

TOP SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB

Proposed Cuban Operation, 11 March 1961.....	1
Revised Cuban Operation, 15 March 1961.....	2
Propaganda Effort.....	3
Status of Political Effort.....	4
Outline - 16 March 1961.....	5
Working Group Paper, 23 March 1961.....	6
Cuban Operation paper, 12 April 1961.....	6A
Resistance Elements Active in Cuba.....	7
Air & Maritime Operations.....	8
Zapata Swamp Revolutionary History.....	9
OCI Paper on Cuba.....	10 — ?
Press Statement by Revolutionary Council.....	11
Memorandum to Task Force, 11 April 1961.....	12
Memorandum to Task Force, 7 April 1961.....	13
JMATE Policy Paper, 17 March 1960.....	14
Background paper on Cuban Operation prepared..... for Mr. Bundy and President Kennedy, 17 Feb. 1961	15
The 22 Points - Press Allegations Regarding Cuban..... Operation	16
Paper on Responsibility for Cuban operation.....	17
Extracts from testimony - DCI, Sen. Capehart, etc.....	18
Comments on Drew Pearson's articles.....	19
Press Releases in Name of the Revolutionary Council... and its Development & Emergence	20
History of Radio Swan.....	21
Twelve "Topics for Tuesday".....	22

Approved for Release  
Date DEC 1999

TOP SECRET

005543

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS  
(Continued)

Mr. Parrott's memo "A Mechanism for Cold War Strategy".....23  
Draft Memo for Record re Meeting with President on 16 May.....24  
Manuel RAY Interview of 18 May 1961 .....25

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Handed out  
21 MAR 1961

## PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

1. Status of Preparatory Action: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion: the organization of a broadly-based opposition to the Castro regime; a major propaganda campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers.

A decision should shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment or disposition of assets that have been created. The status of the more important activities is as follows:

a. Political: Over a period of nearly a year, the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democrático), which was created in the hope that it would become the organizational embodiment of a unified opposition to Castro, has proved to be highly useful as a cover and administrative mechanism but important political elements refused to join it.

Accordingly, a major effort was undertaken three weeks ago to form a more broadly-based revolutionary council which would include the FRD, and which could lead to the setting up of a provisional government. Considerable progress has been made in negotiations with the principal

TOP SECRET

COPY # 18

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cuban leaders in which great efforts have been made to permit the Cubans to chart their own course. It is expected that the desired result will be accomplished shortly. What is emerging from these negotiations is a provisional government with a center to left-of-center political orientation, and a political platform embodying most of the originally stated goals of the 26 July movement. It is believed that this will command the support of a very large majority of anti-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the more conservative groups.

b. Military: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness.

(1) A reinforced battalion with a present strength of 850 which will be brought up to a strength of approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more infantry company to be used primarily for logistic purposes and as a reserve.

(2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment of the battalion.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) An air force of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C54s and 5 C-46s.

(4) Shipping including 2 100-ton ships, 5 1500-ton ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCU's and 4 LCVPs.

A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

c. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to have them remain in the country beyond early April. The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult.

2. The Situation in Cuba: We estimate that time is against us. The

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In the absence of greatly increased external pressure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up.

b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. It is

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

making good use of the militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a more sizeable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

3. Possible Courses of Action: Four alternative courses of action

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are:

- a. Employment of the paramilitary force in a manner which would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.
- b. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing with tactical air support, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.
- c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two successive operations: First, the landing of one company without air support in a remote area in which it could sustain itself for some days (hopefully indefinitely), and second, the landing of the main force forty-eight hours later in a widely different location in the same manner as in paragraph 3.B. above.
- d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible region where it would be expected to keep control of a beachhead for a long period of time to permit installation and recognition of a provisional government and a gradual build-up of military strength.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks.

a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced in amphibious operations.)

b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar, 75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial ammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualties could not be evacuated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

c. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact.

5. A Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for at least non-governmental logistic support.

a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and the display of professional competence and of determination on the part of the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessful in thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

contiguous mountain area and continue operations as a powerful guerrilla force.

b. This course of action has a better chance than any other of leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime because it holds the possibility of administering a demoralizing shock.

c. If this operation were not successful in setting off wide-spread revolt, freedom of action of the U. S. would be preserved because there is an alternative outcome which would neither require U. S. intervention nor constitute a serious defeat; i. e., guerrilla action could be continued on a sizeable scale in favorable terrain. This would be a means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime.

6. A Diversionary Landing: As a variant of the above plan, it would be feasible to conduct a diversionary landing with a force of about 160 men in an inaccessible area as a prelude to a landing of the main assault force. The initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. At least a part of the provisional government would go in with the diversionary landing and presumably the establishment of the provisional government on Cuban soil would thereupon be announced. The subsequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined in paragraph 5 preceding.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

a. This course of action might have certain political advantages in that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could plausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help.

b. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary landing would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack, thus enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit.

7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U. S. after a decent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

a. A major political advantage of this course of action would be that the initial assault might be conducted in such a way as to involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of professional military organization than the landing in force discussed above, especially so as there is every likelihood that the initial landing would be virtually <sup>by land forces</sup> unopposed. Recognition could provide a suitable political and legal basis for a protracted build-up after the initial assault.

b. Such an operation would, however, require tactical air support sufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Air Force. If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could include seizure of an air strip, the necessary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. There is, however, no location which both contains a useable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land as to permit protection of a slow build-up.

c. This type of operation by the very fact of being clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or three.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. Conclusions:

- a. The Castro regime will not fall of its own weight.

In the absence of external action against it, the gradual weakening of internal Cuban opposition must be expected.

- b. Within a matter of months the capabilities of Castro's military forces will probably increase to such a degree that the overthrow of his regime, from within or without the country, by the Cuban opposition will be most unlikely.

- c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has a good chance of overthrowing Castro, or of causing a damaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to overt action against Cuba.

- d. Among the alternative course of action here reviewed, an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing offers the best chance of achieving the desired result.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handed out

15 March 1961

REVISED CUBAN OPERATION

1. Political Requirements: The plan for a Cuban operation and the variants thereof presented on 11 March were considered to be politically objectionable on the ground that the contemplated operation would not have the appearance of an infiltration of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution but rather that of a small-scale World War II type of amphibious assault. In undertaking to develop alternative plans and to judge their political acceptability, it has been necessary to infer from the comments made on the earlier plan the characteristics which a new plan should possess in order to be politically acceptable. They would appear to be the following:

a. An Unspectacular Landing: The initial landing should be as unspectacular as possible and should have neither immediately prior nor concurrent tactical air support. It should conform as closely as possible to the typical pattern of the landings of small groups intended to establish themselves or to join others in terrain suited for guerrilla operations. In the absence of air support and in order to fit the pattern, it should probably be at night.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS-176622

Copy 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. A Base for Tactical Air Operations: It was emphasized that ultimate success of the operation will require tactical air operations leading to the establishment of the control of the air over Cuba. In order to fit the pattern of revolution, these operations should be conducted from an air base within territory held by opposition forces. Since it is impracticable to undertake construction of an air base in the rainy season and before any air support is available, the territory seized in the original landing must include an air strip that can support tactical operations.

c. Slower Tempo: The operation should be so designed that there could be an appreciable period of build up after the initial landing before major offensive action was undertaken. This would allow for a minimum decent interval between the establishment and the recognition by the U.S. of a provisional government and would fit more closely the pattern of a typical revolution.

d. Guerrilla Warfare Alternative: Ideally, the terrain should not only be protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attack from land but also suitable for guerrilla warfare in the event that an organized perimeter could not be held.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS#176622



TOP SECRET

2. Alternative Areas: Five different areas, three of them on the mainland of Cuba and two on islands off the coast, were studied carefully to determine whether they would permit an operation fitting the above conditions. One of the areas appears to be eminently suited for the operation. All the others had to be rejected either because of unfavorable geography (notably the absence of a suitable air strip) or heavy concentrations of enemy forces, or both. The area selected is located at the head of a well protected deep water estuary on the south coast of Cuba. It is almost surrounded by swamps impenetrable to infantry in any numbers and entirely impenetrable to vehicles, except along two narrow and easily defended approaches. Although strategically isolated by these terrain features, the area is near the center of the island and the presence of an opposition force there will soon become known to the entire population of Cuba and constitute a serious threat to the regime. The beachhead area contains one and possibly two air strips adequate to handle B-26's. There are several good landing beaches. It is of interest that this area has been the scene of resistance activities and of outright guerrilla warfare for over a hundred years.

3. Phases of the Operation:

a. The operation will begin with a night landing. There are no known enemy forces (even police) in the objective area and it is anticipated that the landing can be carried out with few if any casualties

~~TOP SECRET~~

and with no serious combat. As many supplies as possible will be unloaded over the beaches but the ships will put to sea in time to be well offshore by dawn. The whole beachhead area including the air strips will be immediately occupied and approach routes defended. No tanks will be brought ashore in the initial landing. It is believed that this operation can be accomplished quite unobtrusively and that the Castro regime will have little idea of the size of the force involved.

b. The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro Air Force. Concurrently C-46's will move in with gas in drums, minimal maintenance equipment, and maintenance personnel. As rapidly as possible, the whole tactical air operation will be based in the beachhead but initially only enough aircraft will be based there plausibly to account for all observable activity over the island.

c. In the third phase, as soon as there is adequate protection for shipping from enemy air attack, ships will move back into the beach to discharge supplies and equipment (including tanks). It must be

- 4 -  
~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #176622

~~TOP SECRET~~

presumed that counter attacks against the beachhead will be undertaken within 24 to 48 hours of the landing but the perimeter can easily be held against attacks along the most direct approach routes. The terrain may well prevent any sizeable attacks (providing the enemy air force has been rendered ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to attempt to break out of the beachhead.

d. The timing and direction of such offensive action will depend upon the course of events in the island. At least three directions of break out are possible. Because of the canalization of the approaches to the beachhead from the interior, a break out will require close support by tactical air to be successful unless enemy forces are thoroughly disorganized. The opposition force will have the option, however, of undertaking an amphibious assault with tactical air support against a different objective area if it should seem desirable.

4. Political Action: The beachhead area proposed to be occupied is both large enough and safe enough so that it should be entirely feasible to install the provisional government there as soon as aircraft can land safely. Once installed, the tempo of the operation will permit the U.S. Government

~~TOP SECRET~~

to extend recognition after a decent interval and thus to prepare the way for more open and more extensive logistical support if this should be necessary.

5. Military Advantages:

a. This is a safer military operation than the daylight landing in force originally proposed. The landing itself is more likely to be unopposed or very lightly opposed and the beachhead perimeter could be more easily held.

b. There are no known communications facilities in the immediate target area. This circumstance, coupled with the plan for a night landing, increases the chance of achieving surprise.

c. By comparison with any of the known inaccessible parts of the Oriente Province the objective area is closer to rear bases for air and sea logistical support.

d. The plan has the disadvantage that the build up of force can be only gradual since there is virtually no local population from which to recruit additional troops and volunteers from other parts of Cuba will be able to infiltrate into the area only gradually.

6. Political Acceptability: The proposal here outlined fits the three conditions stated in paragraph 1 above for the political acceptability of a paramilitary operation. The landing is unspectacular; no tactical air support will be provided until an air base of sorts is active within the beachhead area;

~~TOP SECRET~~

the tempo of the operation is as desired; and the terrain is such as to minimize the risk of defeat and maximize the options open to the opposition force.

a. It may be objected that the undertaking of tactical air operations so promptly after the landing is inconsistent with the pattern of a revolution. But most Latin American revolutions in recent years have used aircraft and it is only natural that they would be used in this case as soon as the opposition had secured control of an air strip. Wherever in the island a paramilitary operation is attempted and whatever its tempo, command of the air will sooner or later have to be established, and aircraft will have to be flown into a beachhead to enable this to be done. Sooner or later, then, it is bound to be revealed that the opposition in Cuba has friends outside who are able and willing to supply it with obsolescent combat aircraft. This revelation will be neither surprising nor out of keeping with traditional practice.

b. An alternative way to handle this problem would be to make a few strafing runs against the Castro Air Force some days before the landing and apparently as an opposition act unrelated to any other military moves.

TOP SECRET

7. Conclusion: The operation here outlined, despite the revision of concept to meet the political requirements stated above, will still have a political cost. The study over the past several months of many possible paramilitary operations makes perfectly clear, however, that it is impossible to introduce into Cuba and commit to action military resources that will have a good chance of setting in motion the overthrow of the regime without paying some price in terms of accusations by the Communists and possible criticism by others. It is believed that the plan here outlined goes as far as possible in the direction of minimizing the political cost without impairing its soundness and chance of success as a military operation. The alternative would appear to be the demobilization of the paramilitary force and the return of its members to the United States. It is, of course, well understood that this course of action too involves certain risks.

-8-

TOP SECRET

(Page 8 of 8)

~~SECRET~~

## PROPAGANDA EFFORT

1. There is an elaborate propaganda plan drawn which is to take effect in support of any landing which may occur and the post-landing period. It will be primarily radio and leaflets. The details of the plan are in writing so that they will not be included here.

2. The radio effort will include short-wave transmitters with the troops and the use of a number of short-wave transmitters already in Cuba. In addition it should be possible as soon as Cuban air is removed to bring a ship-borne medium-wave transmitter close to shore. In addition the following transmissions will support the landing and the provisional government:

a. Short Wave

Swan Radio  
WRUL

[REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

b. Medium Wave

Radio Swan  
WBGs (Miami)  
WMIE (Miami)  
WKWF (Key West)  
Ship (mentioned para. 2 above)

The total time at present is approximately 14 to 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. USIA broadcasts short wave one hour a day from a New Jersey site. This, of course, can pick up and retransmit much of the material sent on the foregoing stations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

3. Another important publicity asset is a connection with UPI through which news can be quickly disseminated to the entire Latin American area. Our connection helps in speed of transmission since news which might be delayed for confirmation can be released on the basis of a quick confirmation by us. This channel must, of course, be limited to actual news.

~~SECRET~~  
15 March 1961

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

### STATUS OF POLITICAL EFFORT

1. Varona has formally enlarged the FRD Executive Committee by adding ten new members. The present membership is: (original five are underlined).

<u>LEFT</u>	<u>LEFT OF CENTER</u>	<u>CENTER</u>	<u>RIGHT</u>
<u>Carrillo</u>	<u>Arttime</u>	<u>Varona</u>	<u>Maceo</u>
Jesus Fernandez (Labor, 30 Nov)	Collada (Labor for Fraginals)	<u>Rasco</u>	Vargas Gomez
	Miro Cardona	Fernandez Travieso (Student for Muller)	Carlos Hevia
		Alvarez Diaz	Goar Mestre
		Sergio Carbo	
		Pepin Bosch	

The probable reasons for this move by Varona are:

a. To strengthen his hand in negotiations in the Committee of Six formed with Ray.

b. To provide a fall-back group in case the Committee of Six is blocked by a Ray veto. Moreover, the existence of this fall-back position will tend to discourage blocking tactics by Ray.

c. To take advantage of the present anti-Ray swing taking place among the Cuban exiles.

2. Carr met two days ago with Varona and yesterday with Ray.

Varona complained that the Committee of Six was composed of individuals unfavorable to him. Ray, on the other hand, was pretty reasonable,

~~SECRET~~

perhaps, thereby confirming Varona's views. It is still felt that the group will be able to agree on a provisional president, who is expected to be either Miro Cardona or Felipe Pazos who is clearly a Ray man. The odds at the moment seem to favor Miro Cardona who if elected would be wholly acceptable as far as we are concerned. The Committee of Six meets tomorrow afternoon with Carr for the purpose of working out certain procedural details. It is not expected that it will select a provisional president at this meeting. I think, however, that we can state with considerable certainty that we can produce a provisional president within a week. He will then immediately appoint his cabinet and perhaps some secondary officials.

3. It is impossible prior to the selection of a provisional president to determine exactly what individuals will initially go ashore but we can state, again with considerable certainty, that a minimum of two and preferably three senior officials will do so. Cardona is not physically able to be transported too soon but would be able to be introduced as soon as any territory became reasonably secure.

  
15 March 1961

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

16 March 1961

OUTLINE

*Following for  
Sullivan  
to High Table*

1. Two operations have been proposed:
  - a. The "T" operation would involve an opposed landing, require use of paratroops and concurrent tactical air support, would have to be in daylight, would be spectacular.
  - b. The "Z" operation would be unopposed, no concurrent tactical air until air strip seized, greater likelihood of surprise, generally unspectacular.
2. Main concern appears to be with later phases of these operations, on two assumptions.
  - a. Initial phase unsuccessful despite successful landing--how is annihilation prevented?
  - b. Initial phase successful--how is this success exploited into a full victory?
3. Assumption of initial failure.
  - a. In the case of a landing at "T" the force retires into the mountains, hopefully well equipped and with communications. Dependent on air resupply. No possibility of extrication.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

b. In the case of a landing at "Z", initial failure takes the form of a stalemate; little chance of beachhead being overwhelmed. This posture can be maintained almost indefinitely. If all chance of ultimate success abandoned, force can be extricated as it was landed without use of U. S. resources.

4. Exploitation of initial success.

a. After landing at "T", concept is for rapid build up of force with local volunteers and cutting of island in two.

b. After landing at "Z!" concept is for slow build up of force mainly through infiltration of additional personnel and equipment, ultimate breakout and drive directly on Havana.

5. Nature of exploitation phase (either location).

a. Immediate recruitment and training of additional 800 man force for reinforcement.

b. Triggering of revolts by known groups with whom agent contact and communication established.

c. Action, short of revolt, by sabotage and propaganda teams.

6. Balance of advantage.

a. The "T" operation has higher likelihood of prompt success but higher risk, (1) in landing and (2) in early counter-attack against beachhead. The "Z" operation lower risk; less shock effect and therefore less chance of quick success; equal change of ultimate success.

b. The "T" operation absolutely requires tactical air support and does not require air base.

c. Balance strongly favors "Z".

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr. Earman -EYES ONLY	YV	
2	TOP SECRET		
3	BY HAND ONLY		
4	TOP SECRET		
5	A/DDP/A-10502		
6	EYES ONLY		

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

**Remarks:**

Attached is the Working Group's paper which Mr. Dulles asked [REDACTED] for last night. The Working Group consisted of [REDACTED], Mr. Braddock (State) and General Gray (Defense). The paper has been given the absolute minimum distribution and I keep a master list of all those who have seen or who have access to it. When you are through with it up there, I would appreciate it if it could be returned to me. Many thanks.

**EYES**

(5) (3)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER		
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
A/DDP/A		
<input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL	<input type="checkbox"/> SECRET

FORM NO. 237  
1 APR 55

Replaces Form 30-4  
which may be used.

**TOP SECRET**

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 - O-542521

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

23 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Director of Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks for the planning and conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, and act as members of a Central Office for the operation, has agreed upon the tasks to be accomplished by the representatives of your respective departments and agency. The tasks are set forth for three phases: Pre-D-Day Phase; D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition; and Post-Recognition Phase.

2. The tasks for the Pre-D-Day Phase are set forth in Enclosure A hereto.

3. The tasks for the D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition are set forth in Enclosure B hereto.

4. The tasks for the Post-Recognition Phase are set forth in Enclosure C hereto.

5. The proposed time schedule for the Pre-D-Day Phase is attached as Enclosure D hereto.

Department of State Representative

Department of Defense Representative

Atts: Encls. A-D as stated

CIA Representative

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ENCLOSURE A

PRE-D-DAY PHASE

1. Department of State representatives will:
  - a. Prepare White Paper for Presidential approval.
  - b. Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements.
  - c. Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.
  - d. Determine action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to Latin American countries - e.g.
    - (1) Guatemala
    - (2) Nicaraguaand other countries, e.g.
    - (1) United Kingdom
    - (2) France
  - e. Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the development of the Free Cuba Government.
  - f. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO \_\_\_\_\_



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE A

- g. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.
  - h. Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.
  - i. Prepare plans for Post-D-Day actions.
2. Department of Defense representatives will:
- a. Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.
  - b. Prepare logistics plans for arms, ammunition, and equipment support beyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support.
  - c. Prepare plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.
  - d. Prepare letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.
  - e. Keep CINCLANT planners informed.
3. CIA representatives will:
- a. Establish a Central Office from which Executive Department and Agency representatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations.
  - b. Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required.
  - c. Assist in the organization of a Free Cuba Government.
  - d. Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE A

- e. Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Volunteer Force in Cuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order.
- f. Continue to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.
- g. Prepare detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition, establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.
- h. Exert effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.  
(N.B: The defection of the military commander of the Isle of Pines, or at least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly desirable.)
- i. Continue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution.
- j. Support the preparation of a White Paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government.
- k. Review cover plans.
- l. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements.
- m. Review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological warfare plan.
- n. Review Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase.
- o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- 4 -

ENCLOSURE A

p. Prepare contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

q. Prepare final briefing on entire operation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

ENCLOSURE B

D-DAY AND POST-D-DAY PHASE UNTIL RECOGNITION

1. Department of State representatives will:

- a. Take such steps as may be feasible for the protection of U.S. citizens in Cuba.
- b. Execute plans for support of the Revolutionary Council or Free Cuba Government in the United Nations or Organization of American States and to counter communist and/or Castro charges in the United Nations or Organization of American States, as appropriate.
- c. Lend support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteer Force and the Free Cuba Government.
- d. Revise plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Government.
- e. Recognize Free Cuba Government as appropriate.

2. Department of Defense representatives will:

- a. Provide follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/or in accordance with logistics plan.
- b. Provide support from operational forces as directed.
- c. Prepare detailed plans to support the U.S. aid plan for the Free Cuba Government for implementation when overt support is given.
- d. Coordinate support by DOD agencies and commands.

3. CIA representatives will:

- a. Execute and support over-all para-military plan.
- b. Inform DOD representatives of logistics requirements.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE B

- c. Continue execution of psychological warfare plan.
- d. Be responsible for the continuous operation of the Central Office and present briefings of the situation as required or directed.
- e. Introduce representatives of the Revolutionary Council and of the Free Cuba Government into Cuba at an appropriate time.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE C

EVES ONLY

POST RECOGNITION PHASE

The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute, as appropriate, such contingency plans as may be required and will, moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions in relation to the new Cuban government.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE D

EYES ONLY

TIME SCHEDULE

1. D - 14

a. Department of State Representatives:

- (1) Complete White Paper for Presidential approval.
- (2) Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba Government (continuous).

b. Department of Defense Representatives:

- (1) Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.

c. CIA Representatives:

- (1) Establish a Central Office.
- (2) Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required (continuous).
- (3) Assist in organization of Free Cuba Government.
- (4) Continue to train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.
- (5) Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements (continuous).
- (6) Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

2. D - 11

a. Department of State Representatives:

- (1) Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements (continuous).
- (2) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE D

3. D - 10

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.

4. D - 9

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.

(2) Have approved policy position regarding action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries.

(3) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, etc.

(4) Complete plans for Post-D-Day actions.

b. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete logistics plans for DOD follow-up support.

c. CIA Representatives:

(1) Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(2) Complete detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

(3) Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.

(4) Complete review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- 4 -

ENCLOSURE D

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America.

10. D - 2

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given prior to this date).

~~TOP SECRET~~

6a.

~~TOP SECRET~~



Copy No. 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Handed across*

12 April 1961

CUBAN OPERATION

1. Orientation and Concept: The present concept of the operation being mounted to overthrow Castro is that it should have the appearance of a growing and increasingly effective internal resistance, helped by the activities of defected Cuban aircraft and by the infiltration (over a period of time and at several places) of weapons and small groups of men. External support should appear to be organized and controlled by the Revolutionary Council under Miro Cardona as the successor to a number of separate groups. To support this picture and to minimize emphasis on invasion, the following steps have been taken:

a. The public statements of Cardona have emphasized that the overthrow of Castro was the responsibility of the Cubans, that it must be performed mainly by the Cubans in Cuba rather than from outside, and that he and his colleagues are organizing this external support free of control by or official help from the U. S. Government.

b. The plans for air operations have been modified to provide for operations on a limited scale on D-2 and again on D-Day itself instead of placing reliance on a larger strike coordinated with the landings on D-Day.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy No. 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~-2-~~

c. Shortly after the first air strikes on D-2 a B-26 with Cuban pilot will land at Miami airport seeking asylum. He will state that he defected with two other B-26 pilots and aircraft and that they strafed aircraft on the ground before departing.

d. A preliminary diversionary landing of true guerrilla type will be made in Oriente Province on D-2. The main D-Day landings will be made by three groups at locations spaced some distance apart on the coast. These will be followed about one week later by a further guerrilla type landing in Pinar del Rio (at the western end of the island).

e. Ships carrying the main forces leave the staging base at staggered times. (The first one sailed on Tuesday morning.) They will follow independent courses to a rendezvous for the final run-in. Until nearly dusk on D-1 they would appear to air observation to be pursuing unrelated courses so there will be no appearance of a convoy.

f. All the landings will be at night. At least in the first 24 hours, supply activity over the beaches will be at night. There will be no obtrusive "beachhead" to be seen by aircraft. Most troops will be deployed promptly to positions inland.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

2. The Time Table of the plan is as follows:

- D-7: Commence staging main force - staging completed night of D-5.
- D-6: First vessel sails from staging area - last vessel departs early morning D-4.
- D-2: B-26 defection operation - limited air strikes.
- D-2: Diversionary landing in Oriente (night D-3 to D-2).
- D-Day: Main landings (night D-1 to D) - limited air strikes. Two B-26s and liaison plane land on seized air strip.
- D to D+1: Vessels return night of D to D+1 to complete discharge of supplies.
- D+7: Diversionary landing in Pinar del Rio.

3. Diversion or Cancellation: It would now be infeasible to halt the staging and embarkation of the troops. In the event of a decision to modify the operational plan or to cancel the operation, ships will be diverted at sea, either to Vieques Island or to ports in the U. S. If cancellation is directed, the troops and ships' officers will be told that the reason for the diversion is that all details of the operation, including time and place of intended landings, had been blown to the Castro regime and that under these circumstances the landings would be suicidal. This explanation would be adhered to after the demobilization of the force in the U. S. The U. S. Government could take the position

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

that this enterprise had been undertaken by the Cubans without U. S. Governmental support, that it had failed because of their poor security, and that the U. S. could not refuse to grant asylum to the Cuban volunteers. If by reason of either new intelligence or policy considerations it is necessary to effect a major change in the operational plan, it will be necessary to divert to Vieques Island so that officers of the brigade and ships' captains can be assembled and briefed on the new plan. (The advantages of this location are its security together with the opportunity for the troops to be ashore briefly after some days onboard ship.)

4. Naval Protection: The ships carrying the main force will receive unobtrusive Naval protection up to the time they enter Cuban territorial waters. If they are attacked they will be protected by U. S. Naval vessels but following such an intervention they would be escorted to a U. S. port and the force would be demobilized.

5. Defections: Every effort is being made to induce the defection of individuals of military and political significance. At the present time contact has been established by and through Cuban agents and anti-Castro Cuban groups with some thirty-one specific military and police officers, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-5-

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ (b)(6)  
(b)(3)  
There are, of course, in addition many others rumored to be disaffected but to whom no channel of approach is available. The objective of these efforts is not to induce immediate defections but to prepare the individuals for appropriate action in place after D-Day.

6. Internal Resistance Movements: On the latest estimate there are nearly 7,000 insurgents responsive to some degree of control through agents with whom communications are currently active. About 3,000 of these are in Havana itself, over 2,000 in Oriente, about 700 in Las Villas in central Cuba. For the most part, the individual groups are small and very inadequately armed. Air drops are currently suspended because available aircraft are tied up in the movement of troops from their training area to the staging base. After D-Day when it is hoped that the effectiveness of the Castro air force will be greatly reduced, it is planned to supply these groups by daytime air drops. Every effort will be made to coordinate their operations with those of the landing parties. Efforts will be made also to sabotage or destroy by air attack the microwave links on which Castro's communication system depends. The objective is of course to create a revolutionary situation, initially perhaps in Oriente and Las Villas Provinces, and then spreading to all parts of the island.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-6-

7. Propaganda and Communications: Currently medium and short wave broadcasting in opposition to Castro is being carried on from seven stations in addition to Radio Swan. Antennae modifications of the latter have increased its effective power in Cuba and it is believed that there is now good medium wave reception of Swan everywhere except in Havana itself where it can still be effectively jammed. The number of hours of broadcasting per day will be increased beginning immediately from about 25 to almost 75 soon after D-Day. The combination of multiple long and short wave stations which will then be in use, supplemented by three boats which carry broadcasting equipment (two short wave and one medium wave) will assure heavy coverage of all parts of the island virtually at all times. Radio programs will avoid any reference to an invasion but will call for up-rising and will of course announce defections and carry news of all revolutionary action. Soon after D-Day a small radio transmitter will be put in operation on Cuban soil.

8. The Political Leadership: As of the present moment, the six members of Cardona's Revolutionary Council, notably including Ray, have reaffirmed their membership. Although no specific portfolios have been confirmed, the following possibilities are currently under discussion: Varona, Defense; Ray, Gobernacion (Interior); Carrillo, Finance;

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

-7-

Hevia, State; Maceo, Public Health. The political leaders have not yet been briefed on the military plan but they will be informed at each phase of military operations. Advance consultation with the political leaders is considered unacceptably dangerous on security grounds and although last minute briefings will be resented, it is believed that the political leaders will want to take credit for and assume control as quickly as possible over these major operations against Castro. The present plan is that one of them (Arturo) will go into Cuba with the main force, others will follow as soon as possible after D-Day and they will announce the establishment of a Provisional Government on Cuban soil.

9. Command: Military command will be exercised in the name of the Revolutionary Council and later of the Provisional Government. In fact, however, the CIA staff constitutes the general staff of the operation and the Agency controls both logistics support and communications. Accordingly, in the early stages at least, the functions of a general headquarters will be exercised from the Agency with the Cuban brigade commander exercising field command over the units that land on D-Day.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Resistance Elements Active in Cuba

1. It is our estimate that there are between 2,000 and 3,000 persons engaged in active resistance against the Castro regime. Some twelve hundred are active guerrillas, and the remainder are participating in sabotage operations. These figures do not include the thousands of sympathizers who support the resistance with food, medicine, and safe havens, or the many who engage in sabotage on a one-time basis.

2. In the provinces guerrilla fighters are distributed as follows:

- a. Oriente - 180 under the leadership of Lt. "Tico" in the Sierra de Parí north of Imías; 100 led by Captain Argimido Fonseca in the area between Guantanamo and Bayate; 80 to 100 in the Sierra de Cristal; an unknown number in the vicinity of Delicias, where a microwave station was attacked recently, and El Cobre. Those near El Cobre are led by Captain Octavio Lujo Padron.
- b. Las Villas - 300 to 400 in the Escambray area under the leadership of Evelio Duque, Osvaldo Ramirez, Captain Merejo, and Lt. Carbone; 180 in the Yaguajay vicinity under Armando de Ortega and (fnu) Morales; 100 in the Corralillo area under Benito Marti Campos. Las Villas is the principal center of resistance. Cuban Government forces have had clashes with guerrillas at some 20 different points since 1 March 1961.
- c. Camaguey. An undetermined number of guerrillas have been reported in the Los Negros area. An air drop has been made to another group on the South coast.
- d. Matanzas. Guerrilla attacks have been reported from Cascajal, Pedro Mayabon, and San Jose de los Ramos.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In the Jaguey Grande area there is a group of 80 led by Hereliu Pena and Ramon Gonzalez.

- e. Havana. There are an estimated 700 to 1,000 activists in the Havana area engaged in sabotage and support of insurgent groups.
- f. Pinar del Rio. An estimated 150 guerrillas are in the Sierra del Rosario. The resistance potential is high, but unfavorable terrain restricts active fighting. A plan to seize the La Fe-San Julian area with the cooperation of Army and Navy officers has been reported.
- g. Isle of Pines. No active resistance reported. There are over 4,000 political prisoners held here who would join a resistance force were it possible for them to secure their release.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

AIR AND MARITIME OPERATIONS

AIR

A total of 25 air missions have been flown as follows:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Number of Missions</u>	<u>Number of Drops</u>
Escambray	9	7
Pinar del Rio	8	3
Matanzas	4	0
Oriente	2	1
Las Villas	1	0
South Camaguey	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	25	12

The total rigged weight dropped is 70,000 lbs or approximately 28 tons net, consisting of arms, ammunition, explosives and food.

On our most conservative estimate, two and one-half tons of the total reached the reception parties. In addition, three bodies were dropped safely.

MARITIME

A total of 54 maritime operations were run as follows: (Total includes aborts)

<u>Area</u>	<u>Number of Operations</u>	<u>Successful or partially successful</u>
Matanzas	25	6
Havana	13	7
Las Villas	7	4
Pinar del Rio	6	2
Oriente	1	0
Cruz del Padre	1	1
Cayo Mono	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
	54	20

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

In addition to the above 20 successful missions, there may have been 2 or 3 more in which deliveries were ultimately recovered. Over forty tons of arms, ammunition and explosives have reached resistance elements by these maritime operations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

### The Zapata Swamp In Revolutionary History

1. The paramilitary advantages of the Cienega de Zapata are well known in Cuba, as the swamp was used extensively both as a haven for refugees and as a base of operations during the insurrections of the 1860's and the 1890's. Less than 100 miles from Havana, Zapata, an area of 1,850 square miles, offers many advantages to a resistance element. Although it is called a swamp, from 30% to 40% of the area is dry land. Those familiar with the trails in the area can move fairly freely, while those who are not find movement virtually impossible.

2. Cuban patriots as early as 1822 sent agents to the U.S. to determine whether Cuba would be admitted to the Union if it freed itself of Spanish rule. The U.S. gave no encouragement at that time, though from 1845 on there were several U.S. attempts to purchase Cuba from Spain. (The Ostend Manifesto of 1853 urged the U.S. to offer Spain \$120,000,000 for the island, and, if the offer was refused, to take Cuba by force).

3. The Zapata area became a significant place of refuge during the Ten Years' War that began in 1868. This struggle, which was begun at Yara (Oriente Province) by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes and Francisco Vicente Aguilar, had as one of its aims the freeing of the slaves. Thousands of the latter fled to the Swamp (some of their descendents are the charcoal burners of the region today) and rallied to the banner of the "Cuban Washington", Ignacio Agramonte. (Agramonte was killed during the war and leadership of the revolution passed to Maximo Gomez). Although the war was ended by the Pact of Zanjón in 1878, fighting continued under the insurgent leader, Calixto Garcia. Garcia conducted for two years a "little war" (guerra chica) against the Spanish. His ability to survive for that time was due in part to his skillful use of advantageous terrain, including the Cienega de Zapata.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4. The War for Cuban Independence began in 1895 under the political leadership of Jose Marti and Tomas Estrada Palma and the military leadership of Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo. Marti went to Cuba and was killed in fighting in Oriente. The revolutionary force traversed the island in 1896. One column made use of the security offered by the Zapata Swamp by following a line of march from Aguada de Pasajeros across the swamp south of Jaguey Grande and thence northwest to Alacranes. Zapata again played its role of safe haven for fugitives sought by the Spanish authorities.

5. During Castro's rise to power, Zapata was not a factor. Since the Castro forces did not in fact have to fight a determined enemy (most of the great Castro victories consisted of wholesale hand over of posts and garrisons by officers unwilling to die for Batista), there was no need for the area's protective cover. Today the foes of Castro have selected another area for their main active effort against him, the Escambray mountains of Las Villas Province. Zapata, it should be noted, lies to the west of the Escambrays and is an administrative part of the same province, Las Villas. Official Cuban interest in Zapata today appears to be centered on the development of several recreation areas, particularly at Playa Giron, the Laguna del Tesoro, and at the head of Bahia Cochinos. There have been several reports of mysterious construction activity in the area (rocket launchers, helicopter pads, etc.), but none have been confirmed. Until there is up-to-date photography of the region, the facts will not be known.

~~SECRET~~

PRESS STATEMENT BY NEW ANTI-CASTRO "REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL"

The following document, outlining a minimum platform of action and political concept, was passed to the press on 22 March 1961 during a conference in New York City held by a group of Cubans announcing the unification of forces against Fidel Castro.....

"Before entering a war, the people should know what they will fight for, where it will lead them, and what will come after."

José Martí

I. FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES

1. To overthrow the Communist tyranny which enslaves the people of Cuba and to re-establish moral peace and harmony among all Cubans.
2. To propose to the Cubans the ideal of national reconstruction as a common task for all - the government and the governed - towards the establishment of the basis of the New Republic and to direct the course of the Nation on the path of a concrete and high historical destiny.

II. A STATE OF LAW.

1. To guarantee the immediate establishment of a State of Law and Order which will impede the excesses of those who would pretend to introduce social chaos under the pretext of applying justice, according to individual or group opinion. To reaffirm the independence of the Judiciary Power and the respect to its decisions.
2. To repudiate the policy of an Open Constituent Power, and in order to guarantee juridical security - basis of a State of Law - to re-establish the Constitution of 1940, with the exclusive exception of the following precepts:



a) Those relating to its organic rules whose compliance are in conflict with the very nature of a provisional government.

b) That referring to the cash payment of expropriations in reference to the application of the Agrarian Reform as formulated in these basis. Indemnifications can be made in bonds.

c) Those referring to the Millionth portion of the national budget payable to teachers, and the contribution of the government to the University of Havana, which in practice has proved to be impossible to comply with. Adequate remuneration for teachers and due endowment for the Universities will be guaranteed by Law.

d) Those relating to the Tribunal of Accounts, with the object of obtaining greater efficiency in the control of public funds.

e) Those relating to the system of election of congressmen, who could be elected by electoral districts if the law should so determine.

3. To hold general elections within the undeferrable term of eighteen months following the overthrow of the Communist tyranny. The Provisional President cannot be a candidate to any elective post in these elections.

4. To establish an efficient public administration. No officials, employees, or workers will be appointed, nor will any budget payrolls be used, in any manner to satisfy sectarian political ends or as recompense for revolutionary sacrifices.

### III. POLICY OF RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1. To promote an active policy of reconstruction of our economy as well as industrial, agricultural, mining and tourist development which will increase the national income, provide work for the unemployed and raise the living standard of the people.

2. To stimulate investment of private capital, national and foreign, to give ample guarantees to free enterprise and initiative and the rights of private ownership in its broadest sense of social function.

3. To revise the tax system violated by the tyranny, returning to the general system of the Law of Tributary Reform - No. 447 of 1959, with the necessary adaptations to meet existing realities of the national economy and the demands of reconstruction.

4. To abolish the so-called Urban Reform Law, freezing rentals in force on October 1, 1960, and offering ample facilities for the construction of low-priced workers' dwellings.

#### IV. AGRARIAN POLICY

1. To establish an agrarian regime which will adequately solve the existing situations created by the Communist government which will facilitate acquisition by the farmer occupying the small parcels of land, giving him full ownership through payment to the former owner of the land in bonds duly guaranteed, and which can be liquidated before maturity for financing industrial projects of national interest.

2. To adopt measures necessary to proscribe latifundia, and specifically to determine the minimum yield of farms exceeding a fixed area, and the procedures and terms in which they should be sold to other owners when the excessive land does not produce the minimum yield.

3. To dictate regulations which offer the farmer adequate financing, long term credits and low interest rates, technical advice, transportation facilities, storage and effective measures for guaranteeing a minimum price for his crops, as well as markets for his agricultural produce.

4. To propitiate and stimulate the creation of farm cooperatives, based on the free decision of its members, offering them technical assistance and the resources which the Government might assign for its more effective functioning.

5. To adopt measures that will assure the farmer a high level of income, education, hygiene and better living conditions.

6. To initiate a large scale plan for the construction of rural homes.

#### V. LABOR PROGRAM

1. To restore to the working classes all social rights recognized and acquired under the Constitution.

2. To abolish the laws which have annulled free unions and to suppress the so-called volunteer contributions.

3. To abolish the State control of labor.

4. To encourage the participation of workers in the earnings of the companies or enterprises.

5. To guarantee equal opportunities of study, apprenticeship and employment for youth.

6. To promulgate the Labor Code regulating the relations between Capital and Labor and to establish Labor Courts.

7. To revise and strengthen the Social Security Institutions and to adjust the Social Security Bank to sound actuarial practices.

#### VI. RESTITUTION OF LEGITIMATE PROPERTY

1. To restore to the legitimate owners all property and right intervened, confiscated, occupied or affected by the Communist regime with the exception of those which for reasons of national interest the State should consider expropriable as authorized by the Constitution and the Law.

2. Property confiscated because of <sup>misappropriation</sup> ~~misappropriation~~ of public funds, illicit gains or fraudulent transactions committed during the tenure of public office will not be included in this restitution. However, a period of 60 days will be granted for the presentation of claims against confiscatory resolutions considered unjustified.

#### VII. EDUCATION AND CULTURE

1. To undertake a realistic educational reform, directed towards preparing the citizen for assuming his responsibilities in a democratic society, to create technicians required for the economic development of the country, to promote cultural advancement of the people, to extend educational facilities throughout the Island through the efficient use of funds destined for this purpose.

2. To re-establish the freedom of educational systems, promoting the moral formation of children and youth.

3. To suppress all militarization and totalitarian indoctrination of children and youth.

4. To reinstate full University autonomy, endowing official institutions with the necessary funds in order to fulfill their high social mission.

#### VIII. PUBLIC HEALTH

1. To develop effective plans which will allow all Cubans, irrespective of their financial situation, complete attention for the maintenance of their health.

#### IX. ARMED FORCES

1. To ratify in their present position all members of the Rebel Army, Navy and Police who contribute to the overthrow of the Communist tyranny and to promote those who distinguish themselves by heroism in the struggle.

2. To organize technical Armed Forces dedicated to the service of the Nation to which members of the former Army as well as of the Rebel Army might belong, if not guilty of criminal offenses.

3. To initiate procedures for the establishment of compulsory Military Service.

4. To disband the Militias.

X. LIBERATION OF PRISONERS AND REVISION OF SENTENCES

1. To dictate the immediate liberation of all prisoners condemned for acts of resistance to the Communist tyranny, to annul the corresponding procedures and to revise the trials held by the so-called Revolutionary Tribunals of Ordinary courts in order to rectify cases of injustice.

XI. ERADICATION OF COMMUNISM AND OF ALL ANTI-DEMOCRATIC ACTIVITY

1. To proscribe the Communist Party and any organization contrary to our Representative Democratic regime, or which threaten the national sovereignty in accordance with the dispositions of Article 37 of the Constitution.

XII. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. To denounce all treaties and international agreements which undermine the national sovereignty and which threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere.

2. Immediate renewal of our traditional relations with the democratic countries of the world and loyal compliance with all legitimate international agreements.

-----  
THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT states that it further maintains:

a) Strengthening the commercial banking system, based on free competition among private Cuban firms, and avoiding excessive financial influence concentrated in few hands.

b) To definitely nationalize the Public Utilities of Light and Power, Telephone, Aqueducts and Railroads through indemnification to former owners, and entrusting the management to efficient autonomous institutions.

No agreement was reached concerning these points, insofar as they are not included in the Program of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, and they have been left pending further discussion under a free public opinion regime.

-----

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Copy of memo sent to the  
Task force circa April 11 AWD*

Has adequate consideration been given to the following points: -

- (1) The command structure
  - a. During embarkation
  - b. Once afloat (relation between ship captains and military personnel)
  - c. After debarkation
- (2) What element of command do USA personnel have during these various phases.
- (3) Who controls communications between flotilla and other separate elements and any USA naval forces in area. Do latter have any command function during voyage up to territorial waters.
- (4) During what stages are USA personnel present during these various phases. Has it been decided whether any American "soldiers of fortune" will be on beachhead.
- (5) What are communications arrangements among elements of flotilla during voyage. What communications security on this communication and on ship-to-shore or ship-to-USA naval craft.
- (6) Who has right and responsibility to give abort signal to flotilla, i.e., USA naval forces - the flotilla commander - ship's captain?
- (7) Who has final decision to abort and any discretion as to where to go?

- (8) Once ashore, are military elements on their own, subject to outside command and is there one overall commander ashore, or do each of the three or more separated units have separate commanders and separate missions.
- (9) Are there plans for close air and sea reconnaissance of beachhead area before elements of flotilla become vulnerable to shore attack?
- (10) What arrangements made for PBVs or equivalent sea planes in landing area.
- (11) What is communications pattern between separate beachhead and HQS? Is there one Commo channel or several?
- (12) What flag or flags do flotilla ships fly. Is there any arrangement for change on route or if threatened with attack? What arrangements made to change ship's name after departure. Is it feasible to select names of plausible ships from Lloyd's Register?
- (13) What information will the commercial officers and crews of the ships know about the undertaking? What is their nationality? Have there been any security checks, etc. ?
- (14) What counterintelligence arrangements have been made and are there any such units on ships and with separate landing parties.
- (15) What are the fresh water resources in the respective landing areas.



- 2.
- (16) What are present arrangements for parachuting teams into areas - where, when and why?
  - (17) What types of uniform will be used and are there any special insignia for "liberation" forces after guerrilla stage is over?
  - (18) Is existing photography of airstrip adequate to base firm judgment as to its useability?
  - (19) What is the thinking about decision for breaking out of the area. Is that left to local separate commanders as opportunity presents or coordinated by the overall command or by HQS.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Copies memo sent to  
Tashiro - circa  
April 7 AM D

Points to be considered in connection with the WAVE Program

1. Diversionary and cover-up operations
  - A. In addition to the one major diversionary landing, consideration should be given to approximately simultaneously sea infiltration of agents via small boats not required for the major operation.
  - B. Use of Swan Island radio for fictitious reports of landings on basis of alleged info from Cuba.
  - C. Placing of flares in sea along coast at several points to divert attention of true destination of troops from MADD.
  - D. Spread stories that detachment from MADD has been flown to USA and if possible arrange token flights to back up this story. Meanwhile, use Guatemala troops through maneuvers or otherwise to give impression that bulk of troops have remained at their base.
  - E. Between now and D-Day, drop parachutes where they can be picked up and considered as evidence of widespread dropping of of arms which have been taken into the bush by dissidents.
2. Consider desirability of arranging, prior to D-Day, for Guatemala and other Central American states to ask for protection against threatened Cuban invasion.
3. Consider possible USA declaration that Cuba by its actions had become outlaw from OAS.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

4. Consider USA action to request legislation embargoing all trade with Cuba except under license.
5. Endeavor arrange maximum sabotage, particularly of oil and public utility objectives, immediately prior D-Day.
6. Prepare statements by leading exiles to be published and broadcasted immediately after landing.
7. Arrange simultaneous defection of as many Cuban foreign diplomatic representatives as possible.
8. Consider feasibility of declaration of war on Cuba by certain Central American and other states, including Guatemala.
9. Stimulate attacks on key Cuban leaders, with appropriate timing.
10. Consider desirability of broad-scale leaflet drops, including by U-2.
11. Consider what type of unattributable action our Navy could take.

Portable radio -

☒ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ INTERNAL  
USE ONLY

☐ CONFIDENTIAL

☒ SECRET

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

(Optional)

SECRET

FROM:

C/WHD *by [signature]*

NO.

DATE

10 March 1961

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DCI  
221 Admin Bldg.

Attached is a copy of the JMATE policy paper presented to and approved by the President on 17 March 1960. (This information was received from Mr. Parrot, DDP/EBM.)

SECRET

14

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U. S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U. S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U. S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U. S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the Revolution", to develop a

~~SECRET~~

-2-

political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

-3-

hard intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U. S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and divisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

in the opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U. S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U. S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. \$100,000 has already been pledged from U. S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional \$2,000,000.

5. Budget: It is anticipated that approximately \$4,400,000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~



~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

-5-

requirements for FY-1960 funds is \$900,000 with the balance of \$3,500,000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

TAB A

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution."

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points.

[REDACTED] group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.

b. Cuba is entitled to an honest democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.

c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect. .

d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated.

e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.

A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

TAB B

PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). Presidents Betancourt and Ydigoras have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. Avance, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has El Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario de la Marina, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

TAB C

FINANCIAL ANNEX

I.	<u>Political Action</u>	<u>FY-1960</u>	<u>FY-1961</u>
	Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities	150,000	800,000
II.	<u>Propaganda</u>		
	Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of trans- mitters)	400,000	700,000
	Press and Publications	100,000	500,000
III.	<u>Paramilitary</u>		
	In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training	200,000	1,300,000
IV.	<u>Intelligence Collection</u>	50,000	200,000
		<hr/>	<hr/>
	Totals	*900,000	3,500,000

\* These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

*of 22 Dec 68*

CUBA

#2

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

Handled to Bundy  
+ Read by Pres?

17 February 1961

be assisted in  
CUBA  
ready to be

1. BACKGROUND: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion the organization of a broadly based opposition to the Castro regime and the development of propaganda channels, clandestine agent nets within Cuba, and trained paramilitary ground and air forces wherewith that opposition could overthrow the Cuban regime. The concept was that this should be so far as possible a Cuban operation, though it was well understood that support in many forms would have to come from the United States. Great progress has been made in this undertaking. A Government-in-Exile will soon be formed embracing most reputable opposition elements. It will have a left-of-center political orientation and should command the support of liberals both within Cuba and throughout the hemisphere. It will sponsor and increasingly control trained and combat-ready military forces based in Central America. A decision must soon be made as to the support (if any) the United States will render the opposition henceforth.

2. PROSPECTS FOR THE CASTRO REGIME: The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. Assuming that the United States applies political and economic pressures at roughly present levels of severity, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support. There is no significant likelihood that the Castro regime will fall of its own weight.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up, along with a huge militia.

b. Cuba is in economic difficulties but the Communist Bloc will almost certainly take whatever steps are necessary to

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

forestall any decisive intensification of these troubles. Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the collapse or the significant weakening of the Castro regime.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained Cuban pilots of known political reliability. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date probably [no more] than six months away it will become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized, *Non-Cuban* military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open.

*8.6.65 shows desperation use of missiles or bombs to cause some damage.*

3. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT: Cuba will, of course, never present a direct military threat to the United States and it is unlikely that Cuba would attempt open invasion of any other Latin American country since the U.S. could and almost certainly would enter the conflict on the side of the invaded country. Nevertheless, as Castro further stabilizes his regime, obtains more sophisticated weapons, and further trains the militia, Cuba will provide an effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operations and expansion of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Arms, money, organizational and other support can be provided from Cuba to dissident leaders and groups throughout Latin America in order to create political instability, encourage Communism, weaken the prestige of the U.S., and foster the inevitable popular support that Castro's continuance of power will engender. A National Estimate states: "For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. More importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communists with a friendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and with a highly exploitable examples of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of the United States."

4. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION: For reasons which require no elaboration the overt use of U.S. military forces to mount an invasion of Cuba has been excluded as a practical alternative. Broadly defined the

*to date..*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
-3-

following three possible alternative courses of action remain for consideration:

- a. Intensification of economic and political pressures coupled with continued covert support of sabotage and minor guerrilla actions but excluding substantial commitment of the Cuban opposition's paramilitary force.
- b. Employment of the paramilitary force but in a manner which would not have the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.
- c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.

These alternatives are discussed in the following paragraphs.

5. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE: There is little that can be done to impose real political and economic pressure on the Castro regime and no such course of action now under serious consideration seems likely to bring about its overthrow.

- a. A true blockade of Cuba enforced by the United States would involve technical acts of war and has now been dismissed as infeasible.
- b. Action to halt arms shipments from Cuba into any other part of the hemisphere would be cumbersome and easily evaded if air transport were employed. While undoubtedly of some value it is difficult to see that the institution of such measures would either impose severe pressure on the Castro regime or effectively insulate the rest of the hemisphere from it. Castro's principal tools of subversion are people, ideology, the force of example and money. The flow of these items cannot be dammed up.

~~TOP SECRET~~

c. Further economic sanctions are theoretically possible but can quite readily be offset by an increase of trade with the Bloc.

d. In any event, it is estimated that the prospects for effective international action are poor.

6. THE MIDDLE COURSE: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary force gradually to an assembly point in suitable terrain, hopefully avoiding major encounters in the process and committing it to extensive guerrilla action. This course of action would have the advantage of rendering unnecessary a single major landing which could be described as an invasion. The infiltration phase would take on the coloration of efforts by small groups of Cubans to join an already existing resistance movement. Unfortunately, it has been found to be infeasible on military grounds. Basically the reasons (explained more fully in the attachment) are:

a. It is considered militarily infeasible to infiltrate in small units a force of this size to a single area where it could assemble, receive supplies, and engage in coordinated military action. Such an operation would have to be done over a period of time and the loss of the element of surprise after initial infiltrations would permit government forces to frustrate further reinforcements to the same area.

b. Military units significantly smaller than the battalion presently undergoing unit training would fall short of the "minimum critical mass" required to give any significant likelihood of success. Smaller scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings of wide-spread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces.

c. Actually, the least costly and most efficient way to infiltrate the force into a terrain suitable for protracted and powerful guerrilla operations would be by a single landing of the whole force as currently planned and its retirement from the landing point into the chosen redoubt.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-5-

7. A LANDING IN FORCE: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of the plan for a landing by the Cuban opposition. They have concluded that "this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success" (that is of detonating a major and ultimately successful revolt against Castro) and that, if ultimate success is not achieved there is every likelihood that the landing can be the means of establishing in favorable terrain a powerful guerrilla force which could be sustained almost indefinitely. The latter outcome would not be (and need not appear as) a serious defeat. It would be the means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime and would be a continuing demonstration of inability of the regime to establish order. It could create an opportunity for an OAS intervention [to impose a cease-fire and hold elections.]

a. Any evaluation of the chances of success of the assault force should be realistic about the fighting qualities of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia are not fighters by instinct or background and are not militiamen by their own choice. Their training has been slight and they have never been exposed to actual fire (particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack. Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that if the tide shifts against the regime, the chances are strong that substantial will desert or change sides.

b. There is no doubt that the paramilitary force would be widely assumed to be U. S. supported. Nevertheless, this conclusion would be difficult to prove and the scale of its activity would not be inconsistent with the potentialities for support by private Cuban and American groups rather than by the U. S. Government. It must be emphasized, moreover, that this enterprise would have nothing in common (as would the use of U. S. military forces) with the Russian suppression of Hungary or the Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. This would be a force of dissident Cubans with Cuban political and military leadership.

c. There would be adverse political repercussions to a landing in force but it is not clear how serious these would be.

Most Latin American Governments would at least privately approve of unobtrusive U. S. support for such an opposition move, especially if the political coloration of the opposition were left-of-center. The reaction of the rest of the free world, it is estimated, would be minimal in the case of unobtrusive U. S. support for such an attempt. It might produce a good deal of cynicism throughout the world about the U. S. role but if quickly successful little lasting reaction. Generally speaking it is believed that the political cost would be low in the event of a fairly quick success. The political dangers flowing from long continued large scale guerrilla warfare would be greater but there are diplomatic preparations that could be made to forestall extreme adverse reactions in this contingency.

*... that it will be ...*

8. DISSOLUTION OF THE MILITARY FORCE: A decision not

to use the paramilitary force must consider the problem of dissolution, since its dissolution will surely be the only alternative if it is not used within the next four to six weeks. It is hoped that at least one hundred volunteers could be retained for infiltration in small teams but it is doubtful whether more than this number would be available or useful for this type of activity.

a. There is no doubt that dissolution in and of itself will be a blow to U. S. prestige as it will be interpreted in many Latin American countries and elsewhere as evidence of the U. S. inability to take decisive action with regard to Castro. David will again have defeated Goliath. Anti-U. S. regimes like that of Trujillo would gain strength while pro-U. S. Betancourt would undoubtedly suffer. Surely Ydigoras, who has been an exceedingly strong ally, would also be placed in a very difficult position for his support of a disbanded effort. It must be remembered in this connection that there are sectors of Latin American opinion which criticize the U. S. for not dealing sufficiently forcefully with the Castro regime. In fact, one reason why many Latin American governments are holding back in opposing Castro is because they feel that sooner or later the U. S. will be compelled to take strong measures.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-7-

b. The resettlement of the military force will unavoidably cause practical problems. Its members will be angry, disillusioned and aggressive with the inevitable result that they will provide honey for the press bees and the U.S. will have to face the resulting indignities and embarrassments. Perhaps more important, however, will be the loss of good relations with the opposition Cuban leaders. To date almost all non-Batista, non-Communist political leaders have been encouraged or offered help in fighting Castro. An abandonment of the military force will be considered by them as a withdrawal of all practical support. In view of the breadth of the political spectrum involved, this will cause some difficulties for the future since it is hard to imagine any acceptable post-Castro leadership that will not include some of the exiles dealt with during the past year.

9. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Castro's position is daily getting stronger and will soon be consolidated to the point that his overthrow will only be possible by drastic, politically undesirable actions such as an all-out embargo or an overt use of military force.

*From Cuba*

b. A failure to remove Castro by external action will lead in the near future to the elimination of all internal and external Cuban opposition of any effective nature. Moreover, the continuance of the Castro regime will be a substantial victory for the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will use Cuba as a base for increased activity throughout the Western Hemisphere, thereby accentuating political instability and weakening U.S. prestige and influence.

c. The Cuban paramilitary force, if used, has a good chance of overthrowing Castro or at the very least causing a damaging civil war without requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt action against Cuba. Whatever embarrassment the alleged (though deniable) U.S. support may cause, it may well be considerably less than that resulting from the continuation of the Castro regime or from the more drastic and more attributable actions necessary to accomplish the result at a later date.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-8-

d. Even though the best estimate of likely Soviet reaction to a successful movement against Castro indicates problems to the U. S. arising from the removal or substantial weakening of the Castro regime, Soviet propaganda and political moves will still be much less prejudicial to the long-range interests of the U. S. than would the results of a failure to remove Castro.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX - A

A CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION BY SEA OF SMALL GROUPS  
(UP TO 50 MEN)

1. The only areas of Cuba with mountainous terrain of sufficient extent and ruggedness for guerrilla operations are the Sierra Escambray of La Villas Province in Central Cuba and the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province at the eastern extremity of the island. The Sierra de los Organos of Western Cuba do not encompass sufficient area and are not rugged enough to sustain guerrilla operations against strong opposition. Of the two areas with adequate terrain, only the Sierra Escambray is truly suitable for our purposes, since the mountains in Eastern Cuba are too distant from air bases in Latin America available to CIA for air logistical support operations. Primary reliance would have to be placed on this method of supply for guerrilla forces.

2. The Government of Cuba (GOC) has concentrated large forces of army and militia in both Las Villas and Oriente Provinces. Estimates of troop strength in Las Villas have varied recently from 17,000 to as high as 60,000 men, while up to 12,000 men are believed to be stationed in Oriente.

3. While of dubious efficiency and morale, the militia, by sheer weight of numbers has been able to surround and eliminate small groups of insurgents. A landing by 27 men of the Masferrer Group in Oriente, for example, was pursued and eliminated by 2,000 militia. A similar

~~SECRET~~



group of insurgents in Western Cuba, was attacked and destroyed by six battalions of army and militia (about 3,000 men).

4. A build-up of force in a given area by infiltration of small groups would require a series of night landings in the same general vicinity. Discovery of the initial landing by GOC forces would be almost a certainty, since security posts are located at all possible landing areas. Even if the initial landing were successful, the GOC could be expected to move troops and naval patrol craft to the area making further landings difficult if not impossible. Any small force landed, experience has shown, will be rapidly engaged by forces vastly superior in numbers. Therefore, it is considered unlikely that small groups landing on successive occasions would succeed in joining forces later. A series of surrounded pockets of resistance would be the result.

5. Repeated approaches to the Cuban coast by vessels large enough to land up to 50 men would probably provoke attack by the Cuban Navy and/or Air Force, either of which is capable of destroying any vessels which could be used by CIA for these purposes.

6. In the Sierra Escambray, which is the only area of Cuba in which true guerrilla operations are now being conducted, ill-equipped and untrained groups of up to 200 to 300 men have been hard pressed to survive and have been unable to conduct effective operations. The only worthwhile accomplishment of these bands has been to serve as a

symbol of resistance. Smaller groups, even though better trained and equipped, could not be expected to be effective.

7. There are very few sites on the south coast of the Sierra Escambray where small boats can be landed. These are found principally at the mouths of rivers and are all guarded by militia posts armed with machine guns. A small group landing at such a point by shuttling from a larger vessel in small boats would probably receive heavy casualties.

8. Small-scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings and widespread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces. These conditions must be produced before the Castro Government can be overthrown by any means short of overt intervention by United States armed forces.

As long as the armed forces respond to Castro's orders, he can maintain himself in power indefinitely. The history of all police-type states bears out this conclusion.

9. The CIA Cuban Assault Force, composed entirely of volunteers, has been trained for action as a compact, heavily armed, hard-hitting military unit, and the troops are aware of the combat power which they possess as a unit. They have been indoctrinated in the military principle of mass and instructed that dispersion of force leads to defeat in detail. They will be quick to recognize the disadvantages of the infiltration concept, and it is unlikely that all would volunteer for piecemeal commitment

~~TOP SECRET~~

commitment to military action in Cuba. The troops can be used in combat only on a voluntary basis. The Government of the United States exercises no legal command or disciplinary authority over them.


CONCLUSIONS:

1. This course of action would result in large scale loss of life, both through military action against forces vastly superior in numbers and as a result of drum-head justice and firing squad execution of those captured.

2. This alternative could achieve no effective military or psychological results.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESS ALLEGATIONS REGARDING CUBAN OPERATION

- 
- (1) The "invasion" was supposed to trigger off a spontaneous uprising within Cuba.
  - (2) The Cuban underground was not notified in advance of the invasion so could not give any aid.
  - (3) There was a failure of intelligence as to the strength of Castro's forces and the speed of their reaction.
  - (4) The enemy was tipped off as to the time and place of landing so that the invasion force was anticipated and liquidated.
  - (5) The invasion force was penetrated by Batistaites.
  - (6) The group of Manuelo Ray which "claimed" the greatest assets in Cuba was neglected in connection with the planning and execution of the operation.
  - (7) C.I.A. put in battalion commanders who were political hacks.

(8) 17 Cuban "volunteers" were imprisoned for some 11 weeks by the C.I.A. in a prison compound in Guatemala. Allegedly this was because they did not like the way the C.I.A. was running the show.

(9) C.I.A. chose the members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council and it was largely representative of the reactionary Cuban elements. (Others claim it had representatives of Communists in it).

(10) C.I.A. tied to right wing Cuban elements.

(11) "C.I.A." recruited Cubans in Miami.

(12) Cuban political leaders were imprisoned in Miami by C.I.A. just prior to the landing and misleading information put out in their name.

(13) False information was put out by the U.S. Government as to numbers involved in the landing.

(14) The U.S.A. placed its reputation in the hands of a poorly trained and squabbly band of refugees.

5) When Cuban Naval officers commanding the invasion were given their destination after sailing from Puerto Cabezas, there was a near mutiny aboard the ships.

6) The propaganda harangues from Radio Swan (the rebel Cuban people were abruptly suspended two weeks before and known Cuban voices were replaced by unknown voices.

7) The Air Force was not destroyed as was boasted after the end of April 15.

The entire psychological warfare phase of the operation initiated from the outset, ever since Radio Swan began to Cuba.

The first trainees who went to the camp sites in Guatemala -- angled, tropical, snake-infested underbrush and many of the within view of passing travelers.

Arturo was CIA's fair-haired boy among the political and staged a coup in the camps in January.

(21) D-Day was hastily moved up from May 1 to April 17 because Russian MIGs were reported arriving in Cuba. In the haste, CIA neglected to coordinate the invasion with the planned uprising. Thousands waiting in Cuba to spring into action never got the signal.

(22) A series of allegations by Drew Pearson particularly containing criticisms of the choice and handling of the invasion ships; their officers and crews; failure to check on loyalty of crew members; misconduct of officers, etc.

17 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. At his press conference on Friday, 21 April 1961, President Kennedy in answer to an inquiry by Sander Van Ocher said:

"Further statements and detailed discussions are not to conceal responsibility because I am the responsible officer of the Government, but merely -- and that is quite obvious -- but merely because I do not believe that such a discussion would benefit us during the present difficult situation."

Van Ocher had asked why background sessions were not being held by the State Department and the White House for a responsible group of reporters to let them know what had happened on the Cuban situation.

3. On 24 April 1961, replying to a statement <sup>made</sup> on TV by Secretary Udall implying Eisenhower administration responsibility for the Cuban incident, Pierre Salinger issued this statement:

"President Kennedy has stated from the beginning that as President he bears full responsibility for the events of past days. He has stated this on all occasions and he restates it now so that it will be understood by all. The President is strongly opposed to anyone within or without the Administration attempting to shift the responsibility."

Secretary Udall then issued this statement:

"The President and his Administration have taken full responsibility in regard to our relations with Cuba. If my remarks on television yesterday gave any other impression, I deeply regret it."

*Stanley J. Grogan*  
STANLEY J. GROGAN  
Assistant to the Director

cc: DDCI

cc: Sec. up



~~TOP SECRET~~

*Testimony  
Sen. FaREL Cammiller*

Mr. Dulles: (p. 25) ...

They had been trained together as a force. They knew their fire power, which was very high and, as I say, the general military estimate of the situation was that if they get ashore with their equipment, they could hold this beachhead for a considerable time until they could have been very substantially reinforced.

That seemed to be the military judgment at the time, and people who have come back from the beaches have said they could handle the situation, they could have handled this situation if they could have had the ammunition and the air cover.

Senator Capehart: (p. 58 & p. 59)

Are you gentlemen telling us here today that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our high military people who fought in World War I and World War II, and who know how to win wars and win battles, approved this, what would appear to me to be a Boy Scout operation?

Mr. Dulles: Well, Senator, I do not want to put responsibility or blame on anyone else. But I can say we took the highest, the best, military advice that we could get.

Senator Capehart: Well, when I say you I was not directing this toward you necessarily.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Dulles: What do you mean by directing?

Senator Capehart: I mean you mean you say "we," I mean you mean the CIA did not particularly direct this invasion, did they, or train those people?

Mr. Dulles: Well, we had obviously a part, in the first place we had loaned to us an extremely capable number of military men in this field of training, logistics, Air and other branches of the Services; and in addition to that the plans were considered, as has been already indicated, at a very high level, and that consideration included high military men.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Senator Morse: (p. 54 & p. 55) What I do not understand is why it was thought that 12 to 16 hundred people, backed with three supply ships, plus these other three ships, I guess, could be used for evacuation, could possibly establish a beachhead in this area of Cuba or two beachheads in this area of Cuba, when we knew, and we knew this from past briefings, that Castro had built up a considerable amount of artillery and tanks and defensive emplacements?

This was their military decision and not the decision of our advisers?

Mr. Bissell: Well, it was -- the judgment as to its feasibility was concurred in, sir, by the various Americans who were familiar with these plans, and this included, of course, the military officers who helped to formulate the plans, and also the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ....

Senator Longhart: (p. 64 & p. 65) I would like to know this, Mr. Bissell: Apparently, all those who did advise did recommend that this measure be undertaken, and they indicated that they thought it could succeed. Was it your agency <sup>which</sup> made the initial evaluation that they felt this landing could succeed?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Bissell: We made, I suppose, the earliest evaluation in time, sir, and then it was, as Mr. Dulles has said, the plans were reviewed, and a great many alternative plans were reviewed by the military authorities, and all the highest authorities of the Executive Branch.

Senator Long: From what I read about this landing it sounds to me as though a great number of people looked at this thing and agreed to it, based on the fact that somebody else thought it was a good idea or somebody else thought this was the way to do it.

Mr. Bissell: I think, sir, that the military advisers who were concerned with this did take a careful and detailed look at it and, indeed, there was at one time, this included a visit by a group of military officers to the units in training to form a first-hand impression of their skill and effectiveness and morale.

Senator Symington: (p. 85) Now, on the question of this military operation, the columnists have had a field day in socking the CIA about it and, of course, that is easy to do. It is like punching a paper bag because the CIA cannot reply.

But didn't you have advice on this from the various military units?

Mr. Bissell: We did, sir.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Senator Symington: (p. 88 & p. 89)

Well, based on history, didn't we know that if they did have any fighter defense that our position would be difficult, if not hopeless, with the B-26 bombers, I say we?

Mr. Bissell: We did indeed know that sir; and we counted on knocking out their air strength on the ground before this operation started.

Senator Symington: Was this discussed with the other Services, the Air Force, the Navy, Army?

Mr. Bissell: Yes, sir; it was.

Senator Symington: What was their position with respect to it?

Mr. Bissell: I believe it was their position, although I think my immediate advisers felt it even more strongly, that we must knock out the enemy air no later than early on D-Day if this operation was to have a good chance of success.

The Chairman: (p. 93, p. 94 & p. 95)

But I understood under the law that this, in a sense, is a creature of the NSC; that you are supposed to -- and it is under the direction of NSC -- and you report to them.

Mr. Bissell: That is correct.

Senator Symington: I mean my point is that, therefore, the Central Intelligence Agency reports directly to the President of the United States because it reports to a body that is strictly

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

an advisory body, by statute, to the President.

The Chairman: The only significance might be that other agencies of the government would have an opportunity through their representatives on the NSC present their views, whereas if you reported directly to the President they do not.

Senator Symington: That is what I was trying to say, sir.

The Chairman: I was just trying to get on the record that on occasion they do not report to NSC; they report directly to the President.

Senator Symington: Then it is not in accordance with statute.

Mr. Bissell: May I say, Mr. Chairman, to repeat that I know of no case in which the agency has reported directly to the President without the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense also being involved and, as a rule, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and other agencies. But I know of no case where the Secretaries of those two Departments have not been involved.

The Chairman: As I understood it correctly in this particular case you did not report to the NSC?

Mr. Bissell: No, sir; we did not. There were many reviews of the plans for and policies toward this operation and they, as a rule, involved several officers in the State Department, the Defense Department, plus the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and on occasion other officers.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C/104/D

17 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

The following documents are transmitted herewith:

1. Comments on Drew Pearson's Column of Friday, 5 May 1961,  
1 original.
2. Comments on Drew Pearson's Column of Saturday, 6 May 1961,  
1 original.
3. Comment on Drew Pearson's Column of Wednesday, 10 May 1961,  
1 original.
4. Comment on Press Allegations Regarding Cuban Operation,  
1 original.

J. C. KING

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN ONE COPY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT  
OF ITEMS 1 THRU 4 LISTED ABOVE:

NAME

COMPONENT

DATE

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

Comments on Drew Pearson's Column of Friday,  
5 May 1961

ITEM 1 - CIA is now trying desperately to hide its mistakes. Agents have been rushed to Florida to house the Cubans who knew the embarrassing truth.

COMMENT: Untrue. As a matter of fact we have expedited the return of all Cubans to the U.S. and have permitted them free and unfettered access to family and friends.

ITEM 2 - The first trainees who went to the camp sites in Guatemala-- "found only tangled, tropical, snake-infested underbrush. For the first week they lived on corn flakes and rain water." A revolution Air Force sent to Guatemala found equipment to build a base with rather than the base they had been promised.

COMMENT: The statements are untrue.

ITEM 3 - Many of the camps were within view of passing travelers.

COMMENT: The ground training camps were located in remote areas of Guatemala and could not be seen by passing travelers. The air operations base at Retalhuleu was somewhat exposed.

ITEM 4 - Artime was CIA's fair-haired boy--ingratiated himself with Bender through Barker--promised to make Barker sports czar in liberated Cuba.

COMMENT: Artime was accepted as a leader by the Cuban exile community in early 1960. He was a member of the original executive committee of the FRD which was formed on 22 June 1960 and was

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~



~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

extremely popular with the troops.

ITEM 5 - Artime staged a coup in the camps in January--he rallied the men with speeches -- only 200 balked at naming him their leader -- he arrested and isolated these -- approximately 80 escaped into the jungle and on to Mexico with the exception of "a stubborn corps of 17 who remained in isolation until the invasion was over."

COMMENT: This is a complete falsehood. The troops cheered Artime on each of the two occasions when he visited them in the training camps. The troops and dissident leaders inside frequently requested that Artime join them. There were 17 malcontents and security risks who were detained under guard. These personnel, however, were isolated from the main body by their Cuban peers. Artime did not participate in this decision as it was made before he came to the camp to remain there.

ITEM 6 - D-Day was moved up from May 1 to April 17 because Russian MIGS were reported arriving in Cuba. In the haste, CIA neglected to coordinate the invasion with the planned uprising. Thousands waiting in Cuba to spring into action never got the signal.

COMMENT: The first sentence is a falsehood. As a matter of fact, principally because of favorable climatic conditions, 10 April was the original date and the presence or absence of MIGS was never a consideration. Re the second and third sentences, all assets were urged to activate large-scale and intensive sabotage operations about two weeks before D-Day.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

ITEM 7 - CIA stopped propaganda broadcasts from Radio Swan 15 days before the invasion. Swan Radio finally went back on the air as the invasion began and announced where the landing was taking place after the first small party had scarcely hit the beach.

COMMENT: This statement is not true. Propaganda broadcasts were not suspended. Rather, there was a reorganization of the efforts, including elimination of bombastic and counterproductive programs and the insertion of more professionally competent Cuban personnel, which was directed toward the achievement of unity and increased impact of psychological pressures supporting the realization of the fundamental objective. The Cuban Government, through President Dorticos, in commenting on this change stated: "the imperialists are intensifying their psychological warfare." UPI was monitoring the Cuban radio and based on reports received from this monitoring broke the news of the invasion at 4:20 a.m. on D-Day. Radio Swan did not go on the air with the story until about 5:30 a.m. on D-Day and only after forces had successfully landed and commercial stations throughout the Hemisphere were announcing the invasion.

ITEM 8 - Three ships packed with radio jamming equipment were waiting in Miami for the big moment. Under secret plan, communications were to be sabotaged ashore and those that could not be sabotaged were supposed to be jammed. On D-Day they were still tied up at the Miami docks.

COMMENT: There was some very limited planning along this line. Agents were instructed in the techniques to be employed in sabotaging the microwave system which extends through central Cuba. Also, with

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

regard to jamming, there is no proven device for jamming microwave. The U. S. Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth did have an experimental device which at our request was rushed into completion and a Cuban team was instructed in its use. However, in this planning, we were not able to overtake the invasion schedule and neither the equipment nor the personnel--which again consisted of one set of equipment and a crew of five Cubans as opposed to the "three ships packed with radio jamming equipment" as reported--never left Miami.

ITEM 9 - The LCI's were manned by defectors from the Cuban Navy but commanded by hired American officers. Some of the latter turned out to be drunks. Others were actually anti-Cuban and refused to bunk with the men. As a result, half the Cuban crew deserted one ship at Vieques.

COMMENT: Ships mentioned were commanded by American merchant officers and partially manned by defectors from the Cuban Navy. The balance of this item is a gross distortion. There was one oiler on a vessel who was relieved for excessive drinking. One captain was relieved for sub-standard performance in that capacity but was retained on other duty. Separation of the officers and crew followed conventional protocol. At one time after the Barbara-J had made three unsuccessful attempts to land teams and supplies on the southern coast of Cuba (reception parties did not appear) she returned to Vieques. The teams and a few members of the crew who were disappointed and impatient to get into action did leave. The incident had nothing whatever to do with the relations between the crews and the ships' officers.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SECRET

ITEM 10 - For all the CIA's stress on security, no one had bothered to check on the crew members. One radio operator, a Cuban, confessed that he was loyal to Castro. It was decided that the safest course would be to take him along where he could be watched. But no one was assigned to watch him. Later, at sea, he was discovered in the radio room, sending frantic messages to Havana about the approaching invasion.

COMMENT: The item is a complete fabrication. There was no such incident involving a radio operator.

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

Comments on Drew Pearson's Column of Saturday,  
6 May 1961

ITEM 1 - One skipper, G. C. Jullian, insisted upon naming his Cuban freedom vessel the "Barbara J" after his wife.

COMMENT: Mr. Jullian is a bachelor and assumed command of the "Barbara J" after she was named and afloat.

ITEM 2 - That the American skipper of an LCI, while drunk, forced underground leaders to flee from his ship's floodlights and threatened, on another occasion, to abandon a sabotage team near Santiago de Cuba.

COMMENT: This is the complete opposite of the truth. The skipper was heroic throughout the operation and all hands returned safely.

ITEM 3 - "For the invasion, the CIA assembled probably the most motley, makeshift armada that has ever embarked upon conquest. It included three commercial ships--the Rio Escondido, Huston and Atlantic--leased from the Garcia lines in such haste that the crews were never checked for security. At least two members turned out to be loyal Castroites who tried to signal Cuba of the coming invasion."

COMMENT: In fact, five (5) vessels owned by the Garcia Lines were chartered for the operation, as opposed to three (3) mentioned by Mr. Pearson. Although 12 members of the crews of the various Garcia ships involved preferred not to go forward with the assault brigade when informed of their true mission by Mr. Garcia at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, we have no information indicating that any member of any ship's crew was a Castroite or Commie. To the best of our

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

knowledge and belief, the statement that two members tried to signal Castro of the coming invasion is a falsehood.

ITEM 4 - "There was also considerable confusion over who was commanding the invasion fleet. Eduardo Garcia, as boss of the Garcia lines, considered himself in command and made the Rio Escondido the flagship."

COMMENT: Eduardo Garcia, a member of the family owning the Garcia lines, did in fact go with the assault brigade aboard the Caribe. Garcia was briefed on the complete invasion plan with particular emphasis on the role of the invasion ships at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua. He accepted the plan completely and never indicated in any way or manner that his role was anything other than as an observer.

ITEM 5 - "The Free Cuban navy, which contributed two LCIs and several landing barges to the task force, designated the LCI Elagard as the flagship. This was commanded by an American merchant officer for whose benefit the invasion plan was neatly spelled out in English."

COMMENT: The LCI's participating in the invasion were purchased by and wholly owned by the Agency. Neither was in any way influenced or commanded by the so-called "free Cuban Navy". The LCI "Elagar" was the command ship--not the flag ship--of the maritime force. Both the Elagar and the sister ship, Barbara J, the alternate command vessel, were captained by contract American personnel, supplemented by U. S. contract case officer personnel.

ITEM 6 - "His job as flagship commander was to direct the landing barges by radio. But in the middle of the action, he forgot the battle plan."

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

COMMENT: The statement that the Blagar commander forgot the battle plan is a falsehood.

ITEM 7 - "A Cuban underwater demolition expert, Eduardo Zayaz Bazan, happened to have memorized the plan, was hustled to the skipper's side and prompted him on what orders to issue next."

COMMENT: Eduardo Zayaz Bazan was part of the assault brigade and could not have been conceivably at the skipper's side prompting him on anything. Further, Zayaz Bazan was part of the assault brigade and as a member of the invading force would have very limited knowledge of the invasion plan other than that portion of the plan that pertained to his basic unit.

ITEM 8 - "Thus the invasion started off with two flagships in command, each giving orders. In addition, several crew members would take orders from only Jesus Blanco, a former Cuban naval officer, who had recruited them."

COMMENT: As indicated previously, the Blagar--and only the Blagar--was in command. It is understood that a Jesus Blanco was used on one of the ships as an interpreter. He was certainly not giving commands.

ITEM 9 - "Unfortunately, the CIA had loaded all the aviation gas, tank shells and antitank mines aboard the slow-moving Rio Escondido. Early in the fighting, one of Castro's Sea Fury fighters hurled a bomb into her side, and she went down in flames with all her cargo."

COMMENT: Aviation gas and other important munitions were aboard

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

the Rio Escondido and went down with it. However, these represented munitions that were not required in the initial assault but rather later in a combat situation. It is true as stated in this allegation, and previously, that the Rio Escondido was slow-moving. This was due to an accident suffered on the way to the staging area, which meant that her speed had to be reduced. She did reach her required rendezvous points without difficulty.

ITEM 10 - On D-Day 168 men commanded by Nino Diaz were ordered to make a diversionary landing at an unfamiliar spot in Camaguey Province.

COMMENT: Nino's troops were to have made a diversionary landing pre-D-Day in Oriente Province but did not accomplish the mission. Oriente was selected because of Nino's reported popularity with provincial dissidents and intelligence reports that indicated a paucity of militia in the landing area.

EYES ONLY  
SECRET



~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

Comment on Drew Pearson's Column of Wednesday,  
10 May 1961-

Point 1: CIA spent one million dollars for building an air strip in Guatemala, of which a voucher for \$500,000 was turned in for labor. Freedom fighters claim they performed most of the labor yet were not paid any part of the \$500,000.

The Facts:

Total Cost of Construction of Airstrip	\$866,260.43
Structures, access roads, fencing, sanitary facilities and utilities	<u>73,929.67</u>
TOTAL COST	\$940,190.10

Cuban trainees did not arrive in Guatemala until the airstrip was completed. All labor for the airstrip and related construction was hired and supervised by Thompson-Cornwall Co. and was largely Guatemalan and American. Some Cubans were used to construct barracks, warehouses, offices and classrooms at a separate site several miles from the airstrip; no Cuban participated in construction of the airstrip.

Point 2: CIA purchased two LCI's at a total cost of \$240,000. Cuban freedom fighters who know ships estimated that the vessels were worth about \$30,000 each.

The Facts:

Barbara J--Purchase Price	\$ 30,000.00
Blagar--Purchase Price	40,000.00
Repairs, reactivation, modification, outfitting, provisions:	
Barbara J	112,885.58
Blagar	<u>140,247.88</u>
Grand Total	\$323,133.46

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

Point 3: CIA leased three commercial ships from the Garcia Lines for \$7,000 monthly. Actually they were needed for less than one month. CIA guaranteed \$100,000 for each ship in case of damage. Cubans who know ships and know shipping say this was excessive. As it turned out the Rio Escondido was sunk and the Houston damaged which means the CIA will be obliged to make a generous settlement.

The Facts:

A total of five ships (Rio Escondido, Lake Charles, Atlantico, Caribe and Houston) were chartered by the Agency. The charters called for a six-month period with provision that the agreement could be extended or terminated by mutual consent, owner or charterer. The charterer agreed to pay all costs during the term of charter including bareboat charter of \$4,000 monthly plus all expenses. It was estimated that the expenses would average \$15,000 per ship per month over and above the \$4,000 bareboat charter.

In the event of loss the Agency agreed to pay the owner the depreciated value of the vessel (\$150,000) less bareboat charter payments earned to date of loss. A marine survey of the Rio Escondido revealed the reasonableness of the \$150,000 figure. The remainder of the four ships were larger than the Rio but the owner agreed to the \$150,000 for all ships.

Point 4: The CIA leased the Santa Ana for \$7,000 a month for the Nino Diaz group with the same \$100,000 guarantee. The Santa Ana did not get into action.

The Facts:

The Santa Ana was hired for a sum of \$7,000 for use of the vessel for each 30 days or portion thereof. In case of loss it was agreed to pay the sum of \$100,000 (which was held in escrow) to the owner of the ship. The vessel was in fact hired and used by Nino Diaz who was to make a diversionary landing pre-D Day in Oriente Province. Nino Diaz, using the Santa Ana, started his mission but later developments caused him to change his plan; his mission was never accomplished.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

Comment on Press Allegations regarding Cuban Operation

ITEM 1 - The "invasion" was supposed to trigger off a spontaneous uprising within Cuba.

COMMENT: The truth is that neither military nor propaganda planners included a mass uprising as a requirement for successful completion of the military operation. It is pertinent to note that in the Propaganda Action Plan which was written and carried out in direct support of the military effort, there are fifteen (15) strategic and tactical objectives. None of these objectives anticipate or predict a mass uprising. It was hoped that the fighting would occur only between Castro's hard core of defenders and the hard core of invaders, with the mass of population remaining passive until such time as it was obvious that the invading force had expanded its beachhead. There are reports that substantiate the belief that the Cuban people as a whole did not take up arms against the invaders. It is true that CIA anticipated a fairly rapid increase in the number of anti-Castro fighters by accruals from the nearby local population and from deserting elements of the Castro armed forces. However, this was not expected to occur until the strike force had demonstrated its staying power by a series of successes and by the securing of a physical area accessible to those who wished to join the freedom fighters.

ITEM 2 - The Cuban underground was not notified in advance of the invasion so could not give any aid.

COMMENT: There is no concrete evidence, in spite of post-invasion assertions by Cuban exiles, that any of the exile political groups

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

had significant, coordinated underground organizations. It is true that the various Miami exile political leaders were not informed of D-Day plans--for obvious security reasons. Thus, should subsequent review prove these leaders did have underground groups, the allegations might then be classified as partially valid. The fact remains, however, that Agency clandestine radio communications with underground groups throughout the island was the most effective link and most promising trigger for underground action. These groups were informed of the invasion and asked to support the landing force in every way possible.

ITEM 3 - There was a failure of intelligence as to the strength of Castro's forces and the speed of their reaction.

COMMENT: The allegation is not true. For each of the several plans which reached a stage of final preparation (The Trinidad Plan, The Nino Diaz Diversionsary Landing Plan, and the Bahia de Cochinos Plan), an intelligence annex was submitted and is presently available for study. The nature and extent of Castro's military force were well known. The location of his Navy and Air units was fixed. Subsequent studies, some of which are based on the debriefings of survivors of the operation, do not point out any major gaps in the intelligence programs which supported the landing on the 17th of April 1961.

ITEM 4 - The enemy was tipped off as to the time and place of landing so that the invasion force was anticipated and liquidated.

COMMENT: This allegation is untrue. Debriefings of returnees

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

who were on the beach indicate that the area was lightly defended and there was no indication that Castro was informed prior to the landing of either its time or place. The strike force was successful in making a surprise assault against light opposition and gave an excellent account of itself until the enemy controlled the air and made their position untenable. A thorough review of all intelligence assets refutes this allegation.

ITEM 5 - The invasion force was penetrated by Batistianos.

COMMENT: On the military plane, Cuban exiles, as well as CIA, felt that professional, competent officers and non-commissioned officers were essential to a successful military operation. Unavoidably, such personnel had to be drawn from the rank and file of the Cuban Constitutional Army, an army which, of course, existed also during the Batista era. Great pains were taken to screen out any "obnoxious Batistianos"; i.e., individuals who had committed or could be charged with actual crimes. The minority of ex-Batista soldiers who were used in the operation were screened, non-political elements. In the over-all planning, and especially in political organization, Batista adherents were excluded from the operation except in those cases where acceptable officers were utilized in the strike force (in one instance the Agency did establish local contact with the Batista follower, Sanchez Mosquera; however, this contact with and support to Mosquera was dropped the moment possible political consequences were analyzed).

ITEM 6 - The group of Manolo Ray which "claimed" the greatest assets in Cuba was neglected in connection with the planning and execution of

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

the operation.

COMMENT: The much-touted "underground" of Manolo Ray was never proved. In any event, Manolo Ray was never neglected in connection with our planning. On several occasions substantial support was offered to Ray; on each occasion he failed to produce even individual units of the underground which has been claimed in his name in the press. Of course Ray, and several of his followers, have participated in the Revolutionary Council.

ITEM 7 - CIA put in battalion commanders who were political hacks.

COMMENT: This allegation is patently false. Battalion commanders, most of whom worked their way up from the ranks, were chosen for (a) military ability, and (b) acceptability to their fellow soldiers. None had significant political backgrounds.

ITEM 8 - 17 Cuban "volunteers" were imprisoned for some 11 weeks by the CIA in a prison compound in Guatemala. Allegedly this was because they did not like the way the CIA was running the show.

COMMENT: There is no basis in fact that these Cubans were imprisoned because the Cubans did not like the way CIA was running the show. The records show that the only persons detained were those who were detained by their own Cuban leaders, as persons who were malcontents, AWOLs, agitators, and deserters. As such, they threatened the security and impaired the efficiency of the strike force. Some of these were removed from the scene to protect them from their Cuban colleagues, who threatened violence. All 17 of these Cubans have now been returned to the United States and have quietly gone to their homes.

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

ITEM 9 - CIA chose the members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council and it was largely representative of the reactionary Cuban elements. (Others claim it had representatives of Communists in it.)

COMMENT: It is not true that CIA chose the members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. In fact, the Cubans representing some 18 different groups, who did elect these Council members did so freely. There was no pressure from CIA during these elections. Indeed, the Agency made it clear to Cuban participants that it was extremely important that this election should be a Cuban one, free of any external pressure. The political spectrum of the Council is wide, but extremes of left and right have been excluded by the Cubans themselves. Because of the width of this political spectrum accusations have been made that the Council contains on the one hand reactionary rightist elements, and on the other, Communists.

ITEM 10 - CIA tied to right wing Cuban elements.

COMMENT: As indicated above, there have been accusations that CIA, through its political contacts with Cubans, has tied itself to right-wing Cuban elements. It is true that there has been contact with right-wing elements, as well as all others, but supporters of the Batista dictatorship were excluded from the political organizations. (It is interesting to note that on the morning of 18 April 1961, Miro Cardona was labelled in a Dallas Morning News editorial as a "pro-Communist").

ITEM 11 - "CIA" recruited Cubans in Miami.

COMMENT: The Agency did recruit Cubans in Miami for unilateral

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

intelligence and propaganda activities within Cuba. The large-scale recruiting of Cubans for the strike force, however, was carried out by the Cuban political groups.

ITEM 12 - Cuban political leaders were imprisoned in Miami by CIA just prior to the landing and misleading information put out in their name.

COMMENT: At no time were members of the Council imprisoned or kidnapped as has been alleged. Miro Cardona and Tony Varona had a meeting with CIA officials and agreed to go into isolation prior to and during the military action, with the idea of proceeding to Cuban soil in order to proclaim a Provisional Government. Thus, Cuban leaders proceeded voluntarily to Opalocka, Florida. In as much as Opalocka was at that time considered a covert installation, the Cuban leaders were asked to restrict themselves to the immediate surroundings of the former Commandant's quarters. It had been anticipated that this period of isolation would not exceed 48 hours. It turned out to have been about 60 hours. At no time was any outside pressure used. The information put out in the name of Cuban leaders during this period was done so only after review and approval of the information by a Cuban representative of the Council. This information was designed to keep the Cubans fighting and took the form of official statements or bulletins on the progress of the military operation.

ITEM 13 - False information was put out by the U. S. Government as to numbers involved in the landing.

COMMENT: No official of CIA ever revealed prior to the invasion

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~



~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

any indication of the size of the strike force. Agency propaganda media only mentioned figures when they were reprinting or rebroadcasting other sources. The figures referring to a 3 to 5 thousand-man strike force originated in speculation in the U. S. press, eventually perpetuating the fiction of a huge strike force.

ITEM 14 - The U.S.A. placed its reputation in the hands of a poorly trained and squabbling band of refugees.

COMMENT: It is untrue that the refugee members of the strike force were poorly trained. They, as well as the political refugees used by the Agency in Miami, were the most representative cross section available, excluding right and left political extremes.

ITEM 15 - When Cuban Naval officers commanding the invasion transports were given their destination after sailing from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, there was a near mutiny aboard the ships.

COMMENT: The statement is untrue. There were no Cuban Naval officers commanding the invasion transports and there was no disagreement or "mutiny" when the crews of the various craft were informed of their ultimate destination. It is also untrue that the naval officers forecast disaster.

ITEM 16 - The propaganda harangues from Radio Swan (the rebel radio) to the Cuban people were abruptly suspended two weeks before the invasion and known Cuban voices were replaced by unknown voices.

COMMENT: This statement is not true. Propaganda broadcasts were not suspended. Rather, there was a reorganization of the efforts,

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

including elimination of bombastic and counterproductive programs and the insertion of more professionally competent Cuban personnel, which was directed toward the achievement of unity and increased impact of psychological pressures supporting the realization of the fundamental objective. The Cuban Government, through President Dorticos, in commenting on this change stated: "the imperialists are intensifying their psychological warfare."

ITEM 17 - The Air Force was not destroyed as was boasted after the bombing raid of April 15.

COMMENT: No claim was made that the Cuban Air Force had been completely destroyed. Sea fury fighters were engaged in the beach action. Despite extensive efforts to verify reports of MIG aircraft in Cuba, no verification has ever been made of their presence.

ITEM 18 - The entire psychological warfare phase of the operation was uncoordinated from the outset, ever since Radio Swan began to broadcast to Cuba.

COMMENT: The statement is untrue. Policy guidance and coordination of those psychological programs which were under our control or influence were continuous. It is true, however, that divergent Cuban political groups of various hues maintained their own selfishly motivated programs that defied coordination.

ITEM 19 - The first trainees who went to the camp sites in Guatemala -- "found only tangled, tropical, snake-infested underbrush and many of the camps were within view of passing travelers.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

COMMENT: The statement is untrue.

ITEM 20 - Arttime was CIA's fair-haired boy among the political refugees. He staged a coup in the camps in January.

COMMENT: Arttime was accepted as a leader by the Cuban exile community in early 1960. He was a member of the original executive committee of the FRD which was formed on 22 June 1960 and was extremely popular with the troops. Arttime did not stage a coup. The troops cheered Arttime on each of the two occasions when he visited them in the training camps. The troops and dissident leaders inside frequently requested that Arttime join them.

ITEM 21 - D-Day was hastily moved up from May 1 to April 17 because Russian MIGs were reported arriving in Cuba. In the haste, CIA neglected to coordinate the invasion with the planned uprising. Thousands waiting in Cuba to spring into action never got the signal.

COMMENT: D-Day was not moved up for the reason stated above. As a matter of fact, principally because of favorable climatic conditions, 10 April was the original date and the presence or absence of MIGs was never a consideration. Re the second and third sentences, all assets were urged to activate large-scale and intensive sabotage operations about two weeks before D-Day.

ITEM 22 - A series of allegations by Drew Pearson particularly containing criticisms of the choice and handling of the invasion ships; their officers and crews; failure to check on loyalty of crew members; misconduct of officers, etc.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

COMMENT: Mr. Pearson made many allegations in a series of articles which were largely based on mis-statements and distortions of the truth. Pearson claimed that one boat skipper, G. C. Jullian, insisted upon naming his Cuban Freedom Vessel the "Barbara J." after his wife. The truth is that Mr. Jullian is a bachelor and assumed command of the "Barbara J." after she was named and afloat. Pearson claimed that the American skipper of an LCI, while drunk, forced underground leaders to flee from his ships' floodlights and threatened, on another occasion, to abandon a sabotage team near Santiago de Cuba. This is the complete opposite of the truth. The skipper was heroic throughout the operation and all hands returned safely. Pearson also claimed that CIA utilized a "motley, makeshift, armada" and that at least two members of the ships' crews turned out to be loyal Castroites who tried to signal Cuba of the coming invasion. In fact, five vessels owned by the Garcia Line were purchased for the operation. We have no information indicating that any member of any ships crew was a Castroite or Commie. To the best of our knowledge and belief, the statement that two members tried to signal Castro of the coming invasion is a falsehood. Drew Pearson also indicated that the flagship commander forgot the battle plan in the middle of the action, a statement that is a complete falsehood. The remainder of allegations concerning the choice and handling of the invasion ships are based on half-truths and point-by-point refutations are available for study.

EYES ONLY  
SECRET

C/WH D

17 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

The following documents are transmitted herewith:

1. Press Releases in the Name of the Revolutionary Council During the Period 17 through 19 April 1961, dated 17 May 1961 (1 original).
2. Chronology of the Development and Emergence of the Revolutionary Council, dated 17 May 1961 (1 original).

J. C. KING

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN ONE COPY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT  
OF ITEMS ONE AND TWO ABOVE:

NAME

COMPONENT

DATE

17 MAY 1961

Press Releases in the Name of the Revolutionary Council  
During the Period 17 through 19 April 1961

---

1. During the period 17 through 19 April 1961, six press statements were released in New York from the office of Mr. Lem Jones, public relations advisor to the Revolutionary Council. It was during this time that the members of the Revolutionary Council were in isolation in Opalocka, Florida. The statements were in the form of bulletins, and were released in the name of the Revolutionary Council.
2. All information contained in the six bulletins was prepared by CIA, at least in basic form, and forwarded to Mr. Jones. Before release, each of the six reports was reviewed and approved by Dr. Antonio Silio, the Cuban representative of the Council in New York. Dr. Silio had been named to this post by the Council, not by CIA.
3. The information in the bulletins was designed to maintain the morale of the members of the strike force on Cuban soil; to provide impetus to the psychological campaign being carried out to influence Cubans within Cuba, and to present the desired picture--especially concerning U.S. participation in the invasion --to world opinion. The bulletins were based on the information available on the progress of the strike force.
4. Mr. Jones had been hired by the Revolutionary Democratic Front as public relations advisor several months previously. He was a Cuban choice, not a CIA recruit. Agency contact with Jones began only after he approached CIA to request guidance on whether

SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

not he should sign a contract with the Cubans. When the Revolutionary Council was formed, Jones was once again chosen as American press representative--by the Council, without pressure from CIA.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17 MAR 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Development and Emergence of the Revolutionary Council

1. As Castro's true position became progressively more apparent in the first half of 1959, much consideration was given by the State Department here and "The Country Team" in Havana to the possible posture of U. S. policy toward Cuba. The general conclusion reached in the latter part of 1959 was that any group or coalition of groups which could hope to supplant the Castro regime could gain popular acceptance only on the basis of continuing the revolution with more practical management and less nationalist, socialist and Marxist contact; the United States would have to disassociate itself from Batista elements which would rush to undo the revolution. Elements within the Department of State catalogued actual or potential opposition to Castro as follows:

- a. The Autenticos (Antonio de Varona).
- b. The Monticristi (Justo Carrillo).
- c. Triple A (Sanchez Arango).
- d. Catholic Labor and Youth.
- e. Ex-26 July Members.
- f. Ex-Batista elements.

2. While the foregoing analysis of the situation was in progress, the Agency's Havana Station, which as a matter of routine SOP had been in touch with anti-Castro elements since January 1959, stepped up its contacts, evaluation and assessment of individuals and/or groups, with the exception of former Batista followers, falling into the above categories.

3. As the project approached its stage of formalization, i.e. approval on the highest governmental level, the possible composition of a "junta" was discussed on the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State level. After the project was approved on 17 March 1960, the Department was kept fully informed of each step leading to the eventual formation of the FRD on 11 May 1960 and its advice on personalities and substance was sought regularly: There was no objection to the original Varona, Carrillo, Rasco, Artime (and later Sanchez Arango) constellation. Coordination with the Department continued throughout the entire project: In September 1960 the Department's advice was sought on the inclusion of additional personalities into the FRD Executive Committee, such as Manuel Ray; in January 1961 the problems inherent in the establishment of a "Provisional Government" were discussed both in terms of personalities and substance; on 13 February 1961 approval was received for the establishment of a Revolutionary Council with the understanding that there should be no U.S. interference and that the Cubans were to nominate anyone they saw fit as

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Council President; also, the President was to be free to select his own Council members. The current Council composition is the result of this understanding. (Biographies of FPD and Council members were previously transmitted to General Taylor.)

4. The FPD political platform and the Revolutionary Council's programs were the result of and responsive to guidance received from the Department of State. In the early stages of the project general FPD utterances fall into the broad category "restore the revolution." Later the FPD and Council statements became more specific on the basis of guidance received. By and large, the tenor and posture of the Council and FPD is liberal and fairly progressive; its legal framework is the 1940 Cuban Constitution; land reform is part of its program as is the possible nationalization of certain industries. None of the Council members desires to turn the clock back; there are naturally differences among the Cubans as to detail and pace for future actions.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C/WH/14

18 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

The following document is transmitted herewith:

1. Brief History of Radio Swan (1 original).

J. C. KING

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN ONE COPY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT  
OF THE ITEM LISTED ABOVE:

\_\_\_\_\_  
NAME

\_\_\_\_\_  
COMPONENT

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

SECRET

Brief History of Radio Swan

1. On 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower approved a covert action program to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime. Within the propaganda framework of that program, an important objective was to create and utilize a high-powered medium and short wave radio station. CIA was asked to provide such a station, outside the continental limits of the United States, and have it ready for operation within sixty (60) days.
2. Swan Island, in the Caribbean, was chosen as an appropriate site. The United States Navy furnished CIA with splendid support: within sixty days, equipment had been brought from Europe, a landing strip was cleared on the island, and the station was able to go on the air on 17 May of the same year, precisely on schedule.
3. Originally it was planned that Radio Swan would be a clandestine station (utilizing a "classified missile and space project" as cover). Just prior to inauguration, however, it was decided the station should be a commercial one. This was at the request of the Navy, which reasonably argued that should their participation in construction of a black facility be known, explanations would be difficult.
4. Using a "commercial" station for the tactical and strategic tasks envisaged for Radio Swan is not, of course, the most desirable way to support a covert operation. The only practical method of operation is to "sell space". Thus, program time on Radio Swan was sold to various Cuban groups. These included organizations of workers, students, women, two publications in exile, two radio

~~EYES ONLY~~  
SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

stations in exile, and several political groups. There were also programs created and controlled by CIA. - Programs (on tape) were produced in New York, Miami, and later, on Swan Island.

5. Radio Swan effectively reached not only its target area of Cuba, but the entire Caribbean as well. Soon after broadcasts began Castro started jamming, but was successful in hindering reception only in the City of Havana. Scores of letters were received from all parts of Cuba to show that the station had listeners. As late as March 1961, a survey was made to determine the extent of listening coverage. An inexpensive ballpoint pen was offered to those listeners who would write in to the station. The reply was immediate: almost 3,000 letters from 26 countries. This barrage of mail included significant amounts from all parts of Cuba.

6. As Radio Swan progressed, it became the symbol of the anti-Castro effort within Cuba and of opposition to Castro throughout the hemisphere. Toward the end of 1960, the effectiveness of Radio Swan began to diminish. Although great numbers of Cubans still listened to the station, its credibility and reputation began to suffer as the result of statements representing the selfish interests of the Cuban groups producing the various programs. In the first place, these groups talked overmuch about their activities in Miami and the hard fight they were conducting along Biscayne Boulevard. Naturally, the Cubans who were suffering under the Castro dictatorship within Cuba resented this. Secondly, the Cuban programs became a fulcrum where the individual political ambitions of Cuban exiles in Miami were presented to the other Cubans in Miami, forgetting the all-important target audience within Cuba. Finally, each program fought

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

with the other for "scoops". As time passed and the Cubans found that their sources of information were no better than the next fellow's, the program producers began to exaggerate in order to give their broadcasts a touch of sensationalism. They made statements which were obvious lies to the listeners. An example: One of the announcers stated that there were 3,000 Russians in a park in Santiago de Cuba -- the residents had only to walk to the park to see that this was untrue. Moreover, the various programs began to defy coordination. All programs but one told the Cuban militiaman that he would be a hero on the day that he defected from Castro. The sole exception told the Cuban militiaman that he would be hanged regardless of what he did. A prolonged effort was made by CIA to exert tighter control over the programs. The officers of Radio Swan called a meeting of all program producers and gave them a list of 30 propaganda points upon which they were all to coordinate before use in broadcasts. This action failed to achieve proper control.

7. As this unfortunate situation developed, the military operation was about to be launched. It was obvious that CIA could not allow uncoordinated programming to continue while the station attempted to provide tactical support to military forces. On the 27th of March 1961 each program producer received a letter from the management of Radio Swan informing him of the termination of his program. Broadcasting was not suspended. Rather, it was immediately replaced with a new, overall programming schedule--more broadcasting hours than before--which was implacably under CIA control. Also, CIA immediately began hourly news programs of a conventional nature on Radio Swan. Thus Radio Swan was converted into a station which

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

provided the Cuban people with straight news as well as a program which stated its only function was to assist those who were fighting Castro within Cuba. This was the beginning of an intensified propaganda campaign directed against Castro. Within a few days after the change, Radio Mambi, a Cuban government station, said to its listeners, "the hysterical parrots of Radio Swan have recently raised their voices scandalously." On the day following these declarations by Radio Mambi, President Osvaldo Dorticos declared in a speech over another radio station, "Cubans must be alert for lies and attempts to destroy the revolution through psychological warfare." A Cuban newspaper, at the same time, repeated Dorticos' statement: "our enemies are intensifying psychological warfare to find weak points in our domestic front."

8. During the military action in Cuba, Radio Swan was used in tactical support of the strike force, as well as a means of communication to independent agents within the country. Radio Swan was monitored by hemisphere radio stations and by world news services, and was an important factor in presenting the desired picture of the fighting in Cuba to world opinion. Despite some press allegations, Radio Swan was not responsible for the wild rumors during those hectic days. It did, of course, engage in the varied activities that a clandestine radio station is called upon to handle on such an occasion. One of these activities was to implement, on a few hours notice and using a stand-by transmitter, the "Voice of the Escambray", the clandestine broadcast which bolstered the propaganda theme that at least some of the survivors of the strike force successfully reached the safe haven of the Escambray mountains.

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

TOPICS FOR TUESDAY

1. Was there any doubt about the necessity of some such military action against Castro?
  2. What was the estimate of the probability of success of ZAPATA before D-Day?
  3. What was the feeling of likelihood of a popular uprising following the landing? How essential was such an uprising regarded for the success of the operation? How rapid a reaction was expected by Castro?
  4. What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful lodgment but there was no uprising?
  5. What was the understanding of the position of the JCS as to ZAPATA? Was it appreciated that they favored TRINIDAD over ZAPATA? What did the President expect from the Chiefs?
  6. Was it understood that control of the air was considered essential to the success of the landing?
  7. What were the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes? How serious was the decision viewed? What was the understanding about pre-landing strikes?
  8. What was the understanding as to the ability of the landing force to pass to a guerrilla status in an emergency? To what extent did this factor influence approval of the operation?
  9. What was the understanding of the ammunition situation by the end of April 18?
  10. What degree of non-attribution was sought and why? Were the operational disadvantages arising from some of the restrictions imposed by the efforts to achieve non-attribution clearly presented and understood?
- ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11. To what extent did the CIA operations representatives have to "sell" the operation to the other agencies of government? Was any consideration given to transferring the operation to Defense?
12. How could interdepartmental planning and coordination be better effected in a similar operation?
12. What were the principal lessons learned?

At what - did he realize op. was  
going to fail



~~SECRET~~

17 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : A mechanism for Cold War Strategy

1. This appears to be a most constructive way out of the continually increasing maze of individual task forces, etc. As you and I - and others - have foreseen, the proliferation of such groups following on the heels of the elimination of most of the established infra-structure has led to considerable confusion.

A few assorted comments:

(1) Personnel

Certainly the key to successful operation of this plan is the selection not only of the Chairman, but of the Director of the permanent Working Group. Unless two really top-notch people are obtained, the operation will backfire. Very important also will be the selection of personnel for the Working Group.

(2) Functions of Committee Members

The members of the Committee itself would of course have to restrict their development of Cold War plans and programs to the "broad outline" specified in the proposal. This is an obvious point, but one that could be easily overlooked - thereby leading to more of a burden than men of these departmental responsibilities could practically assume.

(3) Security

a. I think the chart is grossly undergraded, at Official Use. If the existence of this Committee, and particularly the functions of its Chairman, quickly become common knowledge, its usefulness will be greatly impaired. Some sort of cover should be devised for the Chairman and his staff. (Remember the OCB's quite properly negative reaction to the name of the Defense "Cold War Committee"). Complete secrecy is no doubt too much to expect, but we ought to strive for it.

23

~~SECRET~~

b. The proposal to keep "useful. . . . data. . . . for all sensitive spots" at the Indications Center is potentially dangerous. It seems better to keep finished intelligence on these spots, but to bring in really sensitive data only when a country is designated for the full treatment.

(4) Working Group

Should Treasury be included on the same basis as State, Defense and CIA, as proposed? The experience in the OCB after Treasury representatives achieved full status at all levels was frustrating. Even granted a possible change in Treasury's philosophy, it seems to me unwise to have it represented in this manner. It would seem preferable to call in Treasury and/or Budget representatives to assess new plans from the point of view of extraordinary funding that might be required, after at least the broad outlines of the plan are developed.

*Yap,*  
THOMAS A. PARROTT

~~SECRET~~  
D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Meeting with President on May 16, 1961

Present: President Kennedy  
General Taylor  
Attorney General Kennedy  
Admiral Burke  
Mr. Allen Dulles

The Cuba Study Group met at luncheon with the President to give orally an interim report on their conclusions to date. In the course of the conversation the following points were developed.

There was no formal governmental review after March, 1960 of the necessity for a paramilitary operation to replace the Castro government. Although the President had many doubts with regard to such an operation, the pressure for an affirmative decision arising from the need to use the Cuban Brigade quickly or disband it was a strong factor in causing an affirmative decision. In the President's mind there was reasonable hope for a popular uprising following a successful landing as well as the possibility of setting up a free Cuban government in the beachhead after it had been firmly secured.

The President was always reassured by the assumption that the Cuban Brigade in an emergency could pass to a guerrilla status. There was a breakdown in communications some place between the training base in Guatemala and the senior officials in Washington which occasioned the misunderstanding of the feasibility of exercising the guerrilla option.

~~SECRET~~

It was clear to the President that the TRINIDAD Plan had military advantages over ZAPATA. However, the choice of the latter overcame many of the political objections raised against TRINIDAD.

With regard to the cancellation of the D-Day strikes, the President is inclined to think that a special NSC Meeting should have been called to deal with this important matter. However, the CIA officials in charge of the operation did not speak to him directly with regard to the critical nature of the cancellation.

The President was aware of the serious shortage of ammunition in the beachhead at the end of D+1. However, he was never approached for authority to extend the Navy air cover over the ammunition convoy in its movement to Blue Beach.

In connection with paragraph 14 of the Committee's paper "Study of the Anti-Castro Invasion ZAPATA" dated 11 May 1961, the Chart and paper entitled "A Mechanism for the Planning and Coordination of Cold War Strategy" were discussed. The President encouraged the Group to develop this organizational concept in greater detail for inclusion in their final report. The latter is to be oral, supported by a written memorandum. It was agreed that this final report and the supporting memorandum would not go beyond the President, but the possibility was left open of some sanitized document to set right the past misstatements of the press.

There was some discussion of the desirability of changing the name of CIA in order to reduce its visibility. Mr. Dulles undertook to study the matter and see if he could make a recommendation.

~~SECRET~~

DD/P 1-2731

Executive Registry

61-4296

19 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans) *Ruby* 23 MAY 1961

SUBJECT : Manuel RAY Interview of 18 May 1961

1. This memorandum is for the Director's information only.
2. On 18 May 1961, Manuel RAY, the exiled leader of the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP, Peoples' Revolutionary Movement) was interviewed in the offices of the Joint Chief of Staff in the Pentagon Building. RAY, hereinafter referred to as the Subject, spoke in an extremely soft voice, and at times it was difficult to hear him. Added to this, he spoke in a rambling manner, and sometimes did not fully identify subjects about which he was talking. As an example - he spoke about "the radio" when he meant to say "Radio Swan." In summary, the Subject's presentation was difficult to follow and to understand, and it is the intent of this memorandum to give the gist, or the main thoughts and ideas, of the Subject's interview.
3. The main bulk of the Subject's presentation referred to the past, and he presented his interpretation of the errors which had been committed by the Central Intelligence Agency, resulting in the abortive invasion in the Bay of Cochinos. Mainly these errors were in the lack of monetary, operational, military and political support to his organization. He spelled these out in considerable detail by starting first with the lack of proper political motivation inside Cuba, and thus the lack of incentive by the Cuban people to rise in revolt. He said that the Cuban people did not know the ultimate political goal of the invasion forces. He said that his own people, the members of the MRP, were afraid that if the invasion was successful they, too, would be executed by the invading forces or the succeeding government. This, he emphasized, limited any support which could have been given to the invading forces. Much later in his presentation the Subject came back to this point saying that he and his people had learned about "Operation Forty" as a "mopping-up" operation, which was to have eliminated his followers in Cuba. He said "Operation Forty" was composed of followers of former president Fulgencio BATISTA who were to follow

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 2 -

behind the invading troops and "purge" the captured cities and towns. He said that the operation was planned by SANJENIS and GUTIERREZ, and that one of the members was CALVINOS (fnu), a "war criminal" who was captured in the invasion.

4. The Subject said that his operations were not supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, and talked at some length about his efforts to obtain air drops for his partisans in the Sierra Escambray Mountains during September 1960. According to the Subject, not one drop which he requested was delivered. He was critical of the lack of support, and said that while he was still in Habana he met with an official of the United States Embassy, by inference a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency, and that he was promised full and unconditional logistical support. Later, when he arrived in Miami, Florida, he found that the support was neither full nor unconditional. He said that support was conditioned upon his acceptance of the "Frente", and he told about an instance where air drops to his partisans, again in the Sierra Escambray Mountains, were to carry the mark of the "Frente," a condition which he found intolerable.

5. Other complaints by the Subject concerned the lack of financial support, and he said that the only method by which he could support his organization was by obtaining money inside Cuba, selling the Cuban pesos on the black market, and sending the United States dollars to Miami. He listed his grievance against Radio Swan, saying his organization was not represented in the programming, and adding that later Radio Swan fell into complete disrepute through its use of lies and contradictions.

6. The Subject talked considerably about the large number of "Batistianos" who were in the training camps, and his futile efforts to rid the camps of these undesirable elements. He identified Jose "Pepe" PEREZ San Ramon, the commander of the Brigade, and Roberto PEREZ San Ramon, a Brigade officer, as "Batistianos," but on questioning admitted that they were not charged with any crimes. He explained that, "They liked BATISTA." One point he did not clarify was why his internal organization could use ex-members of the Constitutional Army and yet at the same time they were not suitable if they were in exile.

7. The Subject said that it was his representatives, members of the MRP, who were responsible for successful sabotage in Cuba, and said that they destroyed El Encanto, the Habana department store, and the Habana aqueduct.

8. In the short period which remained the Subject spoke of what can be done inside Cuba. He favored the support of individual organizations, each one doing their own action work inside Cuba. He said that in the

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

underground it was necessary to work with others solely on the basis known bona fides, and that if MRP members had to work with other groups unknown to them, it would increase the chance for compromise. He was questioned as to whether or not it would be preferable to have a coordinating group, representing all groups, to direct the activities and he answered that he did not think that it was necessary, especially at this time. He said that there was so much to do that each group should tell its inside components to go ahead and sabotage and destroy as much as they could, and the efforts would not be wasted.

*J. W. Herbert*  
J. C. KING/*for*  
Chief  
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI  
DDP

SECRET