

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

NIE 12-65
26 August 1965

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 12-65

Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
26 AUGUST 1965

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Nº 384

~~SECRET~~

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~GROUP
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 12-65

Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact

This document has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 1/24/94

HRP 94-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE PROBLEM	1
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	3
I. THE WARSAW PACT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY ..	3
Development of the Pact	3
Value of the Pact to the USSR	3
East European Attitudes Toward the Pact	4
East European Reliability	5
II. EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES	5
Defense Budget	5
Equipment Procurement	6
Manpower	7
III. EAST EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES	7
Command Structure of the Warsaw Pact	7
Ground Forces	7
Table: East European Army Divisions	8
Table: Estimated Personnel Strength of the East European Armed Forces ..	9
Trends in Ground Force Organization and Equipment	9
Tactical Air Support	10
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons	10
National Air Defense	11
Table: Estimated Strength of Combat Aircraft in the East European Air Forces	12
Naval Forces	12
Table: East European Naval Ships	12
Militarized Security Forces	12
IV. WARTIME CAPABILITIES	13
Mobilization Potential	13
V. FUTURE TRENDS	13
Military Capabilities	13
Coherence of the Pact	14
ANNEX	15
Albania	15
Yugoslavia	15
Table: Armed Forces of Albania and Yugoslavia	17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WARSAW PACT

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the significance of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, the military capabilities of the non-Soviet members¹ and probable trends over the next five years or so.

CONCLUSIONS

A. For years little more than a paper organization, the Warsaw Pact has become an important element in Soviet European policy and military planning. In the early 1960s, the USSR moved to establish a new military relationship with the countries of Eastern Europe, to improve their military capabilities and to tighten the Pact as a military organization. Of late, the East European countries have manifested in varying degrees an increasing independence of the USSR in their political and economic policies. The loosening of Soviet controls in Eastern Europe has increased the importance of the Pact to the USSR as an institutional tie. For their part the East European countries see the Pact as an assurance that the Soviets will continue to underwrite their regimes and to safeguard existing boundaries. (Paras. 1-8)

B. Improvements over the past five years have made East European military forces a more useful adjunct to Soviet military power. We estimate that 35 of the 63 East European line divisions, varying considerably in quality, could be deployed within a few days. East European air defense systems are coordinated with each other and

¹The active East European members of the Warsaw Pact are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. The military capabilities of Albania, which has not actively participated since 1961, and Yugoslavia, never a member, are considered in an annex. Soviet strategic concepts with respect to a war in Europe and the relevant Soviet forces will be discussed in the forthcoming NIE 11-14-65, "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

with the Soviet air defense organization. With 125 SAM sites and 2,400 fighter aircraft these systems afford a fair defense throughout the area. While we believe that the Soviets will not give East European forces nuclear weapons in peacetime, in the event of war these weapons would probably be made available under strict Soviet control. (*Paras. 23, 29, 31-34*)

C. The Soviets will probably continue their efforts to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. The growing independence of Eastern Europe, however, will make it difficult to obtain agreement on specific courses of action. Changes in NATO will influence developments in the Warsaw alliance; in particular, any substantial increase in the role of West Germany would strengthen the special relationship among East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Rumania will probably seek to minimize its participation in the Pact, but we do not believe that it will attempt formally to withdraw. (*Paras. 43-45*)

D. In a crisis situation threatening general war, we believe that the East European regimes would attempt to exert a moderating influence on Soviet policy. If the USSR ordered mobilization, their responses would probably differ, ranging from immediate compliance by the East Germans to recalcitrance on the part of the Rumanians. In the event of armed conflict, we believe that the East European armed forces could be relied upon to take part, at least initially, in military operations in conjunction with Soviet forces. (*Paras. 9-11*)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION

I. THE WARSAW PACT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY

Development of the Pact

1. The Warsaw Pact was created by the USSR in May 1955 as a political response to the rearming and admission into NATO of West Germany. During the first five years of its existence, the Pact had little practical significance in the military relationships between the USSR and Eastern Europe. Executive bodies met only irregularly, and very little multinational planning or training took place under Pact auspices. Actual military relationships between the USSR and other members were governed by a series of bilateral treaties and status-of-forces agreements. During this period there was a general slackening in the military efforts of the East European countries; defense expenditures and the strength of the East European armed forces gradually declined. By about 1960, the Soviets evidently concluded that these forces had to be modernized in view of growing NATO strength.

2. At about the same time there was a definite shift in Soviet policy; the USSR began to establish a new military relationship with the countries of Eastern Europe. Soviet propaganda and doctrinal statements began to stress the probability that any future war would be a war of coalitions and to emphasize the importance of close military collaboration within the Bloc. At the same time, the Soviets began to take concrete steps to build up the military capabilities of their East European allies and to strengthen the military organization of the Warsaw Pact. In the last five years, modernization of equipment and weapons has been stepped up, command and control arrangements have been improved, and large-scale multinational training exercises have taken place.

Value of the Pact to the USSR

3. These improvements have occurred during a period in which the East European countries have manifested, in varying degrees, increasing independence of the USSR in their national policies. On the surface there is apparent inconsistency in the USSR's policy of strengthening its East European allies militarily at the very time when they are becoming less tractable politically. But the Soviets probably saw a number of reasons—economic, military, and political—for setting this new course.

4. Problems in the allocation of resources and manpower in the USSR led Khrushchev in 1960 to institute large-scale force reductions, chiefly at the expense of the general purpose forces. It is possible that the Soviets sought

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to offset these reductions to some degree by improving the military capabilities of Eastern Europe. At the same time, a debate in the USSR over military strategy and doctrine led to a re-examination of previous assumptions about the probable character of a future war. Growing doubts concerning the possibility of reinforcements in the European area under conditions of general nuclear war and realization that such a war might have to be fought largely with forces in place may have influenced the Soviet decision.

5. The Soviets probably also expected political returns from a change in policy which would counteract, to some extent, centrifugal tendencies in Eastern Europe. They probably hoped to arrest or at least slow the trend toward political diversity by exploiting both the fear of war and the necessity for common planning to meet this danger. In any event, the loosening of Soviet controls over Eastern Europe has increased the importance of the Pact as an institutional tie. For example, the Soviets have been trying to revive the Political Consultative Committee to serve as a formal mechanism for foreign policy consultation. As the Sino-Soviet dispute has worsened, the USSR has turned increasingly toward its East European allies for political support.

6. From the Soviet point of view, Eastern Europe adds considerably to Soviet military power. The Soviets have long regarded the region as a valuable buffer zone, and probably consider that in a general war it would bear some of the initial impact of a Western attack. They probably also consider that the presence of East European national forces reduces the requirement for Soviet forces in the area.

East European Attitudes Toward the Pact

7. Although the East European countries had no real choice about joining the Pact, they have derived some benefits from it. The collective security arrangements of the Pact give them a greater measure of defense than they could ever obtain with their own resources. In their view, the Warsaw Pact represents a Soviet guarantee to support the continuance of Communist regimes and existing boundaries in Eastern Europe. The latter consideration is particularly weighty in the cases of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which consider a re-armed West Germany a threat to their national security. This common apprehension has led to a special relationship among these three countries and the USSR. In the cases of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, their governments must balance the general security offered by the Pact against possible involvement in German issues which they do not regard as directly affecting their national interests.

8. In spite of the increasing independence of the East European countries, their national policies still generally coincide with those of the USSR. But cooperation and coordination can no longer simply be dictated in Moscow. Many decisions must now be reached on the basis of a consensus among countries which are no longer willing to subordinate completely their national interests

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to the demands of Moscow. Concern that Soviet protection carries with it the risk of involvement in a nuclear war is likely to increase, and Pact members may begin to demand more of a voice in decisions which might involve their national survival.

East European Reliability

9. The responsiveness of East European countries to Soviet direction and the reliability of their forces would depend primarily on the nature, causes, and locale of the conflict. In any crisis situation which carried the threat of general war, we believe that the East European regimes would attempt to exert a moderating influence on Soviet policy. If the USSR should order mobilization, their responses would probably differ, ranging from immediate compliance by the East Germans to recalcitrance on the part of the Rumanians. The Poles, located astride the line of communications to Soviet forces in Germany, would accede reluctantly to Soviet demands, reasoning that it would be impossible for them to avoid becoming involved. Czechoslovakia would probably follow suit for much the same reason. In a particularly threatening situation, Rumania and possibly others might procrastinate in an attempt to remain neutral and might communicate privately with the other side.

10. In general, we believe that East European forces would fight with far more determination in defense of their own territory than as part of a Soviet offensive operation against NATO. The nationality of the opposing forces would also be an important factor. For example, the Poles and the Czechs would probably fight well against anything which they regarded as German aggression, and the Bulgarians have a longstanding antagonism toward Greeks and Turks.

11. Because of strict discipline, party indoctrination, careful screening of officers and key troops, and the very nature of military organization, the better East European divisions could probably be relied upon to take part, at least initially, in military operations in conjunction with Soviet forces. In a fast moving situation the East European forces, including the East Germans, would probably continue to function as long as command channels remained intact and the forces involved did not suffer any serious reverses. If, however, major reverses should occur and victory of the NATO forces appeared imminent, the reliability of the East European forces would probably deteriorate rapidly, and some troops might even seek to shift sides.

II. EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Defense Budget

12. Because the armed forces of the East European countries have few advanced weapons systems and are not involved in the development of costly

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

strategic offensive forces, they are able to maintain their armed forces with relatively small defense budgets. East European expenditures on defense amount to about 4-6 percent of their GNPs. This represents a much smaller relative effort than is made by either the US or the USSR and is about the same as that of the European NATO countries.

13. The defense expenditures of the East European Pact members, after falling during 1956-1958, rose sharply during 1961-1963. Only Poland and East Germany, however, have substantially increased their defense expenditures above 1955 levels. All these countries are probably capable of a greater military effort. However, any increase in military spending would have to be at the expense of economic growth or consumption. Both alternatives are politically undesirable. Under present economic and political conditions, it is unlikely that the East European countries would make a substantially larger military effort without Soviet assistance. Indeed, some of these countries planned reductions in their defense expenditures for 1964 and 1965.

Equipment Procurement

14. The military equipment of the East European armed forces is primarily of Soviet design and manufacture. During the early 1950s, relatively large quantities of Soviet military equipment, mostly of World War II vintage, were shipped into Eastern Europe. Late model equipment began to arrive in the late 1950s, but in general the quantity of these newer items remained relatively small until the early 1960s. In the last few years, the East European countries have been receiving a steady flow of modern Soviet equipment. Initial shipments of new items have generally arrived some two to three years after introduction into the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, but in the past year or so the lag in providing new equipment has been reduced.

15. Soviet statistics on exports to Eastern Europe include unspecified goods which we believe represent predominantly weapons shipments. These figures indicate more than a 40 percent increase in total Soviet military exports to Eastern Europe from 1960 to 1963. The little evidence available suggests that the East Europeans pay about the same prices as other countries for similar types of Soviet equipment.

16. The East European countries produce limited quantities of small arms and ammunition, and some produce larger items such as trucks, tanks, small ships, armored personnel carriers, field artillery, antiaircraft guns, and amphibious reconnaissance vehicles. Poland and Czechoslovakia are the major producers of this heavy equipment. Poland also produces tank landing ships for the Soviet navy. There is some arms trade among the East European countries, but even Poland and Czechoslovakia import some items from the USSR and the others are largely dependent on imported Soviet equipment.

~~SECRET~~

Manpower

17. We estimate that during the past several years total strength of the East European forces, including militarized security forces, has remained relatively stable at around 1.3 million men. However, there was evidence in 1963-1964 of a small reduction in the size of the Bulgarian armed forces, and Rumania has recently reduced the term of service for conscripts. Labor shortages in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany will undoubtedly exert pressures for manpower reductions. Moreover, the acquisition of advanced weapons in quantity has increased the need for more highly qualified technicians, imposing new requirements on the limited supply of skilled manpower in Eastern Europe.

III. EAST EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES

Command Structure of the Warsaw Pact

18. The supreme command of the Warsaw Pact organization is vested in the Combined Armed Forces Command, located in Moscow. This command is composed of military officers from all the Pact countries, and is headed by Soviet Marshal Andrey A. Grechko, who appears to be the second-ranking officer in the Soviet Ministry of Defense. We believe that the East European officers serving on the Combined Command are little more than liaison officers, and that all important plans and policies relating to Pact forces are formulated in the Soviet general staff.

19. The formal chain of command runs from the Combined Armed Forces Command in Moscow, through the East European defense ministers (who are titular deputy commanders), and then down to the various military districts and field commands. In peacetime, the main functions of the Combined Command appear to be to coordinate development and training of the East European armed forces and to plan for the integration of these forces into the regular Soviet command structure in the event of war. In wartime, the Combined Armed Forces Command and the various national Ministries of Defense would almost certainly be bypassed, and the chain of command would run from Moscow through the Soviet Front commanders to the commanders of the East European field armies.

Ground Forces

20. The East European ground forces generally follow Soviet organizational patterns. We estimate that in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania the TOE strength is 8,500 men for a tank division and 10,500 for a motorized rifle division. In Bulgaria the TOE strengths are believed to be slightly less (7,500 in a tank division, with two instead of three tank regiments, and 9,000 in a motorized rifle division), while in Hungary they are slightly higher (9,000 men in a tank division and 11,000 in a motorized rifle division). The quality of our evidence varies with respect to both TOE and actual

~~SECRET~~

strengths, but in general our information on the East German, Polish, and Czech armies is better than for the other East European countries. We believe that the larger units of the East European ground forces generally are not as well trained as their Soviet counterparts.

21. All of the East European ground forces have army level support units such as surface-to-surface missiles, field and antiaircraft artillery, engineer, signal, and chemical units. In general, however, they are light in combat and service support even by Soviet standards, and it is doubtful whether they could function effectively in sustained combat without either mobilizing additional units or receiving direct support from Soviet units.

22. The criteria for assessing the readiness of East European divisions are inexact. They include peacetime manning levels, training, and equipment. However, they also involve the judgment that the East European countries would plan to commit their better divisions promptly should the need arise. There are therefore wide variations among the divisions which we classify as ready for early commitment, i.e., within a few days. For example, the manning level of these divisions ranges from about 70 to 90 percent of TOE strength, and most of these forces fall short of Soviet standards of equipment, particularly in armored personnel carriers.

23. Considering all these factors, we believe that 23 of the 35 East German, Polish, and Czech divisions can be considered available for early commitment. In terms of manning, training, and equipment, the East German divisions are generally comparable to the Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany, and the ready Czech and Polish divisions are somewhat below that standard. We believe that the armies of these three countries would be considerably more effective than those of the other East European countries. We estimate that 12 of the 22 Bulgarian and Rumanian divisions and none of the six Hungarian divisions are available for early commitment. The numbers and types of East European line divisions are shown in the following table.

EAST EUROPEAN ARMY DIVISIONS *

	MOTORIZED		AIRBORNE/	TOTAL
	RIFLE	TANK	ASSAULT LANDING	
East Germany	4 (4)	2 (2)	...	6 (6)
Poland	9 (4)	4 (4)	^b 2 (0)	15 (8)
Czechoslovakia	9 (4)	5 (5)	...	14 (9)
Hungary	5 (0)	1 (0)	...	6 (0)
Rumania	8 (4)	2 (2)	...	10 (6)
Bulgaria	8 (4)	4 (2)	...	12 (6)
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>43 (20)</u>	<u>18 (15)</u>	<u>2 (0)</u>	<u>63 (35)</u>

* Numbers in parentheses are those estimated available for early commitment, but even among these divisions there are wide variations in manning and equipment.

^b One airborne and one assault landing division. The airborne unit, which has an estimated strength of 3,000-4,000 men, is classed as a division by the Poles, but in terms of capabilities more nearly equates to a brigade. At present the assault landing division is a motorized rifle division in which one of the three rifle regiments is composed of naval infantry.

~~SECRET~~

ESTIMATED PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE EAST EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES
MID-1965

	POLAND	CZECHO- SLO- VAKIA	EAST GER- MANY	HUN- GARY	RU- MANIA	BUL- GARIA	TOTAL
Ground Forces	225,000	175,000	90,000	100,000	175,000	125,000	890,000
(Number in Combat Divisions)	(119,000)	(95,000)	(53,000)	(45,000)	(80,000)	(73,000)	(465,000)
Naval Forces	18,000	15,000	1,000	8,000	6,000	48,000
Air Forces	25,000	20,000	12,000	5,000	8,000	12,000	82,000
TOTAL ARMED FORCES	268,000	195,000	117,000	106,000	191,000	143,000	1,020,000
Militarized Security Forces	45,000	40,000	69,000	35,000	50,000	17,000	256,000

Trends in Ground Force Organization and Equipment

24. The appearance of East European field armies in exercises indicates that these forces are acquiring the experience and equipment to operate in large units. We previously estimated that the East European divisions would be integrated into Soviet field armies during wartime, but we now believe that these divisions for the most part would serve in their own field armies, which in turn would be integrated into Soviet Fronts. This development implies increasing Soviet confidence in the military capabilities of these forces.

25. The East European forces, like the Soviets, have increased the number of tank divisions in recent years. Poland and Czechoslovakia now have four and five tank divisions, respectively, and appear to be developing the capability to field tank armies. Airborne and amphibious training has received increased attention, although lift capabilities are limited to small-scale operations. In the late 1950s, the Poles created an airborne unit of brigade size which they term a division, and in 1964, began to convert a mechanized division into an "assault landing" division. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Rumania have each created small airborne units. Some of these units have probably received training in unconventional warfare.

26. The East European armies are significantly improving the quality of their land combat equipment. The T-54 medium tank has replaced the World War II T-34 in East German tank divisions, and is appearing in increasing numbers in the armored units of the other East European countries. Armored personnel carriers are also being introduced in greater numbers than in previous years. In addition, the Soviets have begun to supply the Snapper, a wireguided antitank missile, to their Warsaw Pact allies.

27. The equipping of East European armies with tactical missiles and rockets is well underway. On the basis of past Soviet practice, we estimate that one

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

battalion of two Frog launchers per division and one brigade of six Scud launchers per field army have been established as the standard for equipping these forces. We believe that Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia already have their full complement of Frogs (23 battalions), and Scuds (6-8 brigades). Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania probably have a sufficient number of Scuds (4-6 brigades), but have not received their full complement of Frogs. All the East European countries will probably receive additional tactical missile launchers in the next few years.

Tactical Air Support

28. The primary mission of all of the East European air forces is national air defense. Nevertheless, the Polish and Czech air forces and possibly the Bulgarian and East German air forces as well have been reorganized so that, while most of the fighter regiments perform the air defense role, others function as a tactical force. However, all East European fighter units, whether air defense or tactical, are trained in both air interception and in ground attack techniques. East European tactical air capabilities are improving with the introduction of current model Soviet aircraft. The MIG-21 (Fishbed) has been supplied to all East European air forces, and the Czechs and the Poles have received the SU-7 (Fitter). All of these countries except Hungary have obsolescent IL-28 (Beagle) light bombers, but only Poland and Czechoslovakia have them in any significant quantities; these are employed both in bombing and reconnaissance roles. It is likely that these air forces will increasingly emphasize the ground attack mission.

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

29. For a number of years, East European forces have participated in field training in a simulated nuclear environment. More recently, these forces have simulated their own delivery of nuclear weapons. This development, together with the acquisition of nuclear capable delivery systems, (Scuds, Frogs, and fighters), suggests that East European commanders expect to have access to such weapons in the event of war. While we believe that the Soviets will not give East European forces nuclear weapons in peacetime, in the event of war these weapons would probably be made available under strict Soviet control.

30. The East European forces have trained extensively in defense against chemical and biological weapons. All the armed forces have the capability of delivering CW agents by artillery, aircraft, and missiles. The Czechs, East Germans, and possibly the Poles have the capability to manufacture CW toxic agents but we have no evidence of stockpiling. We believe that in a war the East European armed forces would be dependent on the Soviets for the bulk of their chemical munitions and that these forces would not employ such agents except upon Soviet directive or authorization. All of these countries

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

could produce BW agents on a small scale, but there is no evidence that any of them has an offensive biological warfare development program.

National Air Defense

31. Air defense of the East European countries is composed of separate national systems. They are, nevertheless, coordinated with each other and with the Soviet air defense organization, and there are increasing signs of closer cooperation in the performance of their missions. Although these systems are not formally subordinate to Soviet air defense, they constitute for most practical purposes an extension of it. East European air defense systems are equipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel. The best equipped, and probably the most effective, are the air defense forces of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

32. Early warning (EW) and ground controlled intercept (GCI) radar sites are densely deployed in peripheral areas and provide overlapping coverage. The density of coverage provides good detection and tracking capabilities, and frequency diversification provides some defense against electronic countermeasures. The Soviets have been improving the EW-GCI capabilities of the East European systems in recent years by supplying some of the best radars in the Soviet inventory and semi-automatic data transmission equipment for vectoring fighter aircraft against targets. However, around 80 percent of the approximately 2,400 fighter aircraft are older model fighters.

33. SA-2 sites have been deployed largely in defense of the capital cities and other key urban-industrial areas. In addition to the 33 sites in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary which the Soviets operate in support of their own forces, there are about 125 SA-2 sites in Eastern Europe. Present deployment patterns suggest that an additional 25 to 50 SA-2 sites will be deployed. There are at present no SA-3 sites; defense against low altitude attacks is provided by light and medium AAA.

34. The combination of area and point defenses provided by the present force of fighters and SAMs affords a fair defense throughout the area against medium and high altitude air attacks; in East Germany the concentration of SAMs and interceptors provides a better defense in their area. However, the East European air defense systems have limited low altitude and all-weather capabilities, and special difficulties are posed by Western supersonic aircraft and standoff weapons. We believe that over the next few years, these capabilities will improve with the wider deployment of new EW and GCI radars and semi-automatic control systems and with the acquisition of more advanced interceptors, such as the SU-9 (Fishpot). A low altitude SAM system may be deployed during the period of this estimate. We do not believe that the East Europeans will acquire any antiballistic missile defenses during this period.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN THE EAST EUROPEAN AIR FORCES
1 August 1965

Country	MIG-15/17 (Fagot/ Fresco A, B, C)	MIG-17 (Fresco D, E)	MIG-19 (Farmer)	SU-7 (Fitter)	MIG-21 (Fishbed C, E)	MIG-21 (Fishbed D)	YAK-27 (Man- Grove)	IL-28 (Beagle)	Total by Country
Bulgaria	150	55	75	0	25	0	0	15	320
Czechoslovakia	250	60	135	60	35	45	10	40	635
East Germany	120	75	25	0	70	70	0	10	370
Hungary	25	10	40	0	65	30	0	0	140
Poland (Including naval)	540	170	20	5	25	25	5	60	850
Rumania	150	10	30	0	40	10	0	15	255
Total by Type	1,235	380	295	65	260	180 *	15	140	2,570

* As many as 35 additional Fishbed-Ds may be present in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland.

Naval Forces

35. The East European naval forces are organized and equipped for limited naval operations: coastal patrol, mine warfare, and short-range amphibious operations. The East German, Polish, and Bulgarian navies are continually adding newer ships, and ships in the current inventory are being retrofitted with additional electronic gear and improved armament. These three forces are deploying coastal defense missile sites, and Poland and East Germany have recently acquired guided missile motor boats. The Polish Navy has a small air arm, which includes about 70 older model fighters.

EAST EUROPEAN NAVAL SHIPS (Mid-1965)

	BALTIC		BLACK SEA	
	East Germany	Poland	Rumania	Bulgaria
Destroyers		3		
Destroyer escorts	4			
Submarines		9		2
Motor torpedo boats	37	19	8	8
Guided missile FPBs	4	4-5		
Coastal escorts	63	11	12	8
Fleet minesweepers	20	17	4	2
Other minesweepers	36	26	26	22
Amphibious types	17	26	8	10

Militarized Security Forces

36. East European countries maintain large militarized security forces consisting of frontier guards and internal security troops. Most of these forces have received basic military training. They are armed with light infantry weapons, and in some cases have limited combat support elements. In wartime these forces could participate in limited military operations or perform specialized functions such as rear area security and traffic control.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IV. WARTIME CAPABILITIES

Mobilization Potential

37. The traditional European military conscription system is in effect throughout Eastern Europe. Almost all fit males perform a period of active military service, and then remain in the reserves until a specified age. In time of war the East European countries could draw on a manpower pool of several hundred thousand men, all of whom have had recent military experience. There is a system of periodic refresher training. The governments have set up mobilization systems which provide for the augmentation of existing forces and the creation of new units.

38. The major limiting factor on mobilization potential is the availability of equipment for newly created units. Poland and Czechoslovakia probably have sufficient stocks of obsolescent equipment to equip some additional divisions. The other countries have small stocks of equipment in reserve. Almost all the newly created units would be poorly equipped by modern standards. We do not believe that in the event of mobilization the USSR could supply much additional equipment to Eastern Europe for the creation of new units.

39. In the event of mobilization, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia could deploy within a week 23 divisions, organized into as many as 6 field armies. Poland and Czechoslovakia could bring up to full strength and prepare for combat within 2 or 3 weeks an additional 10 adequately equipped divisions which are now in existence. Because of deficiencies in air and sea lift only small elements of the 2 specialized Polish divisions could be committed in their primary role. Within 30 to 60 days after mobilization, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia could probably put together another dozen poorly equipped infantry divisions out of their own resources. In addition, these 3 countries could support military operations with more than 1,800 combat aircraft.

40. In the event of hostilities, Bulgaria and Rumania could probably field within a week 12 divisions, which would be organized into 2-3 field armies. These forces could be reinforced with an additional 6 Bulgarian divisions and an additional 4 Rumanian divisions within another week or two. Bulgaria and Rumania can currently support a campaign with a total of 575 combat aircraft, mostly older models. We do not believe that the Soviets consider the Hungarian armed forces sufficiently prepared or reliable to take part in offensive operations.

V. FUTURE TRENDS

Military Capabilities

41. We believe that modernization of the East European armed forces will continue at about the present rate. Although manpower levels of the East European armed forces will probably remain about the same, the military capabilities of these forces will increase as a consequence of the continued introduction of more modern equipment. By 1970, the total number of divisions avail-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

able for immediate commitment will probably show a slight increase, and include a greater proportion of tank divisions. Additional airborne and amphibious units may be organized, and lift capabilities almost certainly will improve. We also believe that combat support will continue to improve and that the East European forces will receive sufficient tactical missiles to bring their inventories up to Soviet standards.

42. The total number of aircraft in the Warsaw Pact air forces will probably decline slightly. However, the capabilities of the forces will increase as the share of new generation combat aircraft grows to about half of the total by 1970. The YAK-28 (Brewer), a light jet bomber, and the SU-9 (Fishpot), an all-weather jet interceptor, will probably be introduced into the East European air forces during the period of this estimate. Naval forces in the Baltic and Black Seas will probably continue to improve with the introduction of additional ships and improved armament and electronic gear.

Coherence of the Pact

43. We believe that the Warsaw Pact will continue in existence for the period of this estimate. Soviet interest in the alliance and Soviet power in the area will probably of themselves be sufficient to secure its continuance. In addition, the collective security provided by the Pact and the general community of interest among Communist regimes will continue to be cohesive factors in the alliance. Changes in the structure of NATO probably would have some influence on the Warsaw alliance. Most important, any change which led to a substantial increase in the role of West Germany would strengthen the special relationship among East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Any form of nuclear sharing with West Germany would impel the Soviets to respond, perhaps with a Warsaw Pact atomic command; we believe, however, that they would retain strict control over nuclear weapons.

44. The trend toward political divergence in Eastern Europe will probably continue, and the interplay of national interests will become increasingly important in Pact decisions. The political and economic effects of continued expenditures to fulfill Pact commitments may lead to disputes over the real requirements of Pact forces and the proper size and character of individual contributions. Rumania will probably seek to minimize its participation in the Pact, but we do not believe that it will attempt formally to withdraw.

45. We believe that the Soviets will continue their efforts to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. However, the growing independence of Eastern Europe will make it difficult to obtain agreement on specific courses of action. For example, the Soviets may seek to place some national units directly under the Pact commander in peacetime, bypassing the national ministers of defense. There are indications that Rumania, for one, would strongly resist such a move. Another possibility which may now be under discussion is that East European Pact members station token units on one another's territory as evidence of closer ties. We believe, however, that traditional antagonisms would make some Pact members unwilling to participate in this type of reciprocal arrangement.

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX

ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

Albania

1. Although it is still nominally a member of the Warsaw Pact, Albania takes no part in Pact activities and rejected a Pact invitation to send Albanian representatives to the Political Consultative Council session in January 1965. Without a reconciliation between Albania and the USSR, Albania probably will not renew military relationships with the Warsaw Pact. In event of war, the Albanians would not necessarily follow Pact leadership, but would be guided by their view of their national interests.

2. Albania has received no Soviet equipment since diplomatic relations were severed in 1961. Since that time Communist China has provided small amounts of ammunition, small arms, and electronic equipment and a few motor torpedo boats. Consequently, the 30,000 ground force troops and 12,500 frontier and security troops are poorly equipped and have had little experience with modern materiel. Six infantry brigades are the basic tactical units of the ground forces. While these brigades are below strength and poorly trained, they could be brought up to strength from internal Albanian resources. Weapons and equipment consist principally of Soviet World War II types, although some postwar equipment was furnished before 1961. The ground forces are severely limited as to equipment and training; they have a high potential for guerrilla fighting, however, and are capable of waging determined resistance on a small-unit basis from isolated mountain areas.

3. The small air and naval forces are also primarily defensive in character. The air force is organized into 2 regiments, including 2 squadrons equipped with the Fresco D fighter, which have a limited all-weather capability. The navy has 4 W-class submarines, which seldom exercise at sea, and some 28 other small coastal defense boats.

Yugoslavia

4. While Yugoslavia has been growing increasingly close to the Warsaw Pact countries during the last four years, the Yugoslav regime has been careful to avoid any military relationship which would tie the country to the Warsaw Pact

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

organization. Belgrade has in principle avoided alignment with military or political blocs, and has de-emphasized the military aspects of its policy. Exchange visits of military delegations and purchases of Soviet equipment have been no more extensive than those engaged in by many other "nonaligned" countries. Moreover, the Yugoslavs continue to express an interest in purchasing military items from the West. Reports of more detailed military cooperation and combined planning cannot be supported. It is unlikely that Yugoslavia's policies toward the Warsaw Pact will change in the near future.

5. The Yugoslav military establishment is roughly equal in personnel strength to that of Czechoslovakia or Poland. The ground forces—comprising 17 infantry and 3 armored divisions, 37 independent brigades, including 1 airborne, and other support troops—are deployed throughout the country in a manner calculated to support either general defense of the country or possible guerrilla warfare. These units, some of which are maintained at only 20 percent of full strength, could be brought up to strength within a few days. The field units are controlled by 19 subdistrict headquarters and by 5 army district headquarters. These territorial commands exercise both administrative and command functions. Individual and small-unit training is especially intensive, and guerrilla training continues to be emphasized.

6. The Yugoslav ground forces are equipped with a variety of Soviet, US, and other conventional equipment. The US has not made any significant deliveries since 1957, and the Soviet T 54/55 tanks, self-propelled artillery, and anti-aircraft guns received since 1961 are probably not sufficient to outfit a single division. Yugoslav production of ammunition and small arms is large enough to permit export. However, production of artillery up to 155 mm howitzers is not likely to increase sufficiently to solve current deficiencies in quantity and standardization. Yugoslav doctrine calls for the use of chemical weapons in support of small guerrilla operations, but the ground forces have yet to develop any significant CW offensive or defensive capability.

7. The Yugoslav Navy of 3 destroyers, 3 destroyer-escorts, 3 submarines, and over 270 smaller craft is well adapted to its primary mission of coastal patrol. Although the level of training of its 22,000 personnel is adequate, current naval forces are insufficient for effective defense of the entire coast. A gradual strengthening of the navy is expected, especially through addition of mine warfare and smaller ASW ships with the help of a growing ship building industry.

8. The US aircraft delivered up to 1957 have given the Yugoslavs relatively superior tactical air support for their ground forces, and a somewhat less effective air defense. In the last few years the ground support capability has been reduced by the fact that at least a quarter of the total jet inventory of about 400 planes has not been operational because of the lack of spare parts. During this time the USSR has sold Yugoslavia about 40 Fishbed Cs but has furnished no all-weather interceptor aircraft. The USSR has also sold the Yugoslavs

~~SECRET~~

sufficient SA-2s plus associated radar equipment to establish 4 operational sites in the vicinity of Belgrade; 8 others are scheduled to be constructed.

9. Yugoslavia's military forces would defend well against attack, and could conduct effective guerrilla operations. Yugoslavia has no significant offensive capabilities except against Albania, but could organize and support guerrilla operations in neighboring countries.

10. In the event of a general war, Yugoslavia would try to remain neutral, cooperating with the USSR only if the war should progress favorably for the Soviet Bloc. The overriding consideration would be to maintain the regime in power.

ARMED FORCES OF ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

PERSONNEL	ALBANIA	YUGOSLAVIA
Ground Forces	30,000	* 249,000
Air Forces	2,000	16,000
Naval Forces	3,000	22,000
Total Armed Forces	35,000	287,000
EQUIPMENT		
Combat Aircraft	70	280
SA-2 Sites	2	4
Submarines	4	3
Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts	0	6
Motor Torpedo Boats	9-12	67
Minesweepers	8	51

* Including 15,000 frontier guard troops.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- i. Director of Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~
~~CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CONTROLLED DISSEM~~