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This review is published biweekly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Other elements of the CIA as well as other agencies of the US Intelligence Community are encouraged to submit articles for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor.
Terrorism Review

2 June 1988

Terrorist Threat to Toronto Economic Summit

The gathering of seven allied heads of government at the Toronto Economic Summit from 19 to 21 June will provide an opportunity for terrorist groups to attack Western leaders. Terrorist groups may also time attacks elsewhere against Western interests to coincide with the Summit because of the enhanced opportunity to gain the attention of the international media. Although there have been no documented, specific threats to the Summit or its participants, several groups or their state sponsors pose a threat:

- **Japanese Red Army.** The probability of a JRA-related terrorist incident in Toronto or elsewhere is high. JRA activists have participated in attacks coinciding with the last two Economic Summits and have demonstrated a capability to operate internationally, including in North America. The recent arrest in the United States of suspected JRA member Yu Kikumura, who had large shrapnel bombs, underscores the immediacy of the threat.

- **Libya.** The probability that Libya may attack the Summit is high. Any gathering that offers the opportunity to attack the United States, France, and Great Britain simultaneously in retaliation for the 1986 US airstrikes would attract Qaddafi’s attention. Since the Libyan presence in Canada is small—with no resident diplomats and fewer than 1,000 students—and Tripoli’s capabilities there are minimal, Qaddafi probably would employ another group, such as the JRA or the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), if he were to launch a terrorist attack against the Summit. In addition, use of a surrogate would provide Qaddafi with the layer of deniability that he has consistently sought when striking Western targets.

- **Palestinians.** The threat from Palestinian groups to the Summit is moderate. Palestinian organizations, including the ANO, are prepared to conduct terrorist operations against US and Israeli interests worldwide in retaliation for the assassinations of Abu Jihad, PLO leaders, including Arafat, continue publicly to accuse the United States of complicity in the killing. The ANO—the predominant Palestinian threat to Western interests—recently began a new wave of attacks against Western targets. Although the Summit would offer an appealing target, Palestinian factions have not conducted a terrorist operation in North America and may not have the capability to carry out an attack against the heavily guarded Summit. They probably will conduct retaliatory attacks elsewhere.
- **Iran and Iraq.** The threat from Iran and Iraq to the Summit is low.

Tehran, nevertheless, could increase unexpectedly as the Summit approaches, depending on developments in the Persian Gulf, where many of the Summit participants are engaged. Iran last year conducted surveillance and made contingency plans for attacks against the United States.

- **Sikhs.** The threat to the Summit from Sikh groups in Canada and to Summit

Seven interests in India is low. The threat is diminished largely owing to the recent crackdown on Sikhs in Canada and the deportation, or imminent deportation, of Sikhs charged with terrorist activities. Sikh community leaders probably would not want to worsen their already tarnished press image by supporting Sikh extremist activities there.
Failed Car Bomb Attack Against Israeli Embassy
On 11 May a powerful car bomb exploded in Nicosia, Cyprus, killing three and injuring 17. Cypriot police guards outside the Israeli Embassy had twice prevented the vehicle from parking outside the Embassy—the intended target.

The Abu Nidal organization (ANO) claimed responsibility for the operation in a telephone call to NBC in New York.

FLNC Escalates Level of Violence
The Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) appears to be expanding its targets and escalating the level of violence, as it promised last year. In the past it restricted attacks to non-Corsican French police, other Frenchmen, and Algerians. In April, however, Corsican police were the targets in six separate attacks, including a car bombing that injured five officers in a passing police van. This was the FLNC's first remote-controlled bomb attack and represents an increased level of sophistication and lethality. During March and April the group also set off 10 bombs in Marseille during early evening. In the past such bombs were set to explode late at night to avoid casualties. Members of the group also fired on several guards in March, killing one, and in April, blew up five houses, a car, and a restaurant. The latter attacks and the police van bomb demonstrated the FLNC's ability to carry out several major attacks within slightly more than 24 hours in many different parts of the island, including areas where the group has not been previously active.

Rise in Use of Vehicle Bombs
US personnel and facilities as well as local targets in El Salvador and Colombia are coming under a more serious threat from vehicle bombs. Since March the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has used vehicle bombs to attack businesses frequented by US personnel. Front members detonated car bombs at two restaurants in the Zona Rosa on 11 March and at the parking lot of a movie theater in Colonia Escalon on 19 March, injuring several people. The FMLN also detonated a vehicle bomb in front of a second movie theater on 26 April and left another, which police deactivated, outside a restaurant the following day.
Two incidents involving car bombs occurred during 1988 in Colombia. During February, members of the National Liberation Army used command-detonated car bombs to attack Occidental Petroleum's main office in Bogota and in an attempted bombing in Bucaramanga. Thirteen persons were injured during the attack on Occidental, but police were able to deactivate the device left in Bucaramanga. The devices used in both these assaults were sophisticated and powerful. Because manpower, equipment, and other resources of the Salvadoran and Colombian security forces are already overextended, the growing use and sophistication of vehicle bombs by terrorists greatly increases the threat to US personnel and facilities in those two countries.

South/East Asia

Japanese Red Army Faction Member Arrested
On 6 May, Tokyo police arrested Yasuhiro Shibata, one of eight surviving terrorists wanted for the hijacking of a Japanese airliner to North Korea in March 1970. He was charged with possession of a false passport and may face additional charges.

Shibata's affiliation with the JRA—Japan's parent organization—underlines the continued threat posed by Japanese terrorists, particularly to the Seoul Olympics. In addition, we are concerned with the possible proliferation of weapons to the Middle East.

Africa

Abu Nidal Organization Implicated in Attack
Sudanese authorities arrested five suspects—including the team's leader—in connection with the 15 May attacks on the British Sudan Club and the Acropole Hotel in Khartoum. The two incidents occurred about an hour apart, killing seven and injuring more than 20.

The two incidents reportedly were part of a coordinated operation.
The ANO probably carried out both attacks; the tactics and choice of targets are similar to previous operations. This operation—the group’s first in Sudan—and earlier attacks in South Asia suggest the group may have shifted its focus from West Europe, at least temporarily. Although no Libyan connection has been proved, Tripoli is now the ANO’s primary sponsor and clearly would endorse attacks on such targets.
South Korea: Terrorist Threats to the Seoul Olympics

P'yongyang's public threats against the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics and its sabotage of a South Korean airliner last November clearly point to North Korea as the greatest challenge to the security of the Games. Several other groups have the capability and perhaps the motivation to stage a terrorist incident in Seoul—including the Japanese Red Army, Palestinian groups, and terrorist organizations with ties to Iran. Seoul is taking extensive precautions to prevent violence and agent infiltrations, but international air links to South Korea remain vulnerable to sabotage and may be used for transportation by terrorists.

The Obvious Threat: North Korea

Violence by North Korea remains the highest security threat to the Games. In the mid-1960s the North executed a violent campaign against the South, and in the 1970s and early 1980s P'yongyang sponsored assassination attempts against South Korean leaders. In 1984 North Korea began a broad-gauged effort to open dialogue with the South, seeking to appear eager to alter the dangerous military standoff on the peninsula. Even so, P'yongyang continued to publicly warn of the dangers to the Olympics if its efforts to arrange a co-hosting deal with Seoul failed. In November 1987 the North moved from rhetoric to action when it sabotaged a Korea Air Lines jet over the Andaman Sea near Burma. A confession by the captured saboteur left no doubt of P'yongyang's responsibility and identified disrupting the Olympics as its motivation. More recently, P'yongyang issued public—though veiled—warnings to its allies not to participate in the Games, citing the potential threat to foreigners, which heightens our concern that North Korea may attempt additional violence.

Should the North choose this course, it will have several options for disrupting the Games by fostering an impression that Seoul is unsafe. More airliner sabotage would heighten concern over the safety of travel to Seoul. The North could infiltrate agents into South Korea by sea—or use its existing agent network—to carry out terrorist incidents around Seoul. Of it could raise tension by creating incidents along the Demilitarized Zone. The North might also facilitate attacks against Olympic targets by third-country terrorist groups.

The Threat From Third-Country Groups

Several international terrorist groups, either supported by the North or working on their own, have the capabilities and perhaps the motivation to disrupt the Summer Olympics. The arrest of the JRA's second-ranking member, Osamu Maruoka—in Japan last November suggest the Seoul Olympics is a JRA target.

JRA action against the Games may involve seizing hostages to effect the release of its imprisoned members. The group issued a communiqué shortly after Maruoka's arrest stating that it would retaliate for his seizure. In the past, the JRA has carried out terrorist attacks designed to secure the release of its imprisoned members, and Tokyo has met the JRA demands.

Palestinian Groups. Palestinian groups, which continue to use terrorists to press their case against Israel, also could pose a threat to the Olympics, as in Munich in 1972. Attacks by Palestinians outside Israel and the occupied territories have dropped over the past
North Korea's Campaign of Violence

During the mid-1960s, North Korea carried out a campaign of violence against the South. North Korean guerrilla forces, up to company-size in strength, deliberately sought to engage US and South Korean military forces inside the South. The attacks were well planned, swiftly executed, and designed to produce heavy casualties. The campaign came to a head in January 1968, when about 30 North Korean commandos made a bold but unsuccessful attempt to storm the Blue House—the presidential mansion in Seoul. In late 1968, a 120-man guerrilla force landed on the east coast of South Korea some 160 kilometers south of the DMZ. They tried to establish control over several villages and attempted to organize a popularly supported insurgency. The effort failed, and the entire force was eliminated as it attempted to return overland to North Korea. P'yongyang ended this policy of intimidation by the early 1970s, apparently because it had worked against the North's interests—far from stirring up domestic unrest, the North's violence had a unifying effect on the South Korean population. Less blatant forms of violence did not end, however, as the North has since made several attempts to assassinate South Korean presidents:

- At a cemetery near Seoul in 1970, a North Korean agent was killed when a bomb he was planting detonated accidentally. The detonation occurred shortly before President Park Chung Hee was scheduled to arrive for a ceremony.
- In 1974, another North Korean agent fired a pistol at President Park during an appearance at the National Theater in Seoul. The assassin's shots missed the president but killed his wife.
- In 1981, North Korean agents offered two Canadian criminals large sums of money to assassinate President Chun Doo Hwan when he made an official visit to the Philippines. The Canadians, however, abandoned with the North Korean cash advances.
- P'yongyang failed again in October 1983, when its agents tried to kill President Chun during a visit to Rangoon. Eighteen other senior South Korean officials died when the agents mistakenly triggered their radio-detoned bomb before Chun's arrival at a ceremony site.

year, but, when they have occurred, a growing number have been in Asia rather than "traditional" West European venues. We judge the most serious Palestinian threat to the Olympics would be from the Abu Nidal organization. From its inception, the group has demonstrated an ability to operate beyond the Middle East, having staged armed attacks and bombings in Karachi, Islamabad, New Delhi, and Bombay. US, Israeli, and moderate Arab interests probably would be the targets of any operations by Abu Nidal.

Iranian-Connected Groups:

A terrorist groups supported by Tehran could use the Games to conduct a bombing or hostage-taking operation against US, Iraqi, Saudi, and other Arab targets. Iranian-backed terrorist groups also could act as surrogates for North Korea.

Secret
Iran has contacts with the North Koreans operations. Tehran has an embassy in Seoul. Most apparently come to shop, but these travelers will be difficult to watch when Seoul is inundated with foreign dignitaries and visitors to the Games.

Seoul's Security Response
The South Koreans are taking extensive precautions to prevent violence during the Olympics.

Military and police counterterrorism units, explosive ordnance disposal teams, and bomb-detection dogs will be positioned in advance at Olympic-related locations throughout South Korea. Security will be tight at all hotels and Olympic sites. Seoul will augment military forces to counter any aggressive North Korean action along the DMZ or South Korea's coastlines.

South Korea is also focusing on preventing terrorist infiltrations via international airlines. Security in and around Kimpo International Airport in Seoul—where nearly all scheduled foreign flights to South Korea arrive—is excellent. Disembarking passengers are subject to extensive immigration and customs controls. Airport officials have tightened checks on passenger belongings, and ordinary items such as toothpaste and cosmetics are removed and examined. Sniffer dogs are used to check for explosives. This comprehensive program should make it difficult for terrorist groups to smuggle weapons or explosives into South Korea before or during the Olympics.

Olympic officials are also attempting to sensitize Korea Air Lines and other carriers with regular flights to Seoul to the need for thorough screening at points of departure and at stopovers; nonetheless, we believe this will be the weak link in the security effort. Although airports have machines capable of detecting weapons made of metal, devices that can discover explosives are still largely in the development stage, and many airports do not have sophisticated equipment, particularly those in the Third World. Detection of explosive devices depends on time-consuming hand searches of passengers and their baggage. Many commercial airlines are reluctant to use these measures because they slow flight departures.

Reverse Blank
A New Twist on the Sikh Terrorism Issue

Indian allegations of Pakistani support for Sikh militants is precipitating a downturn in Indo-Pakistani relations in the coming months and frustrating US efforts to foster cooperation between the two countries. New Delhi has revived accusations that Islamabad allows weapons—allegedly intended for the Afghan resistance—to reach Sikh militants in India.

Raising the Pakistani Connection
In early April, senior Indian officials revived allegations of Pakistani complicity in Sikh terrorism primarily, to rally support in Parliament and in the press for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s initiatives to address the Sikh problem. The allegations also help Gandhi deflect accusations by opposition politicians that his security crackdown in Punjab has failed.

Since early 1988, Sikh militants were allowed to purchase—and sometimes were given—increasingly lethal weapons in Pakistan. Pakistani border security guard allegedly provided cover fire for smugglers who were arrested while bringing weapons into India. Indian press accounts claim Sikhs have acquired US-made Stinger missiles and quote unnamed Indian officials as saying Sikh terrorists trained in the West in the use of high explosives have infiltrated Punjab and are now training local Sikhs.

Why Accuse Pakistan Now?
Gandhi’s need to explain the sharp rise in Sikh-related violence to his domestic critics is probably the reason for the latest round of accusations of Pakistani support for the Sikhs. The total of violent deaths in Punjab this year is approaching last year’s record of 1,200. In recent months, Sikh militants for the first time have used rocket-propelled grenades, more powerful explosives, and greater numbers of AK-47s.

New Delhi is also concerned that Sikh militants are moving their campaign of violence outside Punjab. During 1986-87, Sikhs assassinated Hindu Congress party officials in Haryana and Punjab as part of a dual strategy to incite communal violence between Hindus and Sikhs and to discredit Gandhi’s Congress party in Haryana’s State elections. New Delhi has established a special antiterrorist unit in Uttar Pradesh, where Sikhs have targeted Hindu politicians.

Over the last several weeks, New Delhi has implemented even tougher security measures and for the first time in over a year has made several political decisions to address the surge in killings and defuse domestic criticism of its Punjab policy. In April, it closed the Punjab and Kashmir sections of its border with Pakistan, announced plans to erect a fence in strategic areas along the frontier, and assigned additional Border Security forces to patrols. Security forces mounted the largest campaign since the 1984 Bluestar operation to clear militant camps from the Golden Temple. Parliament passed a constitutional amendment earlier this year that gives Gandhi the authority to suspend civil rights in Punjab. New Delhi also is upgrading the weapons of police and paramilitary personnel there. In an effort to show some conciliation, Gandhi released 45 Sikh detainees—including a nephew of Sant Bhindranwale, the charismatic leader killed in the Indian Army’s 1984 attack on the Sikh’s Golden Temple Shrine—in the hope that a Sikh leadership willing to renounce violence will emerge.

What Do We Know About Pakistani Involvement?
Pakistani support for the Sikhs is not a major source of instability in India.

June 1988
They recognize that Sikh militancy is more the result of alienation following the 1984 Army assault on the Golden Temple, anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi following Indira Gandhi’s assassination, and the ongoing security operations in Punjab. The bulk of the militants’ resources probably come from collections at Sikh temples in India, contributions from Sikh expatriates, bank robberies, and thefts of Army and paramilitary equipment, not from the Pakistanis. Even accepting at face value the confessions extracted from Sikhs captured by the security forces, Pakistani involvement appears limited.

New Delhi remains irritated that Islamabad permits Sikh-related activities in Pakistan on the grounds that the Sikhs are political dissidents rather than terrorists. Islamabad has taken no significant step to curtail small-scale arms transfers and training for Sikh militants in Pakistan; in any case, Pakistan would be hard pressed to curtail such activities. Islamabad publicly welcomes a limited number of Sikhs on yearly pilgrimages to shrines in Pakistan and, during 1984-85, allowed Sikhs fleeing the Indian Army to take refuge in Pakistan. They were subsequently sequestered in detention camps—where Pakistani security officials had an opportunity to establish contacts. New Delhi has given Islamabad a videotape allegedly showing Sikhs at a training camp in Pakistan and copies of statements—taken from Sikhs arrested as they illegally returned to India—on training sites and the names of officials who trained them. India and Pakistan recently agreed to mount joint police patrols along the Punjab border, but the agreement does not include provisions for hot pursuit.

Golden Temple Siege

Indian paramilitary forces ended a 10-day siege in Amritsar when Sikh militants occupying the Golden Temple surrendered on 18 May. Approximately 200 Sikhs surrendered and more than 30 suspected Sikh militants were killed after Indian forces took control of buildings in the temple compound. Press reports suggest several of the dead committed suicide or were shot trying to escape during the surrender. The siege began on 9 May, when militants inside the temple complex shot a senior Punjab police officer who was trying to prevent fortification of a passageway. Violence escalated as paramilitary forces moved to isolate and enter the complex. As the siege continued, local police made large-scale arrests of Sikh political leaders and clerics. Just before the shooting that sparked the siege, the Indian parliament had extended President’s Rule in the Punjab in an attempt to curtail steadily rising Sikh terrorism. Killings by Sikh extremists have risen to over 200 in the Punjab since 9 May. The recent upsurge in violence also has spread outside the Punjab into largely Hindu Haryana.

Although the government’s success in ending the siege without storming the temple’s holiest buildings may limit further alienation among Sikhs, we believe the assault by paramilitary forces will do little to cripple militant violence in the Punjab. Neither have curtailment of civil liberties and a greatly reinforced police presence controlled the violence. Detention of Sikh leaders and the mass surrenders of militants engaged in the siege failed to net the most important militant leaders, whose hit squads already have begun to operate outside the Punjab.
given the amount of weapons already in Pakistani arms bazaars, the Sikhs could easily acquire automatic weapons and ammunition even without Pakistani Government complicity.

Outlook
Both India and Pakistan are beginning to recast their diplomatic approaches to the superpowers during the initial weeks of the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Indians hope that by early next year they can enlist sufficient sympathy in Washington on the issues of Sikh terrorism and Pakistan's nuclear weapons program to weaken support for full funding of the US military assistance program for Pakistan.

The Sikh issue is likely to cast a pall over Indo-Pakistani relations in coming months that will preclude progress on other issues such as expanding trade, opening rail links, and cooperating to curtail cross-border narcotics trafficking. New Delhi's problems with the Sikhs are likely to intensify with their acquisition of more lethal weapons, and it almost certainly will continue to blame Islamabad. New Delhi's construction of a fence along segments of the border may raise tension with Islamabad, particularly if it is given publicity. Construction of the fence will not halt the movement of people and arms from Pakistan.

New Delhi will look for additional opportunities to blame Islamabad for terrorist problems in the region. Indian officials probably will try to trace more sophisticated weapons or more lethal explosives to Pakistani sources.

A sharp deterioration of the security situation in Punjab, particularly if Gandhi calls elections, may prompt New Delhi to call out regular Army troops to maintain law and order. Such a decision will raise concern in Islamabad, especially if many of the Indian troops are stationed along the border. If New Delhi moved Army units to augment paramilitary patrolling on the Indo-Pakistani border, Islamabad would probably make a reciprocal move. As long as the Indian armored divisions remained in garrison, however, conditions were less threatening to Pakistan than during military exercises in 1987, when the two sides came close to a conflict.
Attacks Against Saudi Interests: Inspired by Iran

We believe that Iran and its supporters are responsible for terrorist attacks against Saudi interests since August 1987. The incidents stem in part from Iranian resentment over the killing of at least 275 Iranian pilgrims during an Iranian-instigated riot in Mecca last year and from Saudi attempts to reduce Iranian attendance at this year’s Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj). These attacks to continue as the 1988 pilgrimage season begins.

Because few arrests have been made and no case has been solved, we cannot confirm that Iran has directed the recent anti-Saudi attacks. We believe, however, that Tehran began a harassment campaign shortly after the Mecca riot. Posibly as part of this campaign, Hizballah issued a statement not long after the Mecca incident in the name of Islamic Jihad, authenticated with a picture of US hostage Terry Anderson, warning the Saudi monarchy that it would not escape punishment for the deaths of Mecca. As in the 1987 incidents, the latest round of attacks has occurred during a period of deteriorating relations between Tehran and Riyadh.

Likely Perpetrators

Tehran has assets in Islamic fundamentalist populations worldwide on which it could draw—or who might be motivated—for terrorist operations. Iran maintains ties to fundamentalist Muslims in Western Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa; at least in the case of Shia in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf states, Iran has provided them with training. Last year, radical Shias staged attacks in Lebanon and Kuwait in which we suspect an Iranian hand. Tehran probably believes that using non-Iranians for terrorism provides access to strategic targets as well as the deniability needed to prevent retaliation. Iran presumably could also employ its own operatives in terrorism. In the case of attacks on Iranian dissidents, for example, Tehran apparently has used Iranians—either local expatriates or operatives brought in for specific hits—with a high degree

The Case for Iranian Involvement

Iran and its sympathizers are prime suspects. The Khomeini regime undoubtedly believes it has sufficient reason for conducting terrorism against Saudi Arabia. The Saudis support Iraq in the Persian Gulf war, and Tehran holds Riyadh responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Iranian pilgrims during the Mecca rioting.
of success. Finally, Iranian sympathizers may conduct terrorist attacks on their own initiative—with or without Tehran's foreknowledge—to demonstrate their support or for their own purposes. (---)

Fragmentary evidence suggests that the Abu Nidal organization (ANO) mounted some of the attacks against Saudi interests this spring:

Although the evidence of ANO involvement in these attacks—which may be the group's first against Saudi targets—is sketchy, such activity would be consistent with developments in the ANO-Iranian relationship.

Outlook: attacks on Saudi targets worldwide will be even more probable between now and the beginning of the Hajj in mid-July, especially now that Saudi Arabia has severed diplomatic relations with Iran. The bombing of a Saudi Airlines office in Kuwait on 27 April came one day after Riyadh announced it was severing diplomatic relations with Tehran. Iran will attempt to stage attacks in Saudi Arabia itself. The highly charged atmosphere regarding the Hajj, coupled with the break in Iranian-Saudi relations, suggests that terrorist attacks by Iran and its supporters will continue against Saudi Arabia. (---)
Chronology of Terrorism—1988

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists or the use of terrorist tactics. These events have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.

1 April

Spain: Police, acting in cooperation with the Italian Carabinieri, arrest two senior members of the Red Brigades (BR) in Barcelona. Although Italy seeks their extradition, the two are suspected of robberies in the Barcelona area and also may be subject to prosecution in Spain.

15 April

Chile: One bomb explodes at a high-tension tower near Rancagua, and two bombs explode on railroad tracks that link Santiago and Valparaiso, causing minor damage. No one claimed responsibility.

Italy: Italian appeals court reduces sentence of 15 years to eight for Palestinian convicted of the 1985 bazooka attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Rome.

16 April

Chile: Bomb causes minor damage to express train locomotive on the Concepcion-Santiago line. There were no claims of responsibility.

18 April

Argentina: Police arrest 10 suspected members of a rightwing terrorist group during raids in Buenos Aires. Authorities confiscated arms, explosives, ammunition, documents, and pamphlets at nine locations and also defused two bombs.

19 April

Zimbabwe: Armed dissidents kill one West German Catholic priest and wound another at the Engaideni mission near Plumtree in southern Matebeleland. A government security official was also killed during pursuit of the dissidents.

20 April

Italy: BR claims assassination of two policemen in village near Bologna. Police are investigating the claim.

28 April

Colombia: National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas bomb Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline in Arauca Department, causing damage at two unspecified locations.

2 May

Chile: Police arrest two members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and a member of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and charge them with bombing government offices, stores, and buses.
Colombia: Possible members of ELN bomb Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline in Arauca Department, causing substantial oil loss and interrupting pumping operations. b3

Mozambique: Police in Maputo arrest three Portuguese citizens believed to be members of a terrorist group. The three were caught with 200 kilograms of explosives in their possession. Officials claim the suspects infiltrated into the country last February. b3

3 May

Colombia: ELN guerrillas, posing as students, try to kidnap Panamanian honorary consul from consulate in Cartagena. The victim escaped from the kidnappers, who were later arrested by police. b3

Senegal: Bomb explodes in working-class district of Dakar, destroying a car belonging to a government employee. The previously unknown group "February 29 Resistance Movement" claimed responsibility for the attack and demanded the resignation of President Diouf and release of opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, who was arrested on 29 February during riots protesting results of the election the day before. b3

4 May

Argentina: Two bombs explode minutes apart at judge’s residence and lawyer’s office in Santa Fe, causing minor damage. No group has claimed responsibility. b3

Italy: Police arrest terrorist Dario Mariani, member of the Revolutionary Armed Nuclei, at French-Italian border. Mariani, sentenced to 22 years and one month imprisonment, escaped last November while under house arrest. b3

Senegal: Bomb explodes at hydraulic station in suburbs of Dakar, severing pipeline that carries drinking water to capital. The February 29 Resistance Movement claimed responsibility. b3

5 May

Chile: Member of FPFMR kills security official, wounds two others during shootout near an FPFMR safehouse in Vina del Mar. The terrorist was also injured in the incident. b3
Chile: Police in Puerto Montt detain seven fishermen after finding a large number of molotov cocktails in their boats. Officials also discovered instructions on how to make bombs.

Sudan: Two Italian engineers held hostage for six months by Eritrean rebels arrive in Khartoum. They were released in good condition at the Sudanese-Ethiopian border.

Argentina: Police discover arsenal in shantytown of Buenos Aires. Many weapons, military uniforms, and flags with the inscription "The Rico Way" were found in a shack in the Admiral Brown section.

Colombia: Members of ELN release television journalist with a videotape of hostages kidnapped the beginning of May. The guerrillas also sent a message demanding an end to government and military human rights abuses and the "dirty war."

Colombia: ELN guerrillas kidnap an employee of the Swedish Aid Organization, supported by the Swedish International Development Authority. The kidnappers have said they will use her to convey political messages to the Colombian Government.

Guadeloupe: Five explosions outside residences of French citizens and a US citizen cause minor damage in St. Francis. A vehicle belonging to a Frenchman may have been the target of the attack at the US citizen's residence. No group has claimed responsibility; similar bombings have been attributed to the Revolutionary Caribbean Alliance.

Peru: Unidentified individuals attack PetroPeru pipeline near Aramango, Amazonas Department, causing considerable oil loss. The pipeline is jointly owned by Occidental Petroleum.

Kuwait: Bomb slightly damages closed Avis car rental office. Kuwaiti Shia backed by Iran may have been responsible.

Peru: Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) terrorists bomb the National Society of Industries and the Exporters Association in Lima, causing some damage.
7-8 May
Turkey: Members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) kill 11 persons in Siirt Province with automatic weapons after making propaganda speeches. Three other villagers forced to flee with the terrorists were later found dead. Within 24 hours the PKK attacked Behemen hamlet, Mardin Province, and killed 11 persons from the same family. 

8 May
Italy: Two rudimentary explosive devices detonate near the Italian Optical Mechanical (OMI) Plant in Rome, causing minor damage. OMI is a subsidiary of the Agusta Firm and is involved in military production activities. No group has claimed responsibility.

South Africa: Police capture four suspected members of the African National Congress (ANC) at a farmhouse near Pretoria. Authorities also discovered the largest weapons cache ever found at one location, which included a SAM-7 missile.

9 May
Colombia: In Bogota, ELN releases 11 of 13 hostages kidnapped earlier in May. The remaining hostages are a German honorary consul and the president of the Santander Departmental Assembly in Bucaramanga.

France: Bomb explodes in a hostel for North African immigrant workers near Cannes, injuring four persons. The explosive, a boobytrapped liquid gas canister, caused extensive damage. Two previously unknown groups, the Movement against North African Invasion and Group Masada, have claimed responsibility.

10 May
Brazil: Three homemade bombs explode in bathrooms of military police headquarters in Joao Pessoa, Paraiba State. No organization has claimed responsibility.

11 May
Chile: Noise bomb explodes at intersection in La Serena. The device, consisting of 70 grams of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, was planted by unknown persons.

El Salvador: In San Salvador, unknown assailants kill military court judge traveling home in his vehicle. Prior to his death, Jorge Serrano had been adjudicating two controversial cases, the 1985 Zona Rosa murders and a kidnapping that was broken up in April 1986.
Peru: MRTA terrorists fire mortars at headquarters of the Interior Ministry in San Isidro, wounding two policemen.

Spain: Bomb attack on civil guard convoy wounds three in Placencia de las Armas, Guipuzcoa Province. ETA claimed responsibility.

Chile: Unknown persons bomb substation of electric company in the Quinta Normal neighborhood of Santiago, causing minor damage.

Lebanon: Car bomb detonates in Jabayl, injuring four persons. The Christian Lebanese Forces militia denied that the device—consisting of 100 kilograms of explosives—was intended for its leader, Samir Ja'ja', who was visiting a nearby barracks at the time.

Lebanon: Hizballah discovers four foreign hostages at Amal militia center in Beirut's Burj al-Barajjina section. The unidentified hostages were two Libyans, an Iraqi, and an Egyptian.

Peru: Probable members of Sendero Luminoso (SL) bomb and kill seven policemen riding on a bus to a prison guard duty. The assailants threw the explosive through a missing rear window. Approximately 33 other guards on the bus were wounded.

Italy: Two black powder bombs explode in parking lot of the Oto Melara plant, a military industrial facility in La Spezia. Another bomb planted at Rome's Military Tribunal building failed to explode. The Anarchist Movement claimed responsibility for both incidents.

Peru: SL terrorists detonate four bombs in Lima, plunging almost half the city into darkness. The attacks coincided with the 14-16 May visit of the Pope.

Italy: Bombs explode at four locations in Bolzano, a predominantly ethnic German town in northern Italy. The explosions caused considerable damage at the local offices of the Public Radio-Television Network; a branch of the Bank of Rome; a Fiat Dealership; and a new public housing-complex constructed mainly for Italians. Police suspect German-speaking secessionist extremists.