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**The Soviet Military
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for The Third World**

A Research Paper

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The Soviet Military Advisory and Training Program for The Third World

A Research Paper

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GI 84-10066
April 1984

The Soviet Military Advisory and Training Program for the Third World

Overview

*Information available
as of 15 March 1984
was used in this report.*

Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet military advisory and training program for less developed countries has expanded rapidly. This growth has resulted both from increased demand by LDCs for services and from aggressive Soviet efforts to market them. Record arms deliveries, mainly to Middle Eastern and African clients and including advanced weapons, drove much of the expansion. Increased security and intelligence assistance to numerous clients—a key vehicle for penetrating LDC establishments—provided further impetus to the program. As a result, the estimated number of Soviet advisers and technicians abroad has more than tripled during the past decade to some 19,000, while a record 4,200 LDC military trainees were sent to the USSR in 1983.

Moscow's advisory and training effort is an integral part of the Soviet military assistance program (SMAP), which includes the provision of materiel and construction services. SMAP complements other Soviet efforts in the Third World—economic aid and active measures—aimed at gaining influence, or at least denying the United States and other Western countries significant inroads, especially in strategic regions such as the Middle East. To these ends the Soviets have sent experts abroad and provided training in the USSR in an attempt to gain access to ports and other facilities, sway military procurement decisions, recruit LDC personnel, and even shape a recipient's political alignment.

Moscow's success has been greatest in leftist states facing crisis situations. Mozambique's armed forces, for example, were established on the Soviet model largely by Soviet advisers, and Moscow gained access to Ethiopian military facilities in the late 1970s in return for large-scale assistance. Soviet success in garnering influence also is reflected in the existence of high-ranking, Soviet-trained officials in important, policymaking positions in LDC military establishments—often the key political institution in these countries. Alumni of the Soviet program include ministers of defense and similarly influential officials, mainly in leftist regimes such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Syria.

The USSR has been less successful in gaining influence with non-Marxist developing countries such as Jordan and Peru, which are especially wary of Moscow's motivations. Moreover, many LDC governments, irrespective of ideological orientation, are dissatisfied with the quality of the Soviet training and technical support provided to them.

Regardless of the influence Moscow reaps from the program, the USSR has realized increasing financial benefits. We estimate that Soviet hard currency earnings from the training and technical services program for the period from 1979 through 1983 were about \$600 million, more than twice the amount earned during the previous five years.

We believe that the Soviet advisory and training program for LDCs will continue to expand. Moscow is committed to achieving long-term gains in influence, a policy that considers setbacks as short-term deviations from the inevitable. Continuing arms deliveries, especially of advanced weapons—in part spurred by competition from the West—will provide much of the rationale for a higher level of assistance by Soviet personnel. Nonetheless, growth of the Soviet program probably will slow for various political and, in some cases, financial reasons.

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
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Preface

This research paper is one in a series that examines various aspects of Soviet and other Communist country programs that contribute to Communist penetration of the Third World. [

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Figure 1
Soviet Military Advisory and Training Clients in the Third World, 1983



The Soviet Military Advisory and Training Program for the Third World

One of the USSR's major goals is to expand its presence and influence in the Third World to the detriment of Western interests. To this end, the Soviets have undertaken a variety of activities, including broad-based military assistance; limited economic aid; and active measures such as exploitation of front organizations, disinformation, and penetration of local media. The military advisory and training program is a key element of the Soviet military assistance effort, which also includes the provision of arms and construction projects in LDCs.

Since the mid-1970s, the number of Soviet military advisers, technicians, and instructors in the LDCs and the scope of military training offered to Third World personnel in the USSR has expanded significantly. In 1983 some 19,000 Soviet military personnel (excluding troops) were stationed in LDCs as diverse as Peru, Tanzania, and Syria, and an estimated 4,200 trainees from the Third World—most of them from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia—went to the USSR for military training (figure 1). Both are record numbers.¹ The program provides an excellent opportunity for the USSR to increase its presence in key LDCs, a presence that Moscow uses to expand its influence over the long run. During the past decade the program also has earned substantial amounts of hard currency, although Moscow recently has offered more concessionary repayment terms to some clients.

Military Support Activities: The Program

In the LDCs. Moscow dispatches several categories of experts to LDCs, [

- *Advisers*, almost always military or KGB officers, are assigned to LDC staff units, line commands (at

¹ Estimates of the Soviet military presence in LDCs and the number of LDC trainees sent to the USSR are derived from a variety of [reporting. The quality and frequency of such information fluctuate widely over time. Data concerning the Soviet presence abroad probably are more accurate than trainee data, which are often incomplete

Soviet Military Assistance Decisionmaking

The Soviet military advisory and training program is part of Moscow's military assistance effort, which also provided some \$50 billion worth of military materiel and construction to the Third World over the last 10 years. Policy decisions regarding Soviet assistance are made in the Politburo in the context of overall foreign and economic policy and are administered by the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. Operating through its 10th Main Directorate, the General Staff:

- *Reviews the requirements of specific governments and insurgent groups.*
- *Oversees contract negotiations and materiel deliveries.*
- *Chooses and supervises Soviet personnel posted abroad.*
- *Trains (and sometimes helps select) the foreign nationals sent to the USSR.*

Under the 10th Main Directorate, the Chief Engineering Directorate is responsible for the provision to LDCs of military hardware and advisers and other specialists and for training in the USSR, and the Chief Technical Directorate handles Soviet construction abroad. These directorates are nominally subordinate to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, but in fact implement orders of the 10th Main Directorate.

times at the company level or below), and academies. Occasionally, as in Syria, they have been assigned to operational combat units.

- *Technicians* are Soviet enlisted men—and less frequently officers and civilians—who assemble, maintain, and repair weapons and nonlethal equipment (such as communications gear), organize LDC logistic support, and construct military facilities.


- *Instructors* train officers and troops in the operation and maintenance of equipment, military theory, and security and intelligence operations. Political specialists also provide ideological indoctrination.
- *Support personnel* include driver/mechanics, medical teams, logistics experts, interpreters, and administrators.

The Soviet complement in most LDCs usually includes personnel from each of these categories. The size of each group is based on the volume and complexity of recent weapons deliveries and, to a lesser extent, the expertise of indigenous personnel and the nature of threats against the client. The 1,000 or more Soviets sent to Ethiopia during the period 1977-78 in conjunction with the counteroffensive against Somalia, for example, were about evenly divided among advisers, technicians, and instructors,

This support, which accompanied arms deliveries of more than \$1 billion, reflected the requirement to mobilize a new, key Soviet client rapidly during a crisis. By contrast, reporting indicates that the bulk of the 2,000 Soviet experts in Libya in 1981 were technicians sent to assemble, test, and maintain Qadhafi's growing inventory of advanced arms, especially aircraft, tanks, and air defense weapons. The absence of large numbers of advisers probably is attributable to Qadhafi's desire to minimize Soviet involvement in military decision making.

In the USSR. Much of the military training is provided in the USSR, where LDC officers and enlisted men are offered a wide variety of both basic and advanced instruction. This training focuses on weapons maintenance and operation, tactics, logistics, and, increasingly, security and intelligence. Instruction in the USSR complements the services performed by Soviet experts in LDCs. In 1982, for example, Jordanian enlisted men and officers were trained in the USSR on the newly delivered ZSU-23/4 air defense system, and Soviet advisers were providing training on these weapons in Jordan, according to press and attache reporting. In some cases, trainees are sent to the USSR for more advanced courses after receiving rudimentary instruction at home. About 25 officers from Botswana received armor maintenance training in this way in 1981.

Figure 2
USSR: Military and Security/Intelligence Personnel in LDCs, 1974-83



^a Estimated number of persons present for one month or more. Excludes troops.

Soviet policy stipulates that training be geared closely to the capability of specific student groups,

Thus, many courses provide for the basic instruction of students with only a rudimentary education—a sharp contrast to most Western programs. All levels of Soviet training generally emphasize rigid adherence to prescribed procedures for both operations and maintenance,


Unlike much Western training, the Soviets discourage individual decision-making, even by fighter pilots, who probably have the greatest need for such flexibility

Figure 3
USSR: Comparison of Military Deliveries and
Military Presence in LDCs, 1974-83

Note change in scales


USSR: Military Deliveries to LDCs

Billion US \$



USSR: Military Advisory Personnel Present in LDCs^a

Thousand persons



^a Minimum number present for one month or more. Excludes troops.

Recent Developments

Experts in LDCs: Expanded Presence and Functions. The USSR has become increasingly active in providing a variety of advisory and technical services and instruction in LDCs during the past decade. A record 19,000 Soviet advisers, technicians, and instructors—more than 75 percent above the 1978 level—were posted to about 30 LDCs in 1983 (figure 2). This increase has been driven largely by the growing volume and sophistication of Soviet military deliveries to LDCs (figure 3). Security/intelligence assistance—which the Soviets increasingly have pushed—gave further impetus to the growth, as did the Soviets' general willingness to provide services and financial arrangements generally more favorable than those offered by the West. The Soviet contingent was largest by far in Syria, which accounted for about 30 percent of all Soviets in LDCs in 1983. Large groups also were in Libya, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan,² Iraq, and the Yemens. Smaller numbers were posted to countries such as Mozambique, Algeria, India, Peru, and Nicaragua.

Of the various types of Soviet advisers, the number of security/intelligence personnel has grown most rapidly. Indeed, by 1983 an estimated 10 percent of the Soviet military experts in LDCs were security/intelligence operatives (table 1). This growth reflects the efforts of most radical regimes to consolidate revolutionary gains and—at least as important—Soviet attempts to take advantage of an excellent means of penetrating LDCs.

Indicate that KGB and GRU (military intelligence) operatives have been sent to LDCs as politically diverse as Zambia, Syria, and Nicaragua to:

- Establish or reorganize security/intelligence units.
- Provide intelligence instruction and oversee intelligence collection against the LDC's adversaries.

² We estimate that there are some 2,000 Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan in addition to the estimated 105,000 Soviet troops. Unlike the role played by Soviets in most other LDCs, these advisers have assumed outright control of the Afghan organizations to which they are assigned.

Table 1
USSR: Estimated Composition
of Military and Related Experts
in LDCs, 1983

Service/Function	Percent
Total	100
Army	30
Navy	5
Air force	15
Air defense ^a	15
General staff ^b	5
Security/intelligence ^c	10
Interpreters	10
Construction	5
Other	5

^a Listed as a separate functional category, although sometimes included within army or air force tables of organization.

^b Not identified with a particular service.

^c Includes Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and Committee for State Security (KGB) members.

- Conduct surveillance of foreigners.
- Monitor the activities of other Soviets.

The presence of Soviet security and intelligence experts in LDCs provides Moscow the opportunity to gather intelligence on the host country. Intelligence operatives have been dispatched as members of military assistance contingents to recruit LDC officers as in-place agents of Moscow. Some of the 500 Soviets posted to Mozambique in 1981, for example, recruited officers in the high command to sow discord, with the object of having anti-Soviet officers purged.

Some three-fourths of Soviet military and paramilitary personnel abroad provide technical and advisory support and instruction to LDC armed forces. The number of Soviets assigned to specific LDC military services depends to a large extent on the size and sophistication of weapons deliveries. In most LDCs the army is much larger than the other armed services and absorbs the bulk of materiel imports, in terms of both value and quantity. An estimated 30 percent of the Soviet military experts abroad in 1983 were assigned to armies—twice as many as to any other

service. Air forces and air defense units, although much smaller, together accounted for another 30 percent of the Soviet military presence abroad, a disproportionate share that mainly reflects the inability of most Third World clients to operate and maintain even moderately sophisticated weapons. In some cases, this large share is attributable to the establishment of aircraft repair facilities in LDCs—as exemplified by a 1980 Peruvian-Soviet agreement, Few Soviet officers and enlisted men are assigned to LDC navies, almost always the smallest LDC military service. Other Soviets are assigned to construction projects or LDC general staffs or provide support such as language translation.

Soviet technicians abroad, especially enlisted men, are highly specialized

This is especially true of aircraft support personnel. For example, ground maintenance experts assigned to Iraqi fighter squadrons in 1978 were assigned to separate sections concerned with engines, fuselages, communications, electrical equipment, instrumentation, and egress and life support systems, according to a former Iraqi military officer. Similarly, military or civilian technicians from state production enterprises are sent on short tours of duty to LDCs to oversee delivery and testing of specific weapons,

Soviet officers sent to LDCs typically function as advisers to the various services and—to a lesser extent—as academic instructors. In recent years these officers have:

- Reorganized an entire army (North Yemen in 1979,
- Assisted in the formulation of combat plans (Nicaragua in 1981
- Served as political advisers to line units and staffs (in Ethiopia in the late 1970s,
- Planned and executed staff exercises and training sessions and established training curricula in academies (Mozambique in 1979,
- Occasionally provided operational support in a combat situation (Soviets man SA-5 surface-to-air missiles in Syria,

Soviet advisers, in contrast to technicians and instructors, typically are assigned positions affording the greatest opportunities to gain influence. Often posted to LDC staffs, advisers are better situated to affect a recipient's political alignments and policies than are large contingents of specialized technicians, who only help implement military programs. For example, a [] that chief advisers assigned to Syria maintained direct, daily contact with their counterparts concerning tactical, technical, and logistic aspects of military operations—thus providing access to the Syrian decisionmaking apparatus.

Military Training in the USSR: Diverse Courses and Clients. Since the late 1970s Moscow has provided an expanded variety of military and related instruction in the USSR to students from a growing number of LDCs. Training remains focused on the operation, maintenance, and repair of weapons systems and on tactical military planning, largely because of continuing high levels of arms deliveries to LDCs. Anticipated deliveries of new types of weapons—to either established or new clients—often will lead to the dispatch of trainees at least several months before the equipment is received. Officers from Grenada, for example—including the Army Chief of Staff and Deputy Ministers of Defense—were provided specialist training in the USSR before armored vehicles arrived in 1982, []

A prime Soviet motivation for encouraging training in the USSR is to propagandize frequently impressionable LDC personnel in an environment conducive to promoting Moscow's interests. Regardless of the military rank of the trainee, his country of origin, or the substantive content of specific courses, heavy doses of political and ideological indoctrination almost always are integral parts of Soviet instruction. Moscow's most intense efforts apparently are aimed at high-ranking officers, often key power brokers in LDC governments. [] for example, reported that in 1981 the Soviets concentrated on training high-level Mozambique officers to the exclusion of lower ranking officers and enlisted men


Security and intelligence trainees reportedly receive especially heavy doses of political training—apparently a reflection of Moscow's judgment that they offer superior opportunities for penetration. In 1980 trainees from North Yemen were subjected to such instruction. [] even though Sana is a reluctant Soviet client. Frequent attempts at political indoctrination among potentially less influential LDC trainees apparently are aimed at building a base of support for pro-Soviet policies. These efforts occur in cases involving recipients embracing a wide range of ideological persuasions, including those from Peru, which has only a commercial relationship with Moscow, []

An estimated two-thirds of all LDC military and paramilitary trainees sent to the USSR in 1979-83 received instruction on ground weapons, fighter aircraft, and air defense hardware—the most important military items supplied by Moscow. At the same time, [] suggest that security/intelligence instruction by both the KGB and GRU in the USSR has expanded most rapidly during the last five years, coinciding with the surge in the number of such experts sent to LDCs.

The number of LDC military trainees sent to the USSR has varied from year to year, despite Moscow's expanded curricula. An estimated 4,200 personnel departed from LDCs for the USSR in 1983—a record level following sharp declines in the late 1970s (figure 4). Specialized training has always been concentrated in the USSR because of the lack of facilities and other support in LDCs to accommodate training on advanced weapons, in security/intelligence, and for staff officers.

The bulk of Third World trainees in the USSR are government sponsored, but a number of insurgent and irredentist groups also receive training there. Reports from [] suggest that several hundred of the Third World trainees []

Figure 4
USSR: Military and Related Trainees
From LDCs, 1974-83



^a Estimated number of [redacted]. Actual [redacted] to the USSR probably are significantly higher and more evenly distributed than depicted above; a poor data base, however, prevents better quantification.

^b Data not available for South Asia.

[redacted] in recent years were Palestinians and Zimbabwe insurgents:

- Saiqa, one of the more radical Palestinian organizations, was scheduled to send some 150 persons annually to the USSR, beginning in 1981; at least some probably were given conventional military training. [redacted]

- About 70 Zimbabwe insurgents received pilot and other aircraft instruction in the USSR between 1978 and independence in 1980. [redacted] Since then, however, no military trainees have been observed [redacted] the USSR, which supported the faction that opposed Prime Minister Mugabe during the civil war.

We suspect the number of insurgent trainees is larger than reported. Data on all types of military trainees in the USSR, based primarily on [redacted]

[redacted] from LDCs, are sketchy. In the case of insurgent and other nongovernmental groups, attempts to mask such training further restrict our access to the data.

[redacted] and open sources indicate that Moscow provides training at:


- *Military and higher military schools*, which offer theoretical and practical instruction, mainly for officers.
- *Academies*, which typically give advanced training.
- *Special institutes*, which ordinarily provide brief courses on specific subjects, such as weapons firing.
- *Autonomous facilities*, where LDC enlisted men are taught operational and technical subjects [redacted]
- *State manufacturing facilities*, such as tank plants in Kiev and Zhitomir.

Soviet policy stipulates that training be geared to the "cultural level" of students. [redacted]




[redacted] Trainees from more advanced LDCs, such as Syria, ostensibly receive instruction similar to that provided Soviet students, while Angolans, North Yemenis, and others are taught at a more basic level. All trainees take a number of "core" courses, including language training for curricula longer than one year. [redacted] Many weapons operators and technicians and pilot candidates take the same basic mathematics and physics courses. [redacted]

Courses for pilots and weapons technicians usually are the most comprehensive:

- Some Syrians undergoing training as Scud rocket technicians have remained in the USSR as long as four years [redacted]
- Ethiopian MIG-21 pilot candidates study for two years [redacted]



By contrast, tactical and operational courses on specific weapons are of shorter duration:

- A field artillery course for South Yemeni officers covered 10 months in 1980. 
- Radar refresher training often takes less than a year.  

Surging Hard Currency Receipts. One of Moscow's motivations for providing advisory and training assistance to LDCs is financial. Moscow increasingly has attempted to generate hard currency earnings from the program, although Soviet terms remain concessional compared with those of Western suppliers. This policy was adopted after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when key Soviet clients in the Middle East and North

Table 2
USSR: Estimated Hard Currency Earnings
From Military Technical Services to LDCs,
1974-83^a

Million US \$

	1974-78	1979-83	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 ^b
Total	260	610	100	110	120	145	135
Of which:							
Algeria	25	70	10	10	20	20	10
Angola	10	60	10	10	10	15	15
Iraq	55	55	15	15	5	10	10
Libya	60	225	30	40	45	55	55
Syria ^c	100	190	35	35	40	40	40

^a The chronological allocation of earnings, rounded to the nearest \$5 million, reflects the assumption that payment is received in the same year as services performed.

^b The decline in 1983, which mainly reflects a halving of the Soviet presence in Algeria, possibly was much greater. If Syria did not reimburse Moscow in hard currency for Soviet advisers

total earnings could have fallen to less than \$100 million.

^c Iraq may have met some of Syria's obligations before the Iran-Iraq war began in late 1980.

Africa realized large increases in oil revenues. Most of the LDCs now obligated to pay for Soviet assistance are oil producers, and Moscow sometimes demands reimbursement from less affluent clients,

At the same time, the Soviets have been willing to provide services on more concessionary terms than previously to some clients in difficult circumstances. In early 1983, for example, Syria no longer was required to pay the "full cost" of Soviet advisers,

We estimate, on the basis of incomplete reporting covering a small number of clients, that hard currency obligations of LDCs for technical services totaled more than \$600 million in 1979-83—more than twice the amount incurred during the previous five years (table 2).¹ Some three-fourths of the 1979-83 total

¹ Hard currency estimates are based on average reported charges per recipient, applied to all LDCs required to reimburse Moscow for services rendered. The estimates assume payment is received in the same year services are performed—a reflection of Moscow's requirement that reimbursement be made on a current account basis. LDCs, however, sometimes are in arrears.

probably came from payments for Soviets posted to LDCs, since Moscow absorbs most of the costs of training in the USSR,

A variety of sources suggest that payments by Libya constituted roughly one-third of the receipts, while Algeria, Angola, Iraq, and Syria made up most of the remainder indicates that Peru reimburses Moscow both for the services of most technicians and for the costs of trainees—part of Lima's policy of maintaining relations on a commercial basis. India traditionally has paid for Soviet services as well, although in rupees rather than hard currency—a longstanding concessionary arrangement, The only recent formal Soviet financial concessions for training may have involved Nicaragua, which has also received some Soviet-supplied hardware on a grant basis—a departure from Moscow's usual practice.

Soviet hard currency earnings from training and advisory services are especially favorable when considered in light of the salaries and other expenses associated with the program. We believe such costs are much lower than receipts, and, more importantly, virtually all expenses are payable in soft currency. Base pay for technicians and advisers, most of which is deposited into an account in the USSR, is paid in rubles, while foreign-duty wages—usually a 50- to 100-percent supplement—are paid in local (soft) currency, [. Even most of the local costs Moscow occasionally subsidizes, for which all recipients are responsible contractually, represent soft currency expenditures.

Soviet charges for services apparently vary among paying clients, and they can vary over time to the same recipient. Open source reporting, for example, indicates that Libya generally pays higher rates for comparable services provided by Soviet advisers and experts than do other LDCs. This circumstance suggests that Moscow tries to maximize earnings whenever possible, assuming its primary goal of gaining influence is not impaired.

An Assessment: Gains Outweigh Costs

The large-scale expansion of the Soviet advisory and training program since the mid-1970s reflects mutual, practical benefits to Moscow and its clients, although both sides have not fully realized their aims. To the extent that the expanded Soviet presence abroad and stepped-up training in the USSR have been at the expense of Western interests, Moscow has realized its goal of denying or reducing non-Communist initiatives. In some cases—mainly among ideologically compatible, heavily dependent clients—Moscow has been able to translate an active program into true gains in influence. Improvements in Moscow's position attributable to the training program often are manifested when pro-Soviet alumni assume positions of key responsibility in their government. Most of them serve in radical regimes:

- Col. Henrique "Iko" Carreria of Angola, an influential member of the Dos Santos regime, is the presidential adviser on defense affairs, and recently was appointed chief of the Air Force. He received training in the USSR from late 1979 until mid-1982 and has worked closely with Soviet advisers in Angola.

- Lt. Gen. Mustafa Talas is Syrian Minister of Defense. In 1981, Talas became the first non-Soviet to receive a doctorate in military matters from the Soviet Supreme Institute for Military Studies. He reportedly views his Soviet training positively and has been involved in negotiations with the Soviets concerning military supplies and other matters.

- Fikre-Selassie Wogdress is secretary general of Ethiopia's Provisional Military Administrative Council. Fikre-Selassie, one of the most influential and pro-Soviet members of the regime, had nine months of political indoctrination in the USSR. He previously received pilot training in the United States.

- Several high-ranking North Yemenis now or previously in positions of authority have been trained in the USSR. They include the chief of the general staff of the armed forces (Lt. Col. Abdullah Hussein al-Bashiri), the deputy chief of staff for training (Lt. Col. Muhsin al Ulafi), and the deputy director of the Central Organization for National Security (Col. Abdallah Shalamash). These and other key North Yemenis—mainly in the Army and Air Force—each received several years of unspecified training, and Shalamash and al Ulafi are known to advocate pro-Soviet positions.

Similarly, high-ranking Soviet military advisers in LDCs are often at or near the power center because the military is the leading political force of many Third World nations:

- Soviets in North Yemen in 1980 successfully pressured President Salih to install pro-Soviet officers at the highest levels of the armed forces, [
- Mozambique's armed forces were largely created, organized, and trained by the Soviets after independence in 1975, [
- Large-scale Soviet assistance to Ethiopia in response to the 1977 Somali invasion helped Moscow acquire increasing access to ports and airfields, according to open sources.

Soviet cultivation of LDCs through advisory support and training also has fostered links to Moscow by giving arms transfer efforts additional impetus. Training of LDC technicians on Soviet hardware often promotes a heavy dependence on Moscow—often to the exclusion of other suppliers because of the complications diversification presents. Continued arms deliveries, in turn, create a need for additional assistance from Soviet personnel, especially as increasingly advanced weapons are provided. Gains in Soviet influence and the impact on arms sales have been sweetened by the growing hard currency earnings realized by Moscow.

Most recipients view Soviet advisory services and training as essential elements of military assistance and some have complimented Soviet efforts. For example:

- Syrian Air Force pilots being trained to operate new aircraft in 1979 felt "genuinely helped" by Soviet instructors, [
- Jordanian trainees sent to the USSR in late 1982 approved of the SA-8 missile instruction they received, [
- Congolese undergoing security training in the USSR in early 1982 reported that Soviet instructors were highly competent and motivated [

Moscow has nonetheless failed to realize gains in influence proportionate to growth in the Soviet presence abroad and expanded training in the USSR. Soviet clients, regardless of their political orientation, often distrust Moscow and question its true motivation for providing assistance. The Soviet position in Iraq, for example, suffered in 1982 when Moscow unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Baghdad to replace Indian weapons technicians with Soviet experts, [The Soviets apparently believed that the resumption of large-scale arms accords that year—following an embargo after the Iran-Iraq war started—provided justification for an expanded presence. Tanzania, although heavily dependent on Moscow's assistance, has frequently attempted to reduce the number of Soviet personnel during the past decade, [

] Fear of undue Soviet influence—illustrated by efforts by the head of the Soviet

program to increase his training responsibilities—reportedly was a major reason for this stance.

Occasionally, disillusionment with Soviet training has played a role in Moscow's failure to reestablish influence in an LDC. Egyptian President Mubarak, who attended two bomber schools and a command and staff school in the USSR in the mid-1960s, has severely criticized Soviet goals and motivations in the Third World, according to open sources.⁴

On a working level, substantive deficiencies and Soviet heavyhandedness are reflected in complaints from clients in a variety of circumstances:

- Zambia complained in 1981 that the Soviets were unnecessarily complicating assembly of various subsystems of SA-3 surface-to-air missiles, [
- Iraq in early 1983 considered replacing Soviet MIG-23 instructors with Egyptians because of the Soviets' refusal to divulge exact aircraft capabilities—an example of the customary Soviet preoccupation with secrecy— [
- Ethiopian Air Force technicians (some previously trained by the United States) have faulted poor substantive presentations, proselytization efforts, and the superior attitude of instructors in the USSR. [

Most clients have tried to maintain their autonomy while maximizing the improvement in capabilities afforded by Soviet assistance. The most independent recipients have been those which conduct military supply relations on a commercial basis. India, for example, has never allowed more than a few hundred Soviet military personnel in country—most of them technicians rather than advisers—despite receiving

⁴ Western programs also are criticized by LDCs, although for different reasons and generally to a lesser extent.

some \$6 billion worth of materiel since the mid-1950s, [] Moreover, India, like some other recipients of Soviet assistance, has developed its own training programs partly to minimize Soviet influence, a practice Moscow tries to discourage.

Soviet *Weltanschauung* historically has emphasized the long term, viewing setbacks largely as events posing future opportunities. Moscow's commitment to this perspective—manifested also in arms transfers, the main tangible determinant of the scope of the advisory and training program—presages continued growth in the program. The requirement for additional advisers and training probably will be most acute in countries facing crisis situations. The nearly 60-percent increase in the Soviet military presence in Syria to a record 5,500 persons in 1983, for example, accompanied delivery of more advanced weapons.

The growth of Moscow's program could, nevertheless, be slowed by political and other constraints. Fear of further provoking the United States, for example, has led the USSR to limit the Soviet presence in Nicaragua, []

[] that the Soviets were considering a general reduction in their program because of manpower shortages in the USSR. Finally, a deterioration in Soviet relations with specific clients and the financial burden of providing support to some nonpaying LDCs could lead to selectively reduced assistance.

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Appendix A

USSR: Growth of the
Technical Services Program, 1974-83

Table A-1
USSR: Estimated Military and Related
Personnel in LDCs, 1974-83

Number of persons ^a

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Total	6,590	7,950	8,515	9,615	10,770	14,460	16,485	16,080	17,250	19,025
North Africa	780	970	1,420	1,510	2,310	2,800	2,800	4,000	3,500	2,775
Algeria	650	650	650	600	1,000	1,000	1,000	2,000	1,500	775
Libya	130	310	760	900	1,300	1,800	1,800	2,000	2,000	2,000
Other		10	10	10	10					
Sub-Saharan Africa	1,350	1,570	2,290	3,950	3,300	3,170	4,085	4,535	4,440	4,370
Angola			430	485	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,200	1,200	1,200
Ethiopia		5		520	1,300	1,000	1,500	1,700	1,700	1,700
Madagascar			10	10	10	30	300	330	160	150
Mali	15	35	65	170	180	180	180	180	150	150
Mozambique		25	40	200	230	475	500	500	800	800
Somalia	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,500						
Tanzania	5	55	80	290	120	150	140	140	120	85
Other	330	450	665	775	460	335	465	485	310	285
Latin America	20	35	30	100	150	110	150	165	225	250
Nicaragua								65	75	100
Peru	20	35	30	100	150	110	150	100	150	150
Middle East	3,665	4,675	4,085	3,500	4,160	4,230	5,300	5,225	6,735	9,175
Iran	75	70	120	120	5		NA	NA	NA	NA
Iraq	1,035	1,035	1,100	1,025	1,100	1,000	1,000	500	1,000	1,200
North Yemen	120	120	115	90	150	125	300	700	1,200	1,200
South Yemen	235	235	310	315	500	800	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,250
Syria	2,000	3,000	2,250	1,950	2,400	2,300	3,000	3,000	3,500	5,500
Other	200	215	190		5	5		25	35	25
South Asia	775	700	690	555	850	4,150	4,150	2,155	2,350	2,455
Afghanistan	425	350	350	350	700	4,000	4,000	2,000	2,000	2,000 ^b
India	300	300	300	145	150	150	150	150	350	435
Other	50	50	40	60				5		20

^a Minimum number present for at least one month.

^b There were also an estimated 105,000 Soviet troops present in 1983.

Table A-2
USSR: Estimated LDC Trainees Departing for Military
and Related Training, 1974-83

Number of persons ^a

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Total	3,400	3,965	2,490	1,945	2,205	1,855	2,830	1,800	3,435	4,195
North Africa	300	725	260	175	5	195	80	NA	1,800	1,200
Algeria		50	60	15		150	NA	NA	200	300
Libya	300	600	200	60	5	45	80	NA	1,600	900
Other		75		100						
Sub-Saharan Africa	695	1,855	725	1,005	1,720	865	665	615	415	235
Angola			NA	55	NA	NA	10	110	125	NA
Ethiopia				290	900	100	100	185	25	NA
Madagascar				150	30	25	60	75	30	NA
Mali		50		30	5	5	50	NA	160	200
Mozambique		210	100	50	45	15	NA			NA
Somalia	150	500	20							
Tanzania	145	490	440	200	295	150	100	15	25	NA
Zimbabwe and South African insurgents					280	60	NA			
Other	400	605	165	230	165	510	345	230	50	35
Latin America	100	100	300	75	100	55		70	40	200
Nicaragua								15	NA	110
Peru	100	100	300	75	100	55		10	35	85
Insurgents from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras								45	5	NA
Other								NA	NA	5
Middle East	1,520	865	630	610	380	740	1,285	715	1,000	1,200
Iran	35	35	35							NA
Iraq	700	250	300	300	100	60	NA		100	100
North Yemen	75	100	45	70	10	180	1,200	500	600	400
South Yemen	180	180	50	120	170	NA	NA	20	100	100
Syria	530	300	200	120	100	500	NA	55	200	600
Palestinian irredentists	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	85	140	NA	NA
South Asia	785	420	575	80	NA	NA	800	400	180	1,360
Afghanistan	410	300	420	35			NA	800	400	150
India	305	100	100	15				NA	30	710
Other	70	20	55	30						

^a Minimum number, rounded to the nearest five persons.

Appendix B

**USSR: Military Installations Used
To Train LDC Personnel**

Installation/Location	Training Provided	LDCs Represented
Military schools and installations ^a		
Ground Forces		
Baku ^b	Armored vehicle driving	Ethiopia
Leningrad Higher Artillery Command School	Artillery tactics	South Yemen
Odessa ^b	Tank and other armored vehicle operations	Possibly Algeria, India, Iraq, Libya, Syria
Odessa Higher Artillery Command School	Artillery and rocket deployment and operations	Afghanistan, Tanzania
Simferopol ^b	Tank commanders course, infantry tactics, guerrilla training	Tanzania, Zimbabwean insurgents, other African states, Palestinians
Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School ^c	Paratrooper instruction	Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Tanzania
Air Defense		
Krasnovodarsk	Surface-to-air missile (SAM) deployment and operations	Tanzania, unspecified Arab states
Mary ^b	SAM and antiaircraft artillery deployment and maintenance	Algeria, India, Iraq, Jordan, Nicaragua, South Yemen
Odessa Higher United Military Engineering College of Air Defense	SAM engineering and operations, radar	Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania
Air Force		
Frunze Higher Military Aviation School ^b		
Frunze	Fighter and helicopter pilot training; aircraft, armament, and radar training	Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwean insurgents, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh
Kant Military Airfield	Combat pilot training	Mozambique, Syria, other unspecified African and Arab states
Tokmak Military Airfield	Combat and transport pilot, weapons, technical training	Syria, other Arab states, Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Madagascar
Krasnodar Higher Military Aviation School		
Krasnodar Flight School ^b	Fighter and helicopter pilot training; technical training	Afghanistan, Libya, South Yemen, Tanzania, Uganda
Primorsko-Akhtarsk Airbase	Pilot training	Middle East, Peru
Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School	Transport pilot training; aircraft engine maintenance, logistics	Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Libya, Tanzania
Kremenchug Aeroflot School ^d	Helicopter and transport pilot training	Algeria
Kouchopska	MIG-21 technical training	Ethiopia, Guinea, Tanzania, South Yemen

**USSR: Military Installations Used
To Train LDC Personnel (continued)**

Installation/Location	Training Provided	LDCs Represented
Navy		
Black Sea Higher Naval School (Sevastopol)	Tactics and navigation	Angola
Caspian Higher Naval School (Baku)	Navigation, line officer training	Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya
Higher Naval School (Leningrad)	Tactics and navigation	Guinea, South Yemen
Ismail ^b	Technical training	Guinea
Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering School	Naval engineering	Angola, Guinea, Ethiopia
Odessa	Technical training	North Yemen
Poti	Torpedo boat instruction	Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya
Other		
Kaliningrad Higher Engineering School of the Engineer Troops	Specifics unknown	Tanzania
Leningrad Higher School of Railroad Troops and Military Communications	Logistic support	South Yemen
Leningrad Higher Military Engineering School of Signals	Signal operations	Afghanistan, South Yemen
Ryazan Higher Military Automotive Engineering School	Specifics unknown	Tanzania
Ul'yanovsk Higher Military Command School of Signals	Communications	Angola, Tanzania
Vol'sk Logistics School	Specifics unknown	Angola
Academies		
Frunze Military Academy (Moscow)	Combined ground forces training	Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique

**USSR: Military Installations Used
To Train LDC Personnel (continued)**

Installation/Location	Training Provided	LDCs Represented ^a
Military Academy of Armored Forces (Moscow)	Tank commanders	Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Syria, South Yemen
Military Academy of the General Staff (Moscow)	General staff training	Afghanistan
Military Academy of the Rear Services and Transport (Leningrad)	Logistics	Afghanistan
Military Artillery Academy (Leningrad)	Specifics unknown	Afghanistan
Military Engineering Academy (Moscow)	Weapons, other materiel, construction engineering	Afghanistan
Military Medical Academy (Moscow)	Paramedical	Afghanistan, South Yemen
Naval Academy (Leningrad)	Specifics unknown	North Yemen
Construction School (Simferopol)	Specifics unknown	Angola
Specific military courses		
"Vystrel" ^c (Moscow)	Tactics, weapons firing, engineering	Sub-Saharan Africa
Other courses		
KGB School (Moscow)	Security/intelligence	Congo, Peru

^a In addition, courses covering maintenance and repair are given at state manufacturing plants.

^b Facility used exclusively to train foreigners.

^c Not formally part of ground forces, although often grouped under them.

^d An Aeroflot pilot school, where limited military training also is provided.

^e Literally, "the shot."

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