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Purpose Forces

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## CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate the present strength and capabilities of Soviet and East European general purpose forces, especially against the Central Region of NATO, and trends in these forces over the next 10 years.

### CONCLUSIONS

A. The Soviets retain their belief in the primacy of strategic attack and defense forces for deterrence as well as for foreign policy support. At the same time, they are increasingly interested in improving the capabilities of their general purpose forces and in making them better suited to meet contingencies short of general nuclear war. We believe that this trend results partly from a Soviet expectation to improve substantially their strategic position vis-a-vis the US, thereby increasing the relevance of general purpose forces. We think it is a response also to earlier improvement in US and NATO capabilities in Europe and to US advocacy of flexible response. In addition, it is probably attributable to the tensions arising from the Vietnam war and the resulting US military buildup, as well as to Chinese hostility towards the USSR. (*Paras. 1-4*)

B. Despite the evident Soviet desire to broaden the options available to the USSR in the application of its military power, the regime's ability to improve and diversify general purpose forces is limited by the sheer bulk of those forces, by the momentum of existing strategic and research and development programs, and by the increasing cost of competing against the growth and diversification of Western, particularly US, military capabilities. Moreover, the competition between Soviet civilian and military claimants for skilled personnel and scarce economic resources is a major domestic constraint. We believe

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improvement will probably be gradual, without drastic changes in funding or manpower strength. (Para. 5)

C. We estimate that the USSR now has 109 line divisions capable of early commitment to combat. These divisions, which are almost completely equipped, have peacetime manning levels which range from at least 90 percent of TOE strength in the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe to about 60 percent in the interior of the USSR. In addition, we estimate that there are about 32 cadre divisions manned at an average of about 20 percent of full strength. While there have been no major redeployments of Soviet general purpose forces, a gradual increase of troops and materiel near the Soviet border opposite China, as well as certain local realignments, have improved the Soviet military posture in that area. (Paras. 6, 11-13)

D. The numbers of tactical missile and rocket launchers allotted to Soviet ground forces have increased significantly in some areas, although deployment has not been uniform throughout. Further increases are probable, as is the early introduction of a new 300-600 n.m. ballistic missile system. The continued introduction of new equipment into Tactical Aviation has improved its capabilities. The current Soviet interest in improving general purpose forces will probably postpone for the next few years any significant decline in the approximately 3,250 aircraft in Tactical Aviation. (Paras. 20-24, 32-36)

E. The increased tempo of Soviet naval operations which we noted last year has continued into 1966. Soviet out-of-area submarine operations doubled in 1965 over the level observed in 1964. A large number of submarines and surface ships have operated far from home bases. Continuing Soviet concern about the Polaris threat is demonstrated by submarine and trawler patrols off US Polaris submarine operating bases. We expect operational and materiel improvements in Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, but their open ocean ASW capability will probably remain severely limited for the next several years. (Paras. 42-46, 51-53)

F. Soviet capabilities for airborne and amphibious assault remain tied to support of Eurasian operations. Naval infantry appears designed to fight primarily on the coastal flanks of larger land formations. The expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet and the development of

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very large transport aircraft will improve Soviet capabilities to move unopposed forces to distant areas, but the Soviets lack the sea and air combat escort capabilities necessary for opposed distant operations. Developments thus far do not signify any urgent Soviet program to achieve such capabilities. (*Paras. 56-63*)

G. Soviet war planning relies on the availability of the increasingly effective East European forces to perform important tasks. Continuation of recent trends toward East European autonomy will work to narrow the range of contingencies in which the Soviets can rely on effective support from their allies, but we believe Pact members will remain persuaded that their ultimate security rests on the protection provided by Soviet power and influence. We believe that the Pact forces would be reliable in the event of war, at least initially. (*Paras. 64-66*)

H. The Soviets, East Germans, Poles, and Czechs now have about 50 divisions and some 3,000 combat aircraft available for early employment against the Central Region of NATO. We believe, however, that if circumstances permitted the Soviets would reinforce these forces substantially with additional ground and air forces from the western USSR before initiating an attack against the Central Region. (*Paras. 76-86*)

I. For the near term, we think the Soviets have probably determined to maintain their general purpose forces at about the present size and composition. Over the longer term, however, considerable change is likely in force levels, organization, and deployment. In the ground forces we expect an eventual transition to smaller numbers of larger divisions with better support, more capable of conventional as well as nuclear war. In numbers of men and quality of equipment, the Western Theater will continue to have priority. Tactical Aviation will probably acquire more complex and capable aircraft; its numerical size will probably decline in the 1970's, but its overall capability will probably increase.<sup>1</sup> We believe the emphasis in naval

<sup>1</sup> Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would delete this sentence of this paragraph and substitute the following:

"Tactical Aviation will probably acquire more complex and capable aircraft; its numerical size, reflecting Soviet interest in improving capabilities for sustained combat by ground forces, probably will remain at least as large in the 1970's as at present."

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general purpose forces through 1976 will be on more submarines and surface ships capable of sustained, long-range operations, on long-range aerial reconnaissance, and on ASW. (*Paras. 89-102*)

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## DISCUSSION

### I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES<sup>2</sup>

1. The primacy of forces for strategic attack and defense remains undisputed among Soviet military thinkers, but since the ouster of Khrushchev and particularly during the past year the Soviets have been paying more attention to the role of the general purpose forces. There has long been concern among the military that Khrushchev's decisions, which tended to make the buildup of strategic forces at the expense of general purpose forces, neglected an important element of Soviet capabilities for general war and deprived the USSR of flexibility in dealing with contingencies short of general war. General purpose forces were restructured for nuclear war under Khrushchev, but their reequipment and modernization were evidently stretched out because strategic forces had the priority claim. The restructuring itself resulted in certain characteristics which could be handicaps in nonnuclear warfare, particularly if at all prolonged.

2. Recent Soviet military writings and statements have reflected a search for ways to loosen the rigidities once imposed on strategy by Khrushchev's presumption that any war involving the great powers would inevitably become a general nuclear conflict, and that its outcome would be decided almost exclusively by a strategic nuclear exchange. Over the past year, Defense Minister Malinovsky and other top military leaders have underscored the importance attached to the ground forces in Soviet military thinking, both for general nuclear war and for "war in which conventional weapons are used." During the past year also, some Soviet military spokesmen have implied that tactical nuclear weapons might be employed in war without entailing immediate, automatic escalation to general war. There have been only a few such references to limited warfare involving tactical nuclear weapons, and they are couched in terms of a possibility not to be excluded, but they are the first indications that the Soviets may be modifying their views on this question.

3. Among the factors contributing to the increasing Soviet interest in the role and capabilities of general purpose forces is the substantial improvement we think the Soviet leaders expect to achieve in their strategic position vis-a-vis the US in the next few years. They may believe that in a situation of mutual nuclear deterrence the capabilities of general purpose forces for nonnuclear contingencies would have increased relevance, although we do not think they expect such marked strategic alterations as would permit substantially more

<sup>2</sup> For a more extensive discussion of these factors, see NIE 11-4-66, "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," dated 16 June 1966, SECRET.

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aggressive Soviet courses of action. Other important contributing factors probably include US advocacy of flexible response and past improvements in US and NATO conventional strength in Europe. Finally, the Soviet leaders are probably concerned over increasing tensions in the Far East, including the Vietnam war and the resulting US military buildup as well as the implications of Chinese hostility towards the USSR.

4. Soviet military doctrine and force structure continue to emphasize the requirements of general nuclear war. The main thrust of the recent military writings is still on the need to have forces for such a war, with the need to meet other contingencies a secondary but increasingly important aspect. Our evidence is inconclusive as to the views of the top political leadership on these questions, but we think the present leadership is generally receptive to the military argument for greater strategic flexibility, particularly as the leaders consider the various crises and confrontations they must allow for as they contemplate future developments in the world situation.

5. In our evidence there is no suggestion of any sweeping current program to improve and diversify Soviet general purpose forces. Indeed, the regime's ability to carry out such a program in these forces would be limited by their sheer bulk, by the high priority obviously attached to strategic forces and to research and development programs, and by the perennial competition for resources between civilian and military claimants in the USSR. It is probable that the Soviets will seek to improve general purpose forces gradually, without any sharp change in their funding or manpower strength.

6. Soviet general purpose forces remain deployed in greatest strength in the west and focused predominantly against NATO in Europe. The deployment of forces has remained generally static over the past year, with the exception of continued changes in the Sino-Soviet border area. A gradual increase in troops and materiel has occurred in this area since 1963. In addition, during the past year or so the Soviets have improved their military posture (notably opposite northern Sinkiang and eastern Manchuria) by placing some combat units in better strategic locations and possibly by making provision for quick reinforcement and resupply. Tank units in the Transbaikal region have received additional equipment and have probably been brought to an increased state of readiness. Tactical Aviation east of Lake Baikal has been modernized and somewhat increased. Moreover, Soviet equipment, military advisors and technicians, and construction and railroad personnel continue to be sent to Mongolia under the Soviet assistance program. These several developments in the Sino-Soviet border region have involved relatively small numbers of troops and have almost certainly caused no reduction in Soviet strength facing NATO.

7. In NIE 11-4-66, "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," dated 16 June 1966, we estimated the total military personnel strength of the Soviet armed

forces to be 3.0 to 3.2 million men.<sup>3</sup> Current indications point to the high side of the spread. The general purpose forces, estimated at about two million men, absorb by far the largest portion of military manpower, particularly of conscripts. We believe that for the next few years the strength of general purpose forces will be maintained approximately as at present; it may edge up slightly.

## II. GENERAL PURPOSE GROUND FORCES

### General Characteristics

8. The Soviet ground forces are structured in accordance with the Soviet concept of a general nuclear war with NATO. This concept calls for the ground forces to advance rapidly in the aftermath of a massive nuclear exchange and to seize critical objectives before the NATO forces have recovered from the disruption and demoralization caused by the Soviet nuclear strikes. In the late 1950's and early 1960's the Soviets restructured their forces for this mission, subordinating other considerations to the achievement of speed and shock affect. They concentrated their combat strength in a large number of relatively small tank and motorized rifle divisions, radically reducing their provision of non-divisional supporting elements. The divisions are heavily armored, but the ratio of infantry to tanks is low; in general, the ratio of men to equipment is low. The provision of divisional artillery was reduced. Nondivisional artillery was drastically reduced and substituted for with lesser numbers of rockets and missiles, many of which require the use of nuclear warheads for effective employment.

9. If events should not develop according to the Soviet scenario—if in a nuclear war the Soviet advance should be held up by NATO resistance, or if the conflict should be nonnuclear—the Soviet ground forces would be handicapped by their relative lack of provision for sustained action. They do have substantial inherent capabilities to wage nonnuclear warfare, but these capabilities are not what they would have been if this contingency had been a primary consideration in Soviet planning. The Soviets may reckon, however, that in a nonnuclear conflict they would have time to provide more infantry, artillery, and nondivisional support to the divisions engaged.

<sup>3</sup>The component elements of this military manpower total in the Soviet military establishment were estimated to be approximately as follows:

General Purpose Forces .....	1,900,000–2,100,000
Ground .....	(1,300,000–1,500,000)
Air .....	(200,000)
Naval .....	(400,000)
Strategic Defense Forces .....	400,000
Strategic Attack Forces .....	300,000
Command and General Support .....	400,000
TOTAL .....	<u>3,000,000–3,200,000</u>

These figures do not include some 225,000 men in militarized security forces not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and an uncertain number of civilians (500,000–1,000,000) employed in the military establishment.

10. Recent indications suggest that a reorganization is in progress throughout the Soviet Group of Forces, Germany (GSFG). The implications of this activity are as yet unclear. It might indicate the development of more flexible command structure or the transfer of major units from one army to another. It might even be preparation for the eventual withdrawal of some units from the GSFG, although we have no positive evidence of such a Soviet intention. Whatever the Soviet purpose may be, the process appears to be as yet incomplete. When the purpose of this activity in GSFG does become apparent, it may prove to have important implications regarding the structure of the general purpose forces as a whole.

#### Categories and Numbers of Divisions

11. Soviet line divisions are maintained at three different levels of strength and readiness for commitment to combat. Those in Category I are at or near full strength and readiness. Those in Category II are at reduced strength, but are intended for early reinforcement. In a week or so they could be filled up with reservists and made ready to move out. They would not initially be as effective as Category I divisions, but after a brief period of training or combat they would become so. The Category III divisions are essentially cadre units intended to serve as a base for further mobilization. They too could be filled up with reservists in a week or so, but would require two or three months training to become combat effective. They would, however, be available for earlier use in mopping up operations, as line of communications guards, or for internal security and reconstruction duties.

12. We estimate the table of organization (TO) strength of a motorized rifle division at 10,500, that of a tank division at 8,300, and that of an airborne division at 7,300. Category I Soviet divisions in Germany, Poland, and Hungary, are probably manned at 90 percent of TO strength or better. The manning levels of Category I divisions are probably lower in the border districts of the USSR and lowest in interior districts. We estimate that Category II divisions are manned at about 60-75 percent of TO, in some cases having one regiment in cadre status. It is difficult to distinguish Category II divisions at their highest manning levels from Category I divisions at their lowest. Category III divisions are believed to be manned at only 10-30 percent; a few of these may have one regiment capable of early employment.

13. The total number of Soviet ground force divisions has been relatively constant over the past four years. We estimate that the Soviets now have 109 line divisions at Category I or Category II readiness, 61 of the former and 48 of the latter. Some 55 of these are motorized rifle divisions, 47 are tank divisions, and 7 are airborne divisions.<sup>4</sup> We estimate that there are also some 32 Cate-

<sup>4</sup> Motorized rifle divisions typically are organized into three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment as maneuver elements, while tank divisions have three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment. Tank regiments are equipped with medium tanks, except that in a few tank divisions one regiment is equipped with heavy tanks; motorized rifle regiments have one organic tank battalion. Airborne divisions are similar in structure to the motorized rifle divisions, but are considerably smaller, having no tank units and less artillery.

gory III motorized rifle divisions, although this number may be as low as 26 or as high as 39. This range reflects uncertainty as to whether all of the entities counted are in fact divisions. As an approximate estimate, we consider the total number of divisions of all three categories to be about 140.

#### Armies, Fronts, and Theaters

14. There are 19 Soviet ground armies, 10 corps, and a group of forces each in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. A Soviet corps is not an intermediate echelon between division and army, but is rather, in effect, a small army, with reduced provision of combat and service support. Most Soviet divisions are subordinate to these higher echelons, but 28 Category I and II divisions are directly subordinate to military district headquarters or are of undetermined subordination. Finally, seven airborne divisions (Category I and II) are centrally controlled by a directorate in Moscow.<sup>6</sup>

15. The Soviets maintain two types of ground armies, the divisional composition of which varies according to their mission, the terrain, and the opposing forces. The combined-arms army (CAA) usually consists of 2 to 4 motorized rifle divisions and 1 tank division, plus nondivisional combat and service support troops. The 3 CAAs in GSFG have between 37,000 and 47,000 men. Existing tank armies in the USSR contain 3 or 4 tank divisions; however, the 2 tank armies in GSFG each currently have 5 divisions, including 1 motorized rifle division, and contain about 50,000 men.

16. In the event of war most Soviet armies would be grouped into *fronts*. The GSFG can be considered the nearest equivalent of a wartime Soviet *front* currently operational. It contains 2 tank armies, 3 CAAs, and 1 tactical air army (TAA). *Front*-level ground units in the GSFG include about 16,000 men in combat support, 25,000 in headquarters and service support, and over 10,000 in miscellaneous housekeeping functions. In wartime the military districts (MDs) on the borders of the USSR would provide the basis for the creation of additional *fronts*.

17. The evidence on nondivisional support units, especially those within the USSR, is insufficient to permit a definite estimate regarding their prompt availability. We believe that most army and *front*-level combat and service support units are manned at greatly reduced strength in peacetime; some may be only paper organizations. It appears that service support units are likely to be drawn in part from various state-owned civilian service organizations. (In some exercises in Eastern Europe, Soviet units have been supported by East European service units of this character.)

18. In the GSFG a division force (GSFG division slice) is currently estimated at 14,000 men, excluding the air army. The Soviet wartime *front* division slice is estimated to be 17,500. A reinforcement of roughly 70,000 men, mainly in

<sup>6</sup> For the estimated number of Soviet line divisions by geographic area, category of readiness, and type of division, see Table I.

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combat and service support elements, would therefore be required to bring the GSFG up to full wartime strength, assuming that it would become a 20-division *front*.

19. The Soviets currently envisage general war campaigns broken down into theaters of military operations (TVDs). Those in Europe are designated Western, Northwestern, and Southwestern. The Soviets may plan to provide a theater headquarters for each TVD.

#### Tactical Missiles and Rockets

20. Soviet ground forces have tactical missile and rocket systems available at division, army, and *front* level. These systems can deliver nuclear, chemical, and high explosive warheads. In general nuclear war they would probably be supplemented by some of the medium and intermediate range missiles of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which initially would be directed against strategic targets of importance to theater operations and subsequently would probably be used specifically in support of such operations. Over the last few years there has been a significant increase in the number of tactical missile and rocket launchers allocated to Soviet ground forces. Recent evidence suggests, however, that allocations are not uniform throughout the USSR or within any one category of divisions.

21. We believe that Soviet Category I and II divisions (except airborne) have an organic Frog battalion with 3 launchers, each mounted on a light tank chassis, and that some Category III divisions have 2 such launchers. We estimate that there are about 60 tracked Frog launchers in the GSFG. Evidence of 4 Frog launchers per division in parts of the western USSR may foreshadow a similar number in GSFG and other forward area divisions. This trend is probably responsive to the complaint of Soviet division commanders, revealed in the Soviet press, that they lack sufficient Frogs to provide the continuous fire support for the fast moving maneuver elements called for in Soviet operational doctrine.

22. We believe also that many of the brigades of 150 n.m. Scud ballistic missiles which support ground armies throughout the Soviet ground forces have been significantly augmented during the past two years by the addition of a third battalion, making a total of nine launchers per brigade. We estimate that there are about 55 Scud launchers in GSFG. In addition, we believe that a surface-to-surface cruise missile called Salish (a modification of the Kennel air-to-surface cruise missile) is in East Germany for the support of GSFG ground forces, but we have no basis for a definite estimate of the number available.

23. Additional improvements are probably underway in both the Frog and the short-range ballistic missile capabilities of Soviet forces. A new Frog system (Frog-7) was displayed within the past year and has since been observed in the Moscow and Baltic MDs. The wheeled launch vehicle evidently has improved range and road mobility and the rocket probably has greater range and shorter reaction time than previous models. One version of the Scud has been

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displayed on a new, wheeled launch vehicle which will improve the road mobility and possibly the reaction time of the system. This vehicle has not been confirmed in the field; its deployment may await an improved missile.

24. To our knowledge, the Soviets have not yet deployed a tactical missile system with the range and mobility required to support *front* operations throughout the depth of the *front*. Evidence indicates that the Soviets have retired the unsatisfactory SS-2 (Sibling) from service in this role and are using the short-range (150 n.m.) Scud despite its inability to furnish coverage throughout the entire depth of the battle zone. The Shaddock, a 300 n.m. mobile cruise missile system, has been seen in parades. There are recent indications that it has been employed in a coastal defense role; it could also be employed in a *front* support role. The Soviets also have a 300-600 n.m. ballistic missile system (SS-12), the development of which was probably completed in late 1965. When deployed, this would extend missile coverage to the full extent of the battle zone of the *front*.

#### Other Land Armaments

25. Since 1963 T-62 tanks have been gradually introduced into the GSFG and it is expected that by the end of 1966 40 of the 160 tank battalions in GSFG will have their full complement of T-62s. The newer model armored personnel carriers (APCs) which continue to appear in GSFG include all known versions of the eight-wheeled BTR-60P, including one model with overhead cover and a turreted model. However, the older BTR-152s are still the most common APC in GSFG. The new antitank missile, Sagger, has already appeared in the GSFG. None of the new ground force weapons observed in the 1965 parades has yet been confirmed in GSFG troop units, although the Frog-7 and a new 40-round multiple rocket launcher may be present in token quantities.

26. The issuance of a new major item of land armament is usually very gradual; the issuance of an item of new design throughout the ground forces can span 5 to 10 years. Resource demands by other military forces have probably had the effect of stretching out the production of materiel for the ground forces. In general, however, the equipment available to units is combat serviceable and is gradually being improved and modernized. Soviet ground equipment is rugged and easily-maintained, and the Soviets devote considerable attention to conserving it. New equipment on hand is often kept in storage except on field maneuvers, while older versions are used for training. Equipment which has been retired from active use is retained in reserve. We estimate that sufficient equipment, including superseded models, is on hand to equip existing divisions of all three categories at wartime strength.

#### Ground Force Training

27. In peacetime Soviet conscripts are assigned directly to units and are trained almost entirely within those units. There is no large separate basic training establishment. The one-third turnover in conscript troop strength each

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autumn, due to the three-year draft period, causes a drop in combat efficiency from about November to April. This problem, as well as the increasing technical complexity of Soviet theater forces, has caused the Soviets to offer additional inducements to technically trained enlisted men for reenlistment and may cause changes in the conscription system.

28. The Soviet ground forces conduct extensive individual and unit level training. There is no reason to doubt the professional competence of the officer corps. Training of commanders and staffs at all echelons receives special emphasis. However, there are some deficiencies in the nature of Soviet training evidently occasioned in part by a desire to conserve funds and to avoid wear-and-tear on the most up-to-date equipment and also by a penchant for theoretical training methods. There is good evidence that training ammunition for tanks and artillery is allocated sparingly. Tank main armament firing is quite limited, but extensive firing practice is conducted with subcaliber weapons.

### III. THEATER AIR DEFENSE AND TACTICAL AVIATION

#### Theater Air Defense

29. Soviet theater air defense is provided by a combination of the fighter aircraft of Tactical Aviation, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). The defensive capabilities of Tactical Aviation have continued to increase over the past year with the introduction of a new variant of the Fishbed, the F model, and a token number of the Firebar. Fishbed Ds and Fs, which have an all-weather intercept capability, now make up about 1,000 of the 2,400 or so fighters in Tactical Aviation. An air defense control system with semi-automatic features has been deployed within the USSR and in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary; this system is employed to control Tactical Aviation interceptors on air defense missions.

30. We estimate that Soviet theater forces are presently equipped with some 400-600 SA-2 launchers, most of them in SAM units assigned to the field armies and higher headquarters. The Soviets have voiced dissatisfaction with the SA-2 in its role with field forces, because several hours are required to set up a site for firing or to dismantle one for moving. In addition, the SA-2 is vulnerable to low altitude tactics. Main reliance is placed on automatic AAA for low altitude defense and for protection of swiftly moving forces when fighter cover is not available. The latest development in AAA is the radar controlled quadruple-mounted 23 mm weapon which was observed in the November 1965 Moscow parade and last July in a parade in Warsaw, but it has not yet been identified in troop units. The Soviets have developed the Ganef, a track-mounted dual missile system, which may be as vulnerable as the SA-2 to low altitude tactics, but is designed to provide more mobile missile coverage for troops in the field. We believe that they have begun issuing these weapons to field forces, though positive evidence is lacking. The SA-2 may be retained in the field forces for defense of rear area headquarters and other installations which move less frequently.



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31. Although the Soviets probably have conducted research on a system to counter tactical ballistic missiles, no such system is now operationally deployed. We are unable to estimate whether or when the Soviets might achieve a defense against such ballistic missiles.

#### Tactical Aviation

32. Soviet Tactical Aviation has the missions of securing and maintaining local air superiority, supporting ground operations, and providing air defense for the theater forces. There are 13 Soviet TAAs, with three located in Germany, Poland, and Hungary. These armies vary considerably in size and composition; the 24th TAA in East Germany has about 800 combat aircraft, while others range in strength from 75 (Kiev MD) to 355 (Carpathian MD).

33. There are now approximately 3,250 operational combat aircraft in Tactical Aviation. About 2,400 of these are fighters assigned to some 62 fighter regiments.<sup>6</sup> Some 350 light bombers, including about 150 Brewers, are assigned to the 10 bomber regiments. About 450 other aircraft are in reconnaissance units. In addition to these aircraft assigned to tactical air regiments, we believe there are about 500-700 older combat-type aircraft collocated with units of Tactical Aviation.<sup>7</sup>

34. Most of the fighters assigned to Tactical Aviation were designed as interceptors. Their utility as fighter bombers for other than nuclear operations would be limited by their small payload capacity, relatively short range, and lack of an all-weather bombardment capability. On the other hand, Soviet tactical aircraft are designed to operate from unimproved or relatively undeveloped auxiliary airfields and bases. Soviet tactical air units practice redeploying quickly with all their maintenance and support equipment and have demonstrated a capability to operate within a very short time from a new location. In Eastern Europe many auxiliary fields are prestocked with fuel and munitions.

35. The Soviets emphasize flexibility by employing the same fighters for ground support, interdiction, reconnaissance, or air defense missions. Some fighter units appear to have a primary mission of air defense and others of ground support, but pilots are trained in both missions. For example, the Fitter, which is best suited for the fighter bomber role, has been employed in the interceptor role. The Fishbed D and F, whose search/track radar is a prime requirement in the interceptor role, are also used in the ground attack role, performing air-to-ground rocketry and bombing.

36. The continued reequipment of Tactical Aviation during 1965 and 1966 has improved its capabilities to carry out its missions. A significant develop-

<sup>6</sup> Tables II and III give estimated numbers and deployment of Soviet tactical aircraft in operational units, by location and types, as of 1 October 1966.

<sup>7</sup> See paragraph 88, page 27, regarding some 2,300-2,500 additional old model fighters and light bombers available in reserve status.

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ment in this program has been the assignment of a few Firebar interceptors to the 24th TAA in East Germany. This is the latest Soviet fighter to enter operational service and its assignment to TAA units indicates a continuing interest in the air defense role of Soviet tactical air. Firebars are estimated to have an intercept capability as low as 1,000 feet and to have better all-weather intercept capabilities than other current Soviet fighters.

#### Battlefield Reconnaissance

37. In secret journals in 1962, Soviet military leaders expressed strong doubts about the USSR's capabilities for battlefield reconnaissance. The reconnaissance elements which would be available to a wartime *front* appear to be inadequate for providing nuclear delivery units with timely and accurate target data. Currently, aerial reconnaissance continues to be the main means for acquiring targets for nuclear destruction by tactical forces, with lesser dependence on clandestine agents, electronic intercept elements, and troop reconnaissance units. While we have no firm basis for judging what progress they have made since 1962, there is evidence that air reconnaissance units are testing television cameras, infrared apparatus, flares for night photography, and radio-technical collection and automatic data transmission devices.

#### IV. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

38. Soviet doctrine groups biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction." We believe that in Soviet thinking the same constraints apply to the use of toxic chemical warfare (CW) weapons as to the use of nuclear weapons, and that the use of either would require a decision at the highest political level. We also believe that the Soviet leaders would almost certainly authorize the use of toxic chemical agents along with nuclear weapons by theater forces in a nuclear war. While research continues in the field of biological warfare (BW), we have no evidence of any current Soviet capabilities for applying BW to theater operations and we believe Soviet tactical use of BW to be highly unlikely.

39. *Nuclear Weapons.* We believe that the number of nuclear weapons allocated to theater forces has increased considerably in the past few years. Nuclear weapons in a variety of types and yields are available for delivery by tactical rockets, missiles, and aircraft. The Soviet system of command and control over nuclear weapons appears well designed to reserve to the national leadership the decision to initiate the use of these weapons. Strict security procedures give Moscow absolute control of all weapons in storage and during delivery to units, through special KGB security units, as well as over the numbers and yields of weapons to be employed in major theaters. Nuclear weapons storage sites have been firmly identified only within the USSR. For reasons of tactical readiness and logistical efficiency, we would expect tactical nuclear weapons to be stored in some CSFG depots, but we have no firm evidence that they are.

40. *Chemical Weapons.* The Soviets have an extensive stockpile of various toxic chemical agents and have munitions designed for employment with tactical aircraft, missiles, rockets, artillery, and mortars. Spray systems, aerosol generators, landmines, and grenades have also been developed. Missile warheads are probably bulkfilled with one of the "V" agents, while other munitions probably use nerve agents of the "G" type or older type agents of World War I vintage. Production and storage capacity are continuing to expand.

41. *Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense.* It is apparent that Soviet military leaders assume that the West would use chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons in the event of a general war. All elements of the Soviet forces stress training for defense against such weapons. Manual and automatic devices are available for detection of radiation and chemical agents.

## V. GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES

42. The increased tempo of activity which characterized Soviet naval operations last year has continued into 1966. A continuous naval presence is being maintained in the Mediterranean; submarine and surface ship patrols are frequently made into the Norwegian Sea and occasionally into the Philippine Sea. Soviet intelligence collection trawlers patrol off all four of the US Polaris submarine operating bases and maintain surveillance of US military activity off Vietnam. Soviet submarines operate almost continuously off the Polaris base at Holy Loch, have stepped up the number of patrols in the north Atlantic, and continue regular patrols into the northcentral Pacific. Naval-subordinated Bear reconnaissance aircraft continue to conduct long-range flights over the northeast Atlantic, including some flights in the vicinity of US naval operating forces.

### Forces

43. *Submarines.* There are about 340 submarines in the Soviet general purpose submarine force.<sup>8</sup> All of these have both torpedo attack and minelaying capabilities. Included in this number are about 45 cruise missile submarines, all of which are equipped with the SS-N-3 missile and nearly half of which are nuclear-powered. The SS-N-3 can be fired to ranges up to 450 n.m., depending on flight profile, but the Soviets are still developing techniques for its employment at full range. The cruise missile submarines have a primary mission against naval task forces and probably a secondary role against land targets. Included also are some 90 long-range torpedo-attack submarines, of which about 17 are nuclear-powered, and about 200 medium-range torpedo-attack diesel-powered submarines.

44. The independent operations of Soviet submarines, including nuclear-powered units, indicate increasing confidence in the overall reliability of operational units. Existing types of Soviet nuclear submarines can reach speeds of

<sup>1</sup>This estimate excludes 43-47 ballistic missile submarines, which are considered as strategic attack forces.

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about 20 knots. Diving depth capabilities range from a 650-foot normal operating depth for the medium-range, diesel-powered W-class to an estimated 1,000 feet for the nuclear-powered E-II class. Using presently available materiel and technology in a new type of nuclear submarine, speeds of 25 to 30 knots and operating depths of 1,500 to 2,000 feet could probably be achieved. Soviet nuclear submarines radiate a substantial amount of noise, especially at speeds above 10 or 12 knots. The attainment of a relatively quiet submarine over all speed ranges probably would require the development of a new class of submarine incorporating extensive design changes.

45. *Coastal Defense.* Near the approaches to Soviet naval complexes and focal areas are at least 25 coastal defense sites which employ the 35 n.m. Samlet (SSC-2) cruise missile. A coastal defense version of the 300 n.m. Shaddock (SSC-1) cruise missile is believed to be operational and assigned to the Navy, but its deployment pattern is not known.

46. *Surface Forces.* In the late 1950's the Soviets began to increase considerably the firepower of the fleet by installing missiles on converted and new construction surface ships. The Soviet Navy now has 26 combatant ships so equipped. A cruiser and 9 destroyer-type ships carry SAMs; 12 destroyer-types carry the SS-N-1 cruise missile; 4 carry both SAMs and SS-N-3 cruise missiles. In addition to their missile armament, these ships are equipped with antisubmarine systems and conventional guns. Other combatant ships, not equipped with missiles, include 12 cruisers, 60 destroyers, and 86 escort types, most of which were completed before 1958. Five additional cruisers, 18 destroyers, and 10 escorts are in reserve status, but most of these could be ready for sea in two to eight weeks. In addition to the SAM-equipped Kashin-class frigate and the Mirka-class escort, current major surface ship construction programs consist of the new Kresta-class large frigate and a new class of probable helicopter carriers. Both of these new classes probably will be equipped with missiles. The navy also has a large number of smaller combatants and auxiliaries, including about 150 patrol boats equipped with a 20 n.m. cruise missile and nearly 400 minewarfare vessels.

47. *Naval Aviation.* The main missions of Soviet Naval Aviation are reconnaissance, strike missions against maritime targets, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The navy possesses no fighter aircraft, relying for air defense on shipborne SAMs and AAA, or on air cover provided by other services, which would be limited to the operating radii of shore-based fighter aircraft. The force is composed largely of about 500 jet medium bombers, more than 250 of which are equipped to carry the 100 n.m. Kipper or the 55 n.m. Kennel air-to-surface missile (ASM). The force also includes jet light bombers, seaplanes, and helicopters. The number of Blinder supersonic-dash jet medium bombers in Naval Aviation (45) has not increased during the past two years, and we believe that most of the Blinders produced in the next year or so will go to Long Range Aviation (LRA). Nevertheless, we estimate that Blinders equipped with a new antiship ASM will be deployed with Naval Aviation starting in 1967. Dur-

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ing the same time, phaseout of the ASM-equipped Badger B will continue and a reduction in the inventory of reconnaissance/tanker versions of the Badger will begin.

48. Reconnaissance-configured Bear heavy bombers continue to be introduced. One of the missions of these aircraft probably is to provide long-range target data to cruise missile equipped submarines and surface ships. Bear deliveries to the Northern and Pacific fleets will probably continue through about 1968, by which time a total of about 40 probably will be in service. Support of naval operations by LRA aircraft is expected to continue, at least until such time as Naval Aviation receives its quota of long-range reconnaissance planes.

#### Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces and Sea Lines of Communications

49. Soviet naval capabilities to combat carrier task forces and to interdict sea lines of communication are based on long-range, missile-equipped aircraft and the world's largest force of submarines. Missile-equipped surface ships serve to back up these forces. The Soviets, by sending their ships to sea in greater numbers and at greater distances from the USSR than previously, are learning to operate their naval forces more effectively. They are still hampered, however, by the necessity of operating their submarines at great distances from home bases. Only a relatively small number could be maintained continuously on patrol off the US mainland for any length of time: we estimate this number, at about 15 torpedo attack and cruise missile submarines in the western Atlantic and about half as many off the US west coast. If the Soviets were able to provide logistic support for submarine patrols from a forward base, such as Cuba, the number of submarines in the western Atlantic could be more than doubled.

50. The Soviet naval threat to sea communications continues to be greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. Of the nearly 150 torpedo attack and cruise missile submarines available for deployment in the Atlantic approaches to Europe, we estimate that about a third could be maintained continuously on station. Patrols by cruise missile and attack submarines to more distant areas doubled in 1965 over 1964, and this increased tempo of operations is continuing into 1966. The submarines employed for these patrols are well suited for attack against carrier task forces and sea lines of communications. The threat to the more distant sea lines of communications will continue to grow as the Soviets extend these patrols further seaward in greater numbers.

#### Capabilities Against Submarines

51. Since the mid-1950's the Soviets have made a major effort in the construction of ASW ships, particularly small coastal types. As the threat from Polaris submarines grew, the Soviets placed even greater emphasis on ASW. New detection devices and improved ASW ordnance appeared. ASW training significantly increased, and intelligence collection efforts against US submarines and overseas support bases became more intensive.

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52. At present, however, we believe that the Soviet ability to search for, detect, and identify submerged submarines in the open ocean is extremely limited. Detection potential significantly increases within coastal areas contiguous to major Soviet naval bases. Soviet capabilities to identify and destroy diesel-powered submarines detected within range of an ASW platform are considered fair; those against nuclear submarines, poor. We believe that the Soviets will continue to deploy new and improved ASW detection equipment and weapon systems. Present Soviet fixed underwater surveillance systems have a very limited range and detection capability, and are intended for inshore defense. There is tenuous evidence, however, that they are attempting to develop a new, longer range system. With better afloat logistics, ASW surface units will extend their patrols further seaward and the overall effectiveness of such units probably will improve with experience.

53. Two ships now under construction in the Black Sea area are probably helicopter carriers. We do not know the reason for this Soviet venture into the carrier field, but one mission could be to carry ASW-configured helicopters.<sup>9</sup> If this is their mission, these carriers may be intended to operate with the new Kresta-class frigates which are being built simultaneously in the Baltic area. Such ships probably would be equipped with the latest ASW weapons. The most effective platform that the Soviets could employ against an enemy submarine, however, probably is another submarine. We believe that a new type of attack submarine with an ASW role is planned and may already be in production. This judgment is based in part on the sighting over the past few years of several different, potentially long-range, experimental sonars on modified Soviet submarines, the initiation of almost continuous submarine patrols off the Polaris base at Holy Loch, and an increasing Soviet interest in submarine-vs-submarine operations. If our judgment is correct, the first such submarine could be operational as soon as mid-1968—shortly after the first of the new frigates and helicopter carriers enter into service. The construction and effective utilization of such ships would improve Soviet capabilities to conduct ASW operations in the ocean approaches to the USSR. Despite these potential improvements, we believe that the capability of the Soviet Navy to conduct open ocean ASW will remain severely limited for the next several years.

#### Capabilities for Minewarfare

54. The Soviets possess large numbers of conventional mines suitable for laying by aircraft, submarines, or surface craft, and may have developed a shore-controlled mine with a low-yield nuclear warhead. A significant quantity of these mines, as well as a higher percentage of conventionally armed mines with more sophisticated antisweep features, could enter the Soviet mine stockpile during the period of this estimate. Mines could play an important role in Soviet ASW. The Soviets have a moored, contact-firing mine, with antenna. It can effectively mine from the surface down to 260 feet in waters as deep as

<sup>9</sup> Another possible mission is discussed in a later paragraph on amphibious assault.

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1,500 feet. Existing or new influence-firing mines would be used in waters shallower than 180 feet.

#### Logistic Support Capabilities

55. At present the USSR can logistically support limited naval operations on the high seas for extended periods of time, and larger operations for a few weeks. Since mid-1964 they have utilized afloat logistic support to maintain a force of submarines and surface units continuously in the Mediterranean Sea. In 1965-1966 such support was provided to Soviet naval forces cruising in the Philippine and Norwegian Seas. Support capabilities are being improved by the addition of new auxiliary ships as well as by improved techniques. Any further major increase in out-of-area operations would require an even greater augmentation in existing auxiliary forces, however. The Soviets are also developing a system of mobile submarine bases consisting of groups of auxiliary ships which could be deployed to dispersed coastal locations.

#### VI. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT CAPABILITY

56. Soviet capabilities for airborne and amphibious assault remain tied to support of Eurasian operations. These contiguous capabilities are being expanded markedly as the capacity and efficiency of air and sealift forces are increased. The expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet and the development of very large transport aircraft will also improve Soviet capabilities to move unopposed military forces to distant areas. Developments thus far, however, do not signify any urgent Soviet program to acquire capabilities for opposed distant operations.

#### Airlift and Air Assault

57. The number of aircraft assigned to military air transport has increased in the past year. The 25 light and some 700 medium transports of Military Transport Aviation (VTA) now assigned for the transport of airborne forces are able to lift the assault elements of one airborne division plus two battalion assault groups (about 7,400 men with supporting equipment) to a radius of about 560 n.m. In an emergency this capability could be augmented by other aircraft in VTA and civil aviation. This limited transport capability underlines the importance of the greatly increased carrying capacity of the 5,000 n.m. AN-22, which is expected to enter operational service in late 1967 or early 1968.

58. Airborne training during the past year has included day and night operations in a simulated nuclear environment and small unit tactical training involving airlandings of at least battalion size. Some operational exercises have served to develop techniques of command and control for combined operations involving multinational and multilingual forces of both small and large size. Troops and materiel have been staged into forward areas by paratroops and airlandings.

59. The Soviet general purpose forces possess some 175 Hook heavy helicopters capable of lifting maximum payloads of about 13 tons to a combat radius of

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some 20 n.m. or 8-9 tons to a radius of about 150 n.m., and also about 500 Hound light helicopters. Both of these rugged and reliable helicopters are available throughout the general purpose forces and play an important role in Soviet planning for both tactical and logistical employment.

60. The Soviet Civil Air Fleet (Aeroflot) is regarded as the air transport reserve. Arrangements exist for a rapid transfer of a part or all of this fleet to the operational control of VTA. Included in the inventory of Aeroflot are about 600 medium and long-range aircraft which could provide an appreciable augmentation to the ferry lift of military personnel in time of war.

#### Sealift and Amphibious Assault

61. The Soviet naval infantry continues to be emphasized in the Soviet press. It is organized on a brigade structure of approximately 2,000 men. Elements of naval infantry probably exist in each fleet area, but we believe that the total strength remains small, probably less than 8,000 men. The primary mission of naval infantry appears to be to support the planned high rate of advance of land operations by short leap-frog landings along the coast in coordination with paratroop landings. Naval infantry troops specialize in seizing and holding a beachhead to facilitate the advance of regular Soviet ground forces. The current small numbers of troops and landing craft limit the capability of Soviet naval infantry to battalion or brigade-size landings in each of the fleet areas.

62. Amphibious exercises to date have been directed toward improving the Soviet capability to seize crucial peripheral areas such as the Turkish or Danish Straits or to support the flanks of the Soviet Army. Two large ships now under construction in the USSR are probably helicopter carriers; they could be used in vertical assault missions as well as in ASW. Amphibious ships specially designed for long-range operations are in short supply. Deliveries of the modern Polnocny-class medium landing ship are increasing, but some of these are being transferred to other countries. Larger landing ships of a new type have recently been observed in the Baltic. Despite such developments, it does not appear that the Soviets are currently developing a significant capability for amphibious operations beyond waters near the USSR.

63. The USSR has been engaged in the expansion of its merchant fleet since 1951. Military sealift capabilities continue to be improved, particularly through the construction of large-hatched ships such as those which delivered missiles to Cuba. These and other new Soviet merchant ships are characterized by fairly high sustained speeds, long endurance, and heavy lift boom capacity, all of which contribute to sealift value. We estimate that the USSR has the fleet capacity to move 4 to 8 divisions, under varying assumptions, in the Baltic, Black, and Pacific Fleet areas, and 2 to 3 divisions in the Northern Fleet area. Such operations, however, would require ports or other extensive off-loading facilities in the landing area. Moreover, because of the lack of air cover, Soviet naval forces would be unable to provide adequate protection for any sizable force of amphibious ships operating at long distances from the USSR.



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## VII. CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES

### Warsaw Pact

64. It is evident that the USSR can no longer dictate to its Warsaw Pact allies, but must seek their consent in matters which involve them. In parallel with this political development, however, the USSR has been seeking to strengthen the military command structure of the Pact and to improve the military effectiveness of the East European armed forces. Soviet war planning relies on the availability of East European forces to perform important tasks in Central Europe. Nevertheless, if present trends toward autonomy continue, the Pact will evolve toward a conventional military alliance and the range of contingencies in which the USSR can rely on effective support from its East European allies will narrow.

65. The alliance contributes to the mechanisms of Soviet control in Eastern Europe. The East European armed forces are heavily dependent on Soviet provision of materiel and instruction in its use. Pact war planning is done by a Soviet-dominated staff in Moscow. In the event of war most East European field commands would be subordinated to higher echelons of Soviet command. The Soviets probably believe that these factors, plus strict military discipline, Communist indoctrination, and the careful selection of East European officers and career NCO's, will ensure the reliability of the East European armed forces in the event of war. We too believe that this would be the case, at least initially.<sup>10</sup>

66. A distinction has emerged within the Warsaw Pact between East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria on the other. East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia consider a rearmed West Germany a threat to their national security. This common apprehension has led to a special relationship among these three countries and the USSR which has conferred privileged status on this "first strategic echelon" of the Pact, as Moscow has termed it. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, on the other hand, tend to balance the general security offered by the Pact against possible involvement in German issues which they do not regard as directly affecting their national interests. In any case, they would be likely to become engaged only in secondary operations.

### Ground Forces<sup>11</sup>

67. During the past year our estimate of the East European forces has changed somewhat. We have reduced our estimate of overall ground force strength slightly, from 890,000 to 865,000,<sup>12</sup> and the number of line divisions from 63 to 62. Our estimate of the number of divisions in Eastern Europe

<sup>10</sup> For a more extensive discussion, see NIE 11-15-66, "Reliability of the USSR's East European Allies," dated 4 August 1966 (~~SECRET~~).

<sup>11</sup> Table VII gives the estimated number of East European Warsaw Pact line divisions by geographic area, readiness, and type.

<sup>12</sup> This figure does not include an estimated 250,000 men in the East European Warsaw Pact militarized security forces.

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available for early commitment has changed from 35 to 42. This is an increase of 5 motorized rifle divisions and 2 tank divisions: 1 additional motorized rifle division in Rumania; 1 tank division in Poland; 2 motorized rifle divisions in Bulgaria; and, most significantly, we now believe that Hungary has at least 3 divisions (2 motorized rifle and 1 tank) sufficiently manned, equipped, and trained to be considered available for early commitment in a wartime Warsaw Pact role.<sup>13</sup>

68. The equipping of East European armies with tactical rockets and missiles is well underway. We believe that most divisions available for early commitment have an organic Frog battalion with 2 launchers and that each potential field army has 1 Scud brigade with 6 tracked launchers. On this basis, we estimate that the East European armies currently include at least 30-36 Frog battalions and 10-12 Scud brigades. There is some evidence that additional launchers may be issued to existing units and that additional units may be organized during the next several years.

69. The East European countries have detailed mobilization plans and a manpower pool of several million fit reservists with recent military service. In the event of mobilization they would bring their existing forces up to strength and might create new units. The major limiting factor is the availability of equipment. Poland and Czechoslovakia probably have sufficient stocks of obsolescent equipment for several additional divisions. The other countries also are estimated to have in reserve small stocks of major items of equipment and substantial quantities of light equipment, including virtually all types of infantry weapons. We do not believe the USSR would supply much, if any, additional equipment to East European forces during mobilization.

70. We estimate that in the event of hostilities East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia could initially deploy a total of 24 divisions, organized into as many as 6 armies. Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania could probably deploy 18 divisions, organized into 5 armies. We believe the East European Warsaw Pact countries could also bring their remaining 20 divisions to wartime strength and augment existing headquarters and support units for deployment within 30 days, although additional training might be required. Because of deficiencies in air and sealift, only small elements of the Czech airborne brigade and the two specialized Polish divisions (airborne and amphibious) could be committed in their nominal role if they depend on national assets alone. Should the East Europeans elect to use some of their low-strength divisions as cadres for additional divisions, such units would be infantry-type divisions, poorly equipped by modern standards and with limited organic combat and service support.

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<sup>13</sup> However, both qualitative and quantitative distinctions between the "northern" and "southern" tiers are necessary. The motorized rifle divisions of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria are deficient in armored personnel carriers. The tank divisions in Rumania and Bulgaria lack at least one tank regiment.

#### Air Forces <sup>14</sup>

71. The East European air forces supplement both Soviet Tactical Aviation and PVO. There have been increasing indications of closer coordination and functional integration among them, particularly in the air defense role. The East German, Polish, and Czech air forces have been provided with the Soviet semiautomatic air defense control system. East European air defense is thus becoming a more effective forward area extension of the Soviet PVO. Air defense remains the primary mission, but all fighter units are trained and equipped to perform ground attack missions as well. The Czechs and Poles have received Fitters, the best fighter for ground attack now available in Soviet inventory. New fighters such as Fishbed also continue to enter East European inventories. Nevertheless, about 75 percent of the 2,500 combat aircraft in East European air units are older model aircraft. We now believe that the introduction of Brewer into East European forces, which we had anticipated for this year, is likely to be deferred for at least several more years.

72. East European SA-2 sites have been deployed largely in defense of the capital cities and other key urban-industrial areas. In addition to the 36 sites in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary which the Soviets operate in support of their own forces, there are about 125 SA-2 sites in Eastern Europe. Present deployment patterns suggest an additional 25-50 SA-2 sites may be deployed. There are at present no SA-3 sites; defense against low-altitude attacks is provided by light and medium AAA.

#### Naval Forces

73. The capabilities of East European naval forces have improved appreciably in recent years. Equipment is becoming more modern; the Baltic and Black Sea navies now have missile-armed patrol boats in their inventories.<sup>15</sup> The level of operational training has also risen significantly, and has included a limited amount of experience in waters beyond the Baltic and Black Seas. In the Baltic area, the East German and Polish navies are playing a growing role in Warsaw Pact offshore defense and security operations, which suggests an increased degree of interfleet coordination.

#### Nuclear and Chemical Weapons

74. For a number of years East European forces have participated in field training in a simulated nuclear environment. More recently these forces have simulated their own delivery of nuclear weapons. This development, together with the acquisition of nuclear capable delivery systems (Scuds, Frogs, and

<sup>14</sup> Tables VIII and IX give estimated numbers and deployment of East European Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft in operational units, by location and type, as of 1 October 1966.

<sup>15</sup> East European naval strength, by areas, is as follows: Baltic Sea—7 destroyer types, 10 submarines, 17 missile-armed patrol boats, 164 other patrol craft, 86 minesweepers, and 36 amphibious types; Black Sea—2 destroyer types, 2 submarines, 3 missile-armed patrol boats, 35 other patrol craft, 52 minesweepers, and 19 amphibious types.

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fighters), suggests that East European commanders expect to have access to such weapons in the event of war. While we believe that the Soviets will not give East European forces nuclear weapons in peacetime, in the event of war these weapons would probably be made available under strict Soviet control.

75. The East European forces have trained extensively in defense against chemical and biological weapons. All are capable of delivering CW agents by artillery, aircraft, and missiles. The Czechs, East Germans, and possibly the Poles have the capability to manufacture CW toxic agents, but we have no evidence of stockpiling. We believe that in a war the East European armed forces would be dependent on the Soviets for the bulk of their chemical munitions and that these forces would not employ such agents except upon Soviet direction or authorization.

#### VII. CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE CENTRAL REGION OF NATO

76. In this section we confine the discussion to Soviet capabilities against the critical Central Region of NATO. Soviet units located and probably earmarked for operations in this area are the most powerful of the Soviet theater forces. Other Soviet forces are deployed and available for operations against NATO in other regions and to preserve Soviet border security elsewhere.

77. Soviet military writings and exercises generally assume that a war in Europe would begin with a NATO nuclear attack; war games are addressed to surviving such an attack and moving as rapidly as possible to the offensive. Soviet tactical doctrine thus presupposes Soviet strikes with weapons of mass destruction, in great numbers and in great depth, with the main target the NATO nuclear capability. They envisage that these initial strikes would be exploited by the rapid advance of heavily armored Soviet formations at rates of up to 100 kms a day.

78. In such an assault the Soviets would have to rely to a great extent on forces already in place, as the lines of communication to the interior would be subject to interdiction. They have therefore shaped the GSFG into a virtual *front* in being, capable of quick reaction to various contingencies without reinforcement, and have improved the capabilities of the East European armed forces to enable them to take part in the initial operations. Although the Soviets proclaim only defensive intentions and observation of the major exercises indicates a general counteroffensive pattern, current dispositions continue to be such as would allow these forces to initiate an attack into Western Europe.

#### Current Deployment Pattern

79. The bulk of combat ready divisions and tactical air and missile units are deployed in East Central Europe and the western USSR for commitment against NATO in the Central Region. If the achievement of surprise were the overriding consideration, or if the Soviets concluded they must quickly initiate preemptive operations, they could launch an attack against the Central Region of NATO with 35 immediately available divisions (20 Soviet, 6 East German,

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and 9 Czech). An additional 2 Soviet and 9 Polish divisions in Poland, and 4 Soviet and 3 Hungarian divisions in Hungary are available for early commitment, but the divisions in Hungary might not be employed against the Central Region. Twenty-six of these 50 Soviet, East German, Czech, and Polish divisions are tank divisions; the remainder are motorized rifle. Warsaw Pact air strength in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia consists of about 2,900 combat aircraft (1,100 Soviet and 1,800 East German, Polish, and Czech). About 40 percent of the aircraft are current models. Apart from the numbers of combat elements, however, the fact that the divisions in Eastern Europe are somewhat understrength and the support elements are considerably understrength would limit both the radius and the time of combat which could be sustained without reinforcement.

#### Reinforcement

80. Soviet operational concepts for nuclear war, the reinforcements available, the size and nature of the opposing forces, and the geography of the area indicate that, if circumstances permitted, the Soviets would seek to assemble a force of about 80 divisions before attacking the Central Region of NATO. This force would consist of a striking force of some 60 divisions and a theater reserve of about 20 divisions. The striking force would probably consist of the 26 Soviet divisions already in forward area groups of forces (GSFG-20; NCF-2; SGF-4), 19 East European divisions already in place (6 East German, 9 Czech, 4 Polish), and some 15 Soviet divisions from the western USSR. The theater reserve would probably consist of 15 Soviet divisions from the western USSR (6 Category I and 9 Category II) and 5 Polish divisions. It should be noted that all but 9 divisions of the 80-division force would be either Soviet Category I divisions or East European divisions of the better type.

81. The East European rail and road transportation system has a theoretical capacity to accomplish the movement of the indicated 34 Soviet divisions and nondivisional supporting elements from Hungary and the western USSR to the forward area in about two weeks. This theoretical capacity, however, is only one of the considerations involved in realistic estimate of the Soviet reinforcement capability. For example, Soviet reinforcement would almost certainly be by armies. As we have noted earlier, the divisions in armies in the western USSR are manned at a lower level than those in GSFG. Moreover, most of the army and *front*-level combat and service support units within the USSR are manned at greatly reduced strength and some may be only paper organizations. Nevertheless, we believe that the last elements of the three or four armies from the western USSR required to complete the 60-division striking force could be ready to move forward in a week or so. These armies are composed almost entirely of Category I divisions; for this reason we presume that their combat and service support units can be made ready in time to move on schedule. The Soviet armies required for the theater reserve would take longer to be ready to move, but would be the last scheduled to move forward. They would require

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substitution of available Category I or II divisions for their present Category III divisions and would presumably need relatively more augmentation of combat and service support units. These less effective reserve armies could probably be in place in Poland within about four weeks.

82. Other factors bearing on the time required to reinforce on this scale include the days required to assemble a sufficient number of flatcars, delays caused at transloading points along the western border of the USSR, requirements of the civilian economy which prevent 100 percent military utilization of the transportation system, and the inevitable confusion common to all large military movements. The assembly of motor transport, which would constitute a smaller part of the movement capability, would impose no delay since vehicles are readily available. Inland waterways and Baltic sealift could contribute substantially to the forward movement of supplies, but could not materially increase the rate of troop reinforcement. Available airlift probably would be used initially for the movement of key personnel and supplies, such as nuclear weapons. All of these considerations lead us to believe that as a practical matter, from the decision to do so, about three to four weeks would be required for deploying an 80-division force under noncombat conditions.

83. Soviet consideration of a ground attack in the Central Region of NATO is in the context of an assumed nuclear general war. Despite recent Soviet references to the possibility of nonnuclear warfare between nuclear powers, we doubt that the Soviets have seriously considered initiating a massive nonnuclear attack in the Central Region. They would almost certainly expect such an attack to precipitate nuclear general war.<sup>16</sup>

84. If the Soviets were nevertheless to decide to deliver such an attack, they might attempt to take maximum advantage of their present deployments and capabilities by assembling in three to four weeks the 80-division force described above. This would not, however, be a force as well adapted for nonnuclear warfare as it could be made to be. As noted above, the Soviets have subordinated considerations of nonnuclear combat potential and staying power to the achievement of speed and shock effect in the aftermath of a nuclear strike.

85. Alternatively the Soviets, if they decided to deliver a massive nonnuclear attack in the Central Region, might take more time to improve their capabilities for such an operation than is allowed in the three to four week schedule. This

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<sup>16</sup> Maj. Gen. Chester L. Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army, believes large scale nonnuclear warfare is a very real possibility to the Soviets. As past NIEs have said, "They realize the advantages to them if an engagement in the European theater could be kept nonnuclear and the Soviet objective in such a conflict would be to prevent escalation." The Soviets realize the risks involved since there can be no assurance that a war will not escalate. Many leading Soviet marshals have argued that the USSR must prepare for the possibility of a protracted nonnuclear war which shows their grave concern over this likelihood. General Johnson believes paragraph 83 downgrades the judgments in this and past NIEs that the Soviet Union has retained a formidable inherent capability for nonnuclear war and that they are expected to improve these capabilities in the future.

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time could be used, among other things, to augment the proportion of infantry and to make available more combat support (including conventional artillery) and service support. These adjustments would require a more extensive mobilization and training of reservists. The end result would probably be a larger Pact force in the Central Region, having a greater weight of conventional attack capability. In preparing such a force, however, the Soviets would have to plan to keep it balanced against the possibility that conventional combat might quickly escalate to nuclear war.

86. The reinforcement possibilities discussed above are subject to many variations in scale and in execution. Maximum surprise would be achieved by an attack without previous buildup, but we believe the initial advantage would quickly be offset by the lack of weight in the attack. Soviet operational doctrine indicates that they would prefer to assemble a large striking force in the area of the main effort. Some reinforcement could even be effected piecemeal over a longer period in an attempt to preserve secrecy. However, the Soviets would have to weigh the advantage of this alternative against the value of more rapidly building up a favorable ratio of forces against NATO and to recognize the risk of premature detection with possible NATO counteraction.

#### Mobilization Base

87. The Soviets have large numbers of trained reservists to fill out existing understrength units or to mobilize new units. The reservists initially called up would be men who had recently completed a three-year tour in the service. About one million of these reserves would probably be required to fill the current force of about 140 divisions to wartime strength; this would involve fleshing out existing units and mobilizing a large number of additional combat and service support units for armies and *fronts*. We estimate that stocks of materiel on hand at or near existing units would be sufficient for this mobilization, although some of the equipment would be obsolescent. Logistic support for such a mobilization would be supplemented by engineer items and motor transport from civilian sources. We believe that manpower would not be a limiting factor in fielding a greater number of divisions, but equipment for such divisions would be either obsolete or substitute items. It is likely that such divisions could only be lightly equipped rifle divisions, not comparable to present Soviet divisions. In view of the existing structure of their theater forces, it is probable that the Soviets would place initial stress on building stronger support elements rather than on the immediate creation of additional divisions. From what we know of Soviet concepts and materiel stocks, we doubt that any prewar mobilization would go much beyond fully readying the present 140-division force.

88. We know of no organized air or naval reserve units, but the Soviets have sufficient numbers of trained reservists to bring active units to authorized unit manning levels, to create additional units around cadres of regulars, and to provide replacements. We estimate that the Soviets also have approximately 2,300-

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2,500 old model fighters and light bombers in reserve status. These aircraft could be used for augmentation or replacement of aircraft now in Tactical Aviation. We estimate also that the Soviets have 5 cruisers, 18 destroyers, and 10 escorts in a reserve status. About 75 percent of these reserve ships could be made ready for sea in two weeks to two months in an emergency.

## IX. TRENDS OVER THE LONGER TERM (1968-1976)

### General Considerations

89. We can estimate the present strength of the Soviet general purpose forces and the trend over the next year or two with relative confidence, on the basis of current evidence. Speculation about possible developments over the longer term must be understood to be highly tentative. The Soviet planners themselves may not yet have established force goals for the period beyond 1970. Even if they have, such goals are sure to be modified from time to time in response to changes in military technology, in the Soviet sense of the strategic relation of forces, and in the Soviet view of the world situation in general. In any case, the Soviet general purpose forces in 1976 will differ from those of today and this difference will be the net result of the interaction of conflicting interests and pressures, rather than of any single clear and coherent conception.

90. An underlying factor which will hinder any significant change in the character of the Soviet general purpose forces is the inertia inherent in such a large military establishment, especially one in which the leadership tends to be elderly. The only pressure for change now apparent is the current discussion of the importance of general purpose forces and the need to prepare them for nonnuclear as well as nuclear warfare. This agitation is carried on by men who are moved in part by the earlier US shift from the doctrine of "massive retaliation" to that of "flexible response." It is probably agreeable to the political leadership who are concerned to have effective means to support foreign policy in a situation of mutual nuclear deterrence, and to vested military interests who seek to justify the allocation of economic resources to the maintenance of large general purpose forces. Its actual effect on the structure of those forces remains to be seen. We do not think that it portends any radical restructuring. We do believe that it will have some gradual effect over the longer term.

91. Another factor which will affect the development of the general purpose forces is the acute competition for economic resources among various Soviet interests. Current Soviet economic planning assumes an average annual rate of economic growth of 6-7 percent. It is likely that current military programs are also based on that assumption. We think that the actual rate of economic growth is more likely to be 4-5 percent. If that should prove to be the case, some planned military programs might need to be cut back or stretched out. We believe that such a contingency would work to the detriment of general purpose forces, because military R&D and the strategic attack and strategic



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defense forces will continue to have priority in the consideration of the Soviet leadership.

92. The development of the Soviet general purpose forces over the longer term will also be strongly influenced by external developments.<sup>17</sup> Tensions arising from the war in Vietnam have already contributed to some marginal augmentation of strength in being (as did the Berlin crisis of 1961). Rising tensions in Soviet relations with China could have a similar and perhaps longer term effect. A significant weakening of NATO would also importantly affect Soviet calculations regarding their requirements for general purpose forces, but the Soviets will almost certainly continue to judge their military requirements primarily in terms of US capabilities and strategic doctrine.

#### Ground Forces

93. Taking these general considerations into account, we believe that over the longer term the existing structure of Soviet divisions, armies, and potential *fronts* will be filled out more than they are in peacetime at present. The emphasis will probably be on such active combat and service support units as would improve the capabilities of the force to engage in sustained nonnuclear as well as nuclear warfare. We believe that this augmentation of major unit strengths will be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the number of divisions, so that by 1976 there will be a smaller number of larger divisions with better support, probably with no significant change in the total number of men in the ground forces. On this basis, we project a range of 85-100 Category I and II divisions in 1976, as compared with the present 109. The difference between the extremes of the range reflects only different assumptions as to the rate at which new-type, larger divisions might be created. The total manpower would be about the same for either side of the range.

94. Whether the Soviets will maintain substantially the present number of Category III divisions is problematical. The costs of maintaining cadre strength divisions is considerable and they could not be made ready to participate in the initial operations of a general nuclear war. On the other hand, Soviet historical experience and political doctrine both teach that wars are won by the side able to call forth the stronger reserves. On balance, we believe that the Soviets will continue to have a strong bias in favor of maintaining a substantial number of Category III divisions, and that the number in 1976 will be approximately as at present, say 30, or will be only moderately reduced, say 20.

95. In numbers of men and quality of equipment, the Western Theater will continue to have priority. Equipment equivalent in quality to that provided in the West may not be provided for forces elsewhere. The forces opposite China will probably be strengthened gradually to provide a tactical defensive force rather than a force capable of major offensive actions. Strengthened airborne

<sup>17</sup> This subject is more extensively discussed in NIE 11-4-66, "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," dated 16 June 1966, SECRET, paragraphs 6-14.

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and amphibious elements will probably also be maintained at combat readiness so as to be able to engage quickly in key border areas, and perhaps to be prepared for limited military actions in other possible theaters, both near and distant.

#### Tactical Aviation

96. We believe that the USSR will continue to maintain Tactical Aviation as a force capable of both air defense and ground attack. Continuing modernization is bringing new generation fighter bombers and all-weather fighters into service, but about half of the aircraft of Soviet Tactical Aviation are still older models. The present modernization program will probably continue through 1968, and there is evidence that the Soviets are also delaying the phaseout of older aircraft. For these reasons, as well as our general conclusion that the Soviets are now paying more attention to the general purpose forces, we now believe there will be no significant reduction in the force level of Tactical Aviation during the next few years.

97. Over the longer term, the size of Tactical Aviation will depend in part on how seriously the Soviets conceive it to be necessary to prepare their forces for the contingency of nonnuclear war. For such a war their requirement for tactical aircraft would tend to be large, since their nuclear-armed rockets and missiles could not be used. Otherwise, the requirement would tend to decline. Additional long-term factors include the possible advent of newer, more complex aircraft, which will be much more costly and will probably not be required in the same numbers as the older models to perform the same missions. It is also likely that the Soviets have begun to introduce improved SAMs which could eventually relieve Tactical Aviation of some of its responsibility for air defense of ground forces. In light of these considerations, we think it probable that the number of aircraft in operational units of Tactical Aviation will decline in the 1970's, but its overall capability will probably increase. However, the Soviets may hedge against contingencies by maintaining a reserve of older aircraft not in operational units, a practice they have adopted in the past few years.<sup>18</sup>

#### Naval Forces

98. Recent Soviet naval activity and new shipbuilding programs indicate that the USSR intends to increase its capability for conducting sustained, long-range

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<sup>18</sup> Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would delete the last two sentences of this paragraph and substitute the following:

"In light of these considerations, but particularly in view of Soviet interest in improving nonnuclear capabilities, we think it probable that the number of aircraft in operational units in Tactical Aviation will remain at least as large in the 1970's as at present. We believe the Soviets also will continue to hedge against contingencies by maintaining, as they do now, a reserve of older aircraft not in operational units."

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naval operations. While the specific scope and ultimate magnitude of new construction programs is not known, the trend probably will be towards increased production of ships with improved seakeeping, air defense, and antisubmarine capabilities. In the submarine force, we believe that construction of diesel-powered submarines will cease after the next few years, while production of nuclear-powered units will increase. In Naval Aviation, the new emphasis probably will be on the acquisition of additional long-range reconnaissance aircraft and of new ASW planes.

99. More specifically, we estimate that construction of cruise missile submarines will continue until about 1971, but that production of diesel-powered cruise missile submarines will end before then. If the Soviets see a strategic attack role for cruise missile units, construction of nuclear-powered types probably would continue into the mid-1970's. A new type of cruise missile with increased range, speed, and accuracy could be developed for use on these submarines.

100. We believe that production of torpedo-attack submarines will continue, and that new construction will focus on nuclear-powered units and probably will include a new class. We estimate that the latter, which probably will be specifically designed and equipped for ASW operations, could appear as soon as mid-1968. Construction of diesel-powered boats will probably cease altogether by 1971. The addition of new attack submarines to the order-of-battle will be accompanied by the retirement of the numerous medium-range W-class boats during the mid-1970's. As a result, the proportion of nuclear and long-range diesel submarines will increase from about one-third of the current force to more than half of the approximately 240 torpedo attack units estimated for that period. Of these, some 20 to 35 could be of the probable new class of attack submarine.

101. In the surface ship forces, we doubt that any new major combatants will be equipped with SSMs. The emphasis instead will continue to be on air defense and ASW. Surface ship responsibilities for defense against carrier task forces will decline further as cruise missile equipped submarines and aircraft improve their capabilities against those forces. Construction of SAM-equipped frigates of the Kashin-class and of the new Kresta-class probably will continue through 1971, and several older destroyers may be converted to fire SAMs. We estimate that by mid-1971 about 25 SAM-equipped destroyer types will be in service. Construction could continue through the mid-1970's, at which time another new class might appear. Some additional helicopter carriers will probably be built, and production of amphibious ships probably will continue throughout the period of this estimate.

102. In Naval Aviation, a new type of ASW helicopter or patrol plane probably will be developed by 1971. A new supersonic-dash jet medium bomber might be introduced in the early 1970's as a follow-on to the Badger and Blinder bombers, but there is no evidence that such an aircraft is under development.

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#### East European Military Capabilities

103. We believe that selective modernization of the East European general purpose forces will continue. Although manpower levels of the armed forces will probably remain about the same, the military capabilities of these forces will almost certainly increase as a consequence of the continued introduction of better equipment. Militating against this is the growing evidence of East European reluctance to expend resources on their military establishments.

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TABLE I  
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LINE DIVISIONS

AREA	CATEGORY I AND II DIVISIONS						TOTAL	CATEGORY III DIVISIONS <sup>a</sup>
	MRD		TK		ABN			
	Cat. I	Cat. II	Cat. I	Cat. II	Cat. I	Cat. II		
East Germany.....	10	0	10	0	0	0	20	0
Poland.....	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
Hungary.....	2	0	2	0	0	0	4	0
Western USSR.....	9	5	11	6	2	1	34	7
Southwestern USSR...	0	3	1	4	0	0	8	6
Northwestern USSR...	3	2	0	1	1	0	7	3
Southern USSR.....	2	11	1	2	2	0	18	10
Central USSR.....	0	4	0	1	0	0	5	3
Far Eastern USSR....	1	3	2	4	0	1	11	3
TOTAL.....	27	28	29	18	5	2	109	32 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> We estimate that all of these divisions are motorized rifle divisions and that there are no Category III tank or airborne divisions.

<sup>b</sup> This number may be as low as 26 or as high as 39. This range reflects uncertainty as to whether all of the units counted are in fact divisions.

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TABLE II  
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS,  
BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1966

	FAGOT	FRESCO	FARMER	FISHED FISHED FISHED			FIREBAR	FITTER	MAN- GROVE	BEAGLE	BREWER	TOTAL
				C/E	D	F						
East Germany.....	32	99	12	..	199	85	23	157	12	98	74	791
Poland.....	..	94	..	..	61	50	..	37	30	10	..	282
Hungary.....	..	50	..	..	86	..	..	24	..	56	..	216
Baltic.....	..	99	..	24	25	..	..	24	..	40	32	244
Belorussia.....	..	125	12	..	61	..	..	24	..	32	..	254
Carpathian.....	..	111	..	..	111	..	..	37	32	44	20	355
Moscow.....	..	12	20	25	12	..	..	12	32	..	..	113
Leningrad.....	..	50	..	..	..	..	..	24	..	43	..	117
Kiev.....	..	74	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	74
Odessa.....	..	12	37	..	74	..	..	37	32	10	..	202
Transcaucasus.....	..	50	24	..	74	..	..	..	..	64	24	236
Turkistan.....	..	78	12	..	37	37	..	..	..	20	..	184
Far East.....	..	38	..	..	40	37	..	37	..	30	..	182
TOTAL.....	32	892	117	49	780	209	23	413	138	447	150	3,250 *
Rounded TOTALS.....	30	890	115	50	780	210	25	415	140	445	150	3,250

\* There are also some 500-700 older combat-type aircraft collocated with units of Tactical Aviation, and an additional 2,300-2,500 older aircraft in reserve status.

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TABLE III  
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN  
OPERATIONAL UNITS, BY MODEL

	<u>1 OCTOBER 1966</u>	<u>MID-1967</u>	<u>MID-1968</u>
Old Models.....	1,475	1,325-975	1,050-725
Fagot.....	30	0	0
Fresco.....	890	800-625	700-525
Farmer.....	115	125-25	50-0
Beagle.....	440	400-325	300-200
Current Models.....	1,770	1,875-2,275	2,075-2,475
Fishbed C/E.....	50	25-50	0
Fishbed D.....	780	700-800	700-800
Fishbed F.....	210	300-400	400-500
Firebar.....	25	25-50	25-75
Fitter.....	415	500-575	575-650
Mangrove.....	140	125-150	125-150
Brewer.....	150	200-250	250-300
Future Models.....	0	0-0	0-25
TF-67-68.....	0	0	0-25
Rounded TOTALS...	3,250 *	3,200-3,250	3,125-3,225

\* There are also some 500-700 older combat-type aircraft collocated with units of Tactical Aviation, and an additional 2,300-2,500 older aircraft in reserve status.

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TABLE IV

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES BY CLASS, 1 OCTOBER 1966—BY FLEETS

Type of Ship *	<u>NORTH</u>	<u>BALTIC</u>	<u>BLACK</u>	<u>PACIFIC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MID-1967</u>	<u>MID-1968</u>
Cruise Missile							
Nuclear							
"E-I" Class.....	0	0	0	5	5	5	5
"E-II" Class.....	11	0	0	7	18	20-22	24-26
Subtotal.....	11	0	0	12	23	25-27	29-31
Diesel							
"W-Conversion" Class.....	6	3	1	3	13	13	13
"J" Class.....	6-8	1	2	1	10-12	11-15	13-18
Subtotal.....	12-14	4	3	4	23-25	24-28	26-31
TOTAL Cruise Missile.....	23-25	4	3	16	46-48	49-55	55-62
Torpedo Attack							
Nuclear							
"N" Class.....	15	0	0	2	17	17	17
Follow-on.....	..	..	..	..	..	0-1	1-3
Diesel							
"F" Class.....	39	3	0	14	56	60-62	64-68
"Z" Class.....	8	5	0	6	19	19	19
"R" Class.....	11	1	3	0	15	15	15
"W" Class.....	47	48	26	46	167	165	160
"Q" Class.....	..	12	3	0	15	15	15
"M" Class.....	0	0	2	5	7	0	0
TOTAL Torpedo Attack.....	120	69	34	73	296	291-294	291-297
TOTAL General Purpose Submarines.....	143-145	73	37	89	342-344	340-349	346-359

\* The previous distinction between first and second line submarines has been dropped. This table shows the total number of submarines, by class, which are estimated to be operational in the above given years.

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TABLE V  
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET SURFACE SHIPS  
BY TYPE, 1 OCTOBER 1966—BY FLEETS

<u>TYPES OF SHIPS</u>	<u>NORTH</u>	<u>BALTIC</u>	<u>BLACK</u>	<u>PACIFIC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MID- 1967</u>	<u>MID- 1968</u>
Operational Surface Ships *							
Cruisers.....	2	3	6	2	13	12	11
Missile Destroyer Types.....	4	5	10	6	25	28	31
Destroyers.....	12	8	18	22	60	56	52
Escorts.....	26	23	19 <sup>b</sup>	18	86	88	89
Helicopter Carriers.....	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
<b>TOTAL Operational Surface Ships.....</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>185</b>
Reserve Surface Ships *							
Cruisers.....	1	1	0	3	5	6	6
Destroyers.....	7	7	0	4	18	21	24
Escorts.....	2	4	0	4	10	13	16
<b>TOTAL Reserve Surface Ships</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL SURFACE SHIPS.....</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>231</b>

\* First line-second line category for surface ships has been dropped and ships are now listed as operational or in a reserve status. Based on limited evidence it is estimated that 75 percent of these reserve units could be made ready for sea in two weeks to two months in an emergency.

<sup>b</sup> One in Caspian Sea.

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TABLE VI  
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND TYPES OF SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT

	1 OCT 1966	MID-1967	MID-1968
Heavy Bombers			
Bear (Reconnaissance).....	20	25-40	30-50
Medium Bombers			
Badger A * (Reconnaissance/Tanker).....	175	(160-190)	170-140
Badger B (2 AS-1).....	60	(60-40)	(60-20)
Badger C (1 AS-2).....	200	190-215	190-215
Blinder A.....	45	50-60	50-65
Blinder B (1 ASM).....	0	5-15	10-40
Light Bombers			
Beagle.....	80	(80-50)	(60-30)
Patrol Aircraft			
Madge.....	50	50-40	40-30
Mallow <sup>b</sup> .....	20	0-20	0-20
New ASW Aircraft <sup>c</sup> .....	8	0-15	0-25
Helicopters			
Heavy Helicopters.....	8	5-20	5-20
Light Helicopters.....	135	125-150	125-150

\* Totals for Badger A include a small number of Badger D reconnaissance aircraft, and about 15 Badgers used in ASW operations.

<sup>b</sup> It is not certain that these aircraft are operational as of 1 October 1966.

<sup>c</sup> The Mail twin turboprop seaplane and possibly a new ASW aircraft.

TABLE VII  
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW  
PACT GROUND FORCE DIVISIONS

COUNTRY	GROUND FORCE STRENGTH	TOTAL DIVISIONS <sup>a</sup>	DIVISIONS <sup>a</sup>			OTHER
			MECH	ARMORED		
East Germany.....	90,000	6 (6)	4 (4)	2 (2)	..	
Poland.....	225,000	15 (9)	8 (4)	5 (5)	1 Abn 1 Assault Landing (Amph)	
Czechoslovakia....	175,000	14 (9)	9 (4)	5 (5)	..	
Bulgaria.....	125,000	12 (8)	8 (6) <sup>b</sup>	4 (2) <sup>c</sup>	..	
Hungary.....	100,000	6 (3)	5 (2) <sup>b</sup>	1 (1)	..	
Rumania.....	150,000	9 (7)	7 (5) <sup>b</sup>	2 (2) <sup>c</sup>	..	
TOTALS.....	865,000	62 (42)	41 (25)	19 (17)	2 (0)	

\* Parenthetical figures indicate number of divisions available for early commitment.

<sup>b</sup> These divisions are deficient in armored personnel carriers.

<sup>c</sup> These divisions lack at least one tank regiment.

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TABLE VIII

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS BY TYPE AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1966

	FAGOT/ FRESCO A, B, C	FRESCO D/E	FARMER	FITTER	FISHBED C/E	FISHBED D/F	MAN- GROVE/ MAYA	BEAGLE	TOTALS BY COUNTRY
Bulgaria.....	174	22	70	..	30	6	..	10	312
Czechoslovakia...	215	34	180	66	48	36	20	22	621
East Germany....	70	58	24	..	76	72	..	..	300
Hungary.....	20	10	10	..	62	30	..	..	132
Poland.....	488	156	22	16	33	68	..	52	835
Polish Navy.....	36	..	..	..	..	..	4	10	50
Rumania.....	138	10	28	..	42	10	..	10	238
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>1,141</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>334</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>291</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>2,488</b>

TABLE IX

ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT BY TYPE EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT

	<u>1 oct 1966</u>	<u>MID-1967</u>	<u>MID-1968</u>
Old Models.....	(1,869)	(1,700-1,800)	(1,555-1,710)
Fagot/Fresco.....	1,431	1,280-1,320	1,165-1,240
Farmer.....	334	320-335	295-320
Beagle.....	104	100-105	95-100
Current Models.....	(619)	(690-720)	(750-790)
Fishbed C/E.....	291	315-325	330-350
Fishbed D/F.....	222	260-300	295-335
Fitter.....	82	90-105	100-135
Fishpot.....	..	..	..
Mangrove/Maya.....	24	25-30	25-30
<b>GRAND TOTALS.....</b>	<b>2,488</b>	<b>2,390-2,520</b>	<b>2,305-2,500</b>

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