



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Secret~~
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

North Korean Reactions to Instability in the South

Special National Intelligence Estimate


APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAY 2001

~~Secret~~

SNIE 42/14.2-79
20 December 1979

Copy 000

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(U)



~~SECRET~~
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT

SMIE 42/14.2-79

NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO
INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTH

Information available as of 20 December 1979 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

~~SECRET~~

NOTE

This contingency estimate addresses the likelihood of a North Korean attack on the South

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] during the next two or three months. It assumes a level of instability which may not develop.

KEY JUDGMENTS

The emergence of fighting between South Korean military factions and widespread civil disorders in South Korea would prompt Pyongyang to consider forceful reunification of the peninsula.

However, Pyongyang would face a crucial imponderable in attempting to determine the US response to a North Korean attack, given the presence of US ground forces in the South and the virtual certainty of their being engaged. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DISCUSSION

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In 1975, Kim publicly declared that the North would not stand idly by if "revolutionary conditions" developed in the South, a sentiment that Pyongyang has subsequently publicized. [REDACTED]

The Deterrent

2. In considering an attack on a militarily weakened South Korea, Pyongyang would weigh the attitudes of its major allies and, most importantly, the US security commitment to Seoul. For years, Moscow and Beijing have cautioned Kim, but their influence has decreased as the North's military self-sufficiency has grown. If Kim were otherwise convinced that military intervention were in his interest, it is doubtful that China or the USSR could veto the venture.

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] A key indicator for Pyongyang would be the continued presence of US forces in Korea and elsewhere in Northeast Asia, or earmarked for use there.

6. [REDACTED]


Military Options

7. [REDACTED]


8. ~~Thus~~ we believe that North Korean military intervention would likely take the form of a large-scale, coordinated ground, naval, and air assault against the South.



9. [



10. (




11. The USSR and China, as treaty allies of Pyongyang, almost certainly would respond cautiously to a North Korean attack on South Korea. Both would want to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States; the Chinese in particular would be loath to jeopardize their developing relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, because of their mutual rivalry and the strategic importance of maintaining a nonhostile state in North Korea, the USSR and China would feel compelled to provide at least some material assistance to Pyongyang.

12.



~~Secret~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT



~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~