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*Unclassified*

## A Studies Roundtable

# Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (U)

**Introductory Note:** The creation of a new, national-level intelligence agency is not a routine or easy experience. CIA's establishment in 1947 was preceded by a series of halfsteps and extensive discussion (more within the Washington establishment than in public) on the question of how the United States wanted to focus a permanent peacetime intelligence structure. Much of the discussion centered on the tension between national and departmental needs for intelligence and control of the instruments producing it. At another level, the integration of previously separate organizations into a new agency affects the full spectrum of organizational existence, from high-level policy documents to the most mundane (and arcane) decisions on everything from standard forms to parking permits. The creation of the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1952, undertaken even less publicly, was marked by a similar mix of policy-related and bureaucratic issues.

The October 1996 establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) brought together several thousand personnel from eight predecessor organizations. Beyond reorganizing components of the Intelligence Community (IC), a key decision in the NIMA implementation was the incorporation of the former Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), an entity with a distinguished lineage dating back to its service as the Army Map Agency, the principal topographic center of the War Department.

The CIA and NSA experiences were part of the establishment of the American intelligence apparatus for the Cold War. Half a century later, the creation of NIMA is part of the reshaping of that apparatus for service in a different world, technically and politically. On 4 November 1997, *Studies in Intelligence* Editorial Board members Lt. Gen. James Clapper (USAF, retired), Douglas Garthoff (CIA), and William Nolte (NSA) met with NIMA Deputy Director Leo Hazlewood and other key participants in the team that steered the proposal for a national imagery agency (see box). As the text of this edited transcript **(1)** makes clear, the issues surrounding the NIMA debate were numerous and complex. What is imagery's future role? What structure would best support that role? Would converging technologies permit the effective and efficient integration of components that evolved from an IC tradition and culture with components from an arguably related but organizationally different institutional background? Would the benefits of such an integration outweigh the costs of change? One year of operation (noting again the November 1997 basis of this roundtable) has not eliminated skepticism concerning NIMA. The process of integrating its components into a new structure with a new identity continues.

<b>Roundtable Participants</b>	<b>Role in NIMA Planning/Transition</b>	<b>Position, November 1997</b>
Leo Hazlewood	Deputy Director, NIMA Deputy Director, NIMA	Implementation Team
Edward J. Obloy	Legal Issues	General Counsel, NIMA
Letitia A. Long	Program and budget issues	Associate Executive Director for Community Affairs
Sharon Basso	Congressional issues	Director, Agency Information Staff
David Broadhurst	General support and integration issues	Director, National Imagery and Mapping College
Bobbi Lenczowski	Organization issues	Deputy Director, Operations, Directorate, NIMA
William R. Allder, Jr.	"Responsibilities and Boundaries"	Deputy Director, Imagery, NRO
Greg Jay	Contractor (Booz, Allen, & Hamilton)	Booz, Allen, & Hamilton
Rick Stakem	NIMA Implementation Team	Associate Director, Operations Directorate, NIMA
Scott Large	Boundaries: NRO-NIMA	NRO Representative, NIMA
Helen Sullivan	Legal issues	Office of the Deputy, General Counsel, DoD

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*What was driving the idea of a national imagery agency?*

**Hazlewood:** The idea that there was a better way to integrate the imagery process. Coming out of DESERT STORM, it seemed to a number of people that technology was moving in directions that would make a national, "NSA-like" agency for imagery more effective than any possible alternative. Bob Gates, Colin Powell, and John Deutch saw this as an opportunity worth pursuing.

*Was this a case of the existing processes being broken?*

**Hazlewood:** Not really. Most, if not all, of the predecessor units that came to form NIMA had recently received unit citations or commendations of one sort or another, and the sense was that they were all performing well. The key was that some important principals came to believe that we could do things even better.

**Allder:** Let me elaborate. When John Deutch looked at the potential for shared and complementary technologies that would be driving both the imagery and mapping businesses in the future, he saw a set of technological opportunities that could be pursued most effectively through a single set of plans and programs.

*But why include mapping, something that had not traditionally been an IC function? Why not just consolidate imagery?*

**Hazlewood:** Again, as you looked across the emerging technologies, the shared interests were compelling.

**Jay:** Keith Hall's group [Hall was then Executive Director of the Community Management Staff] was asked by John Deutch for suggested goals and objectives during his tenure as DCI. Mr. Hall offered up combining imagery activities in defense and intelligence. In April 1995, Deutch included a combination

of these activities in his confirmation hearings.

**Obloy:** All this came together in November 1995, when [Secretary of Defense William] Perry, John Deutch, and General Shalikashvili signed a letter to the Congressional oversight committees outlining the need for a new look at the problem. Even though the idea would later generate skepticism from within the bureaucracies affected by the change, the proposal had top-level support that provided momentum past the skepticism.

*What about Congressional skepticism?*

**Hazlewood:** We certainly encountered some. Not everyone was convinced of the idea that the objective of all this was a technical opportunity. I think the second question I got asked was "You're not planning a new campus, are you?" things of that sort. Beyond that, on the House side especially, they were in the midst of their own study [*The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century* or "IC21"] and this clearly became a competing idea.

*But the idea was out there: create a national imagery agency, more or less on the NSA model?*

**Hazlewood:** Right, but you had to be careful with whom you used the term "NSA model." Some folks understood immediately what that meant and supported it. Others, including, at times, General Shalikashvili, were much more cautious about what it meant, and they clearly were people who were uncertain about the amount of autonomy it entailed. At the same time, the idea of creating a national imagery agency within the Defense Department (DoD) raised concerns about that agency's ability to support the national--that is, the non-DoD--customer.

**Broadhurst:** The timing here was important. On one level, it looked like we wanted to build yet another stovepipe, when the issue of excessive stovepiping was very real.

**Hazlewood:** This was an important issue with the House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence (HPSCI), which was, as I said, engaged in its IC21 study and which immediately asked why we would want another stovepipe. So we quickly said "This is a porous stovepipe!" that would have to be organized in such a way as to work the flow of information to customers everywhere--through crosswalks at various levels and so forth. The key to making that work, as we kept coming back to this concern over and over, was an architecture that would allow information to flow wherever it was needed.

*Did this produce clearly articulated positions: stovepipes versus crosswalks and so on?*

**Hazlewood:** To some degree, though at another level, these became "religious issues," where people simply believed what they believed.

**Long:** One of the things that generated concern on the Senate side, with the Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence (SSCI), was whether all the money associated with imagery was going to go into the General Defense Intelligence Program. Were they thinking about the effectiveness of stovepipes? Not really; they were much more focused on whether a change would bring with it a loss of oversight and control.

*While this discussion was ongoing, we experienced significant changes among the principals who had initiated much of this discussion. Did that make a change?*

**Hazlewood:** One of the differences was the shift from Powell to Shalikashvili. I was in Gates's office when Gates talked to Powell after Powell had gotten the [Robert] Burnett Panel briefing. [The Burnett Panel, established in 1992, was an effort to examine the structure of the IC's imagery assets. One conclusion of its report, which was not adopted, called for integration of imagery and mapping. The report's recommendations in this regard were not accepted, but the issue remained alive.] Powell expressed his concern about not being sure we were fixing the thing that was broken. That translated to "I understand that imagery is broken; I do not understand mapping to be broken." Shali just had a different orientation. He was prepared to agree that he was not sure mapping was broken, but that he was

prepared to agree with Deutch's argument that this was an opportunity. Shali's father, by the way, worked for the DMA in St. Louis, so he knew a lot about DMA. And that may have been a good thing. Deutch turned the whole argument from finding things that were broken to taking advantage of opportunities. Shali bought onto that, as did Peary.

**Allder:** The Burnett Panel got to Powell late in the process, and there continued to be arguments through the summer of 1995, with a wide range of views as to what was going to happen. I was in the Central Imagery Office (CIO) at the time, and we were bringing in consultants who had worked on corporate mergers to find out how you made government agencies like those engaged in imagery work better together. And their answer was "You can't do it," if we could not put in place the political will to force a change.

**Jay:** You have to understand, as Bill [Allder] just said, that the limitations of the CIO operation were becoming apparent. Dr. Krygiel [Annette Krygiel, Director of the CIO] used to joke about the CIO having a "sponge hammer" or "velvet hammer" as an instrument of authority.

*Had the climate changed that much between the Burnett Study, in 1992, and the summer of 1995?*

**Jay:** It had certainly shifted. The Burnett Panel was largely composed of active or retired senior military officers, and, by 1995, you were starting to feel much more of a grassroots interest in a national imagery agency.

**Lenczowski:** One of the things that had changed was the CIO experiment itself. By 1995, you had a growing number of people who were convinced CIO had been tried but was not the answer. And, to return to an earlier point, you really had an emphasis on finding the best ways to do things, not so much on fixing things found to be broken. When I accompanied Mr. Deutch on his tour of DMA, as he went into the environment, and he saw the cartographers at their work stations dealing with digital imagery, he reemphasized the point that they were working with imagery in much the same way imagery analysts do. So from his viewpoint, he saw it as an opportunity for both sets of analysts to leverage off a common environment. They were not the same job, but they were working in similar technical environments.

**Broadhurst:** Early on, no one in the community seemed terribly enamored of linking mapping with imagery. Except CIO. CIO had nothing to lose and really everything to gain from strengthening the authorities in this area that would force the disciplines together to take advantage of common applications. This did not sell early on, probably because of more of the "religious issues" associated with the whole question.

**Clapper:** Let me add a historical point. Leo and I were part of the committee that came up with the CIO, which was something of a bureaucratic compromise in which nobody gave up much. And that was the intent. Like everyone else, I had major equities at stake, as Director of DIA. As another note, early on it seemed like Bob Gates was prepared to give the entire imagery mission to DIA. There's a reference to that in his "inaugural" speech, but he soon discovered this was politically impossible. As for General Powell, I recall a conversation Adm. Mike McConnell, then the J2, and I had with General Powell on this issue. Basically, General Powell did not come on strong about imagery intelligence. What he was concerned about was DMA. Based on what DMA had done during DESERT STORM, he saw them as a skilled and specialized organization, which responded well when called upon. When he needed maps, he got maps, and he did not want that capability taken away!

*Let's get back to architecture. It is hard to control architecture unless you control money. How successful has NIMA been in gaining authority over budgets and programs? If you are going to adhere to the NSA model, is there going to be an equivalent to the Consolidated Cryptologic Program for imagery and mapping?*

**Hazlewood:** We are not there. We have created a National Imagery Program and a Defense Imagery Program, but the clear fact is that our statutory authority ends at the Joint Task Force level. Once you get below that point, we have not forced people to adhere to our architecture. We have debated this thoroughly. Admiral Dantone's [Rear Adm. John Dantone, NIMA's first Director] feeling is that rather

than declaring war and forcing compliance on a whole bunch of people, it is better to demonstrate to them an architecture that attracts them. If we have good data, they will be attracted to it. We have certain authorities in the statute, but, to be honest, the resources are much more divided than they are in the SIGINT world.

**Large:** Imagery does not have analogs to the Service Cryptologic Elements, with their funding. It is not the same in imagery, where, for example, a large portion of imagery dollars remain in TIARA [Tactical Intelligence And Related Activities Program]. While NIMA may have oversight from an architectural standpoint, it does not have "seal of approval" authority. Much of the program--the former CIO, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and DIA pieces--is in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, as they were previously. They have now been rolled into a National Imagery and Mapping Agency Program (NIMAP). The former DMA resources are not part of NFIP (National Foreign Intelligence Program).

**Obloy:** As for putting all the resources into a single program, that was a nonstarter. Although it may have seemed logical and reasonable to us, it guaranteed real political problems, including the Armed Service Committee giving up jurisdiction, which we would never be able to sell on the Hill.

**Long:** And not just the Hill. In the early days, we presented that possibility to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the answer was "Over our dead bodies." So the easiest way was a compromise that left everything in the programs they were in but funded them all together.

**Broadhurst:** There was an early effort to include the TIARA programs under NIMA--that was the 800-pound gorilla option on our spectrum from "minor enhancement of the CIO to the 800-pound gorilla." But it was a nonstarter.

**Hazlewood:** The point of all this is that we learned early to make compromises on what we wanted to do because, without those compromises, we were not going to be able to build the coalition necessary to get the idea of a national agency first through the executive branch and then through Congress. One of the interesting things we observed through this was something of the fragmentation of the bureaucracy. After the principals has signed on, for example, to the proposal to create the agency, the OSD Comptroller dissented.

*Why?*

**Hazlewood:** They did not want an extra three-star position created. So they took a footnote. This sort of thing happened repeatedly. One of the interesting things to come out of the bureaucracies, on the other hand, was insistence from the Community Management Staff (CMS) that we set up a Senior Steering Group to oversee the process and a Customer Advisor Board to make sure customers are supportive. At the time, we had just stood up our team, we were way behind the schedule we needed to meet, and our initial response to CMS was "We do not think so." CMS insisted, and, in retrospect, those were two useful bodies. The Senior Steering Group (initially cochaired by the DDCI and Paul Kaminski from DoD, then trichaired because the JCS felt they needed to play) greased a bunch of skids through the bureaucracy for us. We would still be trying to coordinate this had it not been for their personal intervention. The Customer Advisory Board, viewed initially by some of our group as a pain, got all the customers together, chaired by the National Intelligence Council and the Operations Directorate (J3) of the Joint Staff. It was the only place where all the customers could come together and state their concerns.

**Obloy:** You can never overemphasize that the decision to go ahead and do this was taken somewhere around 27 November 1995, with a target date of 1 October 1996 for standing up the new agency, and with a legislative timetable that said our legislative package had to be on the Hill by 15 April 1996. So we had to push this whole package through the bureaucracy by April. In fact, the Senior Steering Group did grease some skids, but we still had to go around some skids, in making this thing a reality. This has not been without consequences. You do not make friends going around people, so there was a lot of tension around that time. One real consequence was that the bill got to Congress before it had been formally cleared by the administration. Little things like that.

**Sullivan:** From a legislative standpoint, many things went forward with understandings that some blanks would be filled in later.

*From an outsider's perspective, this looks like you moved the package through in an extraordinarily rapid pace.*

**Hazlewood:** The British and Canadians are going through similar drills now, and as we have pieced together the legislative strategy and schedule, they are fully convinced that Americans move legislatively at breathtaking speed. For those of us who lived it, however, there is the different perspective that in the 18 months from the time John Deutch said "Let's do this," some of us nearly died along the way. But the fact remains that from 4 December 1995, when our team stood up, to 15 April 1996, we assembled the outline for the agency and Ed [Obloy] and Helen [Sullivan] drafted the legislative package, got it through the bureaucracy (sometimes by getting the right checkmarks, at others by avoiding checkmarks), and got it on the Hill for them to work it. Look how long it has taken other recent major legislation to take that path.

**Jay:** One thing to keep in mind as a real check on all of this: Congress was precleared on what we were doing, but they were equally clear with a "thou shall not" declaration prohibiting us from standing up the agency or doing any other implementing actions without final approval. So, during that time, we had to line up facilities, move dollars around, get computers and that kind of thing without violating that injunction. We had one hand tied behind our backs.

**Obloy:** We are still waiting for some implementing memorandums to be signed so we can clear up some loose ends.

**Hazlewood:** It is really important to review the Congressional language that accompanied this process. They made it clear that we would spend no money until we had authorization. We are now doing briefings where we make the point that Lucent Technologies spent more money designing its corporate logo than we did standing up NIMA. How did we do it? Well, most of the people in this room worked two jobs: they had their day jobs and then they had a night job putting together NIMA.

**Long:** This was my day job.

**Hazlewood:** The key determinant was that we had three principal officials--the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS--united that this was going to be done. John Deutch was the action officer, poking the others to get their support. Absent that coalition, we would still be debating this. That's what was fundamentally different from earlier efforts to consolidate imagery.

**Obloy:** Two other things that occurred were really important. First, Sharon [Basso] orchestrated our relationships with the Hill, working around the "thou shalt not implement" problem, and putting together Congressional days where we invited those folks in and really opened up the whole process. Also, we did a good job of identifying and lining up the key stakeholders, so that we could bring them in, tell them what the situation was, tell them we need a decision, and move on.

**Broadhurst:** The way we worked the key stakeholders was important. We would formulate positions on questions and call together the stakeholders from the eight involved agencies. We had good success getting senior participation. Mike Munson [Deputy Director, DIA] or Ruth David [Deputy Director, Science and Technology, CIA], who "owned" NPIC with CIA, would show up. And so on. Once we got buy-in from senior leadership--not that it meant we always had full cooperation all the way down their organizations--we could guarantee that the senior leaders helping us were not going to be blindsided.

**Hazlewood:** One of the working groups we set up was "Boundaries and Responsibilities," which Bill Allder and Scott Large were part of. In some cases, entire agencies were going to transfer to NIMA. In other cases, only parts of an organization were going to transfer. These guys were meeting with NRO, with DARO, and with others to work out the details of what was transferring and what was staying behind. That became a very important group in assuring the stakeholders that we were not there to hurt



them. Some of the boundaries, quite frankly, were political compromises. But once again, our priority was to get on with it. The view was "We can fix it later."

**Obloy:** The three principals were important. At the next level down, working with legislative strategy and packaging, were the General Counsel of the DoD, Judith Miller, and her principal deputy, Whit Peters; and the General Counsel of CIA, Jeff Smith, who helped us get the language and approvals through. We had the moral force from the top leadership and the support of the folks controlling the fundamental documents hooked up to the same train.

**Sullivan:** It has been said that it can be easier to get legislation through Congress than through the executive branch. NIMA may be proof of that. If we had tried to seek an administrative solution to the problem, having the DCI and the SecDef sign some kind of charter, that would have played into the hands of the bureaucracies, we would probably still be waiting for approval. Bureaucracies can take a look at senior leadership, recognize the amount of turnover at that level, and wait them out.

**Hazlewood:** As evidence of that, most of the senior leadership that moved this along have all moved on.

*But they were still in place during that critical November-April period, right?*

**Allder:** We've talked a lot about that period, but at that point at least we had significant senior buy-in. Turf issues continued to arise, but by that time people were motivated to come to closure on most of those issues. I attribute that success to the group that worked through the summer of 1995, when the issue did not seem resolved and much more acrimony was still apparent. That was the time when the spectrum of options--from the "gorilla option" to a very low end--remained open and turf issues were much more open. The folks who worked through the head-butting period deserve a lot of credit.

**Broadhurst:** The nature of the discourse changed. In the later period, we were not arguing "whether" to go forward with a proposal for a new agency. We were arguing details.

**Obloy:** That is a good point. There are two theories for approaching the authorities' documents. We could either have waited for a decision to be made on whether to go ahead and then begun writing the necessary documents. Or we could anticipate the questions that would arise, make some informed decisions based on that summer study, and start with something. That is what I elected to do, having my staff get together, using the summer study, to produce a strawman piece of legislation. On 4 December, when we stood up the team, we had something. Alternatively, we could have waited until February or in some cases March until final decisions were made. The summer study was critical.

**Broadhurst:** I was looking at the final outbriefing that the task force gave, and all the findings, without exception, are now part of NIMA. In many respects, those findings had to be manifested in the implementation and in the legislation.

*You had your package ready by 15 April 1996. When did the legislation actually pass?*

**Hazlewood:** It passed on 30 September. But we have missed a period. We have talked about the period before April. We then hit a fallow period where final coordination was done within the executive branch. In May and June, we started asking how do we organize ourselves, what should be our concepts of operation, and questions like that. That set of activities took us through the summer to stand up. So we had whole sets of people who were given responsibilities for various areas, and business units. But we could not formally place any of those people in charge because that would have been implementation. We were left with having to say things to people like "We are not allowed to make a choice for this position, but if we could, you would be it," and work on that basis.

Keep in mind that a lot of people did not think this was going to happen. So, on 1 October, we had a lot of managers who looked around and realized it had happened. It has taken us a year to sort through all the pieces.

**Obloy:** We sometimes talk as if 1 October was something of an end point. It was really a beginning. In

the summer, we had the DoD authorization bill, which was principally where our statute was, and it was starting to get in trouble. And then the funding started to get in trouble because they were talking about a continuing resolution. So, here we are, in August, after all this work, asking ourselves "What do we do with this mandated 1 October startup date if none of this legislation happens?" While we were designing NIMA to be as robust as possible, we also had to worry about what we were going to do on 1 October. Sharon had a blackboard in her office on which she kept track of something she called "the NIMA heartbeat," and at times it was on life support, or it would change from hour to hour. And then we get the letter from the Speaker. It looked like it was all going to crash and burn.

*What was that?*

**Obloy:** It is a dark memory in my brain.

**Hazlewood:** By this time, HPSCI had come out with IC21, and the House Republicans were being mobilized by the opponents from HPSCI. Some critical people were telling them "Just say no." The Speaker then wrote a letter to the conference committee on the DoD Authorization Bill.

**Basso:** In effect, he was asking the National Security Committee not to support what they had voted to support just two weeks before in public hearings. We really had not had serious opposition from Congress, except within HPSCI. We did have some tension with SSCI, which felt we had put a knife in its back by moving more toward larger control for Defense, but, that aside, HPSCI was our only problem. The House Appropriations Committee was supportive of the National Security Committee's position. We had not gotten in touch with National Security because they kept telling us it was not necessary for them to focus on the issue. When they did focus on the issue, their only concern was [HPSCI chair] Larry Combest. The strategy the National Security Committee proposed was to have the Chairman of the JCS call Speaker Gingrich to make sure the Speaker would support the legislation. But the call did not get made, and the letter came out and all heck broke loose.

One other actor on the Hill needs to be mentioned. When the letter came out, and we all went into depression, a staffer pointed out "Remember, Trent Lott also has an oar in this water." Senator Lott had been the subcommittee chair who originally inserted the bill into the Defense Authorization package. This was an interesting issue on the Hill, not just on the merits of the action, but because of the power bases in Congress. Lott's role helped, for reasons that did not have a lot to do with NIMA, but just because of his position in moving the legislation.

**Hazlewood:** We discovered during this period the importance of reaching out to people who could contact influential people on the Hill. We discovered, for example, that the Armed Services Committee was caught offguard by the Speaker's letter, because they thought passage was in the bag. They were so certain of it they had not become engaged in the events leading to the letter.

**Obloy:** There were two great compromises taken during this time. Before April, the question was "What do we do about the national mission?" The idea we came up with to deal with that was to provide for a National Mission Review, similar to what the military does in the combat support agencies. A review of this source did not exist anywhere else. And that seemed to calm the waters.

**Hazlewood:** In retrospect, this proposal was a stroke of genius. They seized at it on the Hill, thinking that, if this were included in the statute, it would make clear the nature of the agency.

**Obloy:** So this left us with two review processes: one that was primarily the responsibility of the military; the other the responsibility of the DCI. And, as I said, it calmed the waters. In the August-September time frame, the collection tasking issue arose. This was really another one of those "religious issues." Who controlled tasking? What is the role of NIMA and the Director of NIMA in tasking? We spent many, many hours faxing language back and forth to try to craft something that would satisfy all the parties involved that the status quo was not being affected. That was probably the last great compromise, coming up with language that would remove the last major blip on the radar screen.

**Jay:** This is another reflection of the leadership involved in the effort. Not once did I hear senior leadership advocate something just because they thought it was a good idea. They had been asked to assemble data on "what was the right thing to do." In particular, I saw Admiral Dantone say, on many occasions before Congress, "If this thing does not happen, so be it. It is for Congress to decide." I thought I was going to die when he said that. But the approach was that we had done our jobs presenting a balanced view. Now it was up to Congress. It conveyed the sense that this was something that the stakeholders had looked hard at, not that it was something Jack Dantone had cooked up to ensure his next promotion. Even when people came into the working groups openly unsure that this was a good idea, everyone stepped up to the plate.

*As a backdrop to all this, the work force at this point was performing their missions with little firm information about what was going on. Is that correct?*

**Stakem:** Let me add to that point. At the working level, we had existing organizations that not only continued to function but also in some cases were in the midst of major reorganizations in their structure and way of doing business. This was going on almost up to the first of October. Managers were being moved a week before NIMA stood up. NPIC was planning to change totally the way it managed its work processes two weeks before. DIA restructured and redesignated [designator; unclear on tape; ed] about three weeks before standup.

**Hazlewood:** Only DMA (of the proposed NIMA components) did not reorganize during this time.

**Stakem:** Institutions were going along saying NIMA may or may not happen, but we have a job to do. How do we optimize ourselves to do that job? Right up to the end--literally right up to 1 October--internal changes were taking place in various components.

*You had nearly 9,000 people affected by this. As you moved through the summer, what did they know?*

**Hazlewood:** We were enjoined from giving too much information for fear that it would look like implementation. So we would brief people and talk with people, but we could never engage the way you would if you had freedom of movement. We had two or three offsites for "next level" management--groups of several hundred--where we were providing them with their first exposure to what within five or six weeks was going to be a major change in their work lives.

**Obloy:** Many of the things we had to spend money on involved detailed decisions on whether we were violating the law. Relatively little things, signs in buildings, badges, things of that sort. Could we design a badge without issuing them? I think we made a decision when the bill was reported out of committee that Congress probably knew this was going to happen, and we could start to spend money to implement.

**Stakem:** Just a small point: I have two NIMA badges. Because we could not buy badge machines. This badge works in this building; this one works at the Navy Yard.

**Obloy:** You need to understand, beyond the signage and badging, we had 7,000 people in DMA who were in the normal Federal personnel system, with unions and all their protections. All they knew was that a move was afoot to move them into a separate personnel system. They were really in the dark, and it was difficult to deal with the people issue, and the significant changes in people's careers we were undertaking.

**Lenczowski:** We had a robust communications strategy that had absolutely no impact. No matter who we talked to, or how many meetings we had, it was not registering. We were not their managers. A great lesson in communications.

*What are you doing to cope with the continuing cultural issues?*

**Hazlewood:** We had decided we were going to focus on what we saw as the hard issues, and in retrospect those may not have been altogether the right issues. Let me give you an example: when DMA

did a survey in which one of the questions was "Are you proud of your organization?" 85 to 90 percent said yes. When we did a similar survey of NIMA employees recently, about 64 percent said yes. The fact is many of our people have still not bonded to the new organization. We have every intention, at the senior leadership level, to do something about this.

We faced almost immediate pressure to answer questions like "What's your investment strategy for 2010?" and we were in a situation where our response had to be "Our investment strategy is that everyone gets paid this week." Remember, we inherited over 1,200 policy documents from different agencies, totally different procedures for hiring people, firing people, moving people, buying things, and so on. Eight different agencies just did things differently.

Connectivity just killed us. We inherited five different B-level local area nets and another dozen or so SCI LANs--none of which we owned. As a manager, even getting around to see your people is an ordeal. I am not talking about my level, I am talking about branches.

**Stakem:** Let me chime in. We have branches where part of the branch is at DIAC and part is at the Navy Yard. We have others with segments in Langley and segments in the Navy Yard. People do not sit together, and they have absolutely no electronic connectivity. We have people who have to hunt down someone who can type an e-mail message to people in their chain of command. "I'll fax you that e-mail message" is not unknown around here.

**Hazlewood:** We planned for the first day to put the Admiral's morning staff meeting on secure videoconferencing to give him presence across the Agency. This was fine until the dry run, when we discovered we had three incompatible video teleconferencing systems.

*Do your people think they work for NIMA? Or do they think they work for their predecessors?*

**Hazlewood:** Within two days of standup, the imagery analysis elements at DIAC had put up these big NIMA signs. They were the first. Sort of a "Jones Free State" message. If you go into most other places, you still find the legacy signage. I kid the people in St. Louis that I will know NIMA exists when they paint the police cars.

**Stakem:** I instituted a system where anyone using a predecessor designator had to put a dollar in a cigar box. A dollar for managers, actually; 25 cents for analysts. After we had collected about \$1.75, we did not collect anymore. People seemed to catch on.

*What's the legacy of that frenetic startup?*

**Long:** You can probably see some of it in the budget cuts NIMA has taken this year.

**Hazlewood:** One of the things Congress did, not so much intentionally as under the pressure of time, is appropriate our funds in their original categories while saying "But, oh, those are NIMA's funds." In the case of the Air Force, for example, with functions transferring from the NRO or CIA, we had to get permission from the Air Force while at the same time asking CIA or NRO whether NIMA could spend the money.

**Obloy:** I mentioned earlier that we have a unique personnel system. That is, we have no personnel system. We are working on that now. We have a current legal framework in which there are unions in this organization. We are the only intelligence agency with collective bargaining agreements. Seventy percent of the people in NIMA can appeal decisions outside the organization, which is unique. Recently, we went through an exercise on how to deal with budget cuts and the possibility of a reduction in force. You can talk about the people not understanding the rules we are playing under. Even the managers do not understand all the time. Those who came from the unionized environment understand, but the others are really surprised when they find out what they can and cannot do in these circumstances.

**Hazlewood:** The extent of Congressional interest is also unique. We have over 3,000 employees in suburban St. Louis. NIMA is one of the 10 largest employers in the area. Let me tell you, if we move

people around in that facility, we get [Congressional] phone calls. If that work force wants to find out what is going on, they do not ask management. They write their Congressman, who sends the letter to us. We then respond to the Congressman, who replies to the employee, who then posts it on the bulletin board. Talk about things they never taught you in intel school!

How many of your folks would, at this point, say "This was not necessary. The old agencies would have been just fine?"

**Hazlewood:** At least half, maybe two thirds.

*Nevertheless, have there been successes?*

**Hazlewood:** I would highlight the support we provided to the Marines involved in the NEO [Nonmilitary Evacuation Operation] from Sierra Leone. Instead of loading the ship carrying that Marine Expeditionary Force with 70 pallets of paper, we placed what we call a Remote Replication System on the ship that allowed them to print their own maps. We provided them with imagery, current to within two hours of when they went ashore, directly to the ship. When those Marines went ashore, they had the best data we could give them. Within the last two months, we and the NRO transmitted imagery directly to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, where the Ambassador and the country team are now able to see what is going on around them in the country and in the city. We are finding that the former DMA people who work collection have much better access to collection data because they can call their NIMA friends at the ground station and work off the intelligence collection. They now have much greater access to intelligence imagery than ever before! On the intelligence side, by merging different parts of the imagery community, we are seeing much better work on a whole range of issues, including Korea. I cannot go into the details, but I can tell you that over the last few months the breakthroughs, on this issue alone, are directly attributable to the greater focus that comes from having the former DIA elements and the former CIA elements working more closely.

On Iraq, we have been producing slightly less imagery, but we are also looking at greatly reduced overlap, because we are tasking more coherently. You can really eliminate a lot of hidden redundancy when you do not have to look at everything twice because the first person who looked at it "worked for another agency."

**Allder:** It is ironic that we are seeing our short-term benefits from production efficiencies. In all our planning, we expected the short-term gain to come from systems integration, with production gains to follow. This view was the source of many of the disagreements involving IC21 and some of the alternative plans for imagery integration.

**Hazlewood:** We put a lot of emphasis on making the transition as seamless as possible for our customers. The systems issue may turn out to be a harder nut to crack than we earlier anticipated. We inherited something like 650 different development programs, and even getting straight and figuring out what was in them virtually required us to destroy all of them and rebuild them from the ground up.

*Are there any changes contemplated in your relationships with HUMINT and SIGINT?*

**Hazlewood:** On SIGINT, we put together statistics on the first six months of NIMA, compared to the last three months before standup. We were dealing with some concerns that intel was taking over mapping and so forth. One of the statistics revealed that we are doing 20 percent of our imagery tasking from SIGINT tipoffs. I would never have thought it was that high. The SIGINT Committee has indicated an interest in things like joint collection reviews. On the HUMINT side, a number of the things we are doing on Korea are HUMINT-driven, but the process has been episodic.

*How would you assess the current state of skepticism, Congressional and other?*

**Hazlewood:** It is reduced on the Hill, but it is still there. When I go to CIA and DIA, I still find people openly saying this is an aberration, and that at some point the analysts will return to their natural homes. That sort of talk is poisonous in the work force. It gives hope for the past. We have done two customer

surveys. On the second, DIA declined to participate, and many people at CIA said they wanted to go back to the old Office of Imagery Analysis. A lot of people want to go back to the good old days. But we press ahead. You have to have long-term goals, but frankly much of our effort is focused on making sure that we are getting the job done on Monday.

*Stakem:* Or Tuesday.

*Thank you all.*

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## NOTES

1. This roundtable was conducted under ground rules permitting participants to review and emend their comments. The questions and comments of *Studies* board members are generally unattributed and edited severely, placing the focus of the transcript on the participants. As an exception, General Clapper's comments relating to his role as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in discussions on the future of imagery, discussions that led to the creation of NIMA, are noted for attribution.

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*Unclassified*