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Gorbachev's Foreign Policy

An Intelligence Assessment

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Gorbachev's Foreign Policy

An Intelligence Assessment

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Gorbachev's Foreign Policy

Key Judgments

Information available as of 20 January 1989 was used in this report.

Gorbachev is promoting sweeping change in Soviet foreign policy, committing himself to an unprecedented policy of global "tension reduction." Important elements of his strategy do reflect the traditional Leninist premise of enduring competition between "capitalism" and "socialism," but the processes he is setting in motion could weaken the ideological foundations of Soviet antagonism toward the West and foster a longer term "normalization" of Soviet external behavior.

Gorbachev's broad strategy is in the Leninist tradition: it calls for weakening the main enemy—the United States—by exploiting "contradictions" between it and other centers of capitalist power in Western Europe, East Asia, and the developing world. His long-term objectives include:

- Reducing the US military presence abroad as the key to weakening American global political influence.
- "Decoupling" Western Europe from the United States.
- Preserving, in some form, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
- Improving Sino-Soviet relations as a means of strengthening Soviet security, reducing the costs of defense in the Far East, and preventing closer Sino-US military relations.
- Expanding Soviet influence elsewhere in East Asia to tap the economic strength of the region, inhibit growth in its anti-Communist military potential, and weaken the US presence.

Much of Soviet behavior under Gorbachev remains inspired by the traditional desire to promote the interests of the USSR at the expense of the United States and other "enemies." Such behavior is most visible in the Third World, where it has included efforts to undercut the United States through support for Communist and "socialist oriented" clients, arms transfers, diplomacy, arms reduction initiatives, and "active measures."

Gorbachev's conduct of foreign policy, however, has changed radically from that of his predecessors. His innovations have been driven largely by a desire to create an international environment supportive of domestic economic, social, and political revitalization (*perestroyka*), although they have also been influenced by an appreciation of the diplomatic and security gains attainable from a more intelligent conduct of Soviet external affairs. The key need has been to conserve resources—primarily by reducing military spending, but also by rationalizing economic costs and benefits in the USSR's foreign relations.

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To slow military spending Gorbachev has had to convince the Politburo and its security subcommittee, the Defense Council, that the external "threat" is declining. He has tackled this task in two ways:

- First, he has redefined the security threat by arguing that the possibility of a US or NATO attack is low and that the "real" threat lies in the inability of an unreformed Soviet economy to compete with the West in the future in militarily critical areas of high technology.
- Second, he has argued that security can be enhanced and the external threat diminished through a skillful foreign policy.

Accordingly, Gorbachev has made arms control the centerpiece of his foreign policy, initially keying his global political campaign to *strategic* nuclear arms reduction and assigning highest tactical priority to influencing the US administration and Congress. For some time now he has also been paying increasing attention to Europe and conventional arms reductions, which could provide the greatest long-term reduction in military spending and the greatest security-enhancing geopolitical gains

Gorbachev has recognized that popular fear of the Soviet Union has provided critical support for those Western political and security policies he needs to alter, and that propaganda unsupported by real deeds will not eradicate these attitudes. The purposefulness and vigor with which he has acted on this insight are the source of much of the novelty and strength of his foreign policy. He has undertaken major changes in the military sphere that, while motivated by various considerations, have also been designed to reduce the perception of a Soviet threat. These include:

- The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and a campaign to wind down the fighting in "regional conflicts."
- Elimination of INF targeted against Asia.
- Withdrawal of some forces from Mongolia, with the promise now of major further withdrawals, and of significant force reductions vis-a-vis China.
- Announcement on 7 December 1988 of a major force reduction in the Atlantic-to-Urals zone that, from the standpoint of the Soviet High Command, would decisively rule out the possibility of a Warsaw Pact short-warning attack on Western Europe.
- Amplification by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in mid-January 1989 of the 7 December announcement, making it still more attractive to the USSR's neighbors—especially West Germany, China, and Japan.
- Reduction of the Soviet power-projection profile in the Third World.

While downgrading military intimidation and the role of military power in the implementation of foreign policy, Gorbachev has emphasized innovative political activity. By successfully substituting New Thinking—and its rejection of "class war"—for Marxism-Leninism as the framework of policy discussion, he has constrained conservative opposition at home to his foreign and defense policies, inspired supporters of his positions to attack the premises of past Soviet confrontational behavior, and improved the Soviet image internationally. He has initiated a broad diplomacy intended to influence a much wider ideological spectrum and set of international actors than were targeted by his predecessors. He has made significant concessions to Western pressures on human rights, emigration, information policy, travel, and person-to-person contacts. He has encouraged a certain degree of political liberalization in Eastern Europe and circumscribed—perhaps even rejected—application of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." He has addressed Beijing's "three obstacles" to normalization of relations. And, toward the Third World, he has ceased talk of "national liberation" and cultivated the image of the USSR as a responsible international actor.

Meanwhile, he has sought to reduce the economic costs of Soviet international relations. He is trying, by granting the East European regimes greater internal autonomy, to relieve the USSR of the burden of coping with their intractable problems. He has passed the word that the Bloc should put a hold on costly new adventures in the Third World. And he is pressing Third World clients to rationalize their use of Soviet aid, while scaling back some assistance. Simultaneously, he is encouraging a major expansion of trade and technological relations with the West, involvement with international economic organizations, a campaign to gain access to the dynamic economy of East Asia, and efforts to profit from, rather than subsidize, economic contacts with the Third World

Through the changes he has unleashed, Gorbachev hopes to make the USSR a politically, economically, and militarily stronger, more competitive superpower early in the next century. How aware he is of where all these changes *might* lead is subject to debate. But the processes he has set in motion could alter the nature of both the Soviet Union and the international environment. They could:

- Permanently weaken the claims of the military on the Soviet budget.
- Undermine doctrinal orthodoxy as an instrument of political control in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

- Facilitate movement toward the rule of law in the USSR.
- Erode the xenophobia and absolutist outlook that have traditionally propped up Soviet hegemonistic ambitions.
- Pave the way for a further drawdown of forward-based military power in Eastern Europe, and, with this, the removal of the shadow of military intimidation this presence casts on Western Europe.
- Accelerate the decomposition of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and weaken Soviet hegemony.
- Foster atrophy of the "second track"—support for radicalism—in Soviet relations with the Third World.

None of these developments are inevitable, but Gorbachev's policies have increased their likelihood. Maintaining cohesion in US alliances and sustaining Western security, while exploring the positive potentialities of Gorbachev's initiatives, is the central challenge Soviet policy now poses for the United States.

Contents

Scope Note

This report examines what Gorbachev has tried to achieve in foreign policy since he became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985. Its view is from the Kremlin. Rather than attempting to assess overall Soviet policy by aggregating data on Soviet actions in each region of the world, the report emphasizes Gorbachev's general critique of the legacy bequeathed by his predecessors, his view of the requirements of effective policy, and his broad strategies for dealing with the external world.

The report draws heavily on research conducted by CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis covering a broad range of foreign policy and domestic issues. It utilizes two main types of primary data: [redacted] reports that focus on Gorbachev, and Gorbachev's public statements. While each of these sources compensates to some extent for the deficiencies of the other, both suffer from a common problem in that they usually reflect Gorbachev's attempts to influence some particular audience—internal or external. Gorbachev is keenly sensitive to the impact of images conveyed by language, and he adapts his own presentations to fit the group he is addressing—whether in public speeches or in private remarks. For this reason, it is often easier to determine the *effect* he seeks to achieve than to fathom where he really stands. Nevertheless, by comparing his reported and public statements to different groups in different settings it is possible to assess his overall approach.

This is the fourth in a series of papers produced in the Office of Soviet Analysis that seek to explore various aspects of the Gorbachev leadership's broad policy. Each examines the historical roots and current imperatives that appear to have provided the driving force behind the leadership agenda and explores the potential implications for the USSR in the 1990s. The first, SOV 87-10036X, *Gorbachev: Steering the USSR Into the 1990s*, July 1987, focuses on Gorbachev's economic program. The second, SOV 87-10061X, *Gorbachev and the Military: Managing National Security Policy*, October 1987, examines the dynamics of party-military relations and the implications for policy formulation. The third, SOV 88-10040CX, *Soviet National Security Policy: Responses to the Changing Military and Economic Environment*, June 1988, assesses the expanding debate in the USSR over the precepts that guide decisions on the size and composition of Soviet military forces. The present paper is a condensed version of a longer SOVA research study that elaborates on and documents this interpretation of Gorbachev's foreign policy

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Gorbachev's Foreign Policy

Introduction

Soviet foreign policy thinking and action from Lenin's time have been based on the Marxist-Leninist premise that irreconcilably antagonistic contradictions between the capitalist and socialist states require the USSR to engage in ceaseless "class warfare"—political when not military—against an inherently hostile opponent. The central question posed in this paper is, what changes have occurred under Gorbachev in this zero-sum approach to Soviet relations with the West?

This question is relevant for several reasons. The internal and external pressures for major policy and systemic change in the USSR are great. Gorbachev's sense of urgency in dealing with these problems has led him to pursue the USSR's interests as a superpower in ways that provoke extreme anxiety or even opposition among orthodox Communists in the USSR and abroad. Some moves to which he has already committed himself—especially *glasnost* and political restructuring, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the recently announced unilateral reduction of Soviet military forces—are significant enough in themselves to justify a reexamination of motives. On the ideological plane, Gorbachev has introduced a novel doctrine, New Thinking, which is totally lacking in Marxist "class war" language. And some Soviet foreign policy analysts and practitioners, including Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, are harshly attacking basic assumptions of past Soviet confrontational conduct of international relations even in debates not targeted at Western audiences

Leninist thinking has, in principle, always justified accommodations with the "imperialist" West—sometimes of long duration and broad scope—when they have been deemed necessary to buy time and divide the enemy camp. The key analytic issue today is whether Gorbachev's approach constitutes such a tactical shift, or a more fundamental "normalization" of the USSR's international behavior.

Perestroyka and Foreign Policy

Gorbachev's approach to foreign policy has been decisively influenced by the importance he has attached to *perestroyka*—domestic economic, social, and political revitalization.

Gorbachev asserted that the Soviet Union needed *perestroyka* simply to "survive"; if it failed, the USSR would become a third-rate power and the cause of socialism would be imperiled.

Gorbachev believes that successful pursuit of *perestroyka* requires keeping growth rates up in both civilian investment and consumption, which in a practical sense means keeping growth rates in military spending flat or declining. Defense currently claims 15 to 17 percent of Soviet GNP, over 40 percent of the output of the machine-building and metalworking industries, nearly 40 percent of total metals production, over 20 percent of energy production, and substantial percentages of scarce high-quality components. The potential gains for *perestroyka* from reduced rates of growth—not to speak of absolute cutbacks—in military spending would thus be large (see inset). Gorbachev's desire to tap this potential is well documented in reporting

But Gorbachev has not been able simply to impose his resource allocation preferences by diktat. He has had to persuade not only the Politburo but also its security policy subcommittee, the Defense Council, that what he has wanted will not diminish, but enhance the security of the USSR. Apparently it was only in the second half of 1988, with his policy success at the 19th Party Conference in July and personnel gains at the September plenum of the Central Committee (notably the reduction of Ligachev's influence in the leadership), that Gorbachev was able—despite continuing military resistance—to mount a concerted campaign to reduce defense outlays

Potential Savings From Arms Control Agreements

Spending on strategic forces constitutes only about 25 percent of military investment and operating expenditures. Nevertheless, CIA and DIA estimate that the cumulative combined savings from the INF agreement and a deep-reductions START accord alone could exceed 50 billion rubles by the year 2000 and that the two agreements could release substantial numbers of soldiers and industrial workers for other employment. If all the resources saved were transferred to the civilian economy, the nondefense component of GNP could be about 1 percent higher than it otherwise would be by the turn of the century. The gains would be much higher from large reductions in conventional forces, because these absorb a higher proportion of overall procurement costs than do strategic forces. (See DDP-1900-187-88, Unclassified, June 1988, Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge, *p. 17.*

When Gorbachev took office in 1985, the general perception in Moscow was that the USSR confronted an administration in Washington that was deeply hostile to the Soviet system, mounting a massively expensive military buildup, threatening a strategic breakthrough with SDI, and conducting increasingly provocative military exercises against the Warsaw Pact in line with new, "offensively" oriented doctrines. The US administration was also seen to be seeking new anti-Soviet military alliances in the Middle East and East Asia, supporting counterrevolutionary insurgencies against Soviet Marxist Third World clients, expanding covert action against the Soviet homeland, and blocking Soviet technology acquisition. While orthodox Soviet leaders did not find such an environment at all propitious for moving to restrain military spending, Gorbachev's position implied that it was precisely US success in upping the ante that required an economically exhausted and diplomatically outmaneuvered USSR to seek a redirection of East-West competition and a reduction of US-Soviet tensio

In positioning himself to attack the problem of the defense burden, Gorbachev undertook to:

- *Tighten party control over the military.* Boldly challenging the priority status enjoyed by the military under Brezhnev, Gorbachev shook up the military high command and sought to weaken the military establishment's former domination of threat assessment and the determination of military requirements, while making it clear that he expected a more effective use of those resources that were allocated for military purposes. At the same time, he pushed to the forefront a debate on how much spending was really required to meet Soviet security needs.

- *Redefine the nature of the Soviet Union's security problem.* Gorbachev has played down the likelihood of any premeditated near-term NATO attack against the Warsaw Pact, although he voices concern over an accidental nuclear exchange by the superpowers. His argument has been that the real military threat to Soviet security lies primarily in failure to meet the long-term challenge of the United States and its allies in high technology, at both the strategic and theater force levels. He has also taken issue with the position, long held by Soviet military and political leaders, that security is necessarily enhanced by maintaining large, offensively poised forces as a deterrent to any potential adversary or combination of adversaries.

- *Employ foreign policy to lessen the external "threat."* Gorbachev has argued that the outside threat, and consequently the magnitude of the security problem and required level of military spending, is not a constant but can be reduced through astute Soviet diplomacy

The Focus on Strategic Arms Control

In order to be able to argue persuasively within the Soviet leadership that the external threat was being reduced, Gorbachev had little choice but to make arms control the centerpiece of his foreign policy. He concentrated initially on strategic nuclear arms, even

though their reduction did not promise the greatest direct savings, because they did constitute the gravest threat to Soviet security and therefore offered the best hope of being able to "prove" to his colleagues that the "war danger" and overall security threat could be reduced. Also, the military establishment was more receptive to strategic arms reductions than to cuts in conventional forces. The focus on strategic arms was much more likely to produce results quickly than multilateral conventional arms talks; it allowed East European political dilemmas largely to be finessed; it had the greatest global propaganda resonance; it exploited deep tensions in the Atlantic Alliance over extended deterrence; and—as a practical matter—it built upon a workable framework of ongoing negotiations.

By the late summer of 1985, Gorbachev had decided to engage Washington seriously in arms talks. He reportedly had concluded that the old intransigent style of negotiations had to be discarded in favor of a more sophisticated approach that would in effect force the United States to choose between responding to proposals seen to be reasonable, or being globally isolated as the inflexible partner in the superpower relationship and the major threat to world peace.

To pursue such a policy it was necessary to improve the Western image of the USSR. One of Gorbachev's key foreign policy advisers, Aleksandr Yakovlev, strongly argued in the early 1980s that the US "military-industrial complex" and allied elements in Western Europe had entrenched their political control and sustained defense policies hostile to the USSR by deeply instilling anti-Soviet attitudes in the popular mind. This "enemy image" could *not* be eradicated simply by rallying the left through one-shot "peace" campaigns. A more profound approach across the political spectrum was required, supported by deeds as well as propaganda. Gorbachev absorbed this counsel. [redacted] reveal him to be as acutely sensitive to "impression management" on both the tactical and strategic planes as any Western politician.

Mobilizing the Foreign Policy Apparatus

Gorbachev and his allies—especially Foreign Minister Shevardnadze—understand that they cannot hope to implement such a policy successfully without radical changes in the conduct of Soviet foreign relations. They have argued that:

- Past foreign policy has not been closely harnessed to achievement of Soviet domestic needs or real security interests.
- Compartmentation of the military dimension of foreign affairs has seriously damaged both external and internal Soviet interests.
- Displays of military power and tough talk designed to intimidate have been counterproductive, stimulating an arms race that has cost the USSR dearly.
- Foreign policy assessments have been blinkered by ideological dogmatism and have not focused on the real interests of international actors through which the latter can actually be influenced.
- Far too little attention has been paid to economic opportunity costs in foreign policy decisionmaking.

These broad criticisms have played a determinative role in changing Moscow's international posture.

Over the past four years, Gorbachev has made personnel and organizational changes intended to strengthen his management of foreign policy. He now has people who owe their appointments to him in the key positions of Minister of Foreign Affairs (Eduard Shevardnadze), Chairman of the Central Committee's International Commission (Aleksandr Yakovlev), Chairman of the Central Committee's Ideological Commission (Vadim Medvedev), Minister of Defense (Dmitriy Yazov), and Chairman of the KGB (Vladimir Kryuchkov), although only the first two can be considered unqualified supporters. He has restructured both the Central Committee apparatus and the MFA to focus their activities on priorities he has established. And he has laid the groundwork for subjecting foreign and security policy to review by a "democratized" Supreme Soviet, sensitive to domestic needs, that he himself now heads

In the conduct of foreign affairs, while accepting the need to deal with Washington on arms control, Gorbachev has urged that the USSR not fixate on the United States but pursue a more open, active diplomacy toward China, Western Europe, Japan, and the Third World. These parties, he observed [redacted] should be encouraged to involve themselves more actively in shaping international relations, rather than always responding to initiatives from Washington.

Accordingly, Gorbachev has moved toward an activist foreign policy that downgrades the invocation of military power—especially in the European theater and toward China, but also in the "regional conflict" area. His approach generally relies on political initiatives, not military intimidation—although he has tried the latter against Pakistan. It attempts to depolarize regional politics, emphasizing contact with all politically significant elements in a region. And it insists on the calculation of economic costs. Overall, it attempts to synchronize regional policies with the requirements of *perestroyka* and a reasoned view of Soviet security interests

Geopolitically, Gorbachev's policies are thoroughly compatible with Yakovlev's basic strategy for splitting the West by playing on "interimperialist contradictions." Yakovlev has argued that shifts in the balance of economic power among the main contending centers of global capitalism are inevitably leading toward a long-term decline in the position of the United States relative to Western Europe, Japan, and (ultimately) other emerging poles of capitalist power. Yakovlev also argues that this decline is manifest in diverging interests and growing political-commercial frictions between the United States and its allies, and that Washington has retarded its loss of influence only by exploiting fears of the USSR as a means of translating US *military* hegemony into artificial alliance cohesion. This hegemony—in his view—takes the form of military bases, US forces stationed overseas, and deployed power-projection capabilities. Yakovlev's implied advice is clear: remove the brakes on history by minimizing Western perceptions of a Soviet military threat; by reinforcing centripetal economic and political tendencies in relations between Washington, the West European capitals, and [redacted] *Figure 1.*

[redacted]

Tokyo; and by working toward a rollback of the overseas US military presence. To this geostrategic framework Gorbachev has added the high priority of preventing a firming-up of Sino-US military relations.

Soviet Foreign Economic Relations

Primarily to promote *perestroyka* directly, but also to facilitate his security and geopolitical objectives, Gorbachev has embarked on a far-reaching campaign to increase the USSR's role in world economic affairs. Despite his sensitivity to the dangers to the Soviet Union and its East European clients of overindebtedness or dependency on strategic inputs, Gorbachev has begun to decentralize Soviet foreign trading operations and has permitted foreign investors to form joint ventures with Soviet partners on Soviet territory (a revolution in principle in Moscow's conduct of foreign trade). He has energetically pursued ties to international economic organizations and undertaken a diplomatic opening to the (capitalist) "newly industrialized countries" (NICs) while engaging in novel barter arrangements also with less affluent Third World nations. He has maintained, and perhaps increased, the effort assigned to clandestine acquisition of Western military technology and scientific/economic intelligence. He probably will pay even more attention in the future to obtaining credits from Western Europe, Japan, and the United States, and to reducing

COCOM and other trade barriers. Such gains would ease the politically dangerous trade-offs between civil investment, military spending, and consumption that economic failures and *perestroyka* press ever harder upon the Soviet leadership. Although the near-term prospects for a rapid increase in foreign economic relations from this campaign are poor, some political gains will accrue sooner; and continuation of the program could eventually have major domestic and foreign ramifications, both economic and political.

The New Foreign Policy Doctrine

Before Gorbachev, regime ideologists had always drawn on the conceptual inventory of Marxism-Leninism to fashion doctrine that rationalized the leader's priorities and provided guidance for more detailed policy formulation. One of Gorbachev's unique contributions to Soviet foreign policy has been to introduce an entirely novel set of doctrinal precepts that does not draw on Marxism-Leninism whatsoever (see inset). The central contrast between this doctrine—New Thinking—and Marxism-Leninism is that it deliberately eschews "class conflict" language and analysis, the intellectual grist of Communist hostility toward the West.

Gorbachev seems to have decided that merely "working" the conventional Marxist-Leninist formulas would not enable him to impose the intellectual integration, logical prioritization of activities, and emotional dynamism required to effect the radical changes in foreign policy that he sought. He appears to have been persuaded that only a radically fresh public posture (backed up by correspondingly credible behavior) could elicit the changes in a skeptical world opinion and in Western defense policies that the USSR required. And he needed a more potent ideological weapon with which to enforce his will against recalcitrants in his own political-military complex who could not understand the need for, and potential payoffs from, the sort of flexibility in dealing with "imperialism" that he envisaged. Thus, New Thinking faces two ways. Internally, it serves to foreclose conservative policy arguments and options. Externally, it serves various functions, not least that of building a benign image of the USSR

The central tenet of New Thinking is that elimination of the looming danger of a global nuclear Armageddon is *the* paramount task facing mankind. From this proposition various corollaries are deduced, the most important of which is that security can be achieved only through political means (especially arms negotiations), not through the "arms race." In the military field, the key New Thinking precepts are that there can be no victory in nuclear war (a concept that preceded Gorbachev's rule), that military capabilities should be restricted to the limits of "reasonable sufficiency," and that armed forces should be configured so as to be able to repulse aggression but not to conduct "offensive" operations (so-called defensive defense). These notions obviously serve the function of allaying Western fears of the Soviet military threat, but Gorbachev has also imposed them on the military as a framework for far-reaching debate over security policy—thus creating more favorable conditions for constraining military spending and conducting flexible arms negotiation.

Capitalizing on Gorbachev's incorporation of New Thinking in the party line, and on the political support of such Gorbachev allies as Yakovlev and Shevardnadze, reform-minded officials and policy analysts have called into question the ideological propositions and historical record that inspired and sanctified earlier Soviet confrontational behavior in foreign policy. Shevardnadze himself has publicly rejected the core rationale for zero-sum action—that peaceful coexistence is merely a "specific form of the class struggle." He has argued that, on the contrary, peaceful coexistence—and with it, "mutually advantageous cooperation between states with different sociopolitical systems"—is a "higher universal principle" than class struggle (see appendix A for other public statements by Shevardnadze).

In one of the more remarkable displays of unofficial liberal thought, a middle-level diplomat, Andrey Kozyrev, argued publicly in the October 1988 issue of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' own journal that confrontation generated by "class struggle" thinking had been costly for the USSR. He maintained that "militarism" basically did *not* drive the US elite and

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Main Precepts of Gorbachev's New Thinking *

Global nuclear annihilation is a real and rapidly escalating danger. Preventing its occurrence is the paramount task facing mankind.

Modern weapons of mass destruction leave no state able to defend itself with weapons alone. Ensuring security is increasingly becoming a political task that can be solved only by political means.

Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought.

The arms race cannot be won. It leads to destabilization of international relations and eventually to nuclear conflict.

Security can only be mutual: each side must feel that it is equally secure. And security is indivisible: it is either equal security for all countries or none at all.

Equal security is guaranteed not by the highest possible but by the lowest possible level of strategic balance.

The key path to guaranteed security is disarmament, and first of all the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Security depends upon observance of a defensive military doctrine and possession of no more than a reasonable sufficiency of weapons.

There is no alternative to cooperation and dialogue between all states.

Ideological differences should not be transferred to the sphere of interstate relations, nor should foreign policy be subordinated to them.

What is required in international relations is realism—that is, recognition of the interests of all states.

The trend is toward increasing participation in global activities by all states regardless of size and military-economic might, and toward the increasing influence of public opinion and non-governmental organizations; that is, toward the "democratization" of international relations.

The modern world is mutually connected, mutually dependent, and forms an integral whole. This has been brought about by the internationalization of world economic links, the scientific and technological revolution, the new role of the media and communications, the ecological danger, and problems of the developing world that affect everyone.

The solution of global problems, including ecology and economic development, is an indispensable condition for lasting peace.

Revolutions arise out of poverty and oppression, when nations cannot decide their own destiny, and not because of the "hand of Moscow."

The solution to Third World development problems lies in transferring to these countries resources that have been released by disarmament and in ridding economic relations between these countries and the West of "neocolonialism."

Universal security rests on the recognition of the right of every nation to choose its own path of social development and on the renunciation of interference in the domestic affairs of other states. A nation may choose either capitalism or socialism. This is its sovereign right. Nations cannot and should not pattern their life either after the United States or the Soviet Union.

* *This inset paraphrases ideas expressed in Gorbachev's Report to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, in other authoritative speeches he has delivered, and in his book* Perestroyka, *published in 1987.*

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that there were no grounds for the USSR to perceive itself in a state of "class confrontation" with the United States. He also rejected the notion that "the class interests of socialist and developing countries coincide in resisting imperialism," noting that "the majority of developing countries already adhere to or tend toward the Western model of development" and that they "suffer not so much from capitalism as from a lack of it." He contended that it was a mistake for the USSR to have supported repressive Third World Marxist regimes. Civilian security policy analysts, for their part, have argued that the danger of Western attack is low, that unilateral force reductions are effective, and that the existing Warsaw Pact posture *is* threatening from a Western perspective and should be supplanted in fact—not merely verbally—by defensively reconfigured forces

Impact of New Thinking on Military Spending and Force Posture

CIA analysis suggests that Gorbachev's efforts to set the scene for scaling back military spending probably bore little fruit until 1988. Only one case out of hundreds of weapon systems has been identified in which civil production may have interrupted or competed with military production. Apart from this case, the only evidence of restraint in spending is reduced operating rates in the Navy and extensions in the service lives of some military equipment. Gorbachev has, in fact, accepted new highs in spending on military hardware. After a decade of no growth, the value of military hardware procured from the defense industry has grown in real terms by about 3 to 4 percent per year since 1985. The Soviets also appear to be continuing a massive resource commitment to the research, development, testing, and evaluation of military programs. Moscow has at least 105 major weapon systems in advanced development—almost the same number estimated in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, because of the long leadtimes ordinarily involved in military procurement and deployment activities, we cannot confidently affirm that there has not been some deceleration recently in military spending—much less affirm that earlier *planned* rates of spending were not reduced by Gorbachev

As shortfalls became apparent in the key civil machine-building program and signs of consumer dissatisfaction multiplied, Gorbachev began in 1987 to direct defense industry to increase its civil production sharply. Throughout 1988 this pressure on the defense sector intensified, and it was reflected in the economic plan for 1989. At the 19th Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev signaled his intention of ensuring that Soviet military plans for the 13th Five-Year Plan (1991-95) conformed to his economic priorities. Following his consolidation of power at the September plenum of the Central Committee, Gorbachev announced a unilateral force reduction that dwarfed one he reportedly had promoted unsuccessfully earlier in 1988. And on 18 January 1989 Gorbachev claimed, in a speech to the Trilateral Commission, that "the military budget" would be reduced by 14.2 percent and the production of arms and equipment by 19.5 percent. [redacted] later told [redacted] that the cuts referred to the entire defense budget, not the much smaller published budget that covers only current operating costs, and that the reductions would be carried out over the next two years

The cuts Gorbachev announced at the UN on 7 December give Moscow a "bankable" conventional reduction that can now be factored into the 13th Five-Year Plan independently of whatever results may emerge in time from the new conventional arms control talks in Vienna. The force cuts could result in savings of about 2 billion rubles per year, or almost 2 percent of total Soviet defense spending in 1988. About half these savings could be realized quickly through reduced operations and maintenance (O&M) and personnel costs. The rest could come from savings in procurement, provided the force reductions led to lower rates of production of new weapons and equipment. Most of the resources involved—including high-quality metals, components, plant capacity, and manpower—could be readily transferred to the civil economy

The United States

By setting strategic arms control at the top of his security agenda and linking security policy so tightly to *perestroyka*, Gorbachev necessarily assigned the highest immediate priority to influencing the US administration and Congress. But his attitude toward this focus was not based on any traditional "love/hate" fixation on the United States. In the spring of 1986 he stated that, while the Soviets would ostensibly go along with the US emphasis on bilateralism and the personal relationship of the two leaders, Moscow "in real terms" intended to pursue a policy of appealing to multiple actors. Moreover, from early in the Gorbachev period it became clear that INF was the area of strategic arms negotiations that Moscow was most likely to pursue first to actual agreement. From the Soviet perspective, the negotiations with the United States were thus integrally linked to policy toward Western Europe (see pages 10-11).

Gorbachev's tactics as *demandeur* required pressing the Soviet strategic arms reduction agenda on the United States through a deliberate display of patience and flexibility, constant generation of new proposals, and mobilization of pressure on the US administration from within the United States, Western Europe, the Third World, and multilateral international forums. This mobilization effort, in turn, required avoidance of provocations in the European theater or the Third World that could be used to cast doubt on Soviet motives

Bilateral Issues

Gorbachev has orchestrated Soviet attempts to expand dialogue with the United States across a broad range of bilateral issues. His main purpose has been to promote an improvement in the political atmosphere supportive of his arms negotiation aims, but he has also sought to facilitate the dampening of regional conflicts and to accelerate Soviet acquisition of Western technology and scientific information. Thus, he has:

- Discussed with Washington the sensitive issue of regional conflicts, which he realizes has had a profoundly negative impact on past efforts to reach agreement on strategic arms reductions.



Figure 2. General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan at Geneva summit

- Dealt flexibly with the human rights issue, seeking to mollify the United States while stripping it of an important "weapon" in public diplomacy.
- Talked about prospects of expanded trade relations with US businessmen, hoping to enlist their support for liberalizing US policies on most-favored-nation status, loans, and COCOM restrictions, as well as for greater US flexibility in arms issues.
- Courted US public opinion through press interviews and receiving American visitors in Moscow, as well as by authorizing attempts to influence US policy through "active measures" operations.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev's own role in US-Soviet relations has focused largely on where the payoff lies for him—the strategic arms negotiations.

Negotiation of Strategic Arms Reductions

Gorbachev has needed proposals and actions bold enough to generate political pressures in the United States for movement in the strategic arms talks that could be sold to the Soviet leadership as significantly reducing the "threat." Such progress would open a path both to the kind of cuts in conventional forces recently announced and to further reductions that would even more substantially reduce the military



Figure 3. Gorbachev greets crowd in Washington, D.C

drag on *perestroyka*. Accordingly, at a series of critical junctures—many of them relating to INF—Gorbachev displayed his willingness to sacrifice hard equities highly valued by the military establishment in order to impart momentum to the negotiating process. Gorbachev probably hopes that the conventional force cuts he announced at the United Nations will prime the strategic arms reduction pump still further.

Gorbachev is by no means insensitive to the logic of military-technical argumentation. He wishes no less than the Soviet generals to advance Soviet security. But he does not appear to believe there is much current danger of a premeditated Western attack, he seems to hold that each side has a surfeit of nuclear weapons, and he shows some impatience with controversy over the "details" of arms negotiations—because the "security" aims he has his eye on are a radically altered military-political environment in the West and industrial modernization at home.

Not all Soviet officials have understood—let alone shared—Gorbachev's strong faith in political action as the means to achieve these aims. During his tenure there has been good evidence of continuing unease within both political and military circles—sometimes at the top, sometimes lower down—over Gorbachev's conduct of arms negotiations with the United States. There has been some concern as to whether the USSR can deal at all with "US militarism" without jeopardizing Soviet security or truckling to US demands. There was recurrent controversy over whether Moscow should deal with the Reagan administration or save its concessions until after the 1988 US election. And, at key junctures in the negotiations, controversy has arisen over the advisability of individual concessions. The military leadership has repeatedly expressed its disagreement with unilateral force reductions.

Gorbachev has continually sought to overcome this resistance through political argumentation. He has asserted that failure to proceed with the talks, even when faced with the vexing obstacle of SDI, would mean succumbing to provocation by the US "hawks," who he claims are frightened by the Soviet strategy of engagement and wish to break off the dialogue. He has gradually presented an image of a US president less manipulated by the "military-industrial complex" and more able to compromise with the Soviet Union. He has argued, in Marxist-Leninist language, that US behavior considered threatening in Moscow is not a constant but is subject to "improvement." He has emphasized the impact that mass "peace" movements and shifts in public opinion have had in constraining Washington's "belligerence." He has presented agreements that have been reached with the United States in the arms talks—especially when codified as formal declarations—as triumphs of his own diplomacy that have brought about a stabilization of the "arms race," paved the way for further agreements, and ratcheted down the military threat to the socialist camp. And recently, in his 7 December speech at the United Nations, he advanced a new doctrinal position that the world is experiencing a transition to a "period of peace."

Western Europe

Broad Objectives

For Gorbachev, neutralization of Western Europe is the key geostrategic prize in the USSR's global competition with the United States. Soviet actions under Gorbachev, displaying new tactical dexterity, have been consistent with the traditional Soviet aim of weakening US influence and, in particular, eroding

the US military presence in Europe. Gorbachev is sensitive to the possibility that "Europe '92" will produce strains in the Atlantic Alliance. But the Soviet foreign policy establishment reportedly does not believe any serious break between the United States and Western Europe is imminent, and Gorbachev probably does not either. Soviet action toward Western Europe under Gorbachev has stressed moves aimed at incrementally reducing the NATO arms challenge, increasing West European assistance to *perestroyka* through trade and technology transfer, and highlighting differences between European and American interests.

Gorbachev has initiated significant changes in Soviet dealings with Western Europe. These include:

- Promotion of a major propaganda and active measures effort, keyed to the notion of a "Common European House" and to Gorbachev's domestic reforms, that is designed to efface the hostile image of the USSR and build a sense of East-West togetherness that excludes the United States.

- Strict avoidance of official actions that could be taken as military intimidation.

- A differentiated diplomatic effort to exploit vulnerabilities in US–West European relations, weaken the US naval presence on the northern and southern flanks of NATO, reduce support for defense spending and force modernization, impede intra-European military cooperation, and prevent the emergence of a new European regional power center—especially West Germany.

- Pursuit of expanded economic relations, in which West Germany has been assigned a central role, in ways that seek to reduce the dangers of debt dependency, stimulate continuing technology transfer and Western pressure to lower COCOM barriers, ease the USSR's consumer goods production and food-processing problems, ensure East Bloc access to the West European market after 1992, and enlist Western Europe in the economic stabilization of East European Communism

The Federal Republic of Germany remains the central West European military challenge to Soviet interests, an object of possible geostrategic manipulation, and a source of assistance to *perestroyka* through bilateral trade and expansive West German economic relations with Moscow's hard-pressed East Bloc dependents. Gorbachev has mounted a successful public diplomacy campaign that has enhanced Moscow's image in West Germany. He has continued to conduct a dialogue with major West German leaders across the political spectrum and has demonstrated some flexibility on issues of great importance to the West Germans—ethnic German emigration from the USSR, West German relations with East Germany, and Berlin. In mid-January 1989 Shevardnadze indicated that Soviet troops being withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany would take with them tactical nuclear systems—a source of particular anxiety among West Germans. Although some Soviet spokesmen have informally tantalized the West Germans with hints that there might be some room for compromise in the Soviet position on the division of Germany, Gorbachev himself has repeatedly stated in Bloc forums that the German Question is not open for discussion. Ultimately, how Gorbachev proposes to deal with the German issue will be a key factor in determining the limits to success of his European geostrategy

Security Policy Toward Western Europe

The Leverage of Arms Control. From early in his tenure as General Secretary, Gorbachev sought, within the overall framework of strategic arms talks with the United States, to accelerate the pace of the INF negotiations. For Moscow there were genuine military reasons to seek to eliminate the Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). From the standpoint of the Soviet military, the Pershing II presented a unique short-warning challenge to the Soviet homeland that threatened command and control, facilities for warning of strategic attack by the United States, and the very existence of the political leadership. The presence of the missile also made it

more likely, in the military's view, that a war that began in Europe would escalate into a general nuclear war

But Gorbachev must have also factored in the political impact of an INF agreement. The Soviets could hardly have ignored the relief and expectation with which Western Europe greeted the resumption of the INF talks in 1985. Gorbachev almost certainly anticipated from this time on a favorable reception of the agreement by the West European public. He probably calculated that this reception would help to reduce popular perception of a Soviet threat, put greater pressure on the United States for more flexibility in the other strategic arms talks, make it more difficult for West European defense establishments to carry out already programed nuclear and conventional force modernization, and push the West to adopt a more flexible posture on conventional arms issues

What Gorbachev probably did not anticipate was the anxiety and alarm displayed by West European elites over talk of a denuclearized Europe at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986. From this point on, he had to have been aware of the wedge-driving potential of INF. And, in fact, the INF agreement in 1988 did raise important questions in the minds of West European leaders about the reliability of the US commitment to European security and, more generally, about US leadership. Gorbachev's efforts in 1988 to exploit the agreement are consistent with this reading of his appreciation of the political gains realizable from the asymmetrical sacrifice of military hardware it involved

Within a year of his accession to office, Gorbachev indicated that he was prepared to think about large-scale conventional force reductions in the European theater. In June 1986 the "Budapest Appeal" called for mutual NATO and Pact reductions of 100,000 to 150,000 military personnel and a subsequent cut by the early 1990s of another 350,000 to 400,000. And in May 1988, at the Moscow summit, Gorbachev called for reductions above the 500,000 target of the Budapest Appeal. The unilateral reductions announced in December 1988 (see inset) are likely to produce even larger cuts sooner in *Soviet* forces than those postulated in Moscow's proposals for mutual reductions,

Gorbachev's 7 December 1988 and 18 January 1989 Statements on Force Reductions

On 7 December 1988 Gorbachev stated at the United Nations that the Soviet military would be reduced by 500,000 men over the next two years; 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 aircraft would be cut from Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the European part of the USSR. As part of these cuts, six tank divisions would be withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and disbanded by 1991. Assault landing formations and assault river-crossing forces with their weapons and equipment would be withdrawn from these three countries. Overall cuts in Soviet forces stationed in the three countries would total 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks. Soviet divisions remaining in Eastern Europe would be "unambiguously" defensively reconfigured "after the removal of a large number of their tanks." Most Soviet forces in Mongolia would be brought home, and Soviet forces in the Asian part of the USSR would be "substantially" reduced.

In a speech to the Trilateral Commission in Moscow on 18 January 1989, Gorbachev claimed that "the military budget" would be reduced by 14.2 percent and the production of arms and equipment by 19.5 percent. He said that 5,300 tanks would be withdrawn from Eastern Europe and 5,000 of the 10,000 tanks to be removed throughout Soviet forces would be destroyed. The Navy would be included in personnel cuts. About 75 percent of Soviet ground forces in Mongolia would be cut and air forces there would be eliminated. The 500,000-man reduction amounted to a 12-percent cut in the armed forces, and almost half of the personnel to be cut would come from "the East."

because the latter would involve some (undefined) reduction also in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces and would come into effect more slowly.

Like his INF proposals, Gorbachev's conventional arms control positions and his unilateral actions have been designed, in part, to address Soviet *military* considerations. [redacted] the Soviets are concerned about NATO's ability to produce advanced-technology nonnuclear weapons, to mobilize and reinforce military forces, and to capitalize upon qualitative advantages in combat aircraft. These concerns help to explain why the Pact emphasizes that the objectives of conventional arms control should include reducing "tactical strike aviation" and even preventing surprise attack.

But Gorbachev evidently believes that how NATO exploits its potential strengths depends largely on the resolve of Western legislatures and publics to support military programs. Thus, his strategy for dealing with the NATO military problem has focused heavily upon attempts to energize political pressures in the West through accommodative Soviet behavior that will dampen Western military preparedness

The Political Offensive. Gorbachev attacked the problem first through public diplomacy. Reporting from 1986 suggests that he initiated the Budapest Appeal reductions proposal in the first place to allay West European elite fears that a conventional war in Europe would be more likely if the United States and the USSR concluded an agreement on strategic arms—fears that could have obstructed attainment of that objective, especially an INF agreement. And the magnitude of the cuts proposed then and since by Gorbachev certainly served his propaganda goals.

However, Gorbachev has recognized that, in this area of East-West relations as in others, reducing Western perceptions of a Soviet threat depends ultimately on reinforcing words with deeds. Thus, he has attempted to identify and address major Western concerns about Warsaw Pact intentions and capabilities. At Stockholm in September 1986 the Soviet Union took the major step of accepting on-site inspection in the CDE talks. In April 1987 Gorbachev acknowledged that there were asymmetries in the armed forces of the Pact and NATO that should be rectified by reductions in the side that had the numerical advantage. In the INF agreement he accepted further intrusive inspection and asymmetrical reductions. And at the summit in May 1988 he spoke of the need to leave each side ultimately with only "defensively" configured forces.

The main issue, of course, is the massive Soviet troop presence in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev understands that this presence is not only an enormous drain on the USSR's resources, but also *the* paramount source of the Western threat perception that cements the Atlantic Alliance, fuels NATO modernization, and sustains controls over high-technology exports to the USSR. Implementation of Gorbachev's promised unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary will have a major impact on Soviet military capabilities.

The removal of 5,000 tanks from Central Europe would cut total Soviet tank strength there almost in half, reducing the Warsaw Pact advantage over NATO in tanks in this region at least to 1.6:1. After the reductions in tanks, air assault units, and assault river-crossing units announced by Gorbachev are made, Soviet military planners would regard the forces remaining as inadequate to conduct even a limited short-warning attack successfully. The cuts would significantly increase the reinforcement that would be required before the Warsaw Pact could launch sustained theater offensive operations. However, even after these reductions, Warsaw Pact theater forces positioned in Central Europe will remain at sufficient strength and readiness in peacetime to meet a sudden attack almost immediately with formidable military power and to act as a defensive shield to allow for the further mobilization and deployment of Pact forces.

The Politics of Unilateral Action. The announcement of the unilateral reduction in December 1988 was not a sudden decision by Gorbachev. His association with earlier unconsummated unilateral force reduction schemes in 1987 and 1988, instructions he gave to the

military to review force postures, and his public comments indicate that he was thinking seriously all along about reducing and reconfiguring Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Nor was it surprising that he chose to make his first big move unilaterally.

Until the late fall of 1988, Soviet negotiating behavior in Vienna at the mandate talks for conventional arms negotiations (CST) did not suggest a sense of urgency in Moscow, although Soviet spokesmen had been privately hinting at major possible innovations in the USSR's approach to conventional arms negotiations for a year or so previously. It appears that the CST forum ranked low on Gorbachev's priority list—below INF, START, Space and Defense, and even talks on chemical weapons. Negotiated conventional reductions posed daunting conceptual problems, and sheer arms control decisionmaking overload was probably a factor. Alliance management problems with the East Europeans, complicated by the linkage of CST to the parallel CSCE talks and the sticky issue of human rights, probably had a retarding influence. Whether by intent or happenstance, delay in phasing in the CST talks until after consummation of the INF agreement may have increased Soviet leverage vis-a-vis the West Europeans in CST. Also, it is highly likely that decisions on how to proceed at Vienna were obstructed by policy conflict in the Defense Council and with elements of the military establishment.

It seems hardly coincidental that Gorbachev's major conventional arms move followed so shortly after the political breakthrough he scored at the September 1988 plenum of the Central Committee. In personnel terms, the plenum brought to the fore in the party's foreign policy apparatus two leading figures, Aleksandr Yakovlev and the new chief of the International Department, Valentin Falin (a former ambassador to West Germany), whose intellectual predilections and long-held anti-American sentiments might have predisposed them to favor a more "European" inflection in Soviet policy. For Gorbachev, proceeding unilaterally offered concrete results that he probably calculated would be greater than anything likely to emerge soon from the CST talks.

The unilateral action was probably only the beginning move in Gorbachev's serious approach to European security issues. It constituted a response to the concern expressed in the US Congress during INF ratification over the conventional imbalance in Europe, as well as a reaction to the victory in the US election of a candidate who said he would focus first on precisely this problem. It significantly increased the political obstacles to NATO force modernization. It severely weakened some NATO arguments in the conventional arms talks (for example, with respect to aircraft) and strongly positioned Moscow to influence the politics of these negotiations. The impact of the move was amplified by Gorbachev's claim on 18 January 1989 that overall Soviet military spending and procurement were to be cut and that 5,000 of the 10,000 tanks to be removed throughout Soviet forces would be destroyed. Shevardnadze's statement the next day that tactical nuclear systems would also be withdrawn from Central Europe along with Soviet forces was clearly targeted at the West Germans, with the intention of preventing modernization of the Lance missile and increasing pressure on NATO to negotiate with the Warsaw Pact on short-range nuclear forces

The unilateral force reduction announcement has several implications. The cuts, once implemented, will go far toward demonstrating that the present Soviet leadership is not interested in the option of a short-warning attack on Western Europe, and would make it even more costly politically than it presently would be to place the USSR in a position to confidently exercise such an option. At the same time, the cuts suggest that Gorbachev believes that genuine Soviet security interests can be ensured with smaller forces in Eastern Europe. They also imply that the calculable economic benefits to be reaped from force reductions outweigh the security "reinsurance" provided by surplus military power. And the reductions appear to be predicated on the assumption that political gains yet unrealized will more than offset the sacrifices of weapons, troops, and force posture unilaterally relinquished

Eastern Europe

Dealing with Eastern Europe is the foreign policy problem most likely to cause Gorbachev grief, and it is the one in which his ultimate intentions are most opaque. From the beginning of his tenure there have been signs that policy toward Eastern Europe was being reevaluated and that this reappraisal was producing high-level conflict. [redacted] as late as November 1987 a new policy toward Eastern Europe had not been determined. At that time [redacted] a Politburo directive issued that month called for creating a commission chaired by Vadim Medvedev, then a Central Committee secretary and head of the Central Committee's Bloc Relations Department, to review and define the relationship between the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies—a task that was said to include considering the issue of intervention. [redacted] collusion against Gorbachev between Soviet conservatives, including Ligachev, and like-minded party officials in Eastern Europe

Contrary to the orthodox Communist approach that implicitly argues that the main danger to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe lies in the region's latent anti-Communist, anti-Soviet nationalism and externally backed subversion, Gorbachev's position implies that he sees the main danger to be the poor performance of East European economic and political systems. At a Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meeting in March 1987, Gorbachev declared that the economies of the "socialist" countries were on the verge of collapse and that if present trends continued they would be in a state of ruin by the turn of the century.

Intra-Bloc Relations

Despite his pessimistic assessment of the situation he confronts, Gorbachev appears to have set ambitious goals for Bloc relations: to generate a real sense of community in the Bloc; to convey an impression of authentic alliance; and even—to some extent—to expand the fraternity itself through rapprochement with Yugoslavia and Albania. He has sought to replace the old command style of Soviet leadership of Bloc and bilateral relations with a generally more polite, collaborative approach to Pact decisionmaking

[redacted] *Figure 4.*

[redacted]

(although he engages occasionally in private bullying). He has expanded multilateral and bilateral dialogue and consultation, and he has in principle—although not always in practice—accepted as natural the expression by allies of their own interests. At the same time, he has insisted—not always successfully—on Soviet review of all important foreign policy moves by Bloc members and has shown irritation when not notified in advance of leadership changes

In the economic field, Gorbachev has tried to influence the pattern of East European trade relations with the West by formalizing CEMA-EC ties, and to direct East European resources to Soviet goals by attempting to reinvigorate CEMA integration. He has sought to increase East European assistance to Soviet technological modernization and military R&D and to obtain more high-quality goods from Eastern Europe in payment for Soviet exports. He has also attempted to promote more Bloc specialization and a larger East European contribution to Soviet economic plans through joint ventures, direct enterprise links, and coordinated production in key high-technology areas.

However, stagnant Bloc trade and East European nonconvertible trade surpluses with the USSR have reduced Soviet economic leverage and obstructed Moscow's effort to modernize the regions' economies through closer integration with the USSR's [redacted] suggests that the Soviets may now



Figure 5. Party leaders at Warsaw Pact meeting, June 1986: Todor Zhivkov, Nicolae Ceausescu, Gustav Husak, Mikhail Gorbachev, Janos Kadar, Wojciech Jaruzelski, and Erich Honecker.

be banking more than they had been on Western economic assistance to help resuscitate the East European economies.

East European Domestic Politics

Gorbachev apparently is prepared to accept—and even to encourage—the exercise by East European regimes of substantial *domestic* autonomy based on economic and political reform, although he has clearly not foresworn intrusive Soviet behavior. He urges local *perestroyka*, *glasnost*, acceptance of "pluralism of opinion," creation of new institutional structures more responsive to diverse social interests, and a less rejectionist approach to local nationalism—even where this involves filling in some "blank spots" in relations with the USSR. By simply tolerating the status quo, Gorbachev de facto already accepts a significant degree of political communication and articulation of interests outside the framework of traditional Communist party control.

The key question now is whether Gorbachev is prepared to accept organized non-Communist participation in labor representation or political decision making that involves real power sharing by the Communist bureaucracy. The signals he personally has given toward Poland, where he has faced this dilemma since 1985, have been contradictory. According [redacted] Aleksandr Yakovlev told East European officials in the second half of 1988 that the Bloc countries should show signs of political reform to gain Western assistance, and could even tolerate pluralism in the form of distinct trends within a single party or notional opposition parties. Communist parties should make a show of entertaining the ideas of others, but implement only their own. They should not surrender the principle of a one-party state, nor give up power. Recent public statements by Yakovlev's colleague, Vadim Medvedev are consistent with this approach.

Eastern Europe and Soviet Security

Since World War II Moscow has linked Soviet "security" to Eastern Europe in two ways that, together, constitute the most enduring source of East-West tension. First, it has traditionally insisted on stationing large offensively positioned Soviet military forces forward in Eastern Europe in numbers exceeding those required even by Soviet standards to defend against possible Western attack. Second, it has insisted that the East European states participate in a military alliance against NATO, that maintenance of Communist regimes internally structured along traditional "democratic-centralist" lines is the touchstone of this commitment, and that threatened deviation from this commitment justifies military intervention. This picture appears to be changing.

Figure 6. Gorbachev and Jaruzelski at party congress in Warsaw, July 1986

In the West it has been widely assumed that one function of the Soviet troops in Eastern Europe is to intervene if necessary to guarantee political stability. The Hungarian precedent of 1956 and the retention of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia following the invasion of 1968 are adduced to support this view. [redacted] suggesting that at least Czechoslovak and East German leaders have been apprehensive that a withdrawal of Soviet forces could in itself have destabilizing consequences in the region. The withdrawal announced by Gorbachev by no means disproves the argument that Moscow continues to regard these troops as a potential interventionary force. However, it does indicate that Gorbachev was not persuaded that maintenance of East European political stability required avoidance of what could be perceived as the first step in a more radical drawdown of Soviet forces.

The Brezhnev Doctrine. The core of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" is the assertion of a Soviet right to intervene militarily if an East European country threatens to leave the Warsaw Pact or dismantle the system of domestic Communist party control. We do not know whether, at the moment, there *is* a formal Soviet "policy" on intervention. Should one exist, it is undoubtedly more elastic—with a higher threshhold—than previous Soviet thinking on this subject. But even if there is a policy, circumstances alone and not present intentions would determine what Moscow would do in some future contingency

From Gorbachev's standpoint, one might speculate, what is most important now is what different groups *think* the policy is. He probably considers it counterproductive for most groups except the East European public at large to believe that Moscow will intervene. He has an especially strong interest in convincing East European leaders that they cannot count on being bailed out by Moscow, but must reform their regimes and establish a more responsive modus vivendi with their own populations. Only then will they take the steps necessary to raise labor productivity, solve their own economic problems, and stabilize themselves politically. At the same time, he may see advantages in a public posture of ambiguity on the intervention issue, believing that a public perception that the threat of intervention is real is useful in restraining public pressure on East European regimes and preventing destabilization.

The evidence jibes fairly well with this hypothesis. Gorbachev's public statements directly bearing on the issue—especially those delivered in Eastern Europe—can easily be read as code-language justification of the right of intervention (see inset). [redacted] Gorbachev seems to have led at least the Polish and Hungarian leaders to believe [redacted] that Moscow now draws the line only at the prospect of withdrawal of East European countries from the Warsaw Pact. [redacted] began stating unofficially in 1988 that there would never again be any repetitions of 1968. And more abstract statements by Gorbachev that might logically be thought applicable to Eastern Europe have denied the contemporary viability of imperial rule (see inset).

East Asia

Gorbachev has inaugurated a new era in Soviet policy toward East Asia. He has sought to advance Soviet security interests, profit from the dynamic economic development taking place in the region, and diminish the role of the United States. One of his most dramatic public initiatives, the opening to Asia and the Pacific announced in his Vladivostok speech of

Gorbachev's Public Statements With Implications for Intervention

To threaten the socialist order, try to undermine it from outside, and tear one country or another from the socialist community means encroachment not only on the will of the people but also on the entire postwar order and, in the final analysis, on peace. (Warsaw, 30 June 1986)

The entire system of political relations among the socialist countries can and should be built unswervingly on the basis of equality and mutual responsibility. (Prague, 10 April 1987)

I think that in this way and only in this way relations should be built among socialist states: through full independence in defining one's own political course and collective responsibility for the fate of world socialism. . . . (Bucharest, 26 May 1987)

The experience accumulated permits relations among the socialist countries to be better constructed on generally recognized principles. These are unconditional and total equality, the responsibility of the ruling party for affairs in its state, and for patriotic service to its people; concern for the general course of socialism, respect for one another, a serious attitude toward what has been achieved and tried out by friends; voluntary and varied cooperation and the strict observance by all of the principles of peaceful coexistence. The practice of socialist internationalism rests upon these. . . . We also know what damage can be done by a weakening of the internationalist principle in mutual relations of socialist states, by deviation from the principles of mutual benefit and mutual aid, and by a lack of attention to the general interests of socialism in action in the world arena. What is decisive is what ensures a combination of mutual interest and the interests of socialism as a whole. (Moscow, 2 November 1987)

We set great store in, and regard as a sign of maturity in relations between socialist countries, an organic blend of the independence of every party and state with respect for the mutual interests, views, and experience of one another. (Belgrade, 16 March 1988)

July 1986 and amplified at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, has pursued all three of these aims. The initiative has clearly been aimed at effecting a long-term transformation of security relationships in the region that would benefit the USSR and weaken the military presence and political influence of the United States

China

China has been Gorbachev's highest priority in Asia and is likely to be one of the success stories of his foreign policy. Although he has privately expressed considerable suspicion of the Chinese, Gorbachev has from the outset placed improved relations with Beijing high on his geopolitical agenda. He has repeatedly called for a summit and restoration of party-to-party ties. More important for the Chinese, he has taken actions that, whatever their motivation, have responded to China's "three obstacles" to normalization of relations: he is withdrawing from Afghanistan; he is effectively increasing the pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia; he has already removed some Soviet troops from Mongolia; and, in the 18 January speech to the Trilateral Commission, he said that about 75 percent of the remaining Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia would be withdrawn, that Soviet air forces there would be eliminated, and that almost half of the 500,000-man reduction announced on 7 December 1988 would come from "the East.

Gorbachev on Sovereignty and Empire

The Soviet Union considers that every people and every country has the right to dispose of its own fate and its own resources, to sovereignly determine its own social development, to defend its own security, and to participate in the organization of an all-embracing international security system. (August 1986)

Views of foreign policy from an imperial standpoint are over. The Soviet Union will not succeed in foisting its will on anyone, nor will the United States. You can suppress, coerce, suborn, smash, and crush for a while. But from the viewpoint of long-term policy, major, large-scale policy, no one will be able to subjugate others. (August 1987)

We have reached a point in the development of the world situation . . . in which new approaches are needed. Misfortunes and failures in foreign policies, crisis, tension, and confrontations are linked with the fact that we are trying to resolve new matters with the approaches of the 1940s and 1930s—from imperial stances, when a group of countries had empires and pursued their foreign policies accordingly. (September 1987)

As with Europe, Gorbachev obviously believes that pursuit of military intimidation toward China has been counterproductive, and he sees a possibility of lowering the cost of defense against China without any reduction of Soviet security. He also probably thinks that the USSR can gradually develop profitable economic ties to China, and perhaps learn something in the meantime from Chinese successes and failures in marketizing their economy. Geopolitically, what Gorbachev probably hopes to achieve is to move China toward a middle course between the United States and the USSR that precludes solidification of Sino-US military ties. From his standpoint, the summit meeting with the Chinese scheduled for May 1989 should mark significant progress in one of the USSR's top-priority foreign policy areas

Japan

So far, Moscow has been unwilling to pay the price asked by Japan for better relations; it may have judged that something less than return of the disputed Northern Territories might someday be acceptable to Tokyo as the basis for discussing closer ties and encouraging greater Japanese business participation in Siberian development. The Soviets probably hope that the forward momentum of Soviet relations with the United States, Western Europe, China, and even South Korea will eventually force Japan to ease its territorial demands and be more receptive to future Soviet overtures.

[redacted]

But there is also reporting [redacted] that the Soviets were themselves planning in the fall of 1988 to launch a major initiative to overcome the stumblingblock presented by the Kurile Islands. We do know that the Soviets have informally been making increasingly flexible overtures on the Northern Territories to the Japanese. Although no breakthrough occurred during Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo in December 1988, the Soviets and Japanese did agree to establish a working group to discuss a peace treaty—which necessarily would involve the territorial issue. Mounting difficulties in advancing *perestroyka* will enhance the Soviet interest in accommodating Japanese interests—just as they have enhanced Soviet interest in dealing with West Germany. A major move toward Japan would be entirely in keeping with Gorbachev's tactical flair and geostrategic priorities, and, with his power base now more consolidated, it would be surprising if he did not try something in the not too distant future.

The Third World

Soviet policy toward the Third World up to Gorbachev's accession remained heavily mortgaged to "class war" thinking, military instrumentalities, and support

for indigent Marxist dependents or radical Middle East clients. Gorbachev has imposed a new set of priorities. It includes:

- Reasserting an effective role for the Soviet Union by operating on a more realistic, less ideological basis.
- Countering perceived present or potential future challenges to Soviet security interests.
- Fostering an international atmosphere less freighted with East-West confrontation by dampening conflicts and avoiding behavior that could seriously heighten international tensions, justify increased Western defense spending, and inhibit improved Soviet relations with the West.
- Supporting Communist allies, selectively preserving Marxist-Leninist footholds in the Third World gained under Brezhnev, and cautiously backing some revolutionary movements.
- Reducing financial outlays that have no economic or serious political return and seeking to increase economic gains.
- Mobilizing support for Soviet positions in the East-West arms negotiations

In pursuing these priorities, Moscow continues to behave in some respects in ways highly reminiscent of pre–New Thinking days. For example, Gorbachev has deliberately sought to capitalize on tensions between the United States and strategically located partners in the Third World. As conflict developed between Washington and Manuel Noriega, Moscow cautiously but persistently began to expand ties—both open and clandestine—with Panama. Shevardnadze's recent intimation in Manila that the USSR might be prepared unilaterally to vacate its base at Cam Ranh Bay is only the most recent step in a two-track campaign to cultivate the Aquino government in the hopes of strengthening opposition to the US bases and expanding the Soviet economic presence in the Philippines, while gradually developing contacts with the heretofore anti-Soviet Communist Party of the Philippines and other leftist or neutralist groups. As far as we know, however, the Soviets have not provided military assistance to any of these groups.

[redacted]

Moscow's pursuit of "national reconciliation" in regional conflicts may prove to be a cover for a gradual Soviet retreat—as it has been in Afghanistan—from support of Marxist clients unable to defeat insurgencies or cope economically and politically without exhorbitant Soviet assistance. However, while he has urged some client leaders to adopt flexible political tactics in dealing with their opposition and to seek economic aid from the West, Gorbachev's strategy on all regional conflicts except Afghanistan and perhaps Cambodia appears so far to be to promote settlements that provide for an end to insurgencies against client regimes at minimum loss of Soviet sunk investment and, if possible, to preserve Marxist-Leninist parties in effective control. This approach would seem to lie behind Soviet support for the Angola agreement, and private Soviet statements to Bloc officials indicate that maintaining the Sandinista regime in power in Nicaragua remains a top priority for Moscow in Latin America.

Gorbachev has consistently provided "socialist oriented" allies with the military aid they need to contain insurgencies, and Soviet arms transfers to these clients as a group have remained at high levels since 1985. Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World as a whole rose between 1986 and 1987 and remained at about the 1987 level in 1988. Gorbachev also continues to provide military and financial support for selected Third World revolutionary movements, while urging them to explore political options and avoid extremist actions that could disrupt progress on the USSR's East-West agenda

The USSR has publicly cautioned Libya and Syria against terrorism, introduced antiterrorist initiatives of its own in the United Nations, and participated for the first time in discussions with Western countries on

counterterrorist measures. But, during Gorbachev's tenure, the Soviets have been involved in a campaign of subversion and terror implemented by the Soviet-trained Afghan intelligence service against Afghan refugees and the civilian population of Pakistan. The USSR has also remained indirectly linked to terrorism through conventional military training and other assistance to Libya, Syria, North Korea, various "national liberation" movements, and factions of the PLO.

The evidence suggests there has been no fundamental change in "active measures" operations targeted at the Third World under Gorbachev, although an attempt is being made to harness front group activity more effectively to Soviet arms control and security objectives. Under the probable oversight of Yakovlev, the Soviets since 1985 have covertly disseminated some of the more scurrilous falsehoods of recent years aimed at deepening anti-Americanism in the Third World. Soviet disinformation efforts continue apace.

[redacted]

But major change has taken place in other aspects of Soviet Third World policy. It is indicative of his priorities that Gorbachev has visited India twice since 1985, his only travel to the Third World, and has held up Soviet-Indian ties as a model of what the USSR seeks in its relations with the non-Western world. Gorbachev's strategy for reasserting an effective Soviet role in the Third World has taken as its starting point the necessity of coming to grips politically with the actual interests of all the states the USSR wishes to influence. Thus, Moscow has begun to seek involvement with actors previously considered to be on the "wrong" side of regional conflicts—South Korea, the ASEAN countries, Arab moderates, Israel, Somalia, and even South Africa. It has pursued improved relations with other nonsocialist developing countries, including such key regional actors as Mexico, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Thailand, and Zimbabwe; such important South American new democracies as Brazil and Argentina; and such strategically located states as those of Central America and the South Pacific. Gorbachev has strongly advocated an expanded role for the United Nations and activated Soviet diplomacy in it and toward other international bodies still more dominated by the Third World

[redacted]

Figure 7. Gorbachev and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi after signing the Delhi Declaration in November 1986

Gorbachev has put a hold on costly new Third World adventures. He is reported [redacted] to have told the other Bloc leaders in 1987 that they should concentrate on rebuilding their economies before resuming their effort to "export revolution." He has made the difficult decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. He has also pressed Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, the "socialist oriented" regimes, and other clients to use Soviet aid efficiently and meet contractual obligations. He has probably given orders to explore ways to ease the rising burden of aid to non-Communist LDCs. He evidently elicited a decision in the fall of 1988 to reduce the USSR's own military presence in its Third World client states. And, while positioning the USSR rhetorically on the side of the Third World with respect to the debt issue, he has at least supported a negotiated solution and avoided the most inflammatory sort of rhetoric

Figure 8. Gorbachev presenting award to Fidel Castro, 21 November 1986.

Implications

Important facets of Gorbachev's foreign strategy reflect traditional thinking premised on the assumption of enduring East-West antagonism, while other facets reflect a more cooperative, less absolutist outlook. Gorbachev is trying to build socioeconomic foundations that will permit the USSR to act as a superpower in the 21st century—politically, economically, and militarily. In a variety of different contexts he has displayed an intent of working toward a long-term rollback of the US military presence and political influence across the globe that will, in his view, create conditions for enhanced Soviet influence. On occasion he has spoken [redacted] to Communist audiences in terms that suggest an interest in resuming a more combative stance toward the West following an extended "breathing space." This posture may or may not be feigned. The political optimism that he manifests as he seeks to mold both external and internal realities could reinforce a sense of "playing to win" in a zero-sum contest. Yet it is hard to believe that he is not aware, to some extent, that the consequences of his actions—if he is successful—could create an environment hardly conducive to revitalization of the international "class war." Indeed, the scope of changes he is promoting is so broad, and the crisis he confronts in both the USSR and Eastern Europe is so profound, that what may matter more than his intentions is where the processes he has unleashed domestically and internationally could lead.

Gorbachev's attempt to guarantee the foundations of long-term Soviet military strength through the modernization of Soviet industry will, if it succeeds, permit the USSR to compete more effectively with the West in the early 21st century in military high technology—if Moscow so wishes. But, to achieve this objective, Gorbachev is reducing the role assigned to military power in Soviet foreign policy *now*, and sacrificing some real military equities. He is undermining the mystique and heroic status of the military, opening up the discussion of security policy to civilian analysis, and moving to institutionalize electoral and legislative reforms that—if successful—will force a far more questioning juxtaposition of urgent public needs and the military budget than has ever existed before in the USSR. In the process, he is differentiating between a more authentic concept of security and mindless display of military might that provokes threat-intensifying counteraction by potential adversaries.

The substitution of New Thinking for Marxism-Leninism as the public rationale of Soviet foreign policy has strengthened Gorbachev's grip on security policy and brought him important gains with world public opinion. But he is activating a radical critique of Soviet international behavior at high levels within the Soviet foreign policy establishment by individuals who clearly do reject confrontational thinking—with far-reaching potential implications for long-term East-West relations. At the same time, by denigrating the concept of "class struggle," he is undermining Marxism-Leninism as a mechanism of political control in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, whether he cares or not.

In the past, heavyhanded Soviet diplomacy, ill-concealed support for leftist violence, and crude military intimidation eased the task of American diplomacy. Gorbachev has proscribed this behavior, and his "political offensive" aimed at contesting US policies and influence has had considerable success. He has called for denuclearization, arms reduction, and liquidation of "regional conflicts," proclaimed a commitment to the rule of law in the USSR (as he did in his UN

speech), and made pragmatic political and economic appeals to the national interests of US allies, friends, and non-Marxist states. However, this political approach reflects a bold confidence that the Soviet and East European political systems can contain the inevitable side effects of greater exposure of their populations to Western influences. The elimination of radio jamming, concessions on human rights issues, loosening of foreign travel controls, and institution of military-to-military and many other forms of dialogue with the United States and other Western countries constitute an unprecedented opening up of the Soviet Union to the outside world. This process could over time erode the traditional distrust of the West in the USSR that has provided a major prop for Soviet hegemonistic ambitions.

Gorbachev's New Thinking rhetoric about the global economy becoming a single organism requiring new mechanisms and a new international division of labor serves externally mainly as a means, at best, of pushing an agenda quite narrowly focused on overcoming various obstacles to Soviet foreign trade, and, at worst, of playing on Third World and neutralist interests in order to contest Western economic power and gain influence incommensurate with the USSR's weak position in international economic relations. But internally it serves to undercut xenophobia and ideological dogmatism, encourage Western contacts, and promote the adoption of market mechanisms and economic legality

Gorbachev's policy toward Western Europe has already produced a significant change in attitude toward the USSR on the part of the European public and even conservative political leaders. With his 7 December speech, he has further lessened an already low sense of military danger and threat of Soviet-backed political subversion, heightened West European public receptivity to Soviet overtures on security issues, and probably further eroded support for expensive and controversial NATO force modernization programs. He has had considerable success in cultivating a special security dialogue with the West Germans. A broadening of these successes will depend greatly on what sort of additional asymmetrical military reductions and "defensive" force reconfigurations prove politically feasible for him. To the extent he confirms his credibility here, he may be able—in the process of negotiating NATO-Pact arms reductions—to precipitate a highly divisive debate in Western Europe and NATO over US–West European ties and the purpose of the Atlantic Alliance.

But, to achieve a fundamental weakening of US power in Europe and reduce the possibility of serious West European defense cooperation, Gorbachev may have concluded that the USSR must ultimately remove the shadow of intimidation cast on Western Europe by Soviet military power forward based in Eastern Europe. Withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the western USSR of even the forces he promised to remove in his 7 December speech will have a profound effect on the Warsaw Pact's ability to conduct offensive operations against NATO. It will rule out the possibility— in the eyes of Soviet military planners—of managing even a limited short-warning attack successfully in Central Europe, increase the time that would be required to prepare and bring forward the forces needed to wage offensive war against NATO, and extend Western warning time. Gorbachev's troop reduction plan has already encouraged the East Europeans to pursue more vigorously a longstanding interest in paring back their own defense burden. A combination of intensifying economic pressures at home, rising concerns about the West's future military potential, perception of large exploitable rifts in the Atlantic Alliance, and, conceivably, determination not to use Soviet military power to suppress East European political liberalization could lead Gorbachev to challenge NATO by turning decisively toward negotiated but attractively asymmetrical force reductions. Such reductions would have momentous implications for the post–World War II security order in Europe, for traditional Soviet hopes of using Eastern Europe as a platform from which to influence Western Europe, and for East European autonomy

In Eastern Europe, none of Gorbachev's options are good. His current strategy attempts to reinforce Bloc cohesion in foreign policy, strengthen the capacity of East European regimes to cope with their own economic and social problems, and improve the cost/benefit ratio in economic relations between Eastern

Europe and the USSR. Gorbachev realizes that some degree of reform is a sine qua non for improving the economic performance and political stability of East European regimes, and that without such change the Soviet Union will continue to be stuck in the position of having either to guarantee regime maintenance or lose socialist allies. Gradual economic improvement, avoidance of revolutionary upheavals, and preservation of something like present Warsaw Pact arrangements is the best that Gorbachev can hope for from this strategy. His gamble on controlled liberalization as the price of structural modernization could blow up in his face at any moment, damaging *perestroyka* in the USSR and probably hardening East-West confrontation once again.

In the meantime, however, Gorbachev appears to be moving in the direction of defining Soviet "security" interests more narrowly in Eastern Europe. He seems to be counting less on military power as the guarantor of Soviet interests and more on East European dependency on Soviet raw materials and markets. He is tolerating a substantial decay of traditional Communist party control over political communication and the articulation of political demands in a number of Bloc countries. The degree of internal autonomy and systemic variation he reportedly is prepared to accept already represents a significant modification of the Brezhnev Doctrine, and even the limited political reform he urges on the East European leaders will probably generate rising pressures from below for genuine power sharing. Barring an orthodox counterrevolution, developments could lead to substantial further decomposition of Communist rule and weakening of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, with greater political freedom and independence in the region but a status that still falls short of unconstrained multiparty democracy or neutrality

The salience of zero-sum attitudes remains relatively high in the Soviet approach to the Third World. Under Gorbachev, Soviet diplomacy is more active than it was before 1985. It is reaching out more to compete for the attention of US allies and friends. It is armed with a far more appealing propaganda line that, on the whole, is more closely calibrated to the economic, political and psychological needs of Third World elites. By focusing less on support of radical movements, it is likely to be more effective in nurturing local opposition to political alignment with the United States and continued US retention of military facilities and conduct of power-projection activities. But Gorbachev's approach means, at the very least, a more cautious Soviet attitude toward assistance to revolutionary violence. It may, in time, build pressure on intransigent forces in the Third World to seek negotiated solutions to their demands. If continued, it will weaken the position of elements in the Soviet party-propaganda-academic nexus who have constituted a bastion of resistance to accommodation with the West. And in dwelling on "the compelling necessity of the principle of freedom of choice" in the Third World and condemning denial of that right "no matter what the pretext," as Gorbachev did in his UN speech, it legitimizes a standard easily applicable to Communist-ruled countries and to the Soviet multinational empire itself

Whatever Gorbachev's ultimate intentions may be, he is thus setting processes in motion that could lead toward a "normalization" of Soviet foreign policy and lessen East-West tensions in very important ways. At this point change is by no means "irreversible"; like other great shifts in the past, such as Lenin's New Economic Policy or the Popular Front of the 1930s, the Gorbachev revolution may be halted—by Gorbachev himself or, more likely, by a successor regime. But the longer *perestroyka* continues, the greater the prospects will be for truly fundamental change occurring in Soviet relations with the West

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Appendix A

Excerpts From Shevardnadze's Speech to the July 1988 MFA Conference

The Need for Political Control of Military Aspects of Foreign Policy

One of the worst phenomena from the period of stagnation and one which told negatively on our international positions was the then assumed separation between the military and political areas. Defense is the chief priority of a state. This is too serious to allow superficial views on how one can securely protect the people or give firm and correct guarantees for protecting the life and peaceful labor of the Soviet people. . . .

From the decision of the 19th Party Conference on establishing a constitutionally empowered mechanism there follows the necessity of introducing a legislative procedure whereby all the agencies engaged in military and military-industrial activities would be supervised by a superior body elected by all the people. This would concern both questions of the use of military force beyond the nation's national boundaries, the plans for defense development and the openness of defense budgets as concerns the problem of national security. . . .

Power in the Contemporary Age

The lamentable experience of the years of stagnation, when we overlooked the technological gap that sorely changed the balance of forces in the world, has caused diplomacy to take a more sober look at the present and future. . . .

History has repeatedly demonstrated the failure of systems that are closed to an influx of fresh ideas. Under conditions in which, for the leading powers, a transition from industrial-technological societies to scientific-information ones is becoming a given, the fettering of the intellect by dogmas and prohibitions ends up in the falling behind of that state. . . .

Ability and not numbers, the wagering on quality and not solely on quantity, universal development and a high level of scientific and technological infrastructure and not the "gross" of weapons and troop contingents—this is what guarantees the secure defense of the nation and its security. Without putting the mechanisms of *perestroyka* to work, it is difficult to speak about ensuring the peace and security of the nation. . . .

The Need for Realism and an Improved International Image

There is a greater need to set up a more precise and better coordinated mechanism for elaborating realistic and comprehensive assessments of the threats to our national security and a mechanism free of any outside volitional pressures. . . .

[We need] revision of a whole series of definitions that overburden our foreign policy and diplomacy with primitively ideologized approaches. . . .

That "image of the enemy" that we are now spending such an effort to destroy came into being contrary to the real image of the Soviet people. . . . Belief in its creative peacefulness was undermined by the repressions, statements such as "we will bury you," by incorrect steps against friends and by preaching during the period of detente of the erroneous and, I would say, anti-Leninist thesis of peaceful coexistence as a specific form of the class struggle. . . .

The workers of the MFA do not claim the exclusive right to know literally everything. However, they should know literally everything relating to the sphere of their competence. The fundamental innovations in the area of defense development should be tested out at the MFA for their legal conformity to current international agreements and stated political positions. . . .

Comrades, we must not pretend that the standards and ideas of the proper or of what is termed civilized conduct in the world community do not concern us. If you wish to be accepted in it, these must be observed. . . .

The Counterproductiveness of Force and Intimidation

Over the more than 40 years that have passed since World War II, there has been no shortage of so-called little wars. However, none of these has given the side employing force any permanent political or other results. On the contrary, all of them and each individually complicated those problems over which the conflicts arose as well as created new ones. If the map of the world has changed it is only in minor details. And these changes have gained neither political nor legal reinforcement. In all these instances, the existence of nuclear weapons and even the control of them by one or another belligerent have not influenced the situation. . . .

War and armed conflicts in the nuclear space age objectively are losing the functions of instruments of rational policy. Only in very rare instances do such threats lead to any changes in the conduct of a state against whom a threat is applied. . . .

The habit established in the 1950s of "door slamming" was summoned up again in the behavior stereotype at the beginning of the 1980s when walking out of the Geneva talks accelerated and facilitated the establishing of a second strategic front in Europe against us. . . .

The Economic Costs of Bad Foreign and Defense Policies

Let us consider. . . the economic price of political decisions, that is to say, the economic profitability of foreign policy. Here each step has its price, in either adding something or subtracting something from the budget of national well-being. And at times it is too great a subtraction. The rough, rash tossing of weights onto the political scales sharply deflects the arrow toward a minus. . . .

The notion established in the minds and actions of various strategists that the Soviet Union can be as strong as any possible coalition of states opposing it is absolutely fallacious. To follow this means to act outrightly contrary to national interests. . . .

What were we doing in continuing over the last 15 years to achieve a "chemical rampart"? This cost colossal amounts of money. It diverted large production capacity, manpower and resources. Who had estimated what such activity would cost? And now, in order to destroy the chemical arsenals, we must make new expenditures and build the corresponding facilities for this. Finally, what impression have we established of ourselves and our intentions in continuing to stockpile weapons that can only be described as the most barbaric? Great damage has been caused to the nation's reputation and its image. To a person who would say that this was brought about by concern for national security, we could reply that this is the most primitive and distorted notion of what strengthens and weakens the nation. . . .

We have agreed that war cannot be a rational means of policy. But can the arms race be such a means? As paradoxical as it may seem, it can. Yes, the arms race can exhaust and bleed white the enemy, in truth, at a price of undermining one's own economic and social base. This conclusion is so obvious that in skirting it or taking it up, so to speak, only tangentially, we in no way aid in strengthening our security. . . .

Are we drawing lessons for ourselves and do we realize what the missed opportunities cost on the question of limiting and reducing weapons? What are the losses from futile talks? . . .

Appendix B

Recent Related Studies Produced by the Directorate of Intelligence