 1949, is one of the more active members of the Tudeh hierarchy. Born about 1900 in Azerbaijan, Jodat was not one of the original members of the Tudeh leadership, although he was associated with the pro-Soviet Ettehad Party in Azerbaijan around 1920. However, he was elected to the Tudeh Central Committee in 1944 and reelected in 1948 and he played a prominent role in the Azerbaijan regime as editor of the Ardabil newspaper *Jodat*, as deputy and parliamentary committeeman in the autonomous parliament, and as Minister of Arts and Sciences in the Azerbaijan Cabinet. Jodat was a member of the CUCTU's Central Executive Committee (as well as of the official Supreme Labor Council) in 1947 and is one of those reported to have taken Rusta's place as head of the CUCTU. He was active in the Tudeh Youth organization during 1948. One of those tried before the Tehran Military Court in early 1949, Jodat was sentenced to five years in prison.

'Abd es-Samad KAMBAKHSH

Kambakhsh, who is reportedly a member of the all-important Secret Committee and possibly the real leader of the Tudeh Party, has a long history of pro-Soviet activity. Born between 1902 and 1907 into a family related to the deposed Qajar line of shahs, he attended the Soviet School in Tehran and studied aeronautical subjects in Moscow before joining the Iranian Air Force as a pilot instructor in 1929. In 1933 he was arrested for Communist activity and remained in prison until 1941, when he became one of the founders of the Tudeh Party. Kambakhsh was named to the Tudeh Central Committee in 1944 and, after his election to the Majlis from Qazvin during the same year, was an active member of the Tudeh bloc. He went to the USSR at the time of the collapse of the Azerbaijan regime in 1946 but is believed to have returned in 1948, when

~~SECRET~~

he was again elected to the Central Committee. Since then he is believed to have operated from the USSR, although he may be in Paris at present. He was one of the Tudeh leaders wanted by the police following the attempted assassination of the Shah in early 1949 and on 18 May was sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by the Tehran Military Court.

Dr. Feridun KESHAVARZ

Born about 1907, the son of one of the first men elected to the Majlis, Dr. Keshavarz is a specialist in children's diseases who received professional training and experience in Paris before becoming professor of hygiene at the University of Tehran during the middle 1930's. An outstanding speaker, Dr. Keshavarz joined the Tudeh Party soon after it was founded, was elected as a Tudeh deputy from Pahlevi in 1943, and was named to the Central Committee in 1944, to the Temporary Executive Council in 1947, and to the revived Central Committee in 1948. He was editor of the Tudeh paper *Razm* from 1944 through 1948 and briefly held the Ministry of Education under Qayam in 1946. Dr. Keshavarz evaded arrest by the police in the February 1949 roundup and in March 1949 was expelled from the University. He is rumored to have taken refuge in the Soviet Embassy. On 18 May he was sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by the Tehran Military Court.

Nur-al-din KHIANURI

A senior lecturer on building and construction and fine arts at the University of Tehran's College of Fine Arts until his arrest in February 1949, Khianuri has been active in the Tudeh Party since 1944. He was elected to the Inspection Commission in 1944 and to the Central Committee in 1948 and ran unsuccessfully for the XV Majlis in 1947. He was editor of the CUCTU's newspaper *Beshar* during 1948. Khianuri was sentenced on 22 April 1949 to ten years in prison.

Khalil MALEKI

Khalil Maleki, who led the short-lived Tudeh Socialist Society in 1948, returned to the political scene in 1949, when, after signing a published open letter congratulating the Shah

on his escape from death, he appeared as one of the defense lawyers in the Tudeh trials. Born in 1905 and educated in Berlin, Maleki was a close friend of Dr. Erani and was imprisoned in 1937 as one of "the 53." He was named to the Tudeh Inspection Commission in 1944 and to the Temporary Executive Council in 1947, and served under Keshavarz in the Iranian Ministry of Education in 1946. A frequent contributor to the party press, Maleki has been noted in Tudeh circles for his thorough grounding in Marxist theory.

Abdol Hosein NUSHIN

Playwright, director, actor, musician, and translator, Nushin is one of the most notable figures in the Tudeh group, of which he was one of the original members. Nushin has been active in the party leadership throughout its history, having been named member (and possibly chairman) of the Inspection Commission in 1944, a member of the Temporary Executive Council in 1947, and a member of the Central Committee in 1948. Nushin helped set up the Irano-Soviet Relations Society in 1943 and in 1946 did organizing work at Mashhad while his Armenian wife Loretta acted as an announcer for the Azerbaijan regime's radio station at Tabriz. Nushin is the founder of the Ferdowsi Theater in Tehran, the most popular and modern in the city, which has specialized in the production in translation of European plays critical of the upper classes. Early in 1949 the theater was closed by the government and Nushin himself arrested and later sentenced to three years in prison.

Ardeshir (originally Ardashes) OVANESSIAN

Veteran agitator, author of the treatise on Tudeh Party organization, and one of the outstanding Soviet-trained leaders in the party, Ovanessian was born between 1905 and 1910 at Rasht, the son of a poor carriage driver of Armenian extraction. Educated at Tabriz, Ovanessian allegedly attended the Young Communist School at Moscow and then went to France before returning to Iran in 1933. He knows Persian, Armenian, Turki, and Russian. Ovanessian was arrested in 1934 as a member of the Communist underground in Iran and was exiled to the island of Qeshm in the Per-

~~SECRET~~

sian Gulf until the general release of political prisoners in 1941. A founding member of the Tudeh Party, Ovanessian was elected to the XIV Majlis as an Armenian representative in 1944 and in the same year was named to the Tudeh Central Committee. In August 1945 he organized a peasant rebellion in Azerbaijan and later, after the Tehran police had found documents implicating him in a plot against the government, abandoned his position in the Majlis, fled to Rasht, and eventually became Director General of Propaganda for the Azerbaijan regime. When the Azerbaijan regime collapsed he fled with Pishevari to the USSR, and although he is believed to have returned to Iran in May 1947, he is probably in the USSR at the present, allegedly working with the Tudeh Secret Committee on Liaison with the Soviets. He has been wanted by the Iranian police ever since the roundup of Tudeh leaders in 1949 began and on 18 May was sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by the Tehran Military Court.

Ja'far PISHEVARI

Ja'far Pishevari, head of the short-lived Azerbaijan Government and now allegedly leader of "Free Azerbaijan" elements in the USSR, has had a long and distinguished career as a revolutionary. By his own account, he was born in the Khalkhal district of Azerbaijan in 1893, where he supported himself from the age of twelve and was a voracious reader until his entry into active political life at the age of twenty. Editor of a paper called *Horriyat* (Liberty) during the war years, Pishevari claims to have "had an active part in the liberation of the peoples of Russia" and was undoubtedly engaged in various Communist activities of the period. When the Jangal separatist movement arose in Gilan during 1920-21, Pishevari became an active writer and speaker, and he states that he was active in a number of other groups, including a union of 7,000 workers in Tehran, following the Jangal movement's suppression. Forced to change his group's headquarters five times (and finally to print his propaganda in Europe) after the advent of Reza Shah, Pishevari and his comrades were finally, in 1930, sent to prison, where they languished alone until the arrival

of the Erani group enabled them to spread the gospel of revolution. Freed along with the others in 1941, Pishevari was a member of the founding nucleus of the Tudeh Party, although he turned to publication of the "independent" paper *Afir* and avoided open contact with the party until 1944, when (after turning down one Tudeh offer) he agreed to run for the XIV Majlis as the party's candidate from Tabriz. Pishevari was elected but his credentials were subsequently invalidated by the Majlis, and he then turned to organization of the DPA in Tabriz. He held the post of Prime Minister in the Azerbaijan National Government from its creation until June 1946, when a tentative agreement was reached between his regime and the Iranian Government. He thereafter confined himself to *de facto* control of the government and armed forces in Azerbaijan, through his role as DPA secretary-general, until the collapse of the regime in December 1946 forced him to flee to Baku in the USSR. According to an unconfirmed report by the Iranian Consul in Baku in 1947, Pishevari was subsequently killed in an automobile accident, but as late as August 1948 the "Free Azerbaijan" radio in the USSR was referring to him as prime minister of the "Free Azerbaijan Government."

Ahmad QASEMI

Head of the Tudeh Party's Publicity Section, the journalist Ahmad Qasemi has been one of the most prolific writers in the Tudeh camp. He first appeared in 1944 as a member of the Inspection Commission. During 1945 he was active in the Gorgan area, where he worked with the abortive officers' revolt at Mashhad. He was named to the Central Committee in 1948 and was also a member of the Administrative Section and the Financial Commission. Arrested with other Tudeh leaders in early 1949, Qasemi was sentenced on 22 April to ten years imprisonment.

Dr. Reza RADMANESH

Dr. Reza Radmanesh, secretary-general of the Tudeh Party since 1948, is a scientist trained in Germany and France who held the chair of electricity measurements in the University of Tehran's College of Engineering

~~SECRET~~

from 1942 until his dismissal in March 1949. He was born in 1906 in Lahijan (Mazandaran province). Dr. Radmanesh, who may have met Dr. Erani in Germany, was imprisoned as a member of the Erani group in 1937 and was subsequently one of the principal founders of the Tudeh Party. He was named to the Central Committee in 1944 (in which year he also won a seat in the XIV Majlis as a Tudeh deputy from Lahijan), to the Temporary Executive Council in 1947, and to the party's top post in 1948. He was editor of the official Tudeh paper, *Mardom*, in 1947-48 and in the latter year was also active in the CUCTU, as well as personally heading both the Tudeh Youth Organization and the Defense and Security Commission within the Tudeh organization. Dr. Radmanesh disappeared following the attack on the Shah in February 1949 and was rumored to have taken refuge in the Soviet Embassy. On 18 May he was sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by the Tehran Military Court.

Reza RUSTA

Reza Rusta, the Tudeh Party's leading trade union organizer, has a long record as an agitator. According to his own statements, he was born into a peasant family in a village near Rasht in 1902 and was aided by the servant of the landlord in carrying his education up through the College of Agriculture at Rasht before he became politically active in 1920. Rusta claims to have organized the first peasants' union in Gilan province in 1922-23, was engaged in organizing Tehran workers in 1927, and later did union work in Isfahan, Kerman, and Bandar Abbas before Reza Shah's police caught up with him in 1931. Rusta spent the following ten years in prison or exile on one charge or another (including one for espionage), emerging from prison in 1941 to become one of the Tudeh Party founders and, by his own account, "the first to begin organizational activity." Rusta was the prime mover in the union organizing which led to the creation of the CUCTU on 1 May 1943; thereupon, he was elected secretary-general of the new organization and his newspaper *Zafar* was made its official organ. He was named to the Inspection Commission

of the Tudeh Party in 1945 and named to the Council of the WFTU in 1945 despite his brief imprisonment by the Tehran authorities to prevent his attending the WFTU meetings at Paris. Rusta's career was checked in April 1947, when he was arrested on charges of inciting revolution, embezzling one million rials in union funds, and committing other offenses. He remained in jail until November, when he was released on bail furnished by Dr. Keshavarz. He has since dropped from sight, although he was named to the Tudeh Central Committee in 1948, and it is reported that he went to Paris and then to the USSR. Rusta is described as hard-working, ruthless, and given to Marxist cliches. His wife is reputed to be a Soviet agent. On 18 May 1949 he was sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by the Tehran Military Court.

SHARMINI

Sharmini, who was the head of the Tudeh Youth Organization in October 1948, is known to be an engineer and to have been elected to the Central Committee in 1948. Other information is lacking, however, even his full name being unknown.

Ghazar SIMONIAN

Ghazar Simonian, who is reportedly a member of the key Secret Committee of the Tudeh Party, was born at Tehran about 1908 of an Armenian family. After studying in the American College of Tehran, he taught in the Soviet School at Tehran and also engaged in political activity which resulted in his spending some seven years in jail. He knows Armenian, Persian, Russian, French, German, and English. After joining the Tudeh Party (in 1942?) he ran unsuccessfully for the XIVth Majlis as representative of the southern Armenian communities of Iran, thereupon becoming a translator for the *Journal de Tehran* and a contributor to the Tudeh press. He was also active in the Central United Council of Trade Unions and is believed to have been a member of its Central Executive Committee. In 1948 he was employed by the Czech Legation at Tehran as Iranian advisor and chief translator.

~~SECRET~~

Ehsan (Dehgan) TABARI

Said to be the youngest of the Tudeh leaders, Tabari was a founding member of the party and was named to the Central Committee in 1944 and to the Temporary Executive Council in 1947; in 1948 he achieved the distinction of being made a member of the Secretariat. Tabari headed the stillborn Society of Tabarestan in 1946 and has served as editor of *Rahbar* and *Mardom*. He speaks Russian and has a wife who was employed by Tass in Tehran. Following the attack on the Shah in February 1949 Tabari disappeared. It was rumored that he was in hiding in the Soviet Embassy, Tehran. On 18 May he was

sentenced to death, *in absentia*, by the Tehran Military Court.

Dr. Mortaza YAZDI

Dr. Yazdi, a brilliant German-trained physician, born about 1898, who founded the Tehran orphanage, has been active in Tudeh circles ever since he joined the Erani group in the 1930's, having been named to the Inspection Committee (1944), to the Temporary Executive Council (1947), and to the Political Bureau (1948). In August 1946, as one of three Tudeh leaders given office by Qavam, he was briefly Minister of Health. Following the attack on the Shah in 1949 he was arrested and on 22 April was sentenced by the Tehran Military Court to five years in prison.

RECEIVED

1949 JUL 20 15 32

CIC/ORE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

1949 JUL 21 11 37

G/SI