


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Director of Central Intelligence

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
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Special Analysis

CHILE:

Challenges Ahead for President-Elect

Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin won a decisive victory in the presidential election Thursday but still faces several hurdles before he is sworn in on 11 March. In particular, he needs to reconcile conflicting interests within his disparate 17-party coalition and among such other key groups as the military, rightists close to the Pinochet regime, and the far left.

Many Chileans will see Aylwin's large win over two opponents as giving him a strong mandate to reshape policy and undo the remaining authoritarian features of General Pinochet's Constitution of 1980. But his coalition—while apparently winning control over the lower house of Congress—lacks the votes to secure such institutional reforms as liberalizing the rules on political party activity because it will not have a majority in the Senate. Aylwin must therefore court support both from his coalition and from moderate rightists, the second-largest block of senators. He will have to move skillfully to keep leftist parties in the coalition and centrist parties satisfied as he softens proposed changes to bring the right on board.

Coalition parties are already squabbling over the distribution of Cabinet seats. Aylwin also will need all his skills as a conciliator to deal with the Communist Party. Although not part of the coalition, it supported his candidacy—heeding his plea to forgo disruptive actions before the election—and will expect him to legalize it. Aylwin will now have to decide when and how to move on legalization, knowing that he must restrain Communist violence and keep the military's concerns about leftist intentions in mind.

Aylwin will find it hard to build a relationship with the armed forces, particularly given the issues of human rights abuses and Pinochet's staying on as Army Commander after March. Aylwin repeatedly has called for Pinochet to step down voluntarily, acknowledging that under the Constitution he cannot insist the general leave. Even if Aylwin remains nonconfrontational, he may have trouble promoting dialogue with the armed forces on civil-military relations: several coalition members will press hard for human rights trials, which many officers oppose. Aylwin probably realizes that, if he does not make progress on the human rights question before the inauguration, the issue will dominate the early months of his administration.

Aylwin views restoration of close ties to Washington as the cornerstone of his foreign policy. He may hope particularly for speedy removal of restrictions on U.S. military sales to Chile and with

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the armed forces. He is aware [REDACTED] that he will need first to devise a formula to meet US insistence on resolving the 1976 Letelier-Moffitt murder case—by promising, for example, to indemnify the victims' families and bring the accused before Chilean courts. He also will have to move quickly to secure agreement from the military on the matter to ensure a constructive preinauguration visit to Washington. [REDACTED]

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