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**Trends in Soviet Policy Toward
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**Trends in Soviet Policy Toward
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE PROBLEM	1
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	3
I. THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH	3
II. INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY	5
Political Activities	5
Economic Relations	6
Other Policy Instruments	9
The Communist Movement	10
III. PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY	11
ANNEX A: BLOC TRADE AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE	13
ANNEX B: BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE	15
ANNEX C: AFRICAN STUDENTS TRAINED IN THE BLOC	16
ANNEX D: THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	17

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TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the general features of Soviet policy toward the newly independent states and the remaining colonial regimes south of the Sahara over the next two or three years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Soviet Union sees Africa as an area of great potential opportunity for the Bloc and the international Communist movement. From the Soviet viewpoint, Africa is undergoing the kind of social and economic changes which operate to the advantage of the power position of the USSR and, in the long run, will advance the prospects for actual Communist seizures of power. The Soviets anticipate that in the near future African and Western interests will come into new conflicts and that the Soviets can exploit these conflicts to undermine the Western position and improve their own position. (*Paras. 1-4*)

B. For the next several years, the Soviets will concentrate on establishing their own presence throughout Africa and expanding their base of operations through diplomatic, cultural, and economic contacts. Both Bloc economic assistance programs and trade are likely to grow gradually and involve more countries. * Military assistance has not bulked large in the Bloc's aid programs, but it is likely that new opportunities will arise. (*Paras. 10, 12-20, 29-31*)

C. There are formidable obstacles to the expansion of Bloc influence. The Soviets have not had the West's long experience

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in tropical Africa, and they are handicapped by a shortage of trained personnel. Moreover, the Soviets have begun to realize that they cannot rely on traditional Marxist analysis to cope with such African phenomena as race consciousness, tribalism, Pan-Africanism, and African "socialism." The gains made by the Bloc thus far have come on the initiative of strongly nationalist African regimes which wished to redress the imbalance created by Western influence, but these regimes have also shown concern to limit the Bloc presence. (*Paras. 5-7*)

D. The Communist movement in Africa south of the Sahara is embryonic; it is not likely to grow rapidly for some time. Nevertheless, the Soviets have already begun to create the basis for a Communist movement by training cadres, infiltrating the trade union movement, and encouraging the growth of radical nationalist parties and factions. In the meantime, Soviet strategy is to work through existing political organizations and movements, especially with a view to placing Communist adherents in positions of influence. By this means, the Communists may be able to capture power through penetration of the governmental or party apparatus, even in the absence of support in a mass party. (*Paras. 24-28*)

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DISCUSSION

1. The Soviets see Africa as an area of great potential opportunity. The revolution against the colonial system and the emergence of new nations appear to them to mark the accelerated decline of Western imperialism and to offer the USSR a number of natural allies against the West. From the Soviet viewpoint, Africa is undergoing the kind of social and economic changes which will operate to the advantage of the power position of the Soviet Union and, in the long run, will advance the prospects for actual Communist seizures of power.

2. Current Soviet policy towards the colonial and former colonial areas dates from the mid-1950's, when the Soviets drastically altered their previously hostile attitude toward national movements and leaders. At that time they decided to associate themselves with the independence movements, regardless of their political composition or leadership, and to accept the emerging states as a force in world politics. In pursuing relations with these states the Soviets have been willing to subordinate the objective of promoting local Communist movements. The result has been a policy of expediency and opportunism based on collaboration with existing regimes with little regard for their political orientation.

I. THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH

3. The Soviets believe that the achievement of political sovereignty in most of the continent presents them with some important advantages. Intense anticolonialism offers the Soviets an issue for making common cause with African leaders. The Soviets clearly believe that this general question can be kept in the forefront of international affairs, especially in the UN, and converted into a new drive against Western economic as well as political influence. The Soviets also view the emergence of neutralism in Africa as an asset, since nonalignment presumes a role for the Bloc as a counter to Western predominance. In general they expect that any enlargement of the Bloc's role will mean a further diminution of the Western position and a consequent gain for the Bloc in the broader East-West confrontation.

4. The Soviets also see certain favorable conditions in the internal situation in most African countries. With the achievement of independence, the African leaders face a new set of problems, primarily social and economic in nature, which will keep African politics in a state of ferment for many years. Over the long run, each new state will come under mounting pressure to demonstrate economic progress, and the Soviets believe that this situation will offer new chances for the Bloc to gain a foothold and influence the general course of developments. One way of doing this is to exploit the African respect for Soviet economic

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progress by pressing African States to adopt the Communist approach to problems of social and economic development.

5. The various advantages which the Soviets perceive in Africa are offset, however, by formidable obstacles. The Soviets lack several important assets. They have not had the West's long experience in tropical Africa. They are handicapped by a shortage of trained and experienced personnel able to move with assurance in the complex world of African politics. Even the question of anticolonialism, which has provided an entry point for the Bloc, also sets boundaries on the degree of influence that Africans are willing to grant the USSR. To a great extent Bloc gains in Africa have come on the initiative of African regimes which wished to redress the imbalance created by Western influence, but these same regimes have also shown concern to limit the Bloc presence.

6. Their experience in Africa thus far, especially in the Congo crisis of 1960, probably has also impressed the Soviets with certain factors which tend to narrow their freedom of action. First, the Congo demonstrated the limited assets which the Soviets can bring to bear in such a local contest. Second, the Soviets risk a clash with the interests of most African States when they seek the decisive role in situations of immediate concern to Africans, or when Moscow adopts policies which inject the East-West confrontation directly into African affairs. Finally, the Congo affair indicated that even when the Soviets align their policies with African regimes they still find themselves competing for leadership with other African States.

7. The Soviets also recognize that most African regimes are dominated by nationalist intelligentsia, and that this group is likely to remain in power for some time, regardless of shifts in local political alignments. As the recent experience in Guinea pointed up, even those African leaders who are sympathetic to the USSR draw a sharp distinction between the USSR as a benefactor and local Communists who threaten party or governmental control and authority. As in other underdeveloped areas of the world, the acceptance of a role for the USSR has not necessarily meant a simultaneous gain for Communist ideology. On the contrary, the majority of the African intelligentsia has rejected Soviet concepts as well as Western ideologies and has asserted a special African "socialism." This has proved difficult for the Soviets to cope with because, while they wish to encourage the preoccupation of African intellectuals with "socialism," they are bound to reject any forms of socialism which challenge Soviet claims to be the authoritative voice for "scientific socialism." For the present, however, the Soviets are refraining from repeated sharp criticism of "African socialism" and maintaining a fairly tolerant attitude, in order to avoid a conflict with

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African nationalism which might inhibit the more immediate Soviet objectives in the area.

II. INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY

Political Activities

8. The primary purpose of current Soviet political activity in Africa is to undermine and eventually dislodge Western influence. The primary means to this end is still the exploitation of African nationalism, which the Soviets believe will come into new and violent conflict with Western interests. The Soviets assume that the issues of colonialism and, more recently, "neocolonialism" are still a useful bridge between Soviet and African interests. The Soviets will attempt to expedite a conflict between Africa and the West by pressing for a vigorous "national liberation struggle" in the remaining colonial areas, and exploiting racial tensions in south and central Africa.

9. The USSR anticipates that both of these questions will cause grave problems for the West and that, as tensions and violence mount, the Bloc can score major gains in Africa, particularly in developing its relations with conservative as well as with radical African States. If African governments move to give larger material aid to independence movements in the Portuguese colonies or to native movements in central and southern Africa, the Soviets will probably seek to involve themselves in support of such efforts.

10. Moscow will continue to pay special attention to Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, whose radical and aggressively anti-Western policies offered the USSR its first footholds in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite setbacks to the Soviet position in these countries, the Soviets continue to regard them as essential factors in their further strategy. The Soviets have declared that these states are suitable candidates for the status of "national democracy," a formula contrived to permit the close association of certain states with the Bloc, even though these states are not under Communist control. By including them under this rubric, it is hoped that a doctrinal gap can be bridged and a form of government encouraged which would facilitate a nonviolent and gradual transformation of these countries into full Communist states. The unprecedented invitation of the governing parties in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali to attend the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Party underlines the hopes which the Soviets have of bringing the radical African States into the Communist fold by absorption.

11. The preference shown to the African "radicals" has not meant that the Soviets are willing to write off the remainder of the new African States. The USSR has been eager to enter into relations with almost all African countries and extend some economic and technical assistance.

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Recently the Soviets have concentrated on the Monrovia group, and their offers have met with some receptivity in Niger, Dahomey, Senegal, and Cameroon. The Soviets have also maintained relations with such conservative anti-Communist regimes as those in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Togo. In general, the Soviets have been concerned to establish their respectability and usefulness to these governments and to undermine, even if only to a small degree, the monopoly of Western influence.

*Economic Relations*¹

12. Economic aid and assistance is still the primary means of Soviet entry to Africa. The USSR recognizes that, because of the backward, subsistence nature of African economies, its own trade and aid will have little impact on the population at large. Soviet policy, however, is aimed at leadership elements who are preoccupied with developmental problems revolving around the need for capital investment funds and the difficulty in acquiring these funds from domestic savings. Moreover, the national movement in Africa has almost everywhere produced expectations for economic improvement as an immediate benefit of political independence. The Soviets are exploiting this situation with prompt offers of trade, aid, and technical assistance, while at the same time emphasizing the undesirability of relying on Western economic assistance alone. The Soviets are convinced that this approach will eventually break down barriers to Soviet penetration, because most African States, anxious to balance Western influence, are prepared to minimize the risks of involvement with Bloc economies.

13. Soviet Bloc trade with sub-Saharan African countries has increased significantly over the past three years, although it rose from very low levels and still represents only a small share of total African trade and an even smaller share of Bloc trade. In 1961 total trade between the areas amounted to \$140 million, compared with \$89 million in 1959. So far, trade with the Bloc has become a significant factor only in the trade of Guinea and Mali. About 40 percent of Guinea's trade went to the Bloc in 1960, and Mali sold about 85 percent of its principal crop, peanuts, to the Bloc in 1961, with a similar share planned for 1962. While Bloc exports to tropical Africa have increased steadily, African exports have tended to fluctuate primarily because of intermittent Bloc purchases of cocoa, copper, and cotton. The critical determinant of future trade levels is Bloc willingness to absorb larger quantities of peanuts, coffee, and cocoa in exchange for machinery, oil, and industrial materials. There may be some further increases, but any long continued steep rise in total Bloc-African trade seems unlikely.

¹ Statistics on Soviet Bloc economic credits, trade, and technical assistance are provided in Annex A.

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This does not preclude sharp statistical rises in the cases of countries which have not yet taken up active trade with the Bloc.

14. Generally Bloc aid commitments in Africa are characterized by a great number and variety of small-scale developmental projects mostly in light industry. There has been less opportunity, and apparently less inclination, to follow the Soviet practice in other areas of concentrating on large projects for maximum political impact. This kind of program is apparently in accordance with the interests of the recipients and designed with some reference to repayment possibilities. In deference to African desires for a rapid expansion of agricultural production and crop diversification, the Bloc assistance also includes agricultural machinery and equipment, specialists to advise on planning, survey resources, and train agricultural technicians. Among the more expensive projects which the Bloc has undertaken or proposed are in the development of transportation facilities; the Bloc is rebuilding a railroad in Guinea and Mali and plans to modernize ports in Guinea and Somalia.

15. In particular, the Bloc has made a determined effort to expand its activities in connection with civil air services. Soviet or Czech aircraft are operating on airlines in Guinea and Mali and some aircraft have been provided to Ghana. All three countries use Bloc flight and maintenance crews, which will be replaced by national crews now being trained by Bloc technicians. In addition, the Bloc has stepped up its efforts and achieved some success in obtaining overflight and landing rights for Bloc airlines. The agreement with Sudan this spring gives the Soviets a potential for extending their air service to east and central Africa. Both the support for local civil air and extension of its own services provide the Bloc with additional instruments for establishing its presence. Bloc air services into Africa also provide a rapid and relatively secure means of access for Bloc personnel and equipment which might be important in some future crisis situation.

16. Thus far the Bloc has extended about \$550 million in credits to sub-Saharan Africa, but only about \$86 million of this has been drawn. Two-thirds of the credits have been concentrated in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. In these three countries Bloc credits promise to provide over the next several years a significant portion of the imports required to carry out current domestic development programs. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, are the only other states which have accepted Bloc offers of credits and no significant progress has been made in their implementation. The Bloc has had some success in eroding the resistance to Bloc relations by the Afro-Malagasy Union countries. Economic relations have been established with Dahomey, Niger, Senegal, and Cameroon; the Bloc has made overtures for extending economic assistance to these states as well as tentative offers to Nigeria, and Tanganyika, and to Kenya when it becomes independent.

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17. By the end of June 1962, about 1,600 Soviet Bloc economic technicians were on assignment in the six African countries receiving significant Bloc economic aid. About two-thirds of them were in Guinea. Tropical Africa thus accounted for about 18 percent of the 9,000-odd Soviet Bloc technicians in all underdeveloped countries. Most of these technicians are employed on particular projects financed under Bloc lines of credit. In Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, however, many Soviet Bloc technicians are in positions where they may exert a more general influence on the course of economic development. For example, a Hungarian economist drew up the new five-year development plan for Ghana. Several East Germans are employed as advisers to the Ghana Trades Union Congress, which is the only labor organization and a major government-controlled organization in Ghana. In Guinea, about 60 Czech technicians are employed as advisers in the Ministries of Plans, Commerce, Rural Economy, and Finance. Approximately 75 Soviet, East German, and Czech technicians occupy important positions in the Ministry of Public Works. East German and Czech technicians are helping to establish an information service and a news agency in Mali. Bulgarian specialists serve as advisers in the Ministry of Public Works, Housing, and Energy Resources, and also are engaged in organizing the Mali State Trading Company.

18. Thus far military assistance has not bulked large in the Bloc's aid program in Africa, but it is likely that opportunities will arise in the future. The Bloc has provided most of the equipment for the 3,300 man force in Guinea and for a force of similar size in Mali. Some military talks have been conducted with the Sudan and Somalia. The Bloc has encouraged long-range training programs aimed at developing a continuing dependence on the USSR. The Soviets are probably aiming at a position of strong influence over the military establishments on the calculation that in some states these may be a decisive factor in internal politics. The most recent evidence of Soviet interest in using military assistance to promote their objectives is seen in the Congo, where informal suggestions have been made to the Congolese military that Soviet assistance would be provided if the Congolese Army wished to overcome the Katanga secession by military means.²

19. Although the Soviets have not reaped all the political dividends they probably expected, it does not seem likely that they will make major changes in their foreign economic program in Africa. Their effort to date is not large in comparison with Western programs or with Soviet programs for other areas. The Soviets evidently recognize that a foreign aid and assistance program in Africa is almost mandatory unless they are prepared to leave the field to the West. A reduction in their present modest program would risk isolating the USSR from the

² A table of military aid and training is at Annex B.

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main stream of African developments and, as the Soviets themselves have said, would mean a return of Western predominance.

20. It is likely that Soviet economic programs in Africa will gradually increase in volume and in the number of countries involved, but a rapid and substantial increase in the amounts of aid supplied does not seem likely. The Soviets, of course, will be prepared to exploit any special openings which develop, but the Bloc is incapable of replacing more than a fraction of Western trade, aid, and investment in Africa. In order to spread their influence as widely as possible in Africa, the Soviets will probably avoid large and costly projects in single countries and concentrate instead on a multiplicity of smaller projects in several countries.

Other Policy Instruments

21. The Bloc will supplement its growing diplomatic and economic effort with a wide variety of other means to penetrate Africa. The Bloc's cultural exchange program continues to expand, and in some cases where economic relations are not firmly established a cultural agreement has proved the initial entry point for the Bloc. As of mid-1962, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Satellites had signed 25 cultural pacts with nine African States, including new agreements with Dahomey, Senegal, and Cameroon. Although these agreements vary in scope, most of them provide for academic scholarships, cooperation in cultural and information fields, and exchanges in printed materials, radio materials, and films.

22. The Bloc's propaganda has also expanded rapidly. Despite a limited audience, Bloc broadcasts beamed exclusively to Africa increased by almost 20 percent in the first six months of 1962 and had risen 160 percent by June 1962 over the end of 1960. As of mid-1962, the Bloc broadcast 160 hours a week to Africa. Current Bloc activities also point to a considerable expansion of Communist materials for distribution. The Bloc has made its news services available in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Upper Volta, but only Ghana, Guinea, and Mali make substantial use of Soviet material.

23. The Bloc has taken advantage of the lack of adequate indigenous professional and technical personnel to offer training to African students.³ In recent years a total of about 2,000 students from sub-Saharan Africa have enrolled for study in either the USSR or the European Satellites. A majority of these students are under scholarship grants provided for by governmental agreements. Where such agreements do not exist, students have been recruited by Communist-supported local organizations. The Bloc program is by no means an unqualified success.

³A table of the number of students from African countries is provided in Annex C.

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There are growing numbers of disillusioned African students in Bloc countries. Nevertheless, as indicated by a recent conference in Belgrade of African students studying abroad, many have already been heavily indoctrinated.

*The Communist Movement*⁴

24. The Communist movement in Africa south of the Sahara is still embryonic. There are only a few organized Communist parties recognized by Moscow and some other parties which are Communist influenced and have received support from the USSR. But as an organized movement, Communist parties, either overt or covert, have had little influence on African developments, and nowhere do they constitute a significant political force.

25. The Soviets in recent years have done little to remedy this weakness. On the contrary, it seems likely that they have deliberately foregone an immediate effort to promote an African Communist movement. Two reasons have probably led to this approach. First, the local assets for promoting an effective organization are still lacking, and the development of such assets has been recognized in Moscow as a long-term project. Second, the development of a Soviet sponsored movement would be a definite handicap for Soviet policy operations in most African States. In Guinea, Mali, and Ghana, where all political opposition is suppressed, the emergence of an open Communist movement would not only be unsuccessful but would probably seriously undermine the position of the USSR in these countries.

26. This approach does not mean, however, that the Soviets are willing to abandon the political field in Africa. Indeed, it is Soviet doctrine that Communist parties must eventually emerge throughout the continent. But in the interim the Soviets will urge a continuation of a broad "national front" permitting local Communists to work through existing political organizations and movements. In this way the Soviets expect Communists to exert some immediate influence on government policies without running the risks of open conflicts.

27. The Soviets are preparing the groundwork for a more active Communist effort eventually. They are trying to use their student exchange program to recruit disciplined and trained cadres. In addition the Soviets are concentrating on trade unions as a target for penetration and infiltration. They have promoted extensive exchange visits with labor leaders, maintained contacts between local unions and the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and have established training schools in the Bloc for trade union "activists." Finally, the Soviets will encourage the growth of radical nationalist parties and fac-

⁴A detailed survey of the Communist movement is Annex D.

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tions throughout Africa, with the hope that the Communists can eventually gain dominant influence in them. In some African States, the Communists may be able to capture power through penetration of the governmental or party apparatus, even in the absence of any base of support in a mass party.

28. Chinese Communist criticisms of Soviet policy for lack of militancy and for excessive reliance on the USSR's diplomatic influence point to the extension of Sino-Soviet disagreements to Africa. Specific cases of Sino-Soviet rivalry have already evolved in Africa; in one instance, the illegal and terrorist Cameroon Peoples Union (UPC) in Cameroon came under Chinese influence as a result of disenchantment with moderate Soviet advice. In general, however, Communist China is too remote and its resources too limited to compete effectively with the USSR for influence over African governments or within radical African circles, although the militant Chinese line may in time attract some support from impatient cadres in the nascent Communist movement. The Soviets are also confronted by another Communist rival for influence in Africa, Yugoslavia, whose "rightwing" brand of "socialism" has some attraction in several countries. Thus as a Communist movement develops in sub-Saharan Africa it is likely to be heterogeneous, reflecting the strains and divisions in the Communist camp.

III. PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY

29. The Soviets probably consider their efforts to expand their presence and influence in Africa have yielded a net gain, despite setbacks and a slower pace than they may have anticipated a few years ago. They have passed from the role of passive observer to active participant in African affairs and to some extent they have helped to further the decline of Western influence. Nevertheless, there have been growing signs of Soviet impatience over the pace of African developments. Their initial successes in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali have not been followed by other breakthroughs, and even in these three states there is some indication of disenchantment with Soviet policy. The Soviets have begun to realize that they cannot rely on traditional Marxist analysis to cope with such African phenomena as race consciousness, tribalism, Pan-Africanism, and African "socialism." Current Soviet attitudes are, therefore, marked by some concern and uncertainty as to how to proceed.

30. This uncertainty also reflects the USSR's awareness that its prospects over the next few years depend greatly on new opportunities arising out of local developments. In east and central Africa the outlook for the Soviets may be fairly promising, particularly if they are able to establish a position of influence in Kenya and thus win a foothold in that part of Africa. The instability of the Congo situation also

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could provide a chance that the present government or a radical successor would turn to Moscow for support against Katanga. The active revolt in Angola may provide the Soviets an opportunity to involve themselves with arms aid, perhaps through other African States. In South Africa there is already a Communist apparatus which may over time be a factor of some importance as an instrument of Soviet policy.

31. The Soviets seem to recognize that African politics will be unsettled for many years to come and that a flexible Soviet response will be required. It is likely that the Soviets will be chary of excessively committing their resources or their prestige in an area which in their view does not at present offer opportunities for decisive gains in the East-West conflict. At present a more militant Communist line would jeopardize current positions with a highly doubtful promise of success. At the same time, the Soviets do not intend to isolate themselves from an important area. Thus the Soviets probably believe that they have little choice but to continue along the line of their present efforts, varying their tactics and gradually building up Communist strength with a view to exploiting more effectively the opportunities which seem bound to arise in Africa.

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ANNEX A

BLOC TRADE AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

TABLE 1
SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC CREDITS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
JULY 1959-JUNE 1962 *

RECIPIENT COUNTRY	EXTENSIONS			(MILLION US \$)	
	TOTAL SOVIET BLOC	USSR	EURO- PEAN SATEL- LITES	TOTAL SOVIET BLOC	PERCENT OF EX- TENSIONS
Ethiopia	113.6	101.8	11.8	5.6	4.9
Ghana	176.5	95.4	81.1	15.5	8.8
Guinea	98.1	71.1	27.0	45.6	46.5
Mali	78.0	55.4	22.6	19.2	24.6
Somali Republic	62.8	57.2	5.6	0	0
Sudan	25.0	25.0	0	0	0
TOTAL	554.0	405.9	148.1	85.9	15.5

* Not including Chinese Communist credits of \$19.6 million to Ghana, \$26.5 million to Guinea, and \$19.6 million to Mali.

TABLE 2
SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES * (JUNE 1962)

COUNTRY	TOTAL SOVIET BLOC ^b	EUROPEAN SATEL- LITES	
		USSR	
Ethiopia	30	30	0
Ghana	255	225	30
Guinea	1,035	495	540
Mali	160	100	60
Somali Republic	50	50	0
Sudan	25	25	0
TOTAL	1,555	925	630

* Minimum estimates of personnel present for a period of one month, or more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five. The total figure has fluctuated; for example, as of June 1961 there were about 1,400 technicians and in December 1961 about 1,800.

^b Does not include 45 technicians from Communist China in Guinea and 10 in Mali.

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TABLE 3
SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1959-1961 •

COUNTRY	TOTAL SOVIET BLOC EXPORTS			TOTAL SOVIET BLOC IMPORTS		
	1959	1960	1961	1959	1960	1961
Angola	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.6	2.2	0.8
Cameroon	1.4	1.0	1.2	5.7	0.5	0.4
Congo Republic	3.1	2.1	0.5	0.1	0.8	na
Ethiopia	1.8	4.3	3.8	0.4	0.5	1.3
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	1.2	2.0	na	13.9	16.5	na
Ghana	8.0	12.0	18.7	6.2	21.2	10.3
Guinea	9.0	21.2	25.2	5.2	12.5	14.3
Ivory Coast	na	0.1	na	5.6	2.9	3.0
Mali	na	na	6.3	na	na	na
Nigeria	5.2	11.7	15.2	4.0	8.4	2.9
Sudan	5.5	14.4	17.3	11.1	14.2	18.7
TOTAL	35.9	69.2	88.6	52.8	79.7	51.7

SUMMARY TOTALS

	1959	1960	1961
Bloc			
Exports	35.9	69.2	88.6
Imports	52.8	79.7	51.7
TOTAL	88.7	148.9	140.3
Soviet Bloc as a percent of the total trade of sub-Saharan African countries	1.9	3.2	3.0
Tropical Africa as a percent of Soviet Bloc trade with all under-developed countries	1.7	6.4	4.9

• Excluding countries where trade with the Bloc is minimal.

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ANNEX B

BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE (JUNE 1962)

MILITARY AID AGREEMENTS		
MILITARY PERSONNEL		
TRAINED IN THE BLOC		
COUNTRY	TOTAL	TOTAL
	(MILLION US \$)	
Ghana	75	0
Guinea	80 ^a	3
Mali	25	2
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>180 ^b</u>	<u>5</u>

^a Including 40 in Eastern European Satellites.

^b Since June 1962, 20 pilots and a number of mechanics have gone to the USSR from Somalia for military training.

MAJOR BLOC ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERED (SEPTEMBER 1955-JUNE 1962)

COUNTRY	SELF- PRO- PELLED ASSAULT	ARMORED PERSON- NEL CARRIERS	ARTIL- LERY PIECES	VEHICLES	TRANS- PORT AIR- CRAFT	SMALL ARMS
	GUNS					
Guinea	5	25	36	115	0	25,000 pieces
Mali	0	30	47	100	5	2,000-3,000 pieces
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0	7,000 cases

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ANNEX C

ACADEMIC STUDENTS FROM SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICAN COUNTRIES TRAINED IN THE
SOVIET BLOC * JANUARY 1956-
JUNE 1962

COUNTRY	TOTAL SOVIET BLOC ^b	USSR	EUROPEAN SATEL- LITES
Basutoland	30	15	15
Cameroon	105	90	15
Congo	25	10	15
Ethiopia	45	25	20
Ghana	270	180	90
Guinea	410	210	200
Kenya	160	60	100
Malagasy	5	0	5
Mali	165	55	110
Nigeria	95	70	25
Senegal	25	5	20
Sierra Leone	25	25	0
Somali Republic	245	145	100
Sudan	195	50	145
Togo	60	30	30
Uganda	75	10	65
Zanzibar	5	0	5
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1,940</u>	<u>980</u>	<u>960</u>

* Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

^b Not including about 170 students in Communist China.

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ANNEX D

THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. On a geographical basis, Soviet subversive assets in Africa form no consistent pattern, although certain salient points of strength emerge in each of the continent's major regions. Organized parties known to be recognized by Moscow exist only in the Sudan, the Republic of South Africa, and Basutoland. There are also a number of nominally Communist parties whose status and relations with Moscow are highly uncertain.

2. In *Sudan*, the small Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) exercises an influence greater than its numerical strength (1,500-2,000 members) would indicate, especially on students and in the trade unions. The SCP has recently abandoned fruitless efforts to form a "united front" of all the outlawed opposition parties and is devoting itself to independent subversive efforts.

3. In *East Africa*, the two main areas in which the Communists appear to have been laying the groundwork for subversive activity are Kenya and Zanzibar. The extremist faction of the Kenya-African National Union (KANU) headed by Oginga Odinga has been financed by Communist funds. Oginga and KANU leader Jomo Kenyatta are competing with each other for support of young Kikuyus by awarding them scholarships to study in the Bloc.

4. *Zanzibar*, despite its relatively small size and importance, may be the scene of a concerted effort at Communist infiltration. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), an Arab party which forms part of the governing coalition, has a substantial and apparently well-financed pro-Communist wing. There has also been Communist infiltration of the Zanzibar trade unions, and a continuing heavy influx of Communist propaganda. A Zanzibar Communist Party has recently been formed, and its establishment was noted by the Soviet press.

5. In *West Africa*, the main islands of potential Communist strength are the three radical states—Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—all of which have single-party, authoritarian political systems resembling those of the Communists in some particulars. A judgment on the relative degree of Communist penetration among the three poses some difficulties. Guinea has shown a wariness of the dangers of Communist subversion, especially since the November-December 1961 "teachers' plot." The solidarity of the ruling party's leadership behind Sekou Touré at that

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time would seem to indicate that the control of that party had not been greatly affected by the heavy Soviet influence during the preceding three years. The degree of Communist penetration in Mali has been perhaps the most difficult to judge, in part because public information media are under the control of pro-Communist elements, and have given most of the regime's pronouncements a marked pro-Communist slant. The extremist faction in the ruling *Union Soudanaise*—of which Justice Minister Madeira Keita is generally considered to be the leader—includes a number of fairly vocal pro-Soviet ministers and politbureau members. Although it is this element which seems to have the preponderance of power in the party, there are apparently conservative elements of some importance still in the regime.

6. In *Ghana*, Communist influence on both the government and the Convention People's Party (CPP) has grown considerably since 1960. Among the most significant fields in which penetration has occurred are: (a) the public information media, which follow a fairly consistent pro-Soviet line; (b) the trade unions, whose head, John K. Tettegah, has been one of the major pro-Soviet influences on the regime; (c) the CPP youth organization, the Ghana Young Pioneers (GYP); and (d) the ideological training program for younger CPP members, which appears in some respects to be little more than a series of clandestine Communist study groups. Leftwing elements in the CPP may have received an important check with the detention of Information Minister Tawia Adamafio and CPP General Secretary Henry Coffie-Crabbe for alleged involvement in a plot against Nkrumah's life, but the full implications of these developments are not clear. Communist influence in Ghana has also been significant because Ghanaian contacts with radical nationalist movements throughout Africa have given the Soviets access to areas with which direct contacts would otherwise have been difficult.

7. Throughout *French-speaking West Africa*, there is probably a residue of the old Communist apparatus which came into existence at the time of the alliance between the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (RDA) and the Communists in the late 1940's and which continued on in the trade unions after the RDA-Communist split in the early 1950's. The strength of these elements is difficult to gauge, but there is apparently a fairly steady recruitment of young people into radical movements, aided in large part by Communist-penetrated student organizations in France. It is not certain to what extent this has produced effective clandestine organizations. There has been no full-fledged Communist Party in the French-speaking areas. However, the outlawed *Parti Africain de l'Indepence* (PAI), now renamed the Senegalese Party, is active in exile and has recently been upgraded by the Bloc press to the status of a "Marxist-Leninist" Party.

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8. *Nigeria* may offer a substantial opportunity to the Communists over the next few years. A small Nigerian Communist Party, of uncertain status, has been formed. The most important channels for the exertion of Communist and pro-Communist influence have been the leftwing Independent United Labor Congress (IULC) and the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC), the latter a rallying point for the disaffected younger elements.

9. An exception to the situation in West Africa is *Cameroon*, where a crypto-Communist or Communist-infiltrated party—the evidence has never been clear—the UPC, began an armed rebellion against the government in 1955. The UPC split, and one faction has resumed legal activity. But the rebellion itself has never been stamped out, even though it is confined to a fairly restricted area. The Soviets themselves appear to have written off the UPC rebels, but the Communist Chinese, however, are still training some rebel cadres.

10. The death of Lumumba and the detention of Gizenga in the Congo eliminated the principal instruments of Communist influence. No Communist Party is known to exist. Should a radical government come to power in Leopoldville, however, it is probable that Communist organizations would reappear.

11. The Soviets may have their greatest potential opportunities in *Southern Africa*. In the Republic of South Africa the basic strategy of the clandestine but active Communist Party is to exploit the country's racial tensions in order to create a front of opposition parties under Communist leadership. The South African Communist Party (SACP) already substantially controls the African National Congress (one of the leading non-European political organizations) and a number of other front organizations. In *Basutoland*, the Communist Party of Lesotho was created in 1961 with the assistance of the SACP. The party has tried—so far unsuccessfully—to win control of the country's leading nationalist organization, the Basutoland People's Congress.

12. The main Communist effort in the *Portuguese* areas has been in Angola. The Popular Movement for Angolan Liberation (MPLA), an Angolan nationalist organization, appears to be heavily penetrated by Communist or pro-Communist elements. The MPLA's main handicap has been its lack of participation in the Angolan rebellion, which has so far been dominated by the non-Communist Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA), headed by Holden Roberto. Because of this lack of any popular base in Angola, the MPLA's objective, at least until recently, has been to bring about a merger or some other form of unification between itself and the UPA. This move has been supported by many non-Communist African leaders. There have recently been reports that the MPLA has redoubled its efforts to put its own forces in the field in Angola. No Communist activity of this scale has ap-

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peared in the Mozambique nationalist movement, but some Communist contacts apparently have been made with the movement formerly known as Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO), a faction of which refused to take part in the Mozambique Liberation Front formed in the summer of 1962. In Portuguese Guinea, Amilcar Cabral, head of the leading nationalist party, the African Independence Party for Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), has long maintained close relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, which supplies him with most of his finances and arms.

13. *Malagasy Republic* presents a somewhat confusing picture of Communist activity. An official Malagasy Communist Party (PCM), whose status in the international movement is not clear, may be covertly run by the Malagasy Government. The real center of Communist activity appears to be an opposition party, the Party of the Independence Congress (AKFM), which has been variously described as a Communist-infiltrated party or a crypto-Communist Party.

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AFRICA ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS 1 November 1962

Africa
11,500,000 Square Miles

United States
excluding Alaska and Hawaii
3,022,000 Square Miles



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