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EXPANSION OF THE CHIEF DIRECTORATE
OF EAST SIBERIAN LOGGING
1950-52

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FOREWORD

This is the first of a series of papers dealing with the Soviet forest products industries.

The aims of this paper are (1) to report the effects of the 1950-52 industrial expansion program on East Siberian timber production and (2) to examine the reasons behind the regional expansion of the timber industry as they bear upon Soviet intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

This paper has been coordinated with CIA, ORR M/AG and with the US Forest Service.

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EXPANSION OF THE CHIEF DIRECTORATE
OF EAST SIBERIAN LOGGING
1950-52

Summary

Since 1950 the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging, the Chief Directorate of Far Eastern Logging, and the Chief Directorate of Sakhalin Logging, of the Ministry of the Timber Industry have been engaged in organizational expansion programs. Manpower for expansion has been provided through intensive recruitment of local labor and the relocation of logging enterprises from western European USSR.

The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging probably represents the largest productive potential of any of the eight chief directorates of logging subordinate to the Ministry of the Timber Industry. It is the only 1 of the 3 recently expanded chief directorates of logging which makes significant contributions to the economy of other geographic regions.

The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has consistently failed to fulfill its 1950-52 production assignments, even though these annual plans remained almost static for the period. The factors which contributed most heavily to these plan failures were transport difficulties, inadequate housing, mechanization and equipment shortcomings, and resource competition.

Although railroad car shortages still exist in East Siberia, the development of river transport in the Angara Basin will permit the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging and the Chief Directorate of West Siberian Logging to exchange primary consumers. Such an arrangement will result in considerably shorter rail hauls and remove a tremendous freight burden from the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

* This report includes material from all sources available to CIA as of 1 September 1953

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The housing problem is still critical, and it appears that the loggers have been forced to divert a significant portion of their production force to emergency housing construction.

Advanced road and rail development in the region will promote modern all-weather logging methods. The completion of seven new central repair shops for logging equipment should minimize delays in repairs, and the increase in the number of permanent semiskilled workers and engineering-supervisory personnel should lead to improved utilization of equipment.

In dealing with the problems associated with plan failure, the greatest advance has been made in the area of resource competition. In 1952 the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging absorbed local logging enterprises belonging to the Ministry of the River Fleet, and, since Stalin's death, local logging trusts have been transferred from the Ministry of Rail Transport to the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging. These steps toward consolidation of logging operations will provide opportunities for better commercial utilization of the high-quality East Siberian forests, permit more efficient on-site technical planning of logging operations, and simplify the planning of timber distribution.

In spite of these efforts to eliminate the factors contributing to plan failure, it is doubtful that the Russians will realize a return on their East Siberian investment during 1953.

It is apparent that the 1950-52 expansion of all three eastern logging chief directorates was planned as a period of investment, since there were no dramatic increases in their production assignments for this period. The planners chose to invest in these remote eastern areas, although it meant a leveling-off of the rate of growth of total Soviet timber production. This choice was probably the result of long-range conservation policies and consideration of strategic-economic development plans for the east.

I. Introduction.

In 1949, five logging trusts were selected from the Chief Directorate of East Siberian and Far Eastern Logging to form the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging, with headquarters at Irkutsk. Since its formation in 1949, the table of organization of this chief directorate has been vastly expanded by intensive recruitment of local labor and by shifting logging enterprises from western European USSR to East Siberia.* The Chief Directorate of Far Eastern Logging and the Chief Directorate of Sakhalin Logging also received large numbers of workers from western European USSR.**

The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging is the largest timber producer of the 3 eastern chief directorates,*** and it is the only one of the 3 that makes a significant contribution to other regions of the USSR. This chief directorate is the principal supplier of mining timber to the Kuznets Basin and Central Asia, and it has made significant shipments of construction timber to the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Lower Volga, and Dalstroy. An increasing volume of export timber is being rafted by this chief directorate through the Northern Sea Route. 2/

Considering the vast forest resources available along with the recent increases in labor and equipment, this chief directorate is probably the most important of the eight chief directorates of logging of the Ministry of the Timber Industry in terms of potential output. ****

* For a fuller treatment of this resettlement program, see Appendix B, Highlights of the East Siberian Expansion Program (1949-52).

** See Appendix C, Resettlement to Sakhalin and the Far East.

*** 1952 planned production figures for the three eastern chief directorates of the Ministry of the Timber Industry (in cubic meters of hauled timber) are as follows 1/: East Siberia, 11 million; Far East, 5.5 million; and Sakhalin, 2.8 million. (Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in Appendix D.)

**** See Appendix A, Forest Resources of Irkutsk Oblast.

For the purposes of this paper, East Siberia may be defined as the area encompassed by Irkutsk Oblast, Yakutsk ASSR, Chita Oblast, and Buryat-Mongol ASSR.

For the sake of simplification, the names of ministries and their subordinate units have been used in this paper as they existed before the March 1953 ministerial reorganizations. The Ministry of the Timber Industry and the Ministry of the Paper and Wood-Processing Industry were merged on 15 March 1953 to form the Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry. 3/ The Chief Directorates of East Siberian and Far Eastern Logging were merged in the second quarter of 1953 to form the Chief Directorate of the Eastern Timber Industry (Moscow). The jurisdiction of the former Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has been inherited by two new combines -- the Irkutsk Logging Combine and the Transbaykal Logging Combine -- and the Chief Directorate of Far Eastern Logging has been replaced by the Khabarovsk Combine. 4/

II. Causes of Plan Failures in the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging (1950-52).

Even though the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has been undergoing a tremendous organizational expansion since its formation in 1949, production has remained static. There have been no marked increases in planned yearly production throughout the period of resettlement (1950-52) and the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has consistently failed to meet plan figures for this period. In 1952 it turned in one of the poorest performances of any of the 8 chief directorates of logging of the Ministry of the Timber Industry. This trend continued into the first quarter of 1953. Although the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging had 3,500 more permanent workers in 1953 than it had in 1952, it was hauling less timber in February of 1953 than it hauled during the same period of 1952. 5/ An analysis of the principal causes of nonfulfillment of plans follows;

A. Transport.

1/ Railroad car shortages have been acute throughout the period of resettlement. In the first quarter of 1950, the Ministry of Railroad Transport supplied directorates of timber sales in East Siberia, at Irkutsk and Ulan-Ude, with less than half the number of empty cars requisitioned. 6/

Lack of cooperation among the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging, timber sales directorates, and the Ministry of Railroad Transport has aggravated the situation.

B. Housing.

The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging was scheduled to receive enough panel-type prefabricated houses during the first 7 months of 1952 to house 1,300 families (26,000 square meters). * Only half (13,000 square meters) of this allotment was received. 12/ Throughout 1950-52, inadequate housing caused almost continuous disruption of the resettlement plan. 13/ Poor living conditions depressed labor morale and promoted inefficiency. 14/ These conditions were intensified by severe winters and by a flood during the summer of 1952 which left many of the workers homeless. 15/

* The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging will require 28,000 square meters of panel-type prefabricated housing in 1953. 11/

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The East Siberian Woodworking Trust of the Ministry of the Timber Industry is the primary supplier of prefabricated housing to the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging. Although the administrators of this trust have maintained that material and labor shortages are the principal bottlenecks, it would appear that poor organization of production is primarily responsible for the low output of prefabricated houses. Organization of production lines in the plants of this trust has not been developed much beyond the craft stage. In relation to other woodworking trusts and to the quantity of logs available, the volume of output is small. 16/

C. Mechanization and Equipment.

Manual felling of trees and bucking them into logs represents 60 percent of the total labor consumed in logging. 17/ According to the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50), more than 80 percent of the felling and bucking operation was to be mechanized by the use of portable electric saws. 18/ On the basis of yearly allocations of portable electric saw chains and Soviet norms for the productive life of these chains, it is estimated that only 15 to 25 percent of the timber produced by the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging in 1951 was felled by mechanical means. For 1952, this ratio rose to 20 to 35 percent. 19/

In absolute terms, percentage figures for the mechanized skidding and hauling of timber have little meaning because the operational details of logging in East Siberia are not known. It does appear, however, that allocations of tractors to the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging have been periodically reduced, postponed, or cancelled to the detriment of timber output. The Chief Directorate itself has been guilty of poor utilization and maintenance of what equipment is on hand. Long delays in contracted repairs have aggravated this situation. 20/

Apparently the western loggers released only inferior equipment for transfer to the east and kept the best equipment for themselves.

In a recent Izvestiya article, F. Sozauilenko (Minister of the Belorussian Timber Industry) complained that Orlov showed no interest in reports that Belorussia had surplus equipment on hand.

Orlov's lack of interest in this surplus equipment may have been the result of adverse reports from East Siberian representatives concerning the condition of this equipment.

D. Competition for Resources.

Other ministries known to be currently (1949-52) engaged in logging in Irkutsk Oblast* are the Ministries of State Security, River Fleet, Internal Affairs, Armaments, Rail Transport, Local Industry, Local Fuel, Construction of Heavy Industrial Enterprises, and Forestry. Various logging enterprises attached to Uzbek SSR are also exploiting forests in the Irkutsk area. 25/

This system of division of responsibility for timber production has several economic drawbacks in areas of industrial-strategic concentrations (such as the Irkutsk area) where local forests must provide a variety of wood products to many consumers.

The wide range of consumers served by the Ministry of the Timber Industry forces its Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging to make maximum use of the forest resources available. 26/ A comparison of production data of other ministries logging in the Irkutsk area shows that these other ministries have fewer such obligations and in many cases utilize

* Organizational expansion of the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has been greatest in this oblast. 24/

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commercial-grade timber for firewood and other low-quality products. For example, 1953 planned production for a River Fleet logging enterprise operating in Irkutsk Oblast was to be 70 percent firewood and only 30 percent commercial wood. In contrast, enterprises of the Ministry of the Timber Industry operating in the same forests plan to produce only 20 percent firewood and 80 percent commercial wood. 27/ Since these forests contain a high percentage of commercial timber, this means either that the River Fleet enterprise would leave a large quantity of commercial-grade trees standing or that commercial-grade trees would be cut and used for firewood. The natural tendency would be for loggers to follow the second alternative. Either alternative, however, is an example of extremely poor utilization of forest resources.

The present system of division of logging responsibility in Irkutsk Oblast presents an unnecessary coordination problem to the local foresters and logging engineers in the preparation of annual felling allocations and technical logging plans. 28/

Furthermore, a complicated pattern of product distribution has developed in the Irkutsk area as a result of the large number of producers. 29/

III. Attempts to Eliminate the Factors Contributing to Plan Failures.

The Russians have made extensive efforts to overcome the obstacles to plan fulfillment in the East Siberian timber industry, but several of these efforts have not been very successful. The following is an assessment of these efforts.

A. Transport.

The East Siberian railroad car shortage may be well on its way toward being alleviated by means of a simple (although dramatic) logistical move. Indications point toward an exchange of consumers between the Chief Directorate of West Siberian Logging and the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging.

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Up to the present, the Chief Directorate of West Siberian Logging has been the principal supplier of export timber to Igarka on the Yenisey River, and the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has been a secondary supplier. 30/ On the other hand, the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has heavily supplemented West Siberia's supply of local mining timber 31/ to the Kuznets Basin. *

In recent years there have been significant annual increases in rafting in the Angara Basin. ** This rafted timber would probably be destined for lower Yenisey consumers -- primarily to Igarka for export. 35/ It seems logical to assume that East Siberian rafting will continue to increase to the point where the Chief Directorate of East Siberian logging will assume primary responsibility for supplying export timber to Igarka. This will release sufficient local West Siberian timber to serve the Kuzbas mines and remove a tremendous freight burden from the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

* An estimated 43,000 railroad cars (1 million cubic meters) of mining timber (krepezh) are sent by the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging to the Kuznets Basin annually (Planned). 32/

** Angara-Yenisey floating and rafting plans for the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging (in cubic meters of timber) 33/:

	<u>Floating</u>	<u>Rafting</u>
1949	1,987,000	410,000
1952	4,000,000 (1)	? (2)

(1) Actually, only 3.5 million cubic meters were floated and 190,000 cubic meters were frozen in on the Angara, Chuna, Ushakova, and Zima Rivers. 34/

(2) A conservative estimate, based on the 1949 floating-rafting ratio, would place 1952 East Siberian rafting at 700,000 to 800,000 cubic meters.

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B. Housing.

Recently, the new Bratsk Trust of the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has been undertaking its own housing construction. 36/ Judging from the number of workers of the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging engaged in duties other than logging during the 1952-53 winter logging season (29,000 out of 45,000 workers were engaged in other than basic work during February 1953), it seems safe to say that other East Siberian logging trusts are also building their own billets to supplement the lagging program for prefabricated houses. 37/ This, in turn, would be responsible for the continued trend of nonfulfillment of logging plans.

The East Siberian Woodworking Trust, the chief supplier of prefabricated houses to the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging, is being expanded. In 1951, three woodworking plants were transferred from East Siberian logging trusts to the East Siberian Woodworking Trust. 38/ This consolidation of the Ministry's local woodworking facilities under one trust is a step in the direction of local industrial maturity, at least in the organizational sense.

The recent shifting of timber transshipment responsibilities from the East Siberian Woodworking Trust to the Angara Timber Floating Trust may release additional manpower for sawmilling and woodworking and will permit the Woodworking Trust to concentrate on basic production. 39/

Woodworking facilities are being expanded and modernized at several plants of the woodworking trust. Engineers and skilled workers are being schooled in assembly-line methods and wood-lamination processes. 40/ As yet, none of these efforts appear to have affected production of prefabricated houses.

C. Mechanization and Equipment.

There is not sufficient information upon which to base an estimate of the current status of mechanization in the Chief Directorate. There have been, however, several recent

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developments which should indirectly provide economic advantages in the mechanization program.

10mo3 (1951)

As a result of the resettlement program, the Chief Directorate has a higher proportion of permanent workers, some of whom had probably received some industrial training in the west. 42/ Local training of mechanized cadres has been intensified since 1951, and a section for training logging technicians was to be organized at the Yakutsk Forestry School during 1952. 43/

Existing hauling roads and railroads are being straightened out to provide for tree-length hauling. 44/ This means that the whole stem (the felled tree minus top and limbs) is hauled to the transshipment point. This practice comes as close to the assembly-line method of production as is possible in the logging industry; felling teams are engaged only in felling and limbing the tree in the forest, bucking crews make logs out of the stems at the transshipment point, and sorters grade the logs for shipment. Formerly, the whole operation was conducted by one crew in the forest and resulted in poor utilization of wood and duplication of effort. Tree-length logging has been developed to some extent in the US and Canada since World War II with excellent results in the controlling of logging costs.

Up to the present, logging in East Siberia has been primarily a winter operation because of the impassable condition of the hauling roads during the summer months and the lack of permanent workers. Now that the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has a good complement of year-round labor available, the planners have considered it feasible to invest in all-weather roads in an effort to establish a more continuous logging operation throughout the year. Very few of these roads have been completed. 45/

* During the 1952-53 winter logging season (normally the heaviest period of seasonal employment in logging), only 25 percent (10,700 workers) of the Chief Directorate's total labor force (45,000 workers) were seasonal workers. 41/

In 1952, construction was begun on at least 7 new central repair and machine shops (4 in Irkutsk Oblast, 2 in Buryat-Mongol ASSR, and 1 in Chita Oblast). Completion of these shops should minimize delays in repair of equipment. 46/

D. Competition for Resources

During the last half of 1952, logging enterprises of the Ministry of the River Fleet were transferred to the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging. One of these enterprises has been identified as the Osetrovo Logging Enterprise of the Lena River Steamship Agency. 47/ This is the first known reference to the Ministry of the Timber Industry taking over logging responsibility from any other ministry in the Irkutsk area. This monopolistic trend has been developed in the reorganizations which followed Stalin's death. During the second quarter of 1953, two logging trusts (the Tayshet and Irkutsk Transport Timber Trusts) located in Irkutsk Oblast were transferred from the Ministry of Rail Transportation to the Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry. 48/

The importance of the absorption of these logging trusts and enterprises does not lie in the resulting increment to the production of the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging. These transfers are significant steps toward concentration of all logging operations in the hands of the Ministry of the Timber Industry. Such a concentration in the Irkutsk area is highly desirable from the Soviet point of view because it provides three principal economic advantages.

1. The transfer of logging enterprises of the Ministry of the River Fleet to the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging will provide an opportunity for better control of utilization in the Bratsk-Ust' Kut forests -- that is, commercial-grade timber will be processed for commercial output, and the remainder will be processed for firewood.

2. Consolidation of Irkutsk logging operations will permit more efficient on-site technical planning of logging without increasing the number of logging-engineers and foresters required. Elimination of non-timber-industry loggers will reduce

the Ministry of Forestry's field and paper work and should speed up the transfer of felling areas to logging units, thereby allowing these units sufficient time to plan operations.

3. Reducing the number of timber producers will simplify the planning of timber shipments.

The above case for concentration of logging operations would apply only to areas of industrial-strategic concentrations where the local forests must provide a variety of wood products to many consumers. For example, to transfer a military firewood enterprise located at Provideniya to the Ministry of the Timber Industry for the sake of uniformity would serve no economic function.

Further, assumption of logging responsibility by the Ministry of the Timber Industry would not run counter to the efficient practice of attaching one of its enterprises temporarily to a local construction project to facilitate timber supply.

IV. Intentions, Capabilities, and Vulnerabilities.

It is apparent that the Soviet planners realized that their regional expansion program would be in the nature of an investment since there were no marked increases in annual production for the three eastern chief directorates of logging throughout the period of their expansion (1950-52). 49/

This investment was based in part upon conservation principles. Annual log production in the western areas was far in excess of local annual forest growth, whereas eastern loggers were cutting only a small percentage of local annual growth. During World War II, western timber was cut indiscriminately for defense production and the postwar reconstruction effort dictated extremely heavy cutting of western forests. 50/ By 1949, restoration demands had tapered off, but the Great Projects and western industrial expansion raised new demands upon the western timber supply. The Russians were faced with the choice of either (1) continuing to exploit western forests at the expense of completely exhausting western

timber resources or (2) sacrificing a large segment of their efficient western timber supply system and extending themselves in remote virgin areas. Evidently long-range conservation policy and strategic industrial development plans for the east outweighed the knowledge that such a move would result in an interruption of the gradual growth of Soviet timber production since World War II.

In the case of the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging (the largest producer of the three eastern chief directorates of logging); the planners did not realize how much of an investment was involved. The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging consistently failed to meet even the static plan figures assigned to it during its expansion period.

V. Conclusions.

1. The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging, the Chief Directorate of Far Eastern Logging, and the Chief Directorate of Sakhalin Logging have been greatly expanded since 1950 by rebasing logging enterprises and transferring equipment and personnel from western European USSR.

2. The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging is the only one of these 3 eastern chief directorates of logging that makes a significant contribution to other regions of the USSR, and it probably represents the greatest potential of any of the 8 chief directorates of logging of the Ministry of the Timber Industry.

3. The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging did not even meet the modest production goals assigned to it during the expansion period, because of problems associated with transportation, housing, mechanization and equipment, and resource competition.

4. Although railroad-car shortages still exist in East Siberia, the timber transport situation is being relieved to some degree by shortening rail hauls through the development of river transport and simplification of product distribution.

5. As a consequence of the continuing resettlement program and the lag in local prefabricated house production, the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has been obliged to employ its basic logging labor force in emergency housing construction.

6. Permanent personnel increases will permit the introduction of modern year-round logging procedures and lead to improved utilization of equipment. The completion of seven new central repair and machine shops should minimize delays in repair of equipment.

7. In dealing with the problems associated with plan failure, the greatest advancement has been made in the area of resource competition. Logging enterprises of the Ministries of the River Fleet and Rail Transport have been transferred to the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging.

8. This monopolistic trend will lead to better forest utilization and more efficient planning of logging operations in East Siberia.

9. However, with all these efforts to overcome the obstacles to plan fulfillment, it is doubtful that the Russians will realize a return on their investment in East Siberia during 1953.

10. Apparently, the 1950-52 expansion of all 3 eastern chief directorates of logging was planned as a period of investment, since their production assignments remained almost static during this period.

11. It is believed that long-range Soviet conservation policy and strategic-economic development plans for the east dictated this investment.

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APPENDIX A

FOREST RESOURCES OF IRKUTSK OBLAST

During the 1950-52 period of transfer of labor from the west to the east, the greatest expansion within the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging has occurred in the northern, virgin forests of Irkutsk Oblast, particularly in the Bratsk-Ust' Kut region.

Twelve ministries (People's Commissariats) and 5 other organizations were to log 5.9 million cubic meters of timber in Irkutsk Oblast in 1941, according to the State Plan. The Ministry of the Timber Industry was to account for 63 percent (3.7 million cubic meters) of this total. ^{51/} 1952 planned production for the Ministry of the Timber Industry in Irkutsk Oblast amounted to 5.5 million cubic meters. ^{52/} We have no valid estimate of the total 1952 planned production for the oblast. However, if we apply the 1941 ratio, we can make a guess that the total was less than 10 million cubic meters. The Russians estimate that annual forest growth in the oblast amounts to a minimum of 30 million cubic meters. ^{53/} Eighty percent of this timber is mature and overmature, ^{54/} which means that only a small portion of the annual growth is occurring in 80 percent of the reserve. For this reason, at least 40 million cubic meters (or 10 million cubic meters above growth) could be cut annually without damage to the forest base. In other words, annual production could be increased 400 percent (if we accept the 1941 ratio as a base for a 1952 estimate) under sound forest management. Obviously a great deal more than this could be cut annually if no concessions were made to conservation principles.

According to Soviet figures, ^{55/} reserves of Irkutsk Oblast amount to 15 percent of the total Soviet forest resources. A desirable distribution of species, combined with a dominance of large timber, yields a high percentage of commercial-quality wood ^{56/} (from 70-to 80 percent).

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Until recently, logging was very unevenly distributed; the area adjacent to the Trans-Siberian Railroad was overcut, whereas the high-quality timber in the northern part of the oblast was relatively untouched. 57/

APPENDIX B

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HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EAST SIBERIAN EXPANSION PROGRAM
(1949-52)

The Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging was formed during the second quarter of 1949, when the Chief Directorate of East Siberian and Far Eastern Logging was divided. Petr Abramovich Afanasenko, the former director of the Buryat-Mongol Logging Trust, was advanced to the position of Chief of the new Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging. Yuriy Nikolaevich Shkol'nikov, the former chief of the combined chief directorate, has not been heard from since he was replaced. 58/

1. Manpower. *

Shortly after its formation, the new Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging began an intensive local labor recruitment program. By October of 1950, the Chief Directorate was vested with the power of independent labor recruitment under an agreement with the Ministry of Labor Reserves. 59/ Throughout the period 1949-52, the Ministry of Labor Reserves continued to recruit large numbers of local workers for the Chief Directorate (many of these may have been seasonal, however). 60/

Although there is mention of the East Siberian resettlement program early in 1950, the first concrete reference to the sending of European resettlers to the Chief Directorate came in November 1950: 500 Belorussians were to be sent to Irkutsk Oblast logging enterprises during 1951. 61/ By May of 1951, 1,800 European USSR resettlers had been received by logging enterprises of the Chief Directorate in this oblast alone. 62/ In August of 1951 the

* the number of workers actually received by the Chief Directorate are conflicting and fragmentary. Therefore, in the interests of profitable research, the effort to make an accurate estimate of manpower inputs was abandoned. The increase in the number of East Siberian logging trusts from 5 to 8 provides an adequate indication of the magnitude of labor inputs.

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Soviet of Ministers issued a decree which authorized the transfer of supervisory personnel and workers of liquidated Belorussian enterprises 63/ to the Chief Directorate.* During 1951, agents of the Chief Directorate were sent to Belorussia, Tambov Oblast, and the Ukraine to recruit managerial workers and labor. 65/

The Chief Directorate also received engineers and specialists from other ministries in 1951. 66/

At least three complete logging enterprises of the European USSR were transferred to the Chief Directorate in the first half of 1952. During the last half of 1952, local logging enterprises of the Ministry of the River Fleet were transferred to the Chief Directorate. 67/

In January of 1953, 15 representatives of the Chief Directorate were sent on detached duty to recruit industrial resettlers. 68/

2. Organizational Expansion.

Manpower coming into the area not only increased the tables of organization of the 5 existing logging trusts of the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging** but also provided staffs and labor for the creation of 3 new trusts: Bratsk Logging Trust, Ust' Kut Logging Trust, and Angara Timber Floating Trust. All three of these trusts are located in Irkutsk Oblast.

Bratsk Trust began logging early in 1952. Construction and recruitment of resettlers for this trust have been carried on for the past 3 years. 69/ The Director of this trust (probably Anan'ev) was transferred from a liquidated Central European Trust, and the Chief Accountant, Zaytsev, was transferred from Belorussia. 70/ On the basis of 1953 figures for allocations of timber-felling areas, it would appear that the new Bratsk Trust

* This transfer of managerial workers moved slowly until Molotov interceded early in 1952. 64/

** Tayshet, Vostsib, Yakutsk, Buryat-Mongol, and Chita Logging Trusts.

is rapidly approaching the size of the old established trusts of the Chief Directorate. *

The organization of Ust' Kut Trust was first mentioned in October of 1951. 72/ There has been no further reference to this new trust, as such. However, one of the River Fleet enterprises (the Osetrovo Logging Enterprise), which was transferred to the Chief Directorate, is logging in the immediate vicinity of Ust' Kut. 73/ Also, four new logging enterprises are slated for construction at Ust' Kut during 1953. 74/ Although these five enterprises may be assigned to other trusts, it is believed that they will form the nucleus of the proposed Ust' Kut Logging Trust.

The Angara Timber Floating Trust went into operation at the beginning of 1952, with headquarters at Irkutsk. 75/ The staff of this organization came from the liquidated Ukraine Timber Floating Trust. 76/ This new trust supervises floating, rafting, and other roadstead operations for the Chief Directorate of East Siberian Logging in the Angara River Basin. (This trust also carried on limited logging operations during the 1952-53 winter season.) 77/ Two floating offices (Novochunsk and Bratsk) subordinate to the Angara Timber Floating Trust are being expanded to become large transshipment bases, and recent proposals indicate that those bases will be formed into independent production units. 78/

* 1953 allocations for timber-felling areas from Group III (unlimited exploitation) forests 71/: Vostsib Trust, 2,860,000 cubic meters; Buryat-Mongol Trust, 2,780,000 cubic meters; Tayshet Trust, 1,523,000 cubic meters; Chita Trust, 1,010,000 cubic meters; Bratsk Trust, 770,000 cubic meters; Yakutsk Trust, 440,000 cubic meters.

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APPENDIX C

RESETTLEMENT TO SAKHALIN AND THE FAR EAST

It is estimated that during 1949 and 1950, the combined Chief Directorate of Sakhalin Logging and the Paper Industry (a separate Ministry of the Paper Industry did not come into existence until early 1951) received 21,500 families from areas west of the Urals. Of these, 500 are known to have been Belorussian families and 1,000 are known to have been families from the central area of European USSR. It is estimated that, during 1951 and 1952, the Chief Directorate of Sakhalin Logging received some 3,500 families from the west, including an unknown number from the Ukraine. 79/

No valid estimate can be made for the Chief Directorate of Far Eastern Logging. It is known, however, that Primorskiy Trust (1 of the 5 trusts of the Chief Directorate of Far Eastern Logging) received a minimum of 4,200 families of resettlers during 1950 and 1951. Resettlers coming into the Chief Directorate of Far Eastern Logging were sent from the central area, the Ukraine, and West Siberia. 80/

These input figures are softened by the knowledge that much of the labor signed on for only 1 or 2 years. 81/

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APPENDIX

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