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2
EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

CIA INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY UNITED STATES/USSR
SUBJECT SOVIET REACTION TO 10 JUNE SPEECH OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
DOI 11 JUNE 1963
PADA
APPR
SOURCE

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1. THE SOVIETS WERE FAVORABLY SURPRISED BY THE TENOR OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY,S 10 JUNE SPEECH BECAUSE IT REFLECTED A BROAD PROGRESSIVE

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STATE (HUGHES)9 AD/NE [REDACTED] AD/CI DD/1 EXC

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APPROACH TOWARD SOLVING CURRENT PROBLEMS. THE ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY THIS SPEECH IS NOW SUCH THAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF AGREEING ON A TEST BAN TREATY ARE VERY GOOD. NO CHIEF OF STATE WOULD MAKE SUCH A SPEECH UNLESS HE WERE COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT AGREEMENT WAS PROBABLE.

THE ONLY PROBLEM IN THE PAST WHICH PREVENTED A TEST BAN TREATY WAS SOVIET DOUBT OF THE SINCERITY OF UNITED STATES INTENTIONS TO ENTER INTO SUCH AN AGREEMENT. IF THE SOVIETS WERE SURE OF UNITED STATES SINCERITY, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEMS -- INCLUDING THAT OF INSPECTIONS -- WHICH COULD NOT BE SOLVED. PRESIDENT KENNEDY,S SPEECH HAS GONE A LONG WAY TOWARD ASSUAGING SOVIET DOUBTS OF UNITED STATES SINCERITY.

2. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS GENERALLY LIKED THE SPEECH VERY MUCH, THEY DEFINITELY DISLIKED THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY MENTIONED THE COMMUNISTS AS BEING SOURCES OF WORLD TENSION. THE SOVIETS ALSO DISLIKED THE COMMENTS RELEVANT TO WEST BERLIN. HOWEVER, IN SPITE OF THESE OBJECTIONS, THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT THE SPEECH HAS CREATED AN EXCELLENT ATMOSPHERE. SOVIET SECRETARIAT EMPLOYEES BELIEVE THAT PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV WILL MAKE A GESTURE IN RESPONSE TO THIS SPEECH.

3. CONTRARY TO WHAT MAY BE THOUGHT, PRESIDENT KENNEDY,S SPEECH WILL NOT INCREASE TENSION BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND COMMUNIST CHINA. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WEST IN MOSCOW WILL BE TAKING PLACE AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THAT DELEGATES FROM COMMUNIST CHINA WILL BE ARRIVING IN MOSCOW. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WEST WILL ACTUALLY HELP THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN

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THE SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE. MOREOVER, THE CHINESE ARE NOT COMING TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS BUT TO "PATCH" THESE DIFFERENCES UP.

4. THE SOVIET SECRETARIAT EMPLOYEE QUESTIONED WHY PRESIDENT KENNEDY SHOULD WANT TO INTRODUCE THE PROBLEM OF WEST BERLIN AND THE BERLIN WALL BY VISITING THE WALL AT A TIME WHEN HIS SPEECH HAS CREATED SUCH A FAVORABLE AND RESPONSIVE CLIMATE IN THE SOVIET UNION. THROUGH EMPHASIZING THE PROBLEM OF WEST BERLIN AND THE BERLIN WALL, PRESIDENT KENNEDY WOULD SIMPLY CREATE NEW TENSIONS AND JEOPARDIZE A CURRENTLY FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE.

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COMMENT. AN EMPLOYEE OF THE SOVIET PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON 10 JUNE MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME REMARKS AS THOSE ABOVE ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY,S SPEECH, ALMOST WORD FOR WORD. HE ALSO SAID, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA,S BEING A BONE OF CONTENTION IN SINO-SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A DETENTE, THAT THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT WAS A PROBLEM BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIETS AND THAT YUGOSLAVIA WOULD NOT BECOME A CAUSE CELEBRE BETWEEN THE TWO. RATHER, EACH COUNTRY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO HAVE WHATEVER RELATIONSHIP IT MIGHT CHOOSE WITH YUGOSLAVIA. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT GO ON DELIGHTING THE WEST WITH THE SPECTACLE OF A CHICOM-SOVIET RIFT, AND THAT THE MEETING IN MOSCOW BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS CAN ONLY BE A STEP FORWARD./

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