


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DIRECTORATE OF
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1999

Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report

Probable Reactivation of The SS-3/Shyster Missile System

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FMSAC-STIR/67-3
21 JUNE 1967

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Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report

PROBABLE REACTIVATION OF THE SS-3/SHYSTER
MISSILE SYSTEM

FMSAC-STIR/67-3
21 June 1967

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Science and Technology
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

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PROBABLE REACTIVATION OF THE SS-3/SHYSTER MISSILE SYSTEM

PROBLEM

To assess the purpose and the significance of the recent Kapustin Yar ballistic missile firing activity to the 650-nautical-mile impact area.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The March-May 1967 firings of 20 missiles to the nominal 650-nautical-mile impact area of the Kapustin Yar Range probably represented a reactivation of the SS-3/Shyster medium-range missile system.
2. The pace of the exercise itself indicated a sense of urgency. Urgency was further indicated by the fact that the exercise appeared to have precedence over at least two current research and development programs on the Kapustin Yar Range.
3. This apparent reactivation may be related to Soviet intent to deploy the system outside the Soviet Union to a location such as Vietnam or Mongolia. The activity could also be related to the qualification of troops from deployed SS-3 sites, or perhaps the depletion of the existing SS-3 inventory. These two latter possibilities, however, seem inconsistent with the urgency and priority attached to the program. If external deployment is Soviet intent, it could be under way by mid-June.

Note: This report has been produced by CIA and prepared by the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center. It has been coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence.

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4. The missiles are believed to have been fired by Soviet troops for training purposes.

5.

DISCUSSION

BACKGROUND

The SS-3/Shyster is a single-stage ballistic missile employing radio guidance and a liquid oxygen/alcohol propellant combination (see accompanying photo).

The system was probably fully deployed by late 1961, and the last sustained firing of the missile took place in 1961.

A phase-out of the operational inventory of the missile was thought to have begun soon after this time, and it was gradually replaced by the more advanced SS-4/Sandal.

CURRENT FIRING PROGRAM

During a seven-week period the Soviets apparently reactivated the SS-3, firing at least 20 missiles into the nominal 650-nautical-mile impact area of the Kanutin Yar Test Range.

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
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SS-3/Shyster Ballistic Missile

The firing rate and the apparent success of the over-all program indicates that experienced and probably Soviet crews were involved.

INDICATIONS OF URGENCY

A sense of urgency regarding the programmed completion date of the firing exercise may have been indicated by a noticeable ac-

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celeration of firings toward the end of the period.
Additionally, the May Day holiday seemed to have little effect on the program. This is in contrast to the normal lull in firing activity on the Soviet ranges in conjunction with that Holiday.

CULMINATION OF SS-3 ACTIVITY

No further firings of the SS-3 have taken place

A logical explanation for the program is that the Soviets intend to deploy the system outside their borders to a location such as Vietnam or Mongolia. Since the initial phase of the associated firing program appears complete, deployment could be under way at this time, if external deployment is their intent. Although not considered likely, it is possible that the SS-3 has remained a part of the Soviet deployed missile force over the years and that the current activity represents a specialized type of training such as a re-qualification program. This suggestion seems inconsistent with the urgency and priority

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related to the firing activity, however. The SS-3, deployed in North Vietnam, could cover most of South Vietnam. However, because of the relatively elaborate ground support equipment associated with the system it would be difficult to conceal an extensive deployment.

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