

Director of Central Intelligence



Special National Intelligence Estimate

~~Secret~~  
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

# Prospects for South Africa: Stability, Reform, and Violence

Key Judgments

~~Secret~~

SNIE 73.2-85  
August 1985

Copy

000

**APPROVED FOR RELEASE**

4/01 b1 b3


8

Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY-	NFIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . .-	This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to . . .
FGI-	Foreign Government Information



~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN NOCONTRACT

SNIE 73.2-85

PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA:  
STABILITY, REFORM, AND VIOLENCE

KEY JUDGMENTS

The full text of this Estimate  
is being published separately  
with regular distribution.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:*

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

*Also Participating:*

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

~~SECRET~~

## SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate assesses the prospects for stability, reform, and violence in South Africa during the next year and for the remainder of the 1980s. Such an Estimate is called for in light of developments in South Africa during the last year that include:

- The worst outbreak of black unrest in South Africa's modern history.
- Hundreds of attacks by blacks against nonwhites who "collaborate" with the government.
- The declaration of a state of emergency in riot-torn areas.
- Some socioeconomic reforms by the ruling white minority, and the beginning of political reforms designed to bring the blacks into the government at the local, regional, and ultimately the national levels.
- Growing international pressure on South Africa to abandon apartheid.

The paper addresses those factors that will be critical in determining the future course of events in South Africa. These include:

- The level and nature of black unrest.
- White resolve and the security resources of the state.
- The government's reform strategy.
- The rightwing threat to the ruling National Party.
- The economic outlook.
- Capabilities of black protest groups.
- Efforts by the Soviets to exploit Pretoria's problems.
- Western reactions—including sanctions—to developments in South Africa.

The Estimate also examines the effectiveness of the government's program of racial reform and the prospects for evolutionary versus revolutionary change in South Africa during the next five years. The paper does not address in detail Soviet intentions in southern Africa or South Africa's regional role, issues analyzed in recent Estimates.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> NIE 73-84, *South Africa and Its Regional Policies Through the 1990s*, November 1984, and NIE 11/70-85, *Soviet Policies in Southern Africa*, February 1985.

## KEY JUDGMENTS

The white minority government, relying primarily on the coercive actions of its security forces, will be able to restore a semblance of order in the black townships during the next year. *We believe that over the next five years Pretoria's economic, political, and military resources are sufficient to avert the collapse of the white regime.* However, a rough stretch of road lies ahead. We believe the black townships will remain tinderboxes during the next five years, with antigovernment sentiment and socioeconomic pressures prompting more episodic but containable violence.

*At the same time, we must acknowledge internal and external variables beyond the capacity of Pretoria to control that might fundamentally change the attitudes of blacks and set in motion a series of events that would have an impact impossible to forecast but that could seriously threaten the white minority government.* A new breed of black youths may emerge who are determined to continue and escalate their low-level war of the last year. Antigovernment groups may be sustained by the belief that the government's reforms as well as growing international pressures are a direct result of their protest efforts. Moreover, if unforeseen developments limit Pretoria's ability to suppress unrest or stabilize the economy, white resolve could begin to crumble, especially if there is a white perception that the West has abandoned South Africa. A white regime that realized it no longer held the initiative might be forced to cut a new and more equitable political deal with blacks or risk plunging South Africa into a bloody civil war.

The government's reform program is likely to achieve no better than mixed results during the next five years. The program is an evolutionary one intended to reduce tensions and lessen the chances of a single isolated incident triggering nationwide disturbances on the scale of the Sharpeville unrest in 1960, the Soweto riots in 1976-77, and the recent violence. The program may co-opt some blacks, but we believe the stigma attached to being a collaborator will make it difficult for Pretoria to persuade influential blacks to participate in any limited power-sharing system.

Nevertheless, we believe President Botha will forge ahead with his own agenda of reforms, including revision of laws restricting the movement of blacks, while continuing to study alternative political systems that retain white control and expand black rights. Over the next year, Botha is likely to announce steps leading to the establishment of a

~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT

confederal system linking the central government and the homelands; a national advisory body for blacks outside the homelands; and a multiracial government for the KwaZulu-Natal Province region. Conscious of his image with the white electorate, however, he is unlikely to implement major political changes until the unrest abates.

Overall, the government probably will have to rely more on its security resources than on its reform initiatives to protect its stability, especially in the short term. Pretoria's massive internal security apparatus will continue to be able to contain most violence in the black townships, the majority of which are located a great distance from white areas. We estimate, for example, that 1 in 8 South African whites—that is, some 600,000 men and women—participates at least part time in some aspect of internal security or defense, and that Pretoria is likely to carry through with plans for a substantial buildup of its police manpower to avoid calling in the Army in future disturbances.

The fundamental causes of black unrest will still exist. High black unemployment, poor living conditions in the townships, police excesses, widespread dissatisfaction with black schools, and a heightened political consciousness among blacks as a result of their exclusion from the multiracial government—which includes Coloreds and Indians—that was established last year will continue to create a climate conducive to violent protest in black townships.

Black militancy, especially among youths, is likely to increase and may represent more of a threat to the government's interests than the guerrilla campaign of the African National Congress (ANC). Thus far, the unrest has been perpetrated largely by black youths who have little organization. Despite government allegations, the vast majority are not under the direct control of the late antigovernment groups, although the rhetoric of these groups has helped raise the level of political consciousness in the townships. The unprecedented level of attacks on black "collaborators" and their families by other blacks is likely to remain a common feature of black protests.

While Botha will face political criticism and challenge from those in the white community demanding both more and less change, his control of the white political structures and his overall support in the white electorate are likely to remain strong. Aware of the failures of grand apartheid policies to guarantee white security, Botha will continue his "adapt or die" rhetoric in an effort to strengthen the now majority of the white constituency that favors gradual reform. While the ruling National Party under Botha's direction has skillfully fostered a broad coalition of whites who support its reform program, general elections, expected to take place in 1989, will provide a major test.

~~SECRET~~

Botha must balance calls for reform with an image of a strong leader, unpressured and in total control, or risk a rapid unraveling of his white coalition.

Deteriorating security conditions over time could create new opportunities for the right wing to gain support among many Afrikaners who already view Botha's reforms as the first step on the slippery slope leading to black majority rule. The right wing will benefit if white disenchantment with the government's economic policies continues to grow and if Botha institutes costly new programs for blacks at the expense of white taxpayers. While the threat of a white backlash from the right cannot be discounted, we believe Botha has the political skill and support to blunt a serious challenge from whites frustrated over the scope and pace of reform.

During the remainder of this decade, South Africa's average annual rate of real economic growth probably will be no more than 3 percent, and could be lower if the price of gold falls or the world economic recovery slows sharply. If this forecast holds true, South Africa's already grim black unemployment rate—about 25 percent—will rise. Economic sanctions and sustained violence are likely to have only a limited immediate impact on South Africa's economy, but they hurt investor confidence, encourage more capital flight, slow growth, and shake white resolve.

The outlook for the most important black groups is mixed:

- The black protest movement's main weakness will continue to be its lack of unity. Ideological disputes, tribal splits, a wide generation gap, urban-rural divisions, and government divide-and-rule tactics will remain potent factors limiting the ability of these groups to challenge the government.
- The rapidly growing black labor movement will become increasingly politicized, and will test Pretoria by further experimenting with antigovernment protests. Black union activity will continue to be tempered by its vulnerability to government countermeasures.
- The military wing of the ANC, the most popular group among blacks, has been dealt several major setbacks in the region in the last year and probably will not become a military threat to the government. The group's bombing campaign is likely to continue, however, and may result in more incidental white casualties than in the past.
- Prospects for the multiracial United Democratic Front are dim, as the government appears determined either to ban the group or to use stepped-up harassment tactics to keep it under control.



~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN/NO CONTRACT

— The government may be able to co-opt Chief Buthelezi's influential Zulu group, Inkatha, by inviting it to participate in a federal system in Natal Province.

Washington's relations with Pretoria are likely to be problematic during the period of this Estimate. Apartheid critics in the United States and around the world will continue to highlight the inferior political status of nonwhites in South Africa and the repressive methods Pretoria is likely to use to suppress the almost inevitable outbreaks of violence.

~~SECRET~~



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

~~Secret~~  
NOFORN

# Prospects for South Africa: Stability, Reform, and Violence

Special National Intelligence Estimate

~~Secret~~

SIIE 73.2-85  
August 1985


Copy 000

Warning Notice  
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved  
(W/NINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY-	NFIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . .-	This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to . . .
FGI-	Foreign Government Information



A microfiche copy of this document is available from CCR/DLE (351-7177); printed copies from CPAS/IMC (351-5203). Regular receipt of DI reports in either microfiche or printed form can also be arranged through CPAS/IMC.

~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/ORCON

SNIE 73.2-85

PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA:  
STABILITY, REFORM, AND VIOLENCE

Information available as of 29 August 1985 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 22 August 1985

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN~~

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:*

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Treasury.

*Also Participating:*

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army  
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy  
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

~~SECRET~~

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
SCOPE NOTE.....	1
KEY JUDGMENTS.....	2
DISCUSSION.....	7
Introduction.....	7
Key Developments Leading to State of Emergency.....	7
Botha Offers Limited Reform.....	7
The Unrest and Its Causes.....	8
Trends in the Violence.....	10
Critical Factors Affecting Future Course of Events.....	11
Prospects for Reform.....	11
Level and Nature of Unrest.....	15
White Resolve.....	17
Nonwhite Political Dynamic.....	18
The Soviet Role and Strategy.....	21
Outlook.....	22
Short Term (One Year).....	22
Long Term (Next Five Years).....	23
Prerequisites for a Government Collapse—A Worst Case Scenario.....	23
Implications for the United States.....	24
ANNEX A: The Decline of Grand Apartheid.....	25
ANNEX B: Background on Soweto and Sharpeville Violence.....	27
ANNEX C: South African Security Capabilities.....	29
ANNEX D: Indicators of Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change	31

## SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate assesses the prospects for stability, reform, and violence in South Africa during the next year and for the remainder of the 1980s. Such an Estimate is called for in light of developments in South Africa during the last year that include:

- The worst outbreak of black unrest in South Africa's modern history.
- Hundreds of attacks by blacks against nonwhites who "collaborate" with the government.
- The declaration of a state of emergency in riot-torn areas.
- Some socioeconomic reforms by the ruling white minority, and the beginning of political reforms designed to bring the blacks into the government at the local, regional, and ultimately the national levels.
- Growing international pressure on South Africa to abandon apartheid.


The paper addresses those factors that will be critical in determining the future course of events in South Africa. These include:

- The level and nature of black unrest.
- White resolve and the security resources of the state.
- The government's reform strategy.
- The rightwing threat to the ruling National Party.
- The economic outlook.
- Capabilities of black protest groups.
- Efforts by the Soviets to exploit Pretoria's problems.
- Western reactions—including sanctions—to developments in South Africa.

The Estimate also examines the effectiveness of the government's program of racial reform and the prospects for evolutionary versus revolutionary change in South Africa during the next five years. The paper does not address in detail Soviet intentions in southern Africa or South Africa's regional role, issues analyzed in recent Estimates.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> NIE 73-94, *South Africa and Its Regional Policies Through the 1980s*, November 1984, and NIE 11/70-85, *Soviet Policies in Southern Africa*, February 1985.

Figure 1  
Black Homelands and Area Affected by State of Emergency and Unrest



965742 (AG2333) 8-85



## KEY JUDGMENTS

The white minority government, relying primarily on the coercive actions of its security forces, will be able to restore a semblance of order in the black townships during the next year. *We believe that over the next five years Pretoria's economic, political, and military resources are sufficient to avert the collapse of the white regime.* However, a rough stretch of road lies ahead. We believe the black townships will remain tinderboxes during the next five years, with antigovernment sentiment and socioeconomic pressures prompting more episodic but containable violence.

*At the same time, we must acknowledge internal and external variables beyond the capacity of Pretoria to control that might fundamentally change the attitudes of blacks and set in motion a series of events that would have an impact impossible to forecast but that could seriously threaten the white minority government.* A new breed of black youths may emerge who are determined to continue and escalate their low-level war of the last year. Antigovernment groups may be sustained by the belief that the government's reforms as well as growing international pressures are a direct result of their protest efforts. Moreover, if unforeseen developments limit Pretoria's ability to suppress unrest or stabilize the economy, white resolve could begin to crumble, especially if there is a white perception that the West has abandoned South Africa. A white regime that realized it no longer held the initiative might be forced to cut a new and more equitable political deal with blacks or risk plunging South Africa into a bloody civil war.

The government's reform program is likely to achieve no better than mixed results during the next five years. The program is an evolutionary one intended to reduce tensions and lessen the chances of a single isolated incident triggering nationwide disturbances on the scale of the Sharpeville unrest in 1960, the Soweto riots in 1976-77, and the recent violence. The program may co-opt some blacks, but we believe the stigma attached to being a collaborator will make it difficult for Pretoria to persuade influential blacks to participate in any limited power-sharing system.

Nevertheless, we believe President Botha will forge ahead with his own agenda of reforms, including revision of laws restricting the movement of blacks, while continuing to study alternative political systems that retain white control and expand black rights. Over the next year, Botha is likely to announce steps leading to the establishment of a

confederal system linking the central government and the homelands; a national advisory body for blacks outside the homelands; and a multiracial government for the KwaZulu-Natal Province region. Conscious of his image with the white electorate, however, he is unlikely to implement major political changes until the unrest abates.

Overall, the government probably will have to rely more on its security resources than on its reform initiatives to protect its stability, especially in the short term. Pretoria's massive internal security apparatus will continue to be able to contain most violence in the black townships, the majority of which are located a great distance from white areas. We estimate, for example, that 1 in 8 South African whites—that is, some 600,000 men and women—participates at least part time in some aspect of internal security or defense, and that Pretoria is likely to carry through with plans for a substantial buildup of its police manpower to avoid calling in the Army in future disturbances.

The fundamental causes of black unrest will still exist. High black unemployment, poor living conditions in the townships, police excesses, widespread dissatisfaction with black schools, and a heightened political consciousness among blacks as a result of their exclusion from the multiracial government—which includes Coloreds and Indians—that was established last year will continue to create a climate conducive to violent protest in black townships.

Black militancy, especially among youths, is likely to increase and may represent more of a threat to the government's interests than the guerrilla campaign of the African National Congress (ANC). Thus far, the unrest has been perpetrated largely by black youths who have little organization. Despite government allegations, the vast majority are not under the direct control of the large antigovernment groups, although the rhetoric of these groups has helped raise the level of political consciousness in the townships. The unprecedented level of attacks on black "collaborators" and their families by other blacks is likely to remain a common feature of black protests.

While Botha will face political criticism and challenge from those in the white community demanding both more and less change, his control of the white political structures and his overall support in the white electorate are likely to remain strong. Aware of the failures of grand apartheid policies to guarantee white security, Botha will continue his "adapt or die" rhetoric in an effort to strengthen the now majority of the white constituency that favors gradual reform. While the ruling National Party under Botha's direction has skillfully fostered a broad coalition of whites who support its reform program, general elections, expected to take place in 1989, will provide a major test.

Botha must balance calls for reform with an image of a strong leader, unpressured and in total control, or risk a rapid unraveling of his white coalition.

Deteriorating security conditions over time could create new opportunities for the right wing to gain support among many Afrikaners who already view Botha's reforms as the first step on the slippery slope leading to black majority rule. The right wing will benefit if white disenchantment with the government's economic policies continues to grow and if Botha institutes costly new programs for blacks at the expense of white taxpayers. While the threat of a white backlash from the right cannot be discounted, we believe Botha has the political skill and support to blunt a serious challenge from whites frustrated over the scope and pace of reform.

During the remainder of this decade, South Africa's average annual rate of real economic growth probably will be no more than 3 percent, and could be lower if the price of gold falls or the world economic recovery slows sharply. If this forecast holds true, South Africa's already grim black unemployment rate—about 25 percent—will rise. Economic sanctions and sustained violence are likely to have only a limited immediate impact on South Africa's economy, but they hurt investor confidence, encourage more capital flight, slow growth, and shake white resolve.

The outlook for the most important black groups is mixed:

- The black protest movement's main weakness will continue to be its lack of unity. Ideological disputes, tribal splits, a wide generation gap, urban-rural divisions, and government divide-and-rule tactics will remain potent factors limiting the ability of these groups to challenge the government.
- The rapidly growing black labor movement will become increasingly politicized, and will test Pretoria by further experimenting with antigovernment protests. Black union activity will continue to be tempered by its vulnerability to government countermeasures.
- The military wing of the ANC, the most popular group among blacks, has been dealt several major setbacks in the region in the last year and probably will not become a military threat to the government. The group's bombing campaign is likely to continue, however, and may result in more incidental white casualties than in the past.
- Prospects for the multiracial United Democratic Front are dim, as the government appears determined either to ban the group or to use stepped-up harassment tactics to keep it under control.

~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/ORCON

— The government may be able to co-opt Chief Buthelezi's influential Zulu group, Inkatha, by inviting it to participate in a federal system in Natal Province.

Washington's relations with Pretoria are likely to be problematic during the period of this Estimate. Apartheid critics in the United States and around the world will continue to highlight the inferior political status of nonwhites in South Africa and the repressive methods Pretoria is likely to use to suppress the almost inevitable outbreaks of violence.

~~SECRET~~

## DISCUSSION

### Introduction

1. The ruling National Party under President P. W. Botha has embarked in recent years on a new course of racial reform that represents a departure from some of the rigid tenets of orthodox apartheid. (See annex A.) Chief among the changes has been Pretoria's pledge to bring blacks into the political system "at the highest possible level." The white minority regime's strategy is to use limited political and economic concessions to coopt a large portion of the black majority while maintaining and strengthening overall white control. Botha's reforms are intended to lessen black resentment of the government, forged during decades of harsh apartheid rule, and to manage the rapidly growing black population more efficiently and with less conflict.


2. Black anger over severe and worsening economic conditions, coupled with the continued exclusion of blacks from the national political system, led to outbreaks of unrest beginning in September 1984. The unrest continued and increased during the next 11 months, prompting the declaration on 20 July 1985 of a state of emergency in selected areas. Relations between the black community and the government have worsened during the last year as a result of Pretoria's often heavyhanded efforts to end the unrest and its refusal to propose a specific agenda on expanding black political rights. The violence has raised questions among many observers of the South African scene about the stability and longevity of the white regime, and about the prospects for its reform strategy.

### Key Developments Leading to State of Emergency

#### Botha Offers Limited Reform

3. The government's reforms to date have not fundamentally altered the racial allocation of power in South Africa, but they have created a momentum for further changes. We believe President Botha's program of limited racial reform is designed to help Pretoria better manage its many problems involving blacks while maintaining white control. Pretoria's domestic policies have always been driven by demographics: already outnumbering whites by almost 6 to 1, the nonwhite population is growing rapidly. (See figure 2.) Botha is well aware of the failure of past

**Figure 2**  
Expected Growth in South African Population



205515 3 85

grand apartheid policies to guarantee white security in the face of an increasingly restive black population. Large numbers of whites were genuinely alarmed by the unrest in 1976-77. Botha's "adapt or die" rhetoric, which grew out of these events, has come to be accepted by most white South Africans, creating a constituency for gradual reform.

4. We believe Botha's strategy is to use a mix of incentives and regulations to keep much of the black

population within the homelands while fostering a more stable black urban working class that enjoys expanded political rights and improved living conditions and schools in the townships. Botha hopes, in our view, that this urban class will develop its own political and economic stake in defending the system against those bent on using violence to secure more radical changes. In addition, he also probably envisions that his efforts to co-opt urban blacks will improve South Africa's pariah status in the international community. Pretoria, meanwhile, is likely to try to preserve the conservative character of rural blacks by continuing subsidies and reinforcing traditional tribal rule.

5. *New Constitution.* The two new houses of Parliament (Colored and Indian) established last year have functioned with little difficulty and have offered no real challenge to the white government. Only about 16 percent of eligible Coloreds and Indians voted in elections last August for new Colored and Indian chambers in the segregated tricameral Parliament. The low turnout was largely a result of traditional apathy in the two communities reinforced by a nationwide boycott campaign by antigovernment groups protesting the exclusion of blacks from the system.

6. *Black Political Rights.* Botha this year has made several landmark statements—most recently on 15 August—on the political status of blacks. He has changed government policies on the homelands to make "independence" optional, although stressing that homeland independence is still the government's preference. While he has not made a definitive offer, Botha has hinted that residents of "independent" black homelands could regain their South African citizenship.<sup>1</sup> This might pave the way for bringing the black homelands into a limited power-sharing arrangement with the white minority regime at the national level. Botha announced two months ago that he will hold summit meetings with homeland leaders in November to discuss ways of "improving government structures." He has refrained from publicly speculating on the details of a new system, but an unpublished report by a special Cabinet committee last year revealed that Pretoria is considering a confederal-style system with the white government and the independent homelands as full members, and the other homelands as associate members. Under such a system, we

<sup>1</sup> By 1970, all blacks had been designated as citizens of one of the homelands, while retaining their South African nationality under a 1949 law. However, when a homeland becomes "independent," as four of the 10 have done to date, its residents lose their South African nationality and legal rights.

believe homelands officials would continue to administer homeland residents in much the same way as they do now, but presumably would gain a limited voice in some national issues affecting South Africa.

7. Botha has invited black leaders who would renounce "violent methods" of prompting change to join in talks with the government on establishing a new political system that also expands the rights of blacks outside the homelands. Most black leaders, however, have been reluctant to talk to the government because they are skeptical about the prospects for a productive dialogue, are angry at Pretoria's refusal to propose publicly a specific agenda for talks, and are afraid of being branded "collaborators." In the last year, blacks have drawn an increasingly sharper line between nonwhites with ties to the government and those outside the system.

#### The Unrest and Its Causes

8. Coincident with Botha's unveiling of the new multiracial Parliament in September 1984, widespread riots broke out in the black townships south of Johannesburg. The unrest was touched off when township residents staged large-scale protests in response to a 10-percent rent increase (about \$3 a month). Before the increase, residents in these townships already faced a higher cost of living than in any other black area in the country. Some 30 blacks were killed in the first two days of rioting in clashes with the police. Their deaths triggered a cycle of violent protests by blacks and reprisals by security forces that spread to nearby townships. The riots tapered off in late November, following large-scale arrests of black protestors and activists. Some 160 blacks died during the three months of unrest. (See inset.)

9. Violence broke out again in January 1985, but was centered mainly in the eastern Cape Province where school boycotts were occurring as student groups protested the arrests of youth leaders. In March 1985, the police shot into a large crowd of blacks who intended to transit a nearby white area (Uitenhage) to get to a funeral for riot victims in an adjacent black township; at least 20 blacks were killed. The angry reaction to this helped to fuel more unrest, particularly in the eastern Cape townships, over the next months. In Soweto, South Africa's largest black township and a center of black activism, there was relative calm until mid-July, when riots erupted. Three days later, Pretoria—apparently motivated by memories of the drawn-out violence in Soweto eight years ago—declared a state of emergency in the riot-torn areas of Transvaal and Cape Provinces.

Key Events During Unrest

1984

**22-23 August**

Elections for Colored and Indian chambers of Parliament; police clash with nonwhites calling for an election boycott.

**2-5 September**

Thirty-one blacks killed by police during riots in area south of Johannesburg to protest rent hike.

**23 October**

Seven thousand soldiers and police enter Sebokeng and two nearby townships in Transvaal Province; hundreds of blacks arrested.

**5-6 November**

Hundreds of thousands of black workers observe two-day general strike in Transvaal Province; some 25 blacks killed and 13 strike organizers arrested.

**December**

Riots dissipate in Transvaal townships; rent boycott continues in area south of Johannesburg.

1985

**February**

Rioting erupts in eastern Cape Province townships hit hard by recession.

**18-21 February**

Eighteen blacks killed and over 250 injured in riots provoked by rumor of government plan to relocate Crossroads shantytown residents.

**21 March**

Police open fire on crowd of blacks marching to attend funeral near Uitenhage, killing at least 20.

**28 June**

Six blacks killed by grenades rigged to explode prematurely; many blacks believe police posing as guerrillas gave the boobytrapped grenades to inexperienced activists.

**28 June**

Four activists murdered in eastern Cape Province; widely believed to have been killed by government agents.

**15 July**

Black consumer boycott of white shops begins in eastern Cape Province.

**17 July**

Riots erupt in Soweto, country's largest black township.

**20 July**

State of emergency declared.

**31 July**

Restrictions placed on funerals for riot victims.

**5-10 August**

Riots, including large-scale confrontations between Indians and Zulus, break out in Indian and black townships near Durban; 69 dead.

**10-14 August**

Consumer boycott spreads to Johannesburg-Pretoria area and western Cape Province.

10. Many direct and indirect causes have prompted the unrest. South Africa's black townships are tinderboxes because of socioeconomic pressures and non-white resentment of apartheid.

11. Underlying factors contributing to the high volatility of the townships include the following:

- The economic progress made by urban blacks over the last decade has slowed considerably in recent years during South Africa's worst recession since the 1930s, which has hit blacks in eastern Cape Province especially hard. Nationwide, the black unemployment rate is 25 percent.
- The political consciousness of urban blacks has been raised by the vigorous criticism of the government's political proposals by antigovernment groups.
- Black urban areas have a high concentration of bored, unemployed youths who sometimes enjoy

sparking confrontations with the police. Half of South Africa's black population is under the age of 18. Households in which the father and mother both hold jobs are common, and many parents admit they cannot control their children.

- Education ranks as a prime concern of most urban blacks, and there is widespread dissatisfaction in the black community over the poor quality of the schools, which since the early 1970s have been centers of organization for disgruntled black youth.
- The normal complement of police in the townships is inadequate to prevent flareups.
- Intrablack rivalries and black resentment of the more privileged position of other nonwhites can lead to flareups when these groups live in proximity, as has recently happened in the Durban area.

### Trends in the Violence

12. *Attacks on Collaborators.* Blacks have displayed during the unrest a new militancy that is unlikely to fade away completely, and represents more of a threat to the government's interests than the guerrilla campaign of the African National Congress (ANC). The most dramatic evidence of growing black militancy has been the unprecedented level of attacks on black, Colored, and Indian collaborators and their families. During the past year, mobs have murdered at least 18 black councilors and police and have attacked the homes of over 50 collaborators. These attacks may be the most effective protest tactic ever in terms of gaining worldwide media attention and disrupting government plans.

13. One result of these attacks has been the collapse of Pretoria's black town council system. The system of directly elected local black officials supervised by regional white "development boards" was envisaged as partial compensation to urban blacks for their exclusion from the new multiracial Parliament. During the period from September 1984 to June 1985, at least 240 black councilors resigned under pressure, and 29 of 32 black councils set up in 1983 are now defunct. Even before the violence erupted, many black councilors had been accused by township residents of maladministration and corruption, and most blacks were deeply unhappy with the services provided by the councils. The councils, which were expected to be virtually self-sufficient, lack adequate funds to maintain the townships and have accumulated huge budget deficits.

14. *Interorganizational Attacks.* Black-against-black violence also has broken out in the last year among several important nonwhite political groups, including the multiracial United Democratic Front (UDF), the black-consciousness-oriented Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), and Chief Buthelezi's powerful Zulu organization, Inkatha. These organizations are competing for influence in the black community, and their supporters have long been at odds for ideological and political reasons. The simmering rivalries recently have boiled over into violent attacks and retaliations.

15. The violence among black groups has not posed any major threat to the stability of the government, which has strived for decades to sow divisions in and among black protest groups as well as in the larger black community. At times, Pretoria has even helped one black activist faction at the expense of another.

For example, in 1983 the police permitted AZAPO to establish a higher profile in South Africa to counter growing support for groups such as the ANC and the UDF. From Pretoria's perspective, the only negative aspect of the intergroup violence this year has been the widespread belief among many outside observers, as well as blacks familiar with the government's divide-and-rule tactics, that Pretoria somehow is behind it.

16. *Security Tactics.* Police antiriot measures employed during the unrest have varied in severity and effectiveness, depending in part on the area of the country involved. Antiriot squads often have consisted of raw recruits with little experience or training who have used live ammunition rather than birdshot or rubber bullets. The police in eastern Cape Province have at times appeared to be out of control and have been a target of international criticism. There have been numerous incidents involving casualties when police confronted crowds, most dramatically at Uitenhage in March 1985. An official inquiry of the Uitenhage incident revealed that the police sent to intercept the crowd were not in as great a degree of danger as the government had claimed earlier. In Durban, meanwhile, where the local police have long had better relations with the nonwhite community, outbreaks of violence have been handled with minimum force.

17. Other security measures employed during the unrest include the following:

— A state of emergency was declared in 36 magisterial districts on 20 July that empowers the police and Army to search and arrest without warrants and allows for indefinite detentions. Curfews are in effect in several of the riot-torn areas, and restrictions have been placed on the funerals of riot victims, which frequently have turned into large-scale antigovernment demonstrations in the last year.<sup>2</sup>

— The Army has supported the police by manning roadblocks, helping to seal off townships, and participating in joint patrols and large house-to-house sweep operations. The biggest sweep operation occurred on 23 October 1984, when 7,000

<sup>2</sup> Since 1976, outdoor gatherings of more than 12 people in South Africa have required authorization by the government. Nonwhites often seize on the opportunity provided by a funeral to stage mass political protests.



Army troops and policemen moved into Sebokeng, a black township south of Johannesburg that had been calm for several days following earlier riots. Soldiers lined the streets as police searched some 19,600 homes and arrested more than 350 blacks.


— Mass arrests have been used against crowds of rioters and to suppress antigovernment groups in general. In particular, the government has detained many leaders of the UDF, which Pretoria claims is behind much of the unrest in concert with the ANC. Overall, some 12,000 nonwhites have been arrested or detained since last September, most of whom have subsequently been released.

18. *Economic Impact of the Violence.* Black unrest and the threat of trade sanctions have weakened foreign investor confidence in South Africa's economic prospects and triggered capital flight, which has contributed to an outflow of \$2.2 billion in private capital during the last quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 1985 (see figure 3). The capital drain more than offset a strong current account surplus of \$800 million. Pretoria has said it will respond by maintaining fairly tight credit policies to rebuild foreign reserves and reduce inflation, now running at 16 percent. Following the government's restrictive policies, the impending loss of foreign financial credit, continuing high inflation, and the curtailment of economic activity by civil unrest and boycotts, real GDP will most likely decline this year. Although blacks bear the brunt of recession, slow growth and tight credit will reduce somewhat the purchasing power of middle-class whites.

#### Critical Factors Affecting Future Course of Events

19. South Africa's stability and political future will hinge on the interaction of the following critical factors. Their relative order of importance is open to debate and, in any event, is likely to change several times during the period of this Estimate, depending on the ebb and flow of domestic and international pressures on Pretoria. Factors examined include the prospects for reform, the level and nature of black unrest, white resolve, and the nonwhite political dynamic. Soviet influence among nonwhite South African groups and Moscow's activities against Pretoria also will be examined in this section, although at this time they are not as critical as other factors.

Figure 3  
South Africa: Selected Balance of Payments



~~NOFORN~~  
306493 8-85

#### Prospects for Reform

20. The government controls a powerful internal security apparatus and believes this will allow it time to pursue a long-term domestic strategy that includes an evolutionary expansion of nonwhite political rights and the improvement of black urban living conditions. As long as the white minority believes it can control black unrest, it is likely to view certain issues as nonnegotiable, thereby ensuring that antigovernment groups will continue to flourish. Government spokesmen in the last year have stated frequently that new political systems being considered must meet the minimum requirements of guaranteeing the white community both self-determination in its "own affairs" (education, health services, and so forth) and

safeguards to protect it from being dominated by nonwhites in decisions on national issues such as defense and foreign affairs. In essence, whites are seeking a limited power-sharing system that retains both white control and some features of apartheid, such as racially separate schools and residential areas.

21. The prevailing mood among large portions of the urban black community is intense anger at the government. That mood may soften somewhat in the next five years, but many blacks will remain sullen. In addition, economic conditions in South Africa during the remainder of this decade will not be conducive to upgrading urban black townships and schools on a large-scale basis or offsetting high unemployment among blacks. In monitoring the reaction of blacks to the government's reforms in the period of this Estimate, we must differentiate between the rhetoric of black leaders and the attitudes of the majority of blacks. Many militant black leaders are only concerned with the end game and their chief demands—such as a one-man, one-vote system that would enable blacks to dominate the government—have been rejected consistently by the government. These leaders have established a pattern during Botha's rule of rejecting all government concessions, including nonpolitical ones, as inadequate. What is more crucial is the reaction of the bulk of the black populace, especially as Pretoria's stability is only threatened when nonwhites in large numbers engage in violent protests.

22. The government's strategy may have some success in the period beyond the scope of this Estimate, but only if the living conditions of urban blacks improve substantially in the interim. The government is trying to persuade the restive urban black populace to be satisfied with a bigger—but not the biggest—slice of the political pie in return for limited improvements in townships and schools and a loosening of some of the strictures of apartheid.

23. The black reaction to social and economic reforms, therefore, may be as critical to Pretoria's plans as the predictable discontent among blacks over their inferior political status. The power of socioeconomic incentives in the black community can be substantial. For example, prior to July 1985, Soweto remained relatively calm for eight years despite its reputation as a center of black activism. This can be attributed in large part to the funds the government poured into Soweto following the riots in 1977 to improve schools and living conditions. It should be noted, however, that unrest reoccurred in Soweto in July 1985.

24. *Economic Constraints to Reform.* We believe that spontaneous outbreaks of violence resulting largely from the government's inability to satisfy black economic demands will compound the threat to Pretoria posed by the efforts of nonwhite groups to rally blacks to press for greater political rights. South Africa's likely economic performance in the period of this Estimate will severely constrain any government programs to improve the living conditions and schools of urban blacks. Economic austerity measures designed to prevent a large current account deficit and reduce persistent double-digit inflation will limit real economic growth and inhibit government spending on nonwhites.

25. During the remainder of the 1980s, South Africa's average annual rate of real economic growth probably will be no more than 3 percent, and could be lower if the price of gold falls, the world economic recovery slows sharply or strong Western sanctions are applied. The economy presently needs to grow at an annual rate of about 5 percent just to accommodate about 300,000 new jobseekers each year. Meanwhile, South Africa's black population is increasing at a rate of almost 3 percent a year, and an even higher annual economic growth rate will soon be required to keep pace with the demand for new jobs. This means that the government most likely will be struggling just to stay even, and may have to adopt a strategy of concentrating on the improvement of conditions in townships on a selective basis, focusing initially on the traditional trouble spots—like the eastern Cape Province.

26. *White Support for Reform.* Botha has demonstrated great political skill in developing a broad coalition of whites who support his reform program. (See inset.) He has presented his program in such a manner that many progressive whites believe they must endorse it or suffer the status quo, and many conservative whites believe they must support it or risk losing everything in time to a black revolution. The reform program passed its biggest test to date when two-thirds of white voters approved of the new multi-racial Constitution in a national referendum in November 1983. Moreover, an estimated 30 percent of those who voted against the new Constitution were proreformists protesting the exclusion of blacks from the new system. The next general elections, expected to take place in 1989, will be another major test for the reform program. In the interim, Botha must project an image of being unpressured and in total control over

Major Racial Reforms Announced in 1985

**January**

Moratorium on forced resettlement of black communities.

President Botha says urban blacks to be granted political rights at "highest possible level."

**February**

Plans canceled for relocating three black townships near Cape Town.

Blacks to be allowed greater freedom of movement without losing urban residential rights.

Crossroads shantytown to be upgraded rather than destroyed; some residents allowed to remain.

**March**

Plans abandoned to move five black townships from "white area" of Natal Province to black homeland.

**April**

Blacks with 99-year leasehold rights to become eligible for freehold rights.

Revisions to be made in system that controls movements of blacks.

Government considering extending South African citizenship to include blacks officially regarded as foreign citizens of "independent" homelands.

**May**

Racial job restrictions in mines to be abandoned next year.

Ban on multiracial political parties to be dropped.

Plans abandoned to move to homelands all black townships within 50 kilometers of a homeland.

Some central business districts in "white" areas to be opened to all races as early as September.

**June**

Ban on marriages and sexual relations between whites and nonwhites overturned; some 17,000 cases had been prosecuted under these laws.

More classes of train coaches to be opened to all races on 1 September.

**August**

Blacks in nonindependent homelands to be given choice of South African or homeland citizenships.

Botha hints at regional power-sharing system, perhaps referring to plans for joint Kwazulu homeland-Natal Provincial administration rule in Natal Province.

First Regional Service Councils to be set up on 1 January 1986; will consist of local authorities of all races in metropolitan areas and will be responsible for public services; designed to increase benefits to black townships.

the direction and rate of change, or risk seeing his coalition of white support vanish quickly.

27. Whites, however, already hard hit by inflation, recent tax hikes, and credit restrictions, are likely to be unwilling to foot the bill for costly racial reforms in the near term. Pretoria, therefore, will try to sustain the momentum of reform by implementing changes that do not cost very much but are designed to have symbolic value to nonwhites, such as Botha's announcement on 15 August confirming South African citizenship to blacks in the "nonindependent" homelands. Botha capitalized on white fears following the Soweto riots in 1976-77 to launch his reform program; he may be able to use white nervousness over the recent spate of unrest to move faster—especially on political issues—than otherwise would have been possible. Pretoria also can be expected to try to convince whites that they will have to tighten their belts more, and even accept a lower standard of living, if they are to avoid becoming embroiled in a chaotic domestic situation of persistent black unrest. However, the most likely trend is that Pretoria will spend substantially

larger funds on blacks only during the good years in the economic cycle rather than risk a major erosion of white support.

28. The long-term future of the reform program and its appeal among whites will hinge to a large degree on the popularity and political talents of Botha's successor. Botha, 69, is not expected to remain active in politics after the next general elections, which must take place by 1989. Although Botha is head of the National Party and extremely powerful, he cannot simply choose his successor; Botha's candidate must satisfy a party caucus. A leading candidate to replace Botha at this time, in our judgment, is Minister of Education and Development Aid Gerrit Viljoen, who is strongly supportive of Botha's reform efforts, but is not as dynamic a figure. Nonetheless, he probably is capable of keeping most of the National Party intact and moving forward with reform, as would Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, another leading contender.

29. The reform program may falter if a more conservative National Party candidate—like F. W. De Klerk, National Party head in the Transvaal—gains the leadership post. A conservative Nationalist in power may choose to suspend indefinitely many reforms now being considered in a futile effort to restore Afrikaner unity. Even if a more progressive candidate wins the top spot, he may be forced to slow the pace of reform until he is confident he controls the same support that Botha now enjoys.

30. *The Rightwing Threat.* Botha's policies have created new opportunities for the right wing to gain support among many Afrikaners who view his reforms as the first step on the slippery slope leading to black majority rule. We believe that the right wing will remain a threat during the period of this Estimate, but that the National Party most likely will win the next general elections by a comfortable margin, although probably not as convincingly as in the last elections in 1981.

31. The National Party is still experiencing trauma as a result of its shift away from orthodox apartheid. The controversy over Botha's reforms has split Afrikaner political, cultural, and religious institutions, and has revitalized the white right wing in recent years. While the National Party is losing some of its traditional Afrikaner support in rural areas, it is picking up new support from English-speaking whites in urban areas, enabling it to retain its tremendous popularity overall and its hold on the government. (See figure 4.) In the past two years, the two rightwing parties—the Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party—won approximately 40 percent of the popular vote in 18 byelections held in districts composed mainly of Afrikaners.

32. The National Party continues to hold an edge in support in its traditional stronghold of Transvaal Province, but the regions north of Pretoria may turn increasingly to the rightwing parties. Botha himself believes the rightwing parties would win as many as 20 additional seats in the white chamber of Parliament if national elections were held today, although this would not threaten the huge majority now enjoyed by the National Party. He also must protect against conservative Nationalists in Parliament switching over to a rightwing party. The Conservative Party was formed in March 1982 by 16 former Nationalists who opposed Botha's plans for bringing nonwhites into the government.

**Figure 4**  
**South African National Party Strength**

**Current Distribution of Seats in Parliamentary Chamber**


Number/Percent

New Republic Party 5/3

Conservative Party 18/10

Progressive Federal Party 27/15

National Party 128/72



Total seats = 178

**Independent Survey of Party Support Over Past Three Years**

Percent

60

55

50

45

40

35

30

25


20

15

10

5

0



306514 8 25

33. The right wing also may be able to capitalize politically on white dissatisfaction over economic downturns and the government's economic policies. A recent nationwide poll of whites indicates that the government's economic policies—including a 40-percent hike in the cost of gasoline in January 1985—are the biggest single cause of dissatisfaction among those who describe themselves as increasingly disenchanted with the government. South Africa's 70,000 white farmers, meanwhile, are unhappy with agricultural prices set by Pretoria, high interest rates, and inflation.

34. As the government moves forward with its reform program and the polarization of the white community intensifies, militant white conservatives may become more active in using extralegal means to undercut the reform process. Last year, there were over 100 incidents of low-level intimidatory attacks or vandalism against white liberals. The *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (Afrikaner Armed Resistance) and the *Wit Kommando* (White Commando) are rightwing Afrikaner extremist groups with a combined membership of less than 2,000 that may become more prominent again after several years of relative dormancy following a government crackdown in the early 1980s.

35. Most English-speaking whites favor more rapid racial change in South Africa than the government has outlined. The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the official opposition party and the main representative of the white English-speaking community, will continue to press the ruling National Party to institute reforms. The PFP is an important political counterweight to the conservatives, and might form an electoral pact or coalition with reformists in the National Party if the rightwing threat dramatically increases. English-speaking white businessmen also are likely to heighten their efforts to convince Pretoria to abandon apartheid, especially the aspects of it that inhibit South Africa's economy and industry.

#### Level and Nature of Unrest

36. A second critical factor that will help determine the future course of events in South Africa involves the level and nature of domestic unrest. Periods of unrest in the nonwhite communities have long been a feature of South African life and are likely to recur in the period of this Estimate, regardless of the direction and rate of reform, because of growing socioeconomic pressures. The impact of future unrest on the government's reform program, resolve, and stability will

depend to a large part on the degree to which the violence is spontaneous or organized, episodic or sustained, and includes or excludes attacks on whites. In addition to the violence, another common feature of domestic unrest in South Africa is nonviolent resistance in the form of strikes and consumer boycotts for political purposes.

37. *Socioeconomic Pressures.* The socioeconomic pressures that play such a large part in creating an atmosphere for black unrest are unlikely to abate in the next five years, and probably will intensify as the black population expands. The large numbers of blacks who will move from rural to urban areas in the coming years will create an even bigger strain on the already overpopulated townships:

- Government statistics, which may be conservative, presently show a black housing shortage of 196,000 units in "white" areas. By the year 2000, the 10-15 million blacks who are expected to join the 9 million blacks already in urban areas will require at least an additional 2 million houses.
- Largely as a result of the restrictive economic policies pursued by the government, black unemployment is likely to worsen in the future, despite government allocations of \$50 million for short-term job creation in the 1985/86 fiscal year.
- The black education crisis is likely to worsen as the ranks of black school-age children expand. Most black children today never make it to high school, and the few who go on after high school make up only about 3 percent of the enrollment in technical schools and universities. The per capita expenditure for white students is eight times higher than for black pupils. The government estimates that achieving racial parity in schooling by 1990, assuming no inflation, would require an annual additional education outlay of \$2.7 billion (18 percent of the total current budget).

38. *Spontaneous Versus Organized.* Pretoria is likely to continue to experience more serious problems when confronted with outbreaks of spontaneous unrest versus organized campaigns of violence. We believe that the recent spate of unrest has been more spontaneous than previous drawn-out periods of violence and that this trend may continue in the future. (See annex B.)

39. Since the National Party came to power in 1948 and began formally to establish apartheid, it has had to contend with antigovernment protests by organized black groups. In general, the efforts of black protest groups have had little apparent impact on the government's domestic policy. Pretoria has used its vast security apparatus effectively to infiltrate and successfully counter the organized black resistance it has faced over the years without making major concessions. (See annex C.) The police are proficient at rooting out activists and jailing ringleaders. The security laws, including detention without trial, allow the police great freedom in carrying out their duties. Other key laws ban outdoor meetings without a permit and any actions, such as an illegal strike or boycott, that disrupt normal business and economic activities.

40. The security forces have a much more difficult time suppressing outbreaks of spontaneous unrest, which are often characterized by riotous crowds of youths, rock throwing, and vandalism. A major security response involving the Army has proved in the past to be effective in ending these outbreaks, but such a response incurs costs in terms of the government's relations with the black and international communities. These outbreaks also have a more unsettling effect on whites than has been apparent, for example, in their response to the bombing campaign of the ANC. Isolated terrorist attacks and organized protests seem to make whites angry, whereas widespread spontaneous unrest makes them nervous.

41. *Episodic Versus Sustained.* The duration of the violence also is critical. The dynamics of black unrest in South Africa are such that widespread violence—even if it can be confined to the townships—becomes more threatening to government interests the longer it lasts. Serious black unrest sets in motion other pressures—such as sagging foreign investor confidence—that can weaken the government's position and are difficult for Pretoria to counter without ending the violence.

42. The government has survived episodic unrest, cycles of which have lasted well over a year. Many observers believe it is inevitable, however, that widespread unrest will break out in South Africa and persist without the lulls that in the past have afforded the government time to review its options, enhance its security resources, and reassure whites. The current unrest already has lasted almost as long as the Soweto disturbances, and there have been more incidents spread out more evenly over the period.

43. *Random Attacks on Whites.* The direct threat to whites from black unrest also is a crucial determinant of the seriousness of the violence. During the last year, only two whites—both civilians—have died as a result of the township unrest: these deaths occurred in the vicinity of black townships rather than in white areas. The deaths received more coverage in the local media and probably affected white attitudes toward the unrest more than some other major incidents involving large numbers of blacks killed.

44. A rash of random attacks by blacks against white civilians—excluding an organized campaign of terror by externally based groups like the ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)—would be unprecedented, and would greatly increase the pressure on Pretoria to take tougher action than it has over the past year, as well as cause a panic among many whites. We believe such an outbreak is unlikely to occur in the period of this Estimate, although measuring black attitudes in this regard is extremely difficult. Black attacks on whites have not been common, in part because the white and nonwhite residential areas are widely separated and the security forces generally have prevented riots from spilling into white areas. Antigovernment sentiments in the black community have not yet been translated into militant antiwhite fervor. However, once the psychological barrier is broken—which might require only a handful of incidents—random attacks on whites could become a trend that hardens attitudes in both the white and nonwhite communities.

45. *Nonviolent Resistance.* Politically motivated strikes and boycotts and large-scale passive resistance and civil disobedience campaigns have been used frequently in South Africa in the last three decades, but generally have not been successful in achieving the objectives of their organizers. Campaigns of this type also have rarely mirrored those associated with the peaceful protests of Gandhi; they often have been marred by intimidation measures on the part of nonwhites acting as self-appointed enforcers of the campaign.

46. We believe that the use of nonviolent resistance tactics will continue and will result in more pressure on the state than in the past because of the growing strength of the black labor movement, the increasing purchasing power of blacks, and the likely refinement of tactics as a result of lessons learned from previous mistakes. It is doubtful, however, that the government

would be forced to yield to radical political demands as a result of nonviolent resistance campaigns during the period of this Estimate, although it may make some economic and social concessions.

47. *Strikes.* Black groups have called for over 20 large-scale work boycotts in the last three decades to protest government policy. Most of these efforts were poorly organized and drew little support because blacks generally have been unwilling to risk their jobs for political objectives. The work boycott can be a double-edged sword in South Africa, primarily because employers usually can find jobless blacks who are eager to replace participants in a general strike. An urban black who joins a boycott and loses his job to one of the many unemployed blacks faces the threat of being relocated in an impoverished homeland.

48. Even strikes that have been well organized and strongly supported have had little impact on government policy. The two-day general strike in Transvaal Province in November 1984, organized by the UDF and the two black labor federations, is a useful case study. The strike probably was one of the most successful ever in South Africa in terms of the number of black workers who participated—an estimated 70 percent of the black work force in Transvaal Province. The participation rates were highest among union members and residents of the townships hit hardest by the previous months of rioting. Many blacks, however, were unwilling participants who stayed home to escape being injured by boycotters or because they were unable to find transportation. Some bus companies halted service to several townships after crowds of blacks stoned buses and their passengers on the first morning of the strike.

49. Many observers hailed the strike as an impressive show of strength by its organizers and participants, and expected it to be the first of many. The government, however, ignored the long list of political and economic demands that had been compiled by the strike organizers. Moreover, at least 23 blacks died in clashes between police and boycotters and in attacks by boycotters on fellow residents trying to commute to work, about 13 labor leaders and activists who had helped to organize the strike were arrested, and South Africa's large synthetic fuel company (SASOL) fired 90 percent of its black workers—some 5,500—for joining the boycott. Although most of the workers fired were later rehired and many of the activists were subsequently released, the strike organizers have not attempted a repeat performance, mainly because the

union heads—fearing the economic and organizational consequences of political action—have argued strongly against it.

50. *Consumer Boycotts.* A black boycott of white shops is another tactic used in the past as well as during the current unrest. Black consumer boycotts of white-owned shops have cost white businessmen in the affected areas of eastern Cape Province up to one-third of sales, and the boycott is being extended to the Johannesburg and western Cape areas. We believe, however, that the government is willing to let some white shopowners suffer rather than substantially alter its domestic policies. Previous consumer boycotts have been difficult to sustain mainly because black shopowners charge hefty premiums; even basic foods like bread usually cost three times as much or more in a black shop than in a white one.

#### White Resolve

51. A third—and perhaps the most important—factor affecting the course of events is white resolve. Most whites are extremely nationalistic and determined to retain control. They firmly believe that black majority rule inevitably would result in the loss of their social and economic privileges and cultural identity, and that South Africa would resemble other states on the continent that are plagued by tribal feuding and severe economic mismanagement prompted by ill-founded attempts at socialism. They are law and order fanatics who have applauded strong measures to restore order in the black townships. The present emergency measures employed by the state are in no way a maximum security response, and we believe most whites would approve the imposition of harsher measures—including martial law—if the unrest continues.

52. The white populace, however, is not a monolith:

— The almost 3 million Afrikaners, about 60 percent of the white population, are themselves no longer monolithic. There is now a large urban class engaged in business and the professions, often with international connections. Only 8 to 10 percent of Afrikaners remain on the land. While still conservative, the urban Afrikaners are more susceptible to international opinion and are divided over the reform issue. Few Afrikaners are likely to leave the country in large numbers despite severe black unrest.

— Most of the 2 million English speakers are more progressive on racial issues as a group, but have little influence in the predominantly Afrikaner

government. They also probably are less optimistic about the state's ability to keep a lid on domestic violence and more likely than Afrikaners to leave South Africa during major outbreaks of unrest. Emigration is much easier for some 800,000 English-speaking South African nationals who hold British passports.

- The Portuguese community in South Africa, which now numbers approximately 600,000—many of whom have Portuguese passports—are in the main recent immigrants with only tenuous ties to South Africa.

53. *Impact of Sanctions.* The black unrest and subsequent emergency measures have added to international pressure for economic sanctions, but likely measures probably will have little short-term economic impact. The French ban on new investment stops short of limiting trade. London, Bonn, and Bern, Pretoria's key European trading partners, have publicly rejected the sanctions approach. Without their support, most observers believe that sanctions will not seriously hurt the South African economy. Moreover, the country probably could weather even a major cutoff in foreign economic ties for several years. Reduced profits for South African businesses and reduction in the quality of life for whites—which sanctions could engender—would shake white confidence, however.

54. Despite the limited direct impact of sanctions, pressure for disinvestment reinforces investor concerns about South Africa's economic prospects. Recent reduction of credit lines by US and West European banks has triggered a panic in South African financial markets and led to the temporary suspension of domestic trading in currency and stocks. Pretoria has expressed concern that increased reliance on short-term debt is one of South Africa's few sources of economic vulnerability. Even the withdrawal of other major US banks is unlikely to precipitate a sustained debt crisis, but will reinforce Pretoria's desire to accumulate foreign exchange reserves and reduce debt before promoting economic recovery.

55. The potential political and psychological impact of strong punitive measures by the West are more difficult to assess. Recently, South Africa has hinted at some reforms that appear to be intended to head off any further deterioration in relations with the West. However, if countries like the United States and the United Kingdom eventually join the growing ranks of nations applying greater pressure, Pretoria would have

to choose between putting its reform program on the shelf while enhancing its security capabilities and ruthlessly suppressing black opposition or trying to accommodate Western demands for change.

#### Nonwhite Political Dynamic

56. *The Black Leadership Gap.* A fourth critical factor that will have a major impact on the course of events is the nonwhite protest movement in South Africa. Key elements examined include the absence of a dominant black spokesman and the obstacles that have long precluded the type of united, organized protest activity that we believe would be necessary to cause a rapid collapse of the white minority regime. This section also assesses the prospects for some of the leading nonwhite groups.

57. In response to the continuing unrest and attacks on progovernment blacks, many whites and blacks in South Africa agree that Pretoria must free imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela and negotiate with him in order to avert a racial civil war and reach a political compromise that satisfies black aspirations. Botha has offered to set Mandela free if he would renounce violence, most likely knowing that Mandela would refuse to accept on principle. An unconditional release of Mandela might be politically costly to Botha. Most whites view his offer as reasonable, and probably would see it as a sign of weakness if Botha suddenly capitulated and released Mandela unconditionally. Moreover, Mandela's release could introduce another element of instability to the domestic scene—for example, were he to call for a general strike. However, we cannot rule out the freeing of Mandela by the government in the hope of reducing racial tensions

58. *Obstacles to Nonwhite Unity.* In the absence of Mandela and the ANC on the internal scene, any leader or group that hopes to unify the nonwhite protest movement into an effective force for change will have to overcome tremendous obstacles. Even though apartheid alienates all nonwhites, there are deep splits among the Colored, Indian, and black communities. The three have shared some common experiences under apartheid rule, but the differences probably are more important from the perspective of blacks:

- Coloreds and Indians, like blacks, are required to live in racially separate communities, but they enjoy a higher standard of living and better



schools; there is not a homeland system for Coloreds and Indians, and they are not subject to many influx control restrictions; and these groups have been brought into the government while blacks are still on the outside.

- Pretoria ignores Colored and Indian infractions of certain apartheid laws while enforcing them much more stringently against blacks. For example, during the past 10 years, over 637,000 blacks were arrested for not carrying an official identity document, compared to no Indians and only two Coloreds.
- The vast majority of Coloreds speak Afrikaans as their first language, and in many ways are closer culturally to whites than to blacks.
- Indians generally are a business class and—with some striking exceptions—are apathetic toward politics. Many Indians and their businesses have been attacked, especially during the most recent rampages by Zulus near Durban, reflecting deep-seated black resentment. Indians also have not forgotten that 50 of them were killed by Zulus during riots in 1949 in Natal Province.

59. The Colored and Indian communities are caught between the ruling white minority and an angry black majority that sometimes views them as opportune targets of violence. Colored and Indian youth activists will continue to create problems for the government by organizing school protests and by participating in other demonstrations organized by national groups like the UDF. Most Coloreds and Indians, however, probably are silent supporters of gradual political change that defuses tensions in the black community and forestalls a black-dominated government emerging in the foreseeable future.

60. There are strong divisive forces within the black community that are likely to prevent the black protest movement from becoming a threat to the regime during the period of this Estimate. Some of the biggest obstacles to greater black unity involve the following factors:

- *Tribal.* There are nine major black ethnic groups in South Africa that can be differentiated along linguistic, cultural, and historical lines. The government has designated 13 percent of South African territory for 10 linguistically based black homelands where a total of about 14 million blacks reside. The homelands are scattered

throughout South Africa, which helps reinforce the cultural and linguistic differences among black tribal groups. Moreover, in the larger black townships, Pretoria has set up neighborhoods on a tribal basis. Some tribal groups, including the two largest—the Zulus (6 million) and Xhosas (5 million)—have long been hostile toward one another.

- *Urban-Rural.* There are pronounced differences among urban and rural South African blacks, especially in their levels of political awareness and activism. This is largely a result of the relatively inferior educational opportunities in rural areas. Moreover, most blacks who reside in rural areas of the homelands engage in subsistence agriculture and are out of touch with some issues that concern urban blacks, such as union activity, urban residency rights, and petty apartheid restrictions in the cities. About 9 million blacks live in urban areas. The 14 million blacks who reside in rural areas have never posed a security threat to the white government.
- *Ideological.* One of the most divisive issues in the black protest movement involves the role of whites in the pursuit of racial reform. The multiracial groups, led by the UDF and the ANC, encourage white participation in anti-apartheid activities, although the memberships of these groups are mostly blacks. Members of "black consciousness" groups such as AZAPO, on the other hand, argue against permitting whites to join in the struggle for "black" (including Colored and Indian) political rights.

- *Generational.* The generation gap is extremely wide in South Africa's black townships. Young urban blacks generally are more alienated, militant, and impatient than their parents, and believe their parents are politically unaware and are weak for accepting the indignities of apartheid without offering resistance. A major shift in the attitudes of either generation could have a significant impact on the domestic scene.

61. *Outlook for Key Groups.* Government countermeasures probably will continue to prevent the African National Congress from transforming its popularity among South African blacks into large-scale active support in the townships, a necessary condition, we believe, if the group is to become a serious military threat to the government. The ANC's dependence on external bases has become increasingly problematic for

the group, which has some 4,000 guerrillas, most whom are in camps in Angola. Pretoria's aggressive regional strategy, highlighted by cross-border anti-terrorist raids, has prompted nervous black states in the region increasingly to circumscribe the activities of the ANC. Despite its deteriorating position in the region, we believe the group will be able to maintain a campaign of sporadic but sometimes spectacular bombings in South Africa.

62. There is a strong possibility during the period of this Estimate that the ANC—or a splinter group from it—will launch a campaign of harsher attacks in South Africa. Many rank-and-file members are unhappy over the lack of progress made by the group's 24-year-old military wing and are pressing the leadership to approve an intensified campaign that includes targeting white civilians. Pretoria's reaction to such a development would probably include additional cross-border operations against the ANC presence in the region. The ANC already is aware of its tremendous vulnerability to an all-out counterterrorist effort by Pretoria, which we believe is a major factor in the group's reluctance to attack white civilians.

63. We believe a productive dialogue between the government and the ANC is unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future. The group recently decided at its first major conference since 1969 not to enter into talks with Pretoria. The consensus among top government officials also probably precludes the possibility.

64. *The Pan-Africanist Congress*, the ANC's smaller rival, may begin a renewed campaign of guerrilla attacks in South Africa during the period of this Estimate. The group, which has some 600 guerrillas based mostly in Tanzania and Lesotho, has been planning to launch a guerrilla campaign for several years, but has been wracked by internal divisions and a lack of adequate external funding, and are heavily penetrated by South African security services. Some new sources of aid in the region may be forthcoming that allow the group to initiate attacks within the next year or two. A PAC military campaign probably would include some attacks on white civilians, but would not represent a major threat unless the membership of the group expands greatly, something which is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

65. *The black labor movement* increasingly may become the main fulcrum for black political leverage. Since Pretoria decided in 1979 to give black unions official recognition and allow their participation in collective bargaining, the size of the black labor

movement has mushroomed. Total trade union membership, representing all races, stood at approximately 1.5 million in 1984, of which about 700,000 were blacks. Most black trade unionists—at least 500,000 in 1984—belong to newer groups formed since 1970 that make up the so-called emerging black labor movement. Despite the rapid growth of black unions, less than 15 percent of the black work force outside of agriculture, domestic service, and the public sector is unionized.

66. After years of focusing almost exclusively on narrow economic issues, the black labor movement recently has become more active politically. For example, two large black labor unions and the two black labor federations, representing a combined total of more than 350,000 black workers, helped to organize the general strike in Transvaal Province last November. Some black labor groups also actively promoted the nonwhite election boycott campaign last year. Labor unions representing over 400,000 workers, most of them black, after three years of negotiations plan to launch a new federation in November. The organization will link the powerful National Union of Mineworkers with unions belonging to the UDF, as well as an existing labor federation and several major unaffiliated unions. Participation of UDF unions and the mineworkers, who recently demanded an end to the state of emergency, strongly suggests the new federation will seek political gains for blacks.

67. The willingness of the black labor movement to throw its weight behind political protests in the future will be tempered to a large degree by its vulnerability to government harassment. Black labor groups are highly dependent on foreign funding, which can be cut off by the government if the groups engage in illegal activities, such as general strikes for political ends. Some of the most stridently antigovernment unions already have suffered from various government harassment techniques, including the detention of top officials. Despite these hazards, we believe the government will be forced to contend with a more unified and politically demanding black labor movement during the period of this Estimate.

68. Chief Buthelezi's Zulu organization, *Inkatha*, has some 1 million members and may become increasingly important to the government's reform efforts, as Buthelezi is one of the few black power brokers in South Africa. *Inkatha* is despised by many other black groups because of its cultural emphasis and Buthelezi's position as Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland.

Although a vocal minority of young urban Zulus also oppose him, Buthelezi nonetheless is widely popular among the Zulus whose warrior heritage and volatile nature has made them feared by other nonwhite groups. His moderate stance has won him growing praise from many whites who generally are grateful for the influence he has among the Zulus. Late last year, he gained media attention in South Africa for condemning the school boycotts, the violence in black townships, and the general strike by black workers. He publicly has chastized militant groups like the ANC for underestimating the security resources of the state.

69. A decision by Buthelezi either to participate in a new political system set up by the government or join in an active campaign to maximize pressure on Pretoria would be an extremely important development. According to a Colored minister, President Botha announced at a Cabinet meeting in May 1985 that the government is considering plans for a federal system in Natal Province that includes ceding the important port of Richard's Bay to the black homeland of KwaZulu. The Natal provincial council also unanimously approved a general proposal in June 1985 to establish a statutory body linking Natal and KwaZulu administrations on matters of common concern. A commission initiated by Buthelezi proposed a similar power-sharing system in Natal in 1982 that was to be controlled jointly by Buthelezi and a white provincial administrator.

70. Pretoria may decide to experiment with a power-sharing system in Natal, where many progressive English-speaking whites reside. However, many black leaders probably would denounce a regional power-sharing scheme incorporating the tribally based homelands, especially if Buthelezi goes along with it. Even Buthelezi's support for such a plan, in our view, would depend on the level of autonomy it offers him. Pretoria also undoubtedly would face stiff opposition to the plan from white farmers in northern Natal, if it were to be controlled by KwaZulu.

71. *The United Democratic Front* has emerged as the most active and important nonwhite, antigovernment political group inside South Africa. It was officially launched in 1983 to unite groups opposed to the new Constitution that excludes the black majority. Today, the UDF is an umbrella organization that claims a membership of over 600 groups representing more than 2 million individuals, about 90 percent of them black. Although the UDF does not have a constitution, affiliate member groups must support a declaration opposing apartheid.

72. The UDF's prospects are uncertain despite the prominence it has achieved domestically and internationally. The new labor federation to be formed in November will include 24 unions affiliated with the UDF and may result in more joint UDF-black labor action like the two-day general strike last November. However, the UDF already has become a prime target of government harassment tactics: the group's meetings frequently have been banned and many UDF leaders have been detained in the last year. In addition, the ongoing treason trial of 16 leading UDF activists in Durban is designed to allow the prosecution to submit a mountain of evidence—much of it circumstantial—that the government may use to justify outlawing the group.

73. There are several black groups that could attain national prominence and be co-opted to support actively the government's reform program. One such group is the *Zion Christian Church* (ZCC), the largest South African black separatist church with a membership of some 4 million. The ZCC denounces violence and refuses to address political issues, although it has maintained a warm relationship with Pretoria for over two decades. About 1.5 million of its followers attended a 75th anniversary ceremony in April 1985 in Transvaal Province where the keynote speaker—President Botha—was awarded a peace medal. The ZCC has played an important role in teaching its mostly rural and poorly educated members to respect both homeland authorities and Pretoria.

#### The Soviet Role and Strategy

74. The Soviet Union's efforts to undermine the white government in South Africa and foster links with black antiapartheid groups to date have not created any insurmountable problems for Pretoria. The Soviet angle is important, however, largely because Moscow provides critical support to the ANC, which is popular among South African blacks and is a main irritant in Pretoria's relations with neighboring black states where the group has a presence.

75. Moscow has identified the ANC as the leading opposition organization in South Africa, and has sought to build its influence with the ANC in a variety of ways. First, the Soviets rely on the fact that members of the South African Communist Party—an exile party heavily dependent on Soviet funding and support—occupy many key posts in the ANC, including that of secretary general and chief military planner. In addition, the Soviet Bloc supplies virtually all

of the ANC's military supplies and training. Finally, the Soviets champion the ANC's cause in a number of international forums. For its part, the ANC makes no secret of its close relations with the Communist world, but claims to be a nationalist organization committed to revolutionary struggle. Moscow presumably sees the ANC connection as its most effective means of ensuring itself a role in what it sees as the long-term struggle for control in South Africa. The Soviets will also continue their intermittent contacts with the PAC to take advantage of future developments in that organization.

76. The Soviets have no formal relations with Pretoria and thus lack the range of diplomatic, intelligence, and front organization assets inside South Africa that they are able to exploit elsewhere. In the past year, however, the Soviet press has commented positively on the actions of the UDF and the black trade unions and Soviet academics have noted their progressive nature. This reflects Soviet interest in these bodies as promoters of revolutionary change and, possibly, in cultivating elements of such organizations to broaden their connections inside South Africa. At the same time, Soviet commentators have tempered this interest by acknowledging that, for the moment at least, these opposition forces are divided and vulnerable to government suppression.

77. Moscow relies heavily on propaganda and disinformation to promote its interests in southern Africa, with the objectives of demonstrating Soviet solidarity with black African positions, discrediting the United States as a backer of apartheid, and derailing Western negotiating initiatives. The Soviets often "play back" black African criticism of South Africa in the Soviet press, and are frequently able to place Soviet-originated material on supposed US-South African collusion in African press organs, as well as carrying a variety of such material in the Soviet media. At least twice over the past year, for example, the Soviet media ran stories accusing the United States and South Africa of developing an "ethnic weapon" that only worked on Africans and "other nonwhite racial groups."

78. Soviet front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization frequently use South African issues as means of attracting Western and Third World support for their activities, and the anti-South Africa theme was prominently featured at the Moscow Youth Festival. In addition, the Kremlin generally supports anti-South Africa resolutions at the United Nations, although it has not taken the initiative on UN sanctions,

preferring to follow the lead of black African states and avoid casting South Africa as an East-West issue. The Soviets will undoubtedly take a vocal role in castigating Pretoria at the upcoming UN General Assembly.

## Outlook

### Short Term (One Year)

79. We believe it is extremely unlikely that the white government will collapse during the next year. The vast security resources of the state and the firm resolve of most whites will prevent the development of a regime-threatening upheaval during the next 12 months.

80. The government, relying primarily on its coercive powers, probably will restore some semblance of order to many townships in the short term. Pretoria undoubtedly will continue to rely on mass arrests in townships where violence persists to weaken antigovernment groups. If violence intensifies in other areas of the country—for example, the western Cape or Durban—the government may be forced to extend the state of emergency to those areas as well. There are almost certain to be more incidents of violence in the months ahead as blacks protest against the state of emergency and police excesses, flock to the funerals of riot victims, and expand their nonviolent resistance efforts. This unrest may prolong the state of emergency.

81. As discussed earlier, however, the recent unrest differs in some respects from earlier outbreaks, and current security measures may prove inadequate to restore order in the next year. Sporadic violence, for example, has continued in some townships affected by the state of emergency as black youths engage in defiant acts such as throwing rocks at police patrols and attacking collaborators. If violence persists, we believe Pretoria would resort to even harsher countermeasures. The actions taken by the government to date in no way represent a maximum security response by the state. If the situation deteriorates quickly, Pretoria could decide to declare martial law, institute a total press blackout in riot-torn areas, conduct more house-to-house searches and wholesale arrests of dissidents, and ban several protest groups. It also could draw upon the vast reserves of the police and Army, which it has not yet had to do to enforce the current state of emergency.

82. The government's political reform efforts in the short term are likely to hinge largely on the nature of unrest and on the level of international pressure. We believe that when Parliament resumes in September Botha will forge ahead with largely nonpolitical changes—including revision of laws restricting the movement of blacks—while continuing to study alternative political systems that retain white control and expand black rights. During the next year, Botha is likely to announce steps leading to the establishment of a confederal system linking the central government and the homelands, a national advisory body for blacks outside the homelands, and a multiracial government for the KwaZulu-Natal Province region. Conscious of his image with the white electorate, however, he is unlikely to implement major political changes until the unrest abates.

#### Long Term (Next Five Years)

83. We believe that over the long term the chance of a government collapse remains unlikely, but increases somewhat because existing trends may become sustained or magnified. (See annex D.) As in the short term, the state's security resources and white resolve are critical; however, over a five-year period, the interplay of such factors as the economy, black unrest, reform, the cohesiveness of the ruling elite, and international actions against South Africa are more difficult to predict.

84. The government's reform program is likely to achieve no better than mixed results during the next five years:

— We believe the stigma attached to being a collaborator is unlikely to fade soon, which will make it very difficult for Pretoria to find influential blacks other than homeland leaders to talk with or persuade into participating in any limited power-sharing system. Nonetheless, Pretoria may move to implement a new system that expands black political rights without waiting for a mandate from blacks, much in the same way it established the new multiracial Parliament without first securing a mandate from the Colored and Indian communities.

— The economy—suffering in part from the effects of sanctions and diminished investor confidence—probably will be unable to support any comprehensive government programs to ameliorate conditions in the urban townships, which probably will add to the numbers inclined to

protest for greater political rights. Pretoria, however, may be able to improve conditions somewhat in the more troubled townships, and would be able to do more if the price of gold climbs.

— Pretoria's piecemeal eradication of petty apartheid laws—the legal barriers separating the races in public places and social relationships—most likely will lead to greater racial mixing in offices, shops, restaurants, and even in some schools and residential areas. While it will offend some whites and increase conservative opposition, the net effect will be to increase the number of whites who view racial changes as inevitable and irreversible.

85. We believe it is virtually certain that, during the next five years, Pretoria will experience additional black unrest as a result of both growing socioeconomic pressures and continuing political grievances. During this period, the unrest probably will be cyclical, as in the past; some cycles may last longer and be more violent than before, but the government will be able to restore order for a time in between cycles as blacks grow weary of the violence and are discouraged by the overwhelming power of the state.

86. It is less likely, however, but still possible, that South Africa could begin to experience more sustained and intensified violence. Black youths may be undergoing a psychological transition as a result of their daily confrontations with security forces. Rather than fleeing the country to join the ANC as thousands of young blacks did during the Soweto riots, these militant black youths may wage a constant low-level war against the government in the townships. In addition, black protest groups may be more effective in rallying the support of the traditionally passive black majority by pointing to the government's reforms as a sign that their foe is responsive and weakening, and by citing growing international pressure as evidence that their antiapartheid activities are influencing world opinion and getting results.

#### Prerequisites for a Government Collapse—A Worst Case Scenario

87. For a government collapse to occur in the next five years, we believe a significant number of blacks would have to engage in a pervasive campaign of violence that rapidly eroded white resolve and paralyzed the security forces. A catalyst—such as a security action that results in hundreds of blacks killed at once, or the assassination of a key black figure—could spark

such a campaign. The command and control structure of the security forces might break down in the face of nationwide outbreaks of violence that ravaged both nonwhite and white areas. White resolve might crumble quickly should blacks—heretofore passive—turn into random killers of whites.

88. A campaign of widespread violence—even without significant white casualties—also could accelerate forces that might lead to an economic crisis and a dissolution of white resolve:

- The international community is likely to tighten the screws on South Africa in response to the repressive, bloody measures we believe the government would use initially to try to counter escalating violence. The initial measures implemented in the last year could snowball into a complete economic embargo—including the denial of landing and port rights to South African planes and vessels—and the expulsion of South Africa from all international organizations.
- A severely deteriorating domestic situation might send investor confidence to an all-time low, prompt Western banks to recall loans to South Africa, and hasten capital flight.
- The black labor movement might very well make its presence felt through a series of protracted general strikes that could bring industry to a halt.
- The security forces may write off the worst black townships as “no go” areas and halt efforts to restore order there. This would pave the way for guerrilla groups to set up an infrastructure in those areas and dole out weapons to young black firebrands.

— Smelling blood, the Soviet Union probably would step up its support to the ANC and press black states bordering South Africa to do likewise. Some of these states undoubtedly would allow the ANC greater freedom of action if the South African security forces were tied up stamping out brushfires in the black townships.

89. We believe that even under this scenario blacks would be unable to overthrow the white government by force in the next five years. Even before these developments occur, however, the government, faced with growing violence and having exhausted its security options, probably would agree to more far-reaching political reforms and attempt to negotiate with black opponents to avert a civil war.

90. Alternatively, if a groundswell of white opposition to reform develops during the next five years—something we believe is possible but unlikely—the ruling National Party might abandon its reform program, purge itself of reformists, or split into opposing camps. If the Party shifts away from reform—or is replaced by a coalition of rightwing parties that does so—unprecedented levels of black unrest may result.

#### Implications for the United States

91. Washington's relations with Pretoria are likely to be problematic during the period covered by this Estimate. The white regime's responses to endemic violence—whether repressive measures at home or cross-border operations against ANC targets in the region—are guaranteed to preoccupy apartheid critics in the United States and around the world.

## ANNEX A

### The Decline of Grand Apartheid

1. In the 1950s former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd developed the black homelands scheme that until recently served as the political cornerstone of "grand apartheid," which refers to the concept of separate, self-ruling black nation states. In 1950, Verwoerd introduced the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, which set guidelines for the political evolution of the black homelands into independent states and was designed to strip blacks of their South African citizenship. Under this plan, all blacks, even those residing outside the homelands, would become nationals of new independent states. Prior legislation had set the stage for the Self-Government Act: The Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 set aside 13 percent of South African land for tribally based black homelands; separate administrative structures for blacks were set up in the 1920s. The Bantu Authorities Act in 1951 resurrected a tribal local authority system in the homelands.

2. The primary objective of Verwoerd's policy was to protect white control against the threat of a rapidly growing nonwhite population. He presented his homelands scheme as the only alternative to an integrated South Africa that he feared eventually would be dominated by blacks. Verwoerd also viewed the homeland administrations as a necessary outlet for rising black political aspirations, as evidenced by the widespread protests in the 1950s. In addition, he hoped the plan would defuse international criticism, which had been mounting since the government began moving in 1951 to eradicate the limited political rights of nonwhites. Under Verwoerd's plan, the government has moved up to 3 million blacks from white areas to the homelands since the 1960s, frequently resorting to force to gain compliance.

3. The ruling National Party recently has admitted publicly that its grand apartheid doctrines are badly flawed and in need of revision. The Party's rethinking, in our view, is a result of the dramatic failure of the homelands scheme to achieve the National Party's political objectives. Rather than guaranteeing white

control, the denial of South African citizenship and basic political rights to blacks has promoted unrest. Black political aspirations have not been satisfied by the homeland administrative structures, which are filled largely with moderate blacks and tribal authorities who are scorned by most urban blacks for working within the government's system. In addition, no state other than South Africa has recognized the four homelands that to date have evolved into "independent" states, and some homelands, including KwaZulu, have refused independence.

4. The homelands also are a tremendous economic burden, and have virtually no chance of becoming economically viable in the coming decades. Even the government has admitted recently that the homelands eventually will be able to accommodate only 40 percent of blacks at the most. Even though Pretoria spent some \$1.25 billion last year on developing and maintaining the homelands:

- GDP per capita in the homelands only increased from \$20 in 1970 to \$23 in 1980, making them among the poorest areas in the world.
- Pretoria's expensive job creation program for the homelands has provided work for only 7 percent of the resident potential labor force.
- Infant mortality in the homelands is among the highest in Africa.
- The homelands only contribute 3 percent of South Africa's GDP.
- About 85 percent of rural households and 15 percent of urban households located in the homelands have incomes below the minimum subsistence level.
- Earnings of homeland residents who work outside of the homelands in white areas of South Africa make up 72 percent of the total income of the homelands.

## ANNEX B

### Background on Soweto and Sharpeville Violence

1. *Sharpeville*. On 21 March 1960, some 300 police shot into a crowd of 5,000 that had gathered in the township of Sharpeville to protest the "pass laws" requiring blacks to carry identity and work documents and restricting their movement and residency in white areas; 69 blacks died, and some 180 were injured. The protest had been organized by the Pan-Africanist Congress, which also played an active role in the violent aftermath of the shooting. The PAC and other groups organized a general strike in Sharpeville that spread to most industrial areas of the country. The strike was most effective in Cape Town, where it lasted almost three weeks and paralyzed industry in the area; 50,000 of the 60,000 blacks in the area participated.

2. Some of the underlying causes of the Sharpeville unrest were similar to the present outbreak. Three-fourths of Sharpeville's population of 36,600 were under the age of 18, and the high schools in the area could not accommodate all of them. Unemployment was high and rising. Over a third of the residents were defaulting on their rent payments. The area of Transvaal Province in which Sharpeville is situated had been hit hard by the government's program of forcibly resettling communities. The local police were notorious for vigorously enforcing the pass laws.

3. The government responded to the Sharpeville incident by declaring a state of emergency in 24 major cities and towns. The police headed the security response, backed by the regular Army and 18 regiments of reserve soldiers mobilized after the shooting incident. On 8 April, the PAC and ANC were outlawed. The state of emergency was expanded on 11 April to include 122 of approximately 300 magisterial districts (compared to the 36 magisterial districts now affected), even though by then much of the violence was abating. On 31 August, the state of emergency was lifted. There were 11,503 arrests made (slightly more have been arrested so far during the 1984-85 unrest).

4. Black-on-black violence occurred during the Sharpeville unrest on a small scale, including the death of a policeman, the ransacking of numerous homes of policemen, and the murder of a Colored man who had

driven two white journalists into a black township near Cape Town. Like the current unrest, the violence generally was contained within the black townships. The notable exception was a protest march by 30,000 blacks from a township near Cape Town to the Parliament building in the center of the city that ended in a violent clash with police and the dispersal of the crowd.

5. The international community was outraged at the Sharpeville incident and its criticism of apartheid rose sharply. The unrest greatly accelerated an outflow of private investment funds that was not reversed until 1964. Whites in South Africa generally were shaken by the violence. The deeply held belief among Afrikaners that they are God's chosen people was bolstered, however, on 9 April when a bullet fired at close range by a crazed white gunman miraculously passed through the face of then Prime Minister Verwoerd without killing him or damaging his brain. The 1960s was a period of heightened repression as the government responded to Sharpeville by driving subversive groups into exile and intensifying its effort to relocate urban blacks in the homelands.

6. *Soweto*. The disturbances began in Soweto (with a population of 1.25 million at the time) on 16 June 1976, when some 20,000 black students gathered to protest the introduction of Afrikaans as a teaching medium in two courses at local schools. After several students died when police shot into a crowd, youths went on a rampage, destroying government offices and vehicles in Soweto. Within two months, antigovernment violence had spread to some 80 black communities; by the end of 1976, the number had risen to 160 (compared to the 155 communities involved in disturbances in the 1984-85 unrest). Durban was the only major city that saw little or no violence, primarily because the local police used restraint in handling the student protests that did occur.

7. The protests on 16 June followed 18 months of growing frustration in Soweto over the forced teaching of Afrikaans in some classrooms rather than the traditional medium of English or a tribal dialect. Overcrowded classrooms in Soweto resulted from a dramatic government push in the early 1970s to educate more



blacks, even though the number of secondary schools in Soweto rose from 19 in 1972 to 41 in 1976. The per capita expenditure for white students in 1976 was about 15 times higher than for black students. The economy was in a deep recession and unemployment was high and rising, which angered the growing numbers of black high school graduates. Soweto, like other black townships, for over three years had been under the administration of a new system of black local authorities that had resulted in the deterioration of the townships and widespread dissatisfaction with local services. In 1975, 85 percent of the houses in South Africa's black townships had no bathrooms and 66 percent had no hot running water.

8. Student groups were at the forefront of most of the disturbances. They organized several general strikes, including one that at its zenith achieved about 60 percent absenteeism in Johannesburg, and attacked blacks who ignored the strikes. A black consumer boycott of white stores during the 1976 Christmas season also was highly successful. In addition, at least 350 schools were damaged, most of them by firebombs in the hands of militant students who were advocating school boycotts. Students destroyed hundreds of government-run taverns and chided their parents who attended them.

9. At least one black policeman was murdered in the unrest, and there were several instances in which suspected police informers were killed by crowds. Students also attacked the homes of several black policemen. The worst black-on-black violence occurred when Zulu migrant workers in Soweto—angered in part by the attacks on taverns, and suspected of being encouraged by the police—clashed with local residents; some 70 blacks died. Similar violence—pitting migrant workers from the homelands against local black residents—broke out in black townships

near Cape Town; 26 died, 106 were injured, and 156 homes were destroyed during two days of riots.

10. The Soweto unrest deeply frightened many whites and worried foreign investors. Two whites in Soweto on the first day of the riots were beaten to death, and several others died in the following months. In Cape Town, black demonstrators roamed through some white residential areas stoning cars. A few unprecedented large-scale riots also took place in the center of Cape Town as police clashed with protesting students. Immigration figures reflected the level of white concern: in 1975 there was a net gain of some 40,000 whites in South Africa; two years later, there was a net loss of more than 1,000, despite a steady stream of new arrivals who had fled the guerrilla war in Rhodesia. Moreover, the second half of 1976 was a boom period for gun dealers in South Africa as frightened whites rushed to buy handguns and rifles. In addition, the riots immediately contributed to a loss of investor confidence and a subsequent new outflow of foreign capital in South Africa.

11. Police responses to the student-organized protests were generally heavyhanded. Most clashes involved the police using tear gas, batons, and shotguns against students. The death toll after the first week stood at 176. In July 1976 Pretoria banned meetings of antigovernment groups, but with little effect. By October 1977, the death toll had risen to some 660. Over the 16 months of unrest, police arrested and convicted 1,556 people (1,122 under the age of 18) and detained 2,430 "for questioning." The unrest ended after a crackdown on 19 October 1977 in which the government banned the leading student groups and almost all black consciousness organizations—which reached the height of their popularity during the unrest.

## ANNEX C

### South African Security Capabilities

1. South Africa's white minority has invested heavily in a pervasive and growing internal security apparatus that enforces and defends apartheid. We estimate that one in eight South African whites—that is, some 600,000 men and women—participates at least part time in some aspect of internal security or defense. Combined police, prison, and defense expenditures account for almost \$2.7 billion, or 18 percent of the budget.

2. *Police.* The South African Police (SAP), a nationwide paramilitary organization with some 45,000 members, forms the backbone of the internal security apparatus. This national force includes ~~secret~~ police and riot control components as well as traditional uniformed and detective units. It is backed up by a vast array of security legislation that permits detention without trial and wide powers of search and seizure. In addition, the government can limit press coverage of the security forces and their activities.

3. The SAP has recruited nonwhites since its inception, and they make up about half of the force. Of the nonwhites in the SAP today, 80 percent are black, 14 percent are Colored, and 6 percent are Indian. The position of nonwhites in the SAP has improved in recent years, but the leadership remains overwhelmingly made up of conservative Afrikaners.

4. The government has stated publicly that it plans to expand the size of the SAP by 60 percent as funds become available. The number of police in South Africa per capita presently is about half that in New York City. This statistic is misleading because the SAP usually does not maintain a major presence in most black townships and devotes few resources to preventing or investigating crime in nonwhite communities; consequently, some black townships in South Africa are among the highest crime areas in the world.

5. The government in October 1984 empowered black local authorities to establish and control new black police units that will be separate from the SAP and responsible for law enforcement in the townships. In January 1985, Pretoria announced that 16 black local authorities initially would set up these units.

According to a South African official, the plan is designed to nurture and protect a progovernment grassroots leadership in black urban areas and to extricate the central government from the violent unrest. The first contingent of 117 "peace officers" finished training by SAP instructors in May. One black council at the center of the unrest has begun recruiting a 289-man force that will cost about \$1.5 million annually when fully staffed in two years.

6. *Army.* The South African Defense Force (SADF) plays a key role in assisting the SAP in maintaining internal order. Military units share border security responsibilities with the police, provide vital support to large-scale police sweep operations and manhunts in rural areas, and assist the SAP during major internal disturbances. Moreover, the Army's Commando Force, comprised of local home guard units scattered throughout the country, help prevent attacks on important government and industrial facilities. White males are conscripted for two years' full-time duty, and are liable for part-time duty from the age of 20 through 54. Civilian-staffed Civil Defense units under the direction of the Minister of Defense operate throughout South Africa and are buttressed by numerous white gun clubs and neighborhood defense groups (about 35 percent of whites own firearms).

---

#### Military (SADF) Manpower

Total	593,500
Active duty	93,500
Ready reserve	125,000
Commandos	175,000

---

7. Other government security units include the 7,000-man Railway and Harbor Police, responsible for protecting the country's airports, harbors, and railways, and the 15,000-man Prison Service. The black homelands also have security forces that work closely with South African units.

8. *Loyalty of Nonwhite Security Personnel.* There have been no reports thus far of nonwhites defecting from the security forces. Black policemen have a reputation of being tougher on blacks than are

white policemen. In addition, there have been some reports of black policemen from certain tribal groups being deployed in areas predominantly populated by blacks from other hostile tribal groups. Only 3 percent of the active Army is black. If thousands of black policemen began deserting, the government could replace them with personnel from the all-white police reservists or the Army. Historically, the white minority regime in southern Rhodesia experienced almost no defections from its largely black security forces despite their being targeted by insurgents.

9. *Security and Town Planning.* Security is paramount in town planning. Most black townships are purposely separated by great distances from white residential and urban areas and accessible only by a few roads. By using roadblocks, police can quickly seal off a township. In a crisis situation, the government could shut off water and food supplies. Security considerations have also played a major part in determining the internal design of black townships. Regula-

tions governing the design of black townships have long been intended to provide riot police with maximum maneuverability. General guidelines followed by civil engineers and architects planning black townships near Durban in the 1950s called for:

- Township roads wide enough for a South African armored personnel carrier to make a U-turn.
- Houses built no closer than a specified distance so as not to impede police weapons fire and to make it more difficult for a fugitive to evade authorities.
- Convenient vantage points for police vehicles to gather and monitor wide areas of the township.
- A distance between the boundaries of the township and main highways in the area that exceeded the range of a high-powered rifle, presumably to protect travelers from snipers and even errant police shots in the event of a serious disturbance.

## ANNEX D

### Indicators of Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change

The following are checklists of evolutionary and revolutionary indicators for developments in South Africa. None of these indicators should be interpreted in isolation, but the likelihood of either scenario unfolding will increase if the pattern of events in the next few years mirrors one set of indicators more closely than the other.

#### Evolutionary Change

The new political structures set up to include blacks function even though many blacks choose not to participate.

Black-owned stores multiply dramatically in both white and black areas.

The ANC continues its bombing campaign, but is increasingly wracked by internal dissension.

The government receives increased revenues that allow for greater expenditures on services to blacks without raising costs to whites—for example, a rise in gold prices or sale of parastatals.

Pretoria enters into fruitful talks with the UDF or ANC.

The government offers various options to the homeland administrations, including joining a confederal system.

New black police units in the townships drastically reduce the high crime rate in the townships, protect progovernment blacks, and prevent flareups from spreading nationwide.

Nonwhite student demonstrations continue sporadically but increasingly are viewed by the black community as disruptive and counterproductive.

Pretoria writes off rent arrears that have accumulated in various areas of the country as a result of boycotts.

The new Regional Service Councils become conduits for expanded funds to develop black townships.

The government relaxes its housing standards, and private industry responds by providing low-cost pre-

fabricated units that are built on the periphery of existing townships.

The National Party wins elections in 1989, losing a marginal number of seats to the Conservative Party but picking up seats from a floundering Progressive Federal Party.

A smooth transition occurs as Botha retires and is succeeded by a leader who continues a reform program and has good relations with the nonwhites in government.

Almost all petty apartheid laws—the legal barriers separating the races in public settings and social relationships—are eradicated, although residential areas remain largely segregated.

The government creates new opportunities and incentives for black upward mobility, substantially altering South Africa's racial caste system in the process.

#### Revolutionary Indicators

The ANC's military wing establishes active cells in all black townships and begins to systematically chip away at white resolve with terrorist attacks and spectacular bombings.

The Indian and Colored chambers in Parliament stage a walkout as a result of police excesses in suppressing black unrest.

The economy goes into a tailspin as a result of declining gold prices, capital flight, and the collapse of the rand.

Pretoria's efforts to recruit new black policemen are unsuccessful.

South Africa is hit by another devastating cycle of drought that prompts rural blacks to pour into the already overcrowded urban areas.

A white backlash to reform leads many National Party members of Parliament to defect to the Conservative Party.

Nelson Mandela dies in prison, leading to violent protests and work strikes nationwide.

A militant black consciousness ideology becomes popular among nonwhites and fuels growing antiwhite sentiment and attacks.

Inkatha moves into active opposition to the government.

Botha is assassinated by black or white extremists, and a succession crisis develops that paralyzes the government or leads to a new regime that abandons reform.

The police make only a halfhearted effort to stop rightwing militant groups from carrying out attacks against white liberals and progovernment blacks.

The black labor movement expands rapidly and initiates an all-out campaign to extract political concessions from the government.

Nervous whites in rural areas begin shooting "suspicious-looking" blacks.

The Transvaal and Orange Free State provincial branches of the National Party split off to form their own party and slow down reform.

Various homeland administrations come under systematic attack from militant black groups and collapse.

Blacks increasingly engage in industrial sabotage and random attacks on government property.

Marxist-Leninist doctrines become more popular among black students and activists who indoctrinate growing numbers in the townships; government efforts to stop the trend only increase the ideology's appeal.

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for the exclusive information and use of the recipient only.
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~