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Defense Decisionmaking in the USSR: Looking for Legislative Oversight

A Research Paper

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Defense Decisionmaking in the USSR: Looking for Legislative Oversight

A Research Paper

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August 1990

Defense Decisionmaking in the USSR: Looking for Legislative Oversight

Summary

*Information available
as of 17 August 1990
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The Defense and State Security Committee (DSSC) in the Supreme Soviet, responsible for overseeing a broad range of defense issues, is looking to model many of its activities after US Congressional committees. In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in July 1989, former Chief of the General Staff Sergey Akhromeyev claimed that the DSSC will scrutinize the Soviet defense budget "with as much detail as you do here." Since then, the DSSC has developed close contacts with the HASC, and DSSC members have pressed US officials for advice on how they can gain authority over the Soviet defense establishment.

Divided into three subcommittees, the DSSC is charged with reviewing and approving the defense budget, monitoring the KGB, and overseeing defense industry activities, including conversion. In pursuing these activities, the committee has the authority to hold hearings, request reports, review treaties, approve high-level ministerial appointments, conduct special investigations, and propose relevant legislation.

Despite its broad charter, the DSSC has yet to establish itself as a major player in shaping Soviet defense policy. It has exerted some influence, however, by exposing defense initiatives to scrutiny and by mobilizing public opinion. For example, the DSSC and the Supreme Soviet have already established themselves at the forefront of the growing environmental movement in the USSR and have forced the military to be more accountable to the public for its actions in this realm. During the past year, in an effort to address local environmental and health concerns, the military suspended construction of a large phased-array radar (LPA) near Mukachevo and proposed closing the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range by 1993. By holding public hearings and allowing nongovernmental officials to testify, the committee provides a voice for those who have been shut out of defense policy debates and offers a forum for other agencies, civilian analysts, and public groups to push their own agendas.

The committee—and the full Supreme Soviet—has not demonstrated the power to impose policy over the objections of the executive branch. Although the DSSC—on paper—has the legal authority to mandate changes in legislation, it has not issued directives and has instead only presented suggested changes to proposed legislation, including to the 1990 defense budget. In addition, the committee apparently lacks the crucial line-item authority to reorder budget priorities—one of the primary tools

US Congressional committees have for acting on defense legislation. The committee is also hindered by structural problems such as the lack of staff and administrative support. Unlike their US counterparts, who have large personal and committee staffs, DSSC members have little or no personal staff support, and the committee itself has only six staff members, three of whom are retired generals. The DSSC has also been limited by the short amount of time allotted to review the defense budget and by the absence of the many research organizations that provide valuable data and analysis to the US Congress, such as the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service.

The real test of the DSSC's ability to place its stamp on the military establishment should come during the fall session, when it considers two competing proposals for a new Law on Defense—one drafted by a special commission established by a DSSC subcommittee and the other by the Defense Ministry. This law will be the primary vehicle for instituting fundamental reforms in the military. The subcommittee draft calls for dramatic changes such as moving to a smaller all-volunteer army, appointing a civilian defense minister, and reorganizing the political elements in the military. Also on the committee's fall agenda will be consideration of the 1991 defense budget and laws governing the KGB and the defense-industrial conversion program.

Over the long term, the DSSC's authority should increase if its staff size grows and its members serve long enough to gain experience and expertise in defense issues. In late May 1990, committee chairman Vladimir Lapygin, who had been roundly criticized for weak leadership, resigned and was replaced by Leonid Sharin, who may push the DSSC to be more aggressive. Already, Sharin has hinted that the DSSC will establish additional subcommittees to handle the vast array of issues facing the committee. A number of committee members would welcome a more assertive posture. While over half of the 42 DSSC members have close ties to the national security apparatus, the committee is not a tool of the military-industrial complex. A number of members, particularly the DSSC's younger generation, have played a major role in pushing for fundamental military reform.

More generally, the committee is likely to benefit from Gorbachev's efforts to shift power away from the party and toward state structures. As party organizations continue to decay, the DSSC is well positioned to fill the growing power vacuum at the center. Thus, the transformation of the USSR into a state "governed by laws" works to the committee's advantage, and, given time and sufficient resources, the DSSC—along with the entire Supreme Soviet—could develop into a powerful check on the President.

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
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Scope Note

This paper describes the functions of the Supreme Soviet's Defense and State Security Committee and assesses its ability to influence Soviet defense policy. For a discussion of the activities and responsibilities of the full Supreme Soviet, see DI Intelligence Assessment SOV 90-10042X (Secret []), July 1990, *The Supreme Soviet: Will it Be Supreme?*

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Figure 1
USSR: Supreme Soviet



Defense Decisionmaking in the USSR: Looking for Legislative Oversight

Background

Gorbachev's attempts to move the locus of power in the USSR from party to state organizations began in earnest in 1989, when he engineered the establishment of a new legislative body, the 2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies (CPD). Two-thirds of its members are popularly elected, while one-third are drawn from public organizations such as the CPSU. From its ranks, the CPD elected a bicameral legislature, the USSR Supreme Soviet, composed of 542 members. Elected in May 1989, the Supreme Soviet became the first standing parliament in Soviet history. It meets twice a year, in the spring and in the fall, and each session lasts three to four months. In contrast with its rubberstamp predecessor, which met twice a year for three days, the Supreme Soviet has already exercised its powers to pass laws and scrutinize government decisions.

There are 16 joint standing committees and eight commissions in the Supreme Soviet that cover issues ranging from agriculture to health. The membership of each committee is equally split between members of the Congress of People's Deputies that belong to the Supreme Soviet and deputies that do not. The Supreme Soviet organization responsible for overseeing defense and intelligence issues is the Defense and State Security Committee (DSSC).

The DSSC at a Glance

The DSSC is composed of 42 members, a majority of whom work in either military, state security, or defense industry organizations. The original committee chairman was Vladimir Lapygin, a career defense industrialist who helped design ICBM guidance systems and who worked on the Buran space shuttle program. Lapygin resigned in late May 1990 and was replaced by DSSC member Leonid Sharin. Unlike Lapygin, party official Sharin has no known managerial ties to the defense-industrial complex, but he does

have ties to some military officials. [however, Sharin is politically shrewd and should be a far stronger committee leader

The DSSC is divided into three subcommittees: Armed Forces, Defense Industry, and State Security. The Armed Forces Subcommittee is headed by Yevgeniy Velikhov, Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who is particularly interested in arms control, verification, and SDI. The chief of the Defense Industry Subcommittee is aircraft designer Mikhail Simonov of the Sukhoy Design Bureau. Grigoriy Kharchenko, first secretary of the Zaporozhye Obkom (oblast committee), is the chairman of the State Security Subcommittee. Two committee members serve as secretaries: Sergey Tsyplyayev, an organizing official at a state optical institute, is responsible for legislative and foreign affairs, and Vitaliy Biryukov, a former fitter in a metallurgical plant, is responsible for committee correspondence.

While members of the national security apparatus are well represented on the committee, the DSSC is not a tool of the military-industrial complex (see appendix B for a list of committee members). A number of members—particularly the DSSC's younger generation—support fundamental military reforms (see inset)

The United States as a Model: Pursuing Contacts With the US Congress

Since the DSSC's inception, it has aggressively sought contact and exchanges with the US Congress—particularly with the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). Members of the HASC visited the Soviet Union in August 1989 as guests of the DSSC and

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*The DSSC's Younger Generation: Providing
a Different Perspective*

Although many DSSC members have backgrounds in the military or in the defense-industrial sector, not all are unquestioningly sympathetic to the military's views. In particular, a number of younger military officers and civilians have advocated policies that reflect the independent nature of the DSSC. Although it would be an oversimplification to claim that younger deputies support reform while the older generation resists it, there are discernable differences in their approaches to problem solving that can be traced to the unique outlook each generation brings to the committee.

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were peppered with questions by committee members on how the DSSC should structure itself to influence Soviet defense budgets and plans. During February 1990, 10 members of the DSSC paid a reciprocal visit to the United States and continued to probe US officials for information on how the US defense budget is formulated and for advice on how to obtain the necessary budget data from a sometimes reluctant military bureaucracy. At the conclusion of their visit,

DSSC members offered a number of proposals to expand exchanges with the HASC in the future. Proposals included organizing trips and meeting the leaders of their respective defense industries to study conversion, jointly formulating a methodology to compare military budgets, and exchanging the texts of bills each committee adopts.

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functions in the DSSC. In addition, because the DSSC is responsible for overseeing KGB activities, it performs duties that in the United States are carried out by two select committees on intelligence. The committee is also reportedly responsible for approving the budgets of six defense-industrial ministries and for monitoring the conversion effort now under way in the defense sector (see inset, page 5). Another Soviet national-security-related committee is the International Affairs Committee, whose duties—overseeing the conduct of foreign policy, reviewing treaties, and approving ambassadorial appointments and foreign aid budgets—mirror those of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The Effective Power of the DSSC

On *paper*, the committee has many of the same legal responsibilities and powers possessed by US Congressional committees. The DSSC is expected to:

- Review and approve the defense and KGB budgets.
- Oversee defense programs and defense-industrial conversion.
- Hold hearings and request reports.
- Review treaties both during negotiations and in ratification.
- Approve high-level ministerial appointments.
- Conduct special studies and investigations.
- Propose relevant legislation, which must then be approved by the full Supreme Soviet.

During the committee's first three sessions, it performed some of these duties, but it did not dwell at length on any issue. For example, the DSSC performed a cursory review of the budgets for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the KGB and attempted to monitor defense-industrial conversion. The committee also approved the appointments of Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov and KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov.

Committee Structures Compared

The DSSC has primary responsibility for defense and intelligence matters and combines the major functions of at least six US Congressional committees. In contrast with the US system, in which two committees authorize and a different two committees appropriate funds for defense, the Supreme Soviet combines both

The committee's real power depends upon its ability to influence the content of policy and, in the extreme, to impose the will of the Supreme Soviet on the executive branch. The DSSC's inexperience as well as its structural problems—including the lack of staff

Figure 2. Soviet DSSC members meeting with members of US Congress in February 1990

and administrative support—have impeded the development of legislative tools and political clout. Because the Supreme Soviet has yet to vote against Gorbachev's policy preferences and thus prompt a veto, the full constitutional power of the Supreme Soviet—and hence the DSSC—remains untested. Nevertheless, if the Supreme Soviet is faced with a veto and succeeds in mustering the two-thirds vote necessary to override it, Gorbachev could not ignore the legislature without provoking a constitutional crisis and making a mockery of his professed desire to turn the USSR into a rule-of-law state

The Defense and State Security Committee in Action: How Effective?

Defense Budget Review for 1990

During the fall 1989 session the DSSC reviewed the defense budget plan for 1990 submitted by the Council of Ministers. The budget called for an 8-percent reduction from the 1989 level of 77.3 billion rubles¹

¹ The Intelligence Community estimates that Soviet defense spending for 1989 was actually about double this figure, ranging between 130 and 160 billion rubles. See DI Research Paper SOV 90-10026, (Confidential) June 1990, *Defense in the 1989 Soviet State Budget: Still Not Credible*.

down to 70.9 billion rubles. Budget hearings began with a report by Defense Minister Yazov on the international military/political situation and the status of the Soviet military. Yazov was followed by Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev, and in subsequent sessions committee members heard from specialists representing the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), and the Ministries of Finance and Defense. Most hearings were closed, and, for the most part, no stenographic notes were taken. Some hearings were held in makeshift rooms at the Moskva Hotel while others, which dealt with more sensitive subjects, were held in the General Staff Headquarters. In contrast with the International Affairs Committee, which has published some committee proceedings, DSSC hearings have not been published

The quality of the testimony varied, and some officials, particularly Defense Minister Yazov, were reluctant to share information. Some committee members complained that Yazov's report was inadequate; they said it was not specific, contained no comparative

**Comparison of US and Soviet Committees That
Oversee Defense and Intelligence Issues**

US Congress *

Senate Armed Services Committee

Subcommittees:

*Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense
Defense Industry and Technology
Manpower and Personnel
Projection Forces and Regional Defense
Readiness, Sustainability, and Support
Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence*

House Armed Services Committee

Subcommittees:

*Investigations
Military Installations and Facilities
Military Personnel and Compensation
Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems
Research and Development
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials*

Senate Appropriations Committee

Subcommittees:

*Defense
Military Construction*

House Appropriations Committee

Subcommittees:

*Defense
Military Construction*

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

No Subcommittees

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Subcommittees:

*Legislation
Oversight and Evaluation
Program and Budget Authorization*

* The "Defense Management Review" issued by the US Secretary of Defense in 1989 noted that a total of 30 Congressional committees and 77 subcommittees conduct some form of oversight of defense issues.

figures, and that some formulations were not backed up by figures. DSSC members also complained that, while the 1990 defense plan called for specific percentage cuts in tank, aircraft, and ammunition production, it did not give the actual figures from which these cuts were to be made. Throughout its hearings, the DSSC was plagued by its inability to acquire relevant defense information.

His colleagues would provide the DSSC with only a broad outline of military procurement programs. The full Supreme Soviet has had similar problems obtaining information data on the entire 1990 budget provided to the legislature took only six pages, compared with the thousands of pages of budgetary information provided to the US Congress.

Committee members took particular interest in the welfare of servicemen, noting that "the poverty line runs close" to those in the military. Former chairman Lapygin said that providing for the needs of soldiers was the DSSC's "number-one problem." To demonstrate its concern, the committee demanded additional information on the provision of housing and social facilities for servicemen.

Lapygin claimed that debates on the budget were often heated and emotional.

During some sessions, open arguments erupted among MOD, Gosplan, and Finance Ministry representatives and that committee members watched in stunned fascination. Some members exercised their authority by proposing to restructure portions of the armed forces. Meanwhile, various members called for trimming the "bloated" military staff structure, while others wanted to reorganize the system of placing political officers in the military. These suggestions, however, did not meet with widespread support and were not adopted.

In the end, the committee approved the defense budget that was submitted. But, while it did not cut the budget beyond the 6.4 billion rubles already announced, it did back up its concern for the welfare of servicemen by endorsing a shift of 1.2 billion rubles from other spending categories to increase the salaries

of officers, ensigns, and warrant officers. The additional funds are also to pay for housing and other amenities for servicemen. Although some DSSC members have touted this shift as an example of the committee's influence on the defense budget, the actual proposal to reallocate funds came from the MOD the committee "backed an MOD proposal to use around 1 billion rubles to improve the material and living conditions of servicemen and their families."

Committee members claimed that, to finance this increase, funds were reallocated from procurement, research and development (R&D), and operations and maintenance (O&M). The final budget, however, did not fully reflect the changes the committee claims to have made. In fact, funds for O&M and personnel increased over the original plan by just 300 million rubles, while R&D spending did not change at all, and procurement spending fell by only a small amount. Further, some DSSC members claimed that the committee increased funds for pensions, but the amount allocated for pensions showed no change. Subsequent statements on the monthly salary increases planned for officers and other personnel indicate that additional funds have been allocated for servicemen, but this increase was most likely drawn from other maintenance accounts within the O&M and personnel category and from cuts in construction—not, as claimed, from additional cuts in procurement and R&D.

Monitoring Defense-Industrial Conversion

Following the defense budget review, the DSSC turned to the issue of conversion, and at least one hearing on this topic was held in an open forum. Gosplan First Deputy Chairman Smyslov appeared before the DSSC to explain that the conversion program "will involve, in various degrees, nearly 400 enterprises." Armed Forces Subcommittee chairman Velikhov supported protests by aircraft manufacturers that have been tasked to produce consumer items and argued against sacrificing hard-won technical advances. Instead, he called for conversion to be centered in areas where advanced technological potential had already been created. He argued that the USSR

should not try to do everything itself, but rather should focus on selling competitive goods abroad and buying consumer goods with the earnings. Other DSSC members supported Velikhov's views, and the committee probably will use any influence it has to steer conversion efforts in this direction.

in addition to conversion, the committee would review and approve the budgets of the six defense-industrial ministries but noted that, in dealing with defense production, the DSSC had met with resistance from the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission. In what may be a dispute over committee jurisdiction, a number of comrades from this commission do not understand the role of the defense industry and questions of conversion, or how to implement it." He pointed to "sharp discussions ahead." It remains unclear, however, whether the DSSC has the authority to approve the budgets of the defense-industrial ministries.

Oversight of the KGB

The KGB has been more adept than the military in adjusting to legislative oversight, and it probably views it as an opportunity to justify and legitimize its domestic and foreign operations. Unlike Defense Minister Yazov, KGB Chairman Kryuchkov took a different tack in his dealings with the DSSC by being more forthcoming and willing to share information. He used his confirmation hearing before the committee to continue his ongoing public relations effort to restore the tarnished image of the KGB by emphasizing its role in fighting crime, terrorism, and narcotics. Members of the State Security Subcommittee were told they could ask questions on any topic, and they would receive answers. Some members asserted that they would have full oversight powers similar to those possessed by the US House and Senate Intelligence Committees, and citing US practice, they voted to keep the KGB budget secret. Despite the promises made by the KGB, it is doubtful DSSC members will be privy to the type of information on covert action programs and other sensitive issues that is routinely shared with US intelligence committees

Factors Hampering Performance

Staffing and Administrative Problems

Although committee members have moved aggressively to assert the authority and power of the DSSC, a number of obstacles that limit its effectiveness surfaced in the initial committee hearings. These obstacles must be surmounted before the committee can perform a more thorough review of national security programs. Chief among the problems is the lack of staff support and expertise.

The DSSC has only six staff experts—three of whom are retired generals with ties to the MOD. In addition, a number of civilian institutes, including the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada (IUSAC), reportedly are providing informal staff support to the committee. Subcommittees have no staffs of their own. Reliance on retired generals, while probably necessary in the short run, could reduce the committee's independence and effectiveness if these staffers are not replaced—and their numbers increased—with experts loyal to the committee rather than to the MOD. Future prospects for staffing remain unclear because DSSC members differ on the eventual staff requirements for the committee: some want the staff to remain small, while others believe a larger staff is necessary to bolster the DSSC's influence. In any case, several members have made it clear that they do not intend to replicate the large staffs found on US Congressional committees.

Administrative support and office space are also in short supply. At present, many members live and work out of rented rooms in the Moskva Hotel. Eventually each Supreme Soviet member is to receive his/her own office in Moscow. Currently, only committee chairmen have private offices. Moreover, although members are expected to be provided with one aide and a secretary, few now have any help. In addition, unlike the US Congress, which controls its own budget for physical plant and staff salaries, the Supreme Soviet depends on the Council of Ministers

for its budget allocations. [the Council of Ministers is not interested in increasing funding for Supreme Soviet needs. Legislation to give the Supreme Soviet greater authority over its own budget is pending, however, and may be considered in the fall 1990 session.

Finally, unlike US representatives and senators, who—for the most part—take leave from their professions while in office, few Supreme Soviet members have given up their outside jobs. For those Supreme Soviet members from outside of Moscow, obtaining time off from work is difficult, and many are often absent from plenary sessions. Free housing is supplied to those from outside of Moscow, but, because these Supreme Soviet members are not exempt from Moscow's strict consumer residency requirements, they reportedly cannot purchase essential goods and supplies. In addition, many members are reluctant to give up their outside careers because they are uncertain about the future of the Supreme Soviet and about how long they will want to—or be allowed to—remain in the legislature.

Limited Research and Analytical Support

In addition to weak staff and administrative support, the committee lacks the many institutions and organizations—such as the Congressional Budget Office—that provide valuable information and analysis to the US Congress (see table 1). These resources strengthen the hand of Congress in dealing with the executive branch, enabling representatives to challenge the administration's monopoly on information and providing authoritative data that are crucial in budgetary debates. Furthermore, Congress has at its disposal investigative resources—particularly the General Accounting Office—that enhance its powers to oversee the implementation of legislation. These organizations also help point out deficiencies in programs and assist in drafting remedial legislation. Armed with such information and investigative resources, Congressional authority is elevated, making it more of an equal partner with the executive branch.

Aware of the importance of such institutions, the Supreme Soviet announced in February 1990 the creation of a research center called the Analysis and Forecasts Center, which will be under the direction of

diplomat and scholar Vladimir Lukin. The goal of the center, according to Lukin, is to become a "reliable research service of the Soviet parliament similar to the US Congressional Research Service." Unlike CRS, however, which has several hundred full-time research analysts, the Soviet center has only a handful of researchers, a factor that will limit its capabilities. Moreover, Lukin was recently appointed chairman of the International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and he may have left the center. The center [] is expected to perform polls and assist the Supreme Soviet with hearings. To date, however, it has accomplished little.

More Intractable Problems

While the shortage of staff and information can be eased in time, a number of structural and institutional factors will continue to impede the DSSC.

Recommendations Versus Directives. Although the committee has the legal authority to mandate changes to legislation, it has not sought to unilaterally impose its preferences on the defense budget, and thus its actual ability to do so remains unclear. Because of a lack of will or a lack of information, the DSSC has not issued directives and instead has only presented to the MOD suggestions, which subsequently were not included in the 1990 defense budget. Unlike US Congressional decisions, which are often written into the authorizing legislation, the DSSC failed to mandate any changes to defense programs and merely went along with the changes proposed by the MOD.

No Line-Item Authority. Another key legal hurdle the DSSC will have to overcome if it is to exercise significant power is its apparent lack of the crucial line-item authority needed to reorder budget priorities. During the DSSC's 1990 defense budget review, no specific weapons programs were singled out for change beyond those included in the original budget. One of the key tools US Congressional committees have for acting on the defense budget is their ability not only to change the overall budget total but also to increase or decrease funding and production requests

Table 1
Support and Staffing for the US Congress
and the Supreme Soviet

	US Congress	Supreme Soviet
Staff support	Over 20,000 staffers for committees and 535 members.	All 542 members are to have one aide and one secretary. To date, few have any help.
Staffing of defense-related committees	Over 100 professional staffers—most with high-level clearances.	DSSC reportedly has six experts—three are retired generals. Academy of Sciences institutes provide informal help.
Physical plant	Capitol Building, six large office buildings, and a few annexes. Each member has his/her own office as well as offices in home districts. Congress controls its own budget.	Meets in Supreme Soviet building. No permanent offices yet—many live and work out of rooms at the Moskva Hotel (DSSC hearings held there as well). Council of Ministers controls budget. Legislation is planned to address staff, physical plant, and budgetary needs.
Source of budgetary data and economic analysis	Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (staff of 200).	Must rely on Gosplan and other government agencies.
Research and information	Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS) (staff of 850), CBO, and General Accounting Office (GAO).	Counterpart to CRS created, but it presently has only a few staffers. Small size could limit capabilities. Exchange program with CRS may improve the situation.
Scientific and technical data	Office of Technology Assessment (staff of 140).	Must rely on government.
Watchdog agency to perform investigations and oversee programs	GAO (staff of 5,000).	None.
Interest groups	Hundreds provide information on many different topics.	Some institutes are providing information and analysis.



for particular weapons or programs. During their review of the fiscal year 1990 defense authorization bill, for example, the US House and Senate Armed Services Committees reduced proposed purchases of several weapons, including the B-2 bomber and C-17 cargo aircraft, while adding funds to purchase additional F-14D Navy fighters and allocating money for the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft the administration had proposed canceling. Nevertheless, the US armed services committees gained line-item authority only 30 years ago, and, in time, the DSSC could acquire this power as well.

Too Little Time To Review the Budget. A problem limiting the committee's effectiveness so far has been the short amount of time allotted to review the budget. According to press reports, the DSSC's review of the 1990 defense budget lasted three to four weeks and was followed by several weeks of review on

defense-industrial conversion and the KGB budget. In contrast, the US defense budget authorization process lasts almost all year (see figure 3). Faced with only a few weeks to review the budget, the DSSC could not possibly conduct a thorough review and develop recommendations. By compressing the process of holding hearings, reviewing budget proposals, questioning priorities, and working out compromises into such a short period, the budget escaped close scrutiny. Unless more time is allocated, or unless the DSSC can influence the MOD budget drafting process, the Defense Ministry will continue to hold the high cards in future budget debates.

Subcommittee Charters Are Too Broad. Because the jurisdictions of the three subcommittees are so broad, thorough reviews of the budget are almost impossible. In the United States, much of the in-depth review of

Figure 3
Schedules for Soviet and US Legislative Defense Budget Review



*This stage includes additional House and Senate floor debates.

budget submissions is done in subcommittee; 12 subcommittees, for example, have jurisdiction over various slices of the defense authorization budget. The DSSC, in contrast, has one subcommittee—the Armed Forces Subcommittee—charged with covering the entire budget. While the large number of US subcommittees inevitably leads to duplicative efforts, it does ensure that the budget receives a close scrubbing, and it offers Congress many opportunities both

to make its feelings known and to offer amendments. One subcommittee cannot cover the full range of military issues—including strategic and conventional force requirements, research and development plans, and personnel issues—and monitor all five services in any detail

Another glaring difference is the way the US and Soviet legislatures deal with intelligence issues, which in the United States are handled by two committees and three subcommittees and in the USSR by one subcommittee. Moreover, because the KGB performs a number of different tasks in addition to gathering foreign intelligence, such as guarding the borders and maintaining internal security, the one subcommittee will be even further taxed. The Law and Order Committee, however, which also has jurisdiction over the KGB's internal activities, could help ease the burden on the intelligence subcommittee. In addition, recent information indicates that the Supreme Soviet is seriously considering establishing a full committee to monitor the KGB.

Turnover in the Supreme Soviet. Another institutional hindrance to the DSSC is the requirement that up to 20 percent of the members of the Supreme Soviet be replaced every year. The first rotation is scheduled to take place before the end of the year and could lead to the introduction of eight or nine new DSSC members. If fully implemented, such turnover would make it harder for DSSC members to develop the expertise on defense issues that is essential if they are to successfully challenge MOD prerogatives. The institutional memory the US Congress has developed over the years—some members spend decades serving on defense-related committees—has added to its ability to influence defense issues. It is possible, however, that the Supreme Soviet will ease this restriction in the near future. The only similar constraint on tenure in the US Congress is the eight-year limitation for membership on either of the intelligence committees.

The 1990 Agenda

The 1990 session is only half completed, and already the DSSC has tackled many sensitive issues. During the spring session, which began in February and ended in mid-June, the DSSC reviewed the long-awaited conversion plan, considered measures for regulating the MVD and KGB, held hearings on ending nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk, and reviewed the plans of the Strategic Rocket and Air Defense Forces. The agenda for the fall session, scheduled to

begin in September, promises to be even more ambitious. The DSSC will present a Law on Defense—an omnibus piece of legislation introducing fundamental reforms in the military—to the full Supreme Soviet. In addition, the committee will consider the defense plan and budget for 1991—paying close attention to the housing needs of soldiers returning from Eastern Europe—and should complete action on legislation governing the MVD and KGB

Review Conversion Plan

Although committee members have claimed that the DSSC will play a vital role in the conversion program, a series of recent reports suggests that it will be no more than a minor player in the effort to shift resources from defense to the civil sector. In March 1990, Moscow announced that the long-awaited plan for converting defense production during 1990-95 had been forwarded to the Council of Ministers. The plan was drafted by Gosplan, the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), and the Ministry of Defense. According to [

] the DSSC played no meaningful role in the plan's formulation.

Shortly after the plan was unveiled, the DSSC received a report from Gosplan deputy chairman Smyslov, who reiterated previous statements that the conversion program will involve nearly 400 enterprises. He added, however, that 40 billion rubles will be needed to reconfigure defense plants and build new facilities for civilian production. The plan calls for a reduction in the output of tanks, strategic missiles, military aircraft, infantry combat vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, and "other hardware"—items most affected by the START and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. During the hearing, DSSC members called for increased exports of high-tech equipment, particularly civil aircraft. Independent of DSSC actions, the Council of Ministers has withdrawn the plan and is now reworking some of its provisions. A new draft of the conversion plan reportedly will be submitted to the committee in the fall session. The DSSC will continue to monitor the progress of defense-industrial conversion, but it is

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not being consulted about revisions to the plan, and it is doubtful it will have much leeway to make significant changes to the plan once it is completed

Clarify Powers of the Security Services

The DSSC is also in the process of reviewing bills to establish guidelines for the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). In February the DSSC and the Legislation and Legality Committee considered a draft decree on the "Rights and Duties of Internal Security Troops in Protecting Public Order." The decree was drafted by the Council of Ministers in response to the brutal suppression of protesters by the military in Tbilisi in April 1989, in which 20 people were killed and hundreds were wounded. In an effort to avoid such tragedies in the future, the draft law clarifies the MVD's authority to use force and provides stricter guidelines governing methods to restore order. In addition, during the hearings the DSSC agreed to a proposal to man five MVD units on a volunteer basis during 1990-91, and several officials have claimed that, in time, all MVD troops may be volunteer.

This year the DSSC is also formulating a new law governing KGB activities. Some DSSC members have already expressed interest in US Congressional oversight of intelligence activities and have requested and received—from US officials—background materials and documentation of US laws on intelligence oversight. Additional information is being forwarded to the committee, and two DSSC members stated that, as the DSSC proceeds with drafting oversight legislation, they may call for a US expert on intelligence oversight to visit the committee to exchange views.

For their part, KGB officials have expressed support for new laws governing the security service. In meetings with US officials, KGB Deputy Chairman Vladimir Pirozhkov has strongly endorsed the establishment of legislative oversight of the KGB. Pirozhkov has claimed that the KGB wants to operate under clear legal obligations and restrictions—similar to those that govern security services in democratic countries. Reports indicate, however, that KGB officials are confident that committee members will be too intimidated to place many restrictions on the security service. On the other hand, recent statements

by retired KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin charging that the KGB has changed little under Gorbachev and that it still closely monitors internal dissent may spur the DSSC to question KGB activities more closely.

At the same time, a number of legislative proposals are being considered to redress crimes committed by the KGB and by other government agencies against individuals during the period from the 1930s to the mid-1950s. For example, the DSSC recently held a hearing aimed at accelerating the process of rehabilitation of those who suffered under Stalin. During the past two years, over 800,000 people were rehabilitated, but almost 3 million cases remain outstanding, according to the KGB. Although this figure represents only a small portion of those who actually suffered during the Stalinist period, the rehabilitation of these individuals may spur efforts to acknowledge more widespread persecutions under Stalin and his successors. The DSSC is reviewing a Law on Archives that aims to accelerate the rehabilitation process by easing access to all Soviet archives, including those of the KGB.

Limit Nuclear Testing

Growing concerns throughout the USSR about the environment have prompted the Supreme Soviet and the DSSC to address issues that impinge on defense programs and plans. In early March the DSSC held a joint hearing with the Ecology Committee on proposals to halt nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk test range in Kazakhstan. Col. Gen. Vladimir Gerasimov testified that the military is ready to end testing at Semipalatinsk by 1993, after it carries out 27 more explosives tests. After that, all nuclear tests would be concentrated at Novaya Zemlya, an island north of the Arctic Circle whose harsh climate will limit testing operations. In July the Soviets announced new yield limits for tests at Semipalatinsk before it closes: 30 kilotons (kt) for the rest of this year and 20 kt for 1991 and 1992.

The future of any testing at Semipalatinsk remains in doubt, however. Gerasimov's suggestion has raised the hackles of those living near Novaya Zemlya—in addition to those in the Nordic countries—and has

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failed to mollify a number of Supreme Soviet members, especially those from Kazakhstan, who still call for an immediate end to testing at Semipalatinsk. Moreover

the military's proposal was "out of the question," and some committee members have indicated that they will push for a complete ban on nuclear testing this year. At the same time, however, a significant number of DSSC members appear reluctant to prohibit all nuclear testing because of national security concerns. Further complicating Soviet testing plans is Boris Yel'tsin's opposition to testing at Novaya Zemlya and the possibility that the Russian Supreme Soviet, which he heads, may legislate a ban on all testing in the Russian republic

The Soviets' increasing concerns about the environmental impact of military programs was further demonstrated in February, when Defense Minister Yazov announced that construction had been halted on the Mukachevo Large Phased-Array Radar (LPAR), pending the report of a commission established to review the project. The radar, part of a new network of large ballistic missile early warning radars, is located in the western USSR 30 kilometers from the Hungarian border and has been the subject of protests in both countries during the past several months. Soviet officials claim that two-thirds of the funds allotted to the project—the exterior construction of which is almost complete—have already been spent. Critics have labeled the radar an environmental danger—because of the large amount of water needed to cool its components—and a health hazard because it will emit dangerous levels of electromagnetic radiation. (US analysis of similar Soviet LPARs, however, suggests that the one at Mukachevo would operate within US electromagnetic radiation exposure standards.

In a surprise move, the review commission, headed by Armed Forces Subcommittee Chairman Velikhov, concluded that it was not "expedient" to continue construction of the LPAR and directed that the facility be handed over to the civil economy. Although the military mounted a public relations campaign to convince the local populace that the radar would be safe, the USSR Council of Ministers bowed to public pressure and announced in early August that the

LPAR will be mothballed. This episode demonstrates a clear trend: growing public awareness and the ability to voice concerns to the legislature mean the military will no longer be able to act with impunity.

Establish Law on Defense

Scheduled to be debated in the Supreme Soviet in the fall of 1990, the Law on Defense is considered to be the major vehicle for instituting reform in the Soviet military and probably will be the most important piece of legislation the DSSC addresses in 1990. Designed to provide the legal basis for Soviet defense efforts, the Law on Defense is an omnibus piece of legislation that addresses military doctrine, the powers and duties of state institutions, the participation of enterprises in defense programs, and the rights and duties of citizens in defense of the country. It will also serve as the basis for all future legislation on defense issues. US officials familiar with the intent of this legislation have likened it to the US National Security Act of 1947, which outlined the roles and missions of the various components of the US national security establishment

In late 1989 the MOD formed a special legislative commission headed by Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev to draft this new law, an initial version of which was circulated in the spring of 1990. At the same time, the DSSC's Armed Forces Subcommittee—aware of the importance of this legislation—established a commission headed by radical reformer Maj. Vladimir Lopatin to draft an alternative proposal. In a demonstration of the growing independence of the DSSC, both the military's and the subcommittee's drafts will be considered by the full DSSC. Once a final bill is approved by the DSSC, it is expected to be presented in the fall to the full Supreme Soviet for consideration.

While both drafts agree on a few issues—such as disbanding construction troops serving civilian ministries—the military's proposal falls far short of the major reforms found in the subcommittee's draft (see table 2). As support for radical reform has grown, however, the MOD has made a number of concessions in an attempt to co-opt those who would otherwise support the subcommittee draft. Nevertheless, debate

**Table 2
Major Provisions of Competing Soviet
Draft Laws on Defense**

Provision	Subcommittee Draft	Defense Ministry Draft
Alternative military service	Yes	Eventually permit alternative service in civil defense and highway construction units.
Voluntary military service	Yes. Transition over four to five years to a smaller, volunteer military.	No. Retain conscription, but introduce a new volunteer or contract service giving conscripts the option to extend service obligation in exchange for NCO rank and much higher pay. The Navy will begin this experiment in 1991. Also, if possible, starting in 1994, reduce tours for all servicemen from two years to 18 months. ^a
Create territorial formations in the republics	Yes	No. Categorically rejected. But will agree to station a certain percentage of conscripts in their home republics. ^a
Disband construction troops	Disband those detachments under the direction of 20 civilian ministries starting in 1991—329,000 men. ^b	Disband those detachments under the direction of civilian ministries by 1995—no figure given.
Stipulate that the defense minister be a civilian	Yes	No provision.
Reduce the number of political and general officers	Yes	Calls for a 30-percent cut in general officer corps and a 30- to 40-percent cut in officer training schools.
Revamp the military's political organs	Yes	No provision, but at the 28th Party Congress, Gorbachev announced that MPA political officers will be moved from party to state control and will conduct patriotic education work. Party organizations will remain in the military, but other parties are free to organize within the military.
Permit multiparty participation in military policymaking and military personnel participation in unions and in political parties	Yes	No provision, but Gorbachev has said that other parties are free to organize.
Relationship of military to political authority	Stress powers of Supreme Soviet. Full accountability of military leaders to the Supreme Soviet.	Stress authority of president as commander in chief, whose powers include: approving military doctrine and certain R&D programs, recommending defense spending levels to the legislature, appointing commanders at military district and fleet levels and above, ordering armed forces to conduct military operations, releasing nuclear weapons and authorizing nuclear tests.
Force structure	Reorganize armed forces: merge Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Defense Forces with the Air Force	No details released, but Gorbachev has said that the need for five services is under review.

^a In August, Gorbachev said that the issues of a volunteer military and territorial formations are open for discussion.

^b In June the full DSSC endorsed this measure.

over the extent of reform will be contentious. While some of the subcommittee's more radical positions may be softened or dropped before legislation reaches the Supreme Soviet—ethnic unrest may dissuade the DSSC from promoting the creation of regional military units—the legislature may permit a large portion

of military personnel to serve near their home republics.² In addition, the Supreme Soviet may endorse the

² The upcoming debate on a new Union Treaty will probably address the issue of greater republic autonomy on defense issues.

creation of an alternative service and the requirement that the defense minister be a civilian. There is also a growing awareness in the Supreme Soviet that, as the USSR moves toward a multiparty system, the political apparatus in the military cannot survive in its present form and will have to be reorganized. (Indeed, at the recent 28th Party Congress, Gorbachev announced that political officers of the military's Main Political Administration will be moved from party to state control and will conduct patriotic education and "social-cultural" work. Party organizations will remain in the military, but Gorbachev said earlier that other political parties are free to organize within the military.) Moreover, it is increasingly likely that the DSSC and Supreme Soviet will support the transition to a smaller, professional, all-volunteer military, although the pace of such a transition may be lengthened because of cost concerns. Many of these provisions, while opposed by the current military leadership, are widely supported by rank-and-file military personnel and by the population as a whole. The legislature is also likely to seek tighter restrictions on presidential authority than those found in the MOD's draft.

Review Arms Control Treaties

The DSSC will hold its first arms control ratification hearings in the early fall, when it considers the 1974 Threshold Test Ban and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties and the accompanying verification protocols signed at the June 1990 summit in Washington. It is likely that during this ratification process some Supreme Soviet members may push for further reductions in nuclear testing. In addition, the committee may soon have the opportunity to review both the START and the CFE treaties before they are submitted for full Supreme Soviet ratification. (Ratification of a treaty requires approval by a simple majority of the full Supreme Soviet, while in the United States, a two-thirds vote in the Senate is required.) A number of DSSC members are particularly interested in arms control and can be expected to push the committee to aggressively review any signed treaty. DSSC members reportedly will soon travel to the START negotiations in Geneva, and perhaps to the CFE talks in Vienna, in an effort to demonstrate that they are players in the process.

the committee does not receive regular status reports on the progress of the negotiations, but when the committee asks for information it is provided.

Last spring, Oleg Grinevskiy, chief of the Soviet CFE negotiating team, and Yuriy Nazarkin, chief of the Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks delegation, testified before a joint hearing of the DSSC and the International Affairs Committee on the status of the arms control talks. During the hearing, DSSC members referred favorably to the ability of Western parliaments to maintain close scrutiny of arms control negotiations and implied that they intend to do the same. Committee members were particularly interested in the potential economic benefits from arms control and they welcomed Nazarkin's statement that START will permit the use of some ICBMs and SLBMs as space launch vehicles. For their part, Soviet arms control negotiators have tried to use the newfound authority of the Supreme Soviet to bolster Moscow's negotiating positions (see inset).

The DSSC could also play a role in monitoring Soviet compliance with international arms agreements. The committee may review future defense plans to ensure that they comply with Soviet treaty obligations and, in so doing, avert such problems as the Krasnoyarsk radar, which Moscow now admits violates the ABM Treaty.

Draft "War Powers" Legislation

The DSSC, perhaps in concert with the International Affairs Committee, is scheduled to consider legislation controlling the use of the military outside Soviet borders. Legislatures in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have declared that their national forces cannot be used outside national borders without legislative approval. In his inaugural address as President in March 1990, Gorbachev affirmed his adherence to the principle approved by the Congress of People's Deputies that "the use of force outside the country without the sanction of the Supreme Soviet or the Congress is ruled out categorically forever, with one exception, in the event of sudden attack from outside." As President, Gorbachev has the statutory authority to declare a general or partial mobilization and to declare war in the event of military attack. Such a decision must immediately be referred to the Supreme Soviet, which must then approve the declaration by a two-thirds vote.

Using the DSSC as a Foil in Arms Control Negotiations

Taking a page out of US negotiating techniques, the Soviets have claimed that some of their arms control positions in START are necessary to ensure ratification of the treaty by the Supreme Soviet. For example, Soviet START negotiators have argued that many in the Supreme Soviet believe Moscow has given in on too many negotiating positions. This view was bolstered by General Chervov of the General Staff, who reportedly testified against the USSR's air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) position in a hearing before the DSSC, charging that the agreed counting rule put the USSR at a disadvantage. In view of this discontent, Soviet negotiators claimed that, in order to avoid problems during the ratification process, the United States must agree to the Soviet position on the range threshold of accountable ALCMs; the US side has since agreed to the Soviet range threshold of 600 kilometers.

Similarly, Soviet negotiators have said that the Supreme Soviet is interested in the economic savings from a START agreement and thus may not support the US proposal that Moscow complete the costly destruction of a large number of Soviet ICBMs and that up to 16 SSBNs be eliminated under START during the first two years of the agreed seven-year drawdown period. Likewise, in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, Soviet negotiators have used the specter of Supreme Soviet disapproval to argue that NATO should abandon its proposal calling for the destruction of all treaty-limited items

(except helicopters) and permit the conversion of some equipment to civilian purposes.

Although these claims are clearly being used by Soviet officials to strengthen Moscow's negotiating hand, these officials appear genuinely concerned about the successful ratification of both START and a CFE treaty by a Supreme Soviet that is no longer merely a rubberstamp. Unlike the pro forma ratification of the INF Treaty in 1988, START will come under close scrutiny in the DSSC and in a newly assertive full Supreme Soviet that has surprised the leadership in the past. []

[] both President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze have pointed to potential ratification problems. Of major concern to a number of Soviets are press reports claiming that under START Moscow will have to cut more than 4,000 warheads while the United States—because of permissive counting rules for heavy bombers—may choose to make only modest reductions. They fear that such unequal reductions could spark opposition to START in the Supreme Soviet. Still, while these ratification concerns are serious, a treaty must obtain only a simple majority in the full Supreme Soviet, according to the Soviet Constitution—a far less rigorous requirement than the two-thirds majority necessary in the US Senate—and it is doubtful that a treaty the leadership supported would be blocked by the Supreme Soviet.

The Supreme Soviet—with the DSSC playing a major role—will most likely attempt to codify this restriction in Soviet law in the near future. With such legislation, some committee members argue that Moscow will not repeat mistakes such as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. The establishment of such a "war powers act," which would require Supreme Soviet approval prior to the dispatch of troops, would be—on paper—far more restrictive than the US War Powers Act, which requires Congressional approval 60 to 90 days after troops have been introduced into hostilities or into an area where hostilities appear "imminent."

Confirm Key Ministers

Before the reorganization of executive power in March, the DSSC had been expected to confirm members of the Defense Council—the key policymaking body on defense issues. As a result of the creation of a strong presidency, however, all mention of the Defense Council in the Constitution was removed, and a 17-member USSR Presidential Council was established whose functions have been likened to those of the US Cabinet. Although reports indicate that a new Defense Council has been created as a working group under the Presidential Council, the DSSC will not have the power to confirm members of this new

defense body. The DSSC, however, will retain the authority to confirm the minister of defense and the chairman of the KGB, with the knowledge that these officials will serve as members of both the Presidential and Defense Councils

Approve Arms Sales

Some Supreme Soviet members have argued that arms sales abroad should be made public and subject to review by the DSSC. At present, according to Defense Minister Yazov, the Supreme Soviet is not consulted—sales are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in conjunction with the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries. Some observers have criticized Soviet arms export policies to countries such as Syria and Iraq and have pointed favorably to the US practice of publishing detailed information on arms exports and to Congress's ability to review proposed transfers of weapons. Again, the US experience could provide a model for Soviet legislation. In the United States, the administration must submit to Congress any proposal to sell arms that meets one of two thresholds: if a single weapon system costs more than \$14 million or if a package sale exceeds \$50 million. Congress can block any sale that meets one of these criteria by passing a concurrent resolution (both houses vote) of disapproval within 30 days of receiving the administration's proposal. It is increasingly likely that some form of legislation will be introduced soon to give the Supreme Soviet comparable authority to review arms exports.

Potential for Influencing Defense Policy

While the DSSC is looking to expand its powers this year and in future legislative sessions, the problems that surfaced during past sessions will continue to act as a brake on its influence.

Continuing Problems

The DSSC clearly intends to give the next budget a more extensive review—DSSC Deputy Chairman Valeriy Ochirov claimed in June 1990 that "work [on the 1991 defense budget] will proceed more thoroughly, line by line." The shortage of staff coupled with the time constraints that affected the 1990 budget review, however, will again come into play. According to press

reports, the defense budget for 1991 will be submitted for Supreme Soviet approval in September 1990 at the earliest—leaving little time for close scrutiny. Further, DSSC actions to influence defense policy through the budget process have been weakened by the fact that spending plans submitted by the Defense Ministry do not reflect total military expenditures. There is a growing recognition among committee members, however, that the budget understates Soviet defense efforts. Reformer Lopatin, for example, has claimed that the MOD budget does not include full defense-related expenditures of 10 different ministries and of republics and enterprises.

In an attempt to develop a more realistic defense budget, Ochirov has said that the DSSC will pool the various defense accounts that are now spread across ministries and republics and place them under the MOD budget. Ochirov's statement supports the claim DSSC staffer Kapranov made in April that the committee is developing a budget that includes all defense activities and uses "actual" (unsubsidized) prices for military hardware. The result is a budget that is about twice as large as the 70.9 billion rubles announced for 1990 and is generally consistent in size with the Intelligence Community's estimate of Soviet defense expenditures. Kapranov noted that the new estimate does not reflect any real change in Soviet defense activity; rather, it represents the DSSC's effort to produce a much more realistic defense budget by establishing strict financial accountability. It is not clear, however, if the MOD will accept the DSSC-drafted budget, and, even if it does, whether the DSSC has the ability to alter priorities within it.

Still, while the DSSC may not be able to radically reorder budget priorities, it is not powerless. Other options available to the committee include using its ability to publicly challenge programs and priorities throughout the legislative session to influence government debates and plans. Indeed, it is here—on issues such as nuclear testing—that the committee has had the most success. In addition, the DSSC's ability to place its stamp on defense policy is greater in areas where it has drafted viable alternatives—such as the Law on Defense

At the same time, shortages of staff and analytical support and persistent problems in obtaining data will continue to limit the committee's influence. In April, for example, Georgiy Arbatov, director of IUSAC, publicly rebuked the committee for its failure to obtain essential defense information. It will be some time before the recently established research center can provide strong support to the Supreme Soviet, let alone to the DSSC. Although it will continue to be at a disadvantage relative to the MOD, the DSSC will increase its authority over time as its staff size grows and members gain experience and expertise on defense issues. Moreover, as the research center gains strength, it may prompt the Supreme Soviet to establish additional support facilities as counterparts to those used by the US Congress.

The recent selection of Leonid Sharin to replace [] [] Lapygin as DSSC chairman presents the committee with the opportunity to strengthen its legislative oversight capabilities. Sharin, a high-ranking party official, lacks Lapygin's close ties to the defense-industry sector and probably will not be as protective of this sector's interests. At the same time, because Sharin spent most of his career in the Soviet Far East, home of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, he does have close ties to the military. [] []

[] [] Sharin acknowledged many of the committee's shortcomings—such as the cursory budget review process—but claimed that improvements will be made in the near future. Similarly, he also admitted that the DSSC requires additional staff support, but he pointed out that the Supreme Soviet Presidium, not committee chairmen, controls committee staffing. Nonetheless, Sharin will most likely push the DSSC to be more assertive in establishing its role as an oversight committee and has already voiced support for establishing additional subcommittees to deal with arms control and space issues.

Prospects

Even if these problems can be overcome, the core issue remains the committee's desire and ability to pry its way into a policymaking arena dominated by institutions that view the DSSC as an unwelcome intrusion. Further complicating the DSSC's efforts to carve out a niche in defense policymaking has been the creation of a new USSR presidency. Despite the

role Gorbachev has played in promoting the Supreme Soviet and the DSSC, he has made it clear that the DSSC is to remain subordinate to the executive leadership on decisions affecting national security. While the Supreme Soviet appears, on paper, to have the power to challenge the central leadership, many Supreme Soviet members have expressed concern that the legislature may not use its power to counterbalance the newly invigorated executive authority. To date, the DSSC and the Supreme Soviet have yet to challenge Gorbachev's policy preferences, and until they do, their full ability to make policy will remain untested.

Still, the Supreme Soviet and the DSSC are likely to gain in the long run if party structures continue to lose power to state institutions and if the political center retains substantial authority. As the party continues to lose legitimacy, the Supreme Soviet is well positioned to fill the resulting power vacuum. Indeed, the effort under way to transform the Soviet Union into a state "governed by laws" works to the Supreme Soviet's and the DSSC's advantage, and, as the committee gains resources, experience, and expertise, it could develop into a powerful check on the president.


Regardless of the additional powers it can accrue, however, the mere existence of the committee introduces a new dynamic in the formulation of defense policy. Now that representatives of the Defense Ministry must justify their budget requests to the DSSC, the military will have to consider how its proposals will be viewed publicly—a prospect some members of the military apparently do not welcome. Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev recently complained that dealing with the Supreme Soviet was an "absolute nightmare" and that its members were constantly demanding additional information. Similarly, Marshal Akhromeyev has said that many in the military do not like answering to the legislature, although he added that they will have to get used to it. The DSSC also provides a voice for those who have been shut out of the policy debates and offers a forum for other agencies and civilian analysts to push their own

agendas. Some civilian analysts view the DSSC as an opportunity to get a foot in the door of the policymaking arena and are actively pursuing contacts with the committee.



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Appendix B

List of DSSC Members

Chairman (Acting), Leonid Sharin, First Secretary, Amur Obkom

Deputy Chairman, Col. Valeriy Ochirov,¹ student, Voroshilov General Staff Academy

Chairman, State Security Subcommittee, Grigoriy Kharchenko, First Secretary, Zaporozhye Obkom

Chairman, Defense Industry Subcommittee, Mikhail Simonov, general designer, Sukhoy Design Bureau

Chairman, Armed Forces Subcommittee, Yevgeniy Velikhov, Vice President, USSR Academy of Sciences; director, Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute

Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, military adviser to President Gorbachev

Veniamin Baluyev, chairman, Belorussian Republic KGB

Oleg S. Belyakov, chief, Defense Department, CPSU Central Committee

Vitaliy A. Biryukov,¹ Secretary of the DSSC

Keshrim Boztayev, First Secretary, Semipalatinsk Obkom

Nikolay Brivtin, chief, KGB Border Guards Political Directorate

Vasily Bykov, secretary, USSR Union of Writers

Anatoliy A. Chizhov,¹ director, "Progress" aerospace plant

Andrey Gaponov-Grekhov, director, Academy of Sciences Applied Physics Institute

Stanislav Golovin, radio apparatus tuner, machine-building plant

Ivan Gorelovskiy, former chairman, Azerbaijan Republic KGB

Yuriy Isayev, director, production association

Adm. Vitaliy Ivanov, Commander, Baltic Fleet

Arnold Klautsen, First Secretary, Riga Gorkom

Aleksey Kolbeshkin, team leader, production association

Nikolay Kucherskiy, director, mining and metallurgy combine

Vladimir Lapygin,¹ director, Moscow automation and machine-building plant and former DSSC chairman. He may no longer participate as a DSSC member.

Mechis Laurinkus, scientist, Philosophy Institute, Lithuania

Vladimir Lukin, cutter, diesel engine building plant

Yevgeniy Nemtsev, team leader, production association

Rudolf Nikitin, director, production association

Genrikh V. Novozhilov,¹ director and general designer, Ilyushin aircraft design bureau

Vladimir A. Opolinskiy,¹ foreman, shipyard

Lt. Col. Viktor Podziruk, instructor, military unit

Valeriy Ryumin, deputy chief designer, production association

Yuriy Samsonov, First Secretary, Ulyanovsk Obkom

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Vitaliy M. Shabanov,¹ Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments

Igor D. Spasskiy,¹ chief designer and director, marine technology bureau

Petr Talanchuk, Rector, Kiev Polytechnical Institute

Sergey A. Tsyplyayev,¹ Secretary of the DSSC, secretary, state optical institute

Senior Lt. Nikolay Tutov, Cochairman, Social-Democratic Association

Vladimir Tuzov, chairman, Radio and Electronics Workers Union

Vladimir Utkin, director, production association

Vello Vare, staffer, Estonian Academy of Scientific History Institute

Arkadiy Volskiy, member, Scientific-Production Trade Union

Anatoliy Yefimov, Second Secretary, Communist Party, Uzbekistan

Munavarkhon Zokirov, chief, a DOSAAF sports club

¹ Member of the delegation that visited the United States in February 1990.

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