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*National Intelligence Estimate*

# Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995 (U)

8 DEC 1994

## Volume II: Country Estimates

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*NIE 94-33/II*

# **Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995 (U)**

## **Volume II: Country Estimates**

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December 1994

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**Figure 1**  
**Current Severe Humanitarian Emergencies<sup>a</sup>**

Country	Cause	Affected Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	Judgment for 1995
Ethiopia	Drought	4.3	In 1995, the country will continue to have a substantial food deficit estimated at 500,000 metric tons.
Sudan	Conflict	4.3	The humanitarian crisis in the south is intensifying due to the civil war. Owing to good harvests, the number at risk will be reduced to 3 million.
Afghanistan	Conflict	4.2	The civil war has intensified. If Kabul and northern cities continue to be cut off from supplies this winter, 3 million people in the country could be in need of emergency humanitarian assistance.
Rwanda	Conflict	4	The RPF is struggling to maintain security and to govern but faces the threat of insurgency. Humanitarian needs will remain at high levels. Refugees will contribute to instability in Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania.
Angola	Conflict	3.7	Emergency food needs have increased significantly. Despite the signing of the Lusaka Agreement and the implementation of the shaky cease-fire, civilian suffering will continue.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Conflict	2.5	The threat of large-scale deaths due to starvation remains low, but the need for emergency assistance remains high for isolated safe areas. During 1995, the situation will significantly worsen if UNPROFOR withdraws, resulting in heavier fighting and decreased access for aid delivery.
Liberia	Conflict and state collapse	2.1	The failure of the warring factions to abide by the 1994 Akosombo Agreement may lead in early 1995 to the drawdown of ECOMOG and UN observers. An escalation of fighting will put the entire population at risk.
Haiti	Conflict	2	Even if the multilateral UN force is able to maintain order, more than 1 million Haitians will continue to depend on assistance in 1995.
Iraq	Government policy	1.6	The level of need will increase if intra-Kurdish fighting resumes or "Operation Provide Comfort" is discontinued and Saddam Husayn makes incursions into northern Iraq.
Eritrea	Drought	1.6	Despite expectations for a good harvest in 1995, dependence on donor assistance will continue.
Sierra Leone	Conflict and state collapse	1.5	Growing prospects for violence in Freetown and ethnic conflict in the interior risk a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the coming months.
Azerbaijan	Conflict	1+	While both sides have generally been observing a cease-fire in place since May 1994, the economy has slipped notably in the past year and will continue to decline in 1995.
Somalia	Conflict	1.1	Factional fighting will increase after UN forces depart by March 1995. Hunger and disease could reappear, although not at the 1992 level.
Mozambique	Conflict	1	When ONUMOZ withdraws in January 1995, the peace settlement between the MPLA and RENAMO will be severely tested. Renewed conflict may cause refugees to flee into neighboring countries.
Tajikistan	Conflict	Nearly 1	Tajikistan is embroiled in a third year of political and economic instability and civil war. Political reconciliation is unlikely, and its future humanitarian situation remains precarious.
Georgia	Conflict	Nearly 1	The need for emergency assistance will remain at the current high level whether or not a peace settlement is reached between Georgia and Abkhaz.

<sup>a</sup>We define the "most severe" emergencies as those in which 1 million or more people are at risk.

<sup>b</sup>Includes refugees from the named country, internally displaced persons, and others in need.

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**Mostly Likely Potential Emergencies**

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Country	Cause	Judgment
Burundi	Conflict	Political and economic conditions are similar to those in Rwanda in early 1994. Ethnic clashes are rising, and the threat of widespread bloodshed is growing. The situation could explode at any time. Conflict could spread to Rwanda, Zaire and Tanzania.
Croatia	Conflict	Unless there is progress on the diplomatic front, chances are greater than even that a military offensive will occur to retake parts of Krajina, widening the Balkan war. Even a limited war could result in several hundred thousand refugees and internally displaced persons.

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## Discussion

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(For information regarding potential new crises, see *Volume I: Global Overview of the Estimate.*)

### Africa

Africa's present emergency needs stem from the regional impact of the Rwanda emergency; drought, food shortages, and conflicts in the Greater Horn; and conflicts and food shortages elsewhere in Africa. (C/NF)

### Regional Impact of the Emergency in Rwanda

*Rwanda.* Last year, we judged that the chances of renewed conflict in Rwanda were high. The humanitarian crisis now under way in Rwanda is among the most difficult and complex the world has faced in decades. (C/NF)

Before the conflict that erupted 6 April, the population of Rwanda was 7.7 million. The ensuing ethnic slaughter has resulted in 500,000 to 1 million deaths. More than half the surviving population currently is at risk.<sup>1</sup>

About 2 million people are internally displaced and nearly 2 million Rwandans (mostly Hutus) have taken refuge in Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda. (C/NF)

At the same time, 400,000 to 600,000 long-term Tutsi refugees have moved back into Rwanda from neighboring states, taking possession of property abandoned by those who died or fled. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is stretched thin trying to provide

<sup>1</sup> The population at risk includes refugees from the named country, internally displaced persons, and others in need. (C/NF)

security and govern, but Tutsi control of Rwanda is not likely to be overturned in 1995. Extremist Hutus who fled into exile will attempt to move back into Rwanda by force. A developing low-level Hutu insurgency threatens to keep large portions of the country, especially in the former French security zone, unstable. (C/NF)

The United Nations is encouraging Hutu refugees to return to Rwanda, but many are reluctant, fearing retribution from the former Hutu army and militia members who dominate the refugee camps, as well as from Tutsis who now dominate the government and society in Rwanda. Many undoubtedly fear prosecution for their part in the genocide. It is unlikely that the new Rwandan Government or the international community will be able to entice large numbers of refugees to return home soon. Hundreds of thousands of Hutus are likely to remain outside Rwanda indefinitely. The physical, social, and psychological devastation wrought by the massacres and the civil war will take years to overcome; some areas of the countryside will probably remain in the grip of violence or low-level insurgency. (C/NF)

The government is incapable of providing assistance to its large internally displaced and needy population. Expensive rehabilitation projects and demining operations will be difficult to mount:

- As a result of the civil conflict that began in 1990, hundreds of thousands of landmines have been laid, mainly near the Ugandan border. (C/NF)

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Meanwhile, most regions in Rwanda are experiencing food shortages, and the cities lack basic services. Humanitarian needs in Rwanda will remain at high levels for the foreseeable future. Fields are lying fallow, for example, because many of the people who normally cultivate them have left the country. (C/NF)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal  
(April-December 1994): \$598 million*

*Percent Met: 71*

**Burundi.** The murder of President Ndayaye, a Hutu, in October 1993 by the Tutsi-controlled military set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as 50,000 Hutu and Tutsi Burundians, displaced about half a million citizens within Burundi, and drove at least 300,000 people into Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania. In all, more than 15 percent of Burundians are in need of humanitarian assistance. Burundi's transport system, which serves the Rwandan relief efforts, as well as its own needs, is being overwhelmed by the immense amount of aid flowing into both countries, as well as into Zaire:

- Following the Rwanda uprising in April 1994, nearly 250,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees fled to northern Burundi. At the same time, thousands of Burundian Hutu refugees have returned from Rwanda. If many of the refugees do not return to their farms to plant crops by the end of February 1995, the food shortfall could be significant. (C/NF)

Ethnic tensions in Burundi are approaching the levels witnessed in Rwanda before the April massacres began. Even a minor incident could cause communal violence to erupt again and the power-sharing coalition government could fall before the end of 1995 with a Tutsi walk-out.

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One of three scenarios could develop:

- **Burundi military coup.** Tensions and communal violence could lead to a coup by the Tutsi-based military against the Hutu majority government. If one occurs, it would fuel widespread communal violence and likely will trigger a massive new influx of Hutu refugees into Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire. Tens of thousands of Hutus and Tutsis could be killed before civil order is restored.
- **Communal violence.** Violence from localized incidents could spiral into a nationwide calamity, resulting in massive deaths and a flood of refugees. Violence would spread quickly to Bujumbura where humanitarian relief efforts for Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire would be severely hindered.
- **Tensions linger on.** Burundi's Tutsi-dominated military and civilian Tutsi politicians could continue to maintain their control over the Hutu government. Under such a scenario, ethnic violence would continue at low levels with periodic attacks producing population flows. (S/NF)

*Most Recent UN Consolidated Appeal  
(March-August 1994): \$59 million*

*Percent Met: 62*

**Zaire.** Last year we reported that the collapse of basic services, ethnic strife, looting, and violence had reduced the availability of food and that malnutrition and disease were at high levels. Since that time, the influx of more than 1 million refugees from Rwanda and Burundi has

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aggravated local Zairian ethnic and political tensions and has further strained the country's deteriorating economic system:

- About 600,000 people are internally displaced.
- Although agricultural potential is large, 1995 food production is estimated to be lower than pre-1960 levels.
- Malnutrition continues at high levels, particularly among urban children. (C/NF)

The new government of Prime Minister Kengo is attempting to address these problems, but President Mobutu is obstructing these efforts, and the situation is not likely to improve significantly in 1995. (C/NF)

A major outbreak of ethnic violence or military unrest is possible during 1995. Should violence break out in the volatile eastern provinces, in the southern province of Shaba, or elsewhere, the international community would face major logistic difficulties delivering aid to large numbers of dislocated Zairians spread out over such a vast geographic area. (U)

*Most Recent UN Consolidated Appeal (October 1993-June 1994): \$76 million*

*Percent Met: 13*

#### **Conflict and Drought in the Greater Horn of Africa<sup>2</sup>**

**Sudan.** The humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan is continuing due to an ongoing civil war that has gone on for over a decade. Last year we reported that the intensified government

<sup>2</sup> USAID, June 1994, *Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President Clinton's Initiative on the Horn of Africa* identified Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda as the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa. (U)

offensive against the rebels was hindering relief efforts to 1.5 million southerners. Civil war and natural disasters—including flooding—put approximately 4.3 million Sudanese in need of food, medical, and other aid in 1994, but large-scale deaths were averted. We expect that a resumption of fighting between government and rebel forces, as well as intra-Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army infighting, will disrupt relief efforts in the south and cause more population dislocations. More than 400,000 Sudanese have sought refuge in Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Central African Republic. (C/NF)

Due to the good harvests, the number of people in need will be reduced to approximately 3 million in 1995. High levels of malnutrition already are being reported by relief workers in widespread locations throughout the south. Elsewhere in Sudan, displaced southerners and northerners need food, medicine, seeds, and tools. (C/NF)

Funding and logistic problems, bureaucratic delays in granting clearances for humanitarian flights and permits for relief workers, and government and rebel obstruction of relief efforts probably will interrupt deliveries of aid supplies and exacerbate humanitarian problems. In addition, relief efforts will be constrained by the presence of 500,000 to 2 million landmines, mostly in southern Sudan. Both sides in the conflict are continuing to lay mines at a rapid rate. (C/NF)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal (January-December 1994): \$231 million*

*Percent Met: 56*

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**Somalia.** Last year we reported that widespread hunger and disease could recur if international aid were halted. About 17 percent of Somalis are at risk. More than 200,000 are refugees, 400,000 are internally displaced, and approximately 500,000 are otherwise in need. Because of a continuing effort by relief agencies—combined with two years of relatively good harvests—Somalia is not in imminent danger of a food crisis. The World Food Program (WFP) plans to augment donated food with local purchases. (U)

Somalia's transport system—though rundown in many parts of the country due to lack of maintenance—is adequate to serve the country. Landmines are present along the Ethiopian border, but major roads in south and central Somalia are relatively clear. (C/NF)

Relief efforts are increasingly being hampered by interclan fighting, banditry, and threats and attacks against relief workers. Moreover, relief organizations are being forced to negotiate with whatever local faction controls an area. (U)

Somalia has no political or economic structure in place at the current time, and prospects for a lasting political settlement are poor. (C/NF)

Factional fighting will increase in Somalia after UN forces depart by March 1995. Deteriorating security has already prompted some relief agencies to suspend operations. Intense fighting would displace a large number of Somalis now dependent on food aid and reduce the anticipated increases in agricultural output. Hunger and disease could reappear, although not at the 1992 level. (C/NF)

**Kenya.** The situation in Kenya is stable at the current time, although ethnic tensions continue to simmer and persistent drought afflicts the

northern part of the country. About 170,000 of Kenya's 28 million people are internally displaced. (C/NF)

Kenya is a haven for more than 250,000 refugees from Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Due to continuing instability at home, refugees from Somalia and Sudan currently in Kenya probably will not repatriate. Moreover, their numbers may well increase, exacerbating Kenya's food deficit. (C/NF)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal  
(January-December 1994): \$96 million*

*Percent Met: 54*

**Ethiopia and Eritrea.** Early crop failures in 1994 put 8 million Ethiopians and Eritreans in need of food aid, but large-scale deaths were averted by timely international relief and improved rains. Millions of people remain in need of assistance, however, because of low agricultural productivity, a chronic food deficit, and weak distribution systems in the region that will persist for the foreseeable future. Both countries are resource-poor following 30 years of war, and their capacity to cope is limited. More than 1 million landmines are present in both countries, primarily in the north. (U)

In Ethiopia, sporadic rainfall has caused food shortages. In addition, the spread of a pest called army worms during the past several months has added to the problem. Some 4.3 million people—about 8 percent of the population—are refugees, displaced internally, or otherwise in need. Almost 1 million metric tons of emergency food aid were delivered in 1994.

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Figure 2. Food distribution at a Somali refugee camp in Ethiopia. (CME)

Despite the good harvest, the country will have a food deficit of at least 500,000 metric tons in 1995:

- In the past decade, annual grain production in Ethiopia—even in years with bumper crops—has fallen below consumption requirements. (U)

Eritrea is also facing a humanitarian emergency. About 1.6 million Eritreans—or 46 percent of the country's 3.5 million people—are refugees, internally displaced, or otherwise in need. Even in good years, Eritrea's harvest meets only about 60 percent of the population's food needs. Despite expectations for a good harvest in 1995, dependence on donor assistance will continue. Some 90,000 metric tons of food aid likely will be needed in 1995, down from 270,000 metric tons in 1994. (U)

If the more than 200,000 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan, 7,500 in Djibouti, and 11,000 in Kenya return home, aid will be needed to help reintegrate them. A large-scale repatriation to Eritrea of its 400,000 refugees in Sudan is unlikely because Eritrea's economic and social infrastructure cannot absorb them. (U)

#### Elsewhere in Africa

**Angola.** Emergency food needs in Angola have increased significantly since last year's estimate, largely because domestic food production has fallen off due to intense and wide-ranging civil conflict, which prevented planting and harvesting in many areas of the country. The UN estimates the number of Angolans affected by civil unrest and drought at 3.7 million—about 38 percent of the population. (CME)

During most of 1994, continued fighting endangered aid deliveries throughout Angola, since both the government and rebels used food as a political weapon. Although UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) providing relief assistance had improved access early in 1994, beginning in June the government and UNITA frequently denied authorization for relief flights destined for the other's territory:

- The United Nations believes the potential for mass deaths due to starvation and malnutrition-related illnesses to be much higher than in Rwanda. (U)

Even in areas without conflict, the delivery of humanitarian aid is hindered by the country's poor transportation system. After almost 20 years of civil war, most highways are in poor condition; the few sections of existing railroad are virtually nonoperational. A railway accident in September 1994 in which some 139 hitchhiking passengers died was attributed

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to faulty equipment and a poorly maintained railbed. In addition to problems with pilferage and corruption, Angola's three ports and Luanda's airfield offer limited storage, and cargo-handling equipment is scarce. Many villages, major cities, roads and bridges, and thousands of hectares of farmland contain landmines. (U)

Despite the signing of the Lusaka Agreement and the implementation of a shaky cease-fire in November 1994, civilian suffering will continue for some time. Angola will need substantial food donations until the agricultural and transportation sectors are rehabilitated. The need for international food assistance will increase if [REDACTED]

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal  
(February-December 1994): \$188 million*

*Percent Met: 69*

**Liberia.** Last year we reported that the chances of renewed conflict were high. Rival armed factions have increased their competition for territorial control, and divisions among them will intensify along ethnic lines. Liberia's political and economic structures have disintegrated. In all, nearly 75 percent of Liberians are at risk: 750,000 people are internally displaced; more than 800,000 are refugees in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria; and another 600,000 are otherwise in need. The population of the capital, Monrovia, has grown from some 300,000 before the civil war to nearly 1 million currently. (C/NF)

The conflict among numerous armed factions in Liberia frequently makes it impossible for international relief organizations to gain access

to most of the country. Consequently, humanitarian assistance for shifting populations—probably several hundred thousand—trapped between fighting factions in the interior of the country is intermittent or nonexistent. Thousands of landmines have recently been laid, making humanitarian operations even more precarious. (S/NF)

The November 1994 Akosombo Agreement—the latest attempt to end nearly five years of civil war—failed and will do little to prevent a further deterioration of the security situation. The failure of the warring factions to abide by the agreement may lead in early 1995 to a withdrawal of the regional peacekeeping forces, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and UN military observers. This could, in turn, cause a further escalation of the fighting, putting the entire population at risk. (S/NF)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal (November 1993-December 1994): \$170 million*

*Percent Met: 48*

**Sierra Leone.** Last year we reported that the government seemed to have the upper hand against the rebels but that the end of the insurgency was far from certain. Today, Sierra Leone does not have a fully functioning government. Food production has halted in major farming areas, and the economic and social infrastructure of about two-thirds of the country has been destroyed. About 30 percent of the population is at risk: as many as 1.25 million people are internally displaced due to conflict—particularly in the region bordering Liberia; 300,000 are refugees in Guinea and Liberia. (C/NF)

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Deteriorating security conditions caused by renegade soldiers, bandits, and rebels have disrupted humanitarian aid efforts in much of the countryside. Growing prospects for violence in Freetown and ethnic conflict in the interior of the country will lead to a deteriorating humanitarian situation in 1995. The Sierra Leonean military, which lacks transport assets and trained personnel, cannot give much assistance to humanitarian efforts. (U)

**Mozambique.** Last year, we reported that, until the former combatants are disarmed, a breakdown in security could lead to an acute humanitarian crisis. Since then, demobilization in August 1994 and the successful elections in October have defused some of the threat to stability. However, the country is still awash in uncollected arms, and the prospect of unemployed, demobilized soldiers resorting to banditry remains a significant threat to security and the efficient resettlement of refugees and the displaced:

- Mozambique remains susceptible to cyclones. Cyclone Nadia swept across Mozambique in March 1994, lashing the northern province of Nampula and devastating the country's principal northern port city of Nacala. About 1.5 million people were affected. (C/NF)

Since the elections, international attention has shifted to restoring the country's torn social fabric and destroyed infrastructure. The government and international agencies have begun to resettle Mozambican refugees, and many have self-repatriated. The total number of the population at risk is 1 million—6 percent of the population, as compared to 43 percent several years ago. Only 200,000 refugees remain in Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and

Tanzania; roughly 500,000 Mozambicans still are internally displaced, and about 300,000 people are otherwise in need. (C/NF)

The presence of as many as 2 million landmines has slowed economic reconstruction and refugee repatriation. All major roads, all railroads, many power pylons, and some farmlands were mined during the war. (U)

By mid-1995, the population in need within Mozambique is expected to rise from 800,000 to 1.5 million, including returning refugees, demobilized soldiers, and internally displaced persons. When the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) withdraws in January 1995, the peace settlement between the MPLA and RENAMO will be severely tested. Widespread civil or economic unrest—or resumption of civil war—would make the country ungovernable and generate a new wave of refugees. (C/NF)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal  
(May-December 1994): \$195 million*

*Percent Met: 63*

### South Asia

**Afghanistan.** There is no functioning government in Afghanistan, and the civil war is taking a heavy toll on the country's resident population of 13 million. In addition, at least 3 million Afghan refugees remain outside the country as a result of the war that began in 1979. The civil war will continue at least through 1995. According to the United Nations and other relief workers, the situation in Kabul is one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. A

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blockade of the city has been in effect since last winter, and civilians' stockpiles have been depleted:

- Without emergency aid, more than half of Kabul's approximately 800,000 residents will be vulnerable to severe food shortages and epidemics. (C/NF)

Since January 1994, thousands of civilians have been killed or injured, hundreds of thousands have become homeless, and as many as 1 million have been internally displaced. The civil war has halted repatriation efforts for the refugees, most of whom currently are located in Iran and Pakistan. The approximately 1.8 million Afghan refugees in Iran are better off than their counterparts in Pakistan, according to Embassy reporting; most have been integrated into Iranian society. (C/NF)

Delivering humanitarian aid in Afghanistan is treacherous and difficult. Several relief workers were murdered in 1992, causing the United Nations to reassess its humanitarian relief program, dramatically reduce its staff, and remove expatriates from the country. The Soviet-Afghan war left at least 9-10 million—and possibly as many as 35 million—landmines spread throughout the country. While all provinces have been affected, those on the Pakistani border and near Kabul have the most severe problems:

- The number of persons needing aid within Afghanistan could be as high as 3 million if fighting continues and Kabul and its environs as well as northern cities continue to be cut off from supplies this winter. (C/NF)

*Most Recent UN Consolidated Appeal:*  
(April-September 1994): \$62 million

*Percent Met: 33*


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Figure 3. UN trucks at a camp near Peshawar, Pakistan, used to distribute food and supplies to Afghanistan. (C/NF)

**Pakistan.** When fighting resumed in Afghanistan in January 1994, Pakistan closed its border with Afghanistan to prevent a new influx of refugees. Pakistan will remain dependent on international assistance as long as it hosts a significant number of Afghan refugees. Currently, more than 1.4 million Afghans are in camps in Pakistan. More than 70,000 of these have fled to Pakistan since January 1994. (C/NF)

According to a 1993 Department of State report, Pakistan does not have a major problem with landmines, although there are minefields along its disputed border with Kashmir. (U)

**Sri Lanka.** The civil war in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil separatists continues to inflict hardships on the populations of the north and east, where most of the fighting is occurring. Some 600,000 people, mostly Tamils, have been internally displaced by the conflict; more than 100,000 are refugees, mostly in India. Transportation capabilities and the country's infrastructure have largely been neglected for the past decade. Landmines pose a significant threat to the population and to relief operations. They have been heavily used on the Jaffna Peninsula and to a lesser degree in other areas contested by government forces and the insurgents. (U)

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***Bosnia and Herzegovina.*** In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the threat of large-scale deaths due to starvation and exposure currently remains low, although the need for continued humanitarian assistance remains high for isolated safe areas and displaced and vulnerable populations. Approximately 2.5 million Bosnians are at risk. There are 1.1 million Bosnian refugees outside the former Yugoslavia and in neighboring former republics and 1.4 million internally displaced persons and others in need in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (C/NF)

Over the last year, three trends have developed:

- More food is now available, and food prices have fallen to near prewar levels in some areas. Relief agencies delivered 247,000 metric tons of food aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the first eight months of 1994—as compared to 172,000 metric tons delivered in the first eight months of 1993.
- Health conditions have generally improved due to increased food and medical supplies, lower levels of fighting, and improved sanitation. A WHO study in early spring 1994 found no severe or widespread malnutrition in the country, despite delivery shortfalls over the winter. Except in the Bihac enclave, war-related casualties—the chief killer during the conflict—also have declined.
- Aid agencies have begun shifting resources to rehabilitation efforts. However, aid deliveries to people in the eastern enclaves, Sarajevo, and Bihac—as well as to the displaced, the elderly, and other social cases—are continuing. (C/NF)

At the same time, relief organizations still face major obstacles in delivering food and supplies.

- The Bosnian Serbs periodically attack or otherwise obstruct relief convoys and aircraft, as well as cut off water and power supplies. The Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats obstruct deliveries and distribution to a lesser degree.
- Crime—much of it based on black-marketeering of humanitarian goods—has become endemic and will continue to be a major problem in 1995.
- With an estimated 1.5 million landmines, Bosnia and Herzegovina have the most severe landmine problem in Europe. Mines have been placed around the major cities, villages, along roads, and in religious buildings, schools, and other places where refugees might congregate. (U)

In addition, donor funding shortfalls have begun to plague relief efforts:

- Overall contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the first half of this year were 70 percent less than in the same period last year. (U)

Relief officials attribute the decline to lack of progress toward a peace settlement, competition from the Rwandan disaster, and sporadic media coverage. Despite the funding shortfall, relief agencies have pre-positioned food stocks in sufficient amounts to cover basic needs through winter 1995. (C/NF)

The ability of international agencies to meet future humanitarian needs in Bosnia and Herzegovina will depend on the level of

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fighting and the outcome of negotiations to settle the conflict. One of three scenarios could develop:

- **Continued fighting at present levels.** If periodic offensives and counteroffensives fail to result in a decisive shift in the military situation, aid requirements for the isolated "safe" areas—Sarajevo, Bihac, and the eastern enclaves—generally will remain at 1994 levels. Aid needs for the contiguous areas of the Federation of Bosnia will continue to decline if access into central Bosnia is not cut off for an extended period of time.
- **Fighting escalates.** Should increasing hostilities force UNPROFOR to withdraw, Bosnian Serb forces, emboldened by the unlikelihood of a lifting of the arms embargo, would escalate military operations in order to consolidate their territorial gains. They would attempt to expand the northern corridor, capture the eastern enclaves, and tighten their siege of Sarajevo. At the very least, Bosnian Serb forces would cut aid access and utilities to these areas. In addition, Bosnian Serbs would probably interdict major road routes to central Bosnia, cutting off aid deliveries.
- **A political settlement.** In the unlikely event that a political settlement is reached, short-term relief needs may increase as relief agencies begin to resettle refugees and displaced persons. Needs would then transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction as normal commerce resumed. (C/NF)

**Croatia.** The UN, European Community, and other international relief organizations provide aid to more than 180,000 Bosnian refugees—mostly in refugee camps—and support the Croatian Government's effort to assist about 200,000 displaced Croats, many of whom live

with friends and relatives. The Croatian economy revived substantially in 1994, though political settlements of both the Bosnian and Croatian conflicts will be necessary before normal commercial activity can be resumed and large-scale repatriation and resettlement takes place. Negotiations at the end of 1994 made halting progress on economic confidence-building measures between the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs who control approximately 27 percent of Croatian territory in the Krajina and eastern Slavonia:

- If progress continues to be stalled on negotiations to reestablish Zagreb's authority over the UN Protected Areas and to resettle some Croats to the Serb-controlled Krajina, an outbreak of fighting between Croatia and the Krajina Serbs is likely.
- Chances are greater than even that Zagreb will initiate a military offensive to retake all or parts of Krajina during the first half of 1995, widening the Balkan war and involving troops and support from Serbia and Montenegro. An outbreak of fighting could affect hundreds of thousands of Serbs in the "Republic of Serb Krajina" and Croats near the frontlines, resulting in more internally displaced persons and refugees from both communities. (C/NF)

Should a major war erupt in Croatia, UN humanitarian operations in Bosnia would also be affected; relief assistance to more than 1 million Bosnians could be cut off. (C/NF)

About a million landmines are present in the former conflict areas—now UN Protected Areas—and the number may be growing in areas where low-intensity conflict continues. (U)

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**Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).** Macedonia remains vulnerable to economic, external, and interethnic pressures. Its economy has suffered from the loss of transit trade due to UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, as well as from a trade embargo by Greece (begun in February 1994), which cuts off the country from its only outlet to the south. Although unlikely during 1995, the potential exists for the influx of as many as 300,000 ethnic Albanians from the neighboring Serbian regions of Kosovo, should an ethnic incident there lead the minority Serb authorities to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing. The economy is already at the brink of collapse, and the government is unable to care for its Bosnian refugees. An influx of Kosovar Albanians would overwhelm Macedonia's capacity, add to tensions between Macedonians and minority Albanians, and result in the need for large-scale humanitarian assistance. (CNF)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal for all of the former Yugoslavia (January-December 1994): \$721 million*

*Percent Met: 94*

#### Central Asia and the Caucasus

**Georgia.** Last year we reported that civil conflict in Georgia would continue, with full-blown civil war a possibility. Although full-blown civil war was avoided and is not likely to break out over the time period of this Estimate—largely due to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in a security zone along the Abkhaz-Georgian border—the country remains fractured by unresolved ethnic conflicts. There are more than 250,000 internally displaced persons. Key transportation lines remain blocked, most industries are operating at minimum capacity, and a severe energy shortage has crippled the economy. (U)

Nearly 1 million Georgians—about 17 percent of the population—are in need of humanitarian assistance, and most of the population relies on Western grain for bread production. More than 200,000 of those in need are Georgians displaced from Abkhazia:

- The 1994 grain harvest in Georgia was only 229,000 metric tons, well below average, far less than the 1993 harvest.
- FAO estimates Georgia will require more than 1 million metric tons of grain from April 1994 to March 1995; as of November 1994, 750,000 metric tons had been donated, pledged, or secured through credits and loans. (U)

Delivering aid to Georgia is precarious. T'bilisi's access routes north to Russia are controlled by Abkhaz separatists, and those west to Black Sea ports are frequently disrupted by banditry and electricity shortages. Natural gas shutoffs from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Russia will persist this winter because of Georgian arrears. For the next year, the need for humanitarian assistance in Georgia will remain at the current high level whether or not a peace settlement is reached between Georgia and Abkhaz. Civil strife and localized crime and violence are likely to continue to disrupt commercial activity and relief efforts. (CNF)

There are more than 70,000 landmines present in Georgia, primarily in the Gumista River Valley outside Sokhumi, the Kodori Valley, the Och'anch'ire region, the Gali region, and along the western portion of the Enguri River. (U)

**Armenia.** Last year, we reported that Armenia was all but cut off from the outside world because of civil strife and the diversion of relief

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aid in Georgia, a blockade by Azerbaijan, and Turkey's restriction of the delivery of supplies. The restrictions by Azerbaijan and Turkey continue. Minefields are present along Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran. The only overland supply route open for food and fuel deliveries is the deteriorating and dangerous road and rail system extending from Black Sea ports through Georgian territory, which is rife with banditry and subject to interdiction by ethnic Azeris. The natural gas pipeline transits Georgian territory near the Azerbaijan border, where it is vulnerable to sabotage and cutoffs from suppliers. Armenia's humanitarian needs have been lessened by strong expatriate financial support, but widespread hunger will be avoided this winter only if Georgian railroads function. (U)

The UN estimates that more than 250,000 refugees from Armenia—ethnic Russians and ethnic Azeris—are in Russia and Azerbaijan. Another 50,000 Armenians are internally displaced. Government and NGO networks are well established, but shelter programs fall well short of meeting the needs of internally displaced persons and refugees:

- The acreage planted for grain in 1994 was 13 percent lower than in 1993, winter wheat plantings were down by 25 percent, and cereal imports have decreased by a third of their 1990-91 levels.
- FAO estimates a minimum grain import requirement of 450,000 metric tons for July 1994 to June 1995. Donors are expected to meet the grain shortfall needs in Armenia for 1995. (U)

Because it is unlikely that conditions along Armenia's border will change substantially during 1995, the need for emergency humanitarian assistance will continue at existing

levels. The absence of energy supplies is causing the Armenians to experience another cold, dark winter. (U)

**Azerbaijan.** Last year, we reported that the war in Azerbaijan over its ethnic Armenian-dominated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh had escalated. We estimated that living conditions would worsen as winter set in and food supplies dwindled. While both sides have generally been observing a cease-fire in place since May 1994, the Azerbaijan economy has slipped notably in the past year and will continue to decline in 1995. The Karabakh Armenians have conquered one-fifth of the country, including some of the best agricultural land, and have control of a large *cordon sanitaire* into Armenia. The resettlement of Azeris to Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenian-occupied territory will remain problematic even as the various sides continue to jockey in the wake of the December 1994 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreement:

- Civilians living near the frontlines of war zones remain at risk from sporadic shelling. There may be 50,000 or more landmines in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. (U)

The affected population is estimated by the United Nations to total more than 1 million people—about 13 percent of the population. Nearly 1 million refugees and internally displaced people will continue to rely almost fully on international relief. (U)

The country's worsening economic crisis has placed an increasing number of the nonrefugee population at risk, including nearly 200,000 in the Nakhichevan enclave, where Armenian blockades have left an estimated 80 percent of

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the population without wage income. Domestic food shortages will become serious in 1995; bread has already become more scarce on the market due to grain shortages. The cutoff of the rail line from Russia through Chechnya will exacerbate shortages of basic food stocks. Relief agencies are expanding efforts to provide aid to vulnerable populations throughout the country, including 350,000 pensioners and disabled. Baku has appealed to Iran, Turkey, and Russia for food assistance, and in November 1994 Yel'tsin pledged to deliver 300,000 metric tons of grain. (C/NF)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (April 1994–March 1995): \$130 million*

*Percent Met: 40*

**North Caucasus.** Last year, we reported that limited local warfare in Russia's North Caucasus region was likely to result in some refugee movements and hinder relief efforts to the entire Caucasus. Conflict in Chechnya effectively stopped pipeline and rail shipments south into the Caucasus by late 1994, and by the end of November full-scale conflict had broken out between forces loyal to Chechen President Dudayev and those of Russian-backed local oppositionists. Moscow's recent direct intervention may result in a protracted conflict that could draw in sympathizers from neighboring North Caucasus republics, creating refugees and internally displaced persons. (C/NF)

**Tajikistan.** Last year, we reported that, despite a successful UNHCR repatriation of as many as 400,000 displaced and refugee Tajiks, efforts to reintegrate many of these returnees were failing, and the humanitarian situation would probably worsen. Large amounts of international

assistance in 1994 helped to avert a humanitarian crisis, and a Russian- and Uzbek-dominated CIS peacekeeping force is guarding against the resumption of civil war by insurgent Tajik oppositionists operating out of Afghanistan. Continued high levels of food assistance are expected to forestall widespread hunger in 1995, but regional, clan-based violence could break out following parliamentary elections in February, leading to a collapse of the UN cease-fire and isolating as many as 500,000 Tajiks, particularly in the Vodii Gharm (Garm Valley), the Kulob region, and the Pamirs:

- The 1994 grain crop was 25 percent below normal, and the Tajik Government lacks the resources to procure much of the estimated 900,000 metric tons of grain, which are normally imported annually. By late 1994, grain imports had shrunk to less than half of minimum consumption needs, most cities had run out of flour reserves, and armed bands were attacking the food distribution system. (C/NF)

Continued high levels of international assistance will be required in 1995 to provide and distribute food. Following the presidential elections in November 1994, which were widely viewed as fraudulent, interested CIS donors, primarily Russia and Kazakhstan, promised to help make up for the grain shortfall of an estimated 300,000 metric tons in 1995. (C/NF)

Although 80 percent of the refugees and displaced people who fled during the 1992 fighting have since returned, several hundred thousand remain inadequately housed and fed in the southern Kulob region. Security and protection for these returnees is inadequate, and their reintegration into Tajik society has been slow. Approximately 20,000 are living under

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squalid conditions in camps in northern Afghanistan. Nearly 100,000 are internally displaced, many in the isolated Pamirs. The refugees from Tajikistan who have fled to the former Soviet Union number more than 300,000—including native Russians—and most are not expected to return. (U)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal  
(April-December 1994): \$43 million*

*Percent Met: 46*

#### Latin America-Caribbean

*Haiti.* At present, Haiti is the only country in the region in need of emergency humanitarian assistance. Last year, we estimated that desperate economic conditions in the country could bring calls for emergency relief and stimulate sudden and massive migration that would necessitate direct US assistance. At least 2 million Haitians currently are receiving emergency health and water assistance; approximately 1 million are also receiving food from international agencies:

- Lack of agricultural inputs, principally seeds and fertilizers, have hindered vegetable production, and industrial poultry production has been largely abandoned due to lack of feed.
- Unemployment in rural areas, home to the majority of Haitians, may be as high as 40 percent.
- In urban areas, declining production for export has driven hundreds of firms out of business and cost thousands of workers their jobs. (C/NF)

The international community's Energy Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), if implemented, should ease somewhat Haiti's most pressing economic woes. The plan pledges some \$650 million in the next 15 months, with \$195 million coming from the United States. (C/NF)

Still, Haiti remains a deeply divided society and the new civilian government in Port-au-Prince is not able to maintain order on its own. If the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)—set to take over from the US-dominated Multinational Force (MNF)<sup>3</sup> early in 1995—is less effective than the MNF in maintaining order, societal violence could increase sharply. This, in turn, would pose a threat to the distribution of international aid and could create a renewed outflow of refugees. Even if UNMIH is able to maintain order, more than 1 million Haitians probably will depend on international assistance in 1995. (C/NF)

#### Middle East-North Africa

*Iraq.* Iraq will require substantial emergency humanitarian assistance in the coming year. Relief efforts by the UN and other international aid agencies are directed at approximately 1.3 million of Iraq's 20 million people. Last year, we reported that the dependence of the Kurds on international assistance had increased due to Baghdad's embargo of the north. Relief officials estimate that approximately 750,000 people in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq now require assistance. (C/NF)

The displacement of more than 30,000 Iraqi Kurds due to fighting in August and September and an influx into northern Iraq

<sup>3</sup> There will be 6,000 US troops and 2,000 troops from other nations in Haiti by 15 December 1994. (U)

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of approximately 10,000 Kurds fleeing the fighting in southeastern Turkey this summer are adding to the pressure on relief efforts in the region. A more critical situation could develop if widespread intra-Kurdish fighting resumes or if "Operation Provide Comfort" is discontinued and Saddam Hussein makes incursions into northern Iraq. Even if the oil embargo and the sanctions regime were relaxed, the humanitarian needs of the population at risk would remain high. (C/NF)

On the surface, it appears that the humanitarian program in northern Iraq is beginning to have an impact. Irrigation projects—though still limited in scope—have transformed previously barren valleys into productive lands. This year's wheat yield was greater than last year's, the Kurds are again growing their own rice, livestock population has grown, new construction projects are under way, and villagers are returning to their homes. But the improvements in northern Iraq are fragile. The economy remains stymied by the double sanctions, and the fluctuating dollar-to-dinar rate reflects an uncertain political situation. Iraqi shelling along the border areas has escalated in recent months as Saddam continues to look for new ways to increase pressure on the Kurds. (S/NF)

Planned food assistance from relief organizations should be adequate to meet the winter needs in northern Iraq—which is traditionally a surplus foodgrowing region. Approximately 100,000 metric tons will be needed from April 1994 to March 1995.<sup>4</sup> This figure includes food that relief organizations will purchase inside Iraq. Lower resources for the UN program will lead to a drawdown of personnel associated with both security and relief programs. The

<sup>4</sup> This number is a rough estimate only—the need for FY1995 has not yet been determined. (U)

United Nations already plans to cut its guard force in Iraq to 100 personnel. The lack of donor contributions to the food relief programs will probably result in cutbacks for the World Food Program and its implementing partners. (C/NF)

In central and southern Iraq, the United Nations estimates that approximately 550,000 people will require limited food assistance in 1995—the same number as last year. One-hundred thousand to 150,000 Shias are still at risk in southern Iraq. [REDACTED]

Iraq still denies the UN and other relief agencies access to the southern marsh areas. The regime has constructed causeways to divert water away from the marsh areas, burned marsh reeds, destroyed villages, and forced the inhabitants to flee [REDACTED]

An estimated 5-10 million landmines are present in Iraq. Minefields exist along the borders with Iran, Kuwait, and Turkey. Within Iraq, there are extensive minefields in Kurdistan.

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal*  
(April 1994–March 1995): \$289 million

*Percent Met: 25*

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**Yemen.** The need for humanitarian assistance in Yemen is growing and probably will increase over the next year. Economic conditions, already poor, were further weakened by the civil war in 1994. According to US diplomats and other Western observers:

- The fighting, which displaced 375,000 residents, caused an estimated 10,000 casualties and has overwhelmed Yemen's health care system.
- Unexploded ordnance and mines litter roadsides and some hinterland areas, making overland travel dangerous, particularly in the Aden area. (C MF)

Although relief organizations have operated in Yemen for years, the lack of a strong central government has placed relief workers at risk:

- Westerners are subject to threats and harassment by local tribesmen; many of them use hostages as bargaining chips to demand concessions from the government.
- Islamic militants may view Christian relief agencies as an affront. Members of the Sisters of Charity, a humanitarian organization founded by Mother Teresa, reportedly have been harassed by Islamists in Aden since the war ended. (C MF)

*Current UN Consolidated Appeal (August 1994–February 1995): \$22 million*

*Percent Met: 27*

#### East Asia

**Cambodia.** After more than 20 years of civil war and internal unrest and an investment of more than \$2 billion in the 1991-93 UN

peacekeeping operation, less than 5 percent of the population is at risk: fewer than 100,000 Cambodians remain internally displaced; twice that number are otherwise in need. The living standards remain low throughout most of the country. However, sporadic fighting between government troops and Khmer Rouge insurgents continues. Cambodians are forced periodically to flee from their homes. In May, for example, more than 40,000 Khmer fled their villages in Batdambang Province when local government defenses collapsed and the Khmer Rouge razed several villages. Last year, we reported that more than 360,000 refugees who had recently returned would need food assistance as UN rations ran out. The repatriation has been completed. (C MF)

International assistance to Cambodia has been hampered by Phnom Penh's political infighting, corruption, and a lack of qualified administrators. Low-level fighting poses particular hazards for donors distributing assistance outside the capital. The Khmer Rouge and government forces sometimes have harassed NGOs and destroyed their facilities.

- The Cambodian Mine Action Center, a UN-sponsored demining group, was forced to temporarily suspend operations in May when government troops damaged its headquarters during a skirmish with Khmer Rouge troops. (C MF)

In no country in the world have uncleared landmines had such an enormous adverse impact as in Cambodia, where one in every 236 people has lost a limb to a landmine. The mines are found mostly in the western and northwestern parts of the country. New mines continue to be laid. (U)

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Humanitarian assistance will be needed in Cambodia during the next year due to continuing warfare in the countryside, a dilapidated infrastructure, crop shortfalls, and the government's serious budgetary limitations. UN food assistance has ended, but UNHCR is helping some 50,000 returnees to find land, and UNDP is providing development assistance. (CNF)

**Burma.** In Burma, a country with a total population of 44 million people, counterinsurgency operations, and repressive government policies continue to dislocate and bring hardship to ethnic minorities. Half the 280,000 Muslim Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh in early 1992 remain there; the UNHCR now is repatriating them at the rate of 5,000 per week in an operation likely to be concluded by mid-1995. (U)

More than 70,000 refugees—including political dissidents and members of ethnic minorities who have fled political persecution or attacks by the Burma Army—have crossed the border



Figure 4. A Rohingya Muslim border camp in Bangladesh. (CNF)

and live in camps in Thailand. Harsh government policies and fighting between the Burma Army and ethnic or narcotrafficking insurgent groups may periodically increase the need for humanitarian assistance as more people flee their homes. (CNF)

Burma faces a serious problem with uncleared landmines; all sides in the internal conflict have used them over the past 40 years. (U)

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## Annex

### International Humanitarian Agencies and the Red Cross Movement

#### The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA)

The UNDHA was created in 1992 in an attempt to improve UN coordination of humanitarian relief. Its mandate includes providing assistance to developing countries to prevent and warn against disasters, as well as to mitigate their effects; improving the UN's standby capacity for dealing with emergencies; launching consolidated appeals; and improving the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation. Its 1993 expenditures were \$72 million. (U)

#### The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

UNHCR, mandated to protect, repatriate, and resettle refugees,<sup>1</sup> sometimes also coordinates assistance programs for displaced persons. Its budget has increased dramatically from \$400 million in 1984 to \$1.3 billion in 1993. UNHCR, which is represented in more than 100 countries, is financed almost entirely by voluntary contributions from governments and private contributors; a small amount comes from the annual UN budget and may be used only to defray administrative costs. (U)

#### The World Food Program (WFP)

WFP, the food aid arm of the United Nations with offices in 85 developing countries, provides both emergency aid and long-term

<sup>1</sup> International law, as it has developed since 1945, defines "refugees" as persons who are compelled to leave their country due to fear of persecution, armed conflicts, or civil strife and whose lives or security would be endangered if they returned. (U)

development assistance. Its 1994 expenditures for emergency assistance and aid to internally displaced persons are \$1.2 billion. Funding comes from voluntary contributions from governments and other UN agencies in the form of commodities, cash, and services. (U)

#### The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)

UNICEF provides assistance, particularly nutrition, health, and education, to children and mothers in developing countries and to victims of disasters. UNICEF has offices in 128 developing countries. Its total budget for 1993 was \$866 million, of which \$138 million was expended on humanitarian relief. Funding consists of voluntary contributions from governments and from private donors. (U)

#### The World Health Organization (WHO)

WHO, which has a wide range of health-related functions, furnishes technical assistance and aid in humanitarian emergencies. Its 1993 expenditures for humanitarian relief were \$48 million. Funding is provided by assessments on UN member states, voluntary contributions from governments, and contributions from other UN agencies and private donors. (U)

#### The UN Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDP, the world's largest development services network, operates as the United Nation's central funding and coordinating agency for technical cooperation. It maintains more than 100 Resident Representatives in developing

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countries, many of whom serve as UN country team coordinators in complex humanitarian emergencies. Its total budget for 1993 was \$1.4 billion, of which a small but increasing portion was expended on rehabilitation in humanitarian emergencies. Funding comes from voluntary contributions from governments at an annual pledging conference called by the UN Secretary-General. (u)

#### International Organizations

##### The European Emergency Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)

ECHO, the emergency humanitarian assistance organization of the European Union (EU), manages and coordinates all EU relief efforts. One of the largest contributors of humanitarian relief, it allocated roughly \$708 million for humanitarian aid in 1993 and budgeted about the same amount for 1994. Funds come from its 12 member states, many of whom also contribute bilaterally to humanitarian emergencies. (u)

##### The International Organization for Migration (IOM)

IOM arranges resettlement and repatriation for refugees and migrants. In 1993, its budget was \$263 million, of which a substantial portion was for emergency assistance. Operational funding comes from voluntary contributions from governments, and administrative funding comes from mandatory contributions from its member governments. (u)

##### The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Established in 1863, the ICRC predates any other agency in the international humanitarian system and has unique attributes that set it apart from both international organizations and NGOs. Over the last century, it has been

assigned important official responsibilities set forth in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, including protection and assistance to victims of international and internal civil conflict. A unique mandate of the ICRC is to monitor treatment of prisoners of war, a humanitarian responsibility not shared by any other relief organization. When conflict situations stabilize, ICRC turns over assistance operations to National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies and other NGOs. (u)

The ICRC's tradition of neutrality, impartiality, and independence gives it credibility. Its commitment to operating with the consent of warring parties elicits belligerents' cooperation up to a point but can impede its access to endangered populations. ICRC adherence to its well-established principles may also limit coordination with other organizations that do not share its tenets. (u)

The ICRC is a private, independent organization composed largely of Swiss nationals and supported primarily by Western governments. Its 1993 expenditures for international disaster relief were \$519 million. (u)

##### The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

IFRC is a federation of 161 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies that provide assistance to victims of natural disasters and armed conflicts in their countries or in countries in which they have a particular interest. The scale and nature of the Federation's involvement in emergency relief operations have grown dramatically in recent years. Its 1994 Emergency Appeal seeks to assist 13 million persons in 46 countries. In 1993 its expenditures on international relief were \$273 million. (u)

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**Warning Notice**

**National Security Information**

**Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL)**

**Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

**Information available as of 15 December 1993 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.**

**The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:**

- The Central Intelligence Agency
- The Defense Intelligence Agency
- The National Security Agency
- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- The Office of Intelligence Support, Department of the Treasury
- The Director of Intelligence, Department of Energy

**also participating:**

- The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
- The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

**This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.**

**Dissemination Control Abbreviations**

NOFORN (NF)	Not releasable to foreign nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC)	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
PROPIN (PR)	Caution—proprietary information involved
ORCON (OC)	Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
REL...	This information has been authorized for release to...
WN	WNINTEL—Intelligence sources or methods involved
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