

July 26, 1995

SUMMARY OF CIA INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT  
RELATING TO AGENCY ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA

The CIA Inspector General has completed a seven month investigation of allegations concerning Agency activities in Guatemala. This investigation was conducted by a team of 17 Investigators, plus support personnel, and included the review of over 56,000 pages of materials and interviews of over 200 individuals, including present and former DCI's, DDO's, Ambassadors, State Department officials, and staff members of the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees.

The result is a seven volume final Report of Investigation consisting of over 700 pages of findings, conclusions and recommendations. These recommendations include both systemic and administrative actions for consideration by Director of Central Intelligence Deutch and other senior Agency officials.

The major conclusions of the Inspector General's investigation are as follows:

- No evidence has been found that any employëe of the Central Intelligence Agency in any way directed, participated in, or condoned the murder of Michael DeVine.
- No evidence has been found to indicate that Agency personnel in any way directed, participated in, or condoned the capture, torture, subsequent disappearance, and possible death of Efrain Bamaca.

**APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: SEP 2001**

- No evidence has been found to indicate that any Agency employee encouraged, participated in, condoned, or concealed any action that constituted a potential violation of U.S. criminal law.
- Reports received by the Agency that persons with whom the CIA had contact were involved in that murder or possible death were found by the Inspector General to be seriously flawed.
- No evidence has been found to indicate that any Agency employee knowingly misled the congressional oversight committees or deliberately decided to withhold information from them.
- No evidence has been found to indicate that any Agency personnel made any effort to remove, dispose of, or destroy classified Agency documents to avoid any investigation.
- No evidence has been found to indicate that any Agency employee deliberately withheld any information relating to the DeVine case from the Department of Justice.

The investigation concluded that CIA was performing its mission in Guatemala subject to legitimate intelligence requirements from U.S. Government policymakers for information concerning human rights issues in Guatemala; the status of the insurgency in Guatemala; and narcotics trafficking in Guatemala. These Agency activities were conducted under well-established Executive branch guidelines and congressionally approved programs. Agency reporting on the DeVine and Bamaca cases was a major factor in U.S. diplomatic demarches to the Guatemalan Government. In order to acquire needed intelligence, the Agency was required to establish and maintain very close contacts with a military organization that had a long history of human rights abuses and military personnel who may have engaged in such abuses.

The Agency acquired information in an October 1991 report alleging that Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez may have been "present" during an interrogation of Michael DeVine by another officer that ended in DeVine's death. The Agency immediately referred the information to the Department of Justice even though there were substantial grounds for questioning the credibility of this information. It was at variance with other available evidence regarding Alpirez's character and the circumstances of the DeVine killing, including that gathered by a private investigator working for DeVine's wife. The Agency officer who reported the information says it was unclear whether "present" meant that Alpirez was merely in the area or in the interrogation. Furthermore, the officer now says that he is uncertain about the accuracy of key elements of the information that he reported to the Agency about these events.

Similarly, the Agency has only one report that Alpirez was responsible for killing Bamaca. However, a substantial body of information contradicts that report and indicates instead that Bamaca was captured alive, interrogated by Alpirez and then removed from under his control by other military personnel. Furthermore, the information that Alpirez killed Bamaca was at least fourth-hand and provided by an individual who had made contradictory statements earlier regarding Bamaca's fate.

The investigation concluded that certain Agency officers did not meet the Agency's professional standards for accurate and timely reporting of intelligence in connection with the two key reports about Alpirez. These reports were flawed, the Inspector General concluded, with the result that policymakers were unintentionally misled. Appropriate review and corroboration of the information available to Agency officers at the time would have raised very serious doubts about the factual basis of the key reports.

Further, the investigation determined that the Agency did not meet its responsibilities to keep the congressional intelligence oversight committees fully and currently informed. Agency officers intended that the Congress should be informed of information relating to matters of interest to the committees but failed to follow

through. As a result of management inattention, congressional notification was delayed for over three years with regard to one key report. However, no evidence has been found to indicate that any Agency personnel advocated not notifying Congress or made a decision not to do so. No satisfactory explanation has been provided as to why the committees were not notified, but those involved state it was forgotten in the course of events when no one took clear responsibility to ensure it was done.

The investigation also found that the U.S. Ambassadors to Guatemala were not kept appropriately informed about what the Agency knew regarding various aspects of the DeVine and Bamaca cases. On several occasions, based upon apparent concern for protection of sources or Agency equities, Agency personnel failed to exercise good judgment in determining what should be told to the U.S. Ambassadors in Guatemala.

Finally, the analysis that the Agency provided to various officials about these matters was incomplete in certain respects. Agency analysts were not provided, or did not use, all available information from Agency reports in assessing Alpirez's role in the DeVine and Bamaca cases.

The Inspector General has made recommendations to the Director concerning personal accountability on the part of certain Agency officers and for changes in Agency practices and procedures. These systemic recommendations deal with enhancing congressional and ambassadorial notification; improving selection of personnel for senior assignments; increasing evaluation of sources; heightening attention to the accuracy of reports; emphasizing follow-up reporting of human rights abuses; refining procedures for operational decision-making; considering all relevant information in performing analytical functions; and reforming the DO records system.