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**Soviet Policies and Activities
in Latin America and
the Caribbean**

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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SNIE 11/80/90-82
25 June 1982

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SNIE 11/80/90-82

SOVIET POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES
IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN

Information available as of 15 June 1982 was
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KEY JUDGMENTS

Soviet activity and interest in Latin America have increased significantly in the past few years, and in the aftermath of the battle for the Falklands the Soviets and their Cuban allies will be probing for new opportunities. Since 1979, Moscow has moved more aggressively to exploit opportunities presented by pressures for revolutionary change in Central America and the Caribbean and by the willingness of Latin American states to deal with the USSR and its allies. The Soviet Union has helped to consolidate revolutionary regimes in Nicaragua and Grenada, has provided considerable aid—mainly through proxies and other third parties—to revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America, and has intensified its efforts to develop favorable political and economic ties with such countries as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Despite this intensified interest, geographic remoteness has tended to relegate Latin America—except for Cuba—to the periphery of Soviet security concerns.

Cuba plays a central role in Soviet relations with Latin America not only as a dependent client serving Moscow's interests but also as an independent actor influencing Soviet policies and tactics. Fidel Castro's vigorous support of Nicaraguan revolutionaries, for example, was originally a Cuban initiative and had a marked impact on Soviet attitudes and policy toward the region. Soviet leaders came to share Castro's assessment that the prospects for the success of revolutionary forces in Central America were brighter than they had earlier calculated. The Soviets have been working closely with the Cubans to consolidate the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, which both view as central to promoting leftist gains in the region.

The Soviets have by and large successfully implemented a policy of encouraging unrest in various Central American states, gaining a foothold in Nicaragua, and improving their relations with the governments of the more important South American countries. From the Soviet perspective, such a policy has potential for distracting American attention from other regions; is relatively cheap in economic terms; has not required major commitments to local allies; and has not raised confrontation with the United States to an unmanageable level. The Soviets are thus likely to persist with this strategy.

Soviet support and guidance for Latin American revolutionary movements now focus on:

- Encouragement of broad revolutionary coalitions, uniting pro-Soviet Communist parties with their traditional leftwing rivals.
- Creation of loyal military components.
- Use of hemispheric and extrahemispheric intermediaries.
- Training of revolutionaries.

In El Salvador the Soviets have facilitated the flow of arms and military equipment to the Salvadoran insurgents from Cuba and other third parties. Although Moscow does not appear sanguine about the insurgents' short-term military prospects, it probably still believes that they can seize power through a prolonged armed struggle.

In Guatemala and Honduras, the USSR and its allies have been pressuring the local Communists to join broad revolutionary fronts and participate in armed struggle. The Soviets and Cubans have provided financial assistance and training.

Moscow undoubtedly sees potential opportunities for the left in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Chile.

In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, Moscow's policy has aimed largely at cultivating positive state-to-state relations. This approach has emphasized trade expansion and—in some cases—readiness to sell military hardware. Although these efforts have not usually been translated into increased Soviet influence, they have given some Latin American countries additional opportunities to assert their independence of the United States. By building on bilateral ties, the USSR also seeks to achieve specific economic objectives and hopes to gain broader political support for its policy initiatives in the hemisphere and elsewhere in the world.

Since 1980, Soviet economic interest and activity in Latin America have intensified. The USSR has become Argentina's largest grain buyer, incurring large trade deficits. Despite the Falklands crisis, this year's purchases are still expected to be 11-12 million tons, or about one-fourth of the USSR's total grain imports.

In pursuit of major arms clients over the last decade, the USSR has secured only Peru—where it is now the primary supplier of air and ground equipment. Moscow's military relationship with Lima, however, has given the Soviets little leverage over Peruvian policies.

Despite Soviet success in Peru, most of the Latin American military establishments have preferred Western-made arms and have been suspicious of the Soviets. Moscow surely hopes, however, that its support for Argentina in the Falklands dispute and interruptions in the supply of arms from some Western sources will make at least the Argentine military more receptive to Soviet offers.

Even in countries where the USSR's policy is keyed to developing bilateral state-to-state ties, as in Mexico, Moscow continues to conduct a variety of covert activities and other "active measures" to improve its position and play upon domestic vulnerabilities over the longer term. These activities include:

- Funding local Communist parties and front organizations.
- Disseminating disinformation and forgeries aimed at the United States.
- Drumming up support for hemispheric revolutionaries.
- Infiltrating military and security services as well as other important sectors of Latin American bureaucracies.
- Manipulating the media and mass organizations.
- Developing and using agents of influence, mainly through the Cubans.

The Soviets are also educating numerous Latin American and Caribbean students in the USSR, cultivating organized labor, and profiting from the growth of pro-Marxist sentiments among religious activists.

Despite increased Soviet optimism about trends in Latin America, Moscow recognizes that there are major constraints on its ability to influence developments there. Foremost is US political, economic, and military strength; but pervasive Latin American antipathy to Soviet Communism and a Soviet desire not to alarm regional governments through too blatant backing of leftist insurgencies also inhibit Moscow's actions. Moscow has therefore moved in ways designed to avoid directly provoking the United States. In contrast to the USSR's overt and direct bilateral dealings with the larger states, its support for revolutionary movements has been low-key and indirect, often employing intermediaries and surrogates.

Moscow's long-term objectives of eroding and supplanting US influence in Latin America are unlikely to be affected, however, by its recognition of these obstacles to its ambitions. Over the next few years, Soviet efforts to gain influence are likely to increase. Washington's

response to this challenge will be complicated by the fact that its own deep concern about Soviet troublemaking in the area is not shared by many regional governments. Sympathy with revolutionary causes will persist in countries such as Mexico and Panama. Even countries less sympathetic to leftist causes, such as Brazil and Venezuela, would be opposed to US military intervention to check revolutionary gains in Central America and the Caribbean.

The persistent strain of anti-US sentiment in the region, which has been accentuated by the Falklands crisis, offers the Soviets some new opportunities to expand their influence. However, Soviet initiatives are of less intrinsic significance than US policies and actions. US efforts to build hemispheric solidarity with the current Salvadoran Government and to gain Latin American support for countering Soviet-supported leftist insurgency elsewhere in Central America have been damaged. The Soviets are certain to attempt to exploit what they perceive as a US setback.

The large and growing quantity of military hardware in the hands of Soviet clients has major implications for the region. In addition to defending both Cuba and Nicaragua against attack, such military power—especially in Nicaragua—facilitates support to the Salvadoran insurgents and provides shelter for the guerrilla infrastructure. Within the term of this Estimate, other objectives behind arms supply from the USSR and various intermediaries probably include:

- Intimidating Nicaragua's neighbors, thus disposing them toward acquiescence in the Soviet-Cuban foothold in Central America.
- Supporting insurgents in Guatemala.
- Laying the groundwork for support of possible future insurgencies in Honduras, Costa Rica, and elsewhere in the hemisphere.

The recent US warning of the consequences of delivering Soviet-supplied MIG aircraft to Nicaragua may have prompted the deferral of such deliveries. Nevertheless, preparations for their arrival are continuing.

Over the longer term, there is also a possibility that the Soviets may seek access to naval and air facilities in Nicaragua and Grenada. Such access would have a significant impact on US security interests, especially with regard to the Panama Canal and other lines of communication.

DISCUSSION

Soviet Objectives

1. Soviet activity and interest in Latin America¹ have increased significantly in the past few years. Moscow has moved to exploit new opportunities presented by pressures for revolutionary change in Central America and the Caribbean and by the willingness of Latin American states to deal with the USSR and its allies. Since 1979 the Soviet Union has helped to consolidate the revolutionary regime in Nicaragua, has provided considerable aid—mainly through proxies and other third parties—to revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America, and has intensified its efforts to develop favorable political and economic ties with such countries as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

2. Despite this intensified interest, Latin America's geographical remoteness from the USSR has tended to relegate it to the periphery of Soviet security concerns, except when Soviet involvement with Cuba or Cuban activities have threatened to provoke a serious crisis in Soviet-US relations.² Over the years Latin America has been less important in the USSR's rivalry with the United States than other Third World areas such as Asia and the Middle East, where Soviet stakes are greater and Soviet power less constrained.

3. Soviet interest in Latin America is to a substantial degree motivated by the USSR's global competition with the United States and its ideological and pragmatic commitment to support revolutionary causes worldwide. Moscow's basic aim in the region is to undermine US influence, which it seeks to achieve

¹ For purposes of this Estimate, Latin America is defined as all mainland countries/territories/dependencies from Mexico south to Argentina. Central America refers to Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. The Caribbean includes those island states/territories/dependencies with a coast on the Caribbean Sea.

The Estimate considers Soviet prospects in Latin America and the Caribbean over approximately the next two years.

² This Estimate examines the Moscow-Havana connection as it bears upon the formulation and implementation of Soviet policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Analysis of the overall bilateral Soviet-Cuban relationship does not fall within the scope of the paper.

both by strengthening Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military ties with governments of the region and by promoting radical change. This approach is in line with Moscow's forward strategy in the Third World, which has the long-term aim of changing the international correlation of forces in favor of the USSR.

4. The Soviet leadership understands that growing instability in Central America creates serious policy dilemmas for Washington. In Moscow's view, if the United States does not respond effectively in Central America during the next few years, revolutionary momentum will accelerate there and elsewhere in Latin America. If Washington intervenes directly, however, Moscow perceives that it will be able to stimulate international criticism of US action. In either case, Moscow anticipates that revolutionary ferment in America's own backyard will divert US attention and resources from more distant problems, sow divisions between the United States and its allies, and undercut Washington's credibility in the Third World.

5. Moscow's current support for revolutionary causes should not obscure its other important priorities and interests in the area, which it promotes simultaneously and sometimes in contradiction to its backing for revolution. The level of Soviet economic, military, and political activity with the larger countries indicates that they are major targets in Soviet strategy toward Latin America. A substantial share of the USSR's agricultural imports comes from Argentina and Brazil, and Moscow has a major arms supply relationship with Peru. Such state-to-state relations give the Soviet Union an opportunity to expand its presence and influence in specific countries. The Soviets, of course, also seek to encourage those states—such as Mexico—to adopt policies independent of the United States.

6. Moscow regards the Falklands situation as a significant opportunity to intensify Latin American alienation from the United States and expand its own influence in the region. It is trying to stiffen Latin American resentment of US support for Britain and to stimulate distrust of the US commitment to regional

interests. It almost certainly sees the crisis as opening the possibility of Argentina's turning to the USSR to reequip its armed forces. Moreover, it probably also views the crisis as weakening the US ability to mobilize Latin American nations against Soviet, Cuban, and other leftist advances in the area.

Strategic Background

7. The Soviets have had ties with some Latin American Communist parties since the 1920s, but until the 1960s they expended little effort to expand their influence in the hemisphere. Soviet involvement was limited largely to providing some financial assistance to the local Communist parties, which in return—by and large—were expected mainly to support Moscow's position at Communist international gatherings, while seeking to broaden their influence over events in their own countries. Moscow's expectations in the area remained modest until the advent of Fidel Castro.

8. Castro's alignment of Cuba with the USSR by 1961 marked the turning point in Soviet involvement in Latin America. Castro's move handed Moscow an opportunity to establish an ideological, political, and military foothold in the hemisphere, and a potential to gain in the strategic competition with the United States. The outcome of the Cuban missile crisis and the containment of Castroism to Cuba in the early 1960s nevertheless punctured Moscow's hopes of quickly altering the strategic balance and forcing the pace of change in the region.

9. In the 1960s in Latin America and the Caribbean the USSR did not—with the exception of Cuba—frontally challenge US dominance. The Soviets did vigorously undertake "active measures" intended to undercut US influence.³ But Moscow provided no

³ The Soviets use the term "active measures" to refer to a broad range of overt and covert operations intended to provoke policy effects. These measures, which represent an unconventional adjunct to traditional diplomacy, are designed to influence the decisions of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other nations, undermine confidence in foreign leaders and institutions, and discredit opponents. They include such actions as manipulation of the media, disinformation and forgery, use of foreign Communist parties and fronts, sub rosa economic activities, and various political influence operations. Operational Intelligence Memorandum CIA-319/01000-82, *Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures* (April 1982), assesses Soviet "active measures" more broadly and in greater detail.

military or any significant economic assistance to any non-Communist Central American or Caribbean country. It emphasized in its policy the more pragmatic concerns of building diplomatic, commercial, and even military relations with the existing governments, as in Peru. Moscow apparently hoped that stronger bilateral ties would place it in a better position to profit from growing nationalism and its accompanying anti-Americanism. Correspondingly, the Soviets also discouraged the small orthodox Communist parties from engaging in violence and were reluctant to support leftist groups advocating revolution. Although the Soviets did try from time to time to cultivate some local leftist leaders—such as Jamaica's Michael Manley, who was quite eager to curry favor with them—their efforts were limited and they were content to let the Cubans take the lead. In fact, they encouraged Manley to maintain correct relations with the United States in order to qualify for economic assistance which they were unwilling to extend.

10. In the case of Chile's Salvador Allende, Moscow's reluctance wholly to embrace his regime reflected a wide range of considerations beyond its concern with the US reaction: his political opportunism, conflict with members of his own Socialist party as well as the Communist Party, inability to co-opt groups of the extreme left, and lack of a loyal military force to defend his regime. In their reflections on the Chilean experience, Soviet leaders have noted the possibility of a "peaceful road to socialism," while warning revolutionaries of the need for a broad leftist coalition and their own military formation.

11. This measured approach by the Soviets yielded both political and economic benefits. The number of regional states with which Moscow established relations expanded (see map), and the USSR's 1970s imports were 10 times those of the previous decade, largely because of grain purchases from Argentina.

Role of Cuba

12. Cuba plays a central role in Soviet relations with Latin America both as a dependent client serving Moscow's interests and as an independent actor influencing Soviet policies and tactics. Cuba's dependence on the USSR for economic and military assistance has been a tender point for Castro, who vehemently denies any linkage between Soviet largess and Cuban actions in support of the USSR's foreign policy objectives.

Soviet Diplomatic Relations in Latin America and the Caribbean



And, in fact, he has enjoyed greater freedom in his policies in Latin America than he has elsewhere in the Third World. Nevertheless, Castro pays close heed to Soviet interests and to the limits of Moscow's tolerance on tactical matters.

13. Soviet and Cuban approaches to the region have not always been harmonious. Initially Moscow was convinced that a "march toward socialism" in Latin America would be slow and disapproved of Castro's indiscriminate aid to hemispheric revolutionaries as "adventurist." By 1968, however, Soviet political pressure and economic incentives, combined with Cuban foreign policy reverses, began to bring the two countries' goals and interests back into convergence and culminated in their joint intervention in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid-1970s. By 1979 the two had expanded their collaboration to include support of violent revolutionary parties and groups, particularly in Central America.

14. Castro's vigorous support of Nicaraguan revolutionaries beginning in 1978 was essentially a Cuban initiative, and it has had a marked impact on Soviet attitudes and policy toward the region. Moscow was impressed by Havana's success in exploiting the revolutionary situation in Nicaragua. Not only did the Cubans supplant US influence there, but, in a country in which Moscow had previously had no official representation, it soon enjoyed diplomatic, military, economic, and even formal party links with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Soviet leaders apparently came to share Castro's revised assessment that the prospects for the success of revolutionary forces in Central America were brighter than they had earlier calculated, and felt that the United States was irresolute in countering leftist gains.

15. The Soviets have been working closely with the Cubans to consolidate the Sandinista regime; both share the view that Nicaragua is central to promoting leftist gains elsewhere in Central America. The Cubans have also served as intermediaries with insurgent groups elsewhere in Central America and with the radical Bishop regime in Grenada. Moscow prefers that Havana take the lead in advancing regional revolutionary causes—in deference to Castro's understanding of local political dynamics and longstanding involvement with revolution in Latin America; because Cuba is a hemispheric, Spanish-speaking power; and to shield the USSR against any backlash from the

United States and from the larger Latin American countries where it has a bilateral stake.

16. Despite the efficacy of Havana's role so far, Moscow is no doubt alert to the potential for damage to its broader interests arising from its Cuban connection. Potential for friction between Moscow and Havana exists in their conflicting preferences for different factions within some Latin American revolutionary movements. Partly to monitor Cuba's activities and check those they judge too provocative to the United States, the Soviets will continue their efforts to expand their own influence and leverage—particularly in Nicaragua.

Soviet Policies and Tactics

17. Moscow employs diverse means to exploit differing local conditions and to serve multiple Soviet interests. It is helping to consolidate the revolutionary regime in Nicaragua and is supporting the regime in Grenada. In some Latin American countries—particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—it is advocating and supporting violent revolution. In others, it is employing a mix of diplomacy and "active measures." This pattern is likely to persist for at least the two-year period of the Estimate.

Consolidation of Revolutionary Regimes

18. Moscow places a high value on consolidating and ensuring the survival of revolutionary regimes in the hemisphere. The new radical regime in Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, that in Grenada are politically and symbolically significant for the USSR, especially after its experience with Allende's Chile. The Soviets hope that the leftist, pro-Soviet, anti-American governments in Managua and Saint Georges will contribute to the emergence of other similarly oriented regimes in Central America and the Caribbean and serve as a conduit for revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere.

19. *Nicaragua.* Moscow, whose involvement in Central America was low before the Sandinista victory, is assiduously cultivating the new revolutionary regime in Nicaragua. It has subordinated its ties to the minuscule local Communist party and established formal party links with the Sandinistas. A Soviet diplomatic mission was established in January 1980, and the total number of Soviets now in Nicaragua,

including military advisers and technicians, is probably between 150 and 175.

20. The trend toward closer relations has accelerated over the last year or so. Recent high-level Nicaraguan visitors to Moscow have included Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Political Commission Chairman Arce, and Foreign Minister D'Escoto. Junta leader Daniel Ortega's visit to Moscow and meeting with President Brezhnev in May 1982 have put Soviet ties with Nicaragua on the same level as those with many important Soviet clients elsewhere in the Third World.

21. Even at a time in which the Soviets are being tightfisted with economic assistance, Moscow and its allies are meeting some of Nicaragua's economic needs. Moscow's economic assistance program is governed by a 1980 "framework" agreement—a form usually reserved for major aid recipients such as Afghanistan and Cuba—that calls for assistance to all major economic sectors. To date, Moscow, its East European allies, and Cuba claim to have committed about \$480 million in nonconvertible currency credits to finance agricultural, roadbuilding, and communications equipment and other machinery. The claims may involve some double counting and could therefore be inflated; nevertheless, some of the equipment financed by these credits has already been delivered. In addition, Libya has provided a \$100 million cash loan, and may have promised considerably more than that (although the Libyans are notorious for not honoring such commitments).

22. Moscow has also tried to blunt US economic pressure on Managua. The countries of the Soviet Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) gave Nicaragua 80,000 metric tons of grain to offset the cancellation of the 1981 US grain deliveries. Nevertheless, the Soviets appear reluctant to commit the substantial hard currency assistance most needed by Managua and have privately advised the regime to be cautious in disrupting economic ties with Nicaragua's most important Western economic partners.

23. In the area of military relations, Moscow continues to work largely through Cuba and other third parties to help build up the Sandinista military establishment, but its own direct role is increasing as it gauges the Latin American and US reaction. As evi-

denced by the visits of Defense Minister Ortega to Moscow in the last year or so, military consultations are becoming more frequent and direct. Moscow no doubt hopes that its military assistance will forestall efforts to topple the regime and strengthen pro-Soviet elements in the Sandinista establishment.

24. The bulk of Nicaragua's military equipment and assistance has come from the USSR and its Communist allies, with other third parties providing modest levels of assistance (see table 1). Soviet military agreements are estimated to be worth at least \$100 million through 1981. Some equipment has been sent from the USSR to Cuba and Algeria and transshipped to the Sandinistas. Growing East European military cooperation with Nicaragua is almost certainly undertaken at Soviet behest. The Soviets also appear to be encouraging such parties as Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to provide military assistance and training to the Nicaraguans. The PLO apparently views its role in Nicaragua and its aid to revolutionaries elsewhere in the region at least partly as a guarantee of continued Soviet military and political support.

Table 1

**Military Equipment and Assistance Supplied
by Communist Countries to Nicaragua ***

USSR	Tanks, heavy amphibious ferries, armored personnel carriers, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, trucks, transport aircraft, helicopters, patrol craft, and training
Bulgaria	Pilot training
Czechoslovakia	Small arms
East Germany	Trucks and military equipment
Poland	Pilot training
Cuba	Machineguns, artillery, mortars, small arms, ammunition, and training
Vietnam	Small arms

* Among major items in this inventory are about 25 T-55 tanks, about 800 trucks, 12 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, six GSP heavy amphibious ferries, two MI-8 Hip helicopters, six AN-2 aircraft, one Zhuk-class patrol craft, 12 D-20 152-mm gun-howitzers, 48 ZIS-2 57-mm antitank guns, 12 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and more than 100 antiaircraft guns.

25. In contrast to at least 2,000 Cuban military and security personnel, the number of Soviet military personnel in Nicaragua is relatively modest—between 50 and 75. The Soviet contingent thus appears to be roughly equal in size to that from Eastern Europe (mainly East Germany), the Middle East (the PLO and Libya), or Asia (Vietnam and North Korea). However, many of the Soviets, along with their Cuban counterparts, seem to be acting as advisers to key members of the armed forces. Soviet military advisers are attached to the Nicaraguan General Staff, are assisting in the preparation of defensive contingency plans, and are probably providing intelligence support. Soviet military aides are also closely involved in plans to reorganize and improve various Nicaraguan military services, particularly the Air Force—where they have largely displaced the Cubans. Moreover, Soviet pilots and technicians who accompanied deliveries of several AN-2 air transport planes and two MI-8 helicopters last summer apparently are still there and have used this equipment to transport Nicaraguan military personnel.

26. The Soviets also plan to provide several AN-26 transport aircraft soon, and a group of Nicaraguan pilots reportedly are scheduled to go to the USSR for appropriate training. In addition, efforts to expand and upgrade some Nicaraguan airfields, coupled with reported training of Nicaraguan Air Force personnel in Cuba, Bulgaria, and probably elsewhere in Eastern Europe to fly MIGs, suggest that Moscow may have been planning future deliveries of fighter aircraft, including some already in Cuba. The recent US warning of the consequences of such a move, however, may have prompted deferral of such deliveries. Nevertheless, preparations for their arrival are continuing.

27. Moscow's apparent interest in avoiding high-visibility involvement in Nicaragua is derived partly from its desire not to provoke US countermeasures against either Nicaragua or the USSR. In working through intermediaries, especially in military matters, Moscow has sought to ensure that its prestige is not tied directly to the fate of the current regime in Managua. A more conspicuous Soviet role would also risk alienating Mexico, Panama, and other regional countries that are showing some signs of unease over the Nicaraguan military buildup. For these reasons, the Soviets prob-

ably will be content to continue to rely on allies and nonregional intermediaries to provide the bulk of military assistance to Nicaragua. However, Moscow will continue to build more direct channels of influence and make occasional direct deliveries of military equipment to test US reactions to expanding Soviet involvement.

28. *Grenada*. Moscow has appeared less certain about the long-term prospects of the leftist government in the small island state of Grenada and has been somewhat more circumspect in supporting it. Although the Soviets welcomed the leftist coup and have come to regard it as an authentic "anti-imperialist revolution," they have been reluctant thus far to open an embassy on the island. Their economic assistance to the Bishop government so far has also been modest, amounting to a little more than \$1 million in agricultural and construction aid and some limited technical assistance for the island's new television facility and two new radio transmitters far more powerful than the island requires for local broadcast needs.

29. In the area of military assistance, the Soviets have provided about three dozen military trucks and reportedly have offered military training in the USSR to about a dozen Grenadians. Moscow presumably also plays an indirect role through Cuban military assistance efforts, and has encouraged its East European allies to provide aid. Of particular importance is the 3,000-meter runway being built, principally by the Cubans, that will be capable of accommodating all known types of Cuban and Soviet aircraft.

30. There are signs that the USSR and Grenada may be moving to upgrade their relations. The Bishop government has established a diplomatic mission in Moscow—the first Grenadian embassy in the USSR—which could prompt a reciprocal move by Moscow. In recent months, key Grenadian military and political aides have also visited Moscow, presumably to seek additional Soviet economic and military aid.

31. *Suriname*. Recent developments in Suriname have given Moscow a new opportunity to develop relations with another regime with revolutionary/socialist pretensions in the Caribbean. The abortive March coup attempt against the government dominated by army commander Bouterse has been a major factor in the regime's decision to look for support from

Cuba. Havana has responded with a small shipment of arms, and promises of full military and economic support. Although the Soviets will probably let Cuba take the lead, they have already signaled their interest in exploiting the new situation by announcing that they will open a resident embassy in the near future.

32. *Guyana*. Soviet efforts to cultivate the leftist-leaning government of Forbes Burnham and his People's National Congress (PNC) in Guyana have been constrained by Moscow's longstanding relationship with the pro-Soviet People's Progressive Party (PPP) led by Cheddi Jagan. Although in the last year or two Moscow has moved somewhat away from the PPP, relations between Moscow and Burnham continue to be characterized by mistrust. Although the Soviets seem reluctant to extend economic aid to the financially hard-pressed government, they have sought to take advantage of the regime's economic problems by continuing to encourage a PPP-PNC coalition.

Support for Insurgencies and Revolution

33. Much of Moscow's support for insurgent and revolutionary movements in the hemisphere is covert, opportunistic, and flexible. Accordingly, the Soviets are expanding their links with leftists—particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—where growing revolutionary activity promises opportunities to install anti-US and potentially pro-Soviet regimes. Elsewhere, they have encouraged the several small orthodox Communist parties in the Caribbean to prepare for violent revolution and have called on the Chilean left to initiate armed struggle against the Pinochet regime.

34. Soviet support and guidance for Latin American revolutionary movements now focus upon:

- Encouragement of broad revolutionary coalitions, uniting pro-Soviet Communist parties with their traditional leftwing rivals.
- Creation of military components loyal to the revolutionary coalitions.
- Use of hemispheric and extrahemispheric intermediaries.
- Training of revolutionary cadres.

35. In El Salvador, Moscow has continued to support Communist participation in the Unified Revolu-

tionary Directorate, the umbrella organization conducting the insurgency, and has endorsed armed struggle as the left's best alternative. Moscow has facilitated the flow of arms and military equipment to the Salvadoran insurgents from Cuba and other third parties and has contributed logistic support to the operation. While generally supporting the entire revolutionary front, Moscow has strengthened the position of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) within it by funneling some of its assistance to the insurgents through the PCES. This has endowed the Salvadoran Communists with a degree of influence much greater than their numerical strength would warrant. In bolstering the position of the PCES, Moscow hopes to ensure that the party—and through it the USSR—will be well positioned to exert influence on events in El Salvador, especially if the leftist insurgency should succeed.

36. Despite this involvement, Moscow has tried to soft-pedal its role in El Salvador, partly to avoid provoking strong US countermeasures there that could spill over into Nicaragua and lead to further deterioration in relations with Washington. Moscow seemed to have been impressed by the Reagan administration's reaction to the situation in El Salvador and appears concerned that the outcome of the election in March 1982 may have significantly lessened the immediate prospects of the revolutionary left. However, the Soviets have taken comfort in the West European reluctance to endorse the elections. The Soviets also hope that actions by the political right in El Salvador will further complicate the US administration's efforts to mobilize Congressional support for additional military and economic support for that country, and, over the long term, assist the left. Although the Soviets appear less sanguine about the insurgents' short-term military prospects, they probably still believe that the insurgents can seize power through a prolonged armed struggle.

37. In Guatemala and Honduras, Moscow and its allies have also been pressuring the local Communists to join broad revolutionary fronts and participate in armed struggle. Cuba, probably supported by Moscow, has promised arms to Communists and other radical leftists if they unify. The Soviets have provided financial assistance and training and have encouraged various third parties to do the same. In the last few

years, for the first time since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have even resumed giving paramilitary training in the USSR to Honduran Communists. Moreover, in the last year or so, Soviet personnel in Cuba reportedly have participated in political training of Guatemalan Communists and have been more directly involved in giving tactical advice to the Guatemalan insurgents.

38. The Soviets and the Cubans have also pressured the Dominican Communist Party into a grudging agreement to prepare for eventual armed struggle in the Dominican Republic. Recently, however, they urged the party to join a united front with the leftist Dominican Liberation Party for the May 1982 national elections—a coalition that the local Communists nevertheless avoided. Moscow is also using the Dominican Communists to channel funds to the United Party of Haitian Communists, which reportedly is trying to organize a movement of Haitian exiles for the eventual ouster of President Duvalier. In addition, the USSR sponsors propaganda activities to enlist support for hemispheric revolutionaries through Soviet front organizations such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the World Peace Council.

39. In the case of Chile, the Soviets have adopted an openly militant line aimed at promoting a united armed struggle against the Pinochet regime. Moscow provided the chief of the Chilean Communist Party with a forum at the 26th CPSU Congress to call for armed revolution, and subsequently has broadcast similar messages to Chile by other Chilean and even Salvadoran Communists. Despite increasing calls to overthrow Pinochet, Moscow does not believe his demise is imminent and has not committed significant material resources to assist the Chilean Communists.

40. Moscow undoubtedly sees potential opportunities for the left in the political and social flux in Colombia, but has also been seeking good relations with the government in power. Its involvement with Colombian revolutionary groups, therefore, is more ambivalent. The Soviets have longstanding close ties with the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) but

the extent of their dealings with, and influence on, the party's paramilitary arm, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which is one of the country's most effective guerrilla groups, is uncertain. Since the mid-1970s, FARC has assumed a more independent and radical line than the PCC, which has publicly renounced violence as a means to gain power. Some top FARC leaders reportedly have received training in the USSR, and Moscow maintains some contact with the group through the PCC.

41. Nevertheless, the Soviets are not known to have opposed active Cuban support for insurgency in Colombia. Following the seizure of the Dominican Embassy in Bogota in 1980 by the M-19 guerrillas, the Cubans assumed responsibility for their training and subsequent infiltration into Colombia. These Cuban-directed efforts have caused some diplomatic embarrassment to the Soviets—for example, the cancellation of a visit by the President of Colombia that had long been sought by Moscow.

42. One of Moscow's newest and most effective tactics for the support of Latin American revolutionary movements involves the use of proxies and other third parties. Within the region, Cuba has recently been joined by Nicaragua in playing this instrumental role. Nicaragua maintains training camps for Latin American insurgents and acts as a funnel for transporting externally supplied arms into El Salvador, Guatemala, and—to a lesser extent—Honduras. Some Nicaraguan personnel reportedly have been functioning as advisers to the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas, and Nicaragua serves as a base for the Salvadoran guerrilla command structure. Extrahemispheric actors include most prominently the PLO, but Libya, Vietnam, and several East European countries have also participated. Latin Americans are sent for paramilitary and political training to sites in Cuba, Eastern Europe, Libya, and elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as the USSR itself. Arms and other support are shipped from or through a number of countries as a means of distancing the USSR from what would be seen as especially provocative acts.


Bilateral State-to-State Relations

43. In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, Moscow's policy has aimed largely at cultivating positive state-to-state relations. This approach has emphasized trade expansion and—in some cases—readiness to sell military hardware. Although these Soviet efforts have not usually been translated into increased Soviet influence, they have given some Latin American countries additional opportunities to assert their independence of the United States. By building on bilateral ties, the USSR also seeks to achieve specific economic objectives and hopes to gain broader political support for its policy initiatives in the hemisphere and elsewhere in the world.

44. *Economic.* The US-sponsored partial grain embargo following the invasion of Afghanistan, combined with Soviet agricultural problems, has intensified Soviet economic interest and activity in Latin America. It has led to a significant growth in grain purchases from Argentina as well as Brazil. Since 1980 the USSR has become Argentina's largest grain buyer, accounting for about 80 percent of that country's 1981 grain exports. Despite the Falklands crisis, this year's sales are still expected to be 11-12 million metric tons, or about one-fourth of the USSR's total grain imports—although the ultimate volume will depend upon the results of the Soviet grain harvest. The USSR and Argentina also have concluded a five-year agreement which calls for annual Soviet purchase of 60,000 to 100,000 metric tons of Argentine beef; 1981 purchases totaled 87,000 metric tons.

45. Such economic dealings with the USSR so far have paid handsome dividends for Latin American countries. Moscow has imported on a cash basis and has run massive trade deficits. (See chart.) According to the latest Soviet figures, Moscow's trade deficit with Argentina reached \$3.3 billion in 1981. Brazilian exports to the USSR have also boomed—increasing from 1980 by more than 100 percent to \$744 million in 1981—while imports totaled only some \$23 million. Such highly favorable trade arrangements are of great benefit to Argentina, and of more modest benefit to Brazil, in helping to offset their balance-of-payments deficits with other regions. Before the outbreak of the Falklands conflict, the Soviets—in response to their own hard currency stringencies—sought short-term credits from Argentina to cover grain purchases, but they did not appear to use the conflict to press this

Soviet Trade With Latin America and the Caribbean (Excluding Cuba)



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demand. Argentina, badly in need of hard currency from grain sales to finance its military activities, has been unwilling and unable to offer any short-term credits and, in fact, has requested advance hard currency payments from the USSR for impending grain deliveries. In the absence of an agreement on the issue, the USSR has obtained West European financing for its purchases.

46. Despite these deficits, the Soviets have derived certain benefits of their own from this trade. In addition to meeting urgent economic needs, the USSR was able to undercut the 1980 US grain embargo and blunt its potential for future use. The Soviets are pressing to develop the bigger Latin American countries—particularly Argentina and Brazil—into important markets for Soviet finished goods, especially equipment for hydropower projects. There are now almost 1,000 Soviet and East European civilian technicians in the region. (See table 2.)

47. The nuclear field is another important area in the growing relationship between the USSR and Argentina. In an attempt to diversify its sources of supply, Buenos Aires has turned to Moscow for zircaloy production equipment. Earlier this year, the two

Table 2
Soviet Bloc Civilian Technicians in
Latin America and the Caribbean, 1981

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Cuba
Total	5,570	350	580	4,640
Argentina.....	60	40	20	—
Bolivia.....	75	25	50	—
Brazil.....	105	30	75	—
Colombia.....	70	60	10	—
Ecuador.....	10	—	10	—
El Salvador.....	5	—	5	—
Grenada.....	575	25	50	500
Guyana.....	75	10	40	25
Jamaica.....	115	—	—	115
Mexico.....	125	25	100	—
Nicaragua.....	4,200	75	125	4,000
Panama.....	5	5	—	—
Peru.....	115	30	85	—
Uruguay.....	25	20	5	—
Venezuela.....	10	5	5	—

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countries signed a nuclear supply contract that calls for the Soviets to provide enrichment services and 1 ton of heavy water. Consistent with Moscow's opposition to nuclear weapons proliferation, this contract requires safeguard measures. By expanding a relationship with the most advanced nuclear development program in Latin America, Moscow probably hopes to become a welcomed supplier of highly lucrative nuclear materials to other regional states, such as Brazil.

48. The Soviets are also making an economic push in Brazil. Moscow's decision last year to sell oil there when it was reducing deliveries to its allies and other Third World countries reflected a desire to court the Brazilian Government as well as a pressing need for hard currency. Soviet oil exports to Brazil through 1982 will be 20,000 to 24,000 barrels per day, or about 3 percent of Brazil's oil requirements. Long-term trade agreements initiated by the two countries last year envision a trade turnover of \$5 billion over the next five years. According to the terms of the agreements, Brazil will supply agricultural products under long-term contracts while the Soviets will continue sales of crude and also provide turbines for Brazilian hydroelectric projects.

49. Moscow has also expanded technical exchanges with Brazil. Attracted by Moscow's willingness to

provide advanced technology on attractive financial terms, Brasilia has signed a technical service and financing agreement for the installation of Soviet ethanol manufacturing plants. The protocol calls for the construction of 15 facilities, with the USSR supplying equipment and nonconvertible commercial credits of up to 25 percent of total costs. Additionally, a Sao Paulo oil exploration company has agreed to Soviet assistance in evaluating the oil potential of the Parana basin. Moreover, Brasilia has also agreed to expanded Soviet participation in hydroelectric development, and has contracted for assistance in evaluating coal deposits and assessing the feasibility of advanced coal gasification techniques.

50. The Soviets are also increasing their economic and commercial activity in Mexico, albeit not rapidly. For the last seven years, Mexico has had observer status with CEMA. Despite a gradual expansion during this period, Mexican trade with the USSR still accounts for less than 1 percent of Mexico's foreign commerce. Discussions with the USSR on a quadrilateral oil swap underscore Mexico's openness to dealings with the Soviet Union, but Mexico's insistence on commercially viable arrangements may continue to restrict trade expansion. Moscow wants Mexico to ship oil to Cuba. In turn, the USSR would supply Mexican customers

in Europe. In addition to gaining substantial transportation savings, Moscow may think that the United States would be less likely to interrupt Mexican than Soviet shipments of oil if Washington resorted to an oil blockade of Cuba. The Soviets may also seek to obtain advanced US technology in Mexico, but Mexican efforts to avoid violating US export controls could limit Soviet opportunities.

51. *Military Sales and Training.* The Soviets' efforts to enter into military sales relationships have not kept pace with the growth of their economic relationships. Over the last decade, the USSR has secured only Peru—where it is now the primary supplier of air and ground equipment—as a major arms client. In the wake of the US refusal since the early 1960s to sell Peru sophisticated aircraft, a newly installed leftist military regime turned to the USSR in 1968 for military equipment. To date, Soviet military sales to Peru have amounted to more than \$1 billion. While some of this equipment is dated, it more than meets Peruvian requirements and has included sophisticated jet aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air and air-to-surface missile systems, and tanks. The Soviets have also been able to introduce their own military advisers for the first time into South America, and there are currently 125 to 150 Soviet military advisers and technicians in Peru. In addition, 2,000 to 3,000 Peruvians, including military and intelligence personnel, have been trained in the USSR, and Peruvian intelligence has a liaison relationship with the KGB.

52. Peru has sometimes taken pro-Soviet or at least anti-US positions, but Lima's military relationship has given the Soviets little leverage over Peruvian policies. While the Peruvian Army and Air Force continue to seek new and more advanced military equipment from the USSR, key civilian members of the current Belaunde government—including the President himself—are expressing a desire to reduce the degree of Peru's military dependence on Moscow, although the likelihood of this is low. Not only do the Peruvian Army and Air Force appear to value the Soviet tie, but the Falklands crisis has made the USSR more attractive as an arms supplier. The local Communist party remains an insignificant political force and Moscow has shied away from supporting more radical elements. The Soviets are conscious that promotion of violent struggle could cause the military to sever the

arms relationship and thereby severely set back Soviet interests. Moscow seems satisfied, at least for now, that the arms relationship represents its best entree, and hopes that over the longer term leftist and pro-Soviet elements will become stronger.

53. Despite Soviet arms sales to Peru, most of the Latin American military establishments, including those in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, have preferred Western-made arms, been suspicious of the Soviets, and repeatedly declined Moscow's offer of military equipment and joint training programs. These countries' officers corps are by and large staunchly anti-Communist, and their increasing concern over leftist gains in Central America will complicate Soviet efforts to make inroads in the military sales area.

54. Undoubtedly, Moscow hopes that its political support for Argentina in the Falklands dispute and interruptions in the supply of arms from some Western sources will make at least the Argentine military more receptive to Soviet offers. Such a move would be a difficult one for the Western- and US-trained Argentine military leadership, which has been particularly outspoken in its anti-Communism. Nevertheless, if Western restrictions on arms continue, Buenos Aires may seriously consider purchasing selected military equipment from the USSR to replace its losses and demonstrate disenchantment with the West. It is possible that Argentina might be more open to the acquisition of Soviet arms if they were supplied through an intermediary such as Peru. Moscow may believe that its chances of establishing arms supply relationships with some other governments in the region will be enhanced.

55. *Political.* On the political front, the Soviets have consistently sought to discredit US policy. They are prepared at every turn to capitalize on the Latin perception of decades of US political and economic pressure. Moscow has applauded demonstrations of independence from the United States, such as the refusal of Argentina, Brazil, and Peru to join in the US-sponsored trade sanctions against the USSR following the Afghanistan invasion. The Soviets have sought to exploit Mexico's opposition to US initiatives in El Salvador and to play on the differences between Mexico and the United States over how best to restore stability in Central America. Moscow is especially pleased to see differences between the United States

and Latin American countries regarding policy toward the USSR, and probably views such disagreements as signs of a further weakening of US influence and increase in its own.

56. The Soviets have tried to use the Falkland Islands dispute between Argentina and Great Britain to further ingratiate themselves with the government in Buenos Aires and elsewhere in the region. After initial hesitation, Moscow publicly supported Argentina and apparently passed limited intelligence information to Buenos Aires. Nevertheless, Moscow did not approve the invasion, nor has it formally endorsed Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falklands, although it has depicted Argentine policy in positive terms as a continuation of the process of decolonization.

57. Moscow has intensified its diplomatic and political efforts to improve its capabilities and demonstrate the importance it attaches to bilateral ties with the states in the area. In the last year or so, the Latin American section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry has been expanded and a new department created to emphasize more narrow regional expertise in handling the growing volume of contacts. During this period, the Soviets also have begun to send higher level visitors to Latin America. In the spring of 1981, for example, Politburo candidate member Rashidov visited Brazil. More recently, in April 1982, Politburo candidate member Aliyev, accompanied by Brezhnev's personal senior foreign policy aide, paid a visit to Mexico City. Moscow, for its part, has played host to visits by Mexican President Lopez Portillo in 1978 and subsequently his foreign and defense ministers. While these visits have not resulted in any significant agreements between Mexico and the USSR, the publicity accorded to them by the two countries reflects the symbolic importance that both attach to their bilateral ties.

58. Even in countries where the USSR's policy is keyed to developing bilateral state-to-state ties, Moscow continues to conduct a variety of covert activities and other "active measures" to improve its position and play upon domestic vulnerabilities over the longer term. These activities include:

- Funding local Communist parties and front organizations.

- Disseminating disinformation and forgeries aimed at the United States.
- Drumming up support for hemispheric revolutionaries.
- Infiltrating military and security services as well as other important sectors of governmental bureaucracies.
- Manipulating the media and mass organizations.
- Cultivating pro-Soviet sentiments among academics and students.
- Developing and using agents of influence, mainly through the Cubans.

59. To Moscow, the local orthodox Communist parties are essentially instruments of Soviet policy (for sizes of parties, see table 3). The USSR provides funds to most Latin American Communist parties and is encouraging them to become more active, particularly in organizing broad coalitions of the left. In Mexico, for example, in keeping with Moscow's longstanding desire to forge greater unity among the local leftists, top-level Soviet party officials took part in negotiations preceding last year's fusion of the Mexican Communist Party with four smaller leftist parties. The Soviets also tried to pressure other Mexican leftist groups—including two parties that have been co-opted by the government—into joining the new leftist coalition. Their subsequent decision to ease such pressure presumably reflects their awareness of the limits of Soviet influence with some local leftists and a desire not to antagonize the Mexican Government. Nevertheless, the Soviets probably calculate that such low-key involvement in strengthening Communist parties in the existing political systems poses little immediate risk to their state-to-state relations. The Soviets and Cubans employ their state-to-state and covert leftist contacts in Mexico to undermine US influence within the region. They are using Mexico as a base from which to conduct "active measures" against other countries.

60. The Soviets have also stepped up their propaganda activities in the area over the last several years. These efforts aim both to discredit US policy in the hemisphere and to strengthen leftist elements. Moscow, for example, has directed its representatives in Latin America to spread false accusations about the

Table 3

Pro-Soviet Communist Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean

Country	Estimated Population, Mid-1981	Communist Party	
		Estimated Membership	Status
Argentina.....	28,130,000	45,000	Proscribed
Bolivia.....	5,490,000	500	Proscribed
Brazil.....	124,800,000	6,000	Proscribed
Chile.....	11,162,000	20,000	Proscribed
Colombia.....	25,217,000	12,000	Legal
Costa Rica.....	2,332,000	3,200 (PVP)	Legal
Dominican Republic.....	5,855,000	6,000	Legal
Ecuador.....	8,275,000	1,000	Legal
El Salvador.....	4,610,000	800	Proscribed
Guadeloupe.....	304,000	3,000	Legal
Guatemala.....	7,310,000	750 (PGT)	Proscribed
Guyana.....	857,000	Unknown (PPP)	Legal
Haiti.....	5,923,000	350 (PUCH)	Proscribed
Honduras.....	3,940,000	1,500	Proscribed
Jamaica.....	2,268,000	Unknown (WPJ)	Legal
Martinique.....	302,000	1,000	Legal
Mexico.....	69,100,000	112,000*	Legal
Nicaragua.....	2,559,000	250 (PSN)	Legal
Panama.....	1,928,000	550 (PPP)	Legal
Paraguay.....	3,268,000	3,500	Proscribed
Peru.....	18,119,000	3,000	Legal
Uruguay.....	2,944,000	7,000	Proscribed
Venezuela.....	17,913,000	4,500	Legal

* This figure is the total membership claimed for a Communist-dominated coalition called the Unified Party of Mexico (PSUM), which is somewhat more independent in orientation than the other parties listed in the table.

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reasons for Washington's tilt toward Britain on the Falklands dispute. The Soviets have also used front organizations such as the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the World Federation of Trade Unions to mobilize support for Central American and Caribbean revolutionary groups. Moreover, through its greatly expanded English-language, medium-wave coverage (relayed from Cuba), Radio Moscow now blankets the Caribbean.

61. In keeping with the pattern elsewhere in the Third World, the Soviets try to infiltrate the bureaucracy of the host government. In the case of Jamaica under Michael Manley, for example, the KGB developed contacts with a wide range of Jamaican political figures—including Manley and government ministers—and helped Manley to organize a special intelligence unit to monitor his political opponents and US

activities. The KGB was also in close contact with some of Manley's radical supporters who employed violence against the opposition. Yet, at the same time, the Soviets regarded the regime as unstable and proved unwilling to provide significant economic assistance, which might have helped to ensure its survival. Moscow is now apparently seeking to pursue correct and businesslike relations with the current government of Edward Seaga, if only to retain a Soviet presence in Jamaica, while continuing to maintain contacts with local leftist groups.

62. The Soviets are also educating numerous Latin American and Caribbean students in the USSR to improve Moscow's image, establish a cadre of local sympathizers, and spot and evaluate potential agents for the Soviet intelligence services. Moscow reportedly offers hundreds of scholarships per year to students from countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,

Table 4
Academic Students From Latin America and the Caribbean in the USSR and Eastern Europe, ^a 1956-81 ^b

	Departures to the USSR and Eastern Europe						Being Trained as of		
	1956-81			1981			December 1981		
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe
Total	13,955	8,785	5,170	1,390	945	445	6,800	4,360	2,440
Argentina.....	450	235	215	10	5	5	35	25	10
Belize.....	20	20	—	5	5	—	20	20	—
Bolivia.....	910	520	390	20	10	10	105	65	40
Brazil.....	560	290	270	20	5	15	45	30	15
Chile.....	730	530	200	10	5	5	70	40	30
Colombia.....	1,565	975	590	110	100	10	1,015	555	460
Costa Rica.....	910	560	350	100	50	50	670	385	285
Dominica.....	10	5	5	10	5	5	10	5	5
Dominican Republic.....	925	700	225	150	125	25	800	700	100
Ecuador.....	1,805	1,070	735	190	140	50	835	355	480
El Salvador.....	305	160	145	10	5	5	85	30	55
French West Indies.....	155	100	55	15	10	5	75	45	30
Grenada.....	40	40	—	20	20	—	40	40	—
Guatemala.....	145	120	25	20	15	5	80	55	25
Guyana.....	350	140	210	20	5	15	95	20	75
Haiti.....	170	85	85	10	5	5	40	25	15
Honduras.....	470	295	175	50	25	25	230	125	105
Jamaica.....	65	35	30	10	5	5	55	25	30
Mexico.....	735	460	275	35	25	10	140	80	60
Nicaragua.....	725	450	275	250	150	100	425	260	165
Panama.....	1,000	650	350	175	100	75	1,000	650	350
Paraguay.....	20	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	—
Peru.....	1,315	1,005	310	145	125	20	795	770	25
Uruguay.....	65	35	30	—	—	—	—	—	—
Venezuela.....	510	295	215	5	5	—	135	55	80

^a Excludes Yugoslavia.

^b Cuba may have received more Latin American students than all other Communist countries combined. Students from virtually every country in the region have been noted at various schools in Cuba since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, and many of them have received paramilitary training.

Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela to study in the USSR at Lumumba University (see table 4). The Soviet interest in cultivating organized labor in the area has also increased. For example, the USSR now has formal ties with the Nicaraguan trade union organization and maintains an educational exchange program with trade unionists from Colombia.

63. The Soviets have profited from the growth of pro-Marxist sentiments among religious activists. They have been especially impressed with the direct support such activists have provided the Sandinista regime and other revolutionary causes elsewhere in Central Amer-

ica. Growing resistance among church leaders to this de facto partnership between religion and revolution notwithstanding, Moscow and Havana probably will seek to benefit from the sympathies of many church activists for leftist revolution in the region.

Constraints

64. Despite its increased optimism about trends in Latin America, Moscow recognizes that there are major constraints on its ability to influence developments there. Foremost is the attitude and role of the United States. Moscow believes that US political, economic, and military strength still gives Washington potential for considerable leverage in the hemisphere.

65. Moscow has therefore moved in ways designed to avoid directly provoking the United States. In contrast to the USSR's overt and direct bilateral dealings with the larger states, its support for revolutionary movements has been low-key, often employing intermediaries and surrogates. This pattern of indirect support also reflects Soviet uncertainty about the long-term prospects of revolutionary movements and unwillingness to commit the USSR irretrievably to respond to possible US actions against them. Furthermore, Moscow has been careful to play down its direct commitment to the Sandinista regime and has apparently not sought a "friendship" treaty with Nicaragua as it has with some Third World clients outside the Western Hemisphere.

66. More important, the Soviets have displayed concern about the application of US political and military leverage in response to the crisis in Central America. The Reagan administration's frank warnings have emphasized that Washington is indeed sensitive to Moscow's efforts to exploit political instability in its own backyard and that such activities there might well trigger a strong US reaction. The level of arms deliveries to Cuba in 1981—the second-highest annual total on record—and the Soviet efforts to build up Nicaragua's military forces are to a degree indicative of this anxiety. At the same time these measures provide Cuban and Nicaraguan armed forces with increased offensive capabilities and with further means to intimidate neighbors and provide safehaven for leftist insurgents.

67. Antipathy to the Soviets is another constraint on Moscow. Even those governments that have developed important bilateral ties with the USSR, such as Argentina and Brazil, remain strongly anti-Communist and distrustful of Soviet motives with respect to their domestic politics. Brazil, for example, out of fear of Soviet intelligence penetration, has even refused to accept Soviet military attaches. The Brazilians have also kept the USSR out of areas that they consider of strategic importance, such as the nuclear program and uranium exploration efforts. In addition, the Brazilian Communist Party remains outlawed and is closely monitored by the security authorities. Thus, in the near term Moscow recognizes that more extensive and open backing for leftist insurgencies in Central America would risk a backlash against the USSR by regional

governments and reinforce their suspicions of Soviet-inspired interference in their internal politics. Such backing would also stimulate anti-Communist elements among important social groups, especially the various churches.

68. Moreover, economic considerations also impose some constraints on Soviet activism in the region. Foremost are the poor quality, technological backwardness, and narrow range of Soviet industrial goods, which are compounded by the area's historical preference for Western goods. Taken together, these factors severely limit Soviet export prospects. In cases where Moscow might hope to make political inroads through imports from Latin American or Caribbean countries, its severe shortage of hard currency is a major constraint. Finally, the USSR's record of tightfistedness with regard to economic assistance deprives it of further opportunities to assist pro-Soviet regimes or otherwise gain influence in the region.

69. Another constraint on Moscow is the unstable nature of new leftist regimes and its recognition that its influence is dependent on local political trends that it may be unable to control. The electoral ouster of Manley in Jamaica was a key case in point, and the Bishop regime in Grenada faces economic problems that could generate political discontent. The Soviets probably are still uncertain whether the new revolutionary regimes in Nicaragua and Grenada can survive. The Soviets see Nicaragua's Sandinistas under considerable pressure from the United States and formerly sympathetic European socialists. They also see Nicaragua increasingly beset by a wide variety of political opponents, armed counterrevolutionaries, and mounting economic problems.

Prospects and Implications for the United States

70. Moscow's long-term objectives of eroding and supplanting US influence in Latin America are unlikely to be affected by its recognition of the obstacles to its ambitions under present power realities and the political climate in the hemisphere. In fact, over the next few years, Soviet efforts to gain influence in the region are likely to increase and will probably present more serious problems for the United States. Washington's response to this growing Soviet challenge will be complicated by the fact that its own deep concern about Soviet troublemaking in the area is not shared

by many regional governments. Sympathy with revolutionary causes will persist in countries such as Mexico and Panama. Even countries less sympathetic to leftist causes such as Brazil and Venezuela would be opposed to US military intervention to check revolutionary gains in Central America and the Caribbean.

71. The Soviets will continue to use both state-to-state and revolutionary approaches, depending on the situation. Moscow probably will continue to judge that in the long term it has a great deal to gain by continuing to develop positions of influence in the more politically significant countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. It will couple this interest with its exploitation of ferment in countries embroiled in insurgencies or ruled by unstable regimes.

72. Uncertainty about US intentions is the dominant consideration in Soviet thinking about risks and gains in exploiting regional opportunities. Without abandoning its support for revolution, Moscow is likely at present to minimize risk by recommending tactical prudence to its regional clients Cuba and Nicaragua. Moscow's recent endorsement of calls for talks between Nicaragua and the United States, for example, probably reflects its interest in easing US pressure and buying time for the beleaguered Sandinista regime, as well as in cutting its own costs.

73. So far, the Soviets have been reluctant to provide Nicaragua with massive economic aid. Nonetheless, if the Sandinista regime falters for economic reasons, Moscow and its allies probably would be somewhat more forthcoming with economic support. Because Nicaragua's population is much smaller than Cuba's, and because Managua seems at this time to enjoy broader international economic backing than did Havana in the 1960s, in the near term at least the Soviets would almost certainly not have to assume the kind of economic burden that they have been carrying in Cuba for two decades.

74. Intensified pressure on Managua by Nicaraguan dissident armed elements may be seen by Moscow as posing a potential long-term threat to the Sandinista regime, yet as also offering an opportunity to draw Nicaragua still closer to the Soviet Bloc. Moscow will probably counsel Managua to avoid countermeasures provocative to the United States—such as armed

forays deep into Honduras—but may assume a more active role in planning Nicaragua's counterinsurgency measures, and might expand its military assistance.

75. In the event Nicaragua were subject to direct conventional attack, it would have to rely primarily on Havana rather than Moscow for immediate assistance. The Cubans concluded a secret defense agreement with Managua in late 1979 and almost certainly would commit their personnel stationed in Nicaragua, as well as additional Cuban forces, to resist any such attack short of a direct invasion by US forces. The Soviets have not, so far as we know, promised direct Soviet support in this eventuality, but presumably they would step up military aid to the Cubans. Moscow's other allies and clients could not be expected to provide much more than political support.

76. The large and growing levels of military hardware in the hands of Soviet clients have major implications for the region. In addition to defending both Cuba and Nicaragua against attack, such military power—especially in Nicaragua—facilitates support to the Salvadoran insurgents and provides sheiter for the guerrilla infrastructure. Within the term of this Estimate, other objectives behind arms supply from the USSR and various intermediaries probably include:

- Intimidating Nicaragua's neighbors, thus disposing them toward acquiescence in the Soviet-Cuban foothold in Central America.
- Supporting insurgents in Guatemala.
- Laying the groundwork for support of possible future insurgencies in Honduras, Costa Rica, and elsewhere in the hemisphere.

77. Over the longer term, there is also a possibility that the Soviets may seek access to naval and air facilities in Nicaragua and Grenada. Such access would have a significant impact on US security interests, especially with regard to the Panama Canal and other lines of communication. The principal constraint on the Soviets in expanding their military presence in Central America and the Caribbean is their uncertainty as to the US response. Nevertheless, they are very likely to continue to probe US resolve during this decade.

78. The persistent strain of anti-US sentiment in the region, which has been accentuated by the Falklands

crisis, offers the Soviets some new opportunities to expand their influence. However, Soviet initiatives are of less intrinsic significance than US policies and actions. The Soviets probably have no firm expectation of any dramatic new political payoffs in the near term, although they probably do hope that their support will moderate local suspicions of Moscow and enable them to project an image of the USSR as a distant but powerful supporter of Latin American and anti-colonial interests. They may also calculate that the outcome of the crisis could usher in a period of political instability and open prospects for those in Buenos Aires who might be more inclined toward closer relations with the USSR. The Soviets are already seeking to profit from any general deterioration in US influence in the hemisphere arising out of the Falklands crisis, but they realize that Washington's losses cannot be immediately chalked up as Moscow's gains.

79. US efforts to build hemispheric solidarity with the current Salvadoran Government and to gain Latin American support for countering Soviet-supported leftist insurgency elsewhere in Central America have been damaged. The Soviets are certain to attempt to exploit what they perceive as a US setback. They will

continue to conduct many of their activities in the region either covertly or through intermediaries. Although generally successful to date, this tactic is vulnerable to public exposure of Soviet support for subversion and revolutionary violence. Furthermore, some Soviet intermediaries (such as Cuba, Algeria, or the PLO) might possibly be led to moderate their policies through a combination of external pressure and internal problems.

80. The Soviets have by and large successfully implemented a policy of encouraging unrest in various Central American states, gaining a foothold in Nicaragua, and improving their relations with the governments of the more important South American countries. They probably expect their general progress to continue, especially if the United States appears to be inconsistent, or discredits itself through its reactions to events in the region. From the Soviet perspective, such a policy has potential for distracting American attention from other regions; is relatively cheap in economic terms; has not required major commitments to local allies; and has not raised confrontation with the United States to an unmanageable level. The Soviets are thus likely to persist with this strategy.

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