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


Soviet Military Capabilities To Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas

National Intelligence Estimate

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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NI 11-1079
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NIE 11-10-79

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES
TO PROJECT POWER AND
INFLUENCE IN DISTANT AREAS

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.

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PREFACE

Since the mid-1950s the Soviets have strengthened and expanded their influence in the Third World.* During the past three years the USSR's arms sales and military assistance have been portrayed as having entered a new stage with the introduction of Cuban combat forces in Angola and Ethiopia. The magnitude of these interventions and their success in furthering Soviet objectives have caused growing apprehension in the West, in China, and among some Third World leaders that Moscow has embarked in Africa on a new, more assertive expansionist policy with worrisome implications for other areas of the Third World. The overriding concern is that the leading Western nations, wrestling with the intricate and politically volatile issues of counteracting these initiatives, will fail to meet this latest Soviet challenge and thereby encourage Moscow to intensify and broaden its efforts.

This Estimate examines the substance and objectives of this Soviet policy, reviews Soviet gains and losses to date, and analyzes overall Soviet capabilities for distant operations across the full range of military instrumentalities—from military aid, arms sales, and support of insurgent movements to the use of friendly forces and the intervention of Soviet combat units. The Estimate does not address Soviet options or capabilities for military operations against specific countries except in analysis at annex concerning hypothetical deployments to illustrate Soviet airlift capabilities. The final chapter projects likely military initiatives to extend Soviet influence in the Third World, future development of Soviet forces for distant operations, and trends in Soviet arms sales during the next five to 10 years.

At annex are a chronology of notable Soviet military actions in the Third World since 1954, supplemental information on Soviet aid to insurgent movements, and a brief discussion of Third World perceptions of Soviet military power and the effect that Soviet military assistance has on regional balances of forces.

Appended at the end of this Estimate is a foldout map (figure 10) giving locations of places mentioned in the text.

Some figures in this Secret version of NIE 11-10-79 have been updated to account for information that became available after the original Top Secret edition was issued in February 1979.

*The term "Third World" refers to non-Communist, less developed countries, most of which are nonaligned.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Objectives

1. Soviet leaders continue to view the Third World as fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet political, military, and economic influence through an assertive and opportunistic policy. They see political conflict involving the use of military force or conducted in its shadow as the main propellant of fundamental changes in the Third World. They believe that military power will remain the cornerstone of Soviet policy. Their primary objectives in aligning themselves selectively with states and insurgent movements in Third World conflicts are to assert the USSR's legitimacy as ideological vanguard of world "national liberation" movements, to secure a major role in Third World affairs, to affect the outcome of regional conflicts in favor of Soviet interests, and to neutralize Western and Chinese political and military influence. The Soviet leadership has no illusions, however, about the difficulties of attaining these objectives.

2. While broad political objectives are paramount, the Soviets pursue specific military objectives as well. These include acquisition of overflight clearances and access to facilities abroad for supporting military operations of Soviet as well as friendly forces, especially emergency air and sea lifts of military equipment and supplies to Third World states and insurgent forces. Overseas facilities also can ease the logistic problems of operating naval forces at great distances from Soviet waters. The Soviets deploy military forces in distant areas to show the flag, to maintain a military presence that can be augmented relatively quickly in time of crisis, and to monitor and, if necessary, counter the operations of Western naval forces.

3. Objectives of a lower order in Soviet policy in the Third World are to promote trade, to secure access to certain raw materials and foods, and to be capable of restricting Western access to these materials. Moscow's efforts to foster both military and economic dependence in individual Third World countries go hand in hand, as the major recipients of Soviet arms in 1978 also account for almost half of the USSR's nonmilitary trade with the Third World. Soviet economic aid has not always resulted in a commensurate level of influence, nor do the Soviets expect economic interests alone to buy much influence.

Policy Appraisal

4. The Soviets have undoubtedly gained from the expansion of their military activity in the Third World. Soviet policymakers are

probably persuaded that they have generally been on the right track, and their most recent ventures in Angola and Ethiopia have surely reinforced that conviction. Soviet political influence has grown in some countries at the expense of the West and China. Events in Angola and Ethiopia have enhanced the USSR's image as a great power capable of projecting military force far from its shores. Military assistance to Africa and the Middle East has demonstrated the value of Soviet support, especially under emergency conditions. Moscow also has benefited from the international perception that the military balance has changed, to the detriment of the West, and from the seeming US reluctance to use military force to counter the expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence in the Third World.

5. Soviet military involvement in Third World conflicts has evolved from military assistance programs, to occasional use of Soviet forces in defensive roles, to the extensive use of Cuban combat forces. The Cuban intervention in Angola and especially Ethiopia has probably strengthened Soviet confidence in the feasibility and effectiveness of this strategy, enhanced its appeal among political and military leaders in both Moscow and Havana, and encouraged them to press this strategy. Soviet and Cuban leaders probably will believe that, as long as such actions do not portray them as invaders and do not threaten the West's allies or its sources of vital raw materials, the risk of Western military involvement and escalation to a wider conflict will be slight.

6. The interdependent relationship between the USSR and Cuba is complex, and both sides would probably find it difficult to determine at this stage who has gained more from their joint military ventures. The Cubans have worked closely with the Soviets, and Cuban involvement in the Third World has served Soviet policy. The foremost advantage in using Cubans or other friendly forces is the reduction in visibility of Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts. It also allows Moscow to exert influence in circumstances where Soviet forces would be unwelcome.

7. Calculation of the risks in applying military force remains a central feature of Soviet policy. The Angolan and Ethiopian ventures, though dramatic in scale and noteworthy in their use of Cuban forces, did not entail major risks for the Kremlin, but reflected Moscow's assessment of African reactions, of political restraints on the United States, and the availability of Cuban forces. Though the initial role of the Soviets in Cuban military operations in Angola is not known, we assume that the strategy and tactics employed were coordinated with them. In Ethiopia, Moscow's role was clearly more dominant from the outset.

8. In the few instances where the Soviets have introduced their own military forces into conflicts in the Third World, they did so to assist friendly countries and to inhibit possible Western military initiatives. In these cases, however, they have exercised a policy which strictly limits the role of Soviet forces while at the same time accepting measured risks of escalation.

- Their pilots and air defense units have engaged in combat, but to date have not operated outside friendly territory.
- Soviet naval forces have established or augmented a presence in the regions of conflict but have not engaged in combat.
- Airborne units have been placed on alert in a manner possibly designed to bring pressure on the belligerents as well as the United States.

These activities illustrate Soviet appreciation for the utility of a show of force and of implicit and explicit threats as a means of achieving policy goals.

Instrumentalities

9. Arms transfers are by far the most widely employed of the military means available to the Soviets for projecting influence in the Third World. The Soviets have more than tripled the current dollar amount of agreements and deliveries of military assistance to Third World countries over the last five years. Where the bulk of a recipient's military forces become equipped with Soviet weapons, dependence on the USSR for advisers, spare parts, and newer equipment grows and in time becomes a potential means of influencing the recipient's policies. In practice, Moscow's efforts to exploit such dependence for this purpose have had both successes and failures.

10. Third World nations continue to be lured by Soviet offers of modern military equipment not usually available from other suppliers, by long-term credits at low interest rates, often by lower prices, by payment (until recently) in local rather than hard currency, and by quick delivery. Moscow is laying greater stress on the commercial considerations of its arms sales to earn hard currency. Given these factors, the market for Soviet arms remains fertile, and the trend in sales is upward.

11. Through military training, advisory, and assistance programs the Soviets attempt to create a base of enduring influence by fostering extensive ties with Third World military personnel. Since 1955, some 44,000 have been trained in the USSR. About 11,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently stationed in Third World

countries. In recent years, suspicions of some Third World leaders about the motives behind Soviet military assistance programs have grown and led to increasing reluctance by some to allow large numbers of Soviets into their countries. Nevertheless, the number of Soviet military advisers abroad has steadily increased.

12. Emergency resupply of high-priority military items by air and sea is the most widely publicized form of Soviet combat support to Third World states. In this regard, the USSR's ability to provide large quantities of arms in a relatively short time is a major advantage. This service carries little risk for the USSR because few Soviet personnel are involved, they are not combatants, the deliveries are generally made to areas remote from the fighting, and other countries are reluctant to oppose such operations militarily. In addition, such resupply operations do not necessarily commit the Soviets to deeper involvement.

13. A step higher on the ladder of involvement and risk is the assignment of Soviet advisory personnel to Third World combat units. Since 1967, when Soviet pilots flew combat missions against rebels in North Yemen, Soviet personnel have seen actual combat in at least three Third World countries—Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—and have played a direct combat advisory role in two others—Angola and Ethiopia.

14. The USSR supports a number of insurgent movements in the Third World, but the type and extent of this assistance vary. It is usually channeled through third parties because insurgents normally do not operate where Moscow can provide direct aid and because the Soviets may want to play down or conceal their role. By leaving the degree of their support ambiguous, the Soviets gain freedom for political maneuvering.

15. East European states have provided a wide variety of military equipment and experts to Third World nations and insurgent movements, often in close cooperation with the USSR. While in most cases this support has furthered Soviet objectives, the East Europeans have had their own political and economic motives. The East European governments have not committed combat troops in the Third World and would be reluctant to do so.

16. Naval surface ships and submarines are the principal Soviet military forces deployed in distance areas and are supplemented by periodic deployments of naval aircraft. Although Soviet concerns over potential strategic threats from Western carrier-launched airstrikes and submarine-launched ballistic missiles remain prominent in Soviet distant operations, the Navy continues to perform important missions related to the projection of power and influence in the Third World, primarily by maintaining forces in regions of Soviet interest which can be augmented relatively quickly in times of crisis.

17. We have no evidence of Soviet contingency plans to exert political or economic pressure on the United States or its allies through interdiction of sea lines of communication in the absence of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. The Soviets probably believe that such an operation would lead to war with NATO.

18. In the principal areas of their normal deployments in distant areas, Soviet diesel submarines and naval ships have access to a number of ports for crew rest, replenishment, maintenance, and in some cases major overhaul. Moscow is seeking additional access, but the only good prospects in the near term are in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Vietnam. Staging facilities for Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft are currently limited to Cuba, Angola, and South Yemen. Ethiopia also probably will grant access for this purpose.

Intervention Capabilities

19. The Soviets have significant forces capable of intervention in distant areas and have introduced forces into combat situations in distant areas in the past. We believe that Soviet leaders in the future would be willing under certain circumstances to use forces for this purpose. Elements of all Soviet conventional forces—ground, air, and naval—are potential resources for use in situations that call for intervention. The deployment of a large segment of Soviet forces in distant areas is constrained not only by the practical difficulties of moving large forces over long distances but by the requirement, as Moscow sees it, to retain the bulk of these forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe in readiness for their primary mission of waging war with NATO or China. On the other hand, these factors would not restrict the deployment of smaller units.

20. Where Cuban or other friendly forces are not available for use in the Third World or are deemed unsuitable, Moscow would have the option of using its own ground forces. Although Soviet air, naval, and air defense forces have been involved in conflicts in the Middle East, Angola, and Ethiopia, Soviet ground combat forces have not. Growing Soviet self-confidence in projecting power and in the USSR's role as a global power will diminish whatever Soviet reluctance may have existed in the past to employ ground forces outside the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, there are limited situations in which allied forces would not be preferable from a Soviet point of view; Afghanistan is one where the provision of limited Soviet ground forces in a hurry might well be undertaken. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership would probably view the use of ground combat units, even in modest numbers, as a significant escalation of Soviet involvement. The major constraints would be concern over the likelihood of Western or regional

counteraction and the impact on Third World perceptions of Soviet policy. We believe, therefore, that Moscow would employ ground combat units only where, and to the degree, it considered such action essential to preserve vital Soviet interests in the region.

21. Over the next 10 years the Soviets will continue to make modest improvements in amphibious lift, logistic support ships, naval tactical air support, gunfire support, and airlift. Such improvements, when added to current naval, airborne, naval infantry, and command and control resources, will result in an increased ability to deploy forces in distant areas and to come to the assistance of any ally. For example, the Soviets might introduce an airborne or naval infantry unit at the invitation of a government, particularly if Moscow believed there was little danger of Western reaction and that the intensity of combat would be low or the presence of an armed Soviet contingent would be sufficient to accomplish Moscow's objectives. Indeed, a single Soviet airborne division is larger than the armies of many Third World states.

22. We believe, however, that the Soviets are unlikely to invade a Third World country. They have never mounted an airborne assault or amphibious assault operation in a distant area. Nevertheless, Soviet forces have long been capable of undertaking such an operation against the light opposition which could be expected in most areas, and the above-projected improvements will expand this capability. But, over the next decade the Soviets will still not have built the forces capable of transporting, landing, and sustaining a large joint assault operation against substantial opposition in the Third World.

Outlook

23. *Policy.* Although a change in the makeup of the top Soviet leadership is highly probable in the next five years and virtually certain in the next 10, we do not believe that Soviet policies or long-term objectives toward the Third World will change substantially for this reason alone. We do not foresee the present or any likely future Soviet leadership altering these objectives to secure short-term economic or political benefits from the West. Although future Soviet leaders will attach varying degrees of importance to detente relations with the United States and other Western powers, we believe it unlikely that Soviet leaders will be any more dissuaded from pursuing opportunities in the Third World in the future than in the recent past by concern over adverse effects on detente. Indeed, Soviet leaders will probably continue to calculate that major issues like the strategic arms limitation talks will be largely unaffected and that costs in less critical areas of US-Soviet relations will be bearable.

24. *Regional Prospects.* We believe the Soviets will persist in a steady course of creating and exploiting opportunities in distant areas, utilizing wherever possible their comparative advantages in military instruments of influence. They will continue to regard military means—principally arms sales, military assistance, and support of insurgent movements—as the most feasible way of bringing about the changes they seek in the political structure of the Third World.

25. In Latin America, opportunities for expanding Soviet influence through military means are less favorable than in other regions of the Third World, with the exception of the continuing Soviet role in Cuba. Although Moscow has designated Latin America as an arena for Soviet-US competition and has made some economic and diplomatic inroads, prospects are still limited. There will undoubtedly be incidents of unrest and turmoil that should lend themselves to exploitation, but Soviet efforts will be hampered by prevalent anti-Communist sentiments in Latin America and by the USSR's inability to provide the kinds of nonmilitary assistance Latin Americans need. Most Latin American governments are wary of Soviet overtures and concerned as much about Soviet expansionism as about US regional influence.

26. *[This paragraph of the earlier version of NIE 11-10-79 addressed Soviet military presence in Cuba. In view of events related to this matter since issuance of the Estimate, the paragraph has been deleted. The reader is directed to more recent intelligence publications for information and judgments on this subject.]*

27. In South Asia, the Soviet outlook is somewhat brighter than in Latin America. The Soviets are expanding their role in Afghanistan and are maintaining close relations with India. India's current government, however, is not as well disposed toward the Soviets as its predecessor and has begun seeking to make Indian foreign policy more genuinely nonaligned by improving relations with both China and the West and by reducing its dependence on the USSR for arms aid.

28. In Southeast Asia, Soviet support to Vietnam—and the Friendship Treaty of November 1978—gave Hanoi significant external backing for its invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in December 1978. Nonetheless, Hanoi remains fiercely independent, and Soviet influence in the region will remain largely dependent on Hanoi's sufferance.

29. In the Middle East, opportunities to expand Soviet influence will depend, at least in the near term, mainly on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the course of events in Iran. Over the long term, underlying antagonisms toward, and deepening suspicions of, Moscow's motives will qualify Soviet prospects. Soviet opportunities

could greatly improve, however, if peace negotiations in the Middle East fail, raising the likelihood of renewed hostilities. As a result of the instability in Iran, the Soviets undoubtedly anticipate significant changes there and in the conservative regimes of the Persian Gulf area that will lead to opportunities for new Soviet ties with the oil-producing states and to further reduction of Western influence.

30. The best opportunities for the USSR will lie in Africa, where political instability is commonplace and where conditions that promote subversion and insurgencies will remain rife.

31. *Preservation of Influence.* This will remain the overriding problem in Soviet efforts to project power and influence in the Third World through military means. Even where Soviet influence is strongest, it is vulnerable to unpredictable changes in the local political leadership or in its attitudes. Nationalist-minded states will continue to resent the arrogant behavior and thinly veiled prejudice often displayed by Soviet representatives. Many Third World leaders will remain suspicious of Soviet motives and probably would be reluctant clients of the USSR. Those who do accept Soviet assistance can be expected to react against instances of exploitative military agreements, poor-quality assistance and training, and interference in internal affairs.

32. To preserve Soviet influence in a country where, for example, dependence on Soviet military support has diminished or expulsion of Soviet personnel is threatened, Moscow has essentially three alternatives beyond the continuation of present policies:

- Use friendly outside forces more extensively to carry out Moscow's policies.
- Seek to acquire through Soviet advisers sufficient control of the military and internal security forces to prevent the leaders of the client state from taking actions inimical to Soviet interests.
- Garrison Soviet troops in the client state, at its invitation, ostensibly to protect the state against some external threat but in reality to preserve in power a government that is friendly and beholden to Moscow and that will enforce policies in line with Soviet interests.

33. The last alternative would have unforeseeable ramifications for Soviet foreign relations, but it is nonetheless an option that conceivably could attract serious consideration by Soviet decision-makers. The deployment of Soviet forces for this purpose, however, would be a drastic departure from the policy Moscow has followed in the Third World.

34. Despite Soviet difficulties in preserving political influence in most Third World countries, Moscow will have ample opportunities to play a major role. Soviet policy in the Third World feeds on political turbulence, military conflict, and civil strife. During the next 10 years these disruptions are likely to recur, especially in Africa and the Middle East, and the major role the Soviets have effectively played—a source of arms and military assistance and a protector of clients—will remain relevant to the needs of many countries.

DISCUSSION

I. OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

A. The Projection of Power and Influence

1. Soviet leaders continue to view the Third World as fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet political, military, and economic influence. The United States and China are seen as the main opponents of this expansion. The primary objectives in aligning the Soviet Union with states and insurgent movements in Third World conflicts are to assert the USSR's legitimacy as ideological vanguard of world "national liberation" movements, to secure a major role in Third World affairs, to affect the outcome of regional conflicts in favor of Soviet interests, and to neutralize Western and Chinese political and military influence.
2. Soviet leaders have no illusions about the immense difficulties of attaining these objectives, but neither are they in any particular hurry, for they remain convinced—or at least conditioned by Soviet ideology to believe—that time and history are on their side. Although they see their struggle with the United States as rooted in ideology, they view its practical manifestations in terms of territory, in which the tide of battle is measured in political control and influence. Their struggle, moreover, is relentless, pursued aggressively where conditions permit, but patiently when resistance stiffens. Setbacks, which they view as the inevitable accompaniment of a forward policy, do not deter them from pursuing long-term objectives.
3. Soviet policy constantly seeks through exhortation, covert action, and the coordinated application of diverse means to exploit opportunities for expanding Soviet power in the Third World, securing new beachheads of influence and continuing to press the limits of Soviet power projection. Soviet policy therefore is both assertive and opportunistic, exploiting and manipulating events and situations over which Moscow has little or no control and vigorously pursuing competitive advantages where circumstances permit.
4. While broad political objectives are paramount, the Soviets pursue specific military objectives as well. These include acquisition of overflight clearances and access to facilities abroad from which they can support

military operations of Soviet as well as friendly forces, especially emergency air and sea lifts of military equipment and supplies to Third World states and insurgent forces. The Soviet Navy wants overseas facilities that can ease the logistic problems of operating naval forces at great distances from Soviet waters. The Soviets deploy military forces—naval and naval air—in distant areas to promote and defend the USSR's interests abroad: protecting the maritime and fishing fleets, asserting Soviet rights on the high seas, demonstrating Soviet military might through port visits, affirming Moscow's support of Third World governments, and even in some cases assisting the combat operations of friendly forces. They also collect intelligence and attempt to monitor and, if necessary, counter the operations of Western naval forces, especially aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines capable of conducting nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland. Soviet leaders believe that the presence of their naval forces, by serving as a visible symbol of Soviet concern and military capability, also inhibits Western military initiatives in areas of the Third World during periods of tension.

5. Objectives of a lower order in Soviet policy in the Third World are to promote trade and to secure access to certain raw materials and foods in short supply in the USSR. At present the USSR's needs for most Third World mineral resources are limited to a few critical items such as the bauxite it imports in large quantities from Guinea and phosphates it will import from Morocco over the next 30 years. The Soviets already have tried to ensure new, though limited, sources of oil through development assistance to Iraq's and Syria's oil industries and are expected to view access to foreign petroleum sources in the future as an ever more crucial strategic factor. (See the discussion in chapter IV, beginning with paragraph 145, on the possible impact of future Soviet oil requirements on the course of Moscow's policy toward the Third World).

6. In addition, just as Moscow through military assistance seeks to make nations dependent on the

USSR for their military security, so it attempts through a variety of means to foster economic dependence. These two efforts go hand in hand, as the major recipients of Soviet arms in 1978 also accounted for nearly half of Soviet nonmilitary trade with the Third World. Moscow also seeks to create the capability to control, disrupt, or deny Western access to raw materials in the Third World. This capability could be exercised, primarily during periods of international tension, to disrupt Western economies or to pressure Western governments to grant political concessions. All of these efforts serve the same ultimate end—to influence political actions, making them responsive to Moscow's direction.

B. The Primacy of Military Force

7. Soviet leaders see military force, augmented by persistent diplomatic and political efforts, as the main propellant of fundamental changes in the Third World. Military strength is crucial not only in exploiting future opportunities to extend Soviet influence, but also in preserving past gains. It is the foundation of the USSR's status as a global superpower and will remain through the coming decade the key to Soviet behavior in the world arena. Indeed, in the past few years, military assistance and support to friendly forces have become demonstrably effective forms of projecting Soviet influence abroad. Moreover, the Soviets believe that the growth of their military power has permitted them to pursue a more assertive policy in the Third World.

8. Soviet military involvement in Third World conflicts has evolved gradually from dependence on military assistance programs in the 1950s, to occasional use of Soviet forces in strictly defensive roles in the 1970s, and more recently to extensive use of Cuban combat forces for intervention. Calculation of the risks, however, in applying military force in the Third World remains a central feature of Soviet policy and was not vitiated by the actions in Angola and Ethiopia. Those two ventures, though dramatic in scale and noteworthy in their use of Cuban forces, did not entail major risks for the USSR but instead reflected the Soviet assessment of African reactions, political restraints on US involvement in foreign conflicts, and the availability of Cuban forces.

9. Moscow on a few occasions has introduced Soviet military forces into conflicts in the Third World to assist friendly countries and to inhibit possible Western military initiatives. In doing so, however, it has exercised a policy which strictly limits the role of

Soviet forces while at the same time accepting measured risks of escalation.

- Soviet pilots and air defense units have engaged in combat, but to date have not operated outside friendly territory.
- Soviet naval forces have established or augmented a presence in the regions of conflict but have not engaged in combat.
- Airborne units have been placed on alert in a manner possibly designed to bring pressure on the belligerents as well as the United States.

These activities illustrate Soviet appreciation for the utility of show of force and implicit and explicit threats as means toward the realization of policy goals.

C. Policy Appraisal

10. Frequent Soviet appraisals of the international balance of political power contend that the "correlation of forces" since 1945 has shifted steadily in favor of the USSR. They note that the decline and demise of the colonial system gave rise to large numbers of independent nonaligned states in the Third World. Furthermore, many former Western colonies have chosen noncapitalist forms of development and aligned themselves with the "socialist camp," which now comprises greater human and material resources than ever before. Soviet policymakers are probably persuaded by this appraisal that they have generally been on the right track, and their most recent ventures in Angola and Ethiopia have surely reinforced that conviction.

11. Although the USSR has suffered a number of reversals, such as expulsion from Egypt and Somalia and the consequent loss of access to valuable military facilities, Soviet leaders, as far as we know, have not viewed these setbacks as grounds for a fundamental reappraisal of their policy toward the Third World. In general, they probably would attribute these reversals not to the policy but to events beyond their control or to unfortunate miscalculations such as their apparent belief that Sadat could be bullied in 1971 into supporting Egyptian programs along lines dictated by Moscow.

12. Soviet economic efforts in the Third World have been modest and selective but have achieved important returns due largely to military sales.

- Soviet trade with the Third World grew from \$2.8 billion in 1969 to \$9.4 billion in 1976 and

\$12.2 billion in 1977. (Only 40 percent of the growth reflects expansion in real terms.) Military hardware accounted for 40 percent of Soviet exports in 1977 and for most of the sizable earnings in hard currency, which totaled \$800 million in 1976 and an estimated \$1.2 billion in 1977.

— The number of Third World countries trading with the USSR has also risen, from 26 in 1955 to nearly 80 at the present time.

13. The USSR, however, cannot seriously challenge Western economic predominance in the Third World and in the nonmilitary sector is losing ground, although it has gained access to new fishing waters and certain raw materials and food. Although nonmilitary trade rose steadily (in current year prices) from \$1.8 billion in 1971 to \$4.7 billion in 1975, it has dipped somewhat since then to \$4.1 billion in 1976 and \$3.8 billion in 1977. More important, the Soviet share of total Third World trade (excluding arms sales) has not only been insignificant—normally less than 2 percent—but fell sharply in 1976 and 1977,¹ and Soviet nonmilitary trade with Third World countries has declined as a share of total Soviet trade with non-Communist countries. (See figure 1.)

14. In contrast, Soviet pledges of economic aid to Third World countries over the past five years have totaled more than \$5 billion, as compared with \$3.5 billion in the preceding five years. Soviet economic aid deliveries over these six years have averaged about \$500 million annually. Also, there was a sharp increase in economic aid relative to military aid in 1978 (see figure 2). However, Soviet economic aid has not always resulted in a commensurate level of influence, nor do the Soviets expect economic interests alone to buy much influence.

15. The Soviets have undoubtedly gained from the expansion of their military activity in the Third World. Indeed, the policy has established a Soviet



¹ Data for 1978 trade were not available for inclusion in this Estimate.

military and economic presence in some Third World countries and has enabled the Soviets to exercise some influence over the course of events there. Moscow has expanded its political influence in some countries at the expense of the West and, to a lesser extent, the People's Republic of China. The interventions in Angola and Ethiopia have enhanced the USSR's image as a great power capable of projecting military force far from its shores and demonstrated the feasibility of using Cuban forces. The military assistance to Africa and the Middle East has demonstrated the value of Soviet support, especially under emergency conditions. The fact that Soviet involvement in Ethiopia was limited to countering the Somali invasion has probably allayed some African fears of Soviet intentions. Moscow has also benefited from the international perception that the military balance has changed, to the detriment of the West, and from the seeming US reluctance to use military force to counter the expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence in the Third World.

16. Despite its successes, Soviet policy suffers from a number of vulnerabilities which have contributed to the setbacks in the USSR's relations with the Third World. The policy has persistently underestimated the power of nationalism as a counter to the expansion of Soviet influence. Third World states deeply resent the arrogant, secretive, heavyhanded behavior of Soviet representatives and advisers, whose thinly veiled prejudice against, and contempt of, Third World peoples and cultures, especially black African, is sharply felt. The policy also has misjudged the resentment and suspicion that are mounting among Third World leaders against Soviet motives and has overestimated the potential of military assistance as a mechanism of control over Third World political leaders. Moreover, the policy falters where economic considerations become the priority interest of Third World nations. These factors often combine to undermine the achievement of Soviet policy goals and make the preservation of Soviet influence once achieved the most pressing problem facing the Soviet leadership in its efforts to project power and influence in the Third World through military means.

Trade Between the USSR and the Third World, 1971-77

Figure 1





Unclassified

^aExcludes arms sales.

^bExcludes trade with Communist countries.

Value of Soviet Military and Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries, 1969-78

Figure 2



Secret

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II. INSTRUMENTALITIES

A. Military Sales to the Third World

17. Arms transfers are by far the most widely employed of the military means for projecting Soviet influence in the Third World. What began as a low-key military aid effort in 1955, governed largely by political considerations and soft financial terms, has mushroomed into a massive aid and sales program (see tables 1 and 2) paying Moscow important political and commercial dividends. Sales expanded from \$220

million a year in the initial period of the program (1955-58), to more than \$1 billion in 1970, over \$4 billion in 1974, and over \$5 billion in 1977 (these dollar values are not adjusted for inflation). Moscow's ability to move quickly in exploiting new opportunities has given it a 16-percent slice of the Third World arms market in the past four years. Only the United States has sold more military goods to Third World buyers. As a universal staple in the world marketplace, arms have opened the door to wider Soviet relations

Table 1
Soviet Military Assistance to Third World Countries, 1956-78

	Million US Dollars*							
	Total		1956-67		1968-72		1973-78	
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries
North Africa	<u>4,461</u>	<u>3,674</u>	<u>258</u>	<u>238</u>	<u>221</u>	<u>151</u>	<u>3,982</u>	<u>3,285</u>
Algeria	1,881	1,145	245	225	100	63	1,536	857
Libya	2,506	2,498	—	—	121	88	2,385	2,410
Morocco	74	31	13	13	—	—	61	18
Sub-Saharan Africa	<u>3,136</u>	<u>2,743</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>219</u>	<u>157</u>	<u>2,836</u>	<u>2,516</u>
Angola	322	369	—	—	—	—	322	369
Benin	10	10	—	—	—	—	10	10
Burundi	5	2	—	—	Negl	—	5	2
Cameroon	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl	—	Negl
Cape Verde	4	3	—	—	—	—	4	3
Central African Republic	8	3	—	—	2	2	6	1
Chad	7	5	—	—	—	—	7	5
Congo	64	28	2	2	12	6	50	20
Equatorial Guinea	9	9	—	—	2	2	7	7
Ethiopia	1,556	1,306	—	—	6	4	1,550	1,302
Gambia	Negl	Negl	—	—	—	—	Negl	Negl
Ghana	10	10	10	10	—	—	—	—
Guinea	69	70	11	10	15	14	43	46
Guinea-Bissau	11	11	—	—	—	—	11	11
Kenya	Negl	Negl	—	—	—	—	Negl	Negl
Madagascar	63	5	—	—	—	—	63	5
Mali	60	87	4	4	4	1	52	82
Mozambique	61	106	—	—	—	—	61	106
Nigeria	101	90	5	5	21	20	75	65
Seychelles	2	2	—	—	—	—	2	2
Sierra Leone	Negl	Negl	—	—	Negl	Negl	—	—
Somalia	329	329	35	30	71	37	223	262
Sudan	87	84	—	—	85	69	2	15
Tanzania	238	89	2	2	—	Negl	236	87
Uganda	96	102	12	7	—	1	84	94
Zambia	24	23	—	—	1	1	23	22

Footnote at end of table.

Table 1
Soviet Military Assistance to Third World Countries, 1956-78
(Continued)

Million US Dollars*

	Total		1956-67		1968-72		1973-78	
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries
East Asia	891	885	884	873	6	11	1	1
Burma	Negl	Negl	—	—	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl
Indonesia	878	872	878	869	—	3	—	—
Kampuchea (Cambodia)	13	13	6	4	6	8	1	1
Latin America	655	630	—	—	—	—	655	630
Colombia	Negl	Negl	—	—	Negl	Negl	—	—
Peru	655	630	—	—	—	—	655	630
Middle East	14,410	13,604	2,644	2,126	3,796	2,869	7,970	8,609
Cyprus	18	18	18	18	—	—	—	—
Egypt	4,067	4,057	1,335	1,205	1,819	1,667	913	1,185
Iran	1,370	722	150	25	426	313	794	384
Iraq	3,931	4,006	644	455	700	354	2,587	3,197
Kuwait	51	51	—	—	—	—	51	51
Lebanon	4	4	—	Negl	3	3	1	1
North Yemen	114	121	70	70	8	7	36	44
South Yemen	288	318	—	—	77	28	211	290
Syria	4,567	4,307	427	353	763	497	3,377	3,457
South Asia	4,265	3,327	1,177	773	941	841	2,147	1,713
Afghanistan	926	691	348	205	107	132	471	354
Bangladesh	73	56	—	—	63	2	10	54
India	3,204	2,537	826	565	746	684	1,632	1,288
Maldiv Islands	Negl	Negl	Negl	—	Negl	Negl	—	—
Nepal	1	1	—	—	Negl	Negl	1	1
Pakistan	48	29	3	3	23	21	22	5
Sri Lanka	13	13	—	—	2	2	11	11
Total	27,818	24,863	5,044	4,080	5,183	4,029	17,591	16,754

*Not adjusted for inflation.

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Table 2
Soviet Military Assistance to Selected Communist Countries, 1956-78

Million US Dollars*

	Total		1956-67		1968-72		1973-78	
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries
Cuba	1,635	1,668	777	777	199	199	659	692
Laos	77	71	4	4	—	—	73	67
North Korea	1,617	1,617	755	755	543	543	319	319
Vietnam	3,204	3,194	1,220	1,220	1,360	1,360	624	614
Total	6,533	6,550	2,756	2,756	2,102	2,102	1,675	1,692
Total With Assistance to Third World Countries	34,351	31,413	7,800	6,836	7,285	6,131	19,266	18,446

*Not adjusted for inflation.

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with countries like Peru that have few political affinities with the USSR and to which the USSR has few if any other entrees, and they provide direct access to the recipient's military establishment—the fulcrum of power in most Third World countries.

18. Where the bulk of a recipient's military forces are equipped with Soviet weaponry, dependence on the USSR for advisers, spare parts, and newer equipment grows and in time becomes a potential means of influencing the recipient's policies by threatening to curtail or even cut off the supply. Leaders of many countries hang their political survival and their international image on assured weapon flows. In practice, Moscow's efforts to exploit such dependence have had both successes and failures.

19. Third World nations continue to be lured by Soviet offers of modern military equipment not usually available from other suppliers, by long-term credits at low interest rates, often by lower prices, by payment (until recently) in local rather than hard currency, and by quick delivery. Given these factors, the market for Soviet arms remains fertile, and the trend in sales is upward.

20. Moscow is laying greater stress than before on the commercial considerations of its arms sales. We know of few concessions given to important customers in the past year or so either in pricing arrangements or repayment terms. Libya paid cash. Even Syria no longer receives discounts and is believed to be paying for most of its arms purchases in hard currency provided by Arab oil producers. Iraq is paying in crude oil, natural gas, and hard currency for deliveries under its order in 1976 for more than \$1 billion worth of equipment. It should be noted, however, that Moscow will make significant concessions on payment terms when refusal to do so might jeopardize Soviet interests. In Ethiopia's case, for example, Moscow has discounted the price of the arms delivered.

21. In general, Soviet exports of more advanced weapon systems to Third World nations have not begun until Soviet forces have been equipped with the successor systems. The Soviets as a matter of policy have been reluctant to export their most advanced, high-performance military aircraft because of the difficulties in training Third World pilots to fly them and the danger of compromising the capabilities of the aircraft and the level of their technology.

22. The USSR does not produce a wholly separate line of military equipment for export. In some cases,

however, the Soviets manufacture export versions of their hardware that do not include all of the weapons, avionics, or ancillary equipment (such as bomb delivery devices) provided on weapon systems for Soviet use. In other cases, moreover, production of equipment for export has continued even though Soviet units no longer procure this equipment. Also, some weapon systems like the T-54 tank that have been retired from active Soviet inventories have been reconditioned for export.

23. Moscow usually insists that arms buyers submit their requirements for equipment and spares a year in advance so that production schedules can be adjusted. Some of these orders are met from large Soviet stocks. Where the orders impinge on already taut production schedules, the Soviets sometimes draw out deliveries beyond the usual 12 to 18 months. But they retain the capability to deliver large quantities of military equipment rapidly by dipping into the equipment reserves of Soviet units. T-62 tanks in storage in a tank division in the Kiev Military District reportedly were shipped to the Middle East in the fall of 1973, and that division's reserve stocks were later refilled with T-64s.

B. Military Training of Third World Personnel

24. Since 1955 a total of some 44,000 military personnel from Third World countries have received training in the Soviet Union (see table 3). Training is also conducted in Third World states, thereby reducing for the Soviets the administrative, logistical, and security problems that attend the entry of large numbers of foreigners into the Soviet Union. Both the in-country and the USSR-based programs, in addition to providing military training, are intended to extend Soviet influence in Third World countries, to cultivate pro-Soviet sentiments among client military personnel, and to identify controllable individuals and factions that can be exploited to serve Soviet interests.

25. The ever-growing complexity of modern weapons has enabled the Soviets over the years to send large numbers of advisers to client countries in the Third World, where about 11,000 Soviet advisers and technicians now provide instruction on the full range of Soviet equipment, serve as instructors in client military institutions, and supervise military exercises (see table 4). Soviet military advisers are often in potentially good positions to influence political attitudes because of the teacher-student situations in which they generally work and the broad access they frequently have to influential client officials. Some Soviet advisers

Table 3
Military Personnel From Third World Countries Trained in Communist Countries, 1955-78*

	1955-78				1978			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
North Africa	3,735	3,385	335	15	45	5	40	—
Algeria	2,260	2,045	200	15	—	—	—	—
Libya	1,330	1,265	65	—	45	5	40	—
Morocco	145	75	70	—	—	—	—	—
Sub-Saharan Africa	13,790	10,035	1,065	2,690	1,620	1,440	155	25
Angola	60	55	5	—	5	^b	5	—
Benin	20	20	—	—	—	—	—	—
Botswana	10	—	—	10	—	—	—	—
Burundi	75	75	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cameroon	125	—	—	125	—	—	—	—
Chad	105	105	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo	855	355	85	415	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea	200	200	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia	1,640	1,190	450	—	1,050	900	150	—
Ghana	180	180	—	—	—	—	—	—
Guinea	1,290	870	60	360	10	10	—	—
Guinea-Bissau	100	100	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar	30	30	—	—	30	30	—	—
Mali	415	355	10	50	5	5	—	—
Mozambique	465	385	30	50	45	45	—	—
Nigeria	730	695	35	—	150	150	—	—
Sierra Leone	150	—	—	150	—	—	—	—
Somalia	2,585	2,395	160	30	—	—	—	—
Sudan	550	330	20	200	—	—	—	—
Tanzania	2,855	1,820	10	1,025	295	295	—	—
Togo	55	—	—	55	—	—	—	—
Uganda	990	790	200	—	5	5	—	—
Zaire	175	—	—	175	25	—	—	25
Zambia	130	85	—	45	—	—	—	—
East Asia	9,300	7,590	1,710	—	—	—	—	—
Indonesia	9,270	7,560	1,710	—	—	—	—	—
Kampuchea (Cambodia)	30	30	—	—	—	—	—	—
Latin America	725	725	—	—	100	100	—	—
Peru	725	725	—	—	100	100	—	—
Middle East	18,115	15,630	2,485	—	1,030	380	650	—
Egypt	6,250	5,665	585	—	—	—	—	—
Iran	315	315	—	—	—	—	—	—
Iraq	4,330	3,650	680	—	250	100	150	—
North Yemen	1,180	1,180	—	—	10	10	—	—
South Yemen	1,095	1,075	20	—	170	170	—	—
Syria	4,945	3,745	1,200	—	600	100	500	—
South Asia	7,225	6,425	370	430	25	^b	^b	25
Afghanistan	4,010	3,725	285	—	—	—	—	—
Bangladesh	485	445	—	40	25	—	—	25
India	2,285	2,200	85	—	—	—	—	—
Pakistan	430	45	^b	385	—	^b	^b	—
Sri Lanka	15	10	—	5	—	—	—	—
Total	52,890	43,790	5,965	3,135	2,820	1,925	845	50

* Data refer to the estimated number of persons departing for training. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.
^b Number of personnel being trained is not available.

Table 4

Soviet and East European Military Advisers and Technicians in the Third World, 1978*

	Soviet	East European
North Africa	2,310	450
Algeria	1,000	—
Libya	1,300	450
Morocco	10	—
Sub-Saharan Africa	3,300	515
Angola	1,000	300
Benin	30	—
Botswana	5	—
Burundi	5	—
Cape Verdi	50	15
Central African Empire	25	—
Chad	20	—
Congo	50	10
Equatorial Guinea	40	—
Ethiopia	1,300	100
Guinea	100	—
Guinea-Bissau	65	—
Madagascar	10	—
Mali	180	—
Mozambique	230	—
Nigeria	10	—
Tanzania	120	5
Uganda	50	5
Zambia	10	80
Latin America	150	—
Peru	150	—
Middle East	4,160	335
Iran	5	—
Iraq	1,100	100
Kuwait	5	—
North Yemen	150	5
South Yemen	500	50
Syria	2,400	180
South Asia	850	—
Afghanistan	700	—
India	150	—
Total	<u>10,770</u>	<u>1,300</u>

*Minimum number present for one month or more.

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are active at the highest levels of the host military establishments. Moreover, they can spot talented and politically impressionable individuals and single them out for special instruction and political indoctrination in the USSR, where training of foreigners stresses Marxist-Leninist ideology.

26. In recent years, suspicions of some Third World leaders about the motives behind Soviet military assist-

ance programs have grown and led to increasing reluctance by some to permit large numbers of Soviets into their countries, and in some cases both their access to facilities and their contacts with indigenous personnel have been restricted. Some major aid recipients have contended that the Soviets intentionally slow down their training and purposely introduce more sophisticated equipment from time to time as a means of justifying a continued large Soviet presence. The Soviets, in fact, use a number of schemes to perpetuate and enlarge their presence. For example, they sometimes refuse to provide technical manuals for equipment, thereby making the host dependent on Soviet technicians. Despite the suspicions and resistance of Third World leaders, however, there has been a steady increase in recent years in the number of Soviet advisers abroad.

C. Other Advisory Functions

27. Aside from their combat support role (see paragraphs 31-33), military advisers and technicians perform other functions that contribute to the accomplishment of Soviet objectives. These functions fall within three general categories.

Delivery, Assembly, and Maintenance of Military Equipment

28. Because most Soviet equipment guarantees are not valid unless the equipment is maintained by Soviet specialists* during the one- or two-year guarantee period, a substantial number of Soviet military personnel abroad are involved in this activity.

Construction of Military Facilities

29. A large number of Soviet specialists are involved under military aid agreements in the planning, supervision, and construction of military airfields, electronic installations, and military training centers.

Military Intelligence Operations

30. The full extent of Soviet support of client military intelligence activities is not known, nor is it clear whether such assistance is performed under military aid agreements or through separate contracts.

* These personnel are called "guarantors," a term that in Soviet internal administrative usage has come to refer to all Soviet military personnel abroad acting in an advisory capacity except those directly engaged in combat or those who could be by virtue of their duties. The latter are called "combat advisers," discussed in paragraph 33.

The Soviet investment in this area of foreign military assistance is small in comparison with the other activities discussed above and probably earns small returns in increased influence, though it may provide access to client intelligence services. The USSR certainly has benefited from the activities of East German and Czechoslovak intelligence advisers in such countries as Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.

D. Combat Support of Third World Clients

31. The USSR has provided its clients a range of services and combat support that have incrementally increased the level of Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts short of engaging Soviet personnel in operations that would risk entanglement with another major power.

Resupply

32. The most widely publicized form of Soviet combat support to Third World states is the emergency resupply of high-priority items of military equipment by air and sea lift. This service carries relatively little risks for the Soviet Union as the number of Soviet personnel involved is relatively small, they are not combatants, the deliveries are made in the rear areas remote from the fighting, and other countries have been reluctant to oppose such operations militarily. In addition, such resupply operations do not necessarily commit the Soviets to deeper involvement. The Soviets are capable of mounting resupply operations on short notice and can be expected to do so again.

Combat Advisers and Forces

33. A step higher on the ladder of involvement and risk is the assignment of Soviet advisory personnel to Third World combat units, principally to assist in command and control functions but also logistics and other support activities. Soviet leaders recognize the risks and limitations involved in using combat forces and have acted with restraint. Yet since 1967, when Soviet pilots flew combat missions against rebels in North Yemen, Soviet personnel have seen actual combat in at least three Third World countries—Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—and have played a direct combat advisory role in two others—Angola and Ethiopia.⁴

⁴ See annex A for a chronology of Soviet involvement in and support of combat operations in the Third World over the past 20 years.

E. Aid to Insurgencies

34. The Soviet Union supports a number of insurgent movements in the Third World, but the type and extent of this assistance vary, as do the methods of providing it. This aid ranges from propaganda support to arms and other material assistance. The USSR seldom supplies financial backing, preferring to send material which is often paid for with money donated by other sources. While the Soviets maintain direct contact with some insurgent groups, they usually channel their material support through third parties, chiefly for two reasons:

— First, most insurgent groups operate in remote areas far from main ports and air terminals. Supplies must therefore be trucked overland, sometimes through rugged terrain, in countries where the Soviets do not control the resources necessary for such transport. Reliance on third parties—normally, cooperative governments neighboring the countries where the insurgent movements are active—is therefore essential.

— Second, Moscow may wish to conceal or at least play down its support of an insurgent movement. The extent to which the Soviets want to be identified with an insurgent group depends on the political context in which it operates, the chances of its success, the risks involved for the Soviets, and the legitimacy of the cause, both from the Soviet perspective and as more generally perceived. Moscow's assessment of these variables determines the nature and degree of its support. By leaving the degree of their support ambiguous, the Soviets gain freedom for political maneuvering.⁴

F. Use of Cuban and Other Friendly Forces

35. The foremost advantage in using Cuban or other friendly forces to further Soviet objectives in Third World conflicts is that they reduce the visibility of Soviet interest and involvement. They allow Moscow to extend its influence into areas where Soviet military presence on the scale needed to achieve desired results would either be unwelcome to friendly forces in the areas of the conflict and generate hostility and resentment, or be denounced by Third World governments and even opposed with outside military forces. Where large contingents of Soviet forces might cause alarm in

⁴ See annex B for background on the nature and status of Soviet aid to insurgencies in the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

the West and the Third World, allied forces such as the Cubans appear much less menacing. Friendly forces also serve a useful propaganda function in support of Soviet policy in the international forum.

Cuba

36. The Cubans have worked closely with the Soviets; their relationship has in most cases been a matter of Moscow assisting a partner already willing to help but not fully able to do so for financial or logistical—not political—reasons. The interdependent relationship between the two governments' policies is complex, and both sides would probably find it difficult to determine at this stage who has gained more from their joint military ventures. In this regard Cuba is by no means an entirely independent actor, given its economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union, but Castro, if he chose, could refuse to accommodate Moscow's need of allied military forces to pursue its policies in the Third World.

37. Cuba has benefited greatly from its close cooperation with the Soviets in their overseas actions. While Castro has long been a staunch advocate of aggressive action against the "reactionary forces" of imperialism, his impact as the representative of a small country would be negligible without Soviet support. That backing has increased his prestige and influence in the Third World. Moreover, Castro clearly believes that Cuba's actions are of value to the USSR and have provided Cuba with greater influence in dealing with Moscow. He probably views the increased Soviet military and economic assistance to Cuba since 1975 in this light. In addition to the recent delivery of Cuba's first submarine—an F-class diesel-powered attack unit—Moscow has provided some firstline weapons, including MI-8 Hip-E combat assault helicopters and recently MIG-23 Flogger fighter-bombers. These weapons will improve Cuban combat capabilities and most could be employed in distant areas.

38. Between 35,000 and 39,000 Cuban military personnel are currently stationed in Third World countries. Most of these personnel serve in combat units in Angola, Ethiopia, and to some extent Mozambique (see table 5). The rest perform mainly military advisory and training functions.

Eastern Europe

39. East European states have also provided support to Third World nations and insurgent movements, often in close cooperation with the USSR. While in

Table 5
Cuban Nondiplomatic Personnel in
Third World Countries
November 1978

	Civilian Advisers and Technicians	Military Personnel
Sub-Saharan Africa	<u>9,065-9,575</u>	<u>33,635-37,120</u>
Angola	7,000	19,000-20,000
Benin	35	5-10
Cape Verde	10	—
Congo	200	300
Equatorial Guinea	25	100-200
Ethiopia	1,000	13,000-15,000
Guinea	200-400	200
Guinea-Bissau	50-110	50-140
Mozambique	300-350	800-1,000
Sao Tome and Principe ..	100-200	50-100
Sierra Leone	45	—
Tanzania	100-200	—
Zambia	—	130-170
Middle East/North Africa ..	<u>760-870</u>	<u>800-1,400</u>
Algeria	60-70	—
Iraq	375	100-150
Libya	125	—
South Yemen	200-300	500-1,000
Syria	—	200-250
Latin America	<u>175-235</u>	<u>10</u>
Guyana	100-110	10
Jamaica	75-125	—
Total	<u>10,000-10,680</u>	<u>34,445-38,530</u>

—Secret—

Table 6
East European Military Assistance to Third World
Countries, 1955-77

	Arms Commitments	Million US Dollars
Czechoslovakia		1,408
Poland		471
Hungary		240
East Germany		121
Bulgaria		117
Subtotal		<u>2,357</u>
Romania		64
Yugoslavia		1,155
Total		<u>3,576</u>

—Secret—

most cases this support has furthered Soviet policy objectives, the East Europeans have had their own political and economic motives. These countries have provided military assistance (see table 6) as well as military experts (see table 4) to maintain the equipment and train the recipients in its use.

40. East Germany has been especially active in furnishing advisers to strengthen local security services and to establish Soviet-type political institutions. East Germany sees its involvement in the Third World as also serving its own interests, such as affirming its legitimacy as an important actor on the international scene among both its own people and other governments, and establishing productive economic relations with Third World states and movements. Indeed, fostering profitable trading arrangements is a strong motive for the involvement of many East European states, all of which are preoccupied with their own domestic problems, the most serious of which are economic.

41. Romania and Yugoslavia have objectives vis-a-vis the Third World that differ radically from those of the USSR and that do not purposely serve Soviet interests. The Romanians see conflicts in the Third World primarily as stages upon which they can play the larger international role of mediator—as opposed to partisan. Doing so, they believe, buttresses their independence from the USSR. Yugoslavia tries to win the states and movements of the Third World to the nonaligned movement, of which it is a leader, rather than to an international Communist movement led by the USSR.

42. The East European governments have not committed combat troops in support of national liberation movements and progressive regimes in the Third World. Although they generally share the Soviets' ideological commitments, Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe would be reluctant to send troops.

North Korea

43. The North Koreans do not wish to be identified as Soviet surrogates. North Korean involvement abroad has become increasingly circumscribed as President Kim Il-song has tried to avoid involvement with countries or insurgent groups aligned on either side of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. More recently, however, North Korea's sympathy for Kampuchea (Cambodia) has clearly reflected a tilt toward China in North Korean policy. The Soviets probably do not wish to encourage North Korean military activities abroad.

Angola and Ethiopia

44. The Angolan and Ethiopian cases provide some useful insights regarding the role of friendly forces in

Soviet policy and underline the political and military advantages of their use. In particular, the deployment of Cuban forces to Angola to support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) disarmed much of the critical foreign reaction against Soviet involvement. Cuban support for the MPLA dates from the early 1960s. Before 1975, however, the number of Cubans working with the MPLA never exceeded a few hundred and for the most part averaged around 30. Nonetheless, Cuban support for MPLA leader Neto remained constant, even when the Soviets backed one of his rivals from 1972 until 1974.

45. The ultimate requirement for sending more than 15,000 Cuban troops to Angola during 1975-76 was probably unforeseen by Havana in mid-1975 when it apparently decided upon a further increase in its aid to the MPLA. We do not know whether Moscow pressured the Cubans, but it is clear that the USSR and Cuba consulted closely before the decision was made. A final decision to supply large numbers of Cuban troops was probably not made until July 1975, when the MPLA had run into great difficulties on the battlefield.

46. The Cuban forces bore the brunt of the fighting and were indispensable in establishing the MPLA's control of the central government. They continue to play a key role in countering the guerrilla threat to the Angolan regime, which is totally dependent on Cuban military assistance to remain in power. Although some Soviet military advisers saw action with MPLA units during the civil war, Soviet participation in the fighting was limited mainly to logistic support. The role of the Soviets in the Cuban military operations in Angola is not known, though we assume that the strategy and tactics the Cubans employed were coordinated with the Soviets.

47. In any case, Soviet military advisers appear to have a growing responsibility for military operations in Angola. They reportedly operate the naval base in Luanda, and 11 Soviet generals arrived in August to advise the Angolan armed forces. One of these officers has been assigned to each of the country's military districts. In addition, Soviet and East European economic personnel have moved into important financial and commercial positions in the Ministries of Transport, Fisheries, and Trade. These Ministries had been virtually run by Cubans, who filled much of the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial and technical personnel of the colonial era.

48. In Ethiopia, Moscow's role in Cuban military operations was clearly more dominant from the outset. The Soviets would certainly have preferred to play both sides of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict and mediate a settlement that would have assured Soviet influence in both countries as well as access to facilities there. To assuage Somali concern over Moscow's widening support of Ethiopia, Soviet leaders may have hoped at least initially to channel their military assistance largely through Cuban military personnel.

49. In November 1977 General V. I. Petrov, First Deputy Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, arrived in Ethiopia with a retinue of high-ranking Soviet officers to study Ethiopian military needs. By that time some 250 Soviet military personnel were in Ethiopia, 12 of whom were assigned to advisory positions with the Ethiopian high command.

50. The airlift of Cuban forces and Soviet military equipment and supplies went into high gear in December 1977, and by mid-January 1978 some 1,700 Cuban troops had been transported to Ethiopia. The turning point in the conflict occurred in late January when Cuban units joined in the defense of the city of Harar and Cuban-piloted aircraft began bombing Somali positions. Somali forces were driven back, and

the Ethiopian counteroffensive got under way, culminating in the withdrawal of Somali forces from the Ogaden in early March. When the airlift of Cuban troops ended in early April, there were as many as 17,000 Cuban and some 1,200 Soviet military personnel in the country, as well as a number of South Yemeni forces.

51. As the Ogaden fighting drew to a close, the Mengistu regime turned its full attention to suppressing the Eritrean secessionists in the north. Soviet personnel have provided logistic, advisory, and planning support to this effort, while Cuban combat advisers have assisted Ethiopian units down to company level. No Cuban units have been sent to Eritrea. The reinforcement and resupply of the beleaguered Ethiopian forces at Massawa by Soviet ships, protected by Soviet naval combatants offshore, prevented the loss of this vital port to the Eritrean insurgents. The large Cuban and Soviet combat presence remaining in the Ogaden, however, allows the Ethiopians to pursue the campaign in Eritrea without fear of a resurgence of major hostilities with the Somalis. Consequently, these foreign combat troops are playing a significant indirect role, even though not fighting in Eritrea.

52. Tables 7 and 8 provide a chronology of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola and Ethiopia.

Table 7

Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in the Angolan Civil War

1950s	Moscow establishes links (little more than propaganda support) to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) through the Portuguese Communist Party.
1961	Anti-Portuguese insurgency breaks out in Angola.
1964	Moscow, rebuffed by other Angolan insurgent groups, turns exclusively to the smaller, weaker MPLA, providing limited support—arms, money, and training.
Mid-1960s	Cuban support for MPLA begins, with military instructors going to Congo and training of MPLA supporters in Cuba.
1960s and early 1970s	Perhaps thousands of MPLA supporters are trained in Eastern Europe, Cuba, and radical African states.
1972-74	Soviets shift their support from Neto to Chipenda, leader of one of the two other contending wings of MPLA; Cuba sticks with Neto faction.
Latter part of 1974	Soviet shipment of small arms to Neto—first concrete Soviet support of Neto following coup in Lisbon that brought Spínola to power.
28 Sep 1974	Spínola is removed by new leftist-dominated government, which calls for immediate decolonization of Angola. MPLA receives increased political support from Lisbon, and tide in Lisbon-Angolan relations begins to turn in MPLA's favor.
Oct-Nov 1974	MPLA receives increased quantities of Soviet arms from stockpiles in Congo.
Nov 1974	Moscow decides to increase support of MPLA further.
Dec 1974	Some 200 MPLA supporters go to USSR for military training.

Table 7

Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in the Angolan Civil War
(Continued)

23 Mar 1975	First major hostilities occur between competing factions in Angola.
By May 1975	Large amounts of Soviet arms for MPLA, including the first heavy weapons (tanks and large mortars), are delivered by air, mostly to Congo, and by sea to Pointe Noire and Luanda.
6 Jun 1975	MPLA goes on offensive.
17 Jul 1975	The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) begins drive toward Luanda.
Jul 1975	Seventy-one Soviet military advisers are sent to assist MPLA.
23 Jul 1975	FNLA takes Caxito, jumping-off point for assault on Luanda, the MPLA's main stronghold.
Late Jul 1975	About 50 Cubans arrive in Congo to assemble Soviet military equipment.
8-12 Aug 1975	MPLA drives FNLA out of Luanda.
Mid-Aug 1975	Castro makes final decision to send Cuban troops to Angola; majority of foreign military advisers with MPLA at frontlines reportedly are Cubans by this time.
27 Aug 1975	South African and MPLA forces clash; first South African offensive action.
1-3 Sep 1975	Probable dates when first Cuban troopship is loaded for Angola.
6 Sep 1975	MPLA retakes Caxito.
19 Sep 1975	FNLA retakes Caxito.
24 Sep 1975	First of five Cuban troopships that travel to Congo in September and October arrives at Pointe Noire.
30 Sep 1975	Cuban airlift of arms and men to Angola begins; at least five transports (four or five Bristol Britannias and at least one, maybe two, IL-18s) fly across Atlantic in September and October; no urgency is apparent, as the Cuban troop movement depends on sealoift.




Table 7

**Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in the Angolan Civil War
(Continued)**

Mid-Oct 1975	At least 2,000 Cuban soldiers are now in Angola. FNLA is within a few miles of Luanda. FNLA and the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) launch coordinated offensive.
21 Oct 1975	Some 2,000 South African troops with armor enter Angola to join anti-MPLA forces.
23 Oct 1975	South African armored battalion captures Lubango. Moscow media report South African invasion and advance on Lubango.
By late Oct 1975	MPLA forces under siege in both north and south Angola.
28 Oct 1975	UNITA-FNLA forces capture part of Mocimedes.
29 Oct-Mar 1975	Soviet VTA airlift of military equipment to Angola for MPLA. Three Soviet naval ships (first evident Soviet naval involvement) deliver aviation fuel to Conakry, Guinea, for use by transiting Soviet military air transports.
Early Nov 1975	Conflict shifts from guerrilla to conventional warfare.
4 Nov 1975	South African troops, surmounting Cuban resistance, take Lobito. Cuban airlift accelerated.
Nov 1975	Autonomous Cuban combat operations begin. At this point some 1,200 Soviet military personnel reportedly are in the country. How many actually took part in combat is not known, but some did. In at least one engagement Soviet officers commanded multiple rocket launchers in an attack on UNITA forces.
23 Nov 1975	FNLA loses major battle near Luanda and retreats to Caxito.
24 Nov 1975	FNLA abandons Caxito and retreats northward.
25 Nov 1975	MPLA-Cuban forces stop South African-UNITA drive and inflict heavy casualties.
By Dec 1975	Tide of battle has shifted in favor of MPLA.
Late Dec 1975-early Jan 1976	Soviets upgrade their West African naval patrol with a guided-missile cruiser and destroyer, a cruise-missile submarine, a tank-landing ship, and several auxiliaries. Soviet TU-95 Bear-D naval reconnaissance aircraft flying from Conakry and Havana undertake increased surveillance of the southern Atlantic.
Jan 1976	Moscow provides Soviet-piloted IL-62 long-range civil transports for ferrying Cuban troops on nonstop flights from Cuba to Angola; Cuban and Soviet troopships continue to ferry Cuban troops from Cuba to Angola.
By late Jan 1976	South Africa withdraws most of its forces from Angola; FNLA is defeated in north; UNITA forces in south and central Angola return to guerrilla warfare, ending the period of conventional war.
Feb 1976	Cuban military personnel in Angola estimated at 15,000-18,000.
Nov 1978	Cuban military personnel in Angola estimated at 19,000-20,000.

Table 8

**Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in the
Ethiopian-Somali Conflict**

Dec 1976	First Soviet arms agreement with Ethiopia.
Feb 1977	Soviet arms agreements broaden subsequent to series of military talks among Ethiopian, Cuban, and Soviet representatives.
6 May 1977	Mengistu visits Moscow; signs agreement for military assistance.
May 1977	Cuban ship delivers arms to Ethiopia; initial contingent of Cuban military advisers arrives, some probably from South Yemen.
Mid-Aug 1977	Somalia captures important Ethiopian strongholds in Ogaden.

Table 8
Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in the
Ethiopian-Somali Conflict
(Continued)

- Mid-Sep 1977 Seventy Soviet military advisers are in Ethiopia; Jijiga falls; Ethiopia placed on full war footing.
- Late Sep 1977 Ethiopians abandon Filfu in southernmost Ogaden. Soviets begin deliveries of MIG-21s.
- Mid-Oct 1977 Cuban artillerymen provide combat support to Ethiopian units in Ogaden.
- Mid-Nov 1977 Somalia abrogates Soviet friendship treaty; Soviet military personnel are expelled. Some 250 Soviet military personnel are in Ethiopia; 12 are assigned to advisory positions with the Ethiopian high command; others are to be assigned to division level soon.
- Late Nov 1977 The decision to commit Cuban combat units to battle in the Ogaden is made. Soviet VTA airlift of military supplies and Soviet and Cuban military personnel begins. About 1,000 Cuban troops are flown from Cuba to Moscow, and then transported by Soviet aircraft to Angola.
- 9-13 Dec 1977 Some 30 Cuban MIG-17 and MIG-21 pilots arrive in Ethiopia.
- 10 Dec 1977 Soviet arms-carrying merchant ships arrive.
- 15 Dec 1977 Since the end of November, about 400 more Cubans and 250 more Soviet military advisers arrive on airlift. There are now more than 1,000 Cubans and 500 Soviets in Ethiopia.
- Late Dec 1977 First Cuban combat units arrive in the Harar area of the Ogaden.
- 4 Jan 1978 Some 1,650 Cubans are in Ethiopia.
- 10 Jan 1978 A 2,000-man Cuban mechanized brigade and a Cuban artillery battalion are to be deployed to the Ogaden.
- 17 Jan 1978 The major airlift of Cuban troops from Angola begins. These troops are flown on Cuban and Soviet transports from Cuba to Angola, where they stay overnight before continuing on to Ethiopia on Ethiopian and Angolan transports. With this airlift from Angola, that of Cuban troops via Moscow that began in November comes to an end.




Table 8

Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in the
Ethiopian-Somali Conflict
(Continued)

22 Jan 1978	Somalis begin last effort to take Harar—briefly penetrate city as they did in November 1977.
24 Jan 1978	Cuban units join in defense of the city; first Cuban prisoners taken south of Harar; Cuban-piloted aircraft begin bombing Somali positions.
Late Jan 1978	Soviets send large number of naval ships to the Red Sea presumably to keep port of Massawa open and supplied.
27 Jan-1 Feb 1978	Somali forces are driven back from Harar; Somali brigade destroyed south of city; more than 3,000 Cuban combat troops now in Ethiopia. Ethiopians begin counteroffensive northeast from Dire Dawa.
5 Feb 1978	Somali forces northeast of Dire Dawa fall back under Ethiopian pressure.
11 Feb 1978	Somalia declares "state of emergency" and full mobilization. Somali forces regroup north of Harar; Ethiopians continue to advance up the railroad to Djibouti.
19 Feb 1978	Ethiopian and Cuban troops moving into position for three-pronged attack to recapture Jijiga; Arabi and Giri Kocher captured, thus outflanking Somali positions at Marda Pass.
24 Feb 1978	Cuban forces advancing north of Jijiga are reinforced with 150 to 250 tanks.
25-26 Feb 1978	Ethiopians complete plans for final attack on Jijiga during weekend of 4 March; poor weather hampers air operations.
28 Feb 1978	Ethiopian/Cuban forces continue to push through the mountains northeast of Jijiga.
1 Mar 1978	At least four Cuban generals are now in Ethiopia. Cuban/Ethiopian forces break out of mountains northwest of Jijiga.
2-3 Mar 1978	Bad weather delays further movement.
4 Mar 1978	Weather clears; final assault on Jijiga begins, supported by heavy airstrikes.
5 Mar 1978	Jijiga taken; Cubans/Ethiopians push through town to southeast.
8 Mar 1978	Cuban/Ethiopian forces continue to push south; Somalis withdraw under pressure.
9 Mar 1978	Somalis announce withdrawal of all forces from Ogaden.
11 Mar 1978	Somali withdrawal from Ogaden is in progress.
2 Apr 1978	Airlift of Cuban troops to Ethiopia ends. By that time, total of 16,000 to 17,000 Cubans, including at least 1,000 medical personnel and military advisers, are in Ethiopia. The airlift from Cuba via Angola brought about 11,500 Cuban military personnel.
Nov 1978	Some 13,000 to 15,000 Cuban military personnel are in Ethiopia, of which about 8,600 are combat troops deployed throughout the eastern and southern Ogaden.

III. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR DISTANT OPERATIONS

A. Soviet Forces Deployed in Distant Areas


53. Naval surface ships and submarines are the principal Soviet military forces deployed in distant areas and are supplemented by periodic deployments of naval aircraft. The overall level of Soviet naval operations in distant areas has remained relatively stable since 1970, following the steady expansion in the 1960s of Soviet naval presence abroad (see figure 3). That expansion paralleled the extension of Soviet military assistance into the Third World but was motivated initially by Soviet concerns over potential strategic threats from carrier-launched airstrikes and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Although these concerns remain prominent in Soviet distant oper-

ations, the Navy continues to perform important missions related to the projection of power and influence in the Third World, primarily by maintaining forces in regions of Soviet interest (see figure 4) which can be augmented relatively quickly in times of crisis.

54. In addition to routine and show-the-flag missions, Soviet naval forces have demonstrated support for friendly nations and possibly inhibited use of hostile naval forces against Soviet allies. During Third World crises the Soviets have augmented their naval presence in the areas of conflict; the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, the Jordanian crisis in 1970, the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, the Angolan civil war in 1975, and the Ethiopian-Somali conflict in January 1978. (See Annex A for details.)

Operations of Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces Outside Home Waters, 1965-78*

Figure 3



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
Mediterranean

55. The Mediterranean Squadron, the largest of the permanently deployed Soviet naval forces, made its appearance in 1964. Before the loss of access to Egyptian port facilities in 1976, the number of ships in the squadron averaged 54 units. Since then the number has declined to 45 units—normally 12 surface combatants (eight major combatants, two mine-sweepers, and two amphibious ships), nine submarines, and 24 auxiliaries. The squadron relies mainly on the Black Sea Fleet for surface ships and the Northern Fleet for submarines.

56. The basing of Soviet naval aircraft in Egypt from 1968 to 1972 significantly increased Soviet military capabilities in the area to perform reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) missions. In addition, tactical strike aircraft probably were to be based there. Since 1972, however, when the Soviets were denied use of Egyptian military airfields, the Mediterranean Squadron has had no land-based air support.

57. The Soviets have not been able to gain in any other Mediterranean nation the degree of freedom or full range of support for their Mediterranean Squadron that they enjoyed in Egypt. The loss of the Egyptian facilities has probably contributed to the drawdown of surface combatants. Also, the number and length of diesel submarine deployments from the Northern Fleet have been reduced. Units of the

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squadron continue to make extensive use of anchorages in international waters, but most surface units return to their home ports for major repairs. Facilities in Algeria, Syria, and Yugoslavia are used for submarine repairs and maintenance.

58. *Albania*. Since the period 1958-61, when the Soviets operated a submarine base at Saseno, they have not had access to naval or air facilities in Albania, nor have Soviet ships made port calls. The current Albanian leadership would almost certainly not allow the Soviets access to Albanian facilities, but this leadership is without allies since its break with the Chinese earlier this year. Consequently, a new leadership that would look upon an alliance with the USSR with some favor might come to power in Albania during the period of this Estimate.

59. *Yugoslavia*. The Soviets routinely have a diesel submarine, accompanied by a tender, in overhaul in Tivat, the only Yugoslav shipyard officially designated for the repair of foreign naval ships. In violation of the 1974 Yugoslav maritime law, but with Yugoslav acquiescence, Soviet naval auxiliaries, posing as civilian ships, also have been repaired at two or three similar yards not officially assigned for this purpose.

60. Despite the arrival of a large floating drydock in 1975, the facilities at Tivat are more limited than those which had been available at Alexandria in Egypt, and the Soviets have been attempting to persuade Yugoslavia to grant them increased access.

61. *Tunisia*. Since June 1977, when Soviet ships began using the Menzel Bourguiba (Manzil Bu Raqaybah) shipyard at Bizerte, Tunisia, a number of surface combatants, diesel submarines, and auxiliaries have undergone repairs there. Although there was an unexplained hiatus in repair activities between December 1977 and April 1978, regular Soviet usage has resumed. Several Soviet surface ships have been repaired at Bizerte since April 1978, but no submarines appear to have used the yard since early 1979. At present this shipyard provides the only drydock available on short notice to the Soviets in the Mediterranean.

62. *Algeria*. Since early 1976 diesel submarines have been anchoring regularly in the harbor of Anaba, Algeria, for minor maintenance and repair from a submarine tender that usually accompanies them. The Soviets will continue their efforts to obtain the use of the port of Mers el Kebir, which has excellent berthing and storage facilities but no major repair capability.

63. *Italy*. The Soviets have made approaches to the Italian Government regarding the use of ports such as Taranto to provide repair support for the Mediterranean Squadron. They most recently have shown interest in the use of Naples. There are indications that the Italian Government would not approve such access at any of its ports.

64. *Syria*. The Soviets currently have access to the Syrian port of Tartus and usually keep several ships there, including a repair ship. Some minor maintenance is performed on submarines, but the port has no capability for major repairs. The Syrians have made no formal commitment to grant base rights to the Soviet fleet, and there is no clear sign that the Soviets have access to any repair or storage facilities ashore.

65. *Libya*. The Soviets do not have access to Libyan ports, which in any case lack significant repair facilities. Libya may offer some potential for Soviet access in the future, however.

Indian Ocean

66. The Soviet Navy has maintained a near-continuous presence in the Indian Ocean since 1968. This force normally consists of seven surface combatants (four major combatants, two minesweepers, one amphibious ship), one submarine, and 10 auxiliaries drawn mainly from the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Soviet naval ships continue to make extensive use of anchorages in international waters and to obtain logistic support from Iraq, South Yemen, and Ethiopia.

67. The ouster of Soviet military personnel from Somalia in 1977 deprived the Indian Ocean Squadron of its support facilities ashore—the port and airfield at Berbera developed by the Somalis with extensive Soviet help. These facilities included POL storage, a naval communications relay station, a barracks complex, a floating drydock, and a naval cruise missile handling and storage facility. By the time the Soviets were expelled, they had used only some of these facilities, but all of them were important for their potential to sustain higher levels of naval and air activity of the squadron. Soviet naval reconnaissance and ASW aircraft (TU-95 Bear D's and IL-38 Mays) had used other Somali airfields periodically to patrol the Arabian Sea and on several occasions to reconnoiter US ships (see figure 5). The Soviets will remain alert to opportunities to restore their position in Somalia, but they clearly are proceeding on the assumption that they will not regain use of the Somali facilities in the near future.

68. Moscow wasted no time in acquiring access to facilities in other countries, including Ethiopia. Among the Ethiopian ports of potential use is Massawa, which has a small naval base with limited repair facilities that will require rehabilitation. The port of Assab is smaller than Massawa and more crowded, but has a fuel storage facility. The floating drydock formerly at Berbera and then temporarily at Aden is now located off Ethiopia. Despite the geographic problems and the potential for disruption of their operations from the continued fighting in Eritrea, the Soviets seem determined to make the best of the situation.

69. The agreement also grants the Soviets access to temporary facilities at Dahlak Island, which they will share with the Ethiopian Navy pending the restoration of facilities at Massawa, and to a separate facility, to be constructed and controlled by the Soviets, on the Red Sea coast north of Assab opposite Sanahbor Island. The floating drydock formerly at Berbera—and then temporarily at Aden—is now located at Dahlak.

70. The Soviets have long supported South Yemen's Marxist regime but, despite diplomatic pressuring and increased arms deliveries, have been unable to obtain complete freedom of use of South Yemeni facilities. Nevertheless, since 1968, Soviet naval ships have regularly called at Aden for replenishment, crew rest, water, and minor maintenance. Soviet transport aircraft regularly use the airport at Aden in support of Soviet military missions in the area.

71. Greater Soviet access to, and control of, naval support facilities may result from events there in June 1978 that brought a more pro-Soviet leadership to power. The former British naval base at Aden and nearby Khormaksar airfield offer a more attractive location and support capability than the facilities in Ethiopia. The Soviets recently increased their use of Aden and constructed a communications station nearby, evidently a replacement for the one they gave up in Berbera.

72. The Soviets also have given extensive technical assistance to South Yemen in constructing a new airfield that is nearing completion at Al Anad. This field, begun in the spring of 1976, long before the expulsion from Somalia, will be able to handle advanced military aircraft. The Soviets probably will make use of this airfield for both civilian and military aircraft, including naval reconnaissance.

73. Since 1968 the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron has used the Iraqi ports of Al Basrah and Umm Qasr

for logistic support. For a time during 1974 and 1975, a Soviet repair ship was stationed at Al Basrah, primarily to aid in repairing Iraqi naval units. Soviet naval ships also made occasional use of the ship's repair facilities, but no formal agreement providing Soviet access to Iraqi ports is known to exist. The frequency of Soviet calls there has recently declined from an annual average of 15 between 1973 and 1976 to only four during 1978. This reduction may be due to the recent cooling of Soviet-Iraqi relations, stepped-up Soviet naval activity in the Red Sea area, and the suspension of the Soviet patrol of the Strait of Hormuz.

74. Soviet approaches to other Indian Ocean nations for access to port facilities have been reported, but nationalism and sentiment for a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean will likely frustrate such initiatives. The Soviets are aware of the desire of some littoral states to curtail great-power presence in the Indian Ocean. Although Brezhnev has given sympathetic public treatment to the idea of a "zone of peace," there is no indication that the Soviets will unilaterally reduce their naval presence in the Indian Ocean or yield on the principle of freedom of navigation there.

South Atlantic


75. Since late 1970, the Soviets have maintained a small naval presence off West Africa. The initial purpose was to support the government of Guinea against a threatened coup from Portuguese Guinea—now Guinea-Bissau—but in late 1975 this presence was expanded somewhat to support the Cuban intervention in Angola. Since then the force has normally comprised one or two major surface combatants, one submarine, one amphibious ship, and several auxiliaries. Over the past year at least one combatant has been stationed near Luanda, and a repair ship has been there since 1976, serving Soviet units as well as Angolan patrol craft. In addition, a number of Soviet naval auxiliaries regularly deploy into the Atlantic for intelligence collection and research operations.

76. Soviet surface combatants on patrol off Guinea and occasionally some units en route to the Indian Ocean reprovision at Conakry. Soviet use of naval support facilities ashore there remains limited.

77. Deployments of Bear D naval reconnaissance aircraft have been a major part of Soviet activity in West Africa. Since 1977, when President Toure withdrew permission for the Bears to use Guinean airfields, these deployments have shifted to Luanda. Because Angola is some 2,000 miles southeast of Guinea,

Soviet Naval Air Reconnaissance Deployments to Distant Areas

Figure 5



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Luanda is much less satisfactory as a base for air reconnaissance of the North Atlantic, particularly the approaches to the Mediterranean (see figure 5). Moreover, the distance to Luanda from the TU-95 staging bases in the Kola Peninsula is nearly the maximum range of the aircraft. Therefore, apparently in the interest of safety, all Bear D flights to and from Luanda since 1977 have been staged through Cuba, doubling transit distances. The transport aircraft that support these flights continue, however, to stage through Conakry.

78. In Angola the Soviets have access to shore installations, but facilities for major work are lacking.

79. The Soviets are probably seeking access to additional facilities in West Africa to improve their basing and reconnaissance flexibility. Since February Soviet naval units have paid visits to Benin and Soviet military assistance to that country has sharply increased, but the USSR is not known to have access to any facilities ashore.

Caribbean

80. *[This paragraph of the earlier version of NIE 11-10-79 addressed Soviet military activities in Cuba. In view of events related to this matter since issuance of the Estimate, the paragraph has been deleted. The reader is directed to more recent intelligence publications for information and judgments on this subject.]*

Pacific Ocean

81. Except for Indian Ocean deployments and annual ASW activities in the Philippine Sea, Soviet surface combatants do not normally operate in the open ocean areas of the Pacific. The Pacific Ocean Fleet conducts the great majority of its training and routine operations in the Sea of Japan, along the Kuril Islands, and off the Kamchatka Peninsula. Intelligence collection patrols are periodically conducted in the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and La Perouse Straits to provide the fleet command with surveillance of these major passages.

B. Soviet Forces Available for Deployment to Distant Areas

82. The Soviet Union has vast ground, air, and naval forces on which it can draw for deployment to distant areas. The deployment of a large segment of these forces to distant areas, however, is constrained not only

by the practical difficulties of moving large forces over long distances but also by the requirement, as Moscow sees it, to retain the bulk of these forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe in readiness for their primary mission—waging war with NATO or China. On the other hand, these factors would not restrict the deployment of smaller units.

Naval Forces

83. The number of ships and submarines normally deployed outside home waters is only a small fraction of the Soviet inventory. Additional naval forces for deployment to distant areas can be drawn from the approximately 270 principal surface combatants (including two aircraft carriers), 260 general purpose submarines, and 100 amphibious warfare ships of the four major Soviet fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific). About 70 percent of the surface combatants and amphibious ships and a somewhat lower percentage of the submarines could probably be ready for combat operations in four days.

84. The following tabulation shows the number of days it would take Soviet naval units, as applicable, to reach various distant areas at a speed of 10 knots from the different fleets and from the Mediterranean:

	Mediterranean	Black Sea	Baltic Sea	Northern	Pacific Ocean
Eastern Mediterranean	—	2	13	19	—
West Coast of Africa	21.5	24	24	30	—
Northwest Arabian Sea	9*	15*	—	—	25

85. The Black Sea Fleet is constrained in its deployments by the Montreux Convention, which requires prior notification to Turkey of planned transits and limits the numbers and types of ships that may pass through the Turkish Straits. To alleviate the problems these limitations create for the Black Sea Fleet, the Soviets use a contingency declaration system that allows a limited number of ships to deploy out of area to meet an emergency without violating the convention. This system has enabled them to send up to 15 surface combatants to the Mediterranean within nine days.

86. The Montreux Convention prohibits the passage of submarines through the Turkish Straits unless they are to be repaired in a shipyard outside the Black Sea. Probably for this reason the Black Sea Fleet has only 24 operational submarines—a small percentage of the total Soviet submarine order of battle. Although the Convention is ambiguous on restricting aircraft carrier

* Through the Suez Canal with preferential passage.

ers, any potential challenge to the right of passage of the Moskva- and Kiev-class ships would be weakened by the precedent of passage these ships have already established.

Amphibious Forces

87. Manpower in the Soviet Naval Infantry is estimated at 10,000 to 12,000. The basic unit is the naval rifle regiment, totaling about 1,900 men in three infantry battalions, a tank battalion, and supporting units. Six regiments have been identified: one in each of the three western fleet areas and three in the Pacific. Only one of the Pacific Fleet regiments is believed to be fully manned. Constituted for mobility rather than firepower, naval infantry is primarily intended to serve as the initial assault element in amphibious landings.

88. Most of the Soviet Navy's amphibious ships (see table 9) are capable of deployment to distant areas, although only 28 ships of the Rogov, Alligator, and Ropucha classes are well suited for carrying combat troops on extended deployments. Forward deployments of these ships have been a routine practice since the late 1960s and are a regular feature of Soviet naval deployments in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean and off West Africa. There are rarely more than one or two amphibious ships in each area. It is not

known whether these ships routinely carry a detachment of naval infantry; to date no more than 100 troops are believed to have ever been embarked on any forward-deployed amphibious ship.

Naval Aviation

89. Any of the long-range aircraft at the disposal of Naval Aviation (see table 10) could be used in distant areas if they could stage through forward bases. In practice only Bear D's, Badgers, Mays, and Mails have been employed in this way for distant operations, and only in limited numbers. No Soviet naval aircraft at the present time are based in the Third World. Since 1972 the Soviets have periodically deployed TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba, Guinea, Angola, Somalia, and Vietnam. Currently, they have access only to Cuba, Angola, and Vietnam. When combined with flights from bases in the USSR, Soviet naval air reconnaissance can patrol the western Pacific and large portions of the North and South Atlantic.

Frontal Aviation

90. Relatively few of the several thousand combat aircraft in Frontal Aviation could be brought to bear directly in distant areas. None are currently configured for aerial refueling, and most are deployed opposite NATO in Europe or along the Sino-Soviet border. Frontal Aviation equipment is compatible,

Table 9
Soviet Amphibious Assault Ships—Order of Battle by Fleet

	Individual Tonnage	Northern	Baltic	Black Sea	Pacific	Total
Ivan Rogov	13,000	—	—	—	1	1
Alligator	5,800	2	2	5	5	14
Ropucha	4,500	5	3	—	5	13
Polnocny	800-1,100	7	19	20	9	55
MP-4	780	1	—	—	10	11
Total		15	24	25	30	94

—Secret—

Table 10
Soviet Naval Aircraft

Designation	Mission	Number in Inventory
U-95 Bear D	Reconnaissance	45
TU-95 Bear F	ASW	25
IL-38 May	ASW	47
Backfire	Strike	34
TU-16 Badger	Reconnaissance, ASW, strike, electronic warfare	429
TU-22 Blinder	Reconnaissance, strike	47
BE-12 Mail	ASW	93

—Secret—

however, with equipment already sold to Third World countries, and Frontal Aviation could be drawn on, as it has been in the past, for selected tactical air resources.

Airborne Forces

91. Although there are limitations on Soviet capabilities to use airborne forces in distant areas (see discussion of airborne assault operations, paragraphs 113-120), there are many types of distant operations for which these units are well suited. Because of their

high level of readiness, small size (7,300 men), light equipment, and highly mobile and well-developed command and control, airborne divisions can be deployed more rapidly than either tank or motorized rifle divisions, and they can be more easily supported logistically; but they have less firepower.

92. The seven regular airborne divisions (see figure 6) are believed to have most of their authorized men and equipment and to be capable of deploying on short notice. Although these units, like their Western counterparts, are necessarily lighter in both firepower

Soviet Airborne Division Headquarters

Figure 6



and armor protection than other types of divisions, improvements have been made in their firepower, ground mobility, and air defense capability:

- Some 120 amphibious assault vehicles are being added to each airborne division. These can be parachuted from Cock, Candid, and Cub transports.
- The number of fully armored, air-transportable 85-mm assault guns in a division reportedly has been increased from 18 to 31.
- The self-propelled M-1974 122-mm howitzer may be replacing towed howitzers in each division.
- A new, highly mobile 122-mm or 140-mm multiple rocket launcher on a truck chassis reportedly is replacing the towed version that has been standard equipment.
- Each division has been equipped with 189 shoulder-fired SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.

C. Other Soviet Resources for Distant Operations

Overseas Facilities

93. It is clear from the Soviets' efforts to acquire access to naval and air facilities abroad and from their use of those facilities that access is a prized objective of Moscow's policy in the Third World. It has played a key role in the projection of Soviet power and influence in the Third World, and is important for its potential to sustain higher levels of naval and air activity.

94. Access, however, is not to be confused with formal base rights, which the Soviets have never held in any Third World nation. Perhaps the closest they have come to exercising formal base rights was their near-sovereign control of naval facilities in the port of Alexandria before their ouster from Egypt in 1976.

95. The Soviets have been reluctant to become overly dependent in distant areas on shore support which might suddenly be denied them in time of crisis or major war. For this reason, naval auxiliaries for fuel, water, supplies, and repairs usually are deployed with Soviet combatants even in areas where shore support is available. Figure 4 shows the foreign naval and air facilities to which Soviet military forces have access.

96. In support of current operations, Soviet reliance on overseas facilities is heaviest in the case of air

operations, enabling long-range aircraft to conduct military airlifts and reconnaissance over large parts of the world which could not otherwise be reached from Soviet territory. Access to foreign ports greatly facilitates diesel submarine operations in the Mediterranean, but these operations are not absolutely dependent on that access. The same level of deployment could probably be maintained through the use of international anchorages and more frequent deployments of shorter duration. Surface combatants are least reliant on overseas facilities.

Merchant Marine

97. As the principal means for transporting Soviet arms and military equipment destined for friendly forces and insurgent movements, the merchant marine is vital to Moscow's efforts to influence developments in the Third World. As table 11 shows, more than 98 percent of the ships in the USSR's oceangoing cargo fleet (vessels designed for the movement of nonbulk cargo) fall into categories of general purpose freighters and roll-on/roll-off (ro/ro) ships.

98. Most of the USSR's general purpose fleet consists of ships with at least two decks that carry their own cargo-handling gear (cranes or booms). More than 500 of these ships have booms with capacities of 40 tons or more, capable of handling heavy vehicles such as tanks. In addition, at least 230 vessels in the fleet have large hatches with lengths of 50 feet or more, facilitating the transport and concealment of bulky military objects such as aircraft and missiles.

99. The Soviets have been able to use their general cargo and ro/ro vessels to mount crash military sealifts in the past. At such times, merchant ships may cease or limit commercial service and act as naval auxiliaries. Many Soviet merchant ships would require little or no modification to serve in a naval role and provide direct logistic support to military forces.

100. During 1977 a total of 360 individual Soviet merchant ships delivered arms to 30 Third World

Table 11
Soviet Oceangoing Cargo Fleet

	Number of Ships	Deadweight Tonnage (millions)
Total cargo fleet	839	6.9
General purpose	795	6.6
Roll-on/roll-off	29	0.2
Cellular container	15	0.1

Unclassified

countries. Sixty of these deliveries were made by ro/ro ships. These ships, which the USSR is currently stressing in modernizing its cargo fleet, were introduced in 1974 and reflect the latest technology for fast loading and offloading of wheeled and tracked vehicles. It can be expected that in areas where port congestion is a problem and the need for military equipment is immediate, the Soviets will make greater use of ro/ro ships. For example, in Ethiopia, general cargo ships waited as long as 70 days to berth, and some Soviet arms carriers waited 20 days. Ro/ro ships had a turnaround time of two to seven days, demonstrating their utility in a crisis situation, especially where a secure beachhead is available.

Fishing Fleets

101. The USSR's worldwide fishing fleets play no direct role in Soviet distant military operations. Yet, by their sheer numbers—more than 4,100 modern vessels—they have potential for supporting certain types of military activities. They already provide meteorological and oceanographic data used by the Soviet Navy and could serve as transports for small, lightly armed troop units. Properly equipped, these ships could be adapted for mine and electromagnetic warfare and for use as communications stations. Soviet fishing ships routinely report on contacts with foreign naval units and would perform such reconnaissance functions in a crisis to assist Soviet naval intelligence. Soviet fishing support vessels have on occasion replenished Soviet intelligence ships operating off of the US coasts.

D. Capabilities for Distant Operations

Military Airlifts

102. The USSR's Military Transport Aviation (VTA) has undertaken seven major airlifts to Third World countries.⁶ They clearly have demonstrated determination to assist the friends of the Soviet Union even at great distances. Although the tonnage delivered by air is dwarfed by what the Soviets have transported by sea, airlifts have provided critically needed equipment, ammunition, and medical supplies much more rapidly than is possible by sealift. They also have helped overcome logistic bottlenecks in some of the

⁶ These include five military airlifts—to the Middle East (June 1967), North Yemen (November 1967), the Middle East (October 1973), Angola (October 1975), and Ethiopia (November 1977), and two airlifts for disaster relief to Peru (July 1970, earthquake) and Pakistan (December 1970, flood).

smaller Third World ports and have resupplied isolated friendly forces. In addition, these operations represent to both the recipients and the rest of the world a dramatic demonstration of Soviet commitment. While it is impossible to measure the psychological impact of such missions on the client, the sight alone of aircraft offloading urgently needed supplies can boost morale and possibly play a role in the outcome of a crisis.

103. These operations, with the exception of the two to Peru and Pakistan, demonstrate that VTA can mount a major, unopposed airlift in a short time and sustain it. But they also have revealed limitations. The proficiency displayed has been uneven, and in some cases even relatively low levels of effort have taxed VTA's capabilities.

- Obtaining clearance for overflight, landing, and refueling from various countries en route has been and will continue to be crucial to the success of VTA airlifts to the Third World. In the past, VTA's operations have been complicated by the denial of these clearances in airlifts to the Middle East and Africa. As the distance to be covered by an airlift increases, clearances become even more important. To facilitate the acquisition of overflight clearances, VTA aircraft involved in overseas airlifts routinely carry the markings of Aeroflot, the USSR's civil airline.
- Also, as the distance between refueling points exceeds about 2,000 nautical miles, the payload capability of the VTA transport force—80 percent of which is made up of AN-12s, which have a fairly short range—declines rapidly, because of the technical characteristics of this aircraft.

These factors could pose serious problems for the VTA in intensive airlifts⁷ of long duration requiring heavy payloads over distances greater than 2,000 nm. The VTA inventory of 665 transport aircraft consists of 554 AN-12 Cubs, 49 AN-22 Cocks, and 62 IL-76 Candids.

104. *Aeroflot.* The Aeroflot civil fleet constitutes a substantial reserve which enhances the capability of VTA to airlift personnel to areas of the Third World (see table 12). Aeroflot currently has some 1,300 medium- and long-range transports—including about 160 AN-12s—with a total lift capability of 135,000

⁷ Annex C presents some hypothetical deployments of Soviet general purpose forces to the Third World that illustrate VTA airlift capabilities.

passengers. Many of Aeroflot's crews and much of its equipment are available to support VTA and in fact are used whenever needed. This capability is demonstrated each spring and fall when Aeroflot makes over 1,000 flights transporting more than 100,000 Soviet troops to and from bases in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

105. At the present time, most VTA airlifts out of country utilize only a small percentage of the Aeroflot fleet. Nonetheless, Aeroflot IL-62s played a major role in both the Angolan and Ethiopian airlifts.

Blockade

106. A blockade is generally considered a belligerent act carried out by military forces and aimed at preventing the flow of maritime commerce or resupply to a particular area. Blockading can be carried out by ships, submarines, or aircraft and can involve the use of naval mines and other means of destruction. Although the Soviet Navy has never conducted a blockade in a distant area, there are potential, limited local conflicts in the Third World—such as between North and South Yemen or Ethiopia and Somalia—where the risk of Western involvement is minimal and where Soviet leaders might consider a blockade by their Navy to prevent the seaborne resupply of forces opposing a government or faction favored by the USSR. A blockade might appear to be a viable option

where Soviet assistance had been requested by a legitimate government in the region and where local reaction could be expected to be favorable or at least neutral.

107. Once the Soviets had announced their intent to blockade, the mere presence of their combatants in coastal waters might be sufficient to enforce the closure. Still, because the threat of force is at least implicit in the declaration of a blockade, the Soviets would have to be prepared to deal with any attempt to breach their cordon. The units which the Soviets routinely maintain in areas such as the Indian Ocean and off West Africa probably would be adequate to demonstrate resolve in a blockade situation against a poorly armed Third World nation. But to be effective in the face of significant opposition, Soviet forces would require augmentation. So long as augmentation were not opposed by a major power, the Soviets probably would be able to provide sufficient forces from their home fleets to maintain the blockade. In considering the feasibility of enforcing a blockade, however, they would need to calculate the potential vulnerability of their forces to local air and naval attack, in addition to weighing the risk of escalation and involvement of other major powers.

Intervention of Combat Forces in a Local Conflict

108. The Soviets have significant forces capable of intervention in distant areas and have introduced forces into combat situations in distant areas in the past, and we believe that Soviet leaders in the future would be willing under certain circumstances to use forces for this purpose. Elements of all Soviet conventional forces—ground, air, and naval—are potential resources for use in situations that call for intervention. Although Soviet airborne and amphibious forces have generally been touted by Western observers as the most likely components of any Soviet intervention in the Third World, in practice these forces have not played a role, though Soviet airborne divisions have been placed on alert during several periods of international tension. In the few cases where Soviet forces have intervened, they have been composed of standard combat and support units taken from regular formations.

109. The effectiveness of any intervention of Soviet combat units in a local conflict would depend on scenario-related factors, of which two are probably the most important—the level of opposition and the location. Naturally, the kind of opposition the Soviets would expect to encounter would determine the feasi-

Table 12

Estimated Inventory of High-Performance Aircraft in Aeroflot, 1977*

Jet		1,369
TU-104	Camel (A&B)	136
TU-124	Cookpot	66
TU-134	Crusty (Standard & A)	232
TU-154	Careless	128
IL-62/M	Classic	89
YAK-40	Codling	710
IL-76	Candid	8
Turboprop		1,567
AN-10	Cat	74
AN-12	Cub	163
AN-24	Coke	820
IL-18	Coot	343
TU-114	Cleat	24
AN-26	Curl	143
Total		2,936

* In addition to the high-performance aircraft in Aeroflot's current inventory, the fleet includes 850 to 950 multiengine piston aircraft. For the most part, propeller-driven aircraft are used in training operations and for peak traffic periods during summer schedules.

bility of the operation and the composition of the intervention force. Airborne troops or naval infantry would probably make up most of the force against light opposition. As both of these service components are inherently mobile and lightly equipped, their transport to the area of conflict could be accomplished fairly quickly by air or sea.

110. Interventions against more substantial opposition, however, would probably require conventional ground forces. If they could not be moved overland into areas contiguous to the USSR, they would have to depend in large part on movement by sea. The sealift to the Middle East of a substantial intervention force—a combat-ready motorized rifle division from the Odessa Military District, for example—would take around two weeks. This includes assembly, movement to Black Sea ports, loading, transiting across the Mediterranean, and offloading in a Middle East port. Deployment of larger forces—for instance, the equivalent of two combined-arms armies totaling at least 120,000 men—would require two to three months.

111. A consideration in such a movement would likely be the use of naval forces to protect the troop ships against air and naval attack both in the intervention area and en route from the Soviet Union. Naval forces might also be needed to provide direct support to the forces ashore, particularly naval gunfire, airstrikes, and air reconnaissance.

112. Air and naval support of any military operation at great distance from the USSR would be vulnerable to interdiction. The operation of transport aircraft would be open to attack by air defense forces, especially near their destination. Moreover, many Third World countries possess naval forces—such as submarines, aircraft, and fast patrol boats—that could pose an appreciable threat to seaborne intervention.

Airborne Assault Operations

113. In many areas of the Third World, a Soviet airborne division would be more than a match for any indigenous military forces. Indeed, there are more men with better equipment in a single Soviet airborne division than in the armies of most African nations. Thus, there are potentially numerous situations in which an airborne division, from a military standpoint, could be highly effective, although its use might not be politically feasible.

114. The situations in which airborne forces might be used range from antiguerrilla operations like those conducted by the French and Belgians in Zaire last

year to more conventional operations. The suitability of an airborne force in each instance would vary. The Soviets might be tempted to deploy an airborne unit if they believed the likelihood of combat were low and that the mere presence of an armed Soviet contingent would be a sufficient signal to compel the opponent to adopt a policy more favorable to Moscow. Even in these circumstances, however, Soviet leaders would have to consider the military viability of the operation. Soviet prestige would suffer a major blow if a Soviet combat unit were defeated while intervening in a distant state. Again, however, political, not military, considerations would determine whether such combat operations were undertaken.

115. An important factor affecting the feasibility of airborne operations is the extent to which the transport aircraft are threatened by opposing air defense forces. Soviet fighter aircraft could escort the transports up to a distance of about 700 nautical miles from their bases, including those in countries where Soviet aircraft might be deployed. In the absence of fighter support, the slow-moving transports would be extremely vulnerable to attack from both interceptors and surface-to-air missiles. Unless the Soviets believed they could land and resupply an airborne force without serious interference to their transports, the option to deploy the units would be foreclosed.

116. Any plan to employ airborne units would also have to address the capabilities of the units themselves. Airborne units gain their great advantage of air transportability at the expense of less firepower and armored protection. While Soviet airborne units today are much more mobile than their predecessors, they generally remain at a disadvantage against modern motorized forces.

117. The speed with which the Soviets could deploy an airborne force would depend on a number of factors: the distance to be flown, the level and type of opposition expected at the destination, the granting of overflight clearances, the logistic support available, and the degree to which preparation had already been accomplished before the decision to deploy. (See Annex C for a discussion of planning factors for a VTA airlift.)

118. If the Soviets had no time to make advance preparations, they would be hard put to airlift a division-size force to, say, Syria in less than a week. If, however, they chose to make preparations in anticipation or during the development of a crisis, they theoretically could lift a slightly reduced airborne

division* there in one to two days. This would require around 600 flights, full acquiescence of Turkey or Iran for overflight clearances, and full use of three Syrian airfields. Such a rapid deployment would probably be contemplated by Moscow only as a demonstration of support for Syria in a period of tension. More realistically, then, it would probably take the Soviets three to four days to fly a force equivalent to a reduced airborne division to Syria.

119. The time needed to prepare airborne forces themselves would not be a significant constraint in a long-distance operation. Other factors that would have more impact on the time needed to prepare for an airborne operation are acquisition of overflight clearances, obtaining necessary intelligence, preparation and coordination of plans, and laying on of logistical support en route.

120. While there should be numerous indications of Soviet preparations for deployment of a large force (such as requests for overflight clearance), once these have been accomplished, deployment could begin on very short notice.

Amphibious Assault Operations

121. Soviet amphibious forces were developed to conduct assault landings on the maritime flanks of the USSR in support of ground theater operations. With some augmentation by other naval combatants and auxiliaries, these forces could undertake assault operations against light opposition in many areas of the Third World. Limited seaborne tactical air support could be made available from the Forger V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) fighter-bombers deployed with Kiev-class aircraft carriers. An amphibious task force might also receive tactical air support from neighboring countries, possibly by Soviet land-based aircraft deployed there. Even with substantial augmentation, however, it is doubtful that a Soviet amphibious task force could carry out a forced landing abroad against heavy opposition, because of the lack of adequate sea-based tactical air support, the absence of sufficient naval gunfire support, and the vulnerability of air and sea lines of communication. Moreover, the Soviets lack experience in integrating all of the complex facets of an assault landing beyond the Eurasian littoral.

* A reduced airborne division includes all of the unit's heavy weapons, 90 percent of its men, 70 percent of its trucks, and enough ammunition for three days of heavy fighting.

Interdiction of Sea Lines of Communication

122. We have no evidence of Soviet contingency plans to exert political or economic pressure on the United States or its allies through interdiction of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the absence of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Soviet naval doctrine generally considers SLOC interdiction only within the context of such a war. We believe that the Soviets do not anticipate fighting a major naval war in other contexts and that they realize military operations against such vital Western interests as the sea lines would probably lead to war with NATO.

123. In the unlikely event that the Soviets were to opt for an interdiction strategy outside the context of a general war with NATO, a potential target would be the tanker routes from the Persian Gulf. One method of executing such a decision would be to attack tankers as they exited the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. In a situation in which the Western or regional powers were unwilling to take military action to protect the sea lines, the Soviets could stop the tanker traffic with even the relatively small forces normally present in the Indian Ocean Squadron. Even the threat of such action would probably be enough, in the absence of Western counteraction, to deter any tankers from sailing. Soviet leaders would almost certainly believe, however, that the affected states would take prompt and severe countermeasures to forestall the interdiction of tanker routes. In that event, the Indian Ocean Squadron would be extremely vulnerable, and the Soviets would probably assign the major role in such an interdiction campaign in the Indian Ocean to the submarines of the Pacific Fleet.

124. Problems of sustainability and long transits would probably convince the Soviets that an interdiction campaign designed to bring economic or political pressure would be more effective if conducted nearer to Soviet bases. By attacking the sea lines in locations closer to the ports of destination, such as near Western Europe or the Luzon Strait, the Soviet Navy would be able to bring more resources to bear, including not only additional nuclear submarines but also the slower and range-limited diesel boats. Even so, Soviet leaders would expect such actions to provoke serious countermeasures that could lead to major hostilities with the West.

The Monetary Cost of Distant Operations

125. Monetary costs are not a critical factor in Soviet decisions to mount military operations in distant areas.

In the event of a distant operation, selected military units would be diverted from their primary missions to tailor a force suitable to the situation at hand. Most of the costs associated with these units, including development and procurement of weaponry and the units' usual operating outlays, would be incurred whether or not the units were used for a distant operation.

126. Distant operations, however, generate additional costs. For example, the cost of relocation of the designated units and the concomitant logistic train would increase the operating costs for these particular units. The magnitude of these additional costs depends to a large extent on the particular circumstances and nature of the distant operation. In the end, however,

while the additional cost to the Soviets for a distant operation could result in increased outlays, these costs can be expected to be small when placed in the context of Soviet spending for other defense activities.

127. These costs do not, of course, cover the sale and grant of arms and other military assistance that Moscow provides its clients during major operations such as those in Angola and Ethiopia. To date the Soviets have pledged \$300-400 million of military support to the Angolan regime (excluding Cuban aid) and around \$2 billion to Ethiopia. These commitments and deliveries of equipment are at least partially recovered through hard currency and barter repayment programs. Some are not recovered at all.

IV. OUTLOOK

A. Likelihood and Nature of Future Soviet Distant Operations

128. Although a change in the makeup of the top Soviet leadership is highly probable in the next five years and virtually certain in the next 10, we do not believe that Soviet policies or long-term objectives toward the Third World will change substantially on those grounds alone. We do not foresee the present or any likely future Soviet leadership fundamentally altering these objectives to secure short-term economic or political benefits from the West. Although future Soviet leaders will attach varying degrees of importance to detente relations with the United States and other Western powers, we believe it unlikely that Soviet leaders will be any more dissuaded from pursuing opportunities in the Third World in the future than in the recent past by concern over adverse effects on detente. Indeed, Soviet leaders probably will continue to calculate that major issues like the strategic arms limitations talks will be largely unaffected and that costs in less critical areas of US-Soviet relations will be bearable.

129. We believe the Soviets will persist in a steady course of creating and exploiting opportunities in distant areas, utilizing wherever possible their comparative advantages in military instruments of influence. They will continue to regard military means—principally arms sales, military assistance, and support of insurgent movements—as the most feasible way of bringing about the changes they seek in the political structure of the Third World. The following paragraphs assess prospects for expanding Soviet influence in the Third World through military activities. This is a generalized assessment and does not preclude, especially in the long run, opportunities that could develop from events which are now unforeseen or considered unlikely.

Areas of Operations

130. *Southeast Asia.* Soviet support of Vietnam—and the Friendship Treaty of November 1978—gave Hanoi significant external backing for its invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in December 1978. Nonethe-

less, Hanoi remains fiercely independent and Soviet influence in the region will remain largely dependent on Hanoi's sufferance. Soviet arms sales and economic assistance to Vietnam will probably increase as Hanoi faces the problems of solidifying its position in Kampuchea and restructuring the economics of both countries. Hanoi is unlikely to grant the Soviets any formal base rights in either Vietnam or Kampuchea but is permitting some Soviet access to air and naval facilities. Elsewhere in the region, prospects for expanding Soviet influence are not favorable.

131. *South Asia.* Moscow in all likelihood will maintain its position in South Asia over the next few years.

- There is no question that the Soviets have gained substantially in Afghanistan as a result of last April's change of government there and that Soviet influence in that country probably will continue to increase if the present group remains in power. However, the closer the Afghans move to the Soviets, the better the chances that Soviet influence elsewhere in the region will suffer.
- India has been seeking to make Indian foreign policy more genuinely nonaligned by improving relations with both China and the West and by reducing its dependence on the USSR for arms aid. Nonetheless, New Delhi still maintains close relations with Moscow.
- In Bangladesh, the assassination of President Mujib in August 1975 set back Moscow's warm relations with that developing nation. Since November 1975, Dacca has sought to strengthen relations with the West and China and maintain correct, but cool, ties with the Soviets.
- Improved dealings between the USSR and Pakistan have been given some impetus both by Pakistani unhappiness with the United States and by a belief among some Pakistani officials that Islamabad has no alternative but to turn to Moscow. But, Pakistan's close relations with Iran and China, its deep suspicion of Soviet intentions in South Asia, and Moscow's greater interest in

Pakistan's main rivals—Afghanistan and India—all seem to preclude a significant improvement in relations.

132. Over the longer term, the ability of any outside power to influence South Asian developments may diminish. India is already the dominant power in the region, and the stronger it becomes, the more it will insist on being dealt with as a significant power, and the less it will brook outside interference in what it regards as its rightful sphere of interest.

133. *Middle East.* Opportunities to expand Soviet influence in the Middle East will depend mainly on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the course of events in Iran. Over the longer term, underlying antagonisms toward, and deepening suspicions of, Moscow's motives will qualify Soviet prospects. Soviet opportunities could greatly improve, however, if events in the Middle East raise the likelihood of renewed hostilities. As a result of the instability in Iran, the Soviets undoubtedly anticipate significant changes there and in the conservative regimes of the Persian Gulf area that will lead to opportunities for new Soviet ties with the oil-producing states and to further reduction of Western influence. Moreover, in the event of continued civil conflict in Iran, the Soviets may well support one faction in hopes of replacing US influence. In any case, Soviet military assistance programs in this region will retain their fairly high profile.

134. *Latin America.* Opportunities in Latin America are less favorable than in other regions of the Third World, except for the continuing Soviet role in Cuba. The Soviets have made some economic and diplomatic inroads into Latin America since the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union issued a resolution in mid-1974 declaring this region an arena for Soviet-US competition. Although there will undoubtedly be incidents and turmoil that should lend themselves to exploitation, prospects are still limited by prevalent anti-Communist sentiment and the USSR's inability to provide the kinds of nonmilitary assistance Latin Americans need. The anti-US nationalism often present in this area and negative reactions to US policy on human rights have indirectly aided Moscow, but most Latin American governments are wary of Soviet overtures and are concerned as much about Soviet expansionism as about US regional influence. Sales of Soviet military hardware offer some opportunities. So far, only Peru has purchased Soviet weapons in significant quantities, but there is no evidence that this has given the Soviets much influence with Peruvian policymakers.

135. *[This paragraph of the earlier version of NIE 11-10-79 addressed Soviet military presence in Cuba. In view of events related to this matter since issuance of the Estimate, the paragraph has been deleted. The reader is directed to more recent intelligence publications for information and judgments on this subject.]*

136. *Africa.* The best opportunities for expanding Soviet influence will probably continue to lie in Africa, where political instability is commonplace and where conditions that promote subversion and insurgencies will remain rife. Soviet leaders are pleased with the course their assertive and opportunistic policy has taken in Africa and, as their long-range expectations are on the rise there, they are unlikely to change that policy significantly. Their efforts in Angola and Ethiopia have tended to reinforce their view of themselves as upholders of a preordained, long-term historical process in which power and influence around the world are gradually shifting from the West to the Soviet Union. This has strengthened their determination to stick with their present policy. Furthermore, they will regard the constancy and singleness of their policy as giving them a decided advantage—if not ensuring their eventual success—over the Western nations.

137. Soviet policy will not overlook the smaller, less important African states. For example, Benin, a tiny country on the southern coast of West Africa led by a radical, anti-Western, dedicated Marxist, has received increased amounts of Soviet military equipment and additional Cuban and Soviet advisers over the past year. Its acceptance of Soviet and Cuban assistance represents a tactical advance—a strengthening of Soviet and a weakening of Western influence in the Third World. Benin is a potential base for future support of insurgencies in nearby states and would be of some military value to the Soviets if they were granted access there to air and naval facilities.

138. At least over the next 10 years, Moscow foresees a sequence of protracted struggles for power by black liberation movements in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa which it expects will place the West increasingly on the defensive politically and which it intends to use to enlarge the USSR's role and that of its allies. Soviet expectations in southern Africa are fueled by Moscow's perception of the dilemma facing the West in attempting to broker nonviolent political settlements in the region. Should Western political efforts fail, the Soviets will make every effort to

establish themselves as the dominant external patrons of the black nationalists.

139. The Cuban intervention in Angola and especially Ethiopia has probably strengthened Soviet confidence in the feasibility and effectiveness of this strategy and enhanced its appeal among political and military leaders in both Moscow and Havana, who probably will be encouraged to press this strategy. Soviet and Cuban leaders probably will believe that, as long as such action does not portray them as invaders and does not threaten the West's allies or its sources of vital raw materials, the risk of Western military involvement and escalation to a wider conflict will be slight.

140. Where Cuban or other friendly forces are not available for use in the Third World or are deemed unsuitable, Moscow would have the option of using its own ground forces. Although Soviet air, naval, and air defense forces have been involved in conflicts in the Middle East, Angola, and Ethiopia, Soviet ground combat units have not. Growing Soviet self-confidence in projecting power and in the USSR's role as a global power will diminish whatever Soviet reluctance may have existed in the past to employ ground forces outside the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, there are limited situations in which allied forces would not be preferable from a Soviet point of view; Afghanistan is one where the provision of limited Soviet ground forces in a hurry might well be undertaken. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership would probably view the use of ground combat units, even in modest numbers, as a significant escalation of Soviet involvement. The major constraints would be concern over the likelihood of Western or regional counteraction and the impact on Third World perceptions of Soviet policy. We believe, therefore, that Moscow would employ ground combat units only where, and to the degree, it considered such action essential to preserve vital Soviet interests in the region.

141. Where the risks of intervention with allied or even Soviet forces are greater than in Angola or Ethiopia, Soviet leaders are likely to forgo that measure and to rely instead, as they have in the past, on less provocative military means. They will be especially alert to signs that the United States and other Western powers have reached the point where they can no longer withhold their direct involvement in support of endangered governments.

Weaknesses and Alternatives

142. Soviet efforts to project power and influence in the Third World through military means will continue to labor under the same weaknesses as in the past (discussed under "Policy Appraisal," beginning at paragraph 10, in chapter I). Preservation of influence gained will remain the overriding problem. Many Third World leaders will remain suspicious of Soviet motives and probably would be reluctant clients of the Kremlin. Many of those who do accept Soviet assistance can be expected to react against instances of exploitative military agreements, poor-quality assistance and training, and interference in internal affairs. Moscow will be particularly conscious of the strength of conservative and anti-Soviet forces in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and is sensitive to the misgivings which a number of African leaders have begun to voice concerning the continued presence of Soviet and Cuban military personnel in Angola and Ethiopia. Wider use of Cuban intervention forces in Africa could well deepen these apprehensions.*

143. Soviet leaders also know that without a strong, durable pro-Soviet political base in a country, even where Soviet influence is strongest, the USSR is vulnerable to unpredictable changes in the local political leadership or in its attitudes. To preserve Soviet influence in a country where, for example, dependence on Soviet military support has diminished or expulsion of Soviet military personnel is threatened, Moscow has essentially three alternatives beyond continuation of present policies:

- The first would be to use friendly outside forces like Cubans more extensively to carry out Moscow's policies. If these forces were expelled, Moscow might evade complicity in the actions which led to their expulsion and salvage whatever influence it had acquired. The danger for the Soviets is that the outside forces will usurp this influence and work to their own benefit at Moscow's expense.
- A second alternative—evidently being implemented in Afghanistan and attempted in Angola—is to seek to acquire through Soviet advisers sufficient control of the military and internal security forces to prevent the leaders of the client state from taking actions (such as the expulsion of Soviet personnel) that are in conflict with Soviet interests. This approach too has its

* Annex D discusses perception of Soviet military power in various regions of the Third World.

drawbacks, as the behavior of Soviet advisers in the Third World has in almost every region antagonized and offended client governments, thereby jeopardizing the advances the Soviets have made.

- A third alternative is to garrison Soviet troops in the client state, at its invitation, ostensibly to protect the client against some external threat but in reality to preserve in power a government that is friendly and beholden to Moscow and that will enforce policies in line with Soviet interests. The deployment of Soviet troops to a Third World nation under these circumstances would have unforeseeable ramifications for Soviet foreign relations. It is nonetheless an option which conceivably might attract serious consideration by Soviet decisionmakers. The deployment of Soviet forces for this purpose, however, would be a drastic departure from the policy Moscow has followed in the Third World. That policy generally seeks to bring about changes in the world order through small, sometimes unnoticeable steps that will not galvanize the West to take strong countermeasures, possibly in concert with Third World states or even China. Such a reaction could strengthen the very facets of Western capabilities that Soviet policy has sought to weaken, such as military alliances and political and economic cooperation aimed against the Soviet Union.

144. Most African leaders, however, regard Soviet military and political involvement in the internal affairs of African states as interference and will be disposed to inveigh and take countermeasures against such activities where black liberation struggles prevail and Soviet assistance becomes nonessential. In those cases where liberation struggles gradually evolve from armed conflicts into peaceful programs for social and economic reforms and national development, African sensitivities to the nature and extent of continued Soviet or Cuban involvement in black Africa will probably become acute. African opinion has been generally tolerant of Moscow's military ventures on the continent, where the Soviets were seen as helping one African state fend off attack from another, preserving national boundaries, and assisting national liberation movements. Soviet policy in the Third World feeds on political turbulence, military conflict, and civil strife. During the next 10 years, disruptions are likely to continue, especially in Africa and the Middle East, and the major role the Soviets have

effectively played—a source of arms and military assistance and a protector of clients—will remain relevant to the needs of many countries.

Reaction to Economic Problems

145. Continuing economic problems are forecast for the Soviet Union in the 1980s.¹⁰ As the impact of these problems intensifies, they will reinforce the perception among Soviet decisionmakers that the USSR cannot compete across the board with the West in the economic field for influence in the Third World. In addition to these economic problems, the USSR may be unable over the next several years to produce enough oil to satisfy Soviet and most East European energy requirements and simultaneously to export oil for hard currency. While some measures that could provide short-term relief are conceivable—such as reducing the growth of Soviet energy consumption, spending hard currency for oil, and seeking additional barter arrangements to finance imports of oil—they would be unlikely to resolve the Soviet dilemma.

146. The ultimate impact would be a lower rate of Soviet economic growth which, if not rectified, could have serious economic and probably political consequences for the Soviet Union in the long run. In addition, a drop in Soviet oil production would cause severe energy problems for most East European countries and confront them with painful policy choices as well. But we believe it is extremely unlikely that problems created by an oil shortage in the USSR during the period of this Estimate would cause the Soviet economic position to become so bad that the Soviet leadership would risk an invasion of a Third World country to gain access to oil. Moscow realizes that a seizure of oil production facilities by Soviet or Soviet-allied military forces would be an act of war that at a minimum would fundamentally jeopardize the USSR's relations with all other countries and, in the Soviet view, would likely result in Western military counteraction.

B. Options for the Development and Deployment of Forces for Distant Operations

147. We do not foresee any rapid change in Soviet capabilities for distant operations during the period of

¹⁰ These problems include a sharp reduction in the growth of the labor force, declining rates of capital productivity, an inefficient and undependable agriculture, and a limited capacity to earn hard currency to pay for needed technology imports and intermittent massive grain purchases.

this Estimate, nor do we expect that the primary focus of Soviet military programs will shift from preparations for war with NATO and China. We believe, however, that, although the Soviets are unlikely to conduct assault operations against Third World countries, they consider an improved capability for distant operations to be desirable and that gradual improvements will be made in those naval, air, and airborne forces best suited for such operations.

Navy

148. We expect the Soviets to press forward during the next decade with the development of general purpose naval forces. Although the total number of surface combatants in the Soviet Navy is expected to decline slightly over this period, improvements will take place in the Navy's capabilities for air defense, antiship, and antisubmarine warfare. These improvements in combatant forces will be paralleled by those in logistic support ships with a trend toward larger, more seaworthy units with increased capabilities for rapid replenishment and self-defense. We believe, however, the Soviets will continue to have problems in detecting enemy submarines, in providing targeting assistance for the effective use of many antisubmarine and antiship weapons, and in replenishing ships at sea.

149. The capability of the Soviet amphibious forces for distant operations is expected to improve through the continuation of current building programs and the introduction of new designs. By the 1980s these programs will increase the total tonnage of Soviet amphibious ships.

- The Polish-built, 3,400-ton Ropucha-class has been delivered to the Soviets at the rate of two to three per year. The Ropucha is smaller than its predecessor, the Alligator, but, unlike earlier Soviet amphibious ships, this unit appears to provide troop quarters adequate for long periods at sea.
- Following the completion of the Ropucha program, a new class of amphibious ship is expected to enter the inventory at the rate of about two per year in the early-to-mid-1980s.
- More significant, however, is the construction at Kaliningrad of the 13,000-ton Ivan Rogov class. The first unit of this class, which has more than twice the displacement of any previous Soviet design, is operational, and about four more will be constructed over the next 10 years. The Rogov class is a significant departure in amphib-

ious ship design for the Soviets. With its limited shore bombardment and air defense capabilities, a capacity for six Hormone small naval helicopters, space for carrying air cushion assault craft, and accommodations for a fully equipped 500-man battalion landing team, the ship is well suited for maintaining a self-contained assault unit in forward deployments—a capability which the Soviets have previously lacked.

150. The acquisition of roll-on/roll-off merchant ships will also improve Soviet capabilities for the projection of power. These ships can rapidly offload wheeled and tracked vehicles wherever piers are available and, in the case of amphibious vehicles, possibly directly into the water.

151. A deficiency which limits Soviet capabilities for distant intervention is in tactical air support, a prerequisite for successful assault operations. The Soviets are improving their capability somewhat in this area through the production of the Navy's Forger V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) fighter-bomber, which is carried aboard the two operational Kiev-class aircraft carriers. This aircraft gives the Soviets an initial, though limited, capability for sea-based ground attack as well as some air defense. The aircraft would, however, perform poorly against high-performance Western and Soviet-built aircraft found in the inventories of many Third World countries. The normal complement of aircraft on the Kiev carriers is about 20 to 30 helicopters and about 15 Forger fighter-bombers.

152. The Soviets will certainly undertake a program to replace the Forger in the long term with more advanced, probably supersonic aircraft which may be operational by the mid-1980s. The Kiev-class aircraft carriers probably will be followed in the mid-1980s by a larger class of ship capable of carrying more aircraft. By 1988 the Soviets are expected to have a total of five fixed-wing aircraft carriers in addition to their two Moskva-class helicopter cruisers. By the late 1980s, there is a good chance the Soviets will have adapted existing helicopters, or developed new ones, for a number of amphibious warfare tasks, including beach assault by vertical envelopment.

153. The Soviets apparently also see a need for a continued naval shore bombardment capability. They recently introduced a new 100-mm gun on some frigates, and an even larger naval gun may be installed as the main armament on a new cruiser class. The first ship of this class was launched in December 1978 and

could be operational by mid-1980. During the next 10 years, however, many older cruisers and destroyers armed with 152-mm and 130-mm guns will be retired or will be approaching the end of their service life. Nevertheless, along with expected improvements in naval aviation, naval gunfire support will be an important factor in Soviet capability for direct assault ashore against opposition.

Air Forces

154. The transport arm (VTA) of the Soviet Air Force is expected to undergo a significant modernization during the next 10 years. VTA's capabilities will continue to be enhanced by acquisition of IL-76 Candid jet aircraft—a total of 270 by the late 1980s. The Candid can carry twice the payload and has three times the range of the AN-12 Cub, which it is replacing.

155. The Soviets are reportedly developing a new wide-body jet transport that will probably be roughly equivalent to the C-5A. This program, if successful, will improve VTA's capability to transport outsized cargo such as medium tanks. We expect this aircraft to become operational in the early-to-mid-1980s.

156. We believe the Soviets will perceive a requirement to replace the Cub transport in VTA in both number and mission, and by the mid-to-late 1980s will make operational a new medium transport aircraft. We think this development will meet the Soviets' need for a large VTA force to maintain their current capability to perform support missions.

157. The Soviets are likely to continue to rely on friendly Third World countries for refueling stops for operations in distant areas, especially resupply missions. As long as the Soviets can obtain such landing clearances en route, they will probably not need the capability to fly long distances in the Eastern Hemisphere without refueling. If, however, the Soviets anticipated losing landing clearances, or they expected to encounter landing problems or excessive delays, they could pursue development of an in-flight refueling capability.

158. Soviet fighter-bomber aircraft at this time lack an air-to-air refueling capability, a factor which limits their ability to provide air support in distant areas. Soviet tactical aviation, however, will probably develop an air-to-air refueling capability.

159. Currently, VTA has a reasonably good capability to respond rapidly to crisis situations with little or

no warning and subsequently to conduct large-scale transport operations. Yet, the constraints on VTA's capabilities (discussed in paragraph 103) could create problems in long-distance airlifts requiring heavy payloads. The Soviets certainly are aware of these constraints, and we believe they have embarked on a modernization program for VTA that, while maintaining a force near its current size, will enable it over the next decade to increase its lift capability. Assuming that the Candid will be deployed in the number we expect, and that a new wide-body jet transport and a new medium assault transport are deployed, the VTA's payload capability could increase by as much as 50 percent by the late 1980s.

160. Airborne divisions, along with other ground units, are undergoing some modernization, as previously mentioned (see paragraph 92). These improvements—mainly the introduction of self-propelled artillery, shoulder-fired air defense missiles, and modern, highly mobile combat vehicles and rocket launchers—will make airborne divisions increasingly potent intervention forces. Improvements in air transport and tactical air forces will further increase Soviet ability to use airborne forces in distant areas.

161. Over the next 10 years the Soviets will continue to make modest improvements in amphibious lift, logistic support ships, naval tactical air support, gun fire support, and airlift. Such improvements, when added to current naval, airborne, naval infantry, and command and control resources, will result in an increased ability to deploy forces in distant areas and to come to the assistance of any ally. For example, the Soviets might introduce an airborne or naval infantry unit at the invitation of a government, particularly if Moscow believed there was little danger of Western reaction and that the intensity of combat would be low or the presence of an armed Soviet contingent would be sufficient to accomplish Moscow's objectives.

162. We believe, however, that the Soviets are unlikely to invade a Third World country. They have never mounted an airborne assault or amphibious assault operation in a distant area. Nevertheless, Soviet forces have long been capable of undertaking such an operation against the light opposition which could be expected in most areas, and the above-projected improvements will expand this capability. But, over the next decade, the Soviets will still not have built the forces capable of transporting, landing, and sustaining a large joint assault operation against substantial opposition in the Third World.

C. Future Military Sales and Assistance

163. We do not foresee any diminution in the Soviet military sales and assistance programs, which should continue to flourish. Neither the political nor the commercial interests of the USSR would be served by a radical change in policy that would deny arms or advisers to Third World states. Indeed, arms transfers will remain the principal Soviet entree to most of these countries. We expect Moscow to sell arms so long as opportunities exist and to strike hard bargains that earn maximum returns in hard currency. Moscow's major customers—Afghanistan, Algeria, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Libya, Peru, and Syria—are likely to remain dependent on Soviet weaponry and military equipment for at least the next five years. The extent to which opportunities to expand the Soviet market will increase will depend largely on the willingness of Western suppliers to sell arms to Third World nations. Where Western equipment cannot be obtained or the price is too high, the demand for Soviet hardware will rise. In any event, Arab ambitions to achieve superiority in military equipment over Israel will for some time bring pressure on Moscow for more modern arms.

164. Although India will continue to strive for self-sufficiency in arms production, it will remain reliant on outside support for technologically advanced weapon systems. In selecting weapon systems, India will seek the best deal, whether offered by the West or the Soviets. Should India cease to acquire Soviet arms,

its current military modernization programs would suffer until it could obtain alternatives for the weapon systems currently projected to be supplied by the USSR. However, because of its indigenous production capability, its favorable foreign reserve balance, and the availability of Western arms as an alternative source, India's overall military effectiveness would not be seriously degraded.

165. Peru as well, despite misgivings about the quality and intentions of Soviet aid, is deeply committed financially and could not easily disengage from Soviet support for more than \$630 million in arms that it has purchased in the past decade. Nor could Peru switch to other arms suppliers without largely sacrificing the tremendous financial investment it has made in Soviet equipment, without disrupting ongoing military modernization programs, and without degrading military capabilities for a period of several years during a transition to different hardware.

166. In general, most Third World countries will continue to prefer non-Communist arms. Major shifts from the West will reflect the disinclination or the inability of the supplier to fill Third World orders. Requirements of the big Western customers will probably continue to be met by the Western arms exporters. We see no immediate dramatic expansion by the Soviets into the other Western arms markets—South Asia and Latin America. In any event, these markets are small and would not sustain orders for Soviet equipment at the high levels noted from Middle Eastern and North African countries.

ANNEX A

SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO SOVIET
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD—1954-78

- 1955 Soviet marketing of arms to Third World countries began, with sale to Egypt through Czechoslovakia.
- 1958 Pro-Western Iraqi Government was overthrown. New regime was Arab nationalist and "nonaligned," and established diplomatic relations with the USSR.
- 1958-61 Soviets operated a diesel submarine base at Saseno, Albania.
- 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
- 1963 Iraqi Government overthrown. The new regime verbally attacked the international Communist movement, violently repressed the local Communist party, and stepped up military operations against Soviet-backed Kurdish insurgents. In retaliation, Moscow slowed and then stopped its military deliveries to Iraq, causing a sizable diminution in Iraqi operations against the Kurds. When the Iraqis subsequently ceased their anti-Communist propaganda and reduced their repression of local Communists, the USSR agreed to resume arms shipments.
- 1963-64 Soviet naval forces established permanent presence in the Mediterranean.
- 1965 The abortive coup attempt in Indonesia by the Indonesian Communist Party supported by China caused Moscow to lose practically all of its investments in costly military and economic aid programs there, for which the Soviets have never been repaid.
- 1966 Ghana's President Nkrumah—a staunch ally of the Soviet Union—was ousted, and only recently (1977) has Moscow begun to reestablish its influence there.
- Jun 1967 During the Arab-Israeli war the Soviets increased the number of missile-launching surface ships in the Mediterranean from two to five and used them to trail one British and two US carriers. Other ships also augmented the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean, and some took up positions near US ships.
- Jun-Jul 1967 Military Transport Aviation (VTA) airlift to Egypt.
- Nov 1967-
Jan 1968 VTA airlift to North Yemen.
- Dec 1967 North Yemen: Soviet pilots flew combat and supply missions on behalf of republican forces putting down an insurrection by royalist supporters. This is believed to have been the first direct involvement of Soviet combat personnel in the Arab states.
- Mar 1968 Soviet naval ships established near-continuous presence in the Indian Ocean.
- Apr 1968 Soviet naval units began periodic visits to Mogadishu and, later in the year, to other Somali ports.
- Jun 1968 Soviet naval ships began regular calls at Aden, South Yemen, for replenishment, crew rest, water, and minor maintenance. They also began regular use of the Iraqi port of Al Basrah.

1968-72 The Soviets gradually built up a permanent deployment of naval air units in Egypt. They piloted TU-16 Badger reconnaissance and IL-38 May antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft on regular patrols over the Mediterranean, stored air-to-surface missiles at Aswan, and were prepared to station Badger naval strike aircraft in Egypt.

Feb 1969 Soviet naval ships began regular use of the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr for logistic support.

Apr 1969-
Aug 1970 Egypt's "war of attrition." Soviet military manpower in Egypt rose from less than 4,000 in January 1970 to more than 13,000 in July 1970. The number peaked in mid-1971 at more than 15,000, of which some 8,300 were combat personnel, primarily in surface-to-air missile units. This number declined thereafter, as Egyptians manned the Soviet air defense equipment. Some 60 MIG-21 fighters and pilots were airlifted to Egypt, where they flew combat air defense missions and performed their own maintenance and logistics. A Soviet MIG-25 Foxbat detachment was deployed to Egypt and performed reconnaissance missions along the Suez Canal. In July 1970, four Soviet pilots flying MIG-21s were shot down over Egypt by Israeli fighters.

Jul 1969 Soviet naval units visited Cuba for the first time since the missile crisis in 1962.

Since 1970 Limited use of Algerian port of Annaba by Soviet naval units.

Apr 1970 First deployment of Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba.

Jul 1970 The abortive pro-Communist coup in Sudan and the subsequent purge of Communists and sympathizers from the government and the execution of the coup leaders—including the secretary general of the Communist Party—resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from the country and termination of military assistance, dashing any long-range Soviet plans to use Sudanese airfields and port facilities for larger strategic purposes in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.

Jul 1970 VTA airlift to Peru.

Sep-Oct 1970 Jordanian crisis. Soviet deployments of major naval combatants to the Mediterranean increased (from two cruisers and three destroyers to four cruisers and nine destroyers), and Soviet ships took up positions near US ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

Aug 1970 Soviet naval facility under construction at Cienfuegos, Cuba.

Sep 1970 Nasser died, and Sadat began his rise to power as Egyptian President.

Nov 1970 First deployment of Soviet naval ships off West Africa.

Dec 1970-
Feb 1971 VTA airlift to Pakistan.

May 1971 Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed. Despite the treaty, Sadat grew wary of Soviet influence. Moscow delayed or reneged on commitments to deliver weapon systems, particularly those most coveted by the Egyptians, pending an improvement in Sadat's policies toward the USSR. This Soviet tactic backfired, as Sadat's resentment at this treatment reinforced his resistance to Soviet pressure.

Aug 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed.

Dec 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The United States and the Soviet Union each deployed additional naval forces to the Indian Ocean. Following the arrival of the US aircraft carrier Enterprise, four Soviet cruise-missile-equipped units reached the scene. The Soviets maintained surveillance of both US and British naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

Feb 1972 A Soviet ballistic missile submarine—a diesel-powered G-II—visited Cuba for the first time, putting into the port of Antilla. The only other ballistic missile unit—also a G-II—to make a port call in Cuba was in April 1974, in Havana harbor.

Apr 1972 Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed.

Jul 1972	Sadat ordered the bulk of Soviet military personnel in Egypt to withdraw—including ground, air, air defense, naval air, and some naval forces. Soviet naval units for the most part remained at Alexandria.
Oct 1972	Soviets began expanding port and POL storage facilities at Berbera, Somalia.
Jul 1973	First deployment of Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft to Guinea.
Oct 1973	Middle East war. The Soviets doubled their naval forces in the Mediterranean (to 98 units, including more cruise missile units) and increased surveillance of the US 6th Fleet. Soviet ships took no provocative actions. Soviet deployment of combat units other than naval was limited to a few Soviet-manned surface-to-air missile units in Syria. Soviet officers took an active part in operational decisionmaking in the Syrian General Staff. At the same time Soviet advisers supervised tactical operations of Syrian and Iraqi Army units and were actively involved in the operation of Egyptian air defense radar nets. VTA airlift.
Oct 1973	Cuba sent an armored brigade, medical detachment, and contingent of pilots to Syria after the outbreak of the fighting. This was clearly a joint effort with the Soviets. Cuba provided the personnel; the USSR provided the aircraft and other equipment.
1974	Roll-on/roll-off cargo ships were introduced into the Soviet merchant fleet.
Apr 1974	Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed.
Mid-1974	Soviet Party Central Committee resolution on Latin America, stating in effect that Moscow no longer viewed Latin America as a sphere of strictly US influence but rather as an arena for Soviet-US competition.
Dec 1974	First Soviet naval combatant (an F-class diesel submarine) began overhaul at Tivat, Yugoslavia, subsequent to the change in June 1973 of the Yugoslav maritime law to permit repair of foreign naval ships.
1974-75	Final stage of Iraqi-Kurdish war. Soviet pilots reportedly flew combat bombing missions against the Kurds, but took care not to cross the Iranian border.
1974-76	Angolan civil war (see chronology of events in table 7 of chapter II).
Apr 1975	Soviet IL-38 May ASW aircraft began periodic visits to Somalia.
Jun 1975	Suez Canal reopened.
Oct 1975- Mar 1976	VTA airlift to Angola.
Nov 1975	Modest VTA airlift of military equipment to South Yemen for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).
Dec 1975	The PFLO, supported by the Soviets since 1969, was defeated by a combined force of Omanis and Iranians.
Dec 1975	The few Soviet naval ships operating off the West African coast near Conakry were augmented to include a guided missile cruiser and destroyer, a landing ship, a diesel submarine, and several auxiliaries, to support the Cuban intervention in Angola.
Dec 1975	The Soviets moored a large floating drydock in the harbor at Berbera, Somalia, for use by ships of their Indian Ocean Squadron.
Early 1976	Soviet diesel submarines began anchoring regularly at Annaba, Algeria, for minor maintenance and repair from a Soviet submarine tender that usually accompanies them.
Apr 1976	Sadat abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty and ordered the remaining Soviet military personnel—mainly naval—to leave Egypt by mid-April.
Apr 1976	Syrian forces occupied northern Lebanon. Syria's intervention angered Soviet leaders and resulted in a slowdown in Soviet arms deliveries for eight months.

Oct 1976	Soviet-Angolan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed.
Oct 1976	Two Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Somalia.
Dec 1976	A Soviet naval repair ship took up station off Luanda, Angola.
Jan 1977	Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft began periodic deployments to Angola.
Jan 1977	A Soviet destroyer and tanker visited Maputo, Mozambique, at the invitation of the Mozambique Government. This was the first visit by a Soviet naval detachment to this country.
Feb 1977	Soviet naval units began frequent visits to Benin.
Mar-Apr 1977	Soviet President Podgorny visited Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique—the first visit to southern Africa by so senior a member of the Soviet hierarchy. Soviet-Mozambique Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed.
Early 1977	Soviets reportedly began operating the naval base at Luanda, Angola.
May 1977	Expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Sudan.
Jun 1977	Soviet naval ships began using Menzel Bourguiba (Manzil Bu Raqaybah) shipyard in Tunisia.
Jun 1977	Guinea prohibited further TU-95 reconnaissance flights from Conakry but continued to allow Soviet military air transports to land and Soviet naval ships to use certain port facilities.
Nov 1977	Somalia, for years Moscow's favored client in the Horn of Africa, abrogated its friendship treaty with the USSR and expelled all Soviet military personnel in retaliation for Moscow's support of Ethiopia. This action cost the USSR its access to Somali airfields and the port at Berbera. The drydock at Berbera was towed to Aden, South Yemen, and the communications station was dismantled.
Nov 1977- May 1978	VTA airlift to Ethiopia. VTA transports were assigned to Ethiopia for in-country logistic flights.
Jan-Feb 1978	Ethiopian-Somali conflict. The Soviets augmented their Indian Ocean squadron from an average of 18 (including four to five combatants) to a peak of 32 ships (including 13 combatants). A number of ships of the squadron were deployed to the southern Red Sea to assist in the delivery of supplies to Ethiopia and to provide security for Soviet and Ethiopian shipping involved in the sealoft. (For other Soviet involvement see chronology of events in table 8 of chapter II.)
Apr 1978	Soviet drydock at Aden towed to the Red Sea, off Ethiopia.
Apr 1978	Pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan.
Jun 1978	Pro-Soviet coup in South Yemen.
May 1978	The first Soviet MIG-23 Flogger jet fighter-bombers were identified in Cuba.
Jul 1978	Three Soviet IL-18s flew from the USSR to Hanoi, probably ferrying Soviet technicians to replace Chinese.
Jul 1978	VTA AN-12s were stationed in South Yemen. A Soviet communications station was constructed there, apparently as a replacement for the station the Soviets lost in Somalia.
Jul-Aug 1978	Soviet MIG-25 Foxbat interceptors were delivered to Libya—the first delivery of this aircraft to a Third World country.
Aug-Sep 1978	Foxbats were delivered to Algeria, which reportedly will receive a squadron.
Nov 1978	Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed.
Nov 1978	Soviet-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed.
Late Nov- Early Dec 1978	Soviet naval AN-12 transports and IL-38 May ASW aircraft deployed to Aden. This was the first appearance of Soviet tactical aircraft in South Yemen.

ANNEX B

SOVIET AID TO INSURGENT MOVEMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD

This annex provides some background on the level, scope, and motives of Soviet support of insurgencies.

The Middle East

The PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization)

1. Moscow has provided military assistance and training to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and some of its member groups for a number of years. This support increased greatly following the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 as the USSR moved to compensate for losses sustained in its relations with Egypt and to frustrate US-backed efforts to attain a peace settlement. The bulk of Soviet aid has gone to Fatah, the largest group, which is headed by Yasir' Arafat. The Soviets have also given assistance to the Syrian-controlled As-Saiqa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which is headed by George Habbash but is no longer a member of the PLO; and to the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), which is a Marxist group headed by Naif Hawatmah.

2. The quantities and value of materiel furnished by the Soviets cannot be determined, as much of it has been channeled through Arab clients—including, at different times, Egypt, Syria, and Libya. The assistance is substantial, however, and has included anti-aircraft missiles. In addition, the Soviets have provided military and political training to Palestinians in the USSR.

3. While the Soviets have from time to time advised the PLO that terrorist attacks both within and outside Israel could prove counterproductive and were therefore inadvisable, continued Soviet support clearly has not been made contingent on the PLO's abandoning the use of terror.

The PFLO (Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman)

4. The USSR has given propaganda support, training, and arms to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman since 1969. The PFLO is based in South

Yemen and, until late 1975, conducted operations in Dhofar, Oman's southern province. At that time the PFLO members suffered a major military setback and have since been confined to South Yemen, where they are presumably regrouping and waiting for the opportunity to move again.

5. The quantity of Soviet aid provided the PFLO is impossible to evaluate. All assistance has been funneled through either South Yemen or Iraq, and, as the aid furnished by these nations themselves is of Soviet origin, it is hard to differentiate among the donors. The amount of aid apparently was insignificant until 1972, when it began to increase. During 1974 and 1975 the PFLO reportedly received significant quantities of arms from the USSR, including sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles. Since the PFLO's defeat in November 1975, the Soviets reportedly have continued to supply arms and other assistance, but probably in limited quantities.

North Africa

The Polisario (Western Sahara)

6. The Soviets have given little, if any, direct assistance to the Polisario, which operates in Western Sahara and receives most of its support from Algeria. Reports of Soviet involvement in the training of Polisario elements have been of questionable reliability. Though not directly involved, the Soviets have clearly not placed any restrictions on Algerian or Libyan assistance to the organization. As a result, the Polisario has become rather well equipped in the past several years with weapons that are primarily Soviet in origin. This indirect type of assistance has enabled the Soviets to maintain their credibility with both the Polisario and Algeria, while preventing the deterioration of their relations with Morocco. It has also given the Soviets considerable flexibility for future decision-making. They support the right of self-determination for Western Sahara, the position endorsed by Algeria and the Polisario, and they have referred in positive terms to the Polisario organization. This position pre-

sumably gives them the option of supporting the group more overtly in the future if they decide this is desirable.

The Ansars (Sudan)

7. Soviet backing for the Ansar insurgents in northern Sudan is even more tenuous than that for the Polisario. The Soviets have not defended the Ansar cause in their propaganda; they have no direct contact with the Ansars; and they have provided no direct support for the insurgency. They have, however, certainly approved of Libya's supplying of Soviet equipment to the rebels, and in addition, according to several reports, either they or the East Europeans were involved in transporting such equipment from Libya to Ethiopia for transfer to the Ansars in the fall of 1976. Since early 1977, Libyan support for the Ansars has decreased for a number of reasons, one of which has been Sudan's recent policy of reconciliation with the rebels. As Libyan support for the Ansars has fallen, the USSR's remote involvement has further diminished.

Frolinat (Chad Liberation Front)

8. There is no evidence of Soviet support for the Chad Liberation Front (Frolinat). As in the case of the Ansars, however, the rebels are equipped with weapons manufactured by the Soviets which have been supplied by Libya, and there is no indication that the Soviets have sought to prevent the Libyans from transferring this material. This policy has again given the Soviets desirable flexibility. Should the insurgency prove successful, they can claim to have been an important supporter; if it should fail, they have been detached enough to prevent repercussions and to deny responsibility. In September 1978, however, one of the two Frolinat factions went over to the government's side, and Libya withdrew its military personnel—some 300 men—from both factions. Libya will continue to provide small arms and training to the Frolinat insurgents.

Southern Africa

9. In southern Africa the USSR backed successful insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique and continues to be the major source of foreign support for insurgents in Rhodesia and Namibia. But, in supporting these insurgencies, Moscow has been careful to follow overtly the lead of the principal black-ruled states in the area. The USSR has, for example, not

publicly challenged Western attempts to reach negotiated settlements in Namibia and Rhodesia, even though the Soviets have privately advocated continued insurgency. We believe that the Soviets would prefer that nationalists secure power through military struggles like that in Angola which would establish a weak regime dependent on Soviet aid. If one of the insurgent groups gains control through peaceful means, however, the USSR will attempt to maneuver itself into being the dominant foreign power.

Rhodesia

10. The USSR, with Cuban assistance, provides the Patriotic Front (PF)—the tenuous alliance of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—with a range of assistance including weapons, training, diplomatic support, and money. ZAPU has received more of this aid than ZANU, a faction of the PF that Moscow finds ideologically less acceptable. As compared with the Soviet investment in Angola and Ethiopia, support thus far for the PF has been small, costing the USSR less than \$100 million.

11. The Soviet role in the Rhodesian situation has been limited by the leaders of the Frontline States who hope to see the Rhodesian problem solved without extensive non-African involvement. To limit the Soviet role, the Presidents of the Frontline States have insisted that military equipment destined for the PF be channeled through them. In addition, although the number of Cuban military personnel has risen in Mozambique, it and the other Frontline States have restricted the number of Soviet and Cuban advisers they allow to work with the PF; Zambia has been particularly cautious in this regard.

12. The USSR has had to accept the restriction placed on its activities by the Frontline States. The PF controls no territory which could be used to support an expanded Soviet role and is itself dependent on the Frontline States for facilities to train its forces and launch operations into Rhodesia. In deference to the Frontline Presidents, Moscow publicly endorses a united PF, hoping that it can allay their suspicions, expand its influence, and position itself to take advantage of opportunities presented elsewhere in the region.

Namibia

13. The USSR provides political and military support for the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), but the level of military assistance is less

extensive than that provided to the Rhodesian insurgents. SWAPO receives military equipment from the USSR primarily through Angola, where its main training camps and bases are located. SWAPO guerrillas are trained by Soviet and Cuban advisers in Africa, the USSR, and Cuba.

14. The People's Republic of China was the main supplier in the early 1970s. Recently, Chinese aid to SWAPO has declined, and the Soviet role as arms supplier has grown dramatically. We believe, however, that Moscow regards SWAPO as secondary to its interests in Angola and Rhodesia.

Republic of South Africa

15. There is no insurgency in South Africa, but the Soviet Union intends to play a role in developments there. The Soviet Union provides some support for the African National Council (ANC).

Asia

16. Although Vietnam, the centerpiece of Soviet policy in Indochina, continues to provide some support to the Thai Communists, there is no evidence that the Soviets are directly supporting any insurgency in Asia. Moscow does, however, continue to fund local Communist parties. In addition, some Soviet equipment may pass indirectly to local insurgencies through third

if not fourth parties. One, and perhaps the only, example is Libyan support for the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines. On the whole, however, the Soviets have meticulously pursued a policy of state-to-state relations with all of Asia in order to allay suspicions of Soviet intentions and to deprive the Chinese of any opportunities to exploit Soviet duplicity or Soviet-fueled regional antagonisms to their own advantage.

Latin America

17. We have little information on Soviet support for insurgent movements in Latin America. Reliable sources, however, have reported that Latin Americans have been training in the Soviet Union since the early 1960s. Third World trainees in the USSR are selected by the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff and by the Committee for State Security (KGB) on the basis of their potential for leadership and their attitudes toward the USSR.

18. We have some evidence that Soviet support to Latin American insurgencies is channeled through East European and Cuban embassies. Cuba maintains a small training program for Latin American insurgents and provides refuge for Latin American Communist exiles. Latin American Communist parties are supported directly by the Soviet Communist Party and indirectly through a variety of Communist-dominated international organizations.

ANNEX C

THE MOVEMENT OF LARGE SOVIET FORCES BY MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION—HYPOTHETICAL DEPLOYMENTS

1. The circumstances that would determine the nature and scale of any Military Transport Aviation (VTA) airlift of large contingents of general purpose forces to the Third World could vary so widely that any attempt to forecast how the Soviets would employ their military air transports for that purpose is useless. Therefore, to illustrate Soviet airlift capabilities for such missions to destinations at different ranges from the USSR, we have considered three force packages: a slightly reduced airborne division, a tactical aviation regiment, and an air defense force comprising an SA-6 regiment, two ZSU-23-4/SA-9 batteries, and two airborne regiments.

2. The deployment times which have been computed include only the time required to transport the units—from the time the first aircraft departs until the arrival of the last aircraft at the destination. Additional time—perhaps three to four days—would be required to prepare the force for deployment, involving activities such as:

- Alerting airborne and transport aircraft units.
- Making or modifying plans.
- Recalling aircraft from other missions.
- Performing any necessary maintenance.
- Deploying aircraft and airborne units to airfields for loading.
- Loading the force.
- Ensuring adequate support facilities and personnel at intermediate and destination airfields.

Arrangements for overflight clearances and refueling en route are a major uncertainty, particularly if the operation extends over several days. They could delay the movement or force the Soviets to decide between cancellation of the support operation and unauthorized overflight.

3. While there should be numerous indications of Soviet preparations for deployment of a large force

once these have been accomplished, deployment could begin on very short notice.

4. It should also be noted that, for the purposes of this Estimate, the daily sortie capacity of an airfield was determined by certain assumptions regarding the number of available parking spaces, its air traffic control capability, and the average turnaround time for each aircraft. Adequate supplies of fuel were also assumed to be available at all intermediate and destination airfields. Fuel supplies are a major factor in large-scale operations, however, and shortages have been experienced at some of the small Third World airfields in both US and Soviet airlifts.

5. Figure 7 depicts the surge capability of VTA to airlift a reduced airborne division—that is, one with all of its heavy weapons, 90 percent of its men, 70 percent of its trucks, and enough ammunition for three days of heavy fighting. No POL is transported by air. The serviceability of the transport force is assumed to be 0.85, and each aircraft makes one flight. As shown in the tabulation, the force comprises the approximately 500 aircraft found in five VTA divisions but does not include the 150 AN-12s in the five independent VTA regiments:

VTA Division	Aircraft Inventory		
	Cub	Candid	Cock
Seshcha	32	4	49
Vitebsk	43	49	0
Krivoy Rog	132	0	0
Melitopol	99	0	0
Panevezys	99	8	0


6. The capability for surge delivery decreases after 2,000 nautical miles because of the range-payload limits of the AN-12 Cub, which constitutes 80 percent of the transport fleet. Thus, to make full use of their lift capability in long-distance deployments, the Soviets must be able to make stops for refueling every 2,000 to 3,000 nm.

Surge Delivery Capability of Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA)

Figure 7

Without Predeployment of Aircrews

Fraction of reduced airborne division



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7. Movements to Syria, Mozambique, and Cuba were selected as representative of possible Soviet deployments in support of client states. Operations to distant areas such as Mozambique and Cuba would require several refueling stops, and the parking and support capacities of intermediate airfields would probably be an important limiting factor. The available parking space would become particularly significant if the crews were not augmented or replaced and had to remain overnight at an intermediate field. Furthermore, this situation would greatly increase the time required to deploy the units.

8. For movement to Mozambique without augmentation or pre-positioning of crews, the rate of delivery is probably limited by the number of aircraft parking spaces and the requirement for resting crews either en route or in Mozambique. The rates of delivery for five possible routes from the Soviet Union to Mozambique, ranging in distance from 4,700 nm to 7,700 nm, are shown in the left-hand chart of figure 8. The first deliveries require 24 to 28 hours, regardless of the

route selected. Movement of the reduced airborne division would require at least seven days over the most direct route through Pakistan. For routes passing through the Middle East, there is a requirement for a refueling and rest stop in the vicinity of Aden. The most rapid delivery of the air defense force and a tactical aviation regiment would require five to six days and two to three days, respectively. If the only route available were via Guinea and Angola, the delivery rate would be approximately one-third of that achievable using the more direct routes—a constraint due to limited airfield facilities in Guinea. While the first delivery could occur within 48 hours, the deployment of the reduced division would require about 21 days.

9. Deployments to Mozambique could be accelerated by crew augmentation or replacement, so that no rest periods would be required. In this case, the delivery rate would be limited primarily by the refueling time, maintenance requirements, and traffic-handling capability at intermediate stops. Under these conditions, the earliest deliveries could occur within 16 to 20 hours and movement of the reduced airborne division could be completed in three to four days, as shown in the right-hand chart of figure 8. Delivery of the air defense force and the tactical aviation regiment would require two to three days and one to two days, respectively.


10. Movements to Cuba were selected to represent Soviet deployments in support of a client state in the Western Hemisphere. Three possible routes were considered: through Iceland direct to Cuba, through Algeria direct to Cuba, and through Guinea direct to Cuba. Each of these routes has a final leg in excess of 4,000 nm, a distance which precludes the use of the Cub aircraft. The movement shown in figure 9 is based on the route through Algeria, which would likely be used in such an operation. Approximately 30 percent of the reduced airborne division could be delivered in 24 to 48 hours; movement of the force could be completed in approximately 10 days. The movement of the air defense force would require seven to eight days. Delivery of a tactical aviation regiment, almost all of which could be moved in one lift by the available Candid and Cock aircraft, would be essentially complete in two days. In the unlikely event that a refueling point in the Atlantic (such as the Azores) were available, deliveries comparable to those to Mozambique would be possible.

11. Movements to Syria were considered as being representative of deployments to a state relatively near


Delivery Capability to Mozambique of Soviet Military Transport Aviation

Figure 8

Without Predeployment of Aircrews



With Augmentation or Predeployment of Aircrews



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to the Soviet Union. Given the proper circumstances, the Soviets are capable of moving air-transportable units into such areas very rapidly. The delivery rate would most likely be limited by the priority placed upon the operation rather than by considerations which were limiting in deliveries to more distant areas such as Mozambique or Cuba. For Syria, delivery routes might be 600 to 1,700 nm in length, depending on available overflight clearances. Either airdropping or airlanding of Soviet airborne units is possible for such distances.

12. Syria has a number of airfields near major road and rail lines which are suitable for delivery of a large military force. Operational considerations, however, would probably require that deliveries be concentrated at a particular location, such as Damascus. An unopposed airlanding of the reduced airborne division at three major airfields near Damascus (Damascus International, Dumayr, and Mezze) could be accom-

plished in one to two days given the following conditions:

- Availability of sufficient VTA aircraft (approximately 500 to 600 flights would be required with the current force).
- Ability to keep a large percentage of the aircraft on schedule.
- Uninterrupted overflight clearance for the duration of the operation.
- Preemption of all other air operations at the three airfields (two of which are major Syrian fighter bases).
- Availability of adequate air traffic control, logistics handling, and maintenance personnel.
- Continuation of operations on a 24-hour basis.

— Arrival or departure of an aircraft every six minutes; average turnaround time of three hours for each aircraft.

13. Under the above assumptions, a delivery period of one to two days is judged to be the minimum time to airland the unit in Syria under the most favorable


conditions. Should the deployment encounter those disruptions which typically surface in large-scale military operations, the delivery time would likely increase. We therefore believe that a more realistic deployment time for a Soviet airborne unit from the USSR to Syria would be three to four days.

Delivery Capability to Cuba of Soviet Military Transport Aviation

Figure 9

Without Predeployment of Aircrews

Fraction of reduced airborne division



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ANNEX D

THIRD WORLD REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER

A. Apprehension and Complacency

1. Most Third World leaders and their advisers have a fair appreciation of the magnitude and capabilities of the Soviet armed forces. Because of their mission or location, however, a large part of these forces—the strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals, the nationwide air defenses, and the ground and air forces arrayed against Western Europe and China—have little direct bearing on developments in the Third World. Nevertheless, they play a significant role in the perception of many Third World leaders who believe that the USSR, because of its increased military strength, is able to take bolder and more aggressive military initiatives in support of its policies toward the Third World than in years past.

2. Of special concern to Third World leaders are Soviet willingness and readiness to employ military means. The Soviets have demonstrated in the Middle East, Angola, and most recently in Ethiopia an impressive capability to respond to crises and to conduct military operations over considerable distances. Although these leaders are on the whole uncertain about the full extent of Soviet military capabilities, their recognition that the USSR has sufficient military power to become involved in any local conflict almost certainly makes them uneasy.

3. Third World leaders mostly relate to the USSR as a source of weapons and military advisers. In this regard Moscow represents its arms sales—and the Third World generally accepts them—not as military operations but as essentially commercial-political transactions.

4. Attitudes in the Third World toward Soviet military projection and presence, as is to be expected, are conflicting as they reflect age-old regional rivalries spurred by new national aspirations and self-interests. In the areas where regional conflicts are most intense and where Soviet projection of military power could decisively influence the outcomes, these attitudes—discussed briefly below—can play an important role, though to what extent Soviet policy in the Third World takes these attitudes into account is not known.

Middle East

5. The nations of the Middle East are generally uncomfortable with Soviet military presence in this region. The conservative states (principally Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iran) are the most apprehensive of Soviet military capabilities. In their view, the ultimate Soviet objective in the Middle East is to gain control of the Red Sea and eventually the oil-rich Arab Peninsula by establishing hegemony in northeast Africa, including the Horn. They have long believed that the Soviets would attempt to project power in the Middle East, but primarily through clandestine support of insurgencies and national liberation movements, which they see as the greater current threat. The recent events in the Horn, however, appear to have convinced the conservatives that Moscow is now ready and willing to move in an overt manner as well. To a large extent Egyptian leaders share these perceptions.

6. Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean are regarded as the only projection of Soviet military power that currently threatens the Middle East, although Iran certainly is aware of its vulnerability to a Soviet overland invasion and sees Soviet weaponry in Iraq and Afghanistan as a threat by proxy.

7. Though the current socialist regimes in Syria and Iraq lean politically toward the Soviet Union, which furnishes the bulk of their weaponry, they remain independent and fearful of being labeled as Soviet satellites. Syrian attitudes toward Soviet military presence there are somewhat contradictory. The Syrians welcome a Soviet balance to US support of Israel and would like a Soviet promise to intervene directly if Syria were threatened by an Israeli attack. Yet Damascus has always been wary of Soviet intentions and has tried to minimize Soviet military presence in Syria during periods of peace.

8. Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976 and its attempts to control the leftists and Palestinians angered Soviet leaders and resulted in a slowdown of

Soviet arms deliveries for eight months. The maneuver had little effect. Even though Syria is heavily dependent on the Soviets for arms, it maintained and even strengthened its forces in Lebanon and has given no sign of withdrawing. Since then, however, the focus of Syrian opposition in Lebanon has become the Christian militias, a more acceptable target from the Soviet point of view. In addition, Sadat's peace initiative toward Israel has brought the Soviets and Syrians closer together, and they have signed an arms agreement valued at an estimated \$1 billion. Syria's President Assad remains distrustful of the Soviets, however, and has steadfastly refused to sign a friendship treaty with the USSR.

Horn of Africa

9. Attitudes in the Horn differ markedly. The Ethiopian regime looks favorably on Soviet military support, at least in the short term, as the mainstay of its fight against guerrillas in Eritrea and the Ogaden. Somalia and Sudan view Soviet presence as a direct threat to their security and sovereignty. In Djibouti, President Gouled and most of his fellow Issas share this concern, but the Afars are for the most part willing to accept Ethiopian, Cuban, and Soviet support to prevent their ethnic group from being dominated by the Somali-backed Issas. Kenya professes serious alarm at the increased Soviet influence in eastern Africa and holds the USSR responsible for arming Somalia and Uganda and strengthening the threat to Kenya from both those directions. Kenya's closest ally in Africa remains Soviet-backed Ethiopia, an alliance based on common distrust of Somalia.

10. The Ethiopians are grateful for, and impressed by, the massive military assistance they have received from the Soviet Union. Although the Ethiopian revolutionary government had its own ideological motives for siding with the Soviets, Moscow's offer to build the nation into a strong regional military power and help repulse the Somali invasion assured the Soviets of a strong position in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, while Ethiopian leaders in the near term see no alternative to a close military and political relationship with Moscow, they perceive that their interests and those of the Soviets will not always coincide. Meanwhile, the need for Soviet arms to confront Eritrean and Somali guerrillas and Ethiopia's historical concern about "Arab encirclement"—heightened now by the perception that it is surrounded by reactionary Arab states allied with the United States—favor continued close Ethiopian-Soviet military ties.

11. As a result of Soviet assistance to Ethiopia, the Somalis moved from seemingly slavish adherence to the Soviet line in 1977 to the forefront of nations decrying the menace of Moscow's "grand design" for Africa which the Somalis believe includes the subjugation of Somalia and Djibouti. To some extent Somali fears of Soviet intentions are opportunistic—an attempt to gain political and material support from regional and Western powers. Clearly, Somalia's immediate concern is its drive to wrest ethnic Somalis from Ethiopian control. Nevertheless, Mogadishu is genuinely apprehensive about Soviet moves in the Horn and their long-term implications and believes that military power is crucial to the achievement of Soviet objectives. The Somalis believe, moreover, that Moscow will try to pressure them into making substantial accommodations, to use subversion to undermine the Siad regime, and even to support an Ethiopian invasion.

12. Sudan too is apprehensive of Soviet capabilities to project military power, but this is not a new stance prompted by the shift in Moscow's alliance from Somalia to Ethiopia. Sudanese officials for the past two years have warned the United States about Soviet intentions and have been outspoken both in public and private in describing what they believe to be the main Soviet threat to this area—namely, an attack against Sudan by Libya. They perceive that in the long run Moscow seeks to be the dominant foreign influence in the Horn and the Red Sea.

The Frontline States

13. In southern Africa, the three Frontline States that are most directly involved in the Rhodesian problem—Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique—generally view Soviet military assistance for the liberation of Rhodesia as a necessary evil, having failed to persuade the West to provide military aid and observing that such help has not been forthcoming from China. The Frontline Presidents are suspicious of Soviet motives and wary of the entree that military assistance furnishes for Soviet penetration and subversion of their governments. They are cognizant of the depth of Soviet involvement and influence in Angolan affairs as a direct result of Moscow's military support of the Neto regime and determined to avoid a repetition of that process in their countries. They have consistently tried to confine the Soviet role to providing arms and military advisers for their regular forces. The Zambians and Mozambicans also have reluctantly

permitted a few Soviet advisers to work with the Zimbabwe (black Rhodesian) insurgents on their territories. The Presidents view the Cubans as less of a threat than the Soviets, and are somewhat more willing to have Cuban military personnel training and advising nationalist groups. Nevertheless, President Kaunda, who hosted around 100 Cuban advisers as of the fall of 1978, has wanted to limit Cuban presence, though that may be difficult.

Southeast Asia

14. Southeast Asian governments do not perceive a direct military threat to their countries from the Soviet Union, though they frequently call attention to Soviet military power as a way of encouraging the United States to maintain its stabilizing military presence in this region. The nations of Southeast Asia are profoundly suspicious of and basically hostile toward the USSR and view Soviet activities mostly in the framework of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in which Moscow seeks to counter every Chinese move and statement, thus creating needless problems in Southeast Asian relations with China. In this regard they fear that Soviet support of Vietnam in its disputes with China will complicate these relations and ultimately goad Hanoi to adopt a more aggressive policy in the region. They are particularly concerned that the Vietnamese will serve as Moscow's surrogates to expand Soviet influence.

Latin America

15. Concern among Latin American countries about Soviet conventional military prowess is much greater than the threat the USSR's current capabilities pose to this region. The views of many of these countries are affected by their own internal security problems, their traditional distrust of Communist and Marxist ideology encouraging revolution, and the perception that Soviet naval deployments threaten their lines of communication. This last concern is most prevalent in the more southern Latin American countries.

B. Regional Military Balance

16. The degree to which Soviet military assistance to Third World countries affects regional balances of forces is dependent on a variety of factors, chief of which is whether the opposing side has sources of military aid adequate to offset the strengthening of the Soviet client's military capabilities. For example, al-


though the USSR has provided massive aid to the Arab side in the Middle East, Israel has more than compensated by obtaining large quantities of sophisticated arms from the United States. In the Ethiopian-Somali confrontation, however, Somalia was unable to obtain sufficient aid from Arab or Western sources to offset Soviet support of Ethiopia.

17. In this regard, the USSR's ability to provide large quantities of arms in a relatively short time is a major advantage. The West, because of its more complex decisionmaking processes and its limited stocks of weapons available for immediate export, often needs long leadtimes to provide arms in large quantities.

18. Another key determinant of the impact of Soviet aid on a regional balance of forces is the inherent military potential of the recipient relative to other regional states. India, for example, has the largest and best equipped armed forces in South Asia. With the exception of China, no other country in that region—regardless of outside aid—has the population, economic resources, and defense industry to match India's potential. Soviet military assistance to any of these nations, including India, would not affect this basic disparity, although India would look with disfavor on any military aid to its neighbors.

19. A final consideration is the level of military technology which the Soviets are willing to provide. Whereas they have readily introduced certain advanced weapon systems into parts of the Third World, they have withheld these same systems from other parts primarily, we believe, because of the likely effect on the regional military balance. A case in point is North Korea, where the Soviets up to now have refrained from introducing advanced weapons—such as MIG-23 and SU-20 fighters and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles—which they have exported elsewhere.

20. Clearly, it is in Moscow's interest in some instances to limit arms shipments in order to maintain at least a rough parity in military forces in regions where the opposing side has prompt, open-ended access to foreign sources of advanced military equipment and where the United States is deeply committed to that side's defense. This is basically the case in Korea and the Middle East. In areas such as Angola and Ethiopia, however, where these conditions do not obtain, Moscow has made a concerted effort to provide its clients with the military assistance required to gain military superiority in the region.



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