

~~Top Secret~~

NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE

Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

[]

~~Top Secret~~

NIE 11-14-75

~~CC-01648-75~~

4 September 1975

Copy No 216



~~Top-Secret~~

NIE 11-14-75

WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO

~~SG 01648/75~~

~~Top-Secret~~

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Energy Research and Development Administration

Concurring:

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, National Security Agency

The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration

Abstaining:

The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the Treasury

The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

CONTENTS

	Page
NOTE	1
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS	2
DISCUSSION	8
I. SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ROLES OF THEATER FORCES OPPOSITE NATO	8
A. European Security Role	8
B. Protection of Soviet Interests Within the Warsaw Pact	9
C. Political Roles of Warsaw Pact Forces	9
II. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF FUTURE WAR IN EUROPE	9
A. The Khrushchev Era	9
B. Since Khrushchev	10
III. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGIES	11
A. Possible Theaters of War With NATO	15
B. Soviet Strategies and Objectives in a War in Central Europe	18
C. The Strategic Backdrop of a War in Europe	19
IV. WARSAW PACT PLANNING FOR INITIAL OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE	19
A. Forces	19
Ground Forces	20
Air Forces	22
Theater Nuclear Forces	23
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare Capabilities	23
Naval Forces	24
Strengths and Weaknesses	24

	Page
B. Pact Concepts for Launching an Offensive in Central Europe	26
C. Wartime Organization	27
V. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF WARSAW PACT STRATEGY	28
A. Capability of Pact Ground Forces to Break-Through NATO's Defenses	28
B. Warsaw Pact Air Operations	29
C. Control of Multinational Forces in a Warsaw Pact Offensive	29
D. Warsaw Pact Logistical Capability	31
Ground Forces	31
Air Forces	32
E. The Reliability of East European Forces	32
VI. CURRENT TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES	33
A. Background	34
B. Growth and Improvement of Soviet Theater Forces Since the Mid-1960s	34
Expansion of Existing Force Elements	34
Equipment Modernization	35
New Aircraft	36
Ground-Based Air Defense Systems	38
The T-72 Medium Tanks	38
APCs and Combat Vehicles	38
Self-Propelled Artillery	38
Strategic Attack Forces	38
C. The East Europeans	41
East Germany	41
Czechoslovakia	41
Poland	41
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria	42
D. Recent Trends	42
E. Outlook for Further Growth in the Late 1970s	43

WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO

NOTE

This Estimate is concerned with the Warsaw Pact forces—primarily ground and tactical air forces—located in the European USSR and Eastern Europe opposite NATO. Soviet naval, bomber, and missile forces are treated only insofar as they bear directly on potential European land campaigns. Soviet theater forces opposite China are discussed in NIE 11-13-73, *The Sino-Soviet Relationship: The Military Aspects*. Details on Soviet general purpose naval forces are contained in NIE 11-15-74, *Soviet Naval Policy and Programs*. Comprehensive estimates on Soviet strategic attack and defense forces are contained in NIE 11-3/8-74, *Soviet Forces For Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985*. Details of order-of-battle and equipment characteristics which are outside the scope of this Estimate may be found in joint CIA/DIA memorandums and in Defense Intelligence Agency reports and estimates.

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

The USSR considers its military strength in Europe to be fundamental to the protection of its national interests, to the maintenance of its strategic posture vis-a-vis the West, and to its management of foreign policy. The Soviets appear committed to maintaining a demonstrable numerical edge over NATO in some key elements of theater forces such as divisions, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. They cannot, however, separate Europe from the larger context of the overall theater and strategic resources available to the USSR and the West. We believe that the Soviets, given this larger view of the existing balance, consider both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to be deterred from initiating war.

Soviet thinking on the nuclear aspects of a war in Europe has changed in the past decade and may still be changing. The Soviets evidently no longer expect that any NATO use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be answered with massive Pact nuclear strikes throughout NATO Europe. We estimate that the following considerations characterize current Soviet concepts of the initial stages of a war in Europe:

- The Soviets believe that a war in Europe probably would begin with both sides using only non-nuclear weapons.
- They also believe that the Pact would quickly contain a non-nuclear NATO attack, go on the offensive, and achieve early successes in penetrating NATO's defenses.
- The Soviets would continue to use only non-nuclear weapons as long as possible.
- NATO would initiate the use of nuclear weapons to compel Pact forces to halt their offensive.
- If NATO's initial use of theater nuclear weapons were selective and limited, we could not confidently predict the Soviets' response. But they have been broadening the range of options available to them for responding. They might continue purely non-nuclear operations. Or they might launch a massive theater nuclear strike—
[] But we cannot exclude the possibility that they would respond with limited nuclear strikes of their own—they have considered this alternative.

- The Soviets reckon, however, that once nuclear weapons are introduced by either side, the risk of escalation is very great because the side that struck first massively would have the advantage. The likelihood of an attempted preemption by one side or the other with massive, theater-wide strikes would increase greatly.
- Available classified Soviet writings are vague with regard to the issue of nuclear escalation from the European theater to a US-USSR intercontinental exchange. Unclassified writings characterize such escalation as likely.
- Recent evidence does not reveal Soviet intentions toward carrying a Pact offensive into France. The Soviets might prefer not to involve the French in the conflict because the independent French nuclear capability would increase the risk of nuclear escalation.

Because of the uncertainties in our appreciation of current Soviet nuclear doctrine and our lack of information by which to judge how Soviet political authorities would respond to a proposal by the Soviet military to use nuclear weapons, we cannot confidently predict how the Warsaw Pact would react to a NATO initiation of nuclear war. But we judge that the odds still favor rapid escalation once nuclear war began in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact has some 150 divisions in varying states of strength and combat readiness and some 4,200 tactical aircraft, in Eastern Europe and the portion of the USSR opposite NATO. Another 22 divisions and 250 tactical aircraft in the central USSR probably constitute a general reserve for use against either NATO or China. Elements of the Pact's navies and strategic attack and defense forces would also be used in a European war. The Soviets evidently plan for military operations against NATO in three separate theaters:

- In the northwestern USSR and Scandinavia, to defend Murmansk and Northern Fleet installations, to neutralize or seize NATO installations in northern Norway, and to attack NATO naval forces and merchant shipping in the Norwegian Sea.
- In central and western Europe, to destroy NATO forces in West Germany and the Benelux countries, and, using airborne and amphibious forces against key Danish islands in conjunction with ground attacks through Jutland, to assist the Pact navies in gaining control of the Baltic Sea and assuring passage from the Baltic to the open ocean.
- In southern Europe, against Greece and Turkey to secure the Turkish Straits and support naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Also, operations against northern Italy, intended to

secure the southern flank of Pact forces attacking West Germany, might be launched from Hungary through Yugoslavia or Austria.

The Soviets would expect Central Europe to be the decisive theater of a large-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Whether they would launch offensives all along NATO's flanks concurrently with any campaign in Central Europe is uncertain. We believe that the Warsaw Pact has the means to conduct limited, but not general, offensive operations in Scandinavia and southern Europe while simultaneously carrying out an offensive against the NATO center. We judge that early Pact offensives toward the Turkish Straits and northern Norway are more likely than in the other flank areas such as Italy and the rest of Scandinavia.

The Soviets consider it likely that, in the case of a NATO-Pact war, Pact operations—including major offensives—would begin prior to their carrying out a large-scale reinforcement with ground forces from the USSR. Until about the mid-1960s, the Soviets expected to conduct such a reinforcement in advance of war. This change, which has become apparent since the late 1960s, may have occurred because the Soviets no longer count on having the time for prior reinforcement, and also because of the danger that such action could be counterproductive. For example, it might cause NATO to begin a buildup of its own that would work against the Pact's initial numerical superiority of forces in Central Europe. The Soviets may also believe that the reinforcement process is not as severely threatened by NATO nuclear attack as it was in earlier years. This change in doctrine does not necessarily represent a change in Soviet preferences but reflects what is, from their point of view, a prudent planning assumption. This appreciation of Pact offensive concepts has important warning implications for NATO. In particular, we no longer can be confident that the movement of a 25-30 division force from the USSR into Central Europe would take place before an attack.¹

The Soviet military evidently believes that Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's. They also believe that Pact theater forces now in Central Europe are not only capable of containing a NATO attack in the early days of a conflict, but are also capable of conducting a non-nuclear offensive into West Germany. This rapidly advancing offensive would depend on the tank—Pact forces in Central Europe have some 16,000. The Soviet ground forces are more dependent upon the tank than any army in history. If the Soviets were ever forced to conclude

¹ The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that this inadequately states the attack warning implications. He believes that the Soviets actively consider attack plans which do not involve the movement of a 25-30 division force from the USSR to Central Europe before an attack.

that their tanks were unable to penetrate NATO forces they would have to rethink their strategy and contemplate radical redesign of their forces.²

The Soviets probably consider that NATO's tactical air forces could blunt or perhaps even halt this Pact ground offensive. Because of this, the Pact evidently plans a massive, theater-wide air offensive during the initial, non-nuclear phase of a war, aimed at destroying NATO's tactical air forces and other nuclear systems and facilities. This attack is to be conducted by tactical aircraft and by bombers of Soviet Long Range and possibly Naval Aviation. The all-out nature of this scheme and deficiencies in the capabilities of most Pact aircraft would make it a highly risky operation, its success depending heavily on surprise to insure that NATO's air defenses are not fully prepared and mobile nuclear systems not dispersed.

The quantity of Pact tactical nuclear delivery systems has been increasing in recent years, and this would enable the Soviets to conduct nuclear warfare in Europe at higher intensities before having to use

² The Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the Soviet military leaders would be far more conservative than the Estimate indicates in their assessment of the balance in Europe and of the ability of Warsaw Pact forces to execute a successful offensive deep into West Germany.

Soviet military writings do describe a sequence of first containing a NATO attack and then launching a smashing counteroffensive deep into Germany.

There are a number of reasons to doubt that Soviet military or political leaders would have confidence in carrying it out with only the forces already in Central Europe.

- The Soviets have been extremely cautious in reckoning their requirements for any military operation, defensive or offensive. This was vividly demonstrated in the last Soviet military operation in Europe—the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
- Numerical force ratios which strongly favor the Soviets may not appear nearly so advantageous in Soviet eyes. The Soviet military leaders would be prone to calculate on a worst-case basis and use assumptions different from the West. If the Soviets assumed that West Germany began to mobilize before the Pact, they would see Pact troops being quickly outnumbered.
- The Soviets, moreover, would be inclined to credit the West with advantages in characteristics of equipment. This appears to be the case especially with aircraft, and there are indications of Soviet apprehensions over the air operation which their strategy projects, as this Estimate points out.

- []
- Finally, Soviet behavior in MBFR suggests that the Soviets today are far more conservative in calculating their force requirements in Europe than they were ten and 15 years ago.

This view of the Soviet assessment of the chances of success in the operations described in the Estimate suggests that the Soviets would much prefer to reinforce before starting operations in Germany if they could, and that falling such reinforcement they would have substantial doubts over their capability to launch an offensive deep into West Germany. The reason for practicing initiation of operations before reinforcement appears to be a Soviet judgment that there may not in fact be time to bring forces forward before the war starts.

their USSR-based systems. There is, however, no direct evidence that they are deliberately seeking an alternative to using their USSR-based nuclear forces in large-scale theater nuclear war. Available evidence, although inconclusive, suggests that the Soviets have nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, but we can only roughly approximate how many nuclear weapons might be stored in the likely storage facilities.

Soviet military doctrine categorizes toxic chemical agents along with nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and implies that the Pact would use chemical weapons once nuclear weapons were in use. We have little doubt that the Soviets possess substantial stocks of toxic chemical agents but cannot estimate the size of their stockpile. We have good evidence, however, that some toxic chemical munitions are available to Soviet air forces in Eastern Europe. Pact forces emphasize training and equipment for defense against chemical and radiological effects and we judge they could operate in a CBR environment more effectively than NATO forces.

Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have carried out a major expansion and renovation of their theater forces:

- In the ground forces, the numbers of tanks and artillery pieces have been substantially increased and a variety of other changes in organization and equipment have brought about larger and more modern divisions. Motor transport capability has been added not only to supply ammunition for the added weapons, but also to improve overall logistic capability. Modern ground-based air defense systems are being assigned to the ground forces in large numbers. Technical improvements, particularly in air defense and artillery weapons, and the improvements to the APCs also contribute to greater theater force capabilities. Despite these improvements, however, ground force units still have a mixture of old and new equipment and some units in the USSR have substantial shortages.
- The Soviet tactical air forces opposite NATO have remained relatively stable in numbers but have begun acquiring a new generation of aircraft and weapons that is enabling them to change their traditional air defense orientation toward a broader range of offensive as well as defensive missions. But the full realization of these possibilities is still some way off. Despite the acquisition of some new aircraft with capabilities similar to the better NATO aircraft, the majority of Soviet and East European tactical aircraft still have short ranges and low payloads and lack the sophisticated weaponry and avionics of US aircraft.

We have recently acquired a piece of evidence that suggests the Soviets have, or plan to have, nuclear artillery rounds.

In the East European forces, reorganization, expansion, and force modernization has allowed them to assume greater responsibilities in Pact military plans. Although improvements in East European ground forces have generally followed the Soviet lead, they have tended to lag by a few years and to proceed more gradually.

The momentum of the Soviet drive to maintain superiority of theater forces in Europe seems likely to lead to gradual expansion and further technological improvements in Soviet theater forces through the end of the 1970s.³ If the trend of the last two years or so continues, the overall size of the Soviet theater forces will increase by about 100,000 men by the early 1980s, when they would then have a total of more than 2.1 million.

³See footnote 2.

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ROLES OF THEATER FORCES OPPOSITE NATO

A. European Security Role

1. The Soviets have maintained large theater ground and tactical air forces since the end of World War II. Even in the early 1960s after the drastic cuts imposed by Khrushchev they never numbered much less than 1.5 million men.

2. We do not have direct evidence on Soviet force planning objectives, but an important theme of recent Soviet military thought, as evidenced in theoretical writings and in Soviet doctrine for prosecuting theater war, argues the necessity for large ground forces in peacetime. The argument is based, first of all, on a firm determination not to be caught unprepared again as the USSR was by Hitler's onslaught in 1941. Clearly, the Soviets intend that any future European conflict would take place in Western, not Eastern territory and they stress the need for large combat-ready forces and reserves to be available at the outset of hostilities to stop a sudden enemy attack and launch counteroffensives. Soviet analysis of the probable character of a war in Europe apparently has led them to the conclusion that, even should large-scale nuclear exchanges occur, large ground forces would still be needed to defeat surviving NATO forces and seize Western Europe.

3. The Soviet Union considers its military strength in Europe fundamental to the protection

of its national interests, to the maintenance of its strategic posture vis-a-vis the West, and to its management of foreign policy. One of the values of Warsaw Pact forces to the USSR lies in their role as an effective deterrent to a perceived danger from NATO. In effect, the Soviets view Warsaw Pact forces as constituting a buffer between NATO and the Soviet heartland. This helps to explain the Soviet Union's willingness and determination to maintain force levels in Central Europe over a long period and at considerable expense, despite pressing demands from the nonmilitary sector of both Soviet and East European economies. However, the size of the Soviet/Pact forces in the forward area, their doctrine of the offensive, and the across-the-board efforts to improve the capabilities of their forces cannot fully be explained in terms of protection against perceived threats from NATO, control of Pact allies, or maintenance of the status quo. Rather, they suggest a desire for more ambitious policy options. At a minimum these would include the goal of clear conventional superiority to support political pressures, as well as to prevail in the event of military action.

4. The Soviets appear committed to maintaining a demonstrable numerical edge over NATO in some key elements of the theater forces such as divisions, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. They do not, however, separate Europe from the larger context of the overall theater and strategic resources available to the USSR and to the West. Given this larger view of the balance, the Soviets evidently have

little confidence that they can either foresee or control the course of a conflict with NATO and are therefore inclined to be very cautious in the use of their military force in Europe.

B. Protection of Soviet Interests Within the Warsaw Pact

5. It is clear that the USSR considers a NATO contingency paramount in its defense planning for the European theater, and that there must be cohesion among the Pact members for that planning to be effective. The presence of large well-equipped Soviet forces stationed in East European countries and the availability of additional Soviet forces across their borders affords the Soviets considerable leverage in exerting control over these countries.

C. Political Roles of Warsaw Pact Forces

6. Recent years have witnessed a growing employment of Soviet military forces to advance political objectives in the Third World—most frequently in naval activity around Africa and in the Middle East. Toward Western Europe, however, the USSR has been increasingly circumspect in its use of Warsaw Pact forces for political purposes. Basically, there appear to be three reasons for this:

— The stakes (and concomitant risks) are much higher in Western Europe, since the fundamental security of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies is at issue. Thus, political-military behavior which might be acceptable in the Third World could be considered "adventurism" in Europe.

— It is unnecessary. From the perspective of the USSR's primary defense concern—protecting its national security—the impact on NATO of a powerful Warsaw Pact serves that purpose simply by its existence.

— It is undesirable. Although the Soviets see a substantial military presence as necessary to support their European diplomacy, military bluster or the creation of incidents has proven to be counterproductive. Detente has afforded the USSR many more opportunities for cultivating and intensifying bilateral relationships in Western Europe.

7. There are, however, certain instances when Soviet use of Warsaw Pact forces for plainly political purposes might be justified by the high stakes involved:

— The Soviet Union will seek to maintain the status quo in Eastern Europe. West Berlin remains a key potential pressure point.

— While the Soviets have thus far shown little disposition actively to try to take advantage of the recent trouble between Greece and Turkey, they might in the future make more vigorous political efforts to meddle in the troubles of NATO's southern flank. Soviet use of force for intervention, however, seems remote, but Moscow might provide military assistance or resort to some show of military force.

— The Soviet Union clearly wishes to see Yugoslavia remain an avowedly Communist state, or, at a minimum, prevent its alignment with the West. The possibility of Warsaw Pact intervention serves to inhibit Yugoslav moves toward the West.

II. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF FUTURE WAR IN EUROPE

A. The Khrushchev Era

8. Soviet military doctrine under Khrushchev stressed the preeminence of nuclear weapons and discounted the need for large conventional forces to conduct a theater war. Khrushchev and his supporters asserted that any war involving the Soviet Union and the West would be a decisive global conflict between the superpowers with its outcome largely determined by massive nuclear exchanges during the first hours. Strategic exchanges also would decide any European conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and would occur on a large scale at the outset. Most Soviet nuclear strikes against European targets were to be delivered by missiles and bombers based in the western USSR.

9. Because Khrushchev closely linked war in Europe to a decisive nuclear exchange, he saw little need to allocate resources to conventional forces. Following Khrushchev's lead, the prevailing

Soviet planners believed that strategic and tactical nuclear weapons could replace the massed artillery and tactical air formations of World War II. Those forces which appeared to have limited utility in a nuclear war, particularly artillery and tactical air forces, suffered massive cuts. But ground forces proponents argued, with some success, that large armored forces were still necessary to exploit nuclear strikes and successfully conclude a campaign in Europe. Thus, despite the cuts, the armored elements of ground forces survived largely intact.

B. Since Khrushchev

10. Once Khrushchev was removed in 1964, changes in the Soviet view of war in Europe began to emerge. An immediate impetus to these changes was provided by the attitude of the new leadership toward military force structure and balance. In eschewing Khrushchev's reliance on a single war-fighting option, i.e., nuclear war, the collective leadership has supported the expansion of conventional forces to complement the growing Soviet strategic arsenal.

11. The views of the conventional forces proponents were reinforced by changes in NATO doctrine and capabilities that were also occurring during this same period. By the late 1950s the US policy of massive nuclear retaliation to any Soviet aggression in Europe was being openly questioned in the West, and throughout the early 1960s more flexible and less drastic options for conducting a war in Europe were being examined in NATO.

12. Although "flexible response" was not made official NATO doctrine until 1967, the Soviets knew by 1965 that NATO was moving toward the option of delaying the use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict until the Pact was on the verge of overrunning NATO's defenses or had used nuclear weapons first. By the mid-1960s, Soviet strategists had incorporated into their doctrine the notion that war in Europe would most likely begin with a conventional phase and that Pact forces and tactics should be adjusted accordingly.


13. A related post-Khrushchev development that affected the Soviets' views on the likely nature of a European war was their anticipation in the late 1960s of achieving rough strategic parity with the US. Whereas a war in Europe during the Khrush-

chev period was postulated to be nuclear from the start, and then only part of a larger intercontinental conflict, the Soviets could now consider the possibility that war in Europe might not trigger a global exchange. Achievement of strategic parity probably served to reinforce Soviet beliefs that a war in Europe would begin conventionally because of the mutual hesitancy of the US and USSR to use nuclear weapons in a theater conflict that could quickly escalate to global war.

14. In the 1960s, Soviet doctrine held that once a war with NATO developed to the point that the introduction of nuclear weapons became inevitable, the USSR would conduct massive, theater-wide nuclear strikes to preempt NATO nuclear capabilities.⁴ Soviet doctrinal writings indicate that by the late 1960s serious consideration was being given to the possibility of Soviet limited use of nuclear weapons in Europe. By 1970, Soviet planners were being instructed to develop concepts and forces for conducting a variety of nuclear operations in Europe.

15. We are uncertain of the full extent to which Soviet doctrine on limited nuclear war has advanced since the early 1970s. Our evidence on Soviet theater war-fighting concepts during the last few years [

] reflected a variety of Soviet actions ranging from non-use of nuclear weapons to large-scale, theater-wide nuclear strikes.



⁴ For Soviet views on the concurrent use of chemical weapons with nuclear strikes, see paragraph 64 below.

[

16. We consider it likely that Soviet thinking on theater nuclear war and on the links between theater and intercontinental war is fluid and that further changes may become apparent in the next few years. The position at which the Soviets had arrived by 1970 retained some features of the Khrushchev doctrine—especially as to the decisive nature of nuclear weapons—but also exhibited major differences that reflected the realities of the current strategic balance and Soviet perceptions of NATO's military doctrine and capabilities. The doctrine had shifted away from its former preoccupation with a single catastrophic response to any NATO use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, it held only a little hope of limiting the intensity of theater nuclear war in Europe once it is begun.

17. In any case, having once embarked on the search for alternatives to automatic nuclear escalation, the Soviets are unlikely to have abandoned the search. We estimate that the following considerations characterize current Soviet concepts of the initial stages of a war in Europe:

- The Soviets believe that a war in Europe probably would begin with both sides using only non-nuclear weapons.
- The Soviets also believe that the Warsaw Pact would quickly contain a non-nuclear NATO attack, go on the offensive, and achieve early successes in penetrating NATO's defenses.
- The Soviets would seek to continue to use only non-nuclear weapons as long as possible.
- NATO would initiate the use of nuclear weapons to compel Pact forces to halt their offensive.
- If NATO's initial use of nuclear weapons were selective and limited, we could not confidently predict the Soviets' response. They might continue purely non-nuclear operations. Or they might launch a massive nuclear strike [

] But we cannot exclude the possi-

bility that they would respond with limited strikes of their own—they have considered this alternative.

- The Soviets reckon, however, that once nuclear weapons are introduced by either side, the risk of escalation is very great because the side that struck first massively would have the advantage. The likelihood of an attempted preemption by one side or the other with massive, theater-wide strikes would increase greatly.
- Available classified Soviet writings are vague with regard to the issue of nuclear escalation from the European theater to a US-USSR intercontinental exchange. Unclassified writings characterize such escalation as likely. We cannot now discern current Soviet thinking on the limits of escalation.
- Soviet military doctrine has not set any fixed size for the Warsaw pact's initial nuclear strike. Its size would depend on military objectives. While doctrine will influence Soviet decisions, it is not likely to be the force driving the political leadership's decision concerning the actual response.

III. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGIES

18. We do not have access to the Soviets' war plans but we can infer the general nature of their military contingency plans from the information available from Warsaw Pact military exercises, from Pact writings on military strategy and tactics for war with NATO, and from the current disposition of Pact forces. Because of the USSR's geographical position as a major continental power in Eurasia and the Soviet perception of the USSR as having potentially hostile neighbors on virtually every side, the Soviet military apparently have developed contingency plans for military operations on all of their land frontiers. In peacetime, they maintain large ground and air forces in all of the border regions facing these frontiers as well as in Central Europe and the Mongolian Peoples Republic. Altogether, the USSR has about 170 divisions at varying strength levels in its peacetime ground forces and some 4,600 aircraft in its tactical air forces (see Tables 1 and 2). The Navy has some 220 active

TABLE I
Disposition of Warsaw Pact Ground Forces
1 July 1975

Area	Divisions			Total
	Tank	Motorized Rifle	Airborne	
Divisions Opposite NATO Central Region				
East European				
East Germany	2	4	6
Poland	5	9 ¹	1	15
Czechoslovakia	5	5	10 + 1 brigade
Total East European	12	18	1	31 + 1 brigade
Soviet				
GSFG (East Germany)	10	10	---	20
NGF (Poland)	2	---	---	2
CGF (Czechoslovakia)	2	3	---	5
Baltic MD	3	4	2	9
Belorussian MD	8	2	1	11
Carpathian MD	3	8	---	11
Total Soviet	28	27	3	58
Total Opposite Central Region	40	45	4	89 + 1 brigade
Divisions on NATO's Flanks				
East European				
Hungary	1	5	6
Bulgaria	8	8 + 5 brigades
Romania	2	8	10 + 2 brigades
Total East European	3	21	24 + 7 brigades
Soviet				
SGF (Hungary)	2	2	---	4
Odessa MD	7	1	8
Leningrad MD	1	7	1	9
North Caucasus MD	1	5	---	6
Transcaucasus MD	11	1	12
Total Soviet	4	32	3	39
Total on NATO Flanks	7	53	3	63 + 7 brigades
Divisions in Eastern USSR and Mongolia				
Soviet Forces in Mongolia	1	1	---	2
Central Asian MD	1	6	---	7
Siberian MD	1	4	---	5
Transbaykal MD	2	8	---	10
Far East MD	1	18	---	19
Total in Eastern USSR and Mongolia	6	37	---	43

Footnote at end of table.

TABLE 1
Disposition of Warsaw Pact Ground Forces (Continued)
1 July 1975

	Divisions			Total
	Tank	Motorized Rifle	Airborne	
Other Soviet Divisions				
Moscow MD.....	2	3	1	6
Ural MD.....	1	2	3
Volga MD.....	3	3
Turkestan MD.....	5	1	6
Kiev MD.....	6	4	10
Total Other Soviet.....	9	17	2	28
Total Warsaw Pact.....	62	152	9	223 + 8 brigades
Of Which				
Soviet.....	47	113	8	168
East European.....	15	39	1	55 + 8 brigades

¹ Includes Polish Sea Landing Division.

TABLE 2
Disposition of Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Forces¹
1 July 1975

	By Unit Primary Mission ²			Total ³
	Counter-air	Ground Attack	Reconnaissance/ECM	
Aircraft Opposite NATO Central Region				
East European				
East Germany.....	35	15	50
Poland.....	120	260	95	475 ⁴
Czechoslovakia.....	135	155	75	365
Total East European.....	255	450	185	890
Soviet				
GSFG (East Germany).....	390	250	105	745
MGF (Poland).....	130	125	55	310
CGF (Czechoslovakia).....	80	20	100
Baltic MD.....	80	135	50	265
Belorussian MD.....	125	130	35	290
Carpathian MD.....	125	210	45	380
Total Soviet.....	930	850	310	2,090
Total Opposite Central Region.....	1,185	1,300	495	2,980

Footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 2

Disposition of Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Forces¹ (Continued)
1 July 1975

	By Unit Primary Mission ²			
	Counter-air	Ground Attack	Reconnaissance/ECM	Total ³
Aircraft on NATO's Flanks				
East European				
Hungary.....
Bulgaria.....	80	70	35	185
Romania.....	75	15	90
Total East European.....	80	145	50	275
Soviet				
SGF (Hungary).....	135	95	35	265
Odessa MD.....	135	40	55	230
Leningrad MD.....	125	45	170
Transcaucasus MD.....	130	70	70	270
Total Soviet.....	400	330	205	935
Total on NATO Flanks.....	480	475	255	1,210
Aircraft Opposite China				
Soviet Forces in Mongolia.....	90	85	175
Central Asian MD.....	125	85	55	265
Transbaykal MD.....	90	205	65	360
Far East MD.....	120	205	90	415
Total Opposite China.....	425	580	210	1,215
Other Soviet Aircraft				
Moscow MD.....	100	40	30	170
Turkestan MD.....	85	40	15	140
Kiev MD.....	80	80
Total Other Soviet.....	265	80	45	390
Total Warsaw Pact.....	2,355	2,435	1,005	5,795
Of Which				
Soviet.....	2,020	1,840	770	4,630
East European.....	335	595	235	1,165

¹ Includes all combat aircraft (except trainers) assigned to what the Pact calls "Frontal Aviation," or air forces for the support of fronts. It does not include some 2,600 Soviet and 730 East European fighter aircraft that are subordinate to the national air defense commands with the primary mission of strategic air defense over the territories of the Warsaw Pact countries. In an emergency, limited numbers of these aircraft—particularly East European—might be assigned tactical air defense missions. Aircraft models of the Soviet strategic air defense forces (PVO Strany), however, are different from those of the tactical air forces and for the most part would not constitute a suitable replacement pool without special logistical arrangements.

² Based on training, aircraft models, and roles observed in exercises. Some Pact tactical air units are cross-trained in other missions to varying degrees.

³ All figures in this table represent the number of operationally available (OA) aircraft that are assigned to active combat units of the Warsaw Pact tactical air forces. In most units this would include a few aircraft above the normal unit equipment (UE). The figures do not include some 900 combat-capable trainers that are in Pact tactical air units or some 2,500 aircraft assigned to Pact (mainly in the USSR) operational conversion units and pilot training schools. These aircraft probably could serve as maintenance and attrition replacements during hostilities. The table does not include aircraft in storage.

⁴ Includes 50 aircraft subordinate to the Polish Naval Air Forces.

major surface combatants and 260 general purpose submarines.

A. Possible Theaters of War With NATO


19. Soviet strategists have identified at least three theaters of military operations in which they envisage potential land conflicts with NATO. These theaters are described below along with brief characterizations of the types of military operations which the Soviets appear to envisage for each. Also, the military forces which probably would be available for early use in each theater are described. Pact planning is sufficiently flexible to allow for variations in any of these elements

20. Northwestern Theater. Information

indicates that the Soviets envisage a theater of military operations based on the Leningrad Military District which would encompass the Scandinavian peninsula. This information implies contingency plans for the defense of the Murmansk and White Sea areas including Northern Fleet installations, and for the neutralization or seizure of the lightly defended NATO facilities in northern Norway. Whether plans exist for early offensive operations into central

regions of Norway is unknown, but these areas are rugged and considerably more defensible than those in the north. In any event, the Soviets are constrained by the distances involved from bringing their ground and tactical air forces to bear against most of Norway in the initial phase of a war. Their large Northern Fleet, including 56 active major surface combatants, 130 general purpose submarines and some 65 naval combat aircraft, probably would be used against NATO naval forces and merchant shipping. There are nine Soviet divisions, one an airborne division, in the Leningrad Military District—the only district opposite the Northwestern Theater—and about 170 combat aircraft in its Frontal Aviation units. Also, there is a Naval Infantry regiment in the Murmansk area with amphibious lift available to it.

21. *Western Theater.* The Western Theater would include East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the Pact side and the FRG, the Benelux nations, Denmark, and France on the NATO side. The bulk of both NATO's and the Pact's theater forces are either located in Central Europe or earmarked for use there. Pact forces currently in Central Europe



include 58 ground divisions and 2,045 tactical aircraft. An additional 31 Soviet divisions, including 3 airborne divisions, and 935 tactical aircraft are stationed in the western USSR adjacent to the region and are primarily intended to be used in a Western Theater. The Soviet Baltic Fleet with 45 active major surface combatants and some 210 combat aircraft and the Polish and East German Navies would likely be used to gain control of the Baltic Sea, to support amphibious operations in the Western Theater and to assure passage to the open ocean. See paragraphs 82-96 for details of possible Warsaw Pact operations in this theater.

22. *Southwestern Theater.* Soviet planners envision military operations against Greece and western Turkey, and possibly northern Italy and Austria. Operations against Greece and Turkey would be launched from Bulgaria and the Odessa region of the USSR to secure the Turkish Straits and support naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Operations against northern Italy intended to secure the southern flank of the Western Theater might be launched from Hungary through Yugoslavia or Austria. There are 28 Pact divisions and 7 brigades and 540 tactical aircraft in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. In the Odessa Military District, there are an additional eight Soviet divisions (including one airborne division) and 230 tactical aircraft primarily for use in a Southwestern Theater. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, with 61 active major surface combatants, 25 submarines, about 120 com-

bat aircraft and a Naval Infantry regiment, and the much smaller Bulgarian Navy would support operations to gain the Straits and neutralize NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

23. The Soviets also probably have contingency plans for operations against eastern Turkey. About 18 divisions (including one airborne) and 270 combat aircraft in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus Military Districts could be used in these operations.

24. *General Reserves.* In addition to the forces evidently earmarked for early use against NATO in potential theaters, 22 additional Soviet divisions (including one airborne) are located west of the Ural Mountains in the Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military Districts. There is little evidence on where or when the Soviets would expect to use these divisions. The central location and low state of readiness of the motorized rifle and tank divisions suggest, however, that initially most of them might be held as a general reserve for use in any of the theaters opposite NATO. They could also be used in a Far Eastern theater in the case of a Sino-Soviet war.



Figure 3




Figure 4

25. *Soviet Theater Forces Facing China.* There are an additional 49 divisions and 1,355 tactical aircraft in the Soviet military districts east of the Ural Mountains and in the Mongolian Peoples Republic. We believe that these forces are intended mainly for the contingency of a war with China and that, barring a radical improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, most of them would be retained in the Far East even during a Soviet war with NATO.

26. *Soviet Strategic Attack Forces for Theater Nuclear War.* Elements of all the Soviet strategic attack forces—Strategic Rocket Troops, Long Range Aviation, and ballistic missile submarines of the Soviet Navy—would be available to participate in Warsaw Pact nuclear strikes on NATO Europe. Most of the 496 operational MRBMs and the 87 IRBMs are targeted on Europe; the MRBMs are aimed mainly at NATO's Central Region and the United Kingdom while the IRBMs are aimed mostly toward the northern and southern European areas. Some 530 intermediate range bombers located west of the Ural Mountains are mainly intended for strikes against NATO Europe. Also, some 11 of the Soviets older model ballistic missile submarines, with a total of 33 launch tubes, are probably earmarked for use in Europe. We doubt that any of the Y-class or D-class SSBNs would be diverted from their deterrent mission for use in Europe. (See Table 3 for a listing of systems chiefly intended for European use.)

27. We believe that only a relatively small portion of the 1,600 Soviet ICBMs would be used to strike targets in NATO Europe. The 140 strike-configured long-range bombers are mainly intended for intercontinental strikes but are capable of striking European targets.

28. *Soviets Views on the Importance of Central Europe.* However hostilities began, the Soviets would expect Central Europe to be the decisive theater of a large-scale conflict. Europe's major population and economic centers are there, as are the bulk of NATO's and the Pact's theater forces. Whether the Soviets would launch offensives on NATO's flanks concurrently with any campaign in Central Europe is uncertain and would depend on the circumstances at the time. We believe that the Warsaw Pact has the means to conduct limited,

TABLE 3

Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Chiefly Intended
For Theater Operations Against NATO

1 July 1975

Land-based Missiles (launchers)	
SS-4 (MRBM)	496
SS-5 (IRBM)	87
Total	583 ¹
Long Range Aviation Bombers ²	
TU-16 Badger	350
TU-22 Blinder	165
TU-Backfire	15 ³
Total	530
Submarine Launched Missiles (Submarines/Launchers)	
C-I SSB	2/6
C-II SSB	5/15
H-II SSBN	4/12
Total	11/33

¹ Most Soviet MRBMs and IRBM launchers have a refire capability. The Soviets may have as many as four missiles available for each operational launch crew operating out of soft sites. Refire missiles may be available at IRBM silo launchers. Refire missiles are probably not available at MRBM hard sites.

² The Soviets also have 105 TU-95 Bear and 35 M-Type Bison intercontinental bombers which could be used against NATO targets.

³ While initial deployments suggest that the Backfire is targeted on peripheral targets, its estimated performance capabilities make it a potential intercontinental threat. See the upcoming NIE 11-3/8 for further details.

but not general, offensive operations in the Northwestern and Southwestern Theaters while simultaneously carrying out an offensive against the NATO center. The Soviets would view the outcome of such flank operations, especially one against the Turkish Straits, as significantly influencing the success of their naval operations. These operations might also draw NATO ground and air forces away from Central Europe. We judge that early Pact offensive operations toward the Turkish Straits and northern Norway are more likely than in the other flank areas such as Italy and the rest of Scandinavia.

29. Early operations against northern Italy and Scandinavia—aside from northern Norway—would appear to offer little advantage to the Soviets commensurate with the cost in diversion of Pact forces from more urgent objectives. The Soviets are un-

likely to anticipate any serious threat from Italy to a Pact operation in Central Europe. Neither are they likely to feel seriously threatened from eastern Turkey.

30. The Soviets must view the recurring crises in the eastern Mediterranean area as weakening NATO, but at the same time these events, and the prospects for a Yugoslav succession crisis after Tito, probably loom in their eyes as potential sources of dangerous East-West tensions. In this sense, they probably consider the risk of conflict to be higher in the Southwestern Theater than elsewhere, but they would still see Central Europe as the decisive arena.

B. Soviet Strategies and Objectives in a War in Central Europe

31. *Soviet Views on Initiation of Hostilities.* Despite the emphasis on NATO aggressiveness, it is likely that the Soviets reckon that both sides are effectively deterred from deliberately starting a war between the two alliances. They probably believe that East-West hostilities—if they occurred at all—would arise from a snowballing of events growing out of internal disorders, a localized dispute in Europe such as a Berlin problem, or a crisis in another area such as the Middle East. The Soviets would envision a period of heightened tension before a war, and they might expect both sides to begin making military preparations. They would recognize that once either side began mobilization, tensions would rise sharply and the danger of accident or miscalculation would increase. Moreover, once military preparations were under way, the Soviets would believe that one side or the other might see advantage in preemption to take advantage of its preparations and to thwart those of the other side.

32. *Doctrine of the Offensive.* Soviet military doctrine centers on the offensive. Warsaw Pact strategy for war with NATO derives from that doctrine. No matter how hostilities began, the military plan for successful termination of a war involves quickly launching a large-scale Pact offensive to destroy the main NATO forces and seize, at the least, the territories of the FRG, the Benelux nations, and Denmark in a campaign lasting less than a month. Recent evidence does not reveal Soviet intentions

toward carrying such a Pact offensive into France. The Soviets might prefer not to attack France if French forces remained out of the conflict and other NATO forces did not enter French territory. Also, the independent French nuclear capability could be a deterrent because French involvement in the conflict would increase the risk of nuclear escalation.

33. *The Strategic Initiative.* As a corollary to the doctrine of the offensive, Soviet strategists emphasize the critical importance of seizing and maintaining the strategic initiative. The principle applies not only to the ground campaign but also to Pact efforts to achieve air superiority and, ultimately, to the use of nuclear weapons in the theater. It is an important factor leading to the Soviets' great concern with combat readiness and to a strong inclination toward preemption that recurs in their military writings. It also is consistent with Warsaw Pact efforts to maintain a rapid mobilization and emergency deployment capability, and with the Pact's expectations of accomplishing some buildup covertly before its general mobilization is declared. Finally, it is manifested in Pact ground forces organization and tactics, with their emphasis on the tank-dominated forces, surprise, and blitzkrieg.

34. In a conflict with NATO, the Soviets would hope that, by seizure of the initiative, they could interrupt NATO's mobilization and forestall US reinforcements. But they recognize that this would be complicated by a period of political crisis and tension that almost certainly would precede a war and provide impetus to NATO preparations. If their offensive is begun sufficiently early, however, they might even hope to overrun NATO territory so rapidly as to limit the prospects that NATO tactical nuclear weapons could be used to retrieve the situation.

35. *The Dilemma of the Nuclear Transition.* Soviet military writings confirm that Warsaw Pact planners are faced with a dilemma in the prospect that a war with NATO could begin non-nuclear and escalate rapidly to large-scale nuclear war. On the one hand they would wish to mass large concentrations of forces where they chose to attempt breakthroughs. On the other hand they fear that NATO might take advantage of their vulnerability while massing for an attack and launch a preemptive nuclear strike.

36. The dilemma has another aspect. It has driven the Soviets to plan a risky, massive, non-nuclear air attack on NATO's air and nuclear facilities—to which they would commit the bulk of the Warsaw Pact tactical air force and much of the Soviet strategic bomber force—in large part in the hope of eliminating most of NATO's theater nuclear potential at the very outset of hostilities. (See paragraphs 94-96 for further discussion of Pact air operations.)

37. Pact planners hope to reduce their vulnerability while massing for attack, by doing so as much as possible during darkness and by conducting the operation with great speed, thereby denying NATO the opportunity to use nuclear weapons before Pact forces have closed with and, theoretically, penetrated NATO's defenses. Also, they place much stress on efforts to divine NATO's intent to use nuclear weapons on a large scale in time to make a Pact preemptive attack. To this end, they expect to keep their own nuclear delivery systems in a high state of readiness and to conduct a vigorous reconnaissance and intelligence collecting program against NATO's nuclear units and facilities as well as its communications networks on which imminent use of nuclear weapons might be presaged. Despite their efforts, the Soviets are not confident that they could solve the problems of transition from non-nuclear to nuclear war in Europe.

C. The Strategic Backdrop of a War in Europe

38. The Soviets perceive great danger of escalation to a strategic exchange in the event of a war with NATO. In a period of high tension they would take measures to improve the readiness of their strategic nuclear forces and enhance their war fighting capabilities. They would, for example, probably alert the Strategic Rocket Forces and heighten their efforts to acquire early warning of a US decision to launch an attack on the USSR. In addition they might wish to demonstrate their strategic readiness despite the inherent risks of causing NATO to ready itself or initiate hostilities. Overt measures might include massive civil defense activities, the deployment of fleet elements, the movement of aircraft, or relocation of key government and military elements.

39. Furthermore, during any military involvement in Europe, the Soviets would feel themselves vulnerable to Chinese exploitation. They would probably take steps to achieve a maximum deterrent posture with their forces opposite China.

IV. WARSAW PACT PLANNING FOR INITIAL OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

A. Forces

40. The Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO in Central Europe, and those primarily intended for use there, are on the whole larger, better equipped, and more rigorously trained than other Pact forces. Also, these forces are generally at a higher level of peacetime manning and are more combat-ready than the others. (See Table 4

TABLE 4
Warsaw Pact Theater Forces Opposite NATO in
Central Europe and in Western USSR
1 July 1975

	In Central Europe ¹	In the Western USSR ¹
Men:		
Ground Forces	950,000	274,000
Tactical Air Forces	200,000	52,000
	<u>1,150,000</u>	<u>326,000</u>
Tanks	16,000	7,500
Divisions:		
Tank	26	14
Motorized Rifle	30	14
Assault Landing	1	—
Airborne	1	3
	<u>58</u>	<u>31</u>
Tactical Aircraft: ²		
Counterair	855	330
Ground Attack	825	475
Reconnaissance/ECM	365	130
	<u>2,045</u>	<u>935</u>

¹ Includes only Pact forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Pact forces in Hungary probably would not be part of an offensive against the NATO Central Region, although so-capable, but would more likely be used either to defend the southern flank of the Pact forces against possible attack from Austrian or Yugoslav territories, or to conduct offensive operations through those countries.

² Includes forces in the Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts.

³ Does not include combat-capable trainers or some 730 aircraft assigned to the East German, Polish, and Czech National Air Defense Commands.

for details on ground and tactical air forces opposite NATO in Central Europe and the western USSR. Details on the Baltic Fleet are in NIE 11-15-74, *Soviet Naval Policy and Programs.*)

Ground Forces

41. The ground forces are the key element of Warsaw Pact theater forces, with the bulk of the manpower and the primary offensive combat roles. Roughly half of the Pact ground forces in Central Europe are Soviet (27 out of 58 divisions) and two thirds of the total which we believe are intended for early use there are Soviet (58² out of 89).

42. *Peacetime Status.* We have previously estimated that all Soviet units in Central Europe were at or near intended wartime personnel strength. This judgment was based on observations of high activity in Soviet garrisons and training areas, the emphasis on combat readiness in Soviet writings, and the apparent lack of locally available Soviet reservists that could be called up to fill shortages. During recent years, however, we have acquired evidence which does not comport with this judgment.

— Documentary evidence indicates that one Soviet motorized rifle company in East Germany is authorized only 88 men as against the 107 which we estimate to be the unit's wartime TO. Another document indicates that a Soviet motor transport company in East Germany had 15 percent of its slots vacant and marked to be filled from reserves.

[] provided figures from the TOE of his motorized rifle regiment in East Germany which indicate that the regiment was authorized 10 percent fewer men than we estimate for its wartime TO.

— Several sources have reported that discharged Soviet servicemen are retained in East Germany as civilian employees—but in ready reserve status—to fill critical technical positions in Soviet units.

[]

² Includes three Soviet airborne divisions.

Nevertheless, the observed high activity levels of Soviet units in Central Europe and the evidence associated with Soviet troop rotations suggest that generally high manning levels are maintained in those forces.

43. More information and further analysis are needed to determine how many and what kinds of units are affected by the above conditions and the extent to which mobilization might be used. The available evidence suggests, however, that some individual Soviet combat regiments are manned as much as 10 percent below their intended wartime strength. Some support units may be manned even lower. We do not believe, however, that the lower manning levels reflected in available evidence would significantly reduce the combat readiness of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. We continue to believe that these forces are manned and equipped at levels which would permit them to conduct effective combat operations on short notice.

44. None of the East European ground forces are fully manned in peacetime. We have good evidence from a variety of sources that the East European combat units are at varying reduced strength levels ranging from as high as around 90 percent of war strength for East German divisions to as low as 25 percent for a few Czechoslovak and Polish cadre divisions. East European support units are mainly at low strength levels.

45. The range of manning levels of Soviet ground forces in the western USSR resembles that of the East European ground forces: some are at relatively high levels and others are low-strength cadre units. Most of the East European units and the Soviet units in the western USSR do not have their wartime allocation of general purpose trucks but rather would receive civilian trucks requisitioned from the economy. The Soviets, in particular, have a system in which certain civilian truck enterprises are especially selected and maintained

under military supervision with specific mobilization designations to report within a matter of hours to combat units being mobilized.

46. *Availability for Combat and Mobilization Capability.* The Warsaw Pact ground forces in Central Europe are maintained in a status that would enable them to react defensively in emergencies with little prior preparation. We believe that the Soviet divisions are capable of vacating their garrisons in two hours and would be prepared soon thereafter to conduct either defensive or offensive operations. The majority of the East European divisions are sufficiently manned to conduct limited military operations and detailed alerting procedures are maintained and rehearsed frequently.

47. Before launching a coordinated, large-scale offensive, however, Pact ground forces would require major preparations including general mobilization in all the East European countries, concentration of combat forces in assembly areas for attack or in reserve areas, and establishment of field depots and other support bases. Other measures would include establishment of communications networks, activation of command posts and exchange of staff and liaison personnel, reconnaissance, preparation of field fortifications and weapons emplacements, and the preparation and issuance of orders. The Pact would probably attempt initially to conceal or disguise their preparations but, on the whole, the scale of activities would be unprecedented since World War II.

48. The entire process of preparation has, of course, never been rehearsed on a scale approaching that required for war. Most of the elements are practiced on a partial scale from time to time, especially those involving the tactical preparations of the troop units. We have little evidential basis for estimating how long the Pact would take to make all of the preparations necessary for a coordinated offensive. We can, however, estimate how long after the forces were alerted certain key actions would take.

— All 27 Soviet divisions in Central Europe and the six East German divisions probably could move from their garrisons to their concentration areas in about 24 hours.

- Seven Czechoslovak divisions in western Czechoslovakia could be filled out and moved to their attack locations in about two days.
- The nine Polish mechanized and tank divisions in the Pomeranian and Silesian Military Districts could be filled out and moved into northern East Germany in three to four days. The Polish airborne and sea landing divisions would be available within 24 hours but their movement would largely depend on the availability of Soviet transport.
- The remaining seven Czechoslovak and Polish low-strength divisions could be filled out in about three days and would then be available to be moved.
- The 31 Soviet divisions in the western USSR could also be filled out in from one to three days, depending on their peacetime manning levels, and made ready to begin movement westward.

Various calculations of Soviet capability to move all of these divisions and their associated headquarters and support units into their concentration areas in Central Europe have been made in the US and elsewhere. Depending upon the assumptions used as to road, rail, and air capacities, availability of trains, and organization and priority of units and supplies to be moved, these calculations yield figures ranging roughly between 10 to 20 days. No interference by Western actions is assumed in any of these calculations. (See paragraphs 82-93 for a discussion of Soviet planning with respect to the timing of these forces' movement and their likely role in combat.)

49. *Airborne Troops.* The Soviets have seven airborne divisions⁶—six of them located west of the Urals—which could be used in any theater. [large] airborne formations would be used in conjunction with other forces in operations across major water barriers, for example in an attempt to seize the Danish islands and the Turkish Straits. In smaller regimental- or battalion-sized units, they could be used to seize bridgeheads in close proximity to advancing ground forces in land campaigns, or to

⁶ Excludes one airborne training division.

conduct raids on small but critical enemy installations. Sufficient military air transport is available to lift the assault elements of about two airborne divisions simultaneously, but conflicting requirements for relocating tactical air forces and conducting high priority movement of personnel reinforcements and supplies could reduce the number of transports available for airborne operations in the early stages of a war.

Air Forces

50. There are about 2,045 tactical aircraft (1,155 Soviet and 890 East European) based in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Another 935 are located in the three western military districts of the USSR and could reinforce those already in Eastern Europe on short notice (see Table 4). The largest concentration of Pact tactical air power opposite NATO is the Soviet air army in East Germany which has some 745 combat aircraft on 18 bases. The Soviets also have smaller tactical air forces in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

51. The Poles and Czechs have sizable tactical air forces of their own and, with the Soviets, these units would have major responsibilities for offensive air operations in the northern and southern sectors of the Western Theater. East Germany has established two tactical air units—previously it had only national air defense units.

52. About 40 percent of Pact tactical aircraft—primarily MIG-21s and MIG-23s—opposite the the NATO Central Region are fighters in counterair units that have the mission of destroying NATO's air forces through aerial engagements or attacks on bases. Another 40 percent are ground attack aircraft—mainly SU-7/17 and MIG-17 fighter-bombers—with the mission of destroying NATO ground targets either in support of the ground forces or as part of the initial theater-wide strikes. The remainder of the force consists of reconnaissance and other specialized support aircraft that provide target location and electronic warfare support to the counterair and ground attack units. In addition, there are 40 ECM-equipped AN-12s assigned to Military Transport Aviation which would operate in support of the tactical air forces.

53. Aside from their tactical air forces the Soviets have some 530 intermediate-range bombers of Long Range Aviation based in the western USSR.

These bombers, possibly augmented by Soviet naval aircraft, would be used for strikes against targets in the NATO rear area that require large conventional or nuclear payloads.

54. Soviet Military Transport Aviation would provide the main airlift capability for Pact forces opposite NATO. Equipped with some 650 AN-12 medium assault and 60 AN-22 and IL-76 heavy cargo transports, one of its primary missions would be to lift airborne troops. Military Transport Aviation would also be extensively used to support tactical air deployments and for logistic and re-supply tasks, such as the transport of nuclear weapons. The Soviet civil air transport organization, Aeroflot, can substantially augment Military Transport Aviation. It could potentially double the Soviet capability to airlift passengers and has some 200 AN-12s that could be used to transport bulk cargoes.

55. Some 1,000 light, medium, and heavy helicopters are assigned to Soviet Frontal Aviation in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the three western military districts. About 425 helicopters are in the East German, Polish, and Czech air forces. Most Pact helicopter units would be responsible for airlifting combat troops and logistic and liaison tasks. As new models are introduced and new equipment is retrofitted to existing models, these forces are increasingly capable of conducting air assault, ground attack, and anti-helicopter operations.

56. *Peacetime Status and Buildup Capability.* Pact air forces are generally maintained at or near their wartime personnel and equipment levels and would require little preparation before combat. Redeployment of tactical air units, possibly including reinforcements from the USSR, would likely occur prior to an attack. Many units in Central Europe, particularly some equipped with older, short-range aircraft, are currently located where they cannot reach critical NATO targets without staging to forward bases. In general, most tactical air units with air-defense responsibilities are located where they can provide coverage from their peacetime bases.

57. If the Soviets considered air reinforcement to be necessary in a war with NATO, we estimate that several hundred tactical aircraft, along with a minimum required amount of ground personnel

and equipment, could be moved from the western USSR to bases in Central Europe in from one to three days. The actual time involved would depend upon the amount of air transport support allocated to the reinforcement effort. This does not take into consideration, however, the potential effects of incalculables such as adverse weather or military counteractions by NATO.

Theater Nuclear Forces

58. In addition to the USSR-based strategic systems that could be used for massive nuclear strikes against NATO Europe, the Soviets have a variety of tactical nuclear delivery systems in their ground and air forces. The quantity of delivery systems has been increasing in recent years, and this would enable the Soviets to conduct nuclear warfare in Europe at higher intensities before having to use their USSR-based systems. There is, however, no direct evidence that the Soviets are deliberately seeking to provide themselves with an alternative to using their USSR-based nuclear forces in large-scale theater nuclear war.

59. Numerically, the most important nuclear delivery systems in Eastern Europe are Soviet tactical aircraft. We have identified some 20 Soviet tactical air units in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia which—based on their training and exercise activities—are believed to have a mission of delivering nuclear bombs. There are about 850 combat aircraft assigned to these units. There is good evidence, however, that only about 300 of the pilots, the most experienced, in these units are qualified—according to Soviet standards—to drop nuclear bombs. We expect that the number of Soviet tactical aircraft in Eastern Europe with nuclear missions will continue to grow as they train additional air crews and re-equip units with nuclear-capable aircraft such as the MIG-23 Flogger and SU-17 Fitter. There are some 100 aircraft in Czech and Polish units that train in nuclear delivery techniques.

60. Ground forces nuclear delivery systems include the FROG, Scud, and Scaleboard missiles. The Pact is estimated to have 57 FROG battalions with some 200 launchers and 19 Scud brigades with 190 launchers in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The Scud has an effective range of about 160 nm and the FROG about 40 nm. None of the 500-nm Scaleboard launchers is believed to

be located in Central Europe but we estimate that three Scaleboard units with a total of up to 36 launchers are part of the forces in the western USSR earmarked for Central Europe.

61. We have recently acquired evidence that, [suggests that the Soviets either have now, or expect to have, nuclear artillery rounds.

62. We have identified 12 facilities in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia that we believe are for the storage of tactical nuclear weapons.⁷ Available evidence—though inconclusive—suggests that nuclear weapons are stored in these Soviet-controlled sites in peacetime. A lack of information on Soviet storage practices makes it impossible to determine precisely how many nuclear weapons might be stored in these sites, but it is estimated that they could hold from 1,200 to 2,300 warheads and bombs. We do not believe that the Soviets have placed nuclear weapons in the hands of their East European allies. We do not know the circumstances under which non-Soviet forces might receive nuclear weapons, but we judge that they would be provided weapons once a European conflict escalated to a nuclear stage. We estimate that, even in wartime, the Soviets would retain control over all warheads.

63. The Soviets have widely equipped their forces with a variety of good quality radiological and chemical defensive equipment—on a par with the better US equipment. The Soviets have devoted more resources than the US to radiological and chemical defense, reflecting the high level of concern the Soviets have for the survivability of their forces in war when nuclear and chemical weapons are being used.⁸

⁷ Another two facilities in Hungary and three in Bulgaria have been identified.

⁸ The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that this paragraph misstates the key aspects of Soviet abilities for operating in a radiological and/or chemical environment. Although the best Soviet equipment is on a level which does not exceed US technical capabilities, the Soviets have produced and deployed in quantity some types of equipment—for example, the TMS-65 decontamination apparatus and the BRDM-KhR chemical reconnaissance vehicle—which US and Allied forces do not possess.

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Warfare Capabilities

64. Soviet military doctrine categorizes toxic chemical agents along with nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and it implies that the Warsaw Pact would use chemical weapons once nuclear weapons were introduced in a NATO-Pact war. Furthermore, chemical weapons, like nuclear weapons, are controlled by the Soviets and their use almost certainly would require Moscow's approval. We do not believe the Pact intends to use chemical weapons except in concert with nuclear weapons. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets might use chemical weapons independently.

65. The Pact forces have a variety of systems capable of delivering chemical agents. These include artillery (including multiple rocket launchers), mortars, FROGs, Scuds, aerial bombs, and, possibly, spray tanks. We have little doubt that the Soviets possess substantial stocks of toxic chemical agents but cannot estimate the size of their stockpile. We have good evidence, however, that some toxic chemical munitions are available to Soviet air forces in Eastern Europe.

66. The Warsaw Pact forces emphasize CBR defense more than NATO. They have developed an extensive CBR organization with specialized units down to the division level for technical reconnaissance and decontamination and have furnished their forces with a variety of good quality CBR equipment. In recent years Soviet forces have been receiving newer models of equipment designed to improve their effectiveness in a CBR environment. New APCs and perhaps new tanks and some trucks as well as various types of support equipment are equipped with advanced filtration and protective systems. CBR training for the forces is extensive and frequent; training of chemical defense units includes use of toxic chemical agents. All these measures enable the Pact forces to operate in a CBR environment more effectively than NATO forces.

67. All the Warsaw Pact countries have signed the international agreement prohibiting the production, storage, and use of biological weapons. There is good evidence that, in the past, the Soviets conducted extensive research on biological agents and protective techniques and they probably have

facilities that could be used to make biological agents [

]

Naval Forces

68. Soviet, East German, and Polish naval forces in the Baltic Sea would support Pact operations in Central Europe. [] military writings indicate that amphibious operations involving the Polish assault landing division, an amphibious assault trained East German motorized rifle division, and the Soviet naval infantry regiment in the Baltic area are planned in conjunction with airborne troop landings to seize key Danish islands and link up with Pact ground forces attacking through Jutland. The purpose would be to secure the Danish Straits, deny the Baltic to Western naval units, and interdict NATO supply lines in the North Sea.

69. Pact surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft would have the mission of sweeping the Baltic Sea and its approaches of hostile naval forces early in the war. Large mine-laying operations to prevent later penetrations by NATO forces probably would also occur.

70. NIE 11-15-74, *Soviet Naval Policy and Programs*, presents a detailed treatment of the missions, forces, and capabilities of Pact naval forces in a war with NATO.

Strengths and Weaknesses

71. *Ground Forces*. Pact ground forces' doctrine and organization are centered around the medium tank. The rapidly advancing offensive that the Pact intends to conduct depends on the shock, firepower, and mobility of their tanks. Compared to Western forces, Pact units have more tanks overall (16,000 in Central Europe) and a much higher proportion of tanks to men.

72. In a ground offensive the Pact would seek to attain favorable force ratios in local areas over NATO forces and use its mechanized infantry, tanks, and supporting artillery to break through NATO's defenses. Pact tank columns would then commence high speed drives toward their major objectives—on the Rhine River and beyond. Once committed to deep penetrations, the tank forces would have to rely largely on their own firepower, air defenses,

and logistic support to avoid being cut off and destroyed.

73. Soviet ground forces, in recent years, have acquired more tanks and more and better divisional artillery. Also, Pact ground forces have acquired an extensive, integral air-defense capability that is without parallel in NATO. The variety of anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles currently in the ground forces can provide multi-weapon air-defense coverage at all altitudes likely to be used by NATO tactical aircraft. Most of these systems are mobile and capable of accompanying other rapidly maneuvering combat formations.

74. The Pact also benefits from the logistic and command advantages that accrue from having ground forces that are more homogeneous than NATO's in terms of organization and equipment. Almost all combat equipment in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces is of Soviet design and the units are generally organized after the Soviet model. This should facilitate the coordination of support and operation of East European forces with Soviet armies.

75. Significant shortcomings in the Pact's ground forces remain, however. Although large quantities of a variety of modern weapons have been introduced into the ground forces in recent years a few types of equipment are still in short supply. For example, there still are fewer APCs available than Pact doctrine and organization require. For APCs, as well as for other items of equipment, the Pact has used a mixture of different types of old and new equipment to fill out units—thereby complicating supply and maintenance operations. Soviet improvements in non-nuclear artillery and tank ammunition effectiveness have not kept pace with those of the US, although the Pact greatly outnumbered NATO in quantities of artillery pieces and tanks.

76. On balance, however, developments since the early 1960s have largely erased the former picture of Pact armies as a horde armed with masses of simple, rugged, easily maintained weapons. The Pact ground forces are now maturing as modern forces of a sophistication comparable to that of Western armies.

77. *Air Forces.* A strong feature of the Warsaw Pact's air forces is the large number of versatile

aircraft available and the extensive, hardened air base system. The Pact has sufficient airfields and logistic supplies located in Eastern Europe to support a variety of deployments, reinforcements, and air attack operations over extended periods. Pact air units are well versed in deployment and dispersal techniques. Moreover, Pact pilot training now provides the force with greater mission flexibility than in the 1960s.

78. Most Pact ground attack aircraft still have a short range, small payload, and poor all-weather capabilities when compared to NATO's aircraft. This has resulted in Pact reliance on the obsolescent and vulnerable Soviet intermediate-range bomber force for deep strikes when using conventional bombs. Pact tactical air forces also lag considerably behind NATO's in the availability of sophisticated air-to-ground munitions such as tactical air-to-surface missiles and laser-guided bombs.

79. Deficiencies also exist in the air defense capabilities of Pact tactical air units. Almost all Pact air intercept training is conducted under strict ground control within the range of the friendly air surveillance network. There is evidently little emphasis placed on free air combat outside the control system. This could limit the Pact's wartime ability to seek out and destroy airborne enemy aircraft over NATO territory.

80. The Soviets have developed chaff and active jammers to cover virtually all of NATO's radar frequencies—the A through J bands—and their forces exercise frequently in an electronic warfare environment. We do not know, however, how effective these systems would be against NATO air defense systems.

81. The development and deployment since the late 1960s of improved aircraft and airborne weapons reflect a Pact recognition of the shortcomings of its air forces, especially for non-nuclear war. As the proportion of the force equipped with new systems increases and its capabilities expand, we expect to see a continuing evolution of Pact air doctrine away from its traditional preoccupation with air defense, and toward a wider range of offensive and defensive missions. Current Pact programs to improve the air forces are discussed in more detail beginning at paragraph 144.

B. Pact Concepts for Launching an Offensive in Central Europe

82. We have heretofore estimated that, before launching offensive operations against NATO in Central Europe, the Soviets probably would conduct a large reinforcement of ground forces from the western USSR. This judgment was based on [] the early 1960s and on our then-current assessment of the forces. At that time the East European forces were relatively ineffective and could have made only a minor contribution to a Pact offensive. Also, at that time, the Soviets believed that nuclear weapons would be used massively at the outset of a conflict and, therefore, that it was imperative to bring forward the additional Soviet forces deemed necessary for an offensive before NATO could destroy or interdict them. Although this offered NATO more lucrative nuclear targets, the Soviets seemed willing to accept the increased vulnerability that reinforcing units massed in the forward area would entail.

83. [] intelligence information acquired since the late 1960s indicates that the Soviets now consider it likely that their operations—including major offensives—would begin prior to their carrying out a large-scale reinforcement. []

84. The information available to us [] since the late 1960s [] features:

- NATO is always portrayed as the aggressor but the Pact is never caught unprepared because the NATO attack follows a period of greatly increased tension.
- During the days or weeks of crisis that precede hostilities the Pact takes steps to improve its military posture but Pact general mobilization does not occur until hostilities are clearly imminent—no more than a few days before war begins.
- The initial ground reinforcements from outside Central Europe consist of from one to three Soviet armies which are committed

by the end of the first week of combat, but these do not begin moving westward from the USSR until war has begun.

— Follow-on reinforcements from the USSR are usually not brought into play for yet another week, and even then their role is ambiguous. They could be used for an invasion of France, serve as replacements for first-line units—particularly if the war had gone nuclear—or be used to eliminate pockets of NATO forces bypassed earlier in the offensive.

85. In our view, these recurring themes indicate that Pact planners no longer see war with NATO as necessarily preceded by large-scale reinforcement of their ground forces prior to hostilities in Europe. This change does not necessarily represent a Soviet preference for initiating hostilities prior to large-scale reinforcement but rather, from their point of view, reflects a prudent planning assumption. They may simply calculate that there will not be sufficient time for a massive ground movement before any likely crisis escalates to open warfare. They may also reckon that, for a variety of reasons, large-scale ground reinforcement prior to a conflict could be counterproductive. It could, for example, invite preemptive action by NATO, including the early use of nuclear weapons. It might also cause NATO to begin a buildup of its own that would work against the Pact's initial numerical superiority of forces in the area.

86. In any event, the Soviet military evidently believe that Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's. They also believe that Pact forces now in Central Europe are not only capable of containing a NATO attack in the early days of a conflict, but are also capable of conducting a non-nuclear offensive into West Germany before the first Soviet ground reinforcements reach the combat zone.* The Pact, of course, has a variety of options available with regard to the use of its sizable ground reinforcements in the USSR. The evidence clearly indicates to us, however, that Soviet planning perspectives currently hold the above scenario to be the most realistic.

87. There are several possible reasons why Soviet planners evidently no longer consider a ground

* See footnote 2.

forces' buildup before an offensive against NATO to be a realistic planning assumption. One is that the organization, equipment, and training of the East Europeans has increased to the point where they can play a major role in initial operations against NATO. [

] 88. Another factor has been the addition to Pact forward strength of the Soviet Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia. [

] 89. The Soviets may also believe that the reinforcement process is not as severely threatened by NATO nuclear attack as it was in earlier years, but that reinforcements massed in the forward area would still be critically vulnerable to NATO air attack. Pact doctrine now holds that NATO use of nuclear weapons is less probable at the outset of a war than a decade ago.

90. A final consideration that probably has affected the Soviets' thinking regarding ground reinforcement derives from the importance their doctrine places on seizing the initiative. Soviet planners see a greater chance of success if the Pact could launch its offensive before NATO could fully build up its forces and prepare its defenses. They may, therefore, wish to avoid any provocative actions, such as a major ground reinforcement, that could precipitate a NATO buildup.

91. This appreciation of Pact offensive concepts has important warning implications for NATO. In particular, the movement of a 25- to 30-division force from the USSR into Central Europe, which perhaps was the clearest indicator, may not take place before an attack.

C. Wartime Organization

92. For initial wartime operations against NATO in Central Europe the Pact plans—if given time—to organize its forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia into three fronts. Although the composition and internal organization of the forces in each front could vary, their general zones of responsibility would be as follows:

— *Central Front.* The main Pact effort would clearly fall to this front. It would be primarily composed of forces operating from southern East Germany and would have the task of destroying NATO forces in West Germany roughly between Hanover in the north and Mannheim in the south. This front could engage forces from as many as six of NATO's eight corps areas. It would be the largest Pact force in the Western Theater with as many as 25 divisions, including most of the Soviet forces in East Germany and Poland and perhaps three of the East German Army's six divisions.

— *Northern Front.* Pact forces in the north would be responsible for engaging NATO forces in Denmark as well as those in the two northernmost NATO corps areas of West Germany. [

] This front could include some 15 to 20 divisions.

— *Southwestern Front.* The majority of the forces comprising this front would be Czechoslovak, with the addition of the five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia. This front, with some 15 divisions, would have the responsibility of advancing as far as the Rhine in an area roughly between Mannheim and the Swiss border.

93. The organization of Pact forces is flexible and operations subsequent to the initial days of a

conflict may take several forms. [

] fourth front—using one to three of the initial reinforcing armies from the USSR—which probably would be formed after a week or so as the geographic breadth of the campaign area expanded.

94. *Initial Air Operations.* Pact doctrine emphasizes that the success of a ground campaign in Europe is highly dependent on the proper utilization of air power. The Soviets probably consider that, despite the Pact's superiority on the ground, NATO's tactical air forces could enable NATO forces to blunt or perhaps even halt a Pact ground offensive. Because of this the Pact evidently has determined that the most effective application of its air forces in the early conventional phase of a war would be in the form of massive, theater-wide strikes aimed at destroying NATO's tactical air forces and other nuclear systems and facilities. These attacks are to commence immediately at the onset of hostilities and be conducted by Pact tactical aircraft and bombers of Soviet Long Range and possibly Naval Aviation.

95. These theater-wide strikes probably would be centrally controlled. Some allocation of air support to the fronts can be expected during the initial air operations phase, but control of the tactical air forces probably would revert to the front commanders only when the objectives of these attacks had been met.

96. We lack direct information concerning the Pact's view of its own aircraft requirements for sustained conventional or nuclear air operations in Central Europe. Given present Soviet capabilities to reinforce their forward-based tactical air forces and the large numbers of aircraft already in place, however, we believe that the Pact would have sufficient forces to conduct conventional operations while initially withholding a sizable portion for nuclear contingencies.

V. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF WARSAW PACT STRATEGY

A. Capability of Pact Ground Forces to Break-Through NATO's Defenses

97. Pact strategy for a successful offensive in Central Europe is heavily dependent on rapid

breakthroughs of NATO's defenses, preferably before they are fully organized. The achievement of a breakthrough would depend on a number of factors such as surprise, rapid movement, and the massing of forces. The 58 Warsaw Pact divisions in Central Europe give the Pact the capability to initiate offensive action after a relatively brief period of mobilization and without major reinforcement. Even if their forward disposition and rapid mobilization allowed them to achieve tactical surprise and deprive NATO of a prolonged warning of impending war, they would still have to mass their attacking forces in order to achieve sufficient local superiority in numbers to overwhelm the NATO forces at the points at which they chose to attack. This would make them vulnerable to attack by nuclear weapons.

98. The Pact's strategy calls for sharply limiting the period of time in which forces are massed in order to reduce vulnerability to NATO nuclear attack. After the forces moved out of dispersed assembly areas, they would hope to move directly into initial contact with the enemy, deploying directly into combat from the march. This is an extremely complicated maneuver requiring well-trained, highly mobile forces, reliable reconnaissance, and effective command, control, and communications. It calls for an audacity and dash which is in sharp contrast to the deliberate and ponderous style which generally characterized Soviet offensive preparations in World War II. Soviet training does, however, emphasize many of the tactics and techniques that would need to be carried out with high effectiveness if such a maneuver were to succeed.

99. [

] 100. Soviet forces are provided with reconnaissance support at all tactical and strategic levels. Fronts and armies have signals intelligence and long-range reconnaissance units, while divisions have organic reconnaissance battalions. In addition, there

is airborne visual, photo, and electronic reconnaissance, as well as numerous agents in West Germany. This support should provide the Warsaw Pact forces with extensive information concerning NATO deployments and battlefield conditions, but the Soviets have not solved the problem of locating NATO's mobile nuclear delivery systems once they have been deployed.

B. Warsaw Pact Air Operations

101. Faced with the threat from NATO's air and nuclear capabilities, the Soviets have evidently decided that the initial Pact air campaign in the non-nuclear phase of a Central European war should focus on reducing NATO's tactical air and nuclear strength. Massive counterair operations using Pact tactical air forces and USSR-based bombers probably would be mounted early in a war to destroy NATO's air forces through aerial engagements and attacks on airfields. At the same time, Pact air attacks would be directed against command and control centers, nuclear depots, and mobile nuclear delivery systems. During these initial air operations, Pact ground commanders probably could count on little direct air support.

102. Soviet planners recognize that these initial air operations are likely to result in high aircraft losses, and they may attempt to minimize such losses by creating breaches in NATO's air defenses to provide access routes for strikes in NATO's rear area by Pact aircraft. Despite the risks, the Soviets probably would consider high aircraft losses acceptable—viewed in the perspective of a short, intensive war—if: (a) NATO's air forces were sufficiently preoccupied with repelling these attacks to permit Pact ground forces to achieve their offensive goals relatively unimpeded by air attack, and (b) a sizable portion of NATO's tactical nuclear delivery assets were destroyed. The success of air operations depends heavily on surprise to insure that NATO's mobile nuclear systems are not dispersed, and that NATO's air defenses are not fully prepared prior to the initiation of hostilities.

103. The current re-equipment program for Soviet tactical air forces is still far from complete and a high proportion of the Pact fighter-bomber force is composed of older model aircraft. These aircraft have relatively small fuel and weapons loads. They also have little or no all-weather and

night capabilities, although the use of marker beacons could provide some fighter-bombers with the required guidance to target areas. Even so, most of the fighter-bombers in the present Pact inventory could not reach NATO airfields except by flying at the relatively vulnerable medium to high altitudes. The Soviet bomber force, except for the new Backfire, would also be forced to use the more vulnerable altitudes due to aircraft performance limitations.

104. The Pact's limited ability to provide timely target data to attack forces could hinder the success of Pact air operations, particularly in destroying NATO's mobile missile forces. This problem is compounded by the relatively limited navigation and weapons avionics on a large percentage of Pact tactical aircraft, and by Pact training practices which stress the use of GCI and rigid execution of assignments. Once engaged in a heavy ECM environment and facing active defenses, Pact pilots are likely to experience difficulty in finding their targets. Also, although the Soviets are developing precision-guided munitions for aircraft, they probably have not yet made these weapons available to Pact air forces. Use of the older, less accurate munitions currently available would require more sorties per target and consequent high exposure to NATO air defenses.

105. Considering the multinational, multicommand nature of initial Pact air operations, the necessity for close and coordinated timing, and the large numbers of aircraft involved, the Pact would be faced with a complicated command and control situation. We have little basis on which to judge whether current Pact command and control arrangements would be adequate to this task—Pact exercises generally rehearse only portions of the overall air campaign.

C. Control of Multinational Forces in a Warsaw Pact Offensive

106. The Warsaw Pact's ability to coordinate the actions of large, multinational forces would be critical to the success of an offensive. Pact strategy with its emphasis on speed, both in concentration of force before an attack and in the rapid prosecution of a campaign to its objectives once begun, is a key factor contributing to the difficulty of the

control problem. In Central Europe this strategy calls for the concurrent movement to operational locations, within about three days, of 58 divisions with the support necessary to sustain a large-scale offensive. Not only must this movement occur promptly to build up a strong initial combat echelon but it must also clear the lines of communication through Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia in time to begin the early westward movement from the USSR of up to about 30 more divisions and support plus the first surge of large-scale resupply shipments.

107. The problem in a Southwestern Theater would be similar. Fewer forces would be involved but the projected military operation is more complex, involving combined land, sea, air, amphibious, and airborne operations against the main objectives. Also, all of the participating Soviet ground forces must be brought forward from the USSR and, possibly, Hungary.

108. The key questions are:

- What means exist to plan, control, and coordinate these highly complex operations?
- How effective would these means be?

109. In World War II, Soviet operations against the German coalition were planned and coordinated by the Soviet General Staff in Moscow and directed by the Supreme High Command headed by Stalin. This method served well enough because of the deliberate pace of operations and because no important non-Soviet units were involved. Even so, there were shortcomings and the span of control of the Moscow authorities was stretched thin at times.

110. In the mid-1960s, when non-Soviet forces began to assume major, critical roles in planned Warsaw Pact operations, the problem of control became acute. Unlike NATO's, the Pact's command structure was not integrated and, except for a pro forma Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow, no combined planning staffs existed. That the Soviets were highly concerned about the problem became obvious, but the full extent of their efforts to solve it have remained rather obscure.

111. Several developments are known, however:

- The Warsaw Pact headquarters has grown and more senior East European officers have

joined it. (Its wartime function is still unknown, however.)

- Major steps have been taken to improve both Soviet and East European high-level communications facilities and to make them less vulnerable.
- Through training and improved communications systems the Warsaw Pact forces have become more proficient in combined operations; the East German forces, in particular, are integrated into the operational scheme of the CSFG.
- The Warsaw Pact members are developing a uniform command post system to Soviet specifications.

112. [

113. Whether it is the reluctance of the East Europeans to accept more integration that has inhibited the development of a more rational system, or the misgivings of the Soviet General Staff that would have to relinquish much of its control over operations, is not clear. Probably it is both. In any case, the available evidence suggests strongly that in any NATO-Pact war in the next few years Moscow would control the operations of each Soviet and East European front separately through a variety of means—some directly and some through the national command authorities of its allies.

114. Such an arrangement might work well enough if operations went generally according to the contingency plans—an unlikely event in war. But it would seem to be particularly unsuited for managing unexpected large diversions from planned military operations such as enemy counterattacks or the need to make unanticipated major force regroupments. It would be particularly vulnerable to disruption in nuclear war.

115. We expect the Warsaw Pact to continue its efforts to solve the critical and complex problems of coordinating operations of large multinational forces in wartime. These efforts are likely to include:

- Increased integration and standardization of Soviet and East European command arrangements and communications systems;
- Greater automation of troop control systems; and
- Possibly, development of an intermediate theater-level control of combined operations.

D. Warsaw Pact Logistical Capability

116. Since the late 1960s we have acquired extensive information on Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine and planning concepts from Pact military writings and several former Pact logisticians. Soviet logistical doctrine—which is the model for Warsaw Pact doctrine—is evidently derived from Soviet World War II experience modified to take account of the implications of postwar changes in military strategy. We have no information on whether Pact logistical doctrine has been further modified to reflect the high supply expenditure rates experienced by the US in Vietnam and by both sides in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Ground Forces

117. According to Soviet logistical doctrine, each front should maintain enough supplies in its depots, and in the mobile stocks in its armies and divisions, for 30 days of combat. Altogether, in a theater of military operations—which might contain several fronts—the Soviets prescribe stockage of from two to three months of supplies. In addition to the theater stocks, the doctrine calls for national reserves of materiel, supplies, and raw materials. There is no information on the magnitude of national reserves.

118. We have calculated the theoretical capacities of the identified Pact ground force ammunition and POL depots. Ammunition and POL make up the physical bulk of logistical stocks. Based on these calculations and assuming that prescribed mobile stocks are maintained in combat units—our infor-

mation suggests that they are—the available stocks in Central Europe would be as follows:

Warsaw Pact Ground Force Logistic Depot Capacities
(Metric Tons)

	Ammunition	POL
Czechoslovakia	416,000	328,000
East Germany	430,000	531,000
Poland	442,000	634,000
	<u>1,288,000</u>	<u>1,493,000</u>

119. We have little information on the actual contents of Pact depots, but, assuming they are optimally stocked and using Soviet consumption planning factors for ammunition and US factors for POL, we have calculated that these stocks could represent some 20 to 40 days' worth of supplies for the 58 divisions located there in intensive non-nuclear offensive combat. These figures are, at best, a rough approximation of Pact supply status but they do suggest that Pact stocks in Central Europe accord with the doctrinal requirement to stock for 30 days. Such a stockpile would also accord with Soviet strategic planning which envisages a Central Europe campaign being completed in less than a month.

120. Presumably the ground force logistic stocks in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts would also be used in a Western Theater of Operations. The capacities of identified ammunition depots in these districts are some 376,000 metric tons which would represent perhaps a 10-day supply for the 86 divisions that we estimate are earmarked for early use in a Western Theater of Operations. Identified POL depots in these districts could hold some 1,825,000 metric tons—perhaps a 50-day supply. These figures suggest that although POL stocks currently available in the potential Western Theater of Operations could meet the doctrinal requirement of two to three months' supply, the ammunition stocks would evidently fall somewhat short.

121. Calculations further show that the identified ground force ammunition depots in the central part of the USSR—Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military Districts—could hold some 2.2 million metric tons and POL depots some 3.8 million metric tons. Presumably, these stocks are intended as reserves for a potential war with China as well as NATO.

Air Forces

122. We have little information on Pact logistic doctrine for air forces. The following estimates of Pact capabilities to sustain air operations are derived from calculations of air force depot capacities. These calculations are susceptible to considerable error, however, and we have recently acquired evidence indicating that the current ammunition stock levels at several Soviet airfields in Central Europe are far lower than their estimated storage capacities.

Warsaw Pact Air Force Storage Capacities
(Metric Tons)

	Ammunition	POL
Czechoslovakia	88,000	285,000
East Germany	60,000	288,000
Poland	109,000	421,000
	<u>257,000</u>	<u>994,000</u>

123. Assuming that these commodities would be used by all Pact air forces (including National Air Defense) currently based in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Soviet tactical air units deployed forward from the nearby western military districts, the ammunition stocks implied by the above figures probably could support conventional air operations for about 50 to 65 days. There probably would be enough aviation POL available for some 30 to 40 days.¹⁰

124. We also have identified depots in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts which could hold an additional 80,000 metric tons of air ordnance and 1.5 million metric tons of aviation POL. These supplies could also be made available to Pact air units operating against the NATO Central Region.

125. The above figures imply that the Warsaw Pact ground and air forces could have on hand, in Central Europe and in the USSR west of the Urals, sufficient ammunition and POL to last through several months of war, assuming none was destroyed by enemy action. If stocks of this size are in fact available, they would probably be adequate to sustain Warsaw Pact forces in combat until production of new stocks in the USSR could take up the load.

¹⁰ Calculations of ammunition and POL consumption assume an initial three-day surge period during which fighter aircraft achieve between 3 and 4 sorties per day. After this period sorties are reduced to about 1.5 to 2 sorties per day.

126. Analysis of the Warsaw Pact's lines of communication (LOCs) capacities in the light of our estimates of Pact supply requirements and stockpiles in Central Europe suggests that the Pact would be likely to begin a massive effort to replenish supplies from the USSR at the outset of hostilities. At the same time, the Soviets would probably begin a large-scale movement of troop reinforcements from the USSR. During the first two weeks after hostilities began, when these troop and supply movements were straining the capacity of the LOCs, interdiction of the Pact's LOCs could have particularly critical effects. After this initial surge, the movement would probably subside to a level which probably could be sustained despite some damage to the LOCs.

E. The Reliability of East European Forces

127. A major question mark for Soviet military and political leaders would be the reliability of East European forces. Soviet-East European relations have had a checkered history. The USSR used force to suppress popular demonstrations in Berlin in 1953, to invade Hungary in 1956, and to occupy Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Pact has suffered the open break with Albania and well-publicized friction with Romania. While Soviet leaders may have private doubts of whether the Pact cohesiveness would withstand the strains of war, they have committed themselves to relying on East European forces to carry out wartime functions potentially critical to the Pact's prospects for success in a war with NATO. In Central Europe, East Europeans make important contributions:

- They provide over half the combat divisions.
- They permit the achievement of advantageous force ratios without reinforcement from the USSR.
- Polish forces in the north and Czech forces in the south allow for concentration of Soviet forces in the critical center.
- Primary Pact logistic routes run through Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia and the East Europeans commit heavy resources to their protection.
- East European air defenses provide protection for logistic and rear area operations.

128. In Southern Europe, national forces in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria have less critical but nonetheless important combat roles on the flank of the Pact:

- Soviet and Hungarian forces protect against NATO operations through Austria or Yugoslavia.
- Bulgarian forces would be essential to Pact operations against the Turkish Straits.
- Romania and Bulgaria provide and protect Pact logistics routes for southern operations.

129. Many aspects of the Pact, dominated as it is by Soviet officers, seek to assure the effectiveness of the East European allies.

- Major Soviet forces are stationed in four key countries.
- Allegiance is sought by the integration of East European officers into the Pact command structure where they participate on a controlled basis.
- Promising East European officers are schooled in the Soviet Union and indoctrinated with Soviet views and attitudes.
- Most officers and about half the non-commissioned officers are members of Communist parties or organizations; unreliable officers are dismissed.
- The missions assigned to the East European forces are intended to insure their early involvement in a war.
- East German forces are interleaved with the Soviets, to insure their reliability even against other Germans.
- The missions assigned the Polish and Czech forces are initially against their traditional enemies, the Germans.

130. We judge that the armed forces of Eastern Europe are loyal to their national regimes. The basic question of reliability is whether or not an East European regime will commit itself to Pact wartime operations. This decision will be heavily influenced by the perceptions of the national leaders and the political circumstances leading to war.

We judge that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact would initiate an unprovoked invasion of the other side.

131. Should a general war erupt, however, we judge that the East Europeans would fight.

- The period of tension prior to hostilities would allow the Soviets to manipulate popular attitudes and political leaders.
- The Pact's mobilization structure would be set in motion and its momentum would carry military preparations forward.
- East European refusal to participate at this stage could be dealt with by force.
- Eastern Europeans would feel they had no choice but to participate.

132. We have no basis for making the more important judgment with regard to the East Europeans' commitment to their allies in the course of hostilities. That is to say, we cannot judge the enthusiasm with which East Europeans will support the conflict. Neither can we foresee how they would view their own national interests in the course of a conflict nor the inducements that would be required to make them quit the war.

VI. CURRENT TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES

133. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have carried out a major expansion and renovation of their theater forces. We estimate that the manpower in Soviet theater ground and tactical air forces overall has been increased by about one third, from some 1.5 million men in the early 1960s to more than 2 million at present. Procurement expenditures for new equipment have gone up about 40 percent in the same period as a wide range of newly developed weapon systems of increased sophistication has been assigned to theater forces, and the high proportion of obsolescent equipment that formerly prevailed has been considerably reduced. Overall, the changes of the past decade have not only significantly expanded the size of Soviet forces but have also made them more balanced and operationally flexible, with improved capabilities for both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare. Changes in the East European forces have been less dramatic.

134. In this section we summarize the changes that have taken place in theater forces and also examine the prospects for further change in the late 1970s.

A. Background

135. The strategic choices dictated by Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which emphasized nuclear missiles and submarines and deprecated conventional forces, forced large cuts in Soviet ground and tactical air forces. Moreover, those theater forces which survived the cuts were relegated to a period of doctrinal stagnation and increasing obsolescence. Then, beginning in the mid-1960s, events created an entirely new situation for Soviet theater forces planners:

- Khrushchev's removal from office in 1964 permitted the views of Soviet conventional force advocates to gain official acceptance.
- The adoption by NATO of a more flexible nuclear response strategy persuaded the Soviets that at least the initial stages of a Pact offensive against NATO could be prosecuted without nuclear weapons.
- The Sino-Soviet split became more severe and Khrushchev's successors authorized a major buildup of Soviet theater forces opposite China with a consequent step-up in conventional arms production in the USSR.
- In 1968 the Soviets' invasion of Czechoslovakia resulted in the establishment there of a Soviet garrison where no Soviet forces had been stationed since the early post-World-War II period.

B. Growth and Improvement of Soviet Theater Forces Since the Mid-1960s

136. The growth and improvement of Soviet theater forces opposite NATO has been chiefly the result of the creation of new forces, the expansion of existing units, and the modernization of equipment. Of these, the establishment, after the 1968 invasion, of the Soviet Central Group of Forces (CGF) in Czechoslovakia had the greatest single impact. Currently numbering about 78,500 men—much of this a net increase—the CGF added five divisions and a small air force to the first-line

Soviet forces in Central Europe. [

] additional divisions may be forming to replace two of the five CGF divisions in their former western USSR garrisons. The Soviet buildup opposite China, which added some 300,000 men to Soviet ground and tactical air force personnel strength, is described in NIE 11-13-73, *The Sino-Soviet Relationship: The Military Aspects*.

Expansion of Existing Force Elements


137. Much of the increase in Soviet theater forces opposite NATO has come from enlargement of the two primary ground combat units, the motorized rifle division and the tank division. We estimate that since the late 1960s the wartime TO of a Soviet motorized rifle division has increased from about 10,000 to more than 12,000 men, while the tank division has increased from about 8,000 to about 9,500. During the same period the authorized number of vehicles and major weapons systems in the motorized rifle division increased from about 2,400 to about 2,900, and in the tank division from 2,200 to 2,600.

138. The principal changes that produced the larger divisions were made to increase their firepower and mobility. Field artillery weapons in both tank and motorized rifle divisions increased by around 50 percent. In a fully equipped motorized rifle division APCs went up from slightly over 200 to more than 300 and, concurrently, a number of divisions that had formerly possessed few or no APCs received their full allocations. Also, in many motorized rifle divisions medium tank strength was raised from 188 to about 255. Additions were also made to divisional air defense and antitank organizations and, at the same time, more motor transport capability was added—not only to supply ammunition for the added weapons, but apparently also to give the division better overall logistic capacity.


139. Not all Soviet divisions have attained these equipment standards, but most, if not all, of those in Central Europe probably have. Also, a number of the divisions in the western USSR still have a large proportion of older equipment and some significant shortages such as in APCs and trucks.

Figure 5

THE SOVIET TANK DIVISION, 1964 AND 1975



THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION, 1964 AND 1975



*Includes artillery and mortars 100 mm or larger, and multiple rocket launchers.

667550-976-GIA

~~SECRET~~

140. Although of lesser magnitude than the developments in divisions, organizational changes have also increased the strength of Soviet non-divisional ground force units. In East Germany, for example, eight regimental-sized combat training units and some smaller support-type training units have been established to train noncommissioned officers and specialists such as tank drivers for the GSFG. In wartime, these units, along with four separate tank regiments and one battalion that also have been formed by the Soviets in East Germany, could be available for use as reserves. Together they contain some 1,300 tanks. The Soviets have also enlarged their nondivisional motor transport units in Central Europe, in part to meet the in-

creased supply requirements of non-nuclear war and also because of the larger ammunition requirements brought about by more tanks and artillery. There have also been increases in the numbers of Scud launchers, and each field army has acquired a brigade of mobile SA-4 missiles.

Equipment Modernization

142. By the mid-1960s Soviet equipment procurement had languished to the point where obsolescence was overtaking the theater forces. Not only was there a large proportion of old equipment in the forces but also the failure to introduce many new designs—especially of aircraft—was

further retarding the Soviets' efforts to maintain effective forces facing NATO. More than half the combat aircraft were old-model MIG-15, 17, and 19 fighters and IL-28 light bombers. The newer models were still significantly inferior in range and payload to Western aircraft of comparable age. The ground forces still had large numbers of T-54 tanks—and even some T-34 tanks—and obsolete BTR-152 APCs. Many divisions had few or even no APCs. There were widespread shortages of motor transport and many ground forces units in the USSR were completely dependent on mobilization of civilian trucks even to enable them to move from their garrisons in an emergency. Similar deficiencies applied to communications equipment. Field artillery, even after its strength was increased in the late 1960s, had no armored, self-propelled guns of the type most suitable to the Soviets' tank-oriented blitzkrieg tactics.

142. The large upswing in production of theater forces equipment that began in the mid-1960s and still continues cannot be precisely charted with the information available. It seems reasonably certain, however, that much of its initial impetus came from the buildup opposite China which required the outfitting of some 40 divisions and provision of more than 1,000 additional combat aircraft. Modernization and filling out of the forces facing NATO was evidently constrained by the priority going to the Far East forces until about 1970 when that buildup tapered off. Most of what was produced in this period was of older, proven designs.

143. Since the late 1960s the pace of modernization of forces facing NATO has surged strongly and also a larger number of newly designed types and models of equipment has gone into full-scale production.

New Aircraft

144. Of all Pact theater force elements, technology is making its greatest impact on the air and air defense forces. Although the Pact air forces opposite NATO have been relatively stable in numbers over the past decade, they have begun acquiring a new generation of aircraft and weapons which is enabling the Pact to change the traditional air-defense orientation of the tactical air forces toward a broader spectrum of offensive as well as defensive missions.


145. Soviet planners, increasingly concerned with the possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe, have undertaken sizable equipment modernization programs to eliminate the main weaknesses of their tactical air forces—short range, low payload, and lack of modern ground attack ordnance. By the Soviets' own calculations, their tactical aircraft have lacked the range to conduct effective strikes on most of NATO's airfields and other long-range targets. This apparently did not concern them seriously in the early 1960s because in a nuclear war these targets could be reached with USSR-based strategic systems.

146. In the mid-1960s developmental work on new, more capable fighter-bombers began. Initially, new versions of the MIG-21 Fishbed fighter were produced with improved payload and range, making them more effective for offensive roles. Then, beginning about the early 1970s the new SU-17 Fitter C, MIG-23 Flogger and SU-19 Fencer became operational. Compared to earlier Soviet tactical fighters, these new aircraft have substantially improved range, payload, avionics, and ECM capabilities. Although still available only in limited numbers, these aircraft already have improved the operational flexibility and efficiency of the tactical air force. Fencer, Flogger, and Fitter C are capable of striking targets in NATO Europe from bases in the western USSR, especially if they recover to bases in Central Europe. We believe that during sustained conventional operations, Flogger and Fitter C aircraft currently in the western USSR would deploy to forward bases in order to make maximum use of their payload and range capabilities. The introduction of Backfire bombers into Long Range and Naval Aviation is improving the ability of these forces to survive NATO's air defenses, particularly at low altitudes. The MIG-25 Foxbat has substantially improved the reconnaissance capability of Soviet tactical air forces and may also have a high altitude nuclear weapon delivery capability.

147. To complement their growing inventory of modern multi-mission aircraft, the Soviets are developing a variety of new air weapons. These include improved air-to-air missiles, a family of tactical air-to-surface missiles (including an electro-optically guided system), and cluster and retarded bombs. When combined with the improved pene-


New Tactical Aircraft

Figure 6



MIG-21 Fishbed K


The Fishbed J, K, and L variants of the MIG-21 entering Pact counterair units in recent years have improved multi-mission capabilities over older models. They can carry a payload of 2,200 lbs. out to a radius of 400 nm.



SU-17/20 Fitter C

The Fitter C is a highly-modified swing-wing version of the SU-7 Fitter A fighter-bomber. It has much greater radius and payload capabilities than its predecessor—5,500 lbs. of ordnance can be carried to a radius of about 680 nm.


SU-19 Fencer A



The SU-19 is a large, swing-wing ground attack aircraft similar to the US F-111. It is replacing older, light bombers in the Soviet air force and probably will be used for deep strikes against NATO targets that are beyond the range of other Pact tactical aircraft. The SU-19 can carry four tactical air-to-surface missiles (4,000 lbs.) to a radius of 1,000 nm.

~~SECRET~~

~~507030-973-014~~



MIG-23 Flogger C

The MIG-23 is a swing-wing fighter that is currently appearing in both air defense and ground attack versions. It can carry some 5,500 lbs. of ordnance to a radius of almost 750 nm.

tration capabilities of the new aircraft, these weapons should greatly increase the potential effectiveness of each tactical air sortie, particularly against hardened ground targets. In addition, there has been increased emphasis on ground attack training.

Ground-Based Air Defense Systems

148. During the early 1970s, ground-based air defense systems such as the ZSU-23/4, the SA-7, and SA-4, which were first introduced in substantial numbers in the late 1960s, continued to be produced. At the same time, several new SAM systems appeared: the SA-6, the SA-9, and, most recently, the SA-8. Together these weapons form a mutually supportive and highly mobile air defense system. Increases in the effective range and mobility of these systems and in the total number of weapons deployed reduce the vulnerability of ground forces on much larger areas of the battlefield. One of the most important improvement trends has been toward greater mobility which will adapt these weapons to the fluidity of modern battlefield operations. Development of extensive air defense integral to the ground forces has also enabled the tactical air forces to direct more of their resources to offensive missions.

The T-72 Medium Tanks

149. Recently, after at least 13 years of developmental effort, the Soviets began full-scale production of a new-model medium tank, the T-72. Perhaps 1,000 of the T-72 production model are available. Production should increase markedly over the next year or two. Currently, at least half of the Soviet medium tanks in Central Europe are T-62s; the rest are T-54s or T-55s. No T-72s have yet been identified outside the USSR but at least a few are likely to be in Central Europe. We have, at present, no reliable technical description of the tank.

APCs and Combat Vehicles

150. The BMP combat vehicle was first seen in the late 1960s but did not appear in substantial numbers in Soviet motorized rifle units until the last three years. Although its mobility and firepower make it a versatile APC, it costs about three times as much as the BTR-60PB—the other late-

model Soviet APC being produced. This high cost along with operational considerations probably will prevent the BMP from totally replacing the earlier APCs. Some 40,000 BMPs would be required if all Soviet motorized rifle units were to be completely reequipped with them.

151. Currently, both the BTR-60PB and the BMP are being delivered as replacements for older-model BTR-60s and APCs of the still earlier BTR-50 and BTR-152 series. We estimate that a mixture of APCs probably will emerge in the Soviet ground forces, with only about one third to one half of their APC requirements being met by BMPs. The Soviets are also producing a new airborne assault vehicle, the BMD, which is currently being added to the airborne divisions. It will significantly improve the anti-tank capabilities of these forces.

Self-Propelled Artillery

152. In 1974 self-propelled field artillery units—122mm and 152mm—were first identified in the Soviet forces. A self-propelled artillery piece costs from 50 to 100 percent more than a towed gun and its prime mover, and is more difficult to maintain. This may have deterred the Soviets from adopting them earlier. But their superior cross-country mobility and reduced vulnerability, as compared with towed cannons, make them far more capable of supporting fast-moving armored attacks. These advantages have become more significant with the Soviets' renewed emphasis on non-nuclear combat capability.

153. The new self-propelled guns are being assigned initially—as replacements for towed guns—in batteries of six guns each to the motorized rifle regiments of Soviet divisions and in 18-gun battalions to division artillery regiments. Eventually, as more are produced, we expect that many Soviet division artillery regiments will be completely reequipped with self-propelled guns. Some 1,000 of each type of self-propelled gun had been produced so far—roughly 12 percent of the inventory of medium-caliber artillery in Soviet units.


Strategic Attack Forces

154. We believe that, for at least the next five years, the missiles and bombers of the Soviet strategic attack forces will provide the bulk of the

New Air Defense Weapons


Figure 7

ZSU-23/4



The ZSU-23/4 employs a target tracking radar in conjunction with its quad-mounted 23mm guns. It was introduced in the late 1960s for improved low-altitude protection from tactical aircraft and helicopters.


SA-4




The SA-4 is a mobile, medium-to-high altitude surface-to-air missile system which entered service in the late 1960s. It has been assigned at army and Front level to replace the SA-2.

SA-8

The SA-8 is a new mobile SAM system which is just entering service. It is expected to offer air defense coverage below SA-6 coverage and beyond the range of the SA-9. It may be introduced in some divisions as an alternative to the SA-6.




SA-6



The SA-6 is a mobile, low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile system introduced in the early 1970s. It is replacing 57mm anti-aircraft guns at the division level.

SA-9



The SA-9 consists of a BRDM-2 scout vehicle modified to carry small SAMs—similar to the SA-7. Introduced in the late 1960s, it operates in conjunction with the ZSU-23/4 to provide low-altitude protection for regiments.


TOP SECRET

567037-9-75-G1A

New Ground Forces Equipment

Figure B

122mm SP Gun




The 122mm and 152mm self-propelled artillery pieces were developed in the late 1960s, probably to help Pact artillery units keep pace with rapidly advancing armored units. They also provide greater protection for their crews in both conventional and nuclear environments.

The BTR-60PB is an eight-wheeled, amphibious armored personnel carrier which carries an infantry squad and mounts one 7.62mm and one 14.5mm machine gun in its turret.

BTR-60PB




M-1970 Tank



This medium tank is one of a number of developmental tanks referred to collectively in the West as M-1970s. The new Soviet T-72 probably will be similar in appearance.

The BMP combat vehicle has a three-man crew and is armed with a 73mm smoothbore, short-recoil gun with automatic loader, a Sagger ATGM launcher, and a machine gun. The eight-man infantry squad is provided with individual firing ports and CBR protection.

BMP



—SECRET—

—567038-9-75-GIA—

—SC 01648-75—

Warsaw Pact's theater nuclear strike capability, although the numbers of Pact tactical nuclear delivery systems located in Central Europe will increase substantially. The deployment of new ICBMs equipped with MIRVs will substantially augment the potential coverage of European targets. We believe, however, that only a relatively small portion of the 1,600 ICBMs would be used to strike targets in NATO Europe.

155. We expect that the SS-X-20 IRBM, now being tested with MIRVs, will be deployed with mobile launchers. Such a missile could be available for deployment in mid to late 1976 and would be more survivable than the existing SS-4 and SS-5 systems. We do not know whether it will replace any of these older systems. Its mobility may allow the Soviets to launch intermediate-range missiles from either the USSR or Eastern Europe.

156. The number of H-class submarines in the Soviet Navy is expected to decrease as new SSBNs are produced because the launchers on H-class units would be counted in the total number of SLBM launchers allowed to the Soviets under a SAL agreement based on the Vladivostok accords.

C. The East Europeans

157. In the early 1960s the East Europeans, at Soviet urging, began to improve their armed forces. Reorganization, expansion, and force modernization over the past decade have enabled the East Europeans to assume responsibilities in Pact military plans. Although improvements in East European ground and air forces have generally followed the Soviet lead, they have tended to lag by a few years and to proceed more gradually.

East Germany

158. Improvements in the East German Army have proceeded slowly over the past decade with the gradual introduction of new APCs and new-model towed artillery, some increases in division artillery strength, and the recent appearance of T-62 tanks. The number of East German tanks has increased from about 1,400 to 1,700 due to an expansion of the tank battalions in motorized rifle regiments and increases in the Ministry of National Defense reserve. A second Scud brigade and an SA-4 unit have recently been formed. The SA-9

has been introduced on a limited scale. The levels of equipment and manpower in East German Army units have grown moderately in recent years. We estimate that the intended wartime strength of motorized rifle divisions has increased from about 9,900 men in 1965 to 11,000 currently; tank divisions have increased from 8,200 to 8,800. Overall, East German ground forces manpower has increased from 90,000 to about 99,000.

159. The East German Air Force is the most modern of all the East European air forces. Almost all of its fighter aircraft are MIG-21s—half of which are late-model Fishbed Js—and the proportion of new models continues to rise. The size of the Air Force has increased by about 50 aircraft since 1972 due to the formation of a ground attack unit and a reconnaissance unit.

Czechoslovakia

160. Force improvements in Czechoslovakia have been minimal since the 1968 Soviet invasion. Ground and air manpower has actually decreased somewhat due to the Soviet occupation of several former Czech installations and political purges of the military. Although the estimated wartime manning of motorized rifle divisions has increased from 10,000 to 11,500 since 1965 and that of tank divisions from 8,000 to about 8,900, the number of divisions has decreased and overall ground strength has dropped from some 200,000 to about 155,000. The equipment levels of Czech ground units have also been increased since the pre-1968 period and new force elements, such as FROG, Scud, and air defense units, have been added. One significant area of improvement has been the development of new ground forces weapons. In addition to the domestic manufacture of Soviet-designed equipment such as trucks, APCs, and tanks, the Czechs have developed new equipment of noteworthy value, e.g., their new automatic reloading multiple rocket launcher.

161. The Czech Air Force is still primarily equipped with older-model Soviet aircraft, although some late-model MIG-21s have been acquired. The size of the force probably will remain stable over the next several years.

Poland

162. Improvements in Polish forces since the mid-1960s have been extensive in terms of both equip-

ment modernization and unit expansion. The authorized wartime manning of the Polish mechanized division has increased from about 8,300 in 1965 to about 11,000, and the tank divisions from about 7,000 to about 9,000. The number of tanks, APCs, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and FROGs in divisions has increased as well as the size and number of many combat service and support units. Electronic warfare regiments have also been formed and SA-6s, SA-7s, and SA-9s are now being introduced into the forces. Overall, the strength of the Polish Army has increased by some 45,000 men since 1965.

163. Poland has the largest of the East European air forces. It is mainly equipped with older-model Soviet aircraft although some late-model MIG-21s and SU-17 Fitter Cs, have been acquired in recent years. The size of the force is expected to remain stable over the next few years.

Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria

164. The ground and air forces in the southern-tier countries are the least modern of all the Pact forces. Re-equipment programs in these three countries have generally been less extensive than in any of the northern three and most of the other improvement measures seen in Soviet forces, such as the expanded tank battalion, have not appeared at all. New aircraft, air defense systems, and ground forces vehicles are gradually being acquired.

D. Recent Trends

165. The rate of growth of manpower and equipment in Soviet ground and tactical air forces appear to have slowed appreciably in the last two years or so, particularly in comparison with the expansion that occurred earlier in connection with the Sino-Soviet and Czech problems. There is some recent evidence, however, of ongoing organizational changes that could lead to further gradual expansion in the next few years. Further increases in divisional artillery have been observed in some units in the western USSR and a recent defector has said that similar increases are intended for units in Central Europe. Also, some small, previously unidentified infantry elements which have recently been observed with some Soviet tank regiments in Eastern Europe, may portend yet another addition to divisional manpower.

166. Production of new, sophisticated equipment is continuing at a high rate and this trend is likely to continue through the end of the decade. Procurement for a number of recently introduced weapons systems such as the new series of tactical aircraft and the new air defense missile systems is still far from complete. Other expensive weapons systems such as the self-propelled artillery and the T-72 medium tank have just entered full-scale production and output of these weapons almost certainly will increase over the next few years.

167. Research and development on theater force equipment is continuing and a number of new systems now being tested probably will appear over the next few years. Major—and costly—items now undergoing developmental testing include a new tactical aircraft and two new tactical surface-to-surface missiles.

168. Whether, and to what extent, acquisition of new equipment will cause further increases in the overall size of the theater forces is difficult to assess. The Soviets now have enough of most types of weapons to fill the existing active units. Only a few major items, such as APCs and helicopters, are still in short supply. This may lead to a relatively stable weapons inventory over the next few years. Recently, most new equipment appears to have been used to modernize the force by replacing rather than adding to the equipment in active units.

169. In the past, however, the replacement of old items with new equipment has sometimes resulted in overall growth because the Soviets formed new units or expanded existing units using the older but still useful equipment. For example, outmoded heavy tanks and World War II vintage assault guns were eliminated from divisions in Central Europe more than a decade ago but some of these are still retained in separate regiments and battalions in the GSFG. Similarly, some of the anti-aircraft guns recently replaced by SA-6 missiles in a number of GSFG divisions have been transferred to other divisions—not yet equipped with SA-6s—to enlarge their AAA units. This tendency to hoard older equipment in active units suggests a potential for further gradual increases which cannot be precisely estimated.

170. *Heavy Artillery.* In the past three years we have identified heavy artillery pieces at the Sverdlovsk Artillery Test Facility and at several missile-associated ground force installations, all in the USSR. The weapons were in battalion- or regimental-sized groupings of 203mm gun-howitzers and 240mm mortars. The 203mm gun-howitzer is an obsolete weapon developed in 1931. The 240mm mortar is also an older weapon, which first appeared on parade in 1953.

171. We do not know what these developments portend, but with the Soviets' renewed interest in field artillery we would expect them to perceive a requirement for heavy artillery. Heretofore, they have had nothing heavier than 152mm cannons in the active forces. Some association of these weapons with Scaleboard and Scud units could be viewed as a sign that they will have nuclear capabilities. The range of the 240mm mortar is so short (9,700 meters) that its use as a nuclear artillery piece is unlikely. We therefore believe it more likely that the association simply implies that heavy artillery units—if they become generally available in Soviet forces—will be administratively grouped at front level or in the High Command Reserve, as are Scaleboards and some Scuds.

172. *Soviet Response to Western Antitank Developments.* The Soviet ground forces are more dependent upon the tank than any army in history. If the time should come when the Soviets were forced to conclude that their tanks were unable to penetrate NATO forces, Moscow would face an enormous problem. The Soviets would have to rethink their strategy for a war in Europe and contemplate a radical redesign of their ground forces. At present, however, the Soviets seem to be far from drawing any such epochal conclusions. The Soviets have reacted to NATO's acquisition of new antitank weapons with relatively minor adjustments in their forces. Moscow has deployed more tanks in Eastern Europe and possibly added some infantry to its tank units.

E. Outlook for Further Growth in the Late 1970s

173. In Section VI. A., above, we noted a number of factors that have motivated the Soviets to expand and modernize their theater forces over the past

decade. Much of the expansion has been motivated by tensions with China and by Czechoslovak political unreliability. Changes in Soviet military doctrine also had a major impact. Certain major equipment development programs probably represent Soviet attempts to counter specific areas of NATO strength such as superior combat aircraft; technological advances have undoubtedly prompted other equipment changes.

174. All of these factors together, however, do not seem to us to explain the overall magnitude and broad scope of the changes which have occurred. As we suggested at the beginning of this Estimate, the Soviet attitude toward theater force goals is powerfully influenced by historical experience of the catastrophic consequences of military unreadiness. This outlook, reinforced by a traditional xenophobia and a generally conservative approach to military planning, appears to lead the Soviets to aim at achieving and maintaining a demonstrably superior conventional force posture in Europe.

175. This perception of Soviet goals does not, however, make it possible to define the point at which Soviet military planners would consider them satisfied. There is little basis in evidence on which to measure what they would consider a demonstrably superior conventional force.

176. It is clear, at any rate, that the Soviet military are extremely conservative in defining what is "enough"—hence, likely to continue force development programs beyond the point of numerical parity. Also, Soviet military leaders have an institutional interest in continuing the process of expansion and modernization. They have shown a strong tendency in the past to seize upon any improvement in NATO forces as another justification for Soviet force programs. Indeed, by Western standards they seem to overreact to changes in NATO forces. At the same time they present their own programs as strictly defensive and deny that NATO might reasonably consider them threatening.


177. This expansionary momentum has been encouraged by a political leadership that has been generous with manpower and budgetary allocations. Sometime in the mid-1980s the amount of

manpower used by the military could begin to conflict seriously with the demands of the civilian economy, but this probably will not be a problem for the immediate future. Also, the growing complexity of the Soviet weapons inventory is creating an increasing need for highly skilled manpower which probably conflicts with the needs of the economy, but this has not yet appeared to constrain the military programs.

178. Similarly, the current share of GNP devoted to the military and the division of these resources within the various institutional elements of the military is acceptable to the Soviet leadership. Although hard budgetary decisions are presumably made each year at the highest level, the absence of the parliamentary constraints and public scrutiny that exist in the West seems to allow a powerful bureaucratic institution such as the Soviet military considerable latitude to pursue programs which it considers necessary.

179. Barring some major new development comparable to the Sino-Soviet rift of the 1960s, however, it is unlikely that this continuing theater force growth will be as rapid or as large as that which occurred between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. If the more gradual expansion of the last two years or so continues, the size of the theater forces will increase by about one percent annually over the next few years. By the early 1980s even this relatively small annual increase would add 100,000 men to the Soviet theater forces—which would then have more than 2.1 million men.

Figure 9
SOVIET GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES MANPOWER*



*Changes in manpower over time are principally due to the buildup opposite China (some 300,000 men), increases associated with the movement of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia (at least 30,000 men) and changes in the size of Soviet ground forces units since the late 1960s.

—SECRET—

180. In sum, the momentum of the Soviet drive to maintain superiority of forces in Central Europe seems likely to lead to gradual expansion and further technological improvements in Soviet theater forces through the end of the 1970s.¹¹ To reverse this trend would likely require the ascendancy of new political leadership with different priorities and the power base to overcome current institutional positions.

¹¹ See footnote 2.

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- i. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the Treasury
- j. The DCI's Deputy for National Intelligence Officers, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the DCI's Deputy for National Intelligence Officers.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

~~4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: CONFIDENTIAL.~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~