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The Cyprus Dispute

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THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

THE PROBLEM

To examine possible lines of settlement of the Cyprus dispute, and their implications for the parties involved.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The present drift toward a *de facto* Greek Cypriot state cannot go much further without provoking a more serious military confrontation with the Turkish Cypriots. An independent Cyprus has come to pose the dangers of provoking an invasion by Turkey to prevent the island from falling wholly under Greek Cypriot sway or of becoming heavily Communist-influenced, and these considerations are becoming of increasing concern to the Western countries most intimately involved.

B. Any early settlement based on the hope of cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is virtually precluded by their mutual hostility. Two remaining possibilities are enosis (union with Greece) and double enosis (division of the island between Greece and Turkey). Most Greek Cypriots favor the former, but all would be strongly opposed to the latter. Whatever Makarios' private view, he would find it difficult openly to oppose enosis. Either enosis or double enosis would make continuance of UK bases and US facilities likely. Both solutions would be opposed by the USSR and the UAR, which dislike the maintenance of Western power positions in the Levant.

C. To force a settlement and to make it work would require the support of Athens, which strongly favors enosis, and of Ankara, which advocates the double enosis solution. It is possible that both governments could accept a combination of the two approaches: i.e., a Cyprus united to Greece, but containing an area under some sort of Turkish administration. But it would
be a tricky business, since both governments have limited freedom of maneuver: Ankara because of military and political pressures on Inonu’s minority government, Athens because for domestic political reasons Papandreou is reluctant to exercise leadership.

D. An agreed settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would result at least for a time in damage to US relations with Greece, or Turkey, or both. Failing a settlement, we believe that Turkey would be moved to intervene to protect the Turkish community. In this case, Greece would be prepared to send additional forces to Cyprus. In the tension and confusion, armed clashes would be likely, but both sides would be reluctant to expand hostilities.
DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTE

1. Despite a long history of Greek-Turkish animosity, dating from the Greek struggle for independence from Turkey during the nineteenth century, the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus, which came under British control in 1878, lived together for many years without serious strife. Then in the 1950’s, violent agitation by the Greek community for enosis (union with Greece) directly involved Greece and Turkey with their communities on the island. The resulting disorders were finally ended by the London-Zurich Accords, which established an independent Cyprus based on the concept of administrative separation of the two communities without geographic partition. To secure the agreement of all parties it was necessary to include a Treaty of Guarantee which gave Greece, Turkey, and the UK the right to intervene jointly or individually in the internal affairs of the island should this be deemed necessary to uphold the agreements.

2. Lack of mutual confidence prevented the two communities from cooperating in running the government. The Greek majority (80 percent of the population) was determined to get rid of the constitutional provisions which gave the Turkish minority a veto power in matters of foreign affairs, defense and key domestic issues. For their part, the Turks clung rigidly to the constitutional safeguards as their best protection against the Greek majority. In late 1963, President Makarios presented 13 amendments to the constitution which would have created a unitary state under majority rule. Turkey quickly rejected these proposals. In this tense atmosphere, a minor incident sparked violence which rapidly engulfed the island. The more numerous and better organized Greek communal forces quickly seized the initiative and isolated the Turkish community. The British peace-keeping force, which went into operation in January 1964 with the consent of the other Guarantor Powers and both Cypriot communities, incurred the animosity of both communities and was unable to prevent new violence. The activation of a UN peace-keeping force in March 1964 has brought about a gradual reduction in violence, though both sides are dissatisfied with the situation. Moreover, the continued receipt of arms by both communities has turned the island into an armed camp, and hatred and bitterness have reached a high level.

II. THE FORCES AT WORK

The Greek Community and Athens

3. Makarios is clearly the paramount figure on the island. He is a shrewd bargainer and a clever political manipulator. He appears to
enjoy his position as head of an independent state. We are not certain
of his private view of the enosis issue, though it is a popular cause among
the Greek Cypriots and he cannot openly oppose it. Though he gen-
erally makes the final decisions in Greek communal affairs, his control
is far from complete. There is a group of secondary leaders who have
sharp personal differences and sometimes disagree on issues and tactics,
and clashes between their followers cannot be ruled out. Next to
Makarios in influence is probably General George Grivas, the former
leader of EOKA, the militant Greek Cypriot organization that fought
for enosis in the 1950's. Grivas has thus far not challenged Makarios'
political primacy, but he is a fervent anti-Communist and advocate of
enosis. The growing sentiment for enosis in Cyprus tends to increase
Grivas’ prestige and influence. He has many supporters on the island,
including Minister of Interior Georkatzis and the newly appointed com-
mander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, an organization designed
to supersede the various autonomous armed bands.

4. Since the outbreak of violence in December 1963, the already
significant influence of Communist-oriented groups in the Greek com-
community has increased. Makarios apparently does not regard the Com-
munists as an immediate threat, and has taken no action against them.
The Communist Party (AKEL), which probably influences between one-
fourth to one-third of the Greek Cypriots, has strongly supported Mak-
arios. Dr. Vasos Lyssarides, who is Makarios' personal physician and
confidant, has emerged as a leader of a Communist-influenced guerrilla
band and as an important go-between with the Soviet Ambassador.

5. At the moment, Makarios is something of an embarrassment for
Athens. On occasion the Greek Government has even attempted—
without conspicuous success—to hold Makarios in check, particularly
in discouraging his entanglements with the Bloc. However, public
opinion in Greece so strongly supports the aspirations of the Greek com-
nunity that it has been difficult for any Greek government openly to
oppose Makarios. The Greek Government clearly favors union with
Greece as the ultimate solution, and regards a unitary independent
Cyprus as merely an intermediate stage. However, Athens feels in-
hhibited to some extent in voicing these views by a number of consider-
ations. In fact, the Greek Government has publicly handled the Cyprus
problem in relatively low key, though it has at least tacitly condoned
clandestine arms shipments and has allowed the Greek military con-
tingent to aid the Greek Cypriots.

The Turkish Community and Ankara

6. The Turkish communal leadership is neither strong nor self-
sufficient. Its most able member, Rauf Denktash, has been prevented
by Makarios from returning to the island since January 1964. Both he
and Vice President Kuchuk, the community's nominal leader, have been
almost entirely subservient to Ankara. Indeed, the Turkish community has little scope for independent action since its weakness vis-a-vis the Greek Cypriots forces it to rely directly on Turkish military and diplomatic support for its very existence. Thus Turkey, not the Turkish community on Cyprus, calls the tune.

7. For some time the Turks have been supplying men and material to the beleaguered community. Some regroupment of the Turkish community has taken place, in part for reasons of security, in part to create a basis for partition or federation. This regroupment, though far from complete, has made it possible for the Turkish Cypriot Resistance Organization and the Turkish army contingent stationed on Cyprus to provide a measure of protection. This protection and the threat of Turkish intervention have kept hope alive among the Turkish Cypriots and stiffened their determination to resist. Nevertheless, they regard their future with apprehension bordering on desperation.

Other Outside Forces

8. Britain's obligations as a Guarantor Power and its concern for its sovereign base areas on the island have kept the UK closely involved in the dispute. As might be expected, this involvement has resulted in charges by each community that the British are unduly favoring the other and has led to increasing opposition by the Greek Cypriots to the British sovereign bases. The British role has also periodically caused disappointment and anger in Athens and Ankara. Despite recent reductions, the UK contingent is still the largest in the peace-keeping force. Moreover, London has just indicated a willingness to make an additional financial contribution to the support of the operation.

9. Both the UN Secretary General and the powers concerned recognize that the peace-keeping force will be needed on Cyprus for more than the three months authorized. The UN force has had difficulty in establishing order, and the present tenuous equilibrium could be upset at any time. UN mediator Tuomioja has been unable to devise any proposals for a realistic settlement. Though he seems personally inclined toward enosis, he apparently feels it inappropriate for him to recommend the dissolution of a UN state. If the recommendations of the UN mediator are not satisfactory to Makarios, the latter may take the Cyprus controversy to the UN General Assembly where he obviously counts on diplomatic support from the Soviet Bloc and the nonaligned nations.

10. The possibility of Greek-Turkish clashes over Cyprus has aroused concern in NATO, but Secretary General Stikker has so far been unable to move the two sides closer together. NATO intercession is not likely to prove effective in promoting a settlement, though the psychological effect of NATO membership probably tends to inhibit an outbreak of Greek-Turkish hostilities or limit any clash that might occur.
11. The Soviets see clear opportunities as well as dangers in the dispute. Its prolongation obviously weakens NATO. Moscow also desires the elimination of British sovereign bases on Cyprus, in order to undermine the ability of the UK to support its interests in the Near and Middle East. Soviet prestige on Cyprus has risen as a result of Moscow’s support of Makarios. The emergence of an independent unitary Greek Cypriot state would increase the prospects for greater Soviet influence on the island. However, the Soviets seem concerned lest their involvement give impetus to demands for enosis, which would lead to restrictions on the Communists and a reduced role for Moscow. They are also worried about intervention by Turkey, which would create a major crisis and jeopardize the continued independence of Cyprus. Hence, though they feel bound to support Makarios as the leader of a “national liberation struggle,” they recognize the disadvantages of any serious involvement. Makarios has sought to obtain stronger Soviet support for the Greek Cypriot cause and has given considerable publicity to his request for heavy arms. It seems likely that the Soviets will attempt to stall off any decision to supply heavy arms, though they may furnish small arms, ammunition, and the like—perhaps through the UAR, from which some arms have already reached Makarios. The USSR has been at some pains to limit the damage to its relations with Turkey.

12. The UAR seeks the elimination of British bases, which it regards as primarily designed to exert military pressure on the Arabs. The UAR also would not like to see the absorption of a formerly nonaligned state into a NATO member state. Thus it supports an independent Cyprus under Makarios. To this end the UAR has given small arms and probably will continue to do so.

III. THE OUTLOOK FOR A SETTLEMENT

13. During the past six months, the situation on Cyprus has moved a considerable distance toward the de facto establishment of a Greek Cypriot state. The Greek Cypriots are in complete control of the government, and seem determined to push ahead and achieve full control of the island. The Turkish Cypriots are constantly threatened with shortages of food, medicine, and water. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots have substantially improved their defensive position by virtue of their regroupment and the arms they have received from Turkey. We believe that Ankara would intervene militarily in the island rather than see the Turkish Cypriot position eroded away or extinguished.

14. At the same time, both Athens and Ankara are coming to the conclusion that a fully independent Cyprus is not in their interest, or in the interest of the West in general. If Makarios achieved such status, he might move to eliminate the British bases, and he would have no compunctions about accepting Soviet support for the effort. The US special facilities on the island would also be in serious danger. More-
over, Makarios apparently sees little danger in cooperating with the Cypriot Communists, who are strong and well organized. There is a significant chance that an independent Cyprus would gradually fall under increasing Communist influence and perhaps in time under Communist control.

15. Any early settlement based on the hope of future cooperation between the Greek and Turkish communities is virtually precluded by the bitterness and hostility that has grown up between them. This would appear to rule out implementation of the London-Zurich Accords. Nor would the Greek Cypriots accept a "federation" which recognized and protected the rights of the Turkish Cypriots as a community rather than as individual citizens in a Greek Cypriot controlled state. "Partition"—the establishment of two independent states on the island—would be strongly opposed by the Greek community and, even if it could be brought about, would probably involve continuing hostilities between the two entities.

16. Present circumstances have brought two more fundamental approaches under consideration. One is enosis (union with Greece). The other is some formula under which the island would be divided between Greece and Turkey; this has come to be known as double enosis.

**Double Enosis**

17. Double enosis would be the more acceptable to the Turks. It probably would permit continuance of the British base areas, though perhaps not in their present sovereign status. It would almost certainly permit the US facilities to remain. However, even if agreement were reached on the principle of double enosis, there would be extreme haggling over how the island was to be divided. While extensive population shifts would be necessary, we regard these as less difficult to arrange than to gain Greek Cypriot acceptance of such a division. There would be a serious danger that the Greek Cypriots would launch an all-out attack on the areas held by the Turkish community if they thought it necessary to prevent such a settlement. Further, it is unlikely that any Greek government could accept double enosis and remain in office. There might be considerable opposition in the UN, with the USSR taking a leading part.

18. Support for double enosis by the US would have a severe impact on US-Greek relations. Thus far US relations with Greece have not suffered any extensive damage, as the US has not pressed the Greek Government toward any particular solution. However, the continuing threat of Turkish intervention is eroding the Greeks' confidence in the US, which they believe has the power to prevent any Turkish move. Moreover, as proposals for solution emerge, the Greeks will be quick to resent and will strongly resist US efforts to encourage concessions.
Enosis

19. The Turks have so far refused to consider enosis as a solution. They would view the possession of Cyprus by Greece as contrary to their own strategic interests, though less threatening than if the island were in the hands of a Communist-influenced Greek Cypriot Government. They are also moved by considerations of prestige and by concern for the welfare of the Turkish community. Those Turkish Cypriots who wished to leave the island would have to be compensated, and such compensation might be more acceptable to Ankara if it came, at least apparently, from the Greeks. Moreover, in view of its distrust of the Greek Cypriot leadership, Ankara would probably insist that Cyprus not retain any significant autonomy, but be run directly from Athens like other Greek provinces. More important, any settlement probably would have to provide some sort of continuing Turkish presence on the island. A settlement including a Turkish base or an enclave under Turkish sovereignty might come to be regarded by Turkey as acceptable, since it could provide some degree of protection for Turkish strategic interests and an element of security—at least psychological—to the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks have thus far shown little interest in territorial concessions in the Greek islands and only slightly more in Thrace. What they want is a presence on Cyprus itself.

20. The Turkish Government has only limited flexibility on the Cyprus issue. Inonu himself is aware of the perils involved, concerned for Turkey's ties with the West (especially the US), and desirous of attaining a negotiated solution. But he feels that the political and military supporters on whom his minority government depends, as well as popular opinion, demand the protection of Turkish national prestige and Turkish interests on Cyprus, so that he must threaten unilateral intervention when these are in danger. The repeated postponements of military moves against Cyprus have created an atmosphere of disappointment and frustration which has already threatened to disrupt the delicate equilibrium of the Turkish political scene. Indeed, if another intervention crisis should arise—as is likely unless some tangible progress toward a solution is made in the near future—Inonu might be faced with the choice of acquiescing in a military move or being pushed aside. He would have extreme difficulty in persuading parliament and the military to accept enosis—even coupled with territorial or base concessions.

21. The leverage which the US or other Western powers can exert on Turkey is limited. Turkish threats of unilateral intervention have already produced a series of confrontations with the US, each growing in intensity and each progressively embittering relations. The mutual confidence which previously underlay Turkish-American relations has been shaken. There would be a danger that if the US pressed hard for enosis, the Turks would feel betrayed and decide to intervene mil-
tarily. If they reached such a decision, there is a good chance they would not consult or even inform us. If they did not intervene, they would make a major effort—perhaps by putting pressure on the US presence in Turkey—to convince the US that they should have a presence on Cyprus of a scope and nature sufficient to satisfy their political needs.

22. Athens is coming to recognize that no Turkish Government could accept enosis without a quid pro quo of some significance. Athens would almost certainly be willing to provide some compensation for resettlement of Turkish Cypriots; it would almost certainly not be ready to cede any territory already Greek. Greece probably would agree to the presence of Turkish forces on a NATO base on the island. Whether Athens would concede the degree of "Turkishness" that would be required to make the proposition acceptable to Ankara would depend upon a complex of factors, among which would be Papandreou's attitude, Athens' reading of Ankara's intervention intentions, and Western pressure on Greece.

23. Acceptance of an enclave under Turkish administration would be difficult for Greek Prime Minister Papandreou. While his parliamentary majority depends on his ability to maintain discipline among the various elements of the governing Center Union, we believe he could win approval for such a concession, if he could be convinced that it was essential. We believe that he is limited in his freedom of maneuver more by his personal convictions and disinclination to exercise leadership than by forces outside his control. If union of the whole island with Greece were involved, Papandreou could probably count on strong support from Greek Cypriot public opinion to overcome whatever resistance Makarios might offer, but such support might not be forthcoming for a settlement involving a Turkish presence on the island.

*Likely Developments*

24. Settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would result, at least for some time, in damage to US relations with Greece, or Turkey, or both. Athens has, at least until recently, seen the tide as flowing in the direction of enosis and is not yet prepared to make many concessions in the direction of double enosis, which the Turks would probably regard as their minimum requirement. It is likely that a combination of elements from both approaches holds out the best chance of an agreed solution—particularly if the use of provocative labels can be avoided.

25. It may be that the parties involved will prove so intractable as to prevent any agreement. In this case, the plight of the Turkish Cypriots would gradually worsen, though a continued UN presence might afford them some protection. But the possibility of acute crisis without warning would persist. In the event of a massacre of Turkish Cypriots, a direct attack on the Turkish contingent, or an immediate threat of
sizable Soviet involvement on the island, the Turks would almost certainly feel the need to take military action. Moreover, as time passes without any improvement in the prospects for success, desperation may overtake elements in the Turkish community and cause them to precipitate a major crisis. Pressure to intervene is also building up in the Turkish armed forces and in various levels of the government. Thus Turkish intervention will remain a constant danger.

26. If the Turks intervened, they would justify their action as designed merely for the protection of the Turkish community. But Athens would probably feel compelled to respond by sending additional forces to Cyprus. Though both sides would be reluctant to expand hostilities, the tension and confusion would be likely to result in armed clashes. If, at this point, Greece and Turkey found themselves on the brink of war, their leaders might finally be willing to make the compromises required for a settlement. However, a settlement reached under these conditions would not necessarily be a final solution; it could just as well be another patchwork arrangement.
MILITARY ANNEX

1. Organized military forces on the island currently number approximately 6,000 UN troops, 12,000 UK forces not assigned to the UN, 950 Greek Army personnel, and 650 Turkish Army personnel. President Makarios is organizing a 25,000-30,000 man Special Security Force or National Guard. Probably at least some of these guardsmen will be conscripted from the estimated 35,000 Greek Cypriot irregulars reported to be on the island. The National Guard is designed to absorb some of the so-called private armies, some with as many as 600 men, which are part of the current Greek Cypriot irregular forces. The Turkish Cypriots have a smaller irregular force, estimated at 10,000.

2. For the most part these personnel are well supplied with small arms. Both sides have mortars, rocket launchers, hand grenades and the like. The Greek Cypriots have affixed armor plate protection to several tractor vehicles and may also have acquired three British 12 ton tanks. Additionally, the Greek Cypriots are seeking to acquire artillery, at least four light aircraft and two helicopters, 12 jet fighters, and nine fast patrol boats. Makarios has stated that he intends to acquire heavy weapons such as aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, presumably from the USSR. Greece has provided officers to assist in organizing and training the Greek Cypriot forces, as well as weapons for those forces. Turkey is training personnel and smuggling them and weapons to the Turkish Cypriots on the island. Thus, each side is in the process of supplying, organizing, and training its forces. The adversaries are temporarily separated from each other by the UN forces.

3. The current status differs materially from the situation on 21 December 1963 when the disorders erupted. At that time it was reported that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots each had about 3,000 armed irregulars, although each side probably had many more weapons hidden away. While the size and composition of the Greek and Turkish Army contingents on Cyprus are regulated by treaty and thus were the same in December as they are today, there had not yet occurred those murders and other incidents which have hardened the feelings of the contingents against each other. It was in the face of the foregoing, that in early January the British moved 2,500 troops to enforce the truce which had been agreed to by both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. During the three months that the British singlehandedly enforced the peace, there was a steady buildup in the numbers and types of weapons brought in either "legally" to the Greek Cypriot-controlled forces or surreptitiously to the Turkish Cypriot irregulars. Lacking terms of reference to curtail arms shipments, the UN forces have noted an intensification
of the arms buildup since the arrival of the UN on the island about three months ago.

4. This relative quiet is in marked contrast to the period almost ten years ago when EOKA Greek Cypriot terrorism to attain ENOSIS (union with Greece) resulted in a British pacification campaign requiring 20,000 to 25,000 troops. The EOKA, while relatively few in number, enlisted the support of a sympathetic or terrorized Greek Cypriot population and made good use of the island's terrain, which is suited for guerrilla activity, inflicting about 250 casualties on the British forces during a four year period. Although the British exiled Makarios and engaged in a relentless and ruthless campaign, the disorders ended, as they had started, because of political factors.

5. Both Greece and Turkey have the capability to alter the present balance of military power on the island. Turkey's military establishment is considerably superior to that of Greece. The Turkish armed forces outnumber those of Greece and are better equipped. Moreover, in any military action concentrated on the Cyprus area, Ankara's advantage would be enhanced by its proximity to the island. Both forces are deficient in logistic support, communications equipment, and combat vehicles. In particular, deficiencies in ammunition and petroleum would limit operations in any protracted conflict.

6. Turkey's advantage is most pronounced in its ground forces. The Turkish army of 350,000 outnumbers the Greek by more than three to one, and 15 days after mobilization of reserves its effective combat strength by NATO standards would be 500,000, nearly double that of Greece. Both armies are concentrated along the borders of their Communist neighbors to the north. Turkey's 39th Division, however, which numbers nearly 12,000 men and has an excellent combat capability, is based in the Iskenderun area. While it is oriented primarily toward the Syrian border, it is the parent unit of the 650-man contingent on Cyprus. It has conducted extensive training maneuvers recently and is generally kept ready to intervene in Cyprus on short notice. Greece has also increased its level of readiness, moving several hundred men to Crete and maintaining other forces on alert.

7. Neither country has any highly developed capability in amphibious warfare or in airborne operations, though both are increasing their capability through maneuvers. Greece, despite its generally superior navy and greater seaborne support capability for extended operations, would be extremely vulnerable in mounting any action on Cyprus, by reason of long, exposed supply lines. Both countries have ample civilian carriers for any major troop movement, but Turkey's proximity to Cyprus would give it a substantial advantage in any deployment there. Moreover, the Turks have a five to one advantage in submarines.
8. The Turkish Air Force is superior to that of the Greeks. The Turks have a fairly proficient fighter-bomber force, including F-100 and F-104 jet aircraft. The Greeks have only recently received their first few Century series aircraft (F-104s). Most of the Turkish Air Force is located within striking distance of Cyprus, with tactical bombs and napalm containers are stocked at a base less than 200 miles from the island. The air force is capable of close support and reconnaissance missions in the Cyprus area. The Turks could airlift one battalion to Cyprus if they were able to seize control of an airfield on the island. The Greek Air Force, based primarily on the Greek mainland some 500 miles from Cyprus, would experience great difficulty in operating in the area. Some operations could be mounted from Rhodes, within 300 miles of Cyprus, but additional logistic equipment would have to be moved there. The Greeks have the technical capability to airlift a battalion or two to Cyprus, but Turkish air superiority could turn any such operation into a disaster.
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