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CHILE

Military Pressure for Policy Changes

President Pinochet's decision to announce an eventual return to civilian rule marks an extraordinary personal concession to critics of Chile's hard-line military regime. Perhaps more impotant, it reflects widespread pressure from within the armed forcen—Pinochet's principal source of power—for a shift in national policy. Plans to easo repression are designed in large part to clicit a favorable reaction from the US.

Junta members have repeatedly urged the President to establish a timetable for transition to civilian rule. The influential Council of Army Generals recently played a key role in convincing Pinochet that a move toward political normalization was

imperative.

top naval officers believe the President's action is the result of his reiniure to win junta approval for his proposals to increase presidential powers.

Pinochet withdrew his proposals and outlined his plan for a phased transition of power culminating

in limited popular elections by 1985.

Army generals recommended in June that Pinochet approve a series of wide-ranging policy changes. Their motive is rooted in a strong desire for Chile to improve relations with the US. In all probability, Chile's diplomatic ostracism and the attendant difficulty in procuring arms have convinced armed forces leaders that internal policies must be attended if Chile is to repair its dismal image abroad.

The generals bolieve that the recent meeting of the Organization of American States in Grenada amply demonstrated that a new power balance that favors those nations closely aligned with the US is developing in Latin America. There is consequent unease among Chileans that opponents of its human rights practices—such as the US, Mexico, and Venezuela—will use their influence to persuade other Latin American governments to loosen ties with Chile. The Chilean government's close supporters have been countries of the same political stripe in the southern come.

Pinochet evidently has been bombarded with studies recommending a retaxation of the government's emergency powers and improvement in relations with the US. He provided a recent Foreign Ministry recommendation that Chile seek to negotiate its problems with the US. In addition, Chilean diplomata area now suggesting that specific measures, such as reducing the state-of-eloge, will be forthcoming. Further announcements could be timed to coincide with the junta's fourth anniversary on September 11.

the President has ordered a drastic overhaul of the controversial National Intelligence Directorate, the secret police organization responsible for most human rights violations. DINA's arrest powers are to be transferred to the regular police, and a reorganized and renamed unit will concentrate solely on gathering political intelligence. These changes might be made before September 11.

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Full restoration of the open democratic society traditionally enjoyed by Chileans is still a long way off. Nevertheless, if the government follows through on its recent proposed actions, the most blatant aspects of repression would be eased. Pinochet clearly expects the US to react positively to these gestures.

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