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**Soviet and East European General
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
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SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet and East European general purpose forces through mid-1970, especially against NATO, and general trends in those forces over the next 10 years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. During the past two years there has been a marked increase of good information regarding the Warsaw Pact general purpose forces, especially the ground forces, including the observation of a real military operation against Czechoslovakia. Consequently we now have a much clearer picture of the strengths and weaknesses of those forces and can make more confident judgments about total numbers of units and their present deployment, their levels of equipment and combat readiness, and their capabilities for mobilization and deployment.

B. We find that the structure of Warsaw Pact theater forces continues to reflect the reorganization of about 10 years ago, which was based on the assumption that any war in Europe would be nuclear from the outset. The arguments for greater flexibility over the past several years have not resulted in any structural change, although there has been a continuing program for the modernization of equipment.

C. We estimate that Soviet Category I divisions have less equipment than we had previously believed.¹ Category II divisions have only 50 to 70 percent of the equipment found in Category I divisions, rather than nearly full complements of such equipment, and are manned

¹ We now estimate that Category I motorized rifle divisions have about 2,300 major items of equipment and tank divisions about 2,200. These figures were first presented in the Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-14-67, "Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces," dated 9 May 1968.

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at about 50 percent of Category I strength. From the Czech crisis, however, we know that Category II divisions can be brought up to Category I strength within a few days by calling up reservists and vehicles from the civilian economy. Category III divisions are at even lower levels of equipment and personnel strength, and we believe are intended to provide a base for longer term mobilization.

D. We estimate that at present there are 70 Category I divisions (including the 13 Category II divisions recently and perhaps temporarily raised to Category I strength), 43 Category II divisions, 13 divisions in the process of build-up to Category I or II, and 27 Category III divisions. The total of 153 divisions reflects an actual increase of 10 divisions resulting from a buildup along the Chinese border.

E. The Soviets would probably have little difficulty in quickly assembling the personnel required to fill up their reduced strength divisions. However, those divisions would have quantitative and qualitative shortfalls in equipment when compared to Category I divisions. For example, we believe that there is a shortage of armored personnel carriers (APCs), and that about half the total inventory of APCs are old nonamphibious models.

F. There are 19 Soviet ground armies. Most of those within the USSR would require the mobilization of army-level support units prior to commitment, but the armies in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) are almost certainly combat-ready as they now exist.

G. The *front* is the highest Soviet wartime field headquarters for the operational control of general purpose forces. The GSFG is virtually a *front* in being and the only one that exists at combat-ready strength in peacetime. Additional *fronts* would be formed through mobilization in the event of war. Efficient operation of the *fronts'* logistical services would be of critical importance from the outset of military operations; the combined total of mobile stocks of POL and ammunition in divisions and field armies would be sufficient for about five days of intensive combat.

H. Soviet Tactical Aviation is now composed largely of fighters. About 1,550 fighters are in air regiments with the primary mission of air defense and about 1,050 are in regiments which have a primary mission of ground attack. In addition, there are about 360 light bombers in ground attack regiments and there are 540 fighters and light

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bombers in reconnaissance and strike reconnaissance units. As a result of the buildup against China, the numbers of tactical aircraft have increased somewhat over the past year or so, and we expect this trend to continue for the near future. Most of the aircraft delivered to the force in recent years have been late model Mig-21 Fishbeds, which now constitute more than 95 percent of the aircraft in air defense regiments. In a concurrent modernization program, about half of the aircraft in ground attack regiments have been replaced by the SU-7 Fitter and about half of the light bomber force with the Brewer.

I. All Soviet tactical fighter regiments receive training for other than their primary missions and could be used for either air defense or ground attack roles. However, most Soviet tactical fighters were designed as interceptors; their performance as fighter-bombers is characterized by their small payload capacity, short range, but quick turn-around time. The Soviets apparently plan to deploy ground attack fighters as near as possible to front lines.

J. Soviet theater air defenses are deficient against low altitude attack. However, the Soviets are now deploying SA-3 missiles to protect airfields in Eastern Europe. They are also deploying new low altitude radars in the forward area. Additional measures which the Soviets have taken to protect their tactical aircraft from attack while at home base include revetments, hangarages, dispersed parking, and increased light antiaircraft artillery.

K. The Soviets are continuing a major effort to improve their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. New ASW ships have been built, new detection devices and improved ASW ordnance have appeared, and ASW training has been increasingly emphasized. Despite this continuing improvement in equipment and training, we continue to believe that Soviet capabilities to detect, localize, and classify submarines operating in the open ocean will remain very limited for the next several years.

L. The Soviet Navy has made substantial progress in developing flexible forces to project seapower beyond the periphery of the USSR. The emphasis in new surface ships and conversions is on air defense and ASW, as well as improved seaworthiness and range capabilities. Three new classes of attack submarines, at least two of which are nuclear-powered, are now in series production. The Soviets employ

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a system of naval auxiliaries and merchant ships to support their naval force in the Mediterranean, now augmented by shore support facilities made available by Egypt. Without shore support, any major increase in long-range operations would require augmentation of existing auxiliaries, not only with merchant shipping, but also with ships designed to provide specialized technical support.

M. The East European countries have about 40 divisions roughly analogous to Soviet Category I divisions, about 20 understrength divisions, and about 2,600 combat aircraft. The usefulness of these forces in a confrontation with NATO rests squarely on the political reliability of the various East European regimes. Soviet confidence in those regimes must be shaken by recent events in Eastern Europe.

N. In the event of a war with NATO, we believe that the Soviets would seek to assemble five *fronts* in Eastern Europe opposite the Central Region. Three of these would be in contact with NATO: GSFC, the only *front* in being, in the center, and, at least initially, a Polish *front* on the northern flank and a Czech *front* on the southern flank. Two more *fronts* in a "second strategic echelon" would be formed primarily from Soviet forces in the Belorussian and Carpathian MDs and moved initially into eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia.

O. This force, when assembled, would comprise on the order of 1,260,000 men, 20,600 tanks, 370 nuclear capable rockets and missile launchers, 4,900 conventional artillery tubes, and 3,700 combat aircraft (1,350 in ground attack regiments, 2,000 in air defense regiments, and 350 in reconnaissance regiments).² The force would possess formidable capabilities for all types of military contingencies in the Central Region, but its best capability would be that for which it was designed—nuclear theater warfare. In this contingency, Warsaw Pact fire support would be augmented by the massive medium-range ballistic missile/intermediate-range ballistic missile deployment and medium-range bombers in the western USSR. The force would be less effective for sustained conventional combat.

P. We believe that, in extreme emergency conditions, the Warsaw Pact is capable of completing mobilization of the men and vehicles required to organize the *fronts* intended for Central Europe and to

² The force thus described includes the Czech ground and air forces. It does not include Warsaw Pact forces in Hungary.

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move essential combat elements forward in 10 days, if the process is not interrupted by hostile military action. However, the complete integration of these *fronts* as combat-effective organizations would require more time. For that reason, the USSR would almost certainly take about three weeks to complete its mobilization and forward deployment in any circumstances which permitted it to control the timing.

Q. We believe that Soviet plans for mobilization assume a period of high tension in Europe and a period of covert preparations. The Soviets do not expect the subsequent overt mobilization and reinforcement to go undetected by NATO. If the Warsaw Pact were observed to be mobilizing and deploying forces during a period of high tension with NATO, NATO would certainly be alarmed by the increasing danger of armed conflict, but it would be impossible to say whether the Warsaw Pact mobilization was precautionary and defensive, or an attempt to coerce NATO by adopting a threatening posture, or evidence of a firm decision to attack.

R. Soviet policy decisions concerning the future development of general purpose forces will be heavily influenced by recent events in Eastern Europe, which must have raised serious questions concerning the longstanding policy of heavy reliance on East European forces in any conflict with NATO. Also affecting such development are the continuing buildup along the Chinese border and the continuing growth of capabilities for distant limited military action. These considerations will probably combine to exert heavy pressure on the Soviet leadership for increased outlays for general purpose forces. If demands are forthcoming to improve substantially Soviet capabilities for sustained conventional operations, the cost of meeting them would be very high, with intensified competition for resources with claimants for the strategic forces and the civilian sector. The results of this competition cannot be confidently predicted, but we believe that the outlays for general purpose forces will increase in some degree.

S. On balance, we believe that the combat readiness of Soviet forces in the western USSR will be maintained at levels somewhat higher than was the case prior to the Czech crisis, that the modernization of ground and tactical air equipment will continue at about the present pace, and that there may be a modest increase in the provision of army- and *front*-level support units. We believe that the Soviets will also seek to increase substantially their capabilities to con-

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duct ASW operations in the open ocean and sustained long-range naval operations.

T. The future size, quality, and status of East European forces will depend largely on the outcome of Soviet reexamination of military policy in the light of recent experience. The Soviets may conclude that heavy reliance on the East Europeans is no longer a sound military policy. In this case, there would probably be a reduction in East European standing forces. It is more likely, however, that the East German, Polish, and Bulgarian forces will be maintained at approximately their present strength for the foreseeable future and will be improved in quality. In any case, the Soviets may press for tighter controls over East European forces, perhaps through the subordination of East European theater forces to Soviet *fronts*.

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. During the past two years there has been a marked increase of good information regarding the Warsaw Pact general purpose forces, especially the ground forces, including the observation of a real military operation against Czechoslovakia. Consequently we now have a much clearer picture of the strengths and weaknesses of those forces and can make more confident judgments about total numbers of units and their present deployment, their levels of equipment and combat readiness, and their capabilities for mobilization and deployment.

2. We think that some aspects of the actual status of the Soviet general purpose forces revealed by our new information and analysis reflect an internal struggle for the allocation of resources over the past 10 years. Therefore, as a necessary explanation of the present composition of the Soviet general purpose forces, especially the ground forces, we begin with a summary review of the evolution of Soviet military policy and doctrine during that period and their impact on those forces.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET THOUGHT REGARDING GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

3. Until the death of Stalin (1953), Soviet military thought was dominated by his conception of the USSR as a continental power encircled by hostile forces and vulnerable to invasion. This conception had deep roots in the Russian past and in Stalin's personal experience. It led to the conclusion that the primary requirement for the security of the "Socialist Fatherland" was massive ground

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forces capable of deterring or repelling invasion. Naval and air forces were regarded as merely auxiliary. Although Stalin supported the development of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems, because the US had them, he continued to think in continental terms and no one dared to advocate a different conception during his lifetime.

4. In contrast, Stalin's successors have thought of the USSR as one of only two world powers that should be capable of exercising influence and commanding respect in any part of the world. Khrushchev perceived that in order to achieve this status, as well as to ensure the security of the Soviet homeland, the USSR must develop strategic attack and defense forces strong enough to neutralize US strategic superiority by establishing a condition of mutual deterrence. From his point of view, general purpose forces had only a secondary importance in relation to this requirement. Consequently he gave priority to strategic forces in the constant competition for the allocation of limited scientific, industrial, and financial resources. There were Soviet military leaders who understood and supported Khrushchev's purpose, but the traditionalists considered him obsessed about rockets and obtuse about the continuing need for more efficient general purpose forces.

5. From the mid-1950's until the mid-1960's, the Soviets visualized a war in Europe as nuclear at the outset. They therefore undertook to shape their theater forces to advance swiftly across Western Europe in the aftermath of a nuclear holocaust. For this concept, the Soviets saw a requirement for an overwhelming number of tanks and a large number of missiles and rockets to provide chemical and nuclear fire support. Armies were to advance by night and day, crossing obstacles in stride. The concept called for much less infantry, all mounted in amphibious armored carriers. The concept of a quick war obviated the need for heavy service support; the nuclear nature of the war and the fluidity of the battle required less conventional fire support from artillery and tactical aircraft.

6. By the early 1960's the Soviets had gone far in reshaping their theater forces basically along these lines. They were capable of fielding a force of over 20,000 tanks against NATO; they had heavy nuclear and chemical missile support integral to the ground forces, supplemented by a massive medium-range ballistic missile/intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM/IRBM) deployment in the western USSR; they were light in infantry, tube artillery, air-to-ground support, and ground-to-air defenses, and especially so in service support. All line divisions had become essentially small armored divisions, but were not fully provided with the new kinds of equipment called for by the Soviet concept of theater warfare. Competition for resources from strategic defensive and offensive forces had apparently limited the production of new model tanks, amphibious armored personnel carriers, and tactical aircraft. Moreover, they still relied heavily on the mobilization of understrength units and their forward movement from the USSR. Thus in the early 1960's Soviet theater forces had been largely, but not

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completely, restructured in accordance with Soviet doctrine for theater warfare in Europe.

7. At this juncture, however, some Soviet military leaders began to question the established theater warfare doctrine in the light of the condition of mutual deterrence which was then emerging and US advocacy of the doctrine of flexible response. These Soviet military spokesmen generally agreed that the war with NATO would not necessarily be nuclear from the outset, but there was considerable dispute over the probable duration of a nonnuclear phase of conflict.

8. We believe that much of the Soviet military leadership came to see a requirement for theater forces capable of fighting *both* quick nuclear war *and* longer nonnuclear war. However, Soviet theater forces, as actually constituted and equipped, were deficient in some respects for either contingency. Availability of adequate theater forces for nuclear war depended on the assumption of enough warning time in which to mobilize and deploy westward additional Soviet forces and no effective NATO military action against lines of communication during the reinforcement. Moreover, while the restructured Soviet ground forces still represented a formidable capability for nonnuclear warfare, the contingency of protracted nonnuclear conflict would have required expensive reconstitution of supporting arms and services.

9. Khrushchev was not disposed to hinder the development of strategic forces in order to meet the requirements for Soviet theater forces visualized by the marshals. He was openly contemptuous of their demands for the ground forces, and evidently insisted that instead they rely on improved East European forces already in place. Apparently the contingency of sustained conventional conflict was dismissed on the assumption that the conventional phase would not last more than a few days.

10. Khrushchev was kinder to the Soviet admirals. While he stopped construction of conventionally-armed cruisers, he approved a rather ambitious program to improve the Soviet Navy by giving it a strategic missile attack capability, increasing its capabilities to fend off US attack from the sea, and beginning the development of a force capable of operating at a distance from home waters.

11. Khrushchev's successors did not adopt his scornful attitude toward ground forces, and complaints by military spokesmen subsided. Nevertheless, the ground forces share of military expenditures has not been significantly increased. This suggests that, under the pressures of economic restraints and priority needs in strategic forces, the Soviet marshals agreed to forego temporarily most of their claims for theater force improvement on the promise of satisfaction later.

III. SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

12. In recent years, there has been a moderate upward trend in the size of Soviet general purpose ground and air forces. This has resulted almost entirely from the buildup of forces along the Chinese border. Since 1965, the number of

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ground divisions in that area has almost doubled, with a marked improvement in readiness; the number of tactical air regiments has increased sharply. The buildup against China involved the creation of new units without a perceptible decrease in strength opposite NATO.

13. The intervention in Czechoslovakia brought about significant changes in Warsaw Pact military posture. Eleven Soviet divisions were moved forward from the western USSR. This movement, plus a selective mobilization of additional units remaining in the USSR, provided an extensive exercise of the Soviet reinforcement plans against NATO. The ultimate effect on Warsaw Pact deployments and capabilities is not yet clear. Much of the Pact intervention force has returned to former stations, leaving four or five Soviet divisions and supporting elements in Czechoslovakia. Soviet confidence in the Czech forces will almost certainly be impaired, at least until a more reliable political regime is developed in Czechoslovakia. They may maintain an increased readiness posture in the western USSR to compensate.

14. In the past year or so the Soviet Navy has made substantial progress in developing flexible forces to project seapower beyond the periphery of the USSR. New classes of long-range ships equipped with modern air defense weapons and sophisticated electronic equipment are joining the fleet. Training exercises of greater complexity, scope, and realism have been held, including an afloat support operation in the South Atlantic. Surface and submarine forces now operate regularly in the Mediterranean, while recent "show the flag" visits in the Indian Ocean area indicate a wider scope of Soviet naval aspirations.

15. In 1968 the Soviets put into effect the first major change in their draft laws since 1939. The term of service of ground and air forces draftees has been reduced from 3 to 2 years, of navy draftees from 4 to 3 years. Call-ups will be made every 6 months rather than annually. The shorter terms of service will increase the number of men receiving military training by about one-half, but may have an adverse effect on the expertise and readiness of Soviet forces. Military units will lose one productive year per man, while incurring a sharply increased training load—a problem which grows as forces become more complex and technical. Other provisions of the new law indicate concern for these negative effects: age-in-grade provisions governing active duty service have been liberalized to permit officers through the grade of colonel to be retained longer in active service, and a broad new preinduction military training program has been instituted.

IV. GROUND FORCES

16. During the past year we have exploited all available information to study the status of Soviet ground forces in East Germany, in the western military districts (MDs) of the USSR, and along the Chinese border, particularly as

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regards the quantity and character of their holdings of major items of equipment.³ These studies are illuminating with regard to the composition and combat readiness of Soviet ground forces, particularly those opposite the NATO Central Region.

17. We have completed a particularly detailed analysis of two Soviet divisions in East Germany—one motorized rifle and one tank—and estimate their equipment levels with confidence. The motorized rifle division has about 2,300 major items of equipment and the tank division about 2,200. About 800 of these major equipment items consist of combat and special purpose equipment which has no civilian equivalent. The other 1,400 to 1,500 items are mainly general purpose vehicles. Analysis of elements of other Soviet divisions in East Germany supports our belief that the two divisions examined are typical of Soviet divisions in the forward area and that their assessed equipment levels are correct. It is evident that the Soviets consider all their divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) ready for commitment to combat without further augmentation. We have therefore taken these as a standard to judge other divisions in the USSR.

Categories of Divisions

18. The Soviets describe their military units as being maintained "in a full state of readiness for immediate operations" or else at "reduced strength." There are also references to reduced strength units capable of being made "ready to proceed to areas of concentration in several days." The divisions in GSFG and other Soviet divisions comparable to them in holdings of major items of equipment, manning, and training activity are manifestly in the first category, which we designate *Category I*.

19. Other Soviet divisions have only 50 to 70 percent of the major items of equipment found in Category I divisions, with indications of substantially reduced manning and training activity. We estimate that the peacetime personnel strength of most of these divisions is about one-half the strength of Category I divisions; that of a few is probably substantially lower. Soviet preparations for military intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrated, however, that these shortages in men and equipment can be supplied within a few days by calling up ready reservists and general purpose equipment from the civil economy. We designate divisions of this description as *Category II*: i.e., reduced strength divisions capable of being made ready to move out "in several days."

20. There are also some divisions with even less equipment than Category II divisions and appreciably lower manning and training activity. We believe that they are not intended to be employed for early reinforcement, but rather that they are cadre divisions designed to provide a base for longer term mobilization. We designate divisions of this description as *Category III*.

³ By "major items of equipment" we mean all self-propelled vehicles (except motorcycles) and large towed items such as artillery and two-axle trailers.

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21. There are 13 divisions in the USSR that, for the time being, we are unable to categorize. They are now in the process of being built up. All but one of them are stationed near the Sino-Soviet frontier. We believe that by the end of 1969 they will have been made into Category I or II divisions.

22. The operation of this system was illustrated by the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Of the 11 divisions from the USSR employed in that operation, eight were Category I and three were Category II divisions quickly raised to Category I strength in men and equipment.⁴ We estimate that at the same time 10 other Category II divisions were raised to Category I strength, but were retained in the USSR.

23. We estimate that at present there are 70 Category I divisions (including the 13 Category II divisions recently and perhaps temporarily raised to Category I strength), 43 Category II divisions, 13 divisions in the process of build-up to Category I or II, and 27 Category III divisions. For the distribution of Soviet divisions by type and location, see Table I.

24. We believe that all Soviet divisions stationed in Eastern Europe are Category I, and that all but one of the divisions in the western border MDs opposite the Central Region of NATO are either Category I or Category II. We believe that this will be true of the divisions along the Chinese border as well when the buildup is completed. All Category III divisions are motorized rifle, except for one tank division. They are stationed for the most part in the interior regions of the USSR.

25. The Soviets would probably have little difficulty in quickly assembling the personnel required to fill up their reduced strength divisions. However, when compared to Category I divisions, they would have quantitative and qualitative shortfalls in equipment.

26. On the basis of equipment holdings observed in the GSFC, we estimate that on the order of 25,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs) would be required to equip fully 153 Soviet divisions and army-level combat support units. Analysis of new evidence relating to the production and distribution of APCs indicates that the current inventory is less than 25,000, but we are as yet unable to measure with confidence the amount of the indicated shortage. We believe that Category I divisions are fully equipped in this respect, but that some Category II divisions would have to use general purpose trucks as personnel carriers.

27. It appears also that about half of the APCs in units are BTR-40s and BTR-152s. They are essentially armored trucks; they are not amphibious and have limited cross-country mobility. The BTR-60, which is gradually replacing them, is amphibious and has better mobility, but it has a high silhouette and topside entrance hatches. A new low-silhouette, track-mounted, amphibious vehicle has begun to enter inventory.

⁴ Eight Soviet Category I divisions from East Germany and three from Hungary were also employed.

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28. In the event of mobilization the Soviets would have to acquire civilian trucks for use in their understrength divisions. The Soviet policy of drawing general purpose trucks from the civilian economy was confirmed by evidence acquired during the Czech crisis. Cargo and tanker trucks along with their drivers were called up from agricultural and industrial enterprises. Most of these were probably used for logistics support. This system is apparently quite workable, but a former Czech general reports dissatisfaction with it among both Czech and Soviet military leaders. There are obvious military disadvantages and uncertainties inherent in such a system; there are obvious peacetime economic advantages to the truck-shy Soviet economy.

29. Almost certainly the Soviets have adequate numbers of tanks for at least their Category I and II divisions. Most of these are T-54 and T-55 medium tanks. The T-55 (which is a modified T-54) began to enter inventory about 10 years ago. The Soviets are now producing a new medium tank, the T-62; an estimated 4,000-5,000 have entered inventory. The number of tanks for Category III divisions is less certain. They would be older models.

Number and Types of Divisions⁶

30. We now estimate that there are 153 Soviet line divisions of three different types: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne. The indicated increase over the 145 divisions noted in NIE 11-14-67, "The Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces," dated 16 November 1967, SECRET, is an actual increase resulting from the continuing buildup on the Chinese border.

31. We estimate that there are 94 motorized rifle divisions. A Category I motorized rifle division has about 10,000 men and 188 medium tanks. The probable Soviet objective is to mount all infantry in the division in amphibious APCs, but at present more than half of the APCs in Soviet motorized rifle divisions are not amphibious.

32. There are 52 tank divisions, all but 4 or 5 of which in combat-ready status average 8,000 men and 318 medium tanks—an unusually high proportion of tanks to personnel. Tank divisions in East Germany are about one-third equipped with the new T-62 tank, the rest being the earlier model T-54s and T-55s. Four or five of the tank divisions are heavy tank divisions. In a combat-ready status they average 6,500 men, 190 heavy tanks and assault guns (two regiments), and 97 medium tanks (one regiment).

33. According to Soviet statements, in both classified and unclassified sources, motorized rifle and tank divisions have been designed for speed, firepower, and shock action in short-duration combat, with correspondingly minimal organic service support. Division stocks of fuel and ammunition are sufficient for about three days of combat. The divisions are apparently designed to fight until relieved by a fresh division.

⁶For detailed geographical breakdown of Soviet divisions, see Table I.

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34. There are seven Soviet airborne divisions. Each probably has about 1,000 major items of equipment and about 6,000 men. All are in combat-ready status. They are not assigned to field armies, but are centrally controlled in Moscow. In wartime they would probably be allocated to *fronts* for specific operations.

Armies

35. We believe that, in major theaters of operations, Soviet divisions are intended to fight as components of armies; normally Soviet armies would be committed to combat with their peacetime divisional structures, although Soviet doctrine permits the reallocation of divisions to meet contingencies. There are 19 Soviet ground armies.⁶ Most of those within the USSR would require the mobilization of army-level support units prior to commitment. The armies in GSFG, however, are almost certainly combat-ready as they now exist.

36. Soviet field armies have from 3 to 5 line divisions and additional supporting units. They are of two types: the tank army in which all or a majority of the divisions are tank divisions, and the combined arms army in which all or a majority of the divisions are motorized rifle. The Soviet field armies in GSFG, less their divisions, total some 9,000 to 12,000 men and are combat ready.

37. The number and type of support units found in Soviet armies vary. However, typical army support would include a signal regiment, a Scud brigade of 6 to 9 launchers, an artillery brigade of 2 to 4 battalions, an SA-2 regiment of 18 launchers, an engineer ponton bridge unit and an assault river crossing unit. The service support units of Soviet field armies are sufficient to provide their subordinate divisions with the necessary level of transportation, maintenance, and ammunition and fuel supply for about two additional days of combat. Beyond this time Soviet armies rely on the rear services of the *front* for major logistical support.

Fronts

38. The *front* is the highest Soviet wartime field headquarters for the operational control of general purpose forces. *Fronts* do not exist in peacetime, but would be formed from certain MD headquarters in wartime. A *front* would consist of three or more field armies and a tactical air army (TAA), plus combat and service support units. The rear services of the *front* are responsible for most of the administrative support of the combat units, including supply, evacuation, medical service, construction, and maintenance. The limited provision for these kinds of support at division and army level makes the efficient operation of the *front's* rear services of critical importance from the outset of military operations; the combined total of mobile stocks of POL and ammunition in divisions and field armies would be sufficient for about five days of intensive combat.

39. The GSFG is virtually a *front* in being and the only one which exists at combat-ready strength in peacetime. Plans probably exist for the Polish and Czech

⁶There are also 11 Soviet corps headquarters. We believe that most Soviet corps perform special purpose functions.

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military establishments, as well as the Soviet Carpathian MD and the Belorussian MD, each to form a *front* in wartime. In each of these potential *front* areas there are three or more field armies, a TAA, and limited additional combat and service support units. For each potential *front* except the GSFG, most of the service support units would have to be created by mobilization. Other potential Soviet *fronts* probably exist in the southern and far eastern USSR, and possibly in the northwestern USSR. Ground armies and TAAs are stationed in each of these regions. Bulgaria also could probably organize a *front*.

40. The mobilization of Soviet *front* and army-level support units would be more difficult and time consuming than the mobilization of Category II divisions. Headquarters elements of these higher level commands exist in peacetime, but many of the nondivisional units, particularly rear service elements, would have to be mobilized. Many of the *front's* rear service units are to be drawn directly from the civil economy.

V. TACTICAL MISSILE SUPPORT

41. Soviet ground forces rely on rockets and missiles for delivery of supporting nuclear and chemical fire. Soviet Category I divisions have a three-launcher battalion of Frogs; Category II divisions have two or three Frog launchers; some Category III divisions have two launchers. Brigades of Scud (150 n.m.) missiles provide support at army and *front* level. We believe that the GSFG has six or seven Scud brigades, probably with nine launchers each, including one brigade for each army. Armies in the USSR have Scud brigades also, some with six and some with nine launchers.

42. Soviet ground commanders have long complained of the lack of a tactical missile system with the range and mobility suited to the needs of the *front*. The Soviets have developed a missile, the SS-12, which may be intended to meet these needs: it is capable of carrying a 1,500 pound payload to a range of 500 n.m. We have not, however, observed it with Soviet ground forces.

43. Soviet ground units are also equipped with several versions of antitank guided missiles and multiple free rocket launchers. The latter are area-target weapons which can deliver a large volume of fire in a short period of time. A large proportion of the conventional fire support for ground forces is provided by these weapons.

VI. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT AND THEATER AIR DEFENSE

Tactical Aviation⁷

44. The mission of Soviet Tactical Aviation, which the Soviets call *Aviation of the Front*, is to support the ground forces. Air elements with this mission are organized into TAAs, which in wartime are assigned to *fronts*. Tactical air support includes air defense, offensive strikes, and reconnaissance. Tactical air armies also provide transportation support to ground forces.

⁷ See Table II and Table III.

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45. In 1960 the number of aircraft in Tactical Aviation was drastically reduced and a major program of qualitative improvement through the development and introduction of new model aircraft was begun. Tactical Aviation is now composed largely of fighter aircraft. The number of light bombers is only about one-sixth of the pre-1960 figure, while the number of fighters in ground attack regiments has almost doubled.

46. We estimate that there are now about 1,550 fighters in regiments whose primary mission is air defense and 1,050 in regiments whose primary mission is ground attack. In addition there are about 360 light bombers in ground attack regiments, and about 540 fighters and light bombers in reconnaissance and strike reconnaissance units.

47. All Soviet tactical fighter regiments receive training for other than their primary missions and could be used for either air defense or ground attack roles. However, most Soviet tactical fighters were designed as interceptors; their performance as fighter-bombers is characterized by small payload capacity, short range, but quick turn-around time. The Soviets apparently plan to deploy ground attack fighters as near as possible to front lines.

48. Since 1960 the Soviets have made a substantial qualitative improvement in the air defense elements of Tactical Aviation. Most of the aircraft delivered to the force in recent years have been late model Mig-21 Fishbeds, which now constitute more than 95 percent of the aircraft in air defense regiments. In a concurrent modernization program, about half of the aircraft in ground attack regiments have been replaced by the SU-7 Fitter and about half the light bomber force with the Brewer. About half of the reconnaissance units also have received new model aircraft.

49. In the past two years, deliveries of new Fitter fighter-bombers and Brewer light bombers to Soviet forces have virtually ceased, leaving half the ground attack and light bomber regiments equipped with old Mig-17 and Beagle aircraft. Production of the Brewer and the Fitter for Tactical Aviation has ceased or is ceasing, although some Fitters are being produced for export.

50. Soviet Tactical Aviation is organized into 13 identified TAAs, plus a force equivalent to a TAA in the Transbaikal/Mongolia area. TAAs vary greatly in size and composition. By far the largest is that in the GSFG, which has nearly 800 aircraft. The six air armies in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the western border MDs contain two-thirds of the some 3,500 operational combat aircraft assigned to Tactical Aviation. About two-thirds of this force is made up of newer aircraft types; about one-third of the aircraft are older Frescos, Farmers, and Beagle light bombers. In addition to the operational aircraft of the TAAs, there are some 500-600 older model fighters and light bombers which are collocated at the air bases of Tactical Aviation. The purpose of these aircraft is unclear, but they may serve in some training or administrative role and could be used as replacement aircraft.

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51. We believe that the buildup of forces in the Transbaikal/Mongolia area has increased the size of Tactical Aviation by some 250 aircraft over the past year. This would provide a force for a typical tactical air army, containing five to six fighter regiments, a light bomber regiment and a reconnaissance unit. The buildup is still under way, and the force probably will be increased by another 100 aircraft in this area.

52. The Soviets have in the past retained a reserve estimated at more than 2,000 older model aircraft that could be used as replacements or to equip additional units. We believe that, as a result of deliveries made to Arab countries and the equipping of the new regiments in the Sino-Soviet border areas, this reserve was reduced to some 1,200 aircraft.

53. Expansion of Tactical Aviation in the Far East has been possible, in our view, without diminishing the professional qualifications of its personnel. Some of the expansion is being accomplished by transfer of trained personnel from other Tactical Aviation units. It is possible that personnel normally scheduled for discharge are being retained to man the new units. Another potential source for personnel is DOSAAF. We have no knowledge of an organized air reserve force such as would be necessary if other sources of personnel were insufficient.

54. Soviet Tactical Aviation units provide light troop transport and utility support to the ground forces with about 200 light transports such as Cab and Crate and about 700 helicopters, primarily Hound and Hook. Soviet emphasis on the use of helicopters is demonstrated in the continuing development of new models and the modification of some to carry guns or rockets.

Support from Strategic Forces

55. We believe that major *front* commanders would request and receive support from the medium bombers of Long Range Aviation (LRA) and the medium and intermediate-range missiles of SRF in the event of nuclear war. The medium bomber force has the capability to launch conventional bombing attacks in support of theater forces in a nonnuclear war.

Air Defense

56. Soviet theater air defense is dependent mainly on Tactical Aviation, although surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) play an important role. Tactical air capabilities are continuing to improve; most fighter air defense regiments are now fully equipped with all-weather Mig-21 interceptors. An air defense control system with semiautomatic features has been deployed within the Warsaw Pact area. In East Germany efforts are being made to improve this system so as to provide better coordination between SAM and fighter defenses.

57. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have about 40 SA-2 missile battalions, and there are probably an additional 30-60 battalions assigned to the ground forces

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inside the USSR. These elements probably comprise some 400-600 launchers. The medium to high altitude SA-2 system is used primarily for defense of relatively static installations, since it is not mobile enough to provide continuous support to maneuvering ground forces. Both the SA-2 and the SA-4 appear capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but there is no evidence that such warheads have been provided for use by theater air defense forces or that a suitable warhead has been developed for the SA-4.

58. The Soviets recognize their deficiencies in defending against low altitude attack and are taking steps to improve their position. They are deploying SA-3 missiles to protect airfields in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and may be introducing the mobile SA-4 Ganef into theater forces. Also a new low altitude SAM, the SA-6 (Gainful) is under development. Squat Eye radars with improved low-altitude detection capabilities are appearing in the forward area. In 1966 a few (25) Firebar fighters entered the operational inventory of Tactical Aviation. These aircraft have better low altitude capabilities than other Soviet models, but do not have an effective look-down, shoot-down capability. All these improvements have not provided a continuous tracking and intercept capability against very low altitude aircraft.

59. The Soviets rely heavily on light AAA for air defense of ground forces. They have introduced a new radar-controlled, quadmounted, 23 mm weapon. Measures which the Soviets have taken to protect their tactical aircraft from attack while at home base include revetments, hangarages, dispersed parking, and increased light AAA.

VII. GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES

60. The principal military missions of the Soviet general purpose naval forces are defense against seaborne attack, interdiction of sealines of communications, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and support of operations ashore. In recent years Soviet naval forces have also been used increasingly for the political purpose of promoting Soviet influence and interests abroad. In the Mediterranean the Soviet naval presence has been sharply increased and serves as a political counterweight to the US Sixth Fleet in addition to maintaining close surveillance of Western naval activities. The Soviets have recognized the need to develop effective forces capable of countering Western naval power much farther to seaward and of inhibiting the capabilities of other powers to intervene in "Third World" states. Construction programs for new types of submarines and surface ships, better equipped for sustained, long-range operations, are underway, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft have been added to the Soviet naval inventory. Development of tactics and techniques to make more effective use of modern ships and weapons systems is being pressed, particularly in cruise-missile attack, ASW, and air defense.

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Present Forces⁸

61. *Submarines.*⁹ The submarine force continues to be the most important element in the Soviet Navy. It now has some 270 torpedo attack and 60 cruise-missile submarines. All Soviet submarines have minelaying capabilities. Although the size of the submarine force will probably remain fairly stable for the next several years, its composition will be changed and its capabilities improved by the incorporation of additional units of three new attack classes. Older units will be phased out.

62. Construction of current classes of cruise-missile submarines appears to be ending, with the last unit of the diesel-powered J-class expected to be delivered next year. More than half of the Soviet cruise-missile submarines are nuclear-powered. All are equipped with SS-N-3 missiles and torpedoes, and have a primary mission against naval ships, especially aircraft carriers. They could be used against land targets, however, if the Soviets see a requirement for such employment.

63. Three new classes of general purpose submarines—the C, V, and B-classes—are now in series production. The first units of the nuclear-powered C- and V-classes are operational, bringing to 20 the number of nuclear-powered torpedo attack units. Design improvements incorporated in the C- and V-classes, particularly in the area of sound quieting, will enhance their ASW capabilities. In addition, the C-class may be fitted with a new weapon system of undetermined character; it could be either an antisubmarine or an antiship weapon. The B-class is considerably smaller than the other two; its propulsion system remains undetermined.

64. *Surface Forces.* New major surface combatant ships with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) are still being produced, but the emphasis in current surface ship construction and conversion programs is on air defense and ASW, as well as improved seaworthiness and range capabilities. We believe that the primary mission of the new helicopter carrier, *Moskva*, which recently joined the fleet, is ASW. It is also equipped to serve as a task force command ship and has significantly improved air defense capabilities, including a three-dimensional radar and a new naval SAM system.¹⁰ In addition it is capable of landing about 100 men at a time by helicopter. A second ship of this class will enter service by mid-1969. There are 26 SAM-equipped ships now in service (seven of them also equipped with SSMs), and some 6 to 8 more such ships are being added to the fleet each year. Eleven older ships are equipped with SSMs, but most of

⁸ For the estimated number and deployment of Soviet general purpose ships and submarines by type, see Table IV.

⁹ Soviet ballistic missile submarines are considered as strategic attack forces, but also have torpedo attack and minelaying capabilities.

¹⁰ The launcher has not been observed previously and the missile is as yet unidentified.

these probably will be converted to fire SAMs. In addition to their missile armament, these ships are equipped with antisubmarine systems and antiaircraft guns, in some cases dual-purpose guns.

65. Combatant ships not equipped with missiles include 10 cruisers, 52 destroyers, and about 100 escorts. Five additional cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 10 escorts are in reserve status; the time required to make them ready for sea is uncertain. The navy also has a large number of smaller combatants and auxiliaries, including patrol boats equipped with a short-range cruise missile, submarine-chasers, and minewarfare ships.

66. *Naval Aviation.* The Soviet Navy is dependent almost exclusively on land-based aircraft for support of its operations; the few exceptions are shipborne ASW helicopters. In recent years the emphasis in Naval Aviation has been on improving reconnaissance and strike capabilities against surface ships and on ASW. The force now includes almost 900 combat aircraft, of which about 540 are jet medium bombers. About 205 of the latter aircraft are equipped with the 100 n.m. AS-2 Kipper air-to-surface missile (ASM); some 80 are probably equipped with the newer 120 n.m. AS-5 Kelt. The remaining medium jet aircraft consist of tankers and reconnaissance aircraft, with a few equipped for use in an ASW role. The force also includes 40 Bear long-range reconnaissance aircraft, 60 jet light bombers, 85 ASW patrol aircraft, and some 185 helicopters. The total number of naval aircraft has remained fairly stable during the past year; the Hormone ASW helicopter equipped with dipping sonar, and the May long-range ASW patrol aircraft have been introduced into operational units and a few Bears and Blinders have been added.¹¹

67. *Coast Defense.* Near the approaches to Soviet naval bases are some 25 to 35 naval coast defense sites which employ the Samlet (SSC-2b) cruise missile; the effective range of the Samlet varies from 25 to 45 n.m. depending on the location of the guidance radar. In addition, we believe that the 300 n.m. SSC-1b, a mobile coast defense version of the SSC-1a Shaddock cruise missile, is operational and is gradually replacing the Samlet.

Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces and Sealines of Communication

68. Soviet naval capabilities to combat carrier task forces and to interdict sealines of communications are based upon missile-equipped medium bombers and submarines. SSM-equipped surface ships serve to back up those forces. Long-range Bear reconnaissance aircraft are assigned the mission of providing target data to cruise-missile-equipped submarines and surface ships. The use of the Bear for this mission has considerably extended the distance from Soviet land bases in which these cruise-missile forces could be effective. This year there has been a marked increase in the number of aircraft of LRA that have practiced the interception of naval ships at sea, suggesting the possibility that some aircraft of LRA might be employed against naval forces in this way.

¹¹ See Table V.

69. Patrols by Soviet torpedo attack and cruise-missile submarines beyond local operating areas approximately tripled between 1963 and 1966, and activity again increased in 1967 by almost 40 percent. Patrols by cruise-missile units in 1967 approximately doubled the number in 1966, but in 1968 decreased substantially. On the other hand, torpedo attack submarines have continued the high level of activity of 1967. In the Mediterranean, during 1968 the number of units deployed approximated that of 1967, but the average patrol duration was increased over 50 percent through the use of Mediterranean ports.

70. The Soviets have shown a particular interest in the Mediterranean area; the squadron there has grown to become the largest naval force which the Soviets have ever maintained out of home waters on a regular basis. On the average, the squadron now consists of some 4 to 6 major combatant ships, more than half of which are missile equipped (with SAMs, SSMs, or both), and 8 or 9 minor combatants. Some 7 to 10 torpedo attack submarines normally operate with the squadron and a nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine is often there. They have also deployed to the Mediterranean their newest classes of ASW ships, including the *Moskva* with its ASW helicopters. Six reconnaissance-configured Badgers and three ASW-equipped Mail amphibians are operating from Egyptian bases. These aircraft have Egyptian markings, but we believe they have Soviet crews.

71. Soviet capabilities against sea communications are greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. Of the more than 130 torpedo attack and cruise-missile submarines in the Northern Fleet, we estimate that a third could be maintained continuously on station in the Atlantic approaches to Europe. In the Pacific about one-third of the more than 90 general purpose submarines could also be kept on station in the approaches. Only a relatively small number of submarines could be maintained continuously on patrol off the US mainland for any length of time; we estimate this number at about 15 torpedo attack and cruise-missile submarines in the western Atlantic and about half as many off the US west coast. As more nuclear-powered torpedo attack units enter service, these numbers will increase. During 1967 the Soviets maintained an afloat logistic support station for submarines in the mid-Atlantic for about five months. This group is believed to have supported an extended deployment of at least four submarines, including one E-II class which evidently remained at sea for about six months. Use of such a support station would allow a considerable increase in the number of submarines which could be maintained on station and would extend the area of patrol activity, but it would be highly vulnerable in time of war.

Capabilities Against Submarines

72. The Soviets are making a major effort to improve their ASW capabilities. New ASW ships have been designed and built, new detection devices and improved ASW ordnance have appeared, and ASW training has been increasingly emphasized. We believe that current Soviet ability to detect, localize, and classify submerged submarines in the open ocean is very limited, but that detection potential increases appreciably within coastal areas con-

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tiguous to Soviet naval bases. Capabilities to identify and destroy submarines detected within range of an ASW platform are considered good. Soviet recognition of deficiencies in the ASW field is implicit in the significant advances observed during the past year: the first of two helicopter carriers, the ASW-equipped *Moskva*, has become operational, as have Hormone ASW helicopters with dipping sonar, a new lower frequency sonar, a long-range shore-based ASW patrol plane (the May), an air-launched ASW torpedo, and possibly a surface-launched ASW rocket weapon. All three of the new classes of attack submarines (C, V, and B) will almost certainly exhibit improved ASW capabilities.

73. The advent of the Polaris submarine undoubtedly induced anxiety over the lack of long-range submarine detection systems. Present Soviet technology in this field probably lags behind that of the US by about 10 years. At present, Soviet fixed underwater surveillance systems have a very limited range and detection capability; they are intended for inshore defense in the vicinity of naval bases. [

] Its effectiveness is uncertain, but capabilities comparable to those of US systems are believed to be highly unlikely. [

74. The constant watch off Polaris advanced bases as well as Soviet writings indicate the gravity of Soviet concern regarding the Polaris threat to the Soviet homeland. Nevertheless, despite continuing improvement in equipment and training, we believe that Soviet capabilities to detect, localize, and classify submarines operating in the open ocean will probably remain very limited for the next several years.]

Capabilities for Sustaining Long-Range Operations

75. In their efforts to expand the capabilities of the navy to conduct sustained, long-range operations, the Soviets are continuing construction of submarines and surface ships with improved endurance and sea-keeping qualities, and support capabilities are gradually being improved by the introduction of new types of auxiliaries as well as by improved technique. The Soviets continue to employ a system of naval auxiliaries and merchant ships to support a naval force in the Mediterranean and during 1967 experimented with an afloat base concept for support of submarines in the mid-Atlantic. Over the last 12 months the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, in particular, has considerably expanded its capability to conduct extended operations. Egypt has made shore support facilities available to Soviet fleet units, and assistance by Algeria in the western Mediterranean is a possibility. With their present resources the Soviets can support limited naval operations on the high seas for extended periods of time, or larger operations for a few weeks. Without shore support facilities any major increase in long-range operations would require augmentation of existing auxiliary forces, not

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only with oilers and cargo ships from the merchant fleet, but also with ships designed to provide specialized technical support to naval forces at sea.

VIII. NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Nuclear Warfare

76. We believe that the number of nuclear weapons allocated to general purpose forces has increased considerably in the past few years. Nuclear weapons in a variety of types and yields are available for delivery by tactical rockets, missiles, aircraft, and probably a small number of torpedoes and depth bombs. The Soviet system of command and control over nuclear weapons appears well-designed to reserve to the national leadership the decision to initiate the use of these weapons.

77. For reasons of tactical readiness and tactical efficiency we would expect tactical nuclear weapons to be stored in some Soviet depots in the forward area. We have identified some storage sites immediately adjacent to Soviet-controlled airfields in Eastern Europe which are probably intended for storage of nuclear weapons. We have no evidence, however, that nuclear weapons have actually been deployed to the forward area; indeed, Czech procedures indicate that nuclear weapons for their forces in that area are held in the USSR. Nonetheless, we believe that the Soviets could react quickly to provide nuclear weapons to the using units of theater forces. The Soviets almost certainly have not entrusted any nuclear weapons to their East European allies, nor do we believe they will in peacetime. Even in wartime, they would retain close control over any weapons allocated to the East Europeans.

Chemical Warfare

78. We believe that the Soviet leaders think of chemical weapons as essentially tactical weapons, but they consistently group them with nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction." The Soviet leaders thus probably consider them subject to the same political constraints as those imposed on nuclear weapons, and any decision regarding their initial use almost certainly would be made at the highest political level. The Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the use of toxic chemical agents by their theater field forces in a general nuclear war. In a nonnuclear war against a power capable of retaliation in kind, they would probably not initiate the use of toxic chemical weapons.

79. Soviet and East European theater forces have excellent capabilities for both offensive and defensive chemical warfare (CW). Weapon systems for delivery of chemical munitions are available at division, army, and *front*-level; chemical defense units exist down to regiment. Defensive equipment includes new detector kits, but these do not provide adequate warning against nerve agents.

80. The Soviets have an extensive stockpile of various toxic chemical agents and have munitions designed for employment with a variety of tactical ground,

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air, and naval weapons. We estimate that the Soviet agent stockpile, which continues to increase, is on the order of 275,000 tons, and production capacity is increasing. Over half the stockpile consists of modern nerve agents and the remainder of older chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and phosgene. We believe that about one-third of the warheads available for Soviet tactical missiles and Frogs are chemical. Chemical artillery and mortar shells are available; chemical warheads for multiple-launcher rockets are probably also available.

81. The Soviets have an extensive CW research and development program, especially in the nerve-agent-associated field of organophosphorous compounds. Current efforts appear to be directed toward improving agent toxicity, skin penetration, and interference with therapy. Research related to incapacitating agents also continues.

Biological Warfare

82. Soviet research and production capabilities are ample to support a biological warfare (BW) program. Soviet documents indicate that the USSR expects NATO to employ BW in the event of war and is concerned to be prepared to defend against it. In particular, the Soviets are developing a system for mass immunization. Whether the USSR would itself initiate BW is less certain. In Soviet writings the subject is linked with nuclear and chemical warfare in terms that indicate a high degree of political control and restraint. There is, however, some evidence which indicates that *front* commanders would be authorized to employ BW tactically in circumstances in which Warsaw Pact forces were being compelled to withdraw, and that the means to do so could then be provided to them.

IX. AIR AND SEALIFT

Airlift and Air Assault Capabilities

83. The Soviets continue to add to their military air transport capabilities. There are now more than 800 medium transports assigned to Military Transport Aviation (VTA), of which some 700 are AN-12 Cubs. About 635 of the latter have been allocated to support airborne troops; these could lift assault elements totaling about 8,400 men and supporting equipment for airdrop to a radius of about 800 to 900 n.m., depending on the model of aircraft used and their loading. About half of the Cubs assigned to airborne troops have improved range and weight-carrying capabilities; these could lift about 1,550 paratroops with supporting equipment to a radius of about 1,500 n.m., or a range of 2,200 n.m. In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmented by other aircraft in VTA or by more than 700 medium- and long-range aircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.

84. The range and payload limitations of the AN-12 underscore the importance of the new AN-22 heavy transport, which can carry nearly 100,000 pounds of cargo or 175 troops to a radius of some 2,800 n.m. or a range of 5,100 n.m. The first few of these aircraft are now in limited service and at least one was used to support the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We believe that some 25 could be

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operational by mid-1970. With the AN-22 the Soviets would be able to airlift all types of equipment assigned to a motorized rifle division. This aircraft could also airdrop all items of equipment of an airborne division.

85. Major elements of one Soviet airborne division were airlifted from the Baltic MD to Prague in the Czech crisis. Some Bulgarian and Polish units were probably also airlifted. These air movements were well within the capabilities of the AN-12 fleet serving airborne troops.

Sealift and Amphibious Assault

86. We estimate there are currently about 12,000 men in the naval infantry, organized into brigade-size units, with two brigades located in the Baltic Fleet, two brigades in the Black Sea Fleet, one brigade in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, and one brigade in the Northern Fleet. The naval infantry's missions are apparently to assist in seizing critical beachheads and to conduct diversionary operations on the seaward flank. A force of battalion size (500 men) has been present from time to time in the Mediterranean since June 1967; they have conducted at least two landing exercises, suggesting that the Soviets may intend to use the naval infantry as a token intervention force. However, we believe that they would do so only at the invitation of the local government and only where there is little risk of direct confrontation with the West.

87. The current small number of landing ships limits amphibious operations to battalion or brigade-size landings in each of the fleet areas. New landing ships with greater speed, operating range and capacity are being built, however, and there will probably be an increase in the strength of the naval infantry.

88. In addition to their military sealift capability, we estimate that the Soviets could, by using their merchant fleet under various loading conditions, move 6 to 10 divisions in the Baltic, Black, or Pacific Fleet areas, and 3 to 4 divisions in the Northern Fleet area. This lift capacity is being improved by the acquisition of new merchant ships, many of which are characterized by high speed, long endurance, large hatches, and heavy boom capacity. Sealift by merchant ships would require the use of ports, however, and could not be adequately protected beyond waters near the USSR.

X. THE CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES

General Considerations

89. About 10 years ago the Soviets adopted a military policy which sought to create East European theater forces of sufficient size and quality to meet in large measure their requirements for combat-ready units in place opposite NATO. This policy provided for about 60 East European divisions and some 2,600 combat aircraft deployed from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Along with 26 Soviet divisions and about 1,300 Soviet aircraft stationed in East Europe, these forces would bear the initial brunt of war with NATO, either offensively or defensively. The Czechs and Poles would form two of the three *fronts* on the main avenues of movement across Central Europe.

90. This policy was probably attractive to economy-minded Soviet political leaders, since it reduced the peacetime requirement for combat-ready Soviet forces. The cost of large national forces was to be borne by the East Europeans themselves, who were expected to purchase large quantities of their arms from the USSR. It was probably much less attractive to those Soviet military leaders who would have preferred to rely on their own forces rather than on allies. There was no integrated Warsaw Pact command and staff structure; command of the East European forces was vested in the various national Ministers of Defense. This arrangement institutionalized the fact that the military viability of the new policy rested squarely on the political reliability of the East European political regimes. Soviet marshals may have considered that the examples of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Hungary put in question the reliability of such regimes, but would have found it awkward to argue the point.

91. By 1965 strong national military forces had been created in most of the East European countries, but strong currents of nationalism were eroding the political solidarity of the East Europeans with Moscow. The Czech crisis of 1968 is but the latest in a series of developments putting in question the reliability of East European forces—the Hungarian insurrection, Romanian insubordination, the abortive Bulgarian coup, and Polish military disgruntlement at involvement in the Middle East crisis of 1967. Only the Ulbricht regime in East Germany, dependent upon the Soviets for survival, remained relatively free from signs of unreliability.

92. Ironically, the Warsaw Pact's first real military operation was directed against a member country, Czechoslovakia, in order to suppress a domestic political tendency that had alarmed the East German, Polish, and Soviet regimes, but had been encouraged by Hungary and Romania (and Yugoslavia). The repercussions of this event have been unsettling in Eastern as well as Western Europe; it not only stimulated anti-Soviet popular sentiment, but also caused dissension within the Polish and Hungarian parties and governments. Although the fate of Czechoslovakia is likely to discourage any East European regime from asserting its national independence in opposition to Soviet interests for some time to come, Soviet confidence in the political reliability of those regimes and their armed forces must also be shaken. The Soviets will probably seek to restore the military *status quo ante* by political action to ensure the reliability of the respective East European regimes, counting on the political apparatus within the armed forces and military discipline to ensure the reliability of the forces themselves, but they cannot ignore the residual anti-Soviet sentiment engendered by the Czech affair.

Ground Forces¹²

93. East European line divisions are generally patterned on the Soviet model, although there are substantial variations in some countries. Evidence from defectors indicates that Czech and East German divisions are quite similar to Soviet divisions in structure.

¹² For numbers and strength of East European ground forces, see Table VI.

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94. East European field armies do not exist as separate entities in peacetime, but would be formed during mobilization from staff elements and units of the territorial military commands. East European field armies would contain from 3 to 5 divisions and combat and service support units, and would be similar to the Soviet combined arms armies.

95. In the "northern tier" there are 26 East European line divisions roughly equal to Soviet Category I divisions: six East German, 12 Polish, eight Czech. In addition, there are three Polish and three Czech understrength divisions which could probably be mobilized within a week. In the event of war the Polish and Czech divisions would be organized into field armies and national *fronts* would probably be established. The East German forces would apparently be integrated into the Soviet *front*, GSFC, or perhaps some of them would be assigned to a Polish *front*.

96. In the "southern tier" there are about 14 East European divisions roughly analogous to Category I divisions: four Hungarian, five Romanian, and five Bulgarian. There are 13 additional East European divisions which are roughly analogous to some of the least ready Soviet Category II divisions: two Hungarian, four Romanian, and six, possibly seven, Bulgarian. Even at full strength, none of these divisions would be comparable in military effectiveness to a "northern tier" division. In particular, the motorized rifle divisions lack APCs; the structure of the Romanian and Bulgarian tank divisions includes one less tank regiment than other East European tank divisions, and there is generally a lower level of support equipment. Most of the motorized rifle and tank divisions described above have one organic Frog battalion (two, or in some cases three launchers), and each potential East European field army has one Scud brigade (six launchers).

Air Forces¹³

97. Judged in the light of equipment, training, and normal operations, East European air forces are largely for national air defense. Of about 2,600 combat aircraft, almost all are interceptors. The proportion of new model aircraft in East European air forces has increased from one-quarter last year to one-third through the delivery of new fighters. Almost all aircraft delivered to the East Europeans during the past two years have been all-weather Mig-21 (Fishbed) interceptors.

98. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria have ground attack air regiments. Only the Czechs have a significant number of new model (SU-7) ground attack fighters. The Poles have mostly older models in the ground attack roles; the Bulgarians have one regiment of Mig-17s. All East European fighter regiments, however, conduct training in both ground attack and air defense.

Naval Forces¹⁴

99. East European naval capabilities continue to improve with more operational experience and the acquisition of more modern equipment. As with East

¹³ See Table VII.

¹⁴ See Table VIII.

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European ground and air forces, the "northern tier" naval forces are larger and better equipped. In the Baltic area Warsaw Pact interfleet coordination has increased, and the East German and Polish navies have assumed a larger role. The East German Navy is organized for coastal defense, including minewarfare, while the Polish Navy emphasizes amphibious and submarine warfare. In addition, Polish submarines and surface ships have operated both independently and with Soviet units in the North and Norwegian Seas.

XI. WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO

100. In this section we confine the discussion to Soviet capabilities against the critical Central Region of NATO. Soviet units located and probably earmarked for operations in this area are the most powerful of the Soviet theater forces. Other Soviet forces are deployed and available for operations against NATO in other regions and to preserve Soviet border security elsewhere.

101. The Soviets formerly assumed that any general war with NATO would begin with a massive nuclear exchange and planned that, in the aftermath of such an exchange, Soviet forces would advance rapidly to seize critical objectives before NATO forces could recover from the destruction and disorganization caused by Soviet nuclear strikes. In recent years, however, Warsaw Pact military exercises have been conducted on the basis of a significantly different scenario. In the first place, it is assumed that war with NATO would be preceded by a period of high tension that would provide sufficient warning to permit the mobilization and deployment of Warsaw Pact forces. It is further assumed that the war would begin with a NATO conventional attack. Warsaw Pact conventional forces would defeat this attack, whereupon NATO would resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Then the Warsaw Pact forces, reinforced from the USSR and using nuclear weapons, would launch a counteroffensive that would overrun NATO Europe. It is notable that no strategic nuclear exchange is taken into account.

102. For the contingency of a general war with NATO, Warsaw Pact forces in the Central Region would be deployed in two "strategic echelons." We believe that the first echelon would consist of three *fronts* in contact with NATO forces on a line from the Baltic Sea to the northern border of Austria. Initially at least, the northern *front* would be under Polish command, the southern *front* under Czech command. The central *front* would be the GSFG.

103. The only one of these three *fronts* capable of immediate combat is the GSFG. In a war emergency, the East German divisions would be incorporated into it and the East German Air Force would be used to augment the air defense capabilities of its TAA.

104. The northern *front* might include some Soviet and East German forces normally stationed in the northern part of East Germany, but its creation would require the mobilization and forward movement of Polish forces. The Poles have two ready armies with nine Category I line divisions, plus a small airborne division and a small amphibious assault division. Both a third army (four divi-

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sions) and *front*-level elements would require mobilization. Tactical air support would be provided by the Polish Air Force and the Soviet TAA in Poland. Support on the seaward flank would be provided by the Polish and East German navies and elements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

105. At least initially, the southern *front* would consist of three Czech armies (12 divisions) supported by the Czech Air Force as a TAA. Two armies (eight divisions) are maintained in combat-ready status. The third army (four divisions), and much of the *front*-level support, would require mobilization.

106. We believe that the second "strategic echelon" would consist of two Soviet *fronts* formed in the Carpathian and Belorussian MDs and moved forward through Poland and Czechoslovakia. We believe that the *front* from the Carpathian MD is intended to take over the southern *front* from the Czechs on arrival. Similarly, the *front* from the Belorussian MD is probably intended to take over the northern *front*.

107. The *front* from the Carpathian MD would consist of three armies (12 divisions) and a TAA. That from the Belorussian MD would also consist of three armies (12 divisions) and a TAA, to which a fourth army (five divisions) from the Baltic MD might be added.

108. The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia has introduced some uncertainty regarding present plans for constituting the southern *front*. For the time being at least, the Soviets must question the reliability of the Czech forces, but they apparently perceive no urgent requirement to take over the southern *front* from them. Our present evidence indicates that they have left in Czechoslovakia four, possibly five, Soviet ground divisions and about 100 tactical aircraft and these forces are generally strung out east of Prague, leaving the southern *front* with NATO to the Czechs. However, there are uncertainties in our evidence that do not permit ruling out one or more additional divisions in the Soviet occupation forces, and a subsequent repositioning to assume at least a portion of the southern *front* mission. In any case, if the Soviets were to anticipate a serious military confrontation with NATO, they might expedite the forward movement of the *front* from the Carpathian MD to reinforce or take over the southern *front*.

109. The above described force when assembled would comprise on the order of 1,260,000 men, 20,600 tanks, 370 nuclear capable rocket and missile launchers, 4,900 conventional artillery tubes, and 3,700 combat aircraft (1,350 in ground attack regiments, 2,000 in air defense regiments, and 350 in reconnaissance regiments).¹⁶ This force would possess formidable capabilities for all types of military contingencies in the Central Region, but its best capability would be that for which it was designed—nuclear theater warfare. In this contingency, Warsaw Pact fire support would be augmented by the massive MRBM/IRBM deployment and medium-range bombers in the western USSR. The force would be less effective for sustained conventional combat.

¹⁶ The above described force includes Czechoslovak air and ground forces. It does not include Warsaw Pact forces in Hungary.

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110. Should the Soviets elected to execute the above described buildup against NATO, they would probably also mobilize their forces opposite Scandinavia and the southern flank of NATO for contingencies in those areas. In the latter area, only the Bulgarians are likely to contribute to offensive action; supported by the Soviet theater forces from the Odessa MD, they could launch an offensive against Greece and European Turkey. Further, the Soviets would mobilize from interior MDs a reserve of the High Command. Initially, this reserve would comprise the armies of the Kiev MD and some of the airborne divisions in the western USSR. We believe that this reserve would later include some of the less-ready divisions which are not subordinate to the reinforcing armies, including some from the Moscow MD. This reserve of the High Command would be available to reinforce the forward area in the course of operations.

111. Evidence concerning probable Warsaw Pact planning indicates that the Soviets believe they could complete the essential elements of mobilization and reinforcement in about 10 days under conditions of extreme emergency in which the timing of its buildup would be crucial. We believe that the Warsaw Pact is capable of completing mobilization of the men and vehicles required to organize the *fronts* intended for Central Europe and to move essential combat elements forward in 10 days, if the process were not interrupted by hostile military action. However, the complete integration of these *fronts* as combat-effective organizations would require more time. For that reason the USSR would almost certainly take about three weeks to complete its mobilization and forward deployment in any circumstances that permitted it to control the timing.

112. In the case of the Warsaw Pact military intervention in Czechoslovakia, in which the timing was entirely subject to Soviet control, covert preparatory phases of mobilization probably began in mid-July. The callup of reservists and civilian equipment probably began on 23 July with the announcement of a "rear-service exercise." By 10 August, the official termination date of the exercise, most of the deployment from the USSR had apparently been completed. In this case, the partial mobilization and movement were accomplished in a little over three weeks.

113. Classified Soviet writings indicate that they do not expect overt mobilization and reinforcement to go undetected by NATO. Critical to the execution of their plans is the expectation of several days of covert preparations, presupposing a period of high tension in Europe. During the covert phase the Soviets would probably attempt to cover preparations by ostensible exercise activity, as they did in the Czech crisis. They would probably expect the initial stages of the overt phase to become apparent to NATO intelligence, particularly in view of the need to mobilize East European forces and to assemble vast quantities of rail and motor transport from the civilian economies.

114. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the existence of a critical state of tension between the USSR and the CSSR, and the threat of a Soviet military intervention,

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were well known in advance, but it was impossible to say whether and when the Soviets would actually intervene, or whether they were only seeking to coerce the Czechs by threatening to do so. Similarly, if the Warsaw Pact were observed to be mobilizing and deploying forces during a period of high tension with NATO, NATO would certainly be alarmed by the increasing danger of armed conflict, but it would be impossible to say whether the Warsaw Pact mobilization was precautionary and defensive, or an attempt to coerce NATO by adopting a threatening posture, or evidence of a firm decision to attack.

XII. TRENDS TO 1978

General Considerations

115. Soviet policy decisions concerning the future of general purpose forces will be heavily influenced by recent events in Eastern Europe. The major problem for Soviet military policy in Europe is that of the reliability of the East European regimes. In a show of political solidarity, they were able to secure the participation of these forces—East German, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian—in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But the feelings of their allies were probably mixed and the Soviets cannot regard this operation as a true measure of their reliability. The only completely submissive Soviet allies at this point are East Germany and Bulgaria. In these circumstances the USSR probably sees increased requirements for Soviet theater forces for Europe.

116. The changing situation in Eastern Europe will probably prompt a re-examination of basic Warsaw Pact military planning and posture vis-a-vis NATO. In any such reexamination, basic assumptions concerning the likelihood and probable nature of war in Europe may come under critical review. One assumption has been that war would begin with a NATO attack instigated by West German "revanchists." The heavy outlays of men and materiel for Warsaw Pact theater forces are based largely on this notion. Another assumption has been that NATO would inevitably resort to nuclear weapons in any major conflict. This idea has apparently been under attack by military spokesmen for some time. Should either or both of these basic assumptions be finally discarded, there could be profound changes in the size and composition of Warsaw Pact theater forces.

117. Other recent trends which increase the pressure for more and better general purpose forces include the steady buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, and the still small, but growing, Soviet capability to project armed strength beyond Bloc borders. If the Soviets seriously pursue more than a token capability for distant limited military action, that would require at a minimum a stepped up investment in combatant and logistical ships.

118. The above considerations will probably combine to exert heavy pressure on the Soviet leadership for increased outlays for general purpose forces. If demands are forthcoming to improve substantially capabilities for sustained conventional operations, the cost of meeting them would be very high, with intensi-

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fied competition for resources with claimants for the strategic forces and the civilian sector. The results of this competition cannot be confidently predicted, but we believe that the outlay of resources for general purpose forces will increase in some degree.

119. The extent of increase in the size and quality of general purpose forces may hinge directly on the Soviet view of prospects for arms control agreements which would permit a scaledown of strategic offense and defense costs. We believe it unlikely that the Soviets would attempt to keep pace in a new round of strategic forces competition and at the same time make heavy additional investments in general purpose force capabilities. The interplay of these factors may produce any one of a variety of possible Soviet responses to theater force requirements.

120. At one extreme, the Soviets could conclude that the threat from NATO had diminished, and that the possibility of either nuclear or nonnuclear war with NATO was not great enough to warrant greatly increased outlays for theater forces. In this case, current trends in theater forces would continue, with an increase in strength opposite China, and continuing, but always incomplete, modernization programs.

121. At the other extreme, the Soviets might decide that the threat from NATO was as great or greater than ever and that the Warsaw Pact had been considerably weakened, requiring a large increase in combat-ready theater forces in the western USSR and possibly in Eastern Europe. They might also conclude that much greater capability for sustained conventional warfare was required, and that, with or without formal agreements, strategic weapons programs would level off, freeing resources. In this case we might see either a sharp increase in the number of line divisions, or an increase of the infantry in divisions and of fire support and logistics strength at all levels of the ground forces. We would also see a faster replacement of aircraft in tactical aviation, a higher percentage of ground attack aircraft, and a general improvement in the air defense capability of theater forces.

122. It is more likely, however, that the Soviet leadership will continue to shy away from clear-cut strategic decisions, and will arrive instead at a collage of compromises. It is in this expectation that we forecast future developments in the general purpose forces.

123. *Ground Forces.* Over the next few years Soviet theater ground forces will probably increase. At least 4 or 5 additional ground divisions will probably be created along the Chinese border. In the western USSR, the Soviets will probably increase the size and readiness of their ground forces—they may make a *front-in-being* in the Carpathian MD and may organize additional divisions and army headquarters. For the foreseeable future, about four or five Soviet divisions will probably remain in Czechoslovakia in addition to the 26 that were in Eastern Europe prior to the Czech crisis.

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124. By about 1972 the Soviets probably will have ended production of the T-62, after having equipped about one-third of their tank units with this model. We expect a new model medium tank to begin entering the forces in the next year or so, probably replacing the remaining T-54s. By 1978 the Soviet tank park will probably consist of roughly equal proportions of this new model, T-62s, and T-55s. Also, by 1978 they will probably have replaced the BTR-40 and BTR-152 APCs with amphibious models.

125. There will probably be some improvement in the conventional staying power of Soviet ground forces over the period, with a 10 to 15 percent increase in tube artillery and a similar increase in the standing logistical support structure at all levels. There may be an increase in the number of infantrymen as well, with each squad mounted in its own armored fighting vehicle.

Tactical Missiles

126. A new short-range ballistic missile to replace the Scud may become operational by 1970. Such a system would probably have a maximum range greater than that of the present Scud (250 n.m. versus 150 n.m.). The system would probably emphasize improved reliability, accuracy, mobility, and simplified logistical support, and would be capable of carrying either nuclear, CW/BW, or HE warheads. In addition, the Soviets will probably deploy the SS-12 in support of GSFG and other potential fronts within the next year or so. No replacement for the SS-12 is forecast, but this system will probably be modified to provide qualitative improvements in accuracy and reliability.

Theater Air Forces and Air Defense

127. There will probably be further increases in Tactical Aviation deployed along the Chinese border over the next few years—perhaps 100 more fighters and light bombers. The Soviets may also activate new tactical air regiments in the low-strength TAAs in the western USSR. Over the longer term, the total inventory of Soviet tactical aircraft will probably decline somewhat as newer models reduce the requirement for large numbers of older fighters and light bombers. We believe that by mid-1979 there will be 2,800 to 3,300 combat aircraft in Tactical Aviation.

128. The primary requirement for new aircraft for Tactical Aviation is replacement of the Mig-17 (Fresco) fighters and the Beagle light bomber in ground attack and reconnaissance units. We believe that the Soviets are now testing several new aircraft which could meet the requirement for a new fighter. Three of these, Flagon B, Faithless, and Flogger, have short takeoff and landing capabilities and offer speed and dispersal advantages over current models. The Flogger is a variable geometry wing aircraft which would have a greater range than the Fitter fighter-bomber with a similar payload. We believe that the Flogger will begin to enter inventory in the next 3 or 4 years. A short or vertical take off and landing fighter, based on Flagon or Faithless design, could begin to enter inven-

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tory in about four years. The all-weather Mig-21 (Fishbed) interceptor is expected to be the mainstay of tactical air defense units for the period of this estimate.

129. Another new aircraft, the Foxbat, would significantly improve the range and load-carrying capabilities of Tactical Aviation. It will almost certainly be deployed with strategic defense forces as an interceptor, but we believe that variants of the Foxbat will be developed as tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft as well, replacing some Beagle light bombers. It could begin to enter the inventory of Tactical Aviation in 2 or 3 years. The Foxbat is one of the largest and clearly the most expensive fighter thus far developed by the Soviets. Therefore we believe that the rate of delivery to Tactical Aviation will probably be slower than with previous models.

130. Theater air defenses will continue to improve through the deployment of new missile systems and new radars. The mobile SA-4 may now be entering theater force inventory, and the mobile, low altitude SA-6 may begin to enter inventory within the next two years. We believe that the Soviets will not deploy a system for theater force defense against ballistic missiles during the period.

Naval Forces

131. We believe the Soviets will seek to increase substantially their capabilities to conduct ASW, particularly on the high seas, and sustained long-range naval operations. The present emphasis on air defense in the surface forces will enhance the Soviet capability to conduct wartime naval operations beyond the radius of shore-based fighter cover. The major combatants—missile-equipped light cruisers, frigates, and destroyers—now entering the fleet have improved endurance, seakeeping, and ASW capabilities. Present major surface ship construction and conversion programs will continue at least until 1970, and we estimate that about 70 SAM-equipped ships (including 16-20 units also equipped with SSMs) will be in service by mid-1973. Another new class of missile ship may be introduced about that time. Escort speeds up to 40 knots are estimated in the late 1970's. Some additional helicopter carriers may be built toward the latter half of the period.

132. Emphasis in new attack submarine programs will continue to be on nuclear propulsion and improved ASW capabilities. We believe that the annual construction of attack submarines will reach some 8 to 12 units (at least 6 to 8 of which will be nuclear-powered) by the early 1970's. The addition of new attack submarines to the order of battle will be accompanied by the retirement of the numerous medium-range units. As a result, the number of torpedo attack submarines will decline by about 25 percent by 1978, but the proportion of nuclear and long-range diesel units will increase substantially. Of the approximately 200 torpedo attack units estimated for that period, some 75 to 100 will probably be new units. Soviet airborne ASW capabilities will also be enhanced by the continued introduction of the Hormone ASW helicopter and the May

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long-range patrol aircraft. An active sonobuoy will probably be introduced during this period. Additional installation of variable depth sonars will probably be made in escort ships and destroyers. Efforts will continue to develop an effective long-range underwater surveillance system.

133. Within the next year or so we expect to see the deployment of a missile system for C-class submarines; it may be either antisubmarine or antiship. A new type of improved cruise-missile for submarine use may be introduced as a replacement for the SS-N-3. Existing Blinder aircraft could be equipped with an antishipping version of the AS-4; alternatively, a new medium jet bomber configured for ASMs might be developed by the mid-1970's.

East European Forces

134. The future size, quality, and status of East European forces, and the extent to which they will supplement Soviet theater forces will depend largely on the outcome of Soviet reexamination of military policy. The Soviets may conclude in the light of recent experience that heavy reliance on the East Europeans is no longer a sound military policy. In this case, there would probably be a reduction in East European standing forces. This development would be welcomed by most East European regimes, which have chafed under the heavy economic burdens imposed by military establishments which are very large in comparison to the resources of their countries. A reduction of the Czech forces by at least 20 percent is probably under way now. It is likely, however, that the East German, Polish, and Bulgarian forces, will be maintained at about their present strengths, for the foreseeable future, and will be improved in quality. Strengths of East European air forces will probably decline somewhat as obsolescent models are phased out faster than newer models are purchased from the USSR. In any case the Soviets may press for tighter controls over East European forces, perhaps through the subordination of East European theater forces to Soviet *fronts*.

TABLE I
ESTIMATED NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LINE DIVISIONS *

AREA	CATEGORY I DIVISIONS ^b				CATEGORY II DIVISIONS				CATEGORY III DIVISIONS				DIVISIONS BEING BUILT UP ^c			
	MRD	TK	ABN	TOTAL	MRD	TK	TOTAL	MRD	TK	TOTAL	MRD	TK	TOTAL	MRD	TK	TOTAL
East Germany.....	10	10	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland.....	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Hungary.....	2	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Western Border MDs *..	13(5)	8(4)	2	23(9)	5	5	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	34
Kiev MD.....	0	0	0	0	1	8	9	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	11
Moscow MD.....	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	6
Odessa MD.....	4(4)	0	0	4(4)	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
Northwestern USSR.....	1	0	1	2	4	1	5	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	10
Southern USSR ^d	1	1	2	4	9	1	10	13	0	13	2	0	0	0	0	29
Central USSR *.....	0	0	0	0	2	1	3	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	8
Far Eastern USSR ^e	4	5	1	10	2	0	2	1	0	1	4	4	1	4	4	21
Mongolia.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
TOTAL.....	35(9)	28(4)	7	70(13)	25	18	43	26	1	27	8	5	153			

* As of 1 December 1968, four or five Soviet divisions remain in Czechoslovakia. Two of these divisions are MRDs from the Carpathian MD; the other two or three are not fully identified as to type and subordination but are from the Western Border MDs. These divisions are included in the Western Border MD totals. (Carpathian, Baltic, and Belorussian MDs.)

^b Figures in parentheses represent our estimate of the maximum number of Category II divisions raised to Category I status for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

^c These divisions, all but one opposite China, are now at varying strengths, but will probably be Category I or II by the end of 1969.

^d Includes Turkistan, Transcaucasus, and North Caucasus MDs.

^e Includes Siberian, Ural, and Volga MDs.

^f Includes Far Eastern and Transbaikal MDs.

TABLE II
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS,
BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1968^a

	MIG-17 FRESCO	MIG-19 FARMER	MIG-21 FISHED	D/F/H	YAK-28P FIREBAR	SU-7 FITTER	YAK-27 MANGROVE	IL-28 BEAGLE	YAK-28 BREWER	TOTAL ^b
East Germany.....	87	12	333		23	157	24	86	74 ^c	795
Poland.....	82	..	123		..	37	30	10	..	280
Hungary.....	127		..	37	..	52	12	230
Baltic.....	50	..	86		40	32	210
Belorussia.....	99	12	74		..	37	..	32	..	255
Carpathian.....	74	37	111		..	37	32	32	32	355
Moscow.....	74		..	37	32	140
Leningrad.....	37	37	..	44	..	120
Kiev.....	74		75
Odesa.....	12	..	111		..	37	32	10	..	200
Transcaucasus.....	111		..	37	..	32	32	210
Turkestan.....	80	..	85		20	..	185
Far East.....	50	..	77		..	37	..	32	..	195
Transbaikal.....	185	..	12		50	..	250
TOTAL ^b	755	60	1,400		25	490	150	440	180	3,500
Mid-1969.....	750-700	50-0	1,425-1,550		25-50	525-600	125-150	450-400	150-200	3,500-3,650
Mid-1970.....	750-625	50-0	1,425-1,625		25-50	525-600	125-150	450-375	150-200	3,500-3,650 ^d

^a There are also some 500-600 older combat-type aircraft collocated with units of Tactical Aviation, and an additional 1,200 older aircraft in reserve.

^b Figures rounded to the nearest 5.

^c Presently relocated to airfields in the Baltic Military District, probably a temporary redeployment.

^d This includes O-25 Foxbat which may enter inventory in 1970.

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TABLE III
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
(As of 1 December 1968)

PRIMARY MISSION *	TOTAL	MIG-17	MIG-19	MIG-21	SU-7	YAK-28	IL-28	YAK-28	YAK-27/YAK-28
		FRESCO	FARMER	FISHBED	FITTER	FIREBAR	BEAGLE	BREWER	MANGROVE/ MAESTRO
Air Defense.....	1,550	160	65	1,300	..	25
Ground Attack.....	1,050	550	490
Light Bomber.....	360	180	180	..
Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance Strike...	540	40	..	100	260	..	150
TOTAL.....	3,500	750	65	1,400	490	25	440	180	150

* Air defense and ground attack regiments of Tactical Aviation are cross-trained and have some capability for other than their primary missions.

TABLE IV
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS
AND SUBMARINES BY TYPE, 1 NOVEMBER 1968—BY FLEETS

Type	North	Baltic	Black	Pacific	Total	Mid-1969	Mid-1970
Cruise-Missile Submarines							
Nuclear (6-8 launchers).....	16	0	0	17	33	33	33
Diesel (most with 4 launchers).....	13	3	5	6	27	27-28	28
Torpedo Attack Submarines							
Nuclear.....	12-15	0	0	4-5	16-20	18-22	22-26
Long Range Diesel.....	33	9	0	23	65	65	60
Medium Range Diesel.....	55	47	25	44	171	164	159
Short Range Diesel.....	0	10	5	0	15	15	15
B-Class (unidentified propulsion).....	0	0	0	2-3	2-3	2-4	4-7
	129-132	69	35	96-98	329-334	324-331	321-328
Operational Surface Ships							
SAM/SSM Light Cruisers *.....	3	0	3	2	8	10-12	12-15
SSM Destroyers.....	0	4	4	3	11	10	9
SAM Destroyers.....	3	3	9	2	17	24	29
Cruisers.....	0	5	3	2	10	8-7	6-4
Destroyers.....	7	10	15	20	52	47	44
Escorts.....	28	26	24 ^b	24	102	102	104
Helicopter Carriers.....	0	0	1	0	1	2	2
Reserve Surface Ships							
Cruisers.....	1	1	1	2	5	7	8
Destroyers.....	6	5	4	6	21	18	15
Escorts.....	0	4	4	2	10	13	16
	48	58	68	63	237	241-242	245-246

* Includes one SAM-equipped light cruiser presently assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

^b Includes four in the Caspian Sea.

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TABLE V
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND TYPES OF SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT

	1 November 1968	Mid-1969	Mid-1970
HEAVY BOMBERS			
Bear (Reconnaissance).....	40	40-45	40-50
MEDIUM BOMBERS			
Badger A ^a	195	175-195	165-185
Badger B ^b	80	75-95	75-100
Badger C.....	205	190-210	180-205
Blinder ^c	60	60-80	60-105
LIGHT BOMBERS			
Beagle.....	60	40-60	30-50
PATROL AIRCRAFT			
Madge.....	40	25-40	20-30
Mail.....	40	40-60	60-80
May.....	5	10-15	20-30
HELICOPTERS			
Hook.....	15	10-20	10-20
Hound and Hormone.....	170	175-220	185-250

^a Totals for Badger A include approximately 75 tankers, 55 reconnaissance (including 10 D models), 15 configured for ASW and 50 conventional bombers.

^b It is believed that almost all Badger B's are now configured to carry the Kelt (AS-5) missile, although no firm evidence of conversion exists for the Black Sea Fleet Air Force.

^c Some of these may be the Blinder B (ASM-configured), but regardless of model, all Blinders are now performing in the reconnaissance and/or free fall bomber role.

TABLE VI
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND READINESS OF EASTERN
EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS

	STRENGTH	TOTAL DIVS	ANALOGOUS TO SOVIET CAT I				ANALOGOUS TO SOVIET CAT II	
			MRD	TK	ABN	ASLT	MRD	TK
East Germany.....	90,000	6	4	2	
Poland.....	200,000	15	5	5	1	1	3	
Czechoslovakia ^a	175,000	11	4	4	2	
Hungary.....	90,000	6	3	1	2	
Romania.....	150,000	9	3	2	4	
Bulgaria.....	125,000	12	3	2	4-5	
TOTAL.....	830,000	58-59	22	16	1	1	15-16	

^a There are indications that Czechoslovakian forces are being reduced by at least 20 percent.

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TABLE VII
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
1 NOVEMBER 1968

	FAGOT/FRESCO	FARMER	FITTER	FISHBED	FISHBED	MAYA/	HEAGLE	TOTAL
				C/E	D/F	MANGROVE		
Bulgaria.....	180	75	..	10	25	..	10	300
Czechoslovakia.....	250	70	85	55	115	20	25	620
East Germany.....	50	20	..	60	220	350
Hungary.....	30	10	..	60	45	145
Poland *.....	670	15	20	20	130	..	60	915
Romania.....	135	30	..	40	45	..	10	260
TOTAL Mid-1968.....	1,315	220	105	245	580	20	105	2,590
Mid-1969.....	1,100-1,200	175-200	150-180	230-250	600-700	20-25	95-105	2,370-2,660
Mid-1970.....	1,050-1,150	150-175	160-200	230-250	650-750	20-25	80-90	2,340-2,640

* Includes naval units.

TABLE VIII
ESTIMATED NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN
NAVAL VESSELS BY TYPE, 1 NOVEMBER 1968, BY COUNTRY

	BALTIC SEA AREA		BLACK SEA AREA	
	East Germany	Poland *	Bulgaria	Romania
Destroyer Types.....	4	3	2	..
Submarines.....	..	7	2	..
Large Guided Missile Patrol Boats....	12	12	..	5
Motor Torpedo Boats.....	67	28	8	13
Submarine Chasers.....	26	8(18)	8	3
Miscellaneous Patrol Boats.....	59	..(20)	..	3
Fleet Minesweepers.....	20	24	2	4
Small Minesweepers.....	27	35	18	28
Amphibious Ships.....	6	15 ^b
Amphibious Craft.....	12	23(15)	11	8
TOTAL.....	233	155(53)	51	63

* Figures in parentheses are augmenting coast (frontier) guard units, which now operate in close coordination with the navy.

^b Six additional units in reserve and others under construction.

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