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PORTS

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

There was no significant increase in the average time in port for either tankers or dry cargo ships during February or March, despite the record high levels of import.

On-The-Spot Reports

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

In the late March early April 1967 period, port congestion in Haiphong continued with merchant ships waiting two and three weeks before unloading cargo. [REDACTED]

Quantities of building tools and materials, tractors, and forklifts, both crated and uncrated, were stored in the open in the streets and parks near the wharves. There was an obvious lack of storage space. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Heavy bomb attacks on Cam Pha and its port facilities on 15 February destroyed the greater part of the town and many citizens lost their homes. A Soviet ships officer expressed fears that bottom mining of the waterways leading into Cam Pha and Hai Phong ports would render impossible the delivery of aid material by sea to North Vietnam. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The efficiency of handling cargo, particularly coal exports, at the Haiphong ports, including Hon Gai and Can Pha, has decreased by about 45% since the bombing began in August 64. As a result of the numerous air alerts, the bombing damage outside the city, and the many difficulties encountered by longshoremen in reaching their places of employment, the workers of the ports now have to spend much more time commuting between their home and places of work, since the evacuation of so many of them from the city. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

USSR missiles and fuel are coming to North Vietnam by ships. [REDACTED]

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