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ADDRESS BY GENERAL C. P. CABELL, USAF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO THE
DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
DALLAS, TEXAS
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SOME PROBLEMS FACING COMMUNIST LEADERS

I was certainly pleased to get your invitation and delighted to accept. First of all, you have given me a chance to return to Dallas. I like to do that whenever I can. Literally, I am at home here. Moreover, I share with you the interest which you are showing in international affairs, and I want to discuss an important aspect of the international scene with you today.

I am going to talk objectively about some of the problems which the Communists now face and the way in which these problems may affect their future as well as ours. My purpose is to keep our picture of the Communist world in proper focus. To anyone who is trying to understand the international situation today, Communist weaknesses are as important as their strengths. If we overestimate the Communists' power, we are indulging in a dangerous distortion. On the other hand, if we underestimate their strength, we may lull ourselves into a sense of false security. At this point, let me remind you that although I'm concentrating on Communist problems, let no one think that I am predicting that these problems are presently

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serious enough to lead us to expect the Communist regimes to collapse soon under their own weight. The fact of the matter is we face a serious and growing threat from the Communist world, and we must all recognize this.

From where I sit, International Communism continues to give evidence of a determination to communize or otherwise control the world. I want to be the last person on earth knowingly to suggest that we can in any way relax our guard or diminish our efforts in fighting Communism.

The Communists are doing everything in their power to promote the belief that the day of inevitable victory, predicted by Marx, Lenin, and all their followers, is coming nearer and nearer. The Communists tell the world that the Soviet Union has overwhelming military strength. They claim that the Soviet Union will soon overtake the United States in absolute and per capita production. The Communists say they represent the wave of the future, and that they are admired by the vast majority of the people in the new countries of Asia and Africa.

I do not believe any of those Communist claims. The facts warrant no such conclusions. I believe the Soviet Union is in no position at this time to launch a military attack on us without suffering enormous and unacceptable damage to Russia. As far as their industry is concerned, despite their great progress, they have many economic problems, and their claims about overtaking the United

States within the next ten years or so are simply not true. Moreover, despite their efforts to export Communism as a way of life, they have not been so successful in the so-called underdeveloped countries as they would have us believe.

Now, as far as Soviet military strength is concerned, the fact is that the Soviets are quite powerful. They have very good rockets. Their technicians have shown a high degree of skill in producing the steel, machine tools, the electronic and aeronautical devices which have made possible their substantial achievements in missiles and space vehicles. The Soviets are also quite accomplished in atomic energy matters. Their modern military machine is based on a solid technological foundation. This machine has resulted from their deliberate, long standing decision to concentrate on that aspect of their economy which is dedicated to the production of a powerful military force. These achievements they have publicized.

On the other hand, the Soviets have done very little in the way of producing consumer goods. They have a poor record when it comes to building roads or houses. It is not that they lack the inherent ability to do these things. They have simply chosen to give overriding priority to the fast production of what they consider the bulwarks of national power.

Their industrial progress is real. They are the second largest industrial power in the world, and they insist that they

will be satisfied with nothing less than first place. Their slogan is to beat America. This slogan is painted on cowbarns in the Soviet Union. It is the constant refrain of Soviet politicians in public and in private.

Khrushchev is primarily responsible for current industrial progress in the Soviet Union. He is also firmly entrenched as the undisputed political leader. To understand the nature of the Communist threat today, I believe it is essential that we set the facts straight about what Khrushchev has accomplished and, equally important, about what he has failed to do.

He inherited a difficult situation from Stalin. He staked his future on several key policies and won. He believed that in order to meet the demands of the modern age, Moscow's control of the economy should be diluted to give more authority to regional managers. He believed that Soviet agriculture, which had not kept pace with the growth of Soviet population, had to be given a massive transfusion. He believed that the belligerent foreign policy which under Stalin's leadership had brought the Soviet Union close to war on several occasions, should be made more flexible.

He did decentralize state control of the Soviet economy. He has also whittled away at the power of the secret police and has given fuller play to persuasion and material incentives to replace the undiluted terror which the secret police had imposed on the

Russian and satellite peoples. He launched a massive attack on the farm problem, bringing 80 to 100 million acres of new land under the plow. He began beating the drum for so-called peaceful coexistence. He said other Communist countries should develop along their own lines, but smashed the Hungarians when they tried to claim a measure of freedom from Moscow's iron control.

One thing Khrushchev has not done is to change the basic Communist system and its aim of world control. He says that Communism will bury capitalism.

Khrushchev's primary concern is with the Soviet economy, and it is in the industrial field that he has had his greatest success. It is in the economic arena that we face a Soviet challenge which may be as great as their military threat. Nevertheless, his economic programs do not all have clear sailing ahead. The Soviets will probably meet, by 1965, many of the goals which they have set for themselves, but that cannot accomplish all that they claim. The Soviets are short of manpower. In recognition of this problem, Khrushchev has announced a program to cut the armed forces by 1,200,000 men. Characteristically, the Soviets hail this as a move toward peace. The fact is that with the introduction of more modern weapons their over-all military strength remains unimpaired. They need more men, particularly in the neglected areas of their economy.

Because of their decision to concentrate on an increasingly expensive military program, Soviet industrial progress has been quite uneven. Certain basic industries, such as ore processing, mining, and production of power, have been stepchildren and will require much more investment than they have had. This investment must be at the expense of another part of their economic program. Soviet industry has reached the point where it must raise per capita productivity. This calls for the introduction of automation and other sophisticated techniques which the Soviet leaders themselves admit presents serious problems. In their headlong drive for what they consider the essential elements of national power, they have completely neglected parts of what we consider a mature economy. They do not yet accept the proposition that the wellbeing and happiness of the citizen are true measures of national strength. Even their present ambitious plans still keep the level of consumer output low so that there will be no significant reduction in the share given to heavy industry and military production.

The Soviet people are not informed about these and other problems, but the leaders are aware of them and Khrushchev's actions show that he is trying to solve these problems. However, he is in turn creating new problems. For instance, in his efforts to raise productivity, he has offered workers material incentives -- surely a capitalist idea -- and one which in a Communist state is a potential threat to the foundations of political power.

Let me try to illustrate this. The Soviet Union is extremely short of housing. When no one had adequate housing, everyone was on an equal status. However, as time passed, the Soviets discovered that the best reward for an efficient worker was a new apartment. Discontent springs up among those who are not rewarded, and pressures inevitably build up for a greater share in the fruits of Soviet labor. Recently, one Soviet citizen wrote to a Moscow newspaper stating that he was more interested in new shoes than he was in Sputniks. He said that as far as transportation was concerned, he was perfectly happy to ride the streetcar. However, he pointed out, that his only pair of shoes was four years old and that they wouldn't have lasted that long except they were a Western brand. The Moscow newspaper printed this letter calling the writer a slug and an earthworm, who was incapable of understanding the higher flights of the Communist way of life.

The fact is that these consumer pressures exist and are, I believe, bound to grow. We can admire the idea of incentives, and a stronger Soviet economy is in itself no evil threat. We oppose Soviet efforts to export Communism as a way of life.

Please do not think for a minute that I am suggesting that the Soviet people will rise up suddenly and dramatically and throw the present leaders out of office because they, the people, want more creature comforts. The Communist leaders themselves are not

seriously concerned at this time about their ability to contain such pressures from the people. There is no evidence whatsoever that the present Communist leaders have any intentions of dropping their goal of promoting the spread of Communism throughout the world. Nevertheless, they face problems, and popular pressures for a better life will almost certainly become more of a factor on the Soviet scene. It has become increasingly difficult for Khrushchev to pose as a champion of peaceful coexistence and at the same time demand continued sacrifice from the Russian people.

Farming, which was very much neglected under Stalin, is still the most backward area in the Soviet economy. Of the total Soviet labor force, nearly 50% is still working in agriculture and efficiency is quite low. By comparison, less than 10% of the American labor force are farmers, yet they produce about one-third more than the Soviets. Soviet farming lands are not well located as far as climate is concerned and the Communists cannot control the weather any better than anyone else. Given average weather, the Soviets can probably increase their agricultural output by about 20% by 1965. They claim they will gain some 55% to 60%, but they have not revealed how. In farming, as in industry, the Soviet leaders have only so much manpower and so much cash available. Any massive transfusion to overcome their farm problems must be at the expense of their industrial base, the foundation of their military power.

Khrushchev is primarily a practical man, and he would seem to have enough to do in trying to solve his domestic economic problems, to run the vast Soviet bureaucracy and to travel posing as the leading proponent of peaceful coexistence. However, since he is, by his own constant confession, an avowed Communist, he must pay attention to ideology which is the cornerstone of International Communism. He himself is on occasion scornful of ideology. He lifted an expression from Goethe when he said: "Theory is gray but the tree of life is green." Here he comes close to heresy because to the Communists ideology does not mean abstract theory alone. Ideology means theory and practice. They are inseparable. It is not only the goal which, since the time of Marx, has been control of the world. It is also the means by which one achieves this goal. The Communists have never excluded any legal or illegal means.

Khrushchev's role in Communist ideology has created problems for him in the Soviet Union itself, in Soviet relations with its principal ally, Communist China, and in Communist relations with free world countries.

Let me give you an example. Recently, a prominent Hungarian historian, a good Communist, has written a book stating that it is wrong to expect the inevitable collapse of capitalism because of its internal weaknesses. This argument contradicts a basic Marxist doctrine, and publication of this book is in itself a significant sign of change in the Communist world.

Khrushchev himself has called into question the pertinence of Communist gospel as a guide for action in the modern world. He has written: "If Marx, Engels and Lenin could arise now, they would laugh at those bookworms and quoters who instead of studying life of contemporary society and developing theory creatively turn to the classics for a quotation about how to act in connection with a machine tractor station." He has also since abolished the machine tractor station, an institution long regarded by the Communists as the key to successful collective farming and actually a tool to control the farmers.

The Soviet leaders themselves recognize that much of their propaganda has failed, not only abroad where it has not intimidated any essential part of the free world alliance, but also in the Soviet Union itself where it is no longer considered a spur to the Soviet citizens. In a long and tortuous Central Committee resolution in January of this year, the Soviet internal propaganda machine was denounced as backward, dull and boring, and generally unsuited for the "bright future" ahead. The propagandists were ordered to put out "less political blather" and to concentrate their efforts on ensuring the success of the seven-year economic plan.

The Soviets are here concerned with the basic problem of motivation. If the Soviet citizen is no longer exhorted to work harder because the imperialists are threatening to attack, then

what is to be his reward? If the Soviet leaders are deterred from military adventures, to what end will they devote their increased economic wealth? The capitalist world cannot be expected to collapse simply because the Soviets announce a victory in production statistics. How then are the Communists going to control the world?

The ideal Communist citizen should not have to be spurred to greater efforts by material incentives, but the fact is that Khrushchev has offered these incentives and must continue to do so if production is to be increased further. There are already some signs that Khrushchev's liberties with Communist doctrine are beginning to sink in. In the Soviet Asian Republic of Kazakhstan, the Soviets have admitted that dissatisfaction and work stoppage on the construction site of a great new metallurgical plant stemmed from the lack of housing. The leader of the Kazakhstan Communist Party concluded that: "The question of housing and other construction connected with living conditions should occupy the central place in the activity of Party, political, and economic organizations of the Kazakhstan Republic."

The great majority of private dwellings in the Soviet Union are being built by Soviet citizens in do-it-yourself projects. The state favors apartments, and on his recent Asian tour, Khrushchev told his Indian and Indonesian hosts that the desire for a private dwelling was evidence of "peasant psychology".

Perhaps the most serious and practical problem in the Communist world as a whole is the disagreement between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. Their disputes about Communist goals and the way to achieve them are now deeper and more evident for everyone to see than ever before. Although they have overriding reasons for sticking together, there are stresses in their relations which could very well become strains in the future.

The disagreement, which is of most concern to us is Khrushchev's obvious attempts to negotiate with the United States, the country which the Chinese Communists consider their implacable enemy. The Chinese Communists, lacking nuclear weapons, place great stress on their enormous manpower reservoir. They argue the free world is at a military disadvantage and that it is a "weakness" to negotiate with them. The Soviet leaders, well aware of the devastation which modern weapons can accomplish, are more realistic. The Chinese Communists have served notice that no international agreement on any important question is going to be binding on them unless they are a party to it. The Chinese Communists give every evidence of a dogmatic, militant approach to world affairs and they have shown that they are perfectly capable of stirring up trouble beyond their borders if only to distract the Chinese peoples' attention from the serious domestic problems at home.

The Chinese Communists have embarked on their commune program, the most drastic regimentation of human society ever proposed. They did this without advance coordination with the Soviets and without reckoning the costs either to their economic situation or in human sacrifice. They are driving ahead with reckless speed to communize their country. In doing this, the Chinese have incurred Soviet opposition, particularly when the Chinese recommend their own course of action as desirable for other countries.

These basic differences, and there are others, have led to sharp exchanges between the Soviet and Chinese leaders. Ideally, we could sit back and watch this internal dispute as disinterested spectators. Actually, however, we have a stake in the outcome of this dispute. Should the Chinese prevail in their views, the Communist world might revert to the harshness which characterized the Stalin era. Should the Soviets impose their views, the united Sino-Soviet program would still present a great challenge to us and to the underdeveloped countries of the world. In any event, we face a serious threat from both Communist camps.

Whatever the Soviet problems at home, they are well embarked on a sizable and shrewd foreign aid program. They have offered some three and one-half billion dollars to non-Communist countries, and they have done it without any thought of accountability to the

Soviet citizens at home. Their aim is clear. They want to put themselves in a position to dominate the countries which accept Communist aid. In some ways, they have scored some gains. There are in the underdeveloped countries, groups of people willing to accept the false proposition that it is the Communist system which is primarily responsible for Soviet progress. These people are more interested in speedy economic progress than in anything else. They are impressed by Soviet progress and propoganda, and the Soviets are constantly offering more aid to more countries in wider areas of the world.

On the other hand, contrary to what many people believe, the Communists' aid program has not been a smashing success. Their representatives abroad are not all supermen. Many of their projects have been designed to make a quick show and have no lasting benefit. The Communists are generally isolated and aloof, and in many cases they have no desire or ability to understand the local situation or to get along with the people.

Many of the Communists' problems are material, but their most essential failure is not. They simply do not understand the idea of a free human being. They are skillful in manipulating human beings for material ends, and both the Soviets and the Chinese Communists have survived grueling military tests and some severe internal political crises. Their leaders are extremely dynamic and are driving their engines at an intense pace.

The Communists have failed, I believe, to capture the imagination of their young people. They admit that they are still faced with the task of creating the new Soviet man. Since Khrushchev's visit to the United States, there have been wider contacts between Westerners and Soviet citizens. These citizens, especially the younger, more thoughtful ones, are extremely anxious to know more about our way of life. Despite being born and raised under the Communist system, they hold non-Communist ideas about truth, justice, government inefficiency, and personal happiness. I wish I had time to tell some of the stories in detail. Our contacts are extremely limited and the Soviet authorities still try to intimidate their people, but one cannot help but wonder how much of an iceberg of dissatisfaction really lies beneath the surface.

The Communist leaders are brimming with confidence about the future. They may be so blind to their own problems and so desperate to create a diversion that we must face up to the constant danger of some reckless action. They are increasing their subversive activity and it is spreading to wider and wider areas of the world, making its most recent impact among some of our Latin American neighbors.

Khrushchev's tendency to talk of the future as though it were already here is farfetched and fantastic. Let me give you two examples. As far as material things are concerned, when he

visited the American Exhibition in Moscow, he surveyed the modern kitchen and announced airily: "We have all these things in the Soviet Union only they are more attractive and better made." Then, pointing to a common kitchen gadget, he asked: "By the way, what is that?" On the non-material side, I can tell you something which seems almost incredible. He is reported to have ordered an approach made soliciting a nomination for himself for the Nobel Peace Prize.

I have tried to indicate some of the main trends, based on facts, so that each of us who has a role to play can guide himself accordingly. I believe that we must continue to maintain our military deterrent strength and we must, with our allies, continue to set an example of strength and determination for the people in the new countries of the world. We need certainly to step up all of our efforts to get the truth to the Russian people so they can see us for what we really are. It is especially important we continue to rely on the facts in our dealings with the Soviets, particularly the younger citizens. This is our main hope for destroying their wrong impression of us as warmongers or soft capitalists devoted only to the material comforts.

The key to the future does not lie in Moscow or Peiping. They have no magic formula to success. The key lies, rather, in our own determination to remain free and to hold out our example of freedom and all its benefits to any country or people who freely choose individual liberty.

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