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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

28 January 1960

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Khrushchev apparently intends to announce a reduction of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe as his next move to set the stage for his forthcoming trips to Asia and France and for the East-West disarmament and summit conferences.

b3 German ambassador on 18 January the recent Soviet decision to cut conventional forces by one third would be followed by "proportionate" reductions in Soviet troops stationed in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. He added that the USSR was prepared to withdraw all of its forces from these areas if the West accepted the Soviet disarmament plan.

Khrushchev probably believes these moves will give further momentum to his disarmament plan and strengthen his hand at the summit, particularly in pressing for reciprocal reductions of Western forces in Germany and Berlin. Last December in a speech in Budapest Khrushchev dwelt at length on the "utmost absurdity" which could develop if the West agreed to his disarmament plan and at the same time insisted on retaining forces in West Berlin. He asserted that "continuation of the occupation regime completely contradicts the idea of disarmament."

East German party chief Ulbricht is already bringing pressure on Bonn to follow the Soviet lead and "undertake a disarmament initiative" in Germany. In his 26 January letter to Chancellor Adenauer, Ulbricht

warned that if Bonn did not cease its atomic arming and apply a "ban on armaments within a short time," East Germany would be compelled to request its allies to place rocket weapons at its disposal. Ulbricht proposed a referendum in Germany to determine the popular attitude on complete disarmament and the conclusion of a peace treaty and also suggested that the two German states agree on ceilings for their forces and on the "stationing of military forces" in Germany.

Moscow followed a similar pattern in exploiting previous reductions in 1956 and 1958. These moves were given heavy publicity and were accompanied by appeals to Western governments and parliaments to follow the Soviet example. The Supreme Soviet's resolution on 15 January, appealing to the parliaments of all nations to take "practical steps" on disarmament to "create an atmosphere of confidence and facilitate the success of forthcoming negotiations," is almost identical to the December 1957 resolution which foreshadowed the announcement on 6 January 1958 of a 300,000-man reduction, including withdrawals of 41,000 troops from East Germany and 17,000 from Hungary.

Khrushchev can also be expected to follow up his announcement of troop reductions in the satellites with a renewed effort to press previous proposals for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and reductions of foreign forces in Germany and other European countries.

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Communist China officially endorsed the Soviet decision but strongly implied that it will make no comparable gesture. Foreign Minister Chen Yi sought to justify this position in a speech on 21 January by charging that the "peace" posture of the United States is simply a "cover for its policy of aggression and war." He claimed, however, that Peiping's sincerity in "safeguarding peace and disarmament" has been repeatedly shown by its past armament reductions.

Chen Yi also warned that Peiping would not regard as binding any disarmament agreement "arrived at without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of its delegate."

Germany and Berlin

b3 [redacted] Khrushchev reaffirmed the USSR's proposals on Berlin and a German peace treaty and underlined his recent public warnings that the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany unless serious consideration were given to the Soviet proposals.

b3 He would insist on discussing a German peace treaty and Berlin at the summit but that he would be "content" with a temporary agreement on Berlin, provided the occupation was ended. He emphatically rejected linking the Berlin question with German unification.

Moscow's apparent intention to stand firm on its established positions on Berlin and Germany at the summit meeting was echoed

in East German party leader Ulbricht's recent interview with an Italian paper. He claimed that "the positive results of the Geneva foreign ministers' conference will undoubtedly serve as a basis of discussion" at the summit conference. In his letter to Adenauer, Ulbricht emphasized that the creation of a "free city" in West Berlin would be achieved sooner or later and renewed his proposals to establish an all-German committee, based on equal representation, to "deliberate" the preparation of a peace treaty and the reunification of Germany.

Soviet expectations of a protracted period of negotiations on Germany and Berlin were reflected in [redacted] b3

[redacted] that Khrushchev and Ulbricht have evolved a long-range strategy for gaining Western concessions. The Communist leaders feel that they can afford to be patient, believing that the West will eventually grow tired of the Berlin problem.

In the interim, however, physical and propaganda pressure reportedly will be maintained against West Berlin to keep the city in a state of "uncertain suspense." [redacted] b3

[redacted] During the Geneva negotiations, Khrushchev specifically stated, in referring to the Berlin problem, that "not one but several meetings of heads of government will be needed" in order to solve "those questions which now are ripe for settlement and which need to be settled step by step."

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Moscow's aim in passing such a memorandum to the Socialists and Berlin Mayor Brandt is probably to bring pressure on the party to take more decisive action in challenging Adenauer's recent assertions that the Western proposal at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference for an interim Berlin solution should not be the West's starting point at the summit. Moscow may also be seeking to create difficulties between party leaders and Mayor Brandt, who has taken a position similar to Adenauer's in contrast to the more flexible official party attitude toward the negotiations at Geneva.

The Soviet premier has been angling for an invitation to visit West Germany since his 15 October letter to Adenauer, but Bonn has not responded. Such a visit, probably coupled with at least a stopover in East Germany, would serve to accentuate the Soviet contention that two German states are a political reality which should be accepted by the West.


Western Attitudes

Chancellor Adenauer's reply of 14 January to Khrushchev's letter of 15 October was bluntly worded, in the hope of ending the exchange. Adenauer believes further correspondence affords Khrushchev an effective means of exerting pressure on Bonn in the pre-summit period. The chancellor raised no new issues and referred to previous letters in refuting certain charges. He noted that the Berlin question would be settled as soon as Khrushchev permitted the German

people the right of self-determination.

In the course of a visit to Rome on 20-24 January, Adenauer may have been less successful than he had hoped in obtaining from the Italians a firm commitment to support the status quo in Berlin.

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