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Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB
Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces through mid-1967, especially against the Central Region of NATO, and general trends in those forces over the next ten years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The new Soviet political leaders appear to have modified Khrushchev's policy of curbing military costs at the expense of the general purpose forces. This change is probably attributable primarily to international tensions arising from the war in Vietnam, but it also reflects the increased influence of the ground force marshals. (*Paras. 1-9*)

B. Revisions in the force levels, organization, and deployment of the general purpose forces are virtually certain to occur in the course of the next ten years. The Soviets will probably improve the capabilities of their general purpose forces for non-nuclear war. The provision of more advanced weapon systems will increase the military effectiveness of the general purpose forces, but will also increase their cost. Over the longer term we foresee some reductions in personnel strength designed to hold this increasing cost within limits acceptable to the Soviet leadership. (*Paras. 10-12*)

C. We estimate that the USSR now has about 108 line divisions which are capable of participating in the initial operations of a war. These divisions have virtually all of their equipment. Their peacetime manning levels range from at least 90 percent of war strength in the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe to about 60 percent in the interior of the USSR. We estimate that the USSR has an additional 31 cadre divisions manned at an average of about 20 percent of full

strength. Our confidence in these figures is higher than last year as a consequence of more intensive study and new information. (*Paras. 13-27*)

D. The Soviets have significantly increased their tactical rocket and missile support in the past year. Further increases are likely, as well as the introduction of systems of improved range and mobility. We believe that as the capabilities of tactical aircraft improve the numbers of aircraft in Tactical Aviation will gradually decline.[1] (*Paras. 28-36*)

E. During the past year there has been a marked increase in the tempo of Soviet naval activity; a larger number of units have operated at a distance from Soviet waters. We believe that Soviet naval capabilities for operations far from home bases will continue to increase over the next ten years with the introduction into the forces of more long-range submarines and support ships. (*Paras. 47-53, 59*)

F. The USSR is seriously concerned about the Polaris threat to the homeland and has intensified efforts to improve its antisubmarine warfare capabilities. We estimate that, even so, the Soviet capability to detect, identify, and destroy submarines operating in the open seas will remain severely limited for the next several years. (*Paras. 54-57*)

G. The Soviets have shown increasing interest in airborne and amphibious capabilities in support of theater operations. Over the next ten years they will probably improve these capabilities and seek to develop some capability for distant limited military action. (*Paras. 60-66*)

H. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have 45 divisions and about 2,900 combat aircraft immediately available for employment against the Central Region of NATO. We believe, however, that if the Soviets planned to attack NATO they would reinforce these forces, if circumstances permitted, with additional ground and air forces from the western USSR. (*Paras. 67-76*)

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[1] The ACS/Intelligence, USAF is unable to reconcile Conclusion B, which estimates a probable improvement in capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces for non-nuclear warfare, with this conclusion that there will be a further increase in tactical missiles which are cost-effective only with nuclear/CW warheads, but a reduction in Tactical Aviation, which has an iron bomb as well as a nuclear and air defense capability. He notes further that reduction of Tactical Aviation as predicted in each of the past several years has not materialized. He would substitute the following for the final sentence:

"Barring a marked change in the overall structure and size of Soviet general purpose forces we believe that the numbers of aircraft in Tactical Aviation will remain about the same as at present, and introduction of new aircraft will provide improved capabilities."

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

1. Despite the rapid and costly development of Soviet forces for strategic attack and defense, the general purpose forces remain the largest and most expensive element in the Soviet military establishment. Khrushchev, concerned with economic growth and consumer satisfaction, sought to check rising military costs. Because he gave priority to strategic attack and defense, he could accomplish this only by reducing the share of the military budget allocated to the general purpose forces. In 1960 he initiated drastic reductions in their strength. As the result of military opposition, which was strengthened by the Berlin crisis in 1961, these reductions were suspended, but Khrushchev continued to press for further cuts in the general purpose forces.

2. Khrushchev's policy of cutting back the general purpose forces was based on a strategy of deterrence which placed first reliance on strategic rocket forces. These forces, he held, would also be most effective should deterrence fail, since a general nuclear war would be of short duration and its outcome would be determined by the initial nuclear exchange. Subsequent operations, in his view, could have only minor effects, and large scale theater operations would be inconceivable in the aftermath of a massive nuclear exchange.

3. Khrushchev's views were strongly opposed by the military establishment in general. The more conservative marshals vigorously defended the utility of large general purpose forces, contending that large-scale and protracted land campaigns would be indispensable for victory in a general nuclear war; they concluded, not that these forces had no further role to play, but rather that they faced new and demanding requirements. The position eventually adopted by most important Soviet military leaders, including Marshal Malinovskiy, was a compromise. This accepted the decisiveness of nuclear weapons and the probability that a general war would be short, but it also held that such a war might be protracted and that the requirement for large theater forces continued into the nuclear era.

The Policy of the New Leadership

4. The men who displaced Khrushchev face the same problems that confronted him regarding the proper allocation of Soviet resources. They are no less concerned than he to promote economic growth and to strengthen Soviet strategic attack and defense capabilities, but they appear to have relaxed the pressure which he exerted to limit expenditures for the general purpose forces. This change is probably attributable primarily to the increased international tensions arising from the war in Vietnam, but it reflects also the increased influence of the Soviet marshals.

5. The recent restoration of Marshal Chuykov to command of the ground forces is the most definite indication of a change in policy. He is a strong advocate of the maintenance of large ground forces. His bold public defense of his views when he was relieved of that command in 1964 made his return to it unlikely unless there had been a change in policy in the direction which he advocated. Consequently we believe there will be a slight increase in the strength of Soviet general purpose forces, and that they will number some two million men by the end of 1965.[2]

6. Khrushchev's fall was accompanied by expressions of military disapproval of his preoccupation with nuclear armed missiles to the detriment of other military requirements. Ever since 1961 there have been indications of a growing acceptance of the possibility of non-nuclear conflict between nuclear powers. In June of this year Marshal Rotmistrov, predicting a nuclear stalemate between the US and the USSR, suggested that the ground forces might again become the decisive factor, in either a nuclear or a non-nuclear situation. Twice within the past six months Marshal Malinovskiy has spoken of the possibility of a non-nuclear war. Marshal Sokolovskiy recently observed that a situation of nuclear stalemate requires constant reappraisal of the relative roles of strategic and general purpose forces.

7. Thus the Soviet conviction that any conflict between nuclear powers must inevitably and quickly escalate into general nuclear war is now undergoing some modification. We believe that the Soviet leaders are increasingly prepared to contemplate the possibility of non-nuclear warfare between nuclear powers. Nevertheless, they almost certainly still consider that any conflict with NATO in Europe would carry grave risk of escalation to general nuclear war.

8. There has been no perceptible weakening of Soviet insistence that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war would trigger a strategic exchange. While this doctrine serves deterrent purposes in part, it also represents an apparent Soviet conviction that escalation under such circumstances would be well-nigh uncontrollable. We do not believe that Soviet doctrine regarding the limited use of nuclear weapons will change in the foreseeable future, and we consider it highly unlikely that the USSR would initiate the use of such weapons in a limited conflict. If the Western powers were to do so, we believe that, doctrine notwithstanding, the Soviets would seek to prevent escalation to general war.

9. There have been no major changes in deployment of Soviet general purpose forces during the past year. However, after the collapse of border talks between the USSR and Communist China in August 1964, Soviet forces on the Manchurian border were strengthened by a motorized rifle division which was probably redeployed from the western USSR. Moreover, within the past year, internal shifts in the Far East moved elements of two other Soviet divisions

[2] The numbers and distribution of manpower in all the Soviet military forces will be discussed in NIE 11-4-66, "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," scheduled for completion in April 1966.

closer to the Chinese border. Khrushchev's successors have avoided reopening the territorial issue, and the border problem appears to have lapsed into a state of armed quiescence. However, the Soviet units moved there in last year's crisis remain in position.

Trends to 1975

10. Revisions in the force levels, organization, and deployment of the general purpose forces are virtually certain to occur in the course of the next ten years. Such changes are more likely to result from technical military and economic considerations than from external political developments. A substantial relaxation of tensions between the USSR and the West would tend to aggravate tensions between the USSR and Communist China, and vice versa. Hence the Soviet authorities are not likely to find in the development of the international situation any warrant for a substantial reduction in general purpose forces, although the degree of tension may have marginal effects, as in the Berlin crisis of 1961.

11. Economic considerations will continue to be a major factor affecting the development of the general purpose forces. The provision of more advanced weapon systems will increase their military effectiveness, but will also increase their cost. Over the longer term we foresee some reductions in personnel strength designed to hold this increasing cost within limits acceptable to the Soviet leadership.

12. The principal changes over the next decade will probably be in the structure of the general purpose forces, particularly if the Soviets should decide to emphasize preparation for contingencies other than general nuclear war. Such a decision would imply, among other changes, a smaller number of larger divisions and increased provisions for combat and logistic support. Some restructuring along these lines is probable, but it is likely to occur only very gradually.

II. SOVIET THEATER GROUND FORCES

General Characteristics

13. The present structure of the Soviet theater ground forces presupposes a general war against NATO beginning with a massive nuclear exchange, including Soviet nuclear attack on targets in Western Europe. In the aftermath of such an exchange, the Soviet theater ground forces are expected to advance rapidly and seize critical objectives before NATO forces have recovered from the destruction and disorganization resulting from the initial nuclear bombardment. In designing forces for this task, the Soviets have assigned the primary maneuver role to armor and have emphasized speed, shock effect, and tactical nuclear firepower.

14. In keeping with this concept, the Soviet theater ground forces are now characterized by a large number of heavily armored line divisions which, even

at full strength, are substantially smaller than US divisions. Although Soviet divisions generally have less equipment than US divisions, they have a high proportion of tanks relative to manpower. They have less organic combat and service support than US divisions, even considering their difference in size, and are backed up by less nondivisional combat and service support. These differences, however, are attributable to a different concept of employment emphasizing speed and shock effect at the expense of staying power. For that reason, any evaluation of Soviet ground units in terms of equivalents or percentage equivalents of nominally corresponding US units can be of little value in portraying relative combat capabilities.

15. The Soviet concentration upon the requirements for a rapid advance in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange has impaired the capabilities of their theater ground forces for action in other circumstances. In particular, the proportion of infantry, conventional artillery, tactical air support, and logistic support provided is not so well suited to the requirements of a sustained conflict. If events should not develop according to the Soviet scenario—if in a nuclear war the Soviet advance should be held up by NATO resistance, or if the conflict should be non-nuclear—the Soviet theater ground forces would be handicapped by their relative lack of provision for sustained action. The armaments provided for use by the theater ground forces in a general nuclear war do provide formidable inherent capabilities to wage tactical nuclear warfare or non-nuclear warfare, but they are not what they would have been if those contingencies had been the basis of Soviet planning.

16. It is possible that a realignment within the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), portends an effort to enhance the capabilities of Soviet ground forces for sustained combat. A motorized rifle division is now incorporated into each of two tank armies in the GSFG, and one of these armies includes an artillery brigade. Such infantry and artillery elements are not in the normal complement of Soviet tank armies. We have no evidence that service support units are being strengthened, but this could easily escape detection. However, any general reorganization of Soviet ground forces along the lines observed in the GSFG would probably extend over a period of years.

Categories and Numbers of Divisions

17. Soviet military writings refer to line divisions at three different levels of strength and preparedness: at or near full strength, reduced strength, and cadre. We designate these levels as Categories I, II, and III. Category I divisions are those divisions maintained in the highest state of peacetime readiness for commitment to combat; Category II divisions are intended for early reinforcement of Category I divisions and probably could be ready to move in a week or so; Category III divisions are intended to provide a base for reserve training and mobilization. It is difficult to distinguish Category II divisions at their highest manning levels from Category I divisions at their lowest. Category I divisions in Germany, Poland, and Hungary are probably manned at 90 percent of TO

strength or better.[3] The manning levels of Category I divisions are probably lower in the border military districts of the USSR and lowest in districts in the interior of the USSR. We estimate that Category II divisions are manned at about 60 to 75 percent of TO, and that Category III divisions are manned at only 10-30 percent.

18. We estimate that the Soviets now have 108 line divisions at Category I or II readiness. Our confidence in this figure is higher than last year as a consequence of more intensive study and new information. Some 55 of these are motorized rifle divisions, 46 are tank divisions, and 7 are airborne divisions.[4] We estimate that there are also some 31 Category III motorized rifle divisions, although this number may be as low as 24 or as high as 39. This range reflects uncertainty as to whether all of the entities counted are in fact divisions.

Armies, Fronts, and TVDs

19. There are 19 Soviet field armies (including 5 in the GSFG), 9 corps,[5] and 2 groups of forces in Poland and Hungary. There are in addition 23 Category I and II divisions that are either directly subordinate to military district headquarters or of undetermined subordination. Finally, there are 7 airborne divisions (Category I and II) which are centrally controlled by a directorate in Moscow.[6]

20. The Soviets maintain two types of field armies, the divisional composition of which varies according to their mission, the terrain, and the opposing forces. The combined-arms army (CAA) usually consists of two to four motorized rifle divisions and one tank division plus non-divisional combat and service support troops. Although we believe that a typical CAA (three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division) would have about 60,000 men at full wartime strength, the present strength of the three CAAs in GSFG varies between 37,000 and 47,000. We estimate that the existing peacetime CAAs have 8,000 to 13,000 men in non-divisional elements rather than the nearly 20,000 which would be expected in wartime. Existing tank armies contain three or four tank divisions. They have 6,000 to 11,000 men in non-divisional support as opposed to an estimated wartime strength of 15,000 men in such elements. We estimate that the

[3] We estimate the TO strength of a motorized rifle division to be 10,500 men; and of a tank division to be 8,500 men.

[4] Motorized rifle divisions typically are organized into three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment as maneuver elements, while tank divisions have three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment. Tank regiments are equipped with medium tanks, except that in a few tank divisions one regiment is equipped with heavy tanks; motorized rifle regiments have one organic tank battalion. Airborne divisions are similar in structure to the motorized rifle divisions, but are considerably smaller, having no tank units and less artillery.

[5] A Soviet corps is not an intermediate echelon between division and army, but is rather, in effect, a small army.

[6] Table I gives the estimated number of Soviet line divisions, by geographic area, category of readiness, and type of division.

strength of a wartime tank army with four tank divisions would be 49,000 men. However, the two tank armies in GSFG currently have five divisions and about 50,000 men each.

21. In the event of war, most Soviet field armies would be grouped into *fronts*. The GSFG can be considered the nearest equivalent of a wartime Soviet *front* currently operational. It contains two tank armies, three combined arms armies, and one tactical air army. *Front*-level ground units in the GSFG include about 16,000 men in combat support, 25,000 in headquarters and service support, and over 10,000 in miscellaneous housekeeping functions. In wartime, the military districts on the borders of the USSR would provide the basis for the creation of additional *fronts*.

22. The Soviets currently envisage general war campaigns broken down into theaters of military operations (TVDs). Those in Europe are designated Western, Northwestern, and Southwestern. The Soviets may plan to provide a theater headquarters for each TVD.

Ground Forces Training

23. In peacetime, Soviet conscripts are assigned directly to units and are trained almost entirely within those units. There is no large separate training establishment. The one-third turnover in conscript troop strength each year due to the three year conscription period causes a drop in combat efficiency each autumn as recruits replace trained men. This problem and the increasing technical complexity of Soviet theater forces have caused the Soviets to offer additional inducements to technically trained enlisted men to reenlist. In general, the ground forces conduct extensive individual and unit training, but Soviet efforts to conserve funds and to avoid wear and tear on new equipment tend to limit the effectiveness of their field training program.

Land Armaments

24. The USSR has made a major effort to modernize the equipment of its ground forces, but the potential of the Soviet armaments industry has not been fully utilized. Khrushchev's efforts to economize on expenditures for the general purpose forces apparently resulted in considerable stretch-outs in land armament programs. Much old-model equipment remains in the hands of the troops; in general, improved models have been introduced into combat units at a very gradual rate. Some newer models have been superseded by more improved ones before their distribution has been completed. The older equipment remains militarily usable, of course, but some models (e.g., the older armored personnel carriers still in use) are not well suited to the requirements of Soviet operational concepts.

25. Nevertheless, the Soviets continue gradually to improve the quality of equipment in the hands of troops. For example, the new T-62 tanks arriving in the GSFG may soon be sufficient to reequip one regiment in each tank division. The old BTR-152 armored personnel carriers in the GSFG are being

replaced by the tracked BTR-50p and the eight-wheeled BTR-60p, but the progress of replacement has proved to be extremely slow. The 122 mm (1963) gun howitzer with increased range and a 360 degree traverse is being gradually introduced into artillery units. Increased distribution of new pontoon bridging equipment is providing GSFG units with greater river-crossing capabilities. A new anti-tank missile, which we have designated Sagger, was recently displayed for the first time in a Moscow parade and has already appeared in the GSFG.

26. The Soviets go to great lengths to conserve their equipment in units. They also maintain in storage large reserves of ground force equipment, presumably composed primarily of older models retired from active use. We believe that they have enough equipment, including superseded models, to equip fully a wartime force of about 140 divisions.

27. During the next ten years the Soviets will continue to improve the equipment of their theater ground forces. They will seek to increase the mobility and river crossing capabilities of their tanks and armored personnel carriers, to reduce the size, weight, and variety of their field artillery pieces, and to improve their anti-tank missile systems. The Soviets have indicated that they are developing a new medium tank which may be armed with a missile-firing system. Such a tank could be in operation by the end of the decade. We foresee, however, no weapons developments which would materially affect the composition of the ground forces or the basic principles of Soviet tactical doctrine.

III. THEATER FORCES AIR AND MISSILE SUPPORT

Tactical Aviation

28. The mission of Soviet tactical air armies (TAA) is to support the *fronts* to which they are assigned, by gaining local air superiority and by providing tactical air support to ground forces. There are currently 13 TAAs in Tactical Aviation, three of which are located outside the USSR in Germany, Poland, and Hungary. These armies vary considerably in size and composition; the 24th TAA, deployed in East Germany, has more than 800 combat aircraft, while others range in strength from 75 to 355. There are now approximately 3,200 operational combat aircraft assigned to units of the Soviet Tactical Aviation.[7] About 2,400 of these are fighters assigned to some 61 regiments. Of these fighters, one-third to one-half have an all-weather intercept capability. About 350 light bombers, including more than 100 Brewers, are assigned to the 10 bomber regiments. About 500 other aircraft, both fighter and bomber types, are in reconnaissance units. We believe that, in addition to these aircraft assigned to tactical air regiments, there are about 400-500 unassigned combat aircraft co-located on airfields assigned to Tactical Aviation.

[7] Table II gives estimated numbers and deployment of Soviet tactical aircraft in operational units, by location and type, as of 1 October 1965.

29. Most of the fighters assigned to Tactical Aviation were designed as interceptors; their utility as fighter bombers for other than nuclear operations would be limited by their small payload capacity, relatively short range, and lack of an all-weather bombardment capability. On the other hand, the light weight and simplicity of Soviet tactical aircraft permits them to use relatively undeveloped airfields and bases. Soviet tactical air units are practiced in redeploying quickly with all their maintenance and support equipment and have demonstrated a capability to operate within a very short time from a new location. In the forward area, many alternate fields are prestocked with fuel and munitions.

30. The Soviets emphasize flexibility by the use of the same fighters for air defense, close support, interdiction, or reconnaissance missions. Some fighter units appear to have a primary mission of air defense and others of ground support, but pilots are cross-trained in both missions. For example, the Fitter, which is best suited for the fighter/bomber role, has been employed in the interceptor role. The Fishbed D, whose search/track radar is a prime requirement in the interceptor role, is also used in the ground attack role, performing air-to-ground gunnery, air-to-ground rocketry, and bombing.

31. The reequipment program is continuing at a steady pace. The replacement of older models by current model aircraft will probably continue at the present rate of nearly one for one through mid-1968. We estimate that Beagles will be phased out by mid-1969, Farmers by mid-1970, and Frescos by mid-1972. A new, improved, tactical fighter will probably be introduced into Tactical Aviation, perhaps as early as 1967. This model will probably be followed early in the 1970s by a more advanced tactical fighter that might be also suitable for a light bomber role. Recent intelligence reveals that the Soviets are engaged in research and development work on STOL and VTOL [8] aircraft; it is possible that they will bring such aircraft into operation late in the period of this estimate. The production cost of these new types of aircraft will be considerably greater than that of current aircraft, but their capabilities will also be greater. We estimate that the numbers of aircraft in Tactical Aviation will be about 3,100 in mid-1967 [9] and will decline over the next decade to perhaps some 2,500 or 2,000 by 1974.[10]

Tactical Missiles and Rockets

32. In the last year or so, there has been a significant increase in the number of rocket and missile launchers allotted to the GSFG. These launchers can deliver nuclear, chemical, and high explosive warheads. In nuclear war they would probably be supplemented by some medium and intermediate range

[8] Short takeoff and landing; vertical takeoff and landing.

[9] Estimates of numbers of Soviet tactical aircraft in 1966 and 1967 are given in Table III.

[10] For the views of the ACS/Intelligence, USAF, on this subject, see his footnote to Conclusion D, page 2.

missiles of the Strategic Rocket Forces which initially would be directed against targets of importance to a *front* commander and subsequently would probably be used to support theater operations.

33. We believe that each Soviet Category I and II division (except airborne) has an organic Frog battalion with at least two launchers, each mounted on a light tank chassis; Category III divisions may as yet have none at all. Frog battalions in the GSFG have acquired a third tracked launcher, and similar augmentation appears to be in progress in other Soviet forces. We estimate that there are approximately 60 tracked Frog launchers in the GSFG. This increase responds to the earlier complaint of Soviet division commanders that they had insufficient Frog launchers to provide continuous fire support for fast-moving offensive operations, as prescribed in Soviet operational doctrine.

34. We believe that the Scud brigades in the ground armies in the GSFG have also been significantly augmented during the last year by the addition of a third battalion, making a total of nine launchers per army. A similar augmentation appears to be under way in other Soviet field armies, starting in the western military districts of the USSR. In addition, we confirmed in 1965 the earlier deployment in East Germany of a surface-to-surface modification of the Kennel cruise missile. This is one of the most accurate short-range missile systems available for direct support of ground force operations; however, the organization and subordination of units equipped with this weapons system is not yet clear. We estimate that 45-65 Scud and 10-30 Kennel launchers are currently available for support of Soviet ground forces in GSFG.

35. So far as we know, the Soviets have not yet deployed a tactical missile system with the range and mobility required to support *front* operations. At one time ballistic missile systems for employment in support of *front* operations included the Scud and the SS-2 (Sibling). The Sibling, a 350 n.m. missile system dating back to 1954, has subsequently been retired from service. Scud missiles, with a range of up to only 150 n.m., are not capable of furnishing adequate missile support throughout the entire depth of the battle zone. One, or possibly two, 8-launcher regiments of Shaddock, a 300 n.m. mobile cruise missile system, were at one time assigned to tactical air armies for employment in support of *front* operations. There are recent indications that it is employed in a coast defense role. The Soviets are developing a 300-600 n.m. ballistic missile system which could become operational in late 1965 and which could extend missile coverage to the full extent of the battle zone of the *front*.

36. There will probably be a considerable increase in tactical missile support over the next ten years. Improvements in Frog systems will stress greater mobility, possibly including an air transportable version. We believe that a solid fueled missile will probably be introduced as a replacement for the Scud, which uses storable liquid. The provision of tactical rocket and missile systems to divisions, armies, and potential *fronts* will probably be standardized throughout the theater ground forces.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

37. The Soviets consistently group biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction." We believe that, in Soviet thinking, the same constraints apply to the use of toxic CW weapons as to the use of nuclear weapons, that the use of either would require a decision at the highest political level, and that the Soviet leaders would almost certainly authorize the use of toxic chemical agents by theater forces in a nuclear war, but not under any other conditions. Although research continues in the field of biological warfare, we have no evidence of any current Soviet capabilities for applying BW to theater operations and we believe Soviet tactical use of BW to be highly unlikely.

38. *Nuclear Weapons.* We estimate that the numbers of nuclear weapons allocated to the theater forces has increased considerably over the past few years. Soviet theater forces now have at their disposal nuclear weapons in a variety of types and yields suitable for delivery by tactical rockets, missiles, and aircraft. The 203-mm gun-howitzer is a suitable candidate for the delivery of nuclear shells, but we have no evidence of a nuclear projectile of this caliber.

39. The entire system of command and control of nuclear weapons appears well designed to reserve to the national leadership the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Special units of KGB (Committee of State Security) troops have been created to provide security for nuclear weapons, not only in storage, but also during delivery to units. We believe that Soviet procedures give Moscow strict control over the numbers and yields of weapons to be employed in major theaters.

40. We have been able to identify nuclear weapons storage sites only inside the USSR. If the Soviets do not already have nuclear weapons stored in Eastern Europe, a substantial logistical effort would be required to supply a reasonable quantity for the delivery systems currently in the area. For example, a large number of sorties by transport aircraft would be required to move warheads and bombs forward from storage sites inside the USSR. We estimate that the Soviets could launch nuclear-armed aircraft from East German bases within a few hours after the transports had landed at the bases. In the case of Frogs and tactical missiles, we estimate that it would take longer to move the warheads to the delivery units because reshipment by land transport or helicopter would be required. Movement of nuclear weapons from the USSR by rail would, of course, take considerably longer than by air. In view of the above, we think that there is a good chance that nuclear weapons are stored in some GSFG depots, although we have no firm evidence.

41. *Chemical Weapons.* We estimate that the Soviets have an extensive stockpile of a variety of toxic chemical munitions available for use with tactical aircraft, missiles, rockets, artillery, mortars, multiple-rocket launchers, and land mines. Spray systems have also been developed. Missile warheads are bulk-filled, probably with one of the extremely toxic "V" agents; other munitions are apparently loaded with other nerve agents including the "G" type (sarin or soman), or with older types of agents first used in World War I. We estimate

that the total toxic agent stockpile is at least 200,000 tons. Some chemical weapons may be in the hands of the troops, but most are stored in the interior of the USSR.

42. *CBR Defense.* Soviet military authorities evidently assume that the West would use chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons in the event of a general war. All elements of the Soviet forces stress training for defense against such weapons. Manual and automatic devices are available for detection of radiation and chemical agents, but there is no known Soviet system for detection of "V"-type nerve agents.

Battlefield Reconnaissance

43. We believe that Soviet battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities have not improved significantly since 1962, when some Soviet military writers strongly criticized the surveillance available as incapable of fully meeting the requirements of nuclear warfare. The reconnaissance equipment in operation is for the most part incapable of rapidly providing ground and missile units with accurate fire-adjustment data, automatically processed and transmitted. Aerial reconnaissance is the principal means of procuring information, but the Soviets also rely heavily on patrols in force, infiltration, tactical airborne troops, and artillery surveillance radar, flash detection, and sound ranging. We have some evidence that the Soviets are working on more advanced methods of data acquisition, processing, and transmittal, but we have no basis for judging what progress they have made.

Theater Forces Air Defense

44. Theater air defense is composed of the fighter aircraft of Tactical Aviation, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). The defensive capabilities of Tactical Aviation have continued to increase over the past year with the introduction into operational units of another 200 all-weather missile-armed Fishbed Ds, which now make up more than 700 of the 2,400 fighters. An air defense control system with semiautomatic features has been deployed in the USSR and is being deployed in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.

45. The SA-2 is road-mobile, but several hours are required to set up a site for firing or to dismantle one for moving. Main reliance is placed on automatic antiaircraft weapons for low altitude defense and for protection of swiftly moving forces when fighter cover is not available. The Soviets have developed a new missile system, the Ganef, apparently to provide mobile missile coverage for troops in the field, but we have no evidence of its deployment with field forces. Although the requirement still exists for a mobile SAM system capable of both high- and low-altitude defense, there is no evidence of its development. We believe, however, that the Soviets will seek to meet this requirement by the development of a mobile missile system or possibly of a hypervelocity AAA system, and that they will deploy some such weapons within the next ten years.

46. Although the Soviets have conducted extensive research on a field anti-ballistic missile system, no such system is now operationally deployed. We are unable to estimate whether or when the Soviets will be able to develop and deploy one. The SA-2 system may be capable of destroying tactical missiles of short range (50 n.m. or less) under the most favorable circumstances, but we believe that the Soviets do not consider it to be an anti-missile defense system.

IV. SOVIET NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES [11]

47. During the past year there has been a marked increase in the tempo of Soviet naval activity, characterized by a large number of units operating at a distance from Soviet waters. The Soviets have maintained a continuous presence in the Mediterranean Sea with both surface and submarine units from the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets. They have maintained surveillance of the US Polaris submarine bases at Holy Loch, Rota, and Guam with intelligence trawlers and submarines. They have extended their operations into the Philippine Sea, have maintained surveillance of Western forces off Vietnam (with intelligence trawlers), and have continued patrols in the north-central Atlantic and north-central Pacific. In addition, some long-range Bear D reconnaissance aircraft have been assigned to Naval Aviation, and have been frequently observed conducting maritime patrols in the northeastern Atlantic.

Forces

48. *Submarines.* There are about 330 first line submarines (excluding 43-48 ballistic missile submarines) in the Soviet general purpose submarine force—an increase of 20 over last year. All of these submarines have both torpedo attack and mining capabilities. Included in this number are about 40 cruise-missile submarines, of which about 17 are nuclear powered; these may have a dual mission—a primary one against ships at sea, and a secondary one against land targets. Included also are some 85 long-range torpedo-attack submarines, of which about 15 are nuclear powered, and about 205 medium-range torpedo-attack diesel-powered submarines. In addition to these first line submarines, the Soviet Navy has about 20 old coastal type diesel submarines.[12]

49. The operations of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines away from submarine support vessels during the past year, coupled with evidence of under-the-ice operation, suggest that such submarines may now be considered fairly reliable. With existing hull designs and currently operational engineering plants, Soviet nuclear submarines can attain a maximum speed of about 20 knots, with normal cruising speeds probably on the order of 12 to 14 knots. The radiated noise levels of Soviet nuclear submarines appear to be higher than those of

[11] Defined in this estimate as all Soviet naval forces except the ballistic missile submarines, which we include in the strategic attack forces. These submarines carry also torpedoes and mines, and could be used in a general purpose mission.

[12] Table IV gives estimated numbers and deployment of Soviet general purpose submarines by class.

early US nuclear submarines. No significant submarine quieting program has been observed. While incremental improvements could be made at any time, an effective noise reduction program for existing submarines would probably require extensive modification of the engineering plant. We do not believe that a significantly quieter Soviet submarine could appear before 1968.

50. Construction of cruise missile submarines will probably continue for at least the next several years, but at reduced rates. If the Soviets see a strategic attack role for this type, construction will probably continue throughout the period of this estimate and may include a new class. We estimate that construction of torpedo-attack units, both diesel and nuclear powered, will continue at approximately current levels for the rest of the period of the estimate, but that this will be more than offset by the retirement of medium-range W-class submarines. We believe that new construction will be focused on long-range units. As a result, the proportion of long-range submarines will increase from about one-third of the current force to virtually all of the approximately 200 units estimated for 1975.

51. *Surface Forces.*[13] In recent years the Soviet Navy has increased its firepower considerably by installing missiles in new surface ships. It now has 1 cruiser and 24 destroyer types so equipped. The cruiser and 8 of the destroyer types carry SAMs only; 12 destroyer types carry surface-to-surface cruise missiles only; 4 carry both types. Most of these ships were built after 1958. In addition to their missile armament, these ships also carry anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems. Major surface units not equipped with missiles now include 17 cruisers, 78 destroyers, and 94 escort types, most of which were completed before 1958. The Kashin-class guided missile (SAM) frigate and Mirka-class escort are the only major surface vessels currently under construction. In addition, the Soviet Navy has a large number of patrol boats, some of which are armed with short-range missiles. It also has shore based cruise-missile installations for coastal defense.

52. *Naval Aviation.*[14] Soviet Naval Aviation is land based. Its capabilities are focused primarily on reconnaissance and strike missions against maritime targets and to some extent on antisubmarine warfare. The force is composed largely of jet medium bombers, most of which are equipped to carry air-to-surface missiles. It also includes jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters; it is possible that helicopter-carrying ships will be introduced. During the past year it acquired a few Bear heavy bombers which had been modified for a reconnaissance role. Some additional Bears will probably be introduced into Naval Aviation in the next year or so. Moreover, naval operations will continue to be supported by aircraft of Long-Range Aviation. We estimate that as the Soviet Navy receives Blinder supersonic bombers the Badger will be phased out. No ASM for the naval Blinder is operational, but we expect deployment to begin during the next year or so. We also estimate that the Beagle light bomber will

[13] Table V gives estimated numbers and deployment of Soviet naval surface ships by type.
[14] Table VI gives estimated numbers and types of Soviet naval aircraft.

begin phasing out in the next year or two, but doubt that the new Brewer light jet bomber will replace it in Naval Aviation. The Soviets may develop follow-on aircraft of longer range for Naval Aviation to perform specialized missions such as reconnaissance and antiship operations with air-to-surface missiles. We have no evidence, however, that such aircraft are under development.

Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces and Sea Lines of Communication

53. Soviet naval capabilities to combat carrier task forces and to interdict sea lines of communication are based on long-range aircraft and submarines armed with nuclear or high explosive missiles and HE torpedoes. The Soviet Navy is still hampered by the necessity of operating its submarines at great distances from home bases. While it is possible for Soviet submarines to operate off both US coasts, only relatively small numbers can be maintained continuously on station in these areas at any one time. We estimate that the Soviets could maintain about 15 long-range diesel and nuclear submarines on station in the western Atlantic or on the approaches to the Mediterranean, and about half this number off the US west coast. If the Soviets were able to provide logistic support during patrols from a forward base, such as Cuba, the number of submarines in the western Atlantic could be more than doubled. The threat of the Soviet submarine force to sea communications is greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. About 140 first line torpedo attack and cruise-missile submarines are available for deployment in the Atlantic approaches to Europe. Of this number, about 50 could be maintained continuously on station.

Capabilities for Anti-submarine Warfare

54. Since the mid-1950s the Soviets have made a major effort in the construction of ASW ships, particularly small coastal types. The most advanced ship capable of effective ASW is presently the Kashin-class guided missile frigate. An ASW mission may also have been assigned to the diesel-powered F and R class submarines and to the nuclear-powered N-class. Senior Soviet naval officers have written articles that advocate the "multi-purpose" submarine, one purpose of which is ASW. The Soviets also use aircraft and helicopters for ASW operations. Detection equipment now in service includes sonar aboard surface ships and submarines, air-launched and ship-launched passive sonobuoys, airborne magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) equipment, and shore based hydroacoustic systems of limited range and effectiveness. ASW weapons now in service include depth charges, multiple tube ASW rocket launchers, mines, and passive homing torpedoes.

55. The USSR is seriously concerned about the Polaris threat to the homeland and during the past few years the Soviets have placed increased emphasis on ASW. New detection devices and improved ASW ordnance have appeared. ASW training has significantly increased. In addition, the Soviets have intensified intelligence collection efforts against US submarines and overseas support bases.

56. We believe that at present the Soviet ability to search for and detect a submerged submarine in open ocean areas is extremely limited. Detection potential, however, significantly increases within coastal areas contiguous to major Soviet naval facilities. Soviet capabilities to identify and destroy conventional submarines detected within range of an ASW platform are considered fair; those against nuclear submarines, poor.

57. We believe the Soviets will continue to improve ASW detection equipment and weapons systems, including land based hydroacoustic installations in some areas. Increased emphasis on the use of submarines for open ocean ASW is expected, but without a significant submarine quieting program this increased emphasis will not result in a corresponding increase in open ocean ASW capability. With better afloat logistics, ASW surface units will extend their patrols further seaward and the overall effectiveness of such units will probably be improved by the addition of better detection equipment and weapons systems. Airborne ASW will be improved by the addition of more effective turbine powered aircraft and helicopters and better detection systems and armaments. Despite these improvements, we believe that the capability of the Soviet Navy to conduct open ocean ASW will remain severely limited for the next several years.

Capabilities for Mine Warfare

58. We believe that Soviets will seek to make maximum use of naval mines. They possess large numbers of conventional mines suitable for laying by aircraft, surface craft, or submarines, and probably have developed a mine with a low-yield nuclear warhead. A significant quantity of these mines, as well as a higher percentage of conventionally armed mines with more sophisticated anti-sweep features, could enter the Soviet mine stockpile during the period of this estimate. Mines could play an important role in Soviet ASW. The Soviets have a moored, contact-firing mine, with antennae. It can effectively mine from the surface down to 260 feet in waters as deep as 1,500 feet. Existing or new influence-firing mines would be used in waters shallower than 180 feet.

Logistic Support Capabilities

59. At the present time the USSR can logistically support limited operations on the high seas for extended periods of time, and larger operations for periods of 3-4 weeks. Since the middle of 1964 they have utilized afloat logistic support to maintain a force of submarines and surface units continuously in the Mediterranean Sea. In 1965 afloat logistic support was provided Soviet naval forces in the Philippine Sea and the Norwegian Sea. Afloat logistic support capabilities of the Soviet Navy are being improved by the addition of new tankers and support ships as well as by improved techniques. The Soviets are also developing a system of dispersed mobile bases, consisting of groups of auxiliary ships, to which submarines could deploy in time of war for repair and replenishment. In the event of the loss of major shore bases and logistic stockpiles, sustained

submarine operations by the Soviet Navy would be critically dependent upon the survival of such mobile submarine support groups. In circumstances which permitted them to continue to operate, the large and widespread Soviet fishing fleets could provide limited support to submarines.

V. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT CAPABILITY

60. To achieve a greater range of general purpose force capabilities for the local support of theater operations and for more distant limited military action, the Soviets would have to develop substantially their airlift and sealift capabilities. Some progress in this direction is evident. However, the USSR's small capabilities for sealift, airlift, and amphibious assault are still tied to support of local operations.

Airlift and Air Assault

61. During the past year several distinguished Soviet military theoreticians have exhibited a growing interest in distant airborne operations. Paradrop and troop airlift training has been noted with increased frequency and included for the first time a combined air-sea assault. The number of aircraft assigned to air transport has increased; and development work has continued on a new transport aircraft with a larger payload.

62. The 25 light and 640 medium transports of Military Transport Aviation (VTA) assigned to airborne troops could probably transport the assault echelons of one airborne division with all of its combat equipment to a radius of 560 n.m. In an emergency this capability could be augmented by other aircraft in VTA and civil aviation. This limited transport capability highlights the importance of the AN-22 military cargo transport displayed at the Paris air show. The AN-22 can carry 50,000 pounds some 5,000 n.m. It would give the Soviets for the first time a real capability to support distant operations by air. We estimate that this transport will become operational late in 1967 or in 1968, and that there will be some 25 in VTA by mid-1970, giving the Soviets thereby a single distant lift capability of possibly 10,000 lightly equipped men. We believe that the number of AN-22s in VTA will level off within the range of 50-75 aircraft by 1975.

63. The Soviet theater forces possess some 125 Hook heavy helicopters capable of lifting payloads of about 13 tons to short ranges (50 n.m.). A more practical lift would be 8-9 tons to a radius of about 150 nautical miles. In addition, about 375 Hound light helicopters are assigned to the several tactical air armies. These rugged and reliable helicopters are assigned throughout the theater forces. They play an important role in Soviet tactical planning. We believe that the helicopter force will grow, that the proportion of heavy helicopters in the force will increase, and that new helicopters, such as the Hip and a future blade-jet heavy helicopter, will increase the Soviet capability.

Sealift and Amphibious Assault

64. The Soviet naval infantry, since its reestablishment in 1964, has been greatly emphasized in the Soviet press. We believe there are such units in all four major fleet areas, but that the total strength of Soviet naval infantry is probably no more than 5,000 men. Its mission appears to support the planned high rate of advance of land operations, probably by short leap-frog landings along the coast. Its capabilities are limited by the numbers of troops and landing craft to battalion or regiment size landings in each of the fleet areas.

65. Soviet military writers talk of more distant operations. There is, however, very little evidence of the actual development of a significant longer range Soviet amphibious capability. Few specially designed amphibious ships are available, and there is no known construction program in the USSR, which relies on Polish shipyards for this type of ship. Moreover, Soviet naval forces would be unable to provide adequate protection for any sizable forces of amphibious ships over long distances. We believe that a significant long-range amphibious assault capability remains a fairly remote Soviet goal.

66. Soviet sealift capabilities continue to improve, particularly through the construction of large-hatched ships such as those which delivered offensive missiles to Cuba. These, as well as other types of new units being added to the Soviet merchant fleet, are characterized by relatively high sustained speeds, long endurance, and heavy lift boom capacity, all of which contribute significantly to military sealift. Although the USSR has the fleet capacity to move 4 to 8 divisions under varying assumptions in the Baltic, Black, and Pacific areas and 2 to 3 divisions in the Northern Fleet area, these lift operations would require ports or other extensive off-loading facilities in the landing area.

VI. SOVIET THEATER FORCE CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE CENTRAL REGION OF NATO

67. In this section we confine the discussion to Soviet capabilities against the critical Central Region of NATO. The Soviets maintain proportionately smaller theater forces opposite Scandinavia, Southern Europe, and Turkey which could be used for concurrent campaigns into those NATO areas.[15] Soviet theater forces in the Far East have no significant capability for amphibious assault, but are probably adequate to cope with incursions short of a full-scale Chinese invasion.

Current Operational Doctrine

68. During the past year there have been indications that the Soviets are giving greater consideration to the possibility of a non-nuclear war. However, Soviet military writings and exercises generally assume that a war in Europe would begin with a NATO nuclear attack; war-games are addressed to surviv-

[15] For a description of Warsaw Pact forces available for operations in Southern Europe see NIE 12-65, "Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact."

ing such an attack and moving as rapidly as possible to the offensive. Soviet tactical doctrine has thus been based on initial strikes with weapons of mass destruction, in great numbers and in great depth, with the main target the NATO nuclear capability. They envisage that the initial strikes would be exploited by the rapid advance of heavily armored Soviet formations at rates of up to 60 miles a day.

69. In such an assault the Soviets would have to rely to a great extent on forces already in place, as the lines of communication to the interior would be subject to interdiction. They have therefore shaped the GSFG into a virtual *front* in being, capable of quick reaction to various contingencies without reinforcement, and have improved the capabilities of the East European armed forces to enable them to take part in the initial operations on the flanks of the main Soviet attack under Soviet direction. These forces provide the Soviets with a concentrated counter-attack potential astride the best avenues of approach for NATO forces. The intensive GSFG training program continues to emphasize large exercises in a simulated nuclear situation. Although the Soviets proclaim only defensive intentions, and observation of the major exercises indicates a general counteroffensive pattern, current dispositions continue to allow the forces to initiate an attack into Western Europe.

Forces Immediately Available

70. If the achievement of surprise were the overriding consideration, or if the Soviets concluded they must quickly initiate pre-emptive operations, they could launch an attack against the Central Region of NATO with the forces immediately available. The Warsaw Pact forces immediately available in the forward area include 22 Soviet divisions in Germany and Poland and 23 East European divisions (9 Czech, 8 Polish, and 6 East German). Twenty-one of these 45 divisions are tank divisions, and the remainder are motorized rifle. Warsaw Pact air strength in the forward area consists of about 2,900 combat aircraft (1,100 Soviet and 1,800 East German, Polish, and Czech). About 30 percent of these aircraft are current models.

Reinforcement

71. Soviet operational concepts for nuclear war, the reinforcements available, the size and nature of the opposing forces, and the geography of the area indicate that, if circumstances permitted, the Soviets would seek to deploy a larger force before initiating an attack against the Central Region of NATO. We estimate that reinforcement would be by armies for the most part. The total force, comprising both a striking force and a theater reserve, probably would not exceed 19 armies with some 80 divisions, including those already in place. Following Soviet organizational concepts, the striking force would probably be deployed in two echelons and would be organized into three fronts composed of 14 armies (including 4-6 East European) with a total of about 60 divisions. Four or five armies (about 20 divisions) would be held initially in

theater reserve in western Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition 2-4 Soviet airborne divisions would be redeployed to more forward air bases.

72. To deploy such a force would require bringing forward seven existing armies (28 divisions) from the Western USSR and possibly one (with four divisions) from Southwestern USSR. In all of these reinforcing ground armies some elements are prepared to move immediately, while other elements, including army and front level support units, probably would require a week or so to be filled out with personnel. The Category III divisions now in some of these armies would have to be replaced with available Category I or II divisions.

73. A recent study of the problem of organizing and deploying a force of 85 Soviet Category I and II divisions and the best East European divisions from present locations, together with army and *front* support units, indicates a theoretical capability to accomplish the movement, utilizing current road and rail systems, and to position the force for an attack in 15 days. However, other factors, such as the time available for essential prior preparations and limited mobilization, and the ability of the Soviets to make maximum utilization of the transportation systems are uncertainties which lead us to believe that as a practical matter, from the decision to do so, about three to four weeks would be required for deploying such a force under noncombat conditions. Air reinforcement probably would include three air armies with 800 aircraft from Western USSR; these units could readily redeploy in a few days. Inland waterways and Baltic sealift could contribute substantially to the forward movement of supplies, but could not materially increase the rate of troop reinforcement. Available airlift probably would be used initially for the movement of key personnel and supplies, such as nuclear weapons.

74. The estimated reinforcement as outlined is subject to many variations in scale and execution. It is conceivable, in some circumstances, that the Soviets might deliberately reveal their intentions to reinforce, but, in any case, a reinforcement on the scale and at the rate indicated probably would be quickly detected by the West. The Soviets could elect to reinforce more slowly and on a lesser scale in order to preserve secrecy. Ostensible Warsaw Pact exercises and other deception techniques could be utilized to attempt to conceal their actual intent. However, the Soviets would have to weigh the advantages of such techniques against the value of more rapidly increasing the weight of attack and to recognize the ever-present risk of premature detection with possible NATO counteraction.

Mobilization Base

75. The Soviets have available large numbers of trained reservists who could be used for filling out existing understrength units or mobilizing new units. About one million of these reserves would probably be required to fill the current force of about 140 divisions to wartime strength; this would involve fleshing out existing units and mobilizing a large number of additional combat and service support units for armies and *fronts*. Stocks of materiel on hand at or near exist-

ing units would be sufficient for this mobilization, although some of the equipment would be obsolescent. Logistic support for such a mobilization would be supplemented by engineer items and motor transport from civilian sources. We believe that manpower would not be a limiting factor in fielding a greater number of divisions, but equipment for such divisions would be either obsolete or substitute items. In view of the existing structure of their theater forces, it is probable that the Soviets would place initial stress on building stronger support elements rather than on the immediate creation of additional divisions.

76. We know of no organized air reserve units, but the Soviets have sufficient numbers of trained reservists to bring active units to authorized unit manning levels, to create additional units around cadres of regulars, and to provide replacements. We estimate that the Soviets also have, in addition to aircraft at tactical airfields, approximately 2,000 old model fighters and light bombers in storage. These aircraft could be used for augmentation or replacement of aircraft now in Tactical Aviation, but would require time for maintenance check out.

TABLE I

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LINE DIVISIONS

AREA	CATEGORY I AND II DIVISIONS							CATEGORY III DIVISIONS [a]
	MOTORIZED RIFLE		TANK		AIRBORNE		TOTAL	
	Cat I	Cat II	Cat I	Cat II	Cat I	Cat II		
East Germany	10	0	10	0	0	0	20	0
Poland	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
Hungary	2	0	2	0	0	0	4	0
Western USSR	10	5	11	5	2	1	34	7
Southwestern USSR	0	1	1	6	0	0	8	7
Northwestern USSR	3	2	0	1	1	0	7	1
Southern USSR	2	10	1	2	2	0	17	10
Central USSR	0	5	0	1	0	0	6	3
Far Eastern USSR	1	4	2	2	0	1	10	3
TOTALS	28	27	29	17	5	2	108	31 [b]

[a] We estimate that all of these divisions are motorized rifle divisions and that there are no Category III tank or airborne divisions.

[b] This number may be as low as 24 or as high as 39. This range reflects uncertainty as to whether all of the units counted are in fact divisions.

TABLE II

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS, BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1965

	FAGOT	FRESCO	FARMER	FLASHLIGHT	FISHBED C/E	FISHBED D	FITTER	MANGROVE	BREWER	BEAGLE	TOTALS
East Germany	32	124	49	12	25	222	157	12	74	105	812
Poland	..	107	25	..	12	61	37	30	..	10	282
Hungary	..	62	..	..	..	86	24	..	..	56	228
Baltic	..	85	12	..	24	25	24	..	22	32	224
Byelo-Russia	..	161	12	..	12	25	12	..	..	32	254
Carpathian	12	100	6	6	..	98	37	32	10	54	355
Moscow	..	12	20	..	32	..	12	32	..	..	108
Leningrad	..	62	..	..	..	..	12	..	..	42	116
Kiev	..	74	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	74
Odessa	..	24	37	..	..	62	37	32	..	10	202
Transcaucasus	..	25	24	..	..	74	..	..	10	64	197
Turkestan	..	119	12	..	..	37	12	..	..	32	212
Far East	..	37	..	..	..	40	49	..	..	30	156
TOTALS BY MODEL	44	992	197	18	105	730	413	138	116	467	3,220[a]
TOTALS, ROUNDED	40	990	200	20	100	730	420	140	120	460	3,200

[a] There are also some 400–500 combat aircraft unassigned, but co-located at tactical airfields. These figures do not include aircraft in training establishments.

TABLE III

ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS, BY MODEL

	1 OCTOBER 1965 [a]	MID-1966	MID-1967
Old Models	1,700	1,350–1,100	1,025–650
Fagot	40	0	0
Fresco	990	825–625	700–500
Farmer	200	175–150	100–0
Flashlight	20	0	0
Beagle	460	350–325	225–150
Current Models	1,500	1,750–2,100	2,025–2,475
Fishbed C/E	100	50–75	25–50
Fishbed D	730	800–900	900–1,100
Fitter	420	525–625	625–725
Mangrove	140	100–150	100–150
Brewer	120	275–350 [b]	375–450 [b]
Future Models	0	0	0–50
TF-67	0	0	0–50
TOTAL	3,200	3,100–3,200	3,050–3,175

[a] Rounded.

[b] The Director, National Security Agency, believes that the projected numbers of Brewer aircraft operational by mid-1966 and mid-1967 are too high. He believes that ranges of 200–250 for mid-1966 and 250–350 for mid-1967 would be more accurate projections.

TABLE IV

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES, BY CLASS

TYPE OF SHIP	1 OCTOBER 1965 BY FLEETS: NORTH	BALTIC	BLACK	PACIFIC	TOTAL	MID-1966	MID-1967
First-line Submarine [a]							
Cruise Missile							
Nuclear							
E-I Class	0	0	0	5	5	5	5
E-II Class	6-8	0	0	5	11-13	16-18	19-22
Subtotal	6-8	0	0	10	16-18	21-23	24-27
Diesel							
W-Conversion [b]	8	1	1	3	13	13	13
J Class	3-5	3 [c]	4 [c]	0	10-12	14-18	16-24
Subtotal	11-13	4	5	3	23-25	27-31	29-37
Total Cruise Missile	17-21	4	5	13	39-43	48-54	53-64
Torpedo Attack							
Nuclear							
N/Improved	13-16	0	0	1	14-17	17-20	20-25
Diesel							
Z Class	8	6	0	5	19	19	19
F Class	34-36	7	0	10	51-53	57-63	63-73
R Class	17	0	3	0	20	20	20
W Class	46	52	26	46	170	170	170
Q Class	0	12	3	0	15	15	15
Total Torpedo Attack	118-123	77	32	62	289-294	298-307	307-322
Total First-Line Submarines	135-144	81	37	75	328-337	346-361	360-386
Second-Line Submarines (all types) [a]	0	7	7	7	21	16	11
Total Submarines	135-144	88	44	82	349-358	362-377	371-397

[a] The distinction between first- and second-line submarines is an arbitrary one, based on age. First-line submarines are those of modern construction; the second-line category lists units from 14 to 20 years old. Some units carried as first line may be removed from operational status or be scrapped earlier than on an age basis in order to maintain personnel levels and the adequacy of logistic support. Submarines in the second-line category may continue in an operational status, and, if employed in a war at sea, represent military capability.

[b] Including one W-class submarine converted to carry a single cylinder. First observed in 1961, this submarine probably was an experimental model and is believed to have preceded the development of the Twin Cylinder version first observed in 1960.

[c] This number includes submarines currently in the areas indicated for test and trials but which will most likely be deployed with the Northern Fleet.

TABLE V

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET SURFACE SHIPS BY TYPE 1 OCTOBER 1965

TYPES OF SHIPS	BY FLEETS NORTH	BALTIC	BLACK	PACIFIC	TOTAL	MID-1966	MID-1967
First Line Surface Ships							
Cruisers	3	4		4	15	15	15
Missile Destroyer Types	6	5	8	5	24	24–25	26–28
Destroyers	19	19	14	26	78	78	78
Escorts	24	35	15	20	94	98–102	100–106
Total Line Surface Ships	52	63	41	55	211	215–220	219–227
Second Line Surface Ships							
Cruisers	0	1	1	1	3	0	0
Destroyers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escorts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Second Line	0	1	1	1	3	0	0
Grand Total Surface Ships	52	64	42	56	214	215–220	219–227

TABLE VI

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND TYPES OF SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT

	1 OCTOBER 1965	MID-1966	MID-1967
Heavy Bombers			
Bear (Reconnaissance)	10	10–15	10–20
Medium Bombers			
Badger A [a] (Recon-Tanker)	160	150–200	150–200
Badger B (Two AS-1)	65	70–40	40–20
Badger C (One AS-2)	200	200–220	200–220
Blinder A	50	50–75	50–75
Blinder B (One ASM)	...	10–30	20–50
Light Bombers			
Beagle [b]	105	100–75	100–75
Patrol Aircraft			
Madge	65	60–50	40–30
Mallow	25	5–25	5–25
New ASW Aircraft [c]	...	5–25	40–75
Helicopters			
Heavy Helicopters	6	5–15	5–20
Light Helicopters	110	110–130	125–150

[a] Totals for the Badger A include a small number of Badger D electronic reconnaissance aircraft and about 15 Badger used in ASW operations.

[b] It is possible that some Brewer light bombers will enter service as the Beagle is phased out.

[c] The Mail twin-turboprop seaplane and probably the ASW variant of the Coot four-turboprop transport.

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