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# Prospects for Closing the Afghan-Pakistani Border (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

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July 1981

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*Information available as of 8 July 1981  
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

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## Prospects for Closing the Afghan-Pakistani Border (U)

### Summary

The Soviets have made little headway in breaking the tenacious Afghan resistance since they invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Anarchy prevails in the major cities, roads continue to be interdicted, and the countryside remains outside Soviet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan control. To reduce insurgency, the Soviets have attempted to "seal" the Afghan-Pakistani border against the movement of men and supplies in the frontier region. Several border clearing operations have been launched and the most frequented trails in the border areas mined. Nevertheless, cross-border movement continues.

Moscow's attempts to close the border have been thwarted principally by the physical characteristics of the region. Major constraints are the great length of the border, its diverse terrain, and the multiplicity of trails linking Pakistan with an extensive system in Afghanistan. Few, if any, places on these routes can be used as choke points to monitor infiltration effectively. The rugged terrain of much of the border makes many sectors inaccessible to vehicles—a decided drawback to many Soviet combat units whose mobility is dependent on vehicles and motorable routes. Attempts to interdict routes accessible from the ground or vulnerable to air attack have generally had only a temporary effect on cross-border movement. In most cases insurgent groups have simply used one of the numerous alternate routes to cross the border. Consequently, unless the Soviets are willing to commit themselves to a massive long-term effort of clearing and fortifying a zone along the entire border, the movement of insurgent forces to and from Afghanistan will continue.

## Prospects for Closing the Afghan-Pakistani Border (U)

The success of insurgent groups in controlling the countryside in Afghanistan and in carrying on their hit-and-run war against the Soviet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) military forces results in part from their continuing ability to move men and supplies across the Afghan-Pakistani border and within Afghanistan.

Although their sources of supplies and method of obtaining them vary depending on conditions, insurgent bands generally follow time-honored practices. They retire across the Pakistani border to get aid from their own or friendly tribes or by temporarily moving into refugee camps before they return to fight. Many insurgents in Afghanistan obtain supplies locally and supplement them with those procured in Pakistan.

Food usually is provided by their home villages, or, if not available there, is purchased from other villages, or stolen. Supplies of guns and ammunition from Pakistan are augmented by captured Soviet-DRA equipment and by weapons brought by Afghan Army deserters. Soviet and DRA military operations directed against stemming the flow of men and supplies through the border region have only a temporary effect in halting the movement.

The probability that the border could be "sealed" rests on a combination of factors: the physical character of the frontier region; the amount and type of Soviet-DRA military pressure exerted; and the tactics employed by both sides. The problem is addressed here by examining the terrain and related physical conditions of the area, including the number, location, and condition of cross-border routes and passes, and by relating these factors to Soviet military operations and tactics. (U)

### Border Characteristics

The 2,400-kilometer-long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan stretches from very high mountains in the northeast to barren desert plains in the southwest. No

single dominant physical feature is present throughout to clearly delineate the boundary. The alignment is rather a compromise—the result of a late-19th-century agreement negotiated between the British and the Afghans—and reflects the complex historical, cultural, and physical factors of the region.<sup>1</sup> (U)

Historically, the borderlands have been the home territory of fiercely independent and warlike tribes—primarily the Pashtun<sup>2</sup> and Nuristani ethnic groups—whose outlook on life has barely altered through the centuries. Despite numerous invasions through their territories and attempts by conquerors and governments to control the region, most of the tribes have retained a large measure of autonomy. (U)

Culturally, the borderlands are a welter of tribal territories where many clans shift seasonally to graze their animals, to engage in trade and smuggling, to find work, and to visit kin. This fragmented cultural characteristic of the borderlands is further complicated by regular migrations of tribal peoples throughout a still larger region. Some groups regularly leave their summer pastures in the mountains of central Afghanistan in late fall to spend the winter in the warmer valleys and plains of Pakistan. (U)

<sup>1</sup> The boundary, called the Durand Line, is named after Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, representative of the Government of India, who negotiated the agreement on the border in 1893 with Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the ruler of Afghanistan. By 1896 most of the boundary was surveyed and demarcated; the remainder was finally completed and agreed to by 1921. One exception was the Mohmand tribal territory north of the Khyber Pass and adjacent to the Konar Valley in Afghanistan. This sector of the border was never surveyed or demarcated on the ground, and the boundary runs through the area inhabited by the Mohmand tribal group. Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand Line as an international frontier having specifically rejected the 1893 agreement in 1949. (U)

<sup>2</sup> Pashtun is the official spelling in English used in Afghanistan for this group. They are known also as Paktun (Afghanistan), and as Pushtun and Puktun in Pakistan depending on differences in tribal dialect. Pathan, a Hindu corruption of the name, was adopted by the British to refer to these hill tribes. See NFAC Research Paper GS 80-10025 (Confidential), March 1980, *Afghanistan: Ethnic Diversity and Dissidence*. (U)

Physically, the borderlands are mostly a jumble of barren and forbidding hills and mountains. Permanent settlements are confined to valleys and basins, where lack of water is a perennial problem. A significant feature of the border area is the extensive drainage systems to the Kabul and Indus Rivers that provide natural routes. These valley routes and numerous upland paths and trails crisscross the area to such an extent that the frontier has been termed a "sieve." (U)

Although a variety of terrain features typifies the borderlands, certain characteristics are common to major border sectors. North of the Khyber Pass the border generally follows increasingly higher mountain crests toward the Wakhan<sup>1</sup> Corridor where the snowcapped peaks of the Hindu Kush mark the border to China. In this sector are some 120 passes that connect routes leading from Pakistan into the valleys of Nangarhar, Konarha, and Badakhshan Provinces and the District of Wakhan in Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> The longer and physically more diverse border sector south of the Khyber contains at least 270 border routes and passes. Here hills and mountain ridges mark parts of the border. In other areas a river forms the boundary and in the far south the border with Baluchistan consists of straight line segments connecting a series of points across largely empty desert country. (U)

Terrain and climatic conditions pose some limitations on use of and accessibility to borderland trails. Winter snows and ice may block passes and trails at the higher elevations; in other areas flooding of streams during spring and early summer restricts or cuts access to cross-border routes at times. In general, however, either alternate routes can be found that are open or, in some cases, snow-blocked trails and paths can be forced by a determined group. Problems of accessibility are encountered most frequently on trails that cross the Safed Koh range (west of the Khyber Pass) and in the area north of the Khyber toward the Chinese border where the terrain becomes more of an obstacle and routes fewer. The lower and more open and accessible terrain in the south, where the border sections cross desert terrain and ravine-ridden hills, presents

<sup>1</sup> Wakhan is the spelling approved by the Board of Geographic Names. The more familiar Wakhan is used, however, throughout this paper.

<sup>4</sup> See the map for passes along the Afghan-Pakistani border. (U)

additional control problems because of the far greater number of passes and routes. (U)

### Soviet Efforts To Stop Cross-Border Movement

Soviet efforts to block infiltration of Afghan insurgents from Pakistan have failed during the first year of their occupation. In combination, the physical and cultural makeup of the borderlands and the natural recalcitrance of its tribal groups have proved insurmountable. Insurgents still control the countryside, and even the main roads and principal towns held by Soviet-DRA forces remain vulnerable. The border is too long and, in many places, too inaccessible from the road network for effective patrolling with the number of Soviet-DRA forces now in Afghanistan. Moreover, the numerous cross-border trails connect with an extensive trail network in Afghanistan, and everywhere there are a number of alternate approaches to village, town, valley, or any other objective. Few places on the trail system could be used as choke points to monitor infiltration effectively. Finally, support by the Afghan Army against the insurgents has often been ineffective. The DRA forces, plagued with casualties and desertions, have been reduced to about half their former size. Attempts to rebuild through conscription have failed because most new recruits desert at the first opportunity.

Reliance on heavy armor with air support in fighting the hit-and-run war has confined Soviet ground forces to the roads. The road network is sparse, and only a few roads extend close to or across the border. The periodic launching of attacks on suspect rebel concentrations in the border areas, followed by the withdrawal of Soviet forces leaving DRA troops to hold the area, has proved ineffective. The insurgents disperse and return, retaking the area and often swelling their ranks and supplies with Afghan Army deserters who bring their weapons with them.

Shelling and bombing of villages along the roads, or in the vicinity of main towns, have been more effective anti-insurgent tactics. Some places in the border area have been partly cleared of people thereby limiting or

denying support to the insurgents. The villagers filter back in time, however, or the deserted houses become way stations for insurgents on the move.

The most effective weapon against infiltration has been the helicopter gunship used to strafe insurgents and to mine border trails. Any gains made by the periodic use of gunships, however, is only temporary; the insurgents simply either use alternate routes into Afghanistan or move at night. To counter night movement particularly, the Soviets have dropped thousands of small antipersonnel mines on some of the most frequented border trails. Although initially some unsuspecting insurgents were maimed by these mines, they have quickly learned to disarm or explode them with stones or a long stick. Animals stepping on the small mines, however, are still a problem, for they tend to stray off the path unless roped together.

#### Activity by Border Sector

**Badakhshan-Wakhan.** The Soviets do not have easy access to trails and passes in this part of the border with Pakistan. They have had difficulty entering and supplying their troops in Badakhshan overland because the combined efforts of the insurgents and adverse weather conditions frequently make the one gravel-surfaced road impassable. The road extends through the province into eastern Badakhshan, passes in the vicinity of Zibak to Eshkashem, and continues as a dirt road of uncertain motorability along the Ab-e Panj (Amu Darya) into the narrow Wakhan Corridor.<sup>1</sup> Reportedly, the Soviets have moved into the corridor since the spring of 1980 by the simple expedient of crossing the narrow Ab-e Panj (river) that forms the boundary between the USSR and Afghanistan.

The sparse population generally consists of two groups of Tajiks: the sedentary farmers, who live around Zibak and Eshkashem, and the farmer-herders, who live on the high river plain in Wakhan. The upper part of the Sang Lech Valley, which parallels the border south of Zibak, is uninhabited. (U)

The border trails from Pakistan leading into Badakhshan and Wakhan are inaccessible except by men on foot because most of the passes are impractica-

ble for use by pack animals. Passes are high, averaging 4,500 meters, and are approached by steep trails leading from valley floors some 1,000 meters below. Nearly every pass bordering the Wakhan and Badakhshan areas is covered with glaciers and permanent snow fields which generally limit their use to a few months during the summer and early fall. Conditions vary with individual passes, however, and some can be used with difficulty throughout the year. (U)

Two trails are important old trade routes linking Chitral to Badakhshan via the Baroghil and Dorah Passes. The route through Baroghil Pass descends into the Wakhan Corridor. The presence of Soviets in Wakhan, however, makes it an unlikely choice of insurgents bound for Badakhshan or the interior of Afghanistan. The main trail through the Dorah An follows the Sang Lech Valley northward to Zibak. Reportedly, the Soviets have made helicopter gunship forays up the valley and mined the trail in the vicinity of the pass.

All of the trails from Pakistan that cross the border between the Dorah An and the western end of the Wakhan feed into the Sang Lech Valley. The trail network continues into other valleys to the west and southwest and provides a number of routes through Badakhshan to the interior of Afghanistan from the border passes. The Dorah An trail also connects with a southern route to the Konar Valley via the Mandal Pass and the Landy Sind-Katigal Valleys in Konarha Province. Although suitable for pack animals, the route was seldom used in the past because of the hostility of the Nuristanis who frequently used it when making raids into Badakhshan in search of animals and slaves. (U)

**Konarha.** Some of the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan has occurred in this sector of the border inhabited by Nuristani and Pashtun tribes. The fighting generally has been confined to the Konar Valley where a gravel road—one of the few in Afghanistan close to the border—enables Soviet tracked vehicles to move from Jalalabad along the entire length of the valley to Barikowt. Although the Soviets have launched several attacks on rebel concentrations in the Konar Valley, shelled villages adjacent to the road, and mined cross-

<sup>1</sup> See NFAC Research Paper GC 80-10038 (Secret NF), May 1980, *The Wakhan Corridor: An Unlikely Afghan-China Link*. (U)

border trails along the east side of the river, the DRA garrisons at Barikowt, Asmar, and Asadabad remain vulnerable to attack when Soviet mobile forces withdraw. Mining the Konar Valley trails may have slowed infiltration, or temporarily halted traffic on some trails, but it has not kept insurgents from infiltrating the valley from other directions.

*North of the Konar Valley from Barikowt to the Dorah An*, a number of trails cross the border from Chitral and lead directly into the deep, rugged, and heavily forested valleys of Nuristan.\* The trail system in this region is extensive, providing circuitous access to the Konar Valley from the west, and more direct access to the Panjsher Valley and to Mehtar Lam. The operational limitations of Soviet helicopters restrict their use to the lower valleys adjacent to the Konar. A considerable stretch of border, therefore, is inaccessible to Soviet forces except on foot. Although it has been reported that the entire border—Badakhshan to the Khyber Pass—has been mined, most of the cross-border trails in Nuristan are still usable.

Passes in the Nuristani sector are similar to those farther north, averaging 4,500 meters in altitude and covered by glaciers and snow fields. They generally are open only in summer to men on foot, but two of the passes—the Brambulu and Paitasun—traditionally have been used in winter by the Nuristanis. South of Nuristan the passes are much lower, averaging less than 2,500 meters, and the number of passes (and trails converging on them) increases substantially. Little is known about the physical conditions of the southern passes, but a considerable amount of trade (smuggling) has flowed through them between Afghanistan and the

\* The nearly autonomous region of Nuristan has neither boundaries nor an administrative center but encompasses the area of four provinces where the Nuristani tribes live. Roughly it includes southern Badakhshan, except for the Munjan and Sang Lech Valleys; Laghman Province north of Mehtar Lam; the west bank tributary valleys of the Konar in Nangarhar and Konarha Provinces; all of Konarha except along the river itself and the area east of the river to the border. The only conquest of the region (then known as Kafiristan) was in 1895-96 by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, who forcibly converted the Kafir tribes to Islam. The Amir immediately withdrew his troops and administrators to the Konar Valley leaving Nuristan in the hands of Pashtun mullahs and existing tribal councils. Since that time, government control has remained more or less confined to the Konar Valley, but even here control tends to peter out near Barikowt.

States of Dir and Chitral in Pakistan. In general, they are open in summer and into late fall, or until they are closed by heavy snow. (U)

*Nangarhar*. This sector of the border is one of the best known. It contains the area of the Kabul Valley and the Khyber Pass, one of the traditional invasion routes used by conquerors. The Kabul-Jalalabad-Peshawar road through the Khyber Pass<sup>7</sup> provides the Soviets direct access to the border. A few natural surface roads and motorable tracks extending south from the vicinity of Jalalabad could be used in dry weather, but the Soviets apparently seldom venture from the main road.

Jalalabad, the largest town in eastern Afghanistan, is the staging base for Soviet attacks into the Konar Valley. Although the Soviets maintain daytime control of Jalalabad, it is vulnerable to attack by the insurgents who periodically disrupt traffic and ambush convoys on the road. Unescorted Afghan trucks make it through on occasion by paying tolls to insurgent groups at makeshift control points along the road. It is not known to what extent the Soviets have mined the trails in this part of the border. They have made regular helicopter gunship forays against the rebels in the area and shelled villages believed in support of the insurgents.

*South from the border of Konarha Province to the Kabul River*, the border cuts across low, barren, and relatively open hill country. It also bisects the homeland of the Mohmand Pashtun tribe, separating the hill clans from their settled brethren in the Konar Valley and in the area north of the Kabul River as far west as Jalalabad. The Mohmands virtually ignore the border and move freely within their tribal area visiting clan members and carrying out trade. (U)

<sup>7</sup> The Khyber Pass, a 37-kilometer-long defile, lies entirely within Pakistan. The border is at its western end and traffic is controlled by a unit of the Khyber Rifles manned by Afridi Pashtuns. At the border on the Afghan side is the customs house of Tawr Kham; on the Pakistani side, the small town of Landi Khana. Just to the east of Landi Khana, the road passes through a belt of dragons teeth (concrete antitank obstacles) constructed during World War II. Beyond the belt the actual pass begins and the road hugs the hills above the narrow pass on its way to Landi Kotal, situated several kilometers farther east. (U)

The extensive drainage systems in both the Afghan and Pakistani portions provide a multiplicity of stream valley and route connections at the border over low passes averaging about 1,000 meters in elevation. A few caravan routes through Pakistan lead toward the Konar Valley and Jalalabad. Most of the route, however, cross the Kabul\* and, passing through the area below the big bend of the river, enter Afghanistan some 10 kilometers north of the Khyber where the river turns northward and forms a 15-kilometer section of the border. The Mohmands have been the chief transporters of goods on these caravan routes linking Kabul and Peshawar. (U)

*From the Kabul south*, the border is aligned initially along the river and then through ravine-ridden hill country to the Safed Koh range that extends west from the Khyber hills. Three large tribes of Pashtuns live in this area of the border: the Shinwari farmers, who live south of Jalalabad, and, on the Pakistani side of the border, the Orakzai and Afridi tribes, who consider themselves as guardians of the passes. (U)

Numerous foot and animal trails wind through the jumbled hills crossing the border through deep ravines or along hill ridges. Some of the trails are alternate routes to the Khyber Pass. Farther south in the hill country are routes that lead from the Bazar and Bara Valleys into Afghanistan. Here the trails turn northward following seasonal stream beds and converge on the south bank of the Kabul. Along the way they link with east-west trails in Afghanistan. These trails make it possible to travel westward through the foothills of the Safed Koh at some distance south of the main Kabul-Jalalabad-Peshawar road. In general, this part of Nangarhar has relatively milder winters than farther north. Passes are open most of the year, though winter and spring rains may create occasional flash flooding and treacherous conditions. (U)

*South of the hill country*, the border turns westward and follows the east-west aligned Safed Koh range. Here some peaks reach 4,600 meters in elevation and

\* The Kabul is not navigable by a boat of any size until its confluence with the Konar near Jalalabad. From there rafts can be used, primarily as ferries, but the river generally is not safe because of rapids. Navigation does not begin until the river enters the Peshawar plain near Michni Fort in Pakistan. (U)

the terrain is rugged. The 20 main border passes through the Safed Koh average 3,400 meters in elevation and are more hazardous. The majority of the border routes are pack trails used primarily by some of the Afridi clans to transport salt from Pakistan into Afghanistan on the backs of small, sturdy bullocks. Because the south face of the mountain range receives a considerable amount of both rain and snow, passes and trails through the Safed Koh often are blocked, usually from January through June. (U)

*Paktia-Paktika-Zabol-Qandahar*. In this sector, the Kabul-Qandahar highway parallels the border at distances of approximately 100 to 150 kilometers. Except for the Qandahar-Spin Buldak-Chaman road in the south, which leads to Quetta in Pakistan, access from the Kabul-Qandahar road to the border is over a sparse network of gravel roads. Most of the roads are little more than motorable tracks winding through a belt of low mountains and ending short of the border. The Soviets have made little use of this low-grade road system and instead have kept to the Kabul-Qandahar and Kabul-Gardez-Khowst roads. These roads are continuously being cut and convoys on them ambushed by the insurgents. Here, as elsewhere in the border area, the Soviets rely on helicopter gunship attacks on the insurgents and on mining of some of the most frequently used border-crossing routes in the attempt to stop infiltration. Men and caravans nevertheless continue to cross the border and roam the Afghan countryside at will.

Most of the fighting in this sector of the border south of the Safed Koh has been around the towns of Gardez and Khowst as well as at a few border posts where DRA garrisons and troops are located.\* The town garrisons are supplied directly from Kabul by a road difficult to keep open because of several choke points used by the insurgents. One choke point is the Tere Pass, located about 20 to 25 kilometers north of Gardez. Several others are located in another mountain section between Gardez and Khowst where the

\* Although fighting has continued, it is believed that a kind of practical compromise—if you don't shoot, we won't shoot—has developed between some of the DRA forces and the insurgents. A similar situation may well exist in other border sectors.



road follows a narrow stream valley for some distance. In addition to harrasing military convoys, the insurgents have often succeeded in keeping trucks loaded with much-needed firewood from Paktia and Paktika Provinces from reaching Kabul over this road. Vehicles traveling on other roads and motorable tracks to border posts are equally subject to ambush by the insurgents, and the posts often must be supplied by air.

*South of the Safed Koh*, the border follows along the crests of a series of low mountains and hill ranges. Unlike most other border sectors, Paktia and parts of Paktika are fairly heavily wooded. Between the Kurram River and Chaman, the border cuts across a tangled highland area—the Waziristan hills and the Toba Kakar Range—that consists of basins, ridges, and ravines. High-walled ravines, from 90 to 900 meters in width, are interconnected to one another and to the basins by narrower gullies created by heavy summer rains. The eroded landscape is a maze of passes and trails, many of which are suitable for pack animals; many others are only wide enough for a man on foot. (U)

The trail network follows the extensive drainage system of the area, with trails crossing the border over water divides, in streambeds and ravines, and along hill ridges. Although this section of the border is generally drier than areas farther north, snow melt and spring rains (March-April) or the occasional violent summer storms turn the streambeds into destructive walls of water temporarily blocking or limiting access in the borderlands. In winter, snow falls at the higher elevations and below-freezing temperatures occur from December to March. Brief snowstorms can occur as far south as Chaman until late March. Strong northwesterly winds—scorching hot in summer or bitterly cold in winter—sweep across the border region most of the time. (U)

Between the Safed Koh range and the village of Kharlachi, where a main caravan trail crosses the border in the Kurram Valley, a motorable track links Gardez (Afghanistan) with a road to Parachinar (Pakistan) via the Peywan-Kandaw (Pewan Kotel, or Peiwan Pass). From Kharlachi south to Waziristan, innumerable trails lead from the Kurram Valley and connect

with an extensive trail maze in the low mountains of Paktia Province. To the south are about an equal number of trails suitable for animals and for men on foot that can be used to cross the border through the labyrinth of paths in the Waziristan hills and the Tobar Kakar Range. (U)

Among these trails are a few main routes used primarily by nomads<sup>10</sup> who annually trek to and from Afghanistan. In practice the term nomad includes those shepherds, camelmen, traders, and laborers who seasonally move their families and animals into Pakistan and do a little moneylending and smuggling on the side. The term is also applied to those laborers, traders, moneylenders, and thieves who leave their families at home and wander into Pakistan alone or in small groups. The latter types of "nomad" usually move on foot and are free to use any of the many paths and trails that cross the border. In contrast, the large groups of nomads traveling with women, children, and animals have a more restricted choice. The individual route chosen is determined by the proximity to the tribal territory occupied in Afghanistan, local security considerations, and the availability of grazing and water along the route—conditions which vary from year to year. Security traditionally involved periodic rerouting to avoid attack from a feuding tribe; presently the nomads have the added burden of finding alternate routes to avoid Soviet-DRA forces. (U)

The major nomad routes are the Khyber Pass and adjacent trails, the valleys of the Kurram, Kaitu, Tochi, Gumal, Kundar, and the Pishin Lora Rivers and their tributary valleys, and the border-crossing point at Chaman. The normal period of nomadic movement into Pakistan is from mid-October through mid-December, with a return to Afghanistan during April and May. The period of travel varies depending on the weather and the economic and political conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. (U)


<sup>10</sup> Nomads are called *kuchi* in northern and eastern Afghanistan and in Peshawar, Bannu, and Kohat in Pakistan; in southern Afghanistan and in Dera Ismail Khan and Baluchistan in Pakistan, they are known as *powindah*. Nomads are primarily Pashtun tribes as are most of the people who live in this part of the border. See NFAC Research Paper GC 79-10105 (Confidential), October 1979, *The Pushtuns of the Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands*. (U)


*Qandahar-Helmand-Nimruz.* Except for the Pishin Lora Valley, this sector of the border is not crossed with nearly the same frequency as the others. Partly for this reason, combined with the remoteness of the area, Soviet activity has been minimal. The border extends westward through an uninhabited desert region where a few old trade routes cross from Afghanistan into Baluchistan. The alignment of trails is necessarily determined by the location of wells. Because the water supply is ephemeral, the routes are only generally defined and can vary from season to season or year to year. (U)

#### Outlook

The Soviets have little chance of closing or "sealing" the Afghan-Pakistani border unless they make a much greater commitment of resources than they have thus far. Through 1980 and the early months of 1981, Soviet-DRA control in the border region has been confined to the Wakhan Corridor, the roads in Badakhshan Province and the Konar Valley, and the checkpoints at the Khyber Pass and in the Spin Baldak-Chaman area. Along the remainder of the border, control is tenuous or nonexistent.

To effectively close the border to insurgent infiltration, Moscow would have to develop long-term operations to systematically clear a zone of all inhabitants along the entire border. It would also have to permanently station a sufficient number of troops in the zone to monitor cross-border movement. Implementation of these operations would require a massive increase in the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the construction of numerous roads, the improvement and maintenance of the entire road network to ensure support to the border troops, and the building of supply and other facilities required by border personnel. Unless the Soviets are willing to make such a commitment, the Afghan-Pakistani border cannot be effectively sealed against the movement of insurgents into and throughout Afghanistan.





# Afghan-Pakistani Border Passes\*

- International boundary
- Internal administrative boundary
- National capital
- Internal administrative capital
- Railroad
- Paved road
- Gravel road
- Natural surface road
- Track or trail
- Airfield

## Populated Places

- Over 500,000
- 25,000 to 100,000
- 100,000 to 500,000
- Under 25,000

\*Number of passes on the map are approximations

Scale 1:2,500,000


Spot elevations in meters

# Afghan-Pak Border P


- International bound
- Inter. I. administr
- National capital
- Internal administrative
- Railroad
- Paved road
- Gravel road
- Natural surface road
- Track or trail
- Airfield

Populated Pl  
 ● Over 500,000  
 ○ 100,000 to 500,000  
 • 1

Number of passes on  
 are approximately  
 Spot elevations in  
 feet  
 Scale 1:250,000







# Afghan-Pakistani Border Passes\*

- International boundary
- Inter: administrative boundary
- National capital
- Internal administrative capital
- Railroad
- Paved road
- Gravel road
- Natural surface road
- Track or trail
- Airfield

**Populated Places**

- Over 500,000
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Number of passes on the map are approximations  
Spot elevations in meters  
Scale 1:2,500,000

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