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SNIE 73-86

The African National Congress of South Africa: Organization, Communist Ties, and Short-Term Prospects

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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July 1986

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THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
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SNIE 73-86

THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
SOUTH AFRICA: ORGANIZATION, COMMUNIST
TIES, AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

Information available as of 31 July 1986 was used in the
preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board on 31 July 1986.

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
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SCOPE NOTE

In the past two years, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa has emerged both within South Africa and on the international scene as a major actor on the South African scene. Its growing international acceptance seems predicated on the belief that the ANC is a dominant shaper of events inside South Africa. This Estimate seeks to examine the ANC, assess its policies and role in contemporary South Africa, and estimate its growth and influence over the next two years. It will also examine the nature of the ANC's "revolutionary alliance" with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and measure SACP influence and control over the ANC and its policies and activities. [REDACTED]

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
KEY JUDGMENTS ¹

The international recognition accorded to the African National Congress (ANC) as a spokesman for South African black political aspirations is likely to grow during the next two years, as is its popularity with South African blacks. The ANC's ability to garner widespread support, however, is unlikely to be matched by a commensurate increase in its ability to direct and control events inside South Africa. We believe that the ANC recognizes that its chances for overthrowing the South African Government in the near term are poor and that its greatest short-run strengths lie in its ability to broaden its base of international support and to gain domestic support as South African blacks become more politicized and radicalized.


In our judgment, the ANC's advocacy of the revolutionary and violent overthrow of the South African Government will continue and likely intensify. The ANC will maintain a pro-Soviet posture and the longstanding alliance between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) will continue, as will the SACP's considerable influence over and extensive and widespread presence in the ANC's organizational and decisionmaking structures. This influence, however, will remain constrained by non-Communist ANC leaders and fall short of complete domination or control.


The Soviets calculate that the ANC will be the principal vehicle for change in South Africa and they view the SACP, as well as ANC dependence on Soviet military assistance, as their means of influence within the ANC. The SACP is a protege of the Soviet Communist Party, which funds and guides it. Moscow has treated the ANC as its "natural ally" in the region deserving of financial, political, and military support. The Soviets, however, are somewhat suspicious of the ANC's ideological reliability and are concerned that nationalist elements could be co-opted by Pretoria into some kind of reform program.

¹ The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, concurs in this Estimate, but notes that it has not examined how potential changes in US policy or a significant expansion of US relations with black South African organizations might alter the conduct or policies of the ANC.



The ANC is a small (about 10,000), externally based and bureaucratically complex organization. Transformed by banning and suppression in the 1960s from a legal, internal mass party to an externally based, "vanguard" style liberation movement, the ANC's main components are:

- A military wing (about 5,000 strong), mostly based in Angola.
- A collection of governing bodies located, along with most of the ANC leaders, in London and Lusaka.
- An extensive external network (in about 40 countries, including most major capitals) of ANC offices, which raises funds and garners support, disseminates propaganda, and provides general foreign representation.
- A rather disorganized and small clandestine political and military support infrastructure within South Africa and in neighboring states. 

We see little near-term prospect that the ANC and the South African Government will find common ground to negotiate. Both sides appear ill-disposed to compromise and determined to gird themselves for the long struggle. There remains, however, an outside chance that both sides could agree to talks. Should such talks occur, we believe both sides would enter into them largely for tactical reasons, such as sowing division in the other's camp or fostering the appearance of reasonableness in Western eyes, rather than with the intention of negotiating seriously. 

The ANC is unlikely to fundamentally alter its articulated goals and objectives. The ANC's short-term military goals will continue to be designed to rally black resistance to the government, to intimidate whites and erode their resolve, and to undermine government control of nonwhite areas, while seeking over the longer term to develop an insurgency capable of overthrowing the white government. On the

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political front, the ANC is likely to continue to encourage intensified antigovernment activities by black South Africans and try to increase Pretoria's international isolation by supporting demands for harsh economic sanctions. In an effort to appeal to as broad an audience as possible, the ANC also is likely to maintain its allegiance to its official political manifesto—the 1955 Freedom Charter—that lists moderate socialist and democratic aims. ANC leaders are unlikely to see any political advantage to formulating a more specific vision of a future black majority government.

Notwithstanding the fact that the ANC is now the most popular black organization inside South Africa, there is little prospect that the ANC will be able to mount a regime-threatening military campaign during the period of this Estimate. In particular, Pretoria's willingness to strike whenever and wherever it believes necessary against the ANC will hamper its efforts to build the infrastructure needed inside South Africa to sustain an insurgency.

ANC military activities during the next two years will probably result in more civilian—especially white—casualties than in the past. Although the older generation leaders may question the political wisdom of risking Western support by such a campaign, we believe pressure from young militants for such actions—including possible attacks on Western business interests—will grow.

ANC internal political operations will have very mixed results. Efforts to create a coherent underground political organization have been beset with difficulties and will face continuing constraints. We expect the ANC to participate in and even take control of some of the shadow government organizations springing up in townships where government control has collapsed. Although in competition with other groups, ANC popularity and access to weapons will give it a decided edge.

The ANC will continue to try to broaden its appeal to supporters of groups such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). While these groups are not now under—or likely to come under—ANC control or direction, a growing number of internal groups are likely to at least publicly pay homage to the figurehead role of the ANC. In most cases, however, ties between the exiled ANC and internal opposition groups are unlikely to go much beyond rhetorical alliances with their leaderships, and we expect that the ANC will be forced to be content with trying to bypass leaders and appeal to the rank and file. Internal leaders, in our judgment, recognize that closer ties probably are a short-term liability rather than an asset as long as the ANC remains a banned organization.

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Resistance to the ANC from "black consciousness" groups, regionally/tribally based groups like Chief Buthelezi's Zulu organization Inkatha, and rural-based groups such as the Pretoria-created homeland "governments," will continue but slowly erode as the ANC makes inroads into their memberships and areas of influence [REDACTED]

The ANC is likely to have considerably more success mobilizing international opinion in its favor and gaining increased financial, and perhaps military, support. Although we expect that many supporters, and potential supporters, in the West will be troubled by the ANC's close ties to the Soviet Bloc and the group's increasing use of indiscriminate attacks, current political trends in South Africa as well as the worldwide focus on Pretoria's intransigence will work to the ANC's advantage [REDACTED]


Increases in support from the wider international community, however, are likely to be offset somewhat by ANC reverses in the region. South Africa almost certainly will increase the cost of supporting the ANC to neighboring countries by repeatedly demonstrating its military and economic dominance. The black ruled nations have few resources for fending off Pretoria, and when pressed will have no choice but to attempt to please Pretoria, if only by temporarily limiting or restricting ANC activities within their borders [REDACTED]

The SACP, by dint of its long history of support for the ANC and presence therein and its dedicated and ideologically committed leadership, has exercised, and is likely to continue to exercise, considerable influence in the ANC. We see little likelihood that ANC officials—Communist and non-Communist alike—will see any political advantage to fundamentally altering their longstanding and extensive relationship. These ties date to the 1920s, extend through the period of civil disobedience in the 1950s, and were formalized in an alliance in 1969 of the three revolutionary "pillars of the liberation struggle": the ANC, the SACP, and the SACP-controlled South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). We estimate that perhaps as much as 25 percent of the ANC's total membership now belongs to the SACP [REDACTED]


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There are two sets of key variables that could alter our estimation of ANC prospects. The first would see the release of Nelson Mandela. The South African Government would like to release Nelson Mandela primarily to avoid the repercussions of his dying in jail. However, given the immense domestic and international popularity of Mandela, he poses a real threat to the government and it is unlikely, in our judgment, that he will be released over the next two years.

A second key variable, somewhat outside the scope of this Estimate, is the pace and scope of South African Government reform. Should political reform be accelerated by the government, ANC relationships with internal organizations would be jeopardized. There are few indications that Pretoria has such an acceleration in mind, however, and recent government crackdowns suggest that the pace of reforms will, if anything, slow.

During the period of this Estimate, Moscow is likely to continue its present mix of low-cost and low-risk support for the ANC and SACP by supplying arms, advisers, and limited funds, and lending propaganda and diplomatic support. The Soviets probably are confident that in the long run this effort will pay off with a pro-Soviet regime in South Africa. To this end, they likely are encouraged by Pretoria's shift toward greater repression of black dissidents, believing that it further isolates Pretoria, increases the chances of a violent overthrow of the government, and lessens the chances that the ANC will be tempted to backslide and negotiate with the South African Government.

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The ANC will continue to present a dilemma for the United States. The ANC's tactics of revolutionary violence are not consonant with US policies designed to promote nonviolent change. Most troubling is the SACP's strong position in the ANC leadership and the ANC's pro-Soviet, anti-US posture. These negative factors are not likely to change in the next two years. [REDACTED]


On the other hand, in the likely context of developments in South Africa over the next two years and beyond—inadequate reforms, increasing black resistance, government suppression—the ANC will strengthen its monopoly on the symbols of liberation and hold a virtual veto over blacks who may claim to speak for the majority. In the absence of significant political reform and negotiations with credible black leaders, and given the likelihood of increasing violence and polarization, it is difficult to see: how the ANC can be divorced from a growing number of internal black opposition groups; the ANC-SACP alliance sundered; its support of revolutionary violence diminished; or Soviet influence reduced. [REDACTED]

While the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC, South African Government-ANC negotiations, or accelerated government political reforms all seem unlikely over this period, progress on any of them could alter the estimated course of developments or change the factors in a more favorable direction for US interests. [REDACTED]

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African National Congress (ANC) in Southern Africa—Selected Facilities and Camps



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DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. The African National Congress (ANC) is at one and the same time a small, largely external, semiclandestine organization of probably not more than 10,000 members and the most popular organization within South Africa. The ANC's position has been bolstered by its ability to gain increasing international recognition as the leading representative of South African blacks, which must be allowed at least a share in any future government. Its resurgence during the past two years of domestic unrest in South Africa has brought to the surface old and new controversies over the depth and significance of the group's ties to the South African Communist Party (SACP), the ANC's political and economic vision of a postapartheid South Africa, and its ability to control and direct antigovernment activities in the black township.

2. The seeming paradox between the mass appeal of the ANC and its small size and external base is explained by several factors:

- The ANC was forced by government banning and other suppressive efforts to become a small, semiclandestine, mainly external organization in order to survive.
- None of its rivals for the mantle of the anti-apartheid struggle has developed a broad national appeal.
- The ANC has concentrated its appeal on its broadest, most popular program contained in its 1955 "Freedom Charter," which calls for a "united, democratic, and nonracial state."
- SAG policies of granting only limited reforms and periodically heavily suppressing internal dissent have raised both nonwhite political expectations and the level of frustration and dissent. These policies, combined with economic, demographic, and sociological factors, have served to politicize millions of nonwhite South Africans in the last few years, creating a vast new audience for ANC activity.

GLOSSARY

ANC	African National Congress
NEC ANC	National Executive Committee of the ANC
SACP	South African Communist Party
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organization (Azania is "the black consciousness" term for South Africa)
AZACTU	Azanian Congress of Trade Unions
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
UDF	United Democratic Front
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the ANC military arm
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions

The Evolution of the ANC

3. Founded in 1912, the ANC has undergone a number of transformations that reflect the changing goals and tactics of South African blacks as well as the differing responses of successive white-dominated governments to black political activity. The small group of largely middle-class, educated, black professionals and tribal chiefs who formed the core of the early ANC made little headway in organizing opposition to the government's racial policies. Dynamic younger activists—including Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and others who now form the "old guard" of today's ANC—gained control of the organization in the 1940s and launched a campaign of more militant disobedience that included protest marches, strikes, and mass demonstrations. By the mid-1950s the ANC claimed a membership of over 100,000 but achieved little more success than its predecessors in forcing changes on the government.

4. Banned—along with the rival Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)²—by the government following the Sharpeville incident in 1960, the ANC went underground and pursued a campaign of sabotage directed by the group's newly formed military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation). South African police broke the campaign in 1962-63 with a series of arrests of ANC leaders, including Mandela. With its internal organization decimated, some 600 ANC cadres who had eluded arrest went into exile to begin the long process of reforming and transforming the ANC from an internally based mass political organization to a small, externally based revolutionary movement.

5. As the organization atrophied in exile, the ANC in the early 1970s became less and less relevant to events going on inside South Africa. The Soweto riots in 1976-77, however, proved a boon to the ANC; some 4,000 young, black, student refugees fled South Africa and joined the ANC. Strengthened by new recruits, increased military and training assistance from the Soviet Bloc, and the emergence of new staging and training areas in newly independent Mozambique and Angola, the ANC began to conduct a limited number of sabotage bombings and haphazard attacks on police stations in the late 1970s. In 1980, it began a more active and organized paramilitary campaign that has continued to this day.

6. Although the ANC had been closely associated with the SACP since the 1920s—the ANC, for example, was closely tied to several SACP-controlled mass organizations during the period of civil disobedience in the 1950s—these bonds were strengthened and expanded when the ANC was forced into exile beginning in the early 1960s. The SACP, far more experienced than the ANC at operating in exile and with wider international contacts, funneled economic aid to the ANC and provided limited military assistance and training. Most black SACP members joined the ANC after the banning of the Communist Party in 1950. Most of the remaining party members followed when the ANC officially opened its membership to non-blacks in 1969.

² The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which continues to this day as a rival of the ANC, split from the ANC in the late 1950s over the issue of white and Communist influence within the organization. The PAC leaders argued that non-African—especially white Communist—participation in the anti-apartheid struggle was reinforcing black servitude.

throughout this period the ANC's public ideological pronouncements and programs assumed a more revolutionary Marxist tone.

The Current Setting

7. The ANC's growing popularity comes against a backdrop of dramatically escalating black frustration and protest over the scope and pace of the political reforms offered by Pretoria. The 1984 Constitution, granting some political representation to Coloreds and Indians but none to blacks, served as a catalyst for black resistance to apartheid and the government. Many blacks saw the constitutional changes as denying them any hope of increased political rights and gave up on Pretoria's intermittent and slow reform program. Violent resistance to government authority broke out in black townships, at first over economic grievances, but, within a year, largely motivated by a political agenda of total resistance to government authority. Despite massive government efforts to contain it, violence in black townships has resulted in some 2,000 killed in unrest-related incidents since September 1984. This violence increasingly has been directed against symbols of political authority, most notably blacks who either represent the government by serving on local governing bodies or who economically benefit from "the system"; many government-imposed local government authorities have been destroyed. In their place have arisen new community organizations, which range from local groups often under the control of bullyboys to more organized—and probably more representative—shadow community governments. Although many of these organizations have proved, or will prove to be, transitory, there is no question that the multiplication of black political organizations and the expansion of violent black resistance to South African governmental authority signal a new phase of black political protest.

8. Although these trends appear on the surface to track well with longstanding ANC objectives, the ANC has been responsible for only a small percentage of recent violent incidents. In contrast to their public statements, in which they claim that township violence is a response to their call to "make South Africa ungovernable," ANC leaders privately have admitted that they trailed, rather than led, events. In August 1985, ANC President Oliver Tambo, in a rare public admission, noted that the ANC must "catch up" with township militants and "properly take control of them."

9. Despite its lack of control over the internal situation, the ANC has benefited from the unrest.

Popular support among South African blacks for the ANC as a symbol of black resistance has skyrocketed in this volatile political climate. Polls indicate that roughly half of South Africa's 9 million urban blacks now support the ANC, and that an even greater number favor imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela as their political leader. Nor is there any question that the overwhelming majority of the nonwhite population identifies with the ANC's broad objectives enshrined in the 1955 Freedom Charter (see inset).

10. In our judgment, the ANC's position inside South Africa has been enhanced in part by the group's skillful use of its Freedom Charter, the powerful symbolic appeal of Nelson Mandela and other long-imprisoned ANC leaders, and the attention focused on the ANC by the government. The ANC, for example, has skillfully reechoed and pledged allegiance to the purposely broad and vague goals of the ANC's 1955 Freedom Charter rather than attempting to spell out in detail the specifics of a new government. Consequently the group has been able to draw differing political visions of the future under its umbrella. Liberal white, Colored, and Indian supporters, for example, identify with the Charter's call for a multiracial democratic state, while more militant blacks focus more on demands for social and economic change. The continued imprisonment of Nelson Mandela provides a powerful unifying and rallying symbol for South African blacks while allowing Mandela to remain above the partisan fray. We also believe that the South African Government's stated view that the ANC is directing and controlling much of the unrest has burnished the ANC's credentials as the most influential opposition group.

The ANC

Organization

11. The ANC is a complex organization (see annex A) consisting of numerous committees, 11 of which meet with regularity and varying effectiveness. The ANC has offices in about 40 countries, including most major capitals, but the leadership is concentrated in two countries—the United Kingdom and Zambia.

12. [REDACTED]

Objectives

14. The ANC's short-term objectives are fairly clear. The group's military strategy is designed in the near term to rally black resistance against the government, to intimidate whites and wear down their resolve, and to undermine the government's control in nonwhite areas. Short-term political goals center on persuading the international community to isolate the white government completely by imposing the harshest sanctions possible, encouraging intensified antigovernment activities by blacks in South Africa—particularly those who support the ANC—and gaining greater domestic and international recognition as the leading representative of the nonwhite community in South Africa.

15. In the longer term, the ANC seeks to develop an insurgency capable of overthrowing the intransigent white government. Most ANC leaders, recognizing the might of South Africa's vast military resources, privately admit, however, that prospects for such an insurgency are bleak without significant help from the black populace—a "people's war"—and neighboring states. Pinpointing the ANC's long-term political goals

THE FREEDOM CHARTER

We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:

that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people;

that our people have been robbed of their birthrights to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality; that our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities; that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief; And therefore, we, the people of South Africa, black and white together -- equals, countrymen and brothers -- adopt this Freedom Charter. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won.

THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN!

Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws;
All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country;
The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex;
All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government.

ALL NATIONAL GROUPS SHALL HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS!

There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races;
All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and to develop their own folk culture and customs;
All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to their race and national pride;
The preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime;
All apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside.

THE PEOPLE SHALL SHARE IN THE COUNTRY'S WEALTH!

The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people;
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;
All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people;
All people shall have equal rights in trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.

THE LAND SHALL BE SHARED AMONG THOSE WHO WORK IT!

Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it to banish famine and land hunger;
The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tiller;
Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land;
All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose; People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.

ALL SHALL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW!

No-one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without a fair trial;
No-one shall be condemned by the order of any Government official;
The courts shall be representative of all the people;
Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the people, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance;
The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis and shall be the helpers and protectors of the people;
All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or belief shall be repealed.

ALL SHALL ENJOY EQUAL HUMAN RIGHTS!

The law shall guarantee in all their right to speak, to organize, to meet together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their children;
The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law;
All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to province, and from South Africa abroad;
Pass Laws, permits and all other laws restricting these freedoms shall be abolished.

THERE SHALL BE WORK AND SECURITY!

All who work shall be free to form trade unions, to elect their officers and to make wage agreements with their employers;
The state shall recognise the right and duty of all to work, and to draw full unemployment benefits;
Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for equal work;
There shall be a forty-hour working week, a national minimum wage, paid annual leave, and sick leave for all workers, and maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers;
Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil servants shall have the same rights as all others who work;
Child labour, compound labour, the tot system and contract labour shall be abolished.

THE DOORS OF LEARNING AND OF CULTURE SHALL BE OPENED!

The government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life;
All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free exchange of books, ideas and contact with other lands;
The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love their people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty and peace;
Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children;
Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit;
Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan;
Teachers shall have all the rights of other citizens;
The colour bar in cultural life, in sport and in education shall be abolished.

THERE SHALL BE HOUSES, SECURITY AND COMFORT!

All people shall have the right to live where they choose, be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security;
Unused housing space to be made available to the people;
Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no-one shall go hungry;
A preventive health scheme shall be run by the state;
Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young children;
Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, crèches and social centres;
The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state;
Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of all;
Fenced locations and ghettos shall be abolished, and laws which break up families shall be repealed.

THERE SHALL BE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP!

South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations;
South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation -- not war;
Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all;
The people of the protectorates -- Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland -- shall be free to decide for themselves their own future;
The right of all the peoples of Africa to independence and self-government shall be recognised, and shall be the basis of close co-operation.

Let all who love their people and their country now say, as we say here:
**'THESE FREEDOMS WE WILL FIGHT FOR, SIDE BY SIDE, THROUGHOUT OUR LIVES,
UNTIL WE HAVE WON OUR LIBERTY.'**

Adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, South Africa, on 26th June, 1955
ISSUED BY THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, P O BOX 31791, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA.

is more difficult given the diversity of views represented in the ANC leadership. The group's official political manifesto, the 1955 Freedom Charter (see inset), lists moderate socialist aims but is deliberately vague in order to appeal to and attract as broad a coalition of antiapartheid forces as possible. While President Tambo has privately expressed a preference for a moderate, independent state with a democratic base, the ANC leadership has avoided formulating a platform for a black majority government—in part to avoid internecine conflict.

ANC External Activities

16. The ANC, through its foreign offices and participation in international organizations, seeks to mobilize opinion in favor of the ANC and obtain material support for the ANC. The ANC also promotes measures and activities that condemn, isolate, and damage the South African Government such as boycotts and sanctions. The ANC also seeks international recognition as the sole and only legitimate representative of the South African peoples.

17. The ANC has had growing success in all these external activities, and this success will very likely continue to increase. Aided initially only by the Soviet Bloc, Soviet front organizations (all of which the ANC has joined), and radical African states, the ANC has obtained a worldwide venue for its agitprop activities against South Africa and to promote itself. Although we have only sketchy intelligence on external support to the ANC, non-Communist moral and material support is on the increase. Non-Communist governments and organizations, such as the British Government and the EEC, which have historically avoided contact with the ANC because of its program of seeking the overthrow of the South African Government through revolutionary violence, have publicly opened contact with the ANC leadership in the last year.

ANC Internal Activities

18. Internal activities fall into two categories: military/paramilitary and political actions. (u)

Military/Paramilitary Activities



19. The capabilities of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (commonly referred to as "MK"), to conduct military operations are modest (see annex B). Handicapped by the need to infiltrate MK cadres over long distances, sometimes remote and difficult terrain, and heavily patrolled borders into and out of

South Africa, and handicapped also by the need to have some form of support mechanism in states bordering South Africa, and by difficult to nonexistent communications with operational units, the MK has done well to increase its sabotage activity in the last year (see annex B).

20. Recent bombings suggest that the ANC is continuing its shift toward attacks on civilians despite the potential hazards of South African retaliation and Western condemnation. Against a backdrop of the worst domestic unrest in South Africa's modern history and challenges presented by the state of emergency, the ANC leadership apparently has decided that attacks on government targets alone are not sufficient. Given the pattern and scope of recent indiscriminate bombings, we consider it highly likely that virtually all of these bombings were the work of ANC guerrillas.

21. Until last year the ANC generally tried to avoid causing civilian casualties during attacks on government targets. Exceptions usually were unintentional or were justified as retaliation for South African raids against ANC targets in neighboring states. ANC spokesmen claimed, for example, that the car bombing of the South African Air Force headquarters in May 1983, in which 19 people died and 219 were injured—many of them civilian passersby—was in response to a South African attack on ANC guerrillas in Lesotho six months earlier. Following a major ANC conference in Zambia in June 1985, President Tambo said the group would continue to strike at government targets but would be less concerned about civilian casualties. This decision reflected the growing influence of militant, rank-and-file black nationalist youths opposed to what they saw as inaction by the ANC's relatively moderate "old guard" leadership. Most ANC bombings since late last year have been directed against civilian rather than government targets. A recent ANC statement specifically noted that white farmers and urban white males were considered by the ANC as part of the government's "security forces" and were valid targets for ANC operations.

22.



27. We do anticipate that ANC cadres will participate in, and in some cases, control the "shadow governments," (for example "street committees," "action councils," and "peoples' courts") that are springing up in some populous African townships, such as Mamelodi, Guguletu, and Alexandra. The government is unlikely to succeed in suppressing all of these groups and their self-appointed leaderships. The ANC agents will be in competition with other groups such as "black consciousness" militants and local criminal warlords, but we anticipate that the ANC influence within these "liberated areas" will gradually increase and represent a significant ANC gain.

28. The second line of ANC internal political strategy, which has been more successful than the development of an underground, focuses on legal internal

opposition groups. The ANC seeks to win support from, and in turn supports, existing major associations of groups opposed to the government's policies. In addition, the ANC calls for the creation of new united fronts of other groups, such as women and youth. This strategy enhances ANC claims to represent the majority and advances the work of building unity. Two key federations, with extensively overlapping memberships, have developed this line of strategy. The principal group is the UDF, which brings together over 600 organizations; second is the COSATU labor federation, some of whose components are also linked to the UDF. Leaders of both have traveled to Lusaka for meetings with ANC leaders and issued statements of support. Some ANC leaders intend to build these and other federations into the broad popular fronts similar to those called for in classic Marxist-Leninist strategy. We anticipate that ANC connections with and influence over these groups will become stronger, although dependent to a degree on Pretoria's actions. The ANC will fall short of converting them to obedient surrogates in most cases, however.

Relations With Internal Organizations

29. The ANC has a wide range of supporters and opponents within South Africa. While few groups are under ANC control or direction, a growing number support it. Some support derives simply from its symbolic importance as the oldest black nationalist movement. Numerous groups also share the fundamental ANC objectives of eliminating apartheid and restructuring South African politics and society on lines similar to, if not explicitly following, the ANC Freedom Charter. This support, however, does not equate with complete agreement with every aspect of ANC programs and tactics. In particular many groups do not endorse the "armed struggle." Some disagreements lead to moderate or strong—even bitter—opposition among sectors of society that otherwise share the desire to protest and change apartheid.

Labor

30. The black labor movement in South Africa is divided on support for the ANC. The leadership of the largest black labor federation, the 660,000 member Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), has made statements openly supportive of the ANC. COSATU leaders have conducted talks with ANC officials in Lusaka. Officials of the ANC's SACP-controlled labor affiliate, SACTU, were present at these talks but played only a minor role. Nonetheless, we expect the COSATU leadership to retain formal

independence from all political groups. While COSATU may support the ANC in opposition to the white government, it is unlikely to welcome any effort by the ANC or SACTU to assert itself as the senior spokesman for or representative of black labor.

31. One small black federation, AZACTU, which claims 60,000 members, rejects the ANC's multiracial character and Communist ties. Many other labor leaders, such as the CUSA and TUCSA federation leaders, prefer to remain neutral even if they have personal inclinations toward the ANC in order not to divide their memberships on a political issue.

32. COSATU's expression of support for the ANC was the key factor in the creation in May 1986 of a new labor grouping based on Chief Buthelezi's Zulu-based Inkatha movement. This grouping, called the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), is explicitly anti-ANC and opposed also to COSATU, which it accuses—incorrectly in our view—of being an ANC front. Although UWUSA is being built from the top down as the labor arm of Inkatha, it is likely to organize substantial portions of the work force in Natal and KwaZulu and thus dilute both ANC and COSATU influence in these areas.

The United Democratic Front (UDF)

33. The UDF is a loose federation of over 600 separate and widely disparate organizations with both national and regional leaderships and a claimed membership of some 2 million. The UDF's political agenda closely resembles the democratic and multiracial aspects of the ANC's Freedom Charter and many UDF leaders have had strong ANC connections. The ANC probably has substantial influence in the national UDF leadership, in some of the regional leaderships such as the Natal and West Cape UDF organizations, and reportedly directs a small number of the component organizations. Nonetheless, we do not credit either South African Government or ANC claims that the UDF is an ANC surrogate. The UDF is a loose organization and the large majority of its component organizations are autonomous actors and not controlled by the ANC. Many of these groups are issue oriented and are willing to act contrary to ANC wishes in negotiating with the South African Government or "establishment" entities to obtain real reforms or benefits for their members.

34. The UDF's future is cloudy. Newly formed community and youth groups, some dominated by violence-oriented radicals that claim allegiance to the

UDF, have overshadowed more conservative, reform-oriented groups and leaders, including religious groups. The UDF has been a specific target of government suppression and, given the disparate nature of its constituency, it is questionable whether the UDF can survive as a national organization given concerted government suppression [REDACTED]

Black Consciousness Groups

35. Black consciousness groups reflect a longstanding minority black opposition to the ANC's multiracialism and its alleged SACP domination. They believe blacks should win their own liberation and reject white domination or participation in the struggle. The first group formed to promote these views was the 1958 Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), still feebly opposing the ANC from exile. A second group, the now-banned Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), provided the dynamics for the 1976 Soweto riots. Successor Black Consciousness (BC) groups set up the National Forum in 1983 as a much smaller rival to the UDF. Most National Forum groups are dominated by intellectuals, internally divided, and are increasingly in violent conflict with the UDF and ANC supporters. The leading component, the 20,000 member Azanian Peoples' Organization (AZAPO), is hostile to the ANC and UDF on a number of counts. It accuses the ANC of being controlled by white and Indian Communists, and criticizes ANC/UDF support of consumer and school boycotts. In turn, the ANC has publicly disparaged AZAPO as immature. Although the views of many young radicals are closer to the views of the BC National Forum, we expect continuing defections from this group to the ANC and UDF [REDACTED]

The Township Militants

36. The most visibly active group within South Africa is the mostly unemployed and young township militants who are responsible for much of the violence. The township militants appear to lack coherent organization or serious affiliation with other groups. In general, they favor violence against "collaborators," and the "establishment," and feel that only by open violence can they bring down the system of white rule. Various groups claim allegiance to the ANC, UDF, or AZAPO, but evidence of serious organization or incorporation is lacking. Violence often seems random and nihilistic. The ANC, UDF, and AZAPO are making efforts to recruit and control these groups, but with only limited success to date. The very amorphousness of these groups prevents comprehensive government suppression of them [REDACTED]

37. As economic conditions in the townships worsen and recruitment efforts on the part of the ANC, UDF, and AZAPO intensify, we envision some more structured organization of these elements developing, particularly in townships where the government administration has collapsed. The ANC has a marked advantage in recruiting these groups by means of its supply of arms and will likely make the most headway, but we envision much of the township violence continuing to come from ill-organized and largely transitory groups. We also see interfactional violence among these township militants on the rise, [REDACTED] times encouraged by the South African Government [REDACTED]

Rural and Homeland Blacks

38. The often-made charge that the ANC is dominated by Xhosa-speaking leaders such as Mandela and Tambo has had some impact on ANC appeal among other ethnic groups, particularly among the Zulu, traditionally hostile to the Xhosa. ANC rivalry with the KwaZulu leader, Chief Buthelezi, and his Zulu-based political movement (which claims a membership of over 1 million) has been quite bitter and shows no signs of diminishing. While Buthelezi embraces the political aims of the ANC and has acknowledged the leadership of Nelson Mandela, he rejects the armed struggle and ANC demands for disinvestment and other sanctions. Buthelezi has probably significantly undermined ANC efforts to expand among the 7 million Zulus, who represent about one-quarter of South Africa's black population. Many young urban Zulus, however, have rebuffed Buthelezi's leadership, and his continued failure to win any significant concessions from Pretoria has diminished his general prestige. Meanwhile the ANC has moved to increase its support in rural areas and the homelands. ANC and UDF activities have expanded to several "homeland" areas and are likely to increase. The tribally oriented homeland "governments" created by Pretoria are not uniformly hostile to the ANC. For example, the KwaZulu leader Enos Mabuza in early 1986 met with ANC leaders in Lusaka and [REDACTED] made statements generally supportive of the ANC [REDACTED]

White Groups

39. Numerous white groups—businessmen, students, religious leaders, opposition political figures—have opened contact with the ANC in the last year. The ANC has made expansion of contacts with white groups such as the End Conscription Campaign and the National Union of South African Students a top

priority for 1986. The garnering of white support for the ANC will be handicapped by the increasing ANC support for sabotage and terrorist actions that kill white civilians. [REDACTED]

Communist Influence in the ANC


40. The nature of the relationship between the ANC and the South African Communist Party has provoked sharp debate within the ANC and drawn close scrutiny of outside observers. Historically, the SACP has preferred to conceal the Communist allegiance of some senior ANC officials for fear of alienating moderate sympathizers. Nevertheless, in public the two groups define their relationship as an "alliance" that, along with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), forms the three "pillars of the liberation struggle." [REDACTED]

41. The ANC, however, is not a monolith nor do we believe it is under the firm control of any one cohesive group. In our judgment, the SACP (in part because of its long history of support for the ANC and its dedicated and ideologically committed leadership) has a considerable degree of influence in the ANC—particularly in the ANC's military wing. At the same time, however, we believe that generational, racial, and ideological differences within the ANC act as a brake against any SACP attempt to gain domination over or total control of the ANC. [REDACTED]


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
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48. *SACP Objectives.* SACP literature makes clear that it envisions and is planning for a scenario in which there is a broad national democratic revolution after which the "working class" under SACP control will "take over the state apparatus" to engineer an economic and social revolution. In 1983, the late Chairman of the SACP, an Indian, listed the Party's more immediate tactical goals as:


- Guiding and directing the revolutionary struggle.
- Educating the masses to the "universal truths" of Marxism-Leninism.
- Strengthening the ANC-SACP alliance.
- Resisting backsliding to a "bourgeois-reformist" way of development.
- Concentrating on organizing, uniting, and giving clear guidance to the black working class.
- Defeating South African Government attempts to create a black middle class.

49. Taking its cues from Moscow, the SACP's agenda not surprisingly takes on a manifestly anti-US tone claiming that US efforts to foster political change without destroying South Africa's economic system are unwelcome "reformism."



51. Soviet strategy toward South Africa closely meshes with Soviet policy toward other southern African states whose governments are generally sympathetic to the ANC. For example, a portion of the Soviet military assistance to several of those states is channeled toward the arming and training of the ANC. Southern African states often suffer South African retaliation for support to the ANC, creating a perceived need for improved self defense and military assistance, openings the Soviets can exploit.


52. The Soviets calculate that the ANC will be the principal vehicle for change in South Africa and view the SACP, as well as ANC dependence on Soviet military assistance, as their means of influence within the ANC.



...ets, however, are somewhat suspicious of the ANC's ideological reliability and are concerned that nationalist elements could be co-opted by Pretoria into some kind of reform program. (S)

* A recent SACP publication gave the following ethnic breakdown for the attendees at the late 1984 Sixth Congress of the SACP: 64 percent African, 18 percent Indian, 6 percent Colored, and 12 percent white. (u)

53.



in the United Kingdom. Funds have been provided by the Soviets to individual ANC members, both SACP and non-SACP, within the ANC hierarchy. Recent reporting indicates that Soviet embassies have supplied coded communications channels between some ANC offices. Numerous senior ANC cadres are regular visitors to the Soviet Union and to Soviet Bloc embassies—Oliver Tambo's personal assistant Joe Nhlanhla reportedly visited the Soviet Embassy in Lusaka twice a week in 1983.

Constraints on Communist Influence in the ANC


The Black Nationalist Faction

57. The history of the ANC since the 1940s has included periodic unsuccessful attempts by "black nationalists" to protest SACP and nonblack influence within the ANC. In each case, SACP leaders and veteran non-Communist leaders were able to control the organization and oust the protesters. There have been several grassroots mutinies within MK also protesting SACP and nonblack control, and all these were ruthlessly suppressed (see annex C).

Soviet Bloc Support



54. Soviet support to the ANC is across the board and through multiple channels and seems designed to both enhance the influence of the SACP within the ANC as well as maintain Soviet influence over the broader ANC. We believe the Soviet Bloc provides military assistance received by the ANC but is much less generous regarding nonmilitary aid. In both cases, we cannot estimate specific dollar amounts of this assistance.

58.




55. The ANC's heavy dependence on the Soviet Bloc for military aid is an important source of leverage for the SACP and the Soviet Union. In 1983, Oliver Tambo stated that the ANC obtained 90 percent of its military support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Bloc supplies virtually all the military equipment to the MK, and the 500 Cuban and East German instructors present in Angolan training camps provide training to MK recruits, among others. The Soviet Bloc donates all advanced military and sabotage training by means of "scholarships" to the USSR and East Germany; attendance at such courses seems to be a sine qua non for advancement in the MK hierarchy.

56. Soviet Bloc nonmilitary assistance takes many forms. According to a 1982 report, 180 ANC nonmilitary cadres are given scholarships to study in the Soviet Bloc each year. The Soviets also give or encourage a wide spectrum of material support through non-Bloc surrogates and fronts. The British Communist Party provides a wide variety of support to the ANC.



63. We also believe that the SACP's lack of popular support inside South Africa gives non-Communist leaders considerable counterleverage against SACP efforts to dominate the group. While we view a collapse of the ANC-SACP alliance as unlikely, such a split would leave the SACP isolated and with little influence in South Africa. We believe both the SACP and Moscow realize this and would be reluctant to pursue opposition to an ANC policy line to the point of risking an irreparable split in the ANC-SACP alliance.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ANC Prospects for the Next Two Years

66. We believe that some black SACP members, particularly in Umkhonto we Sizwe, have opportunistically moved to support the military policies advocated by these militants, probably sensing that this group, which almost certainly represents a majority of the rank and file in Umkhonto we Sizwe and the ANC, poses the most significant potential challenge to the established leadership of the ANC. We see continuing tension between the leadership and this broad group; and the views of this group will increasingly impact on and circumscribe ANC tactical flexibility. For example, we believe that the ANC leadership is cautious and divided over the questions of negotiation with the South African Government or compromise over the armed struggle, in part because of leadership perception that such a move would not be tolerated by the young, militant rank and file. Nonetheless, we see both ANC and SACP leaders retaining overall control of the organization and capable of resisting any challenge to their leadership positions from this group. Over a longer time frame than this Estimate, this group will have the potential for moving into the ANC leadership as some veterans die off and other leaders seek to mollify this faction further by promoting representatives into leadership positions.

68. A recent Estimate¹ described the most likely scenario of developments within South Africa over the next several years as one of continuing white rule, an ongoing government-directed reform program that will receive at best mixed results, at best sluggish economic growth, and continuing outbreaks of black violence. We believe this scenario still is the most likely, and project the following for the ANC for the next two years against this scenario.

69. The international recognition accorded to the ANC is likely to grow during the next two years. The ANC's ability to garner widespread support as the major—and in some circles the only—recognized spokesman for the broad mass of black South Africans, however, is not likely to be matched by a commensurate increase in the ability of the ANC to direct and control events inside South Africa. The ANC probably recognizes that chances for the overthrow of the South African Government in the near term are poor and that the group's greatest short-run strength lies in its ability to burnish its image and broaden the base of its international support.

External Activities

70. We anticipate that the ANC's greatest successes will come in mobilizing international opinion in its favor and gaining increased financial, and perhaps military, support. Although we expect that many supporters, and potential supporters, in the West will be troubled by the ANC's close ties to the Soviet Bloc and the group's use at times of indiscriminate attacks, current political trends in South Africa, as well as the worldwide focus on Pretoria's intransigence, will work to the ANC's advantage. The United Kingdom and other EEC members, for example, already have partially reversed past policies and opened contact with the ANC leadership in the past year.

71. To achieve this broadened external support, the ANC is likely to lobby hard for the imposition of strict sanctions and boycotts against Pretoria while remaining vague about characteristics of a future ANC-oriented government. The ANC can expect continued

Non-Communist Foreign Support

67.

[REDACTED]

¹ SNIE 73.2-85, *Prospects for South Africa: Stability, Reform, and Violence*, August 1985.

0 6 5 2

and consistent support from the Soviet Bloc, Soviet front organizations, and most African nations. (SXP)

72. Increases in support from the wider international community, however, are likely to be offset somewhat by ANC reverses in the region. In particular, South Africa almost certainly will increase the cost of supporting the ANC to the neighboring countries. There is little that militarily weaker and economically dependent black-ruled nations can do to fend off Pretoria. As such, we expect that nations such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique will try to walk a fine line between bowing to South Africa's military and economic might and allowing a limited ANC presence in their countries. When pressed, however, the black-ruled nations will have no choice but to attempt to please Pretoria, if only by temporarily limiting restricting ANC activities within their borders.

Internal Activities

73. In part because of its inability to establish secure bases in neighboring countries, the ANC will be incapable of mounting a regime-threatening military campaign during the period of this Estimate. ANC operations, however, are likely to be keyed to ANC perceptions of the state of unrest inside South Africa. Given the South African Government's extensive security network, there is little prospect during the next two years that the ANC will be able in any significant way to move intermediate command and communications echelons now located in neighboring countries into South Africa. Pretoria's willingness to strike whenever necessary at neighboring countries also will hamper ANC efforts to build an infrastructure inside South Africa.

74.

75. On the political front inside South Africa, the ANC is likely to attempt to broaden its appeal to the rank and file of groups such as the UDF and COSATU, but in most cases is unlikely to succeed in establishing much beyond rhetorical alliances with their leaderships. Instead, we expect that the ANC will have to be content with trying to bypass leaders in an attempt to appeal to the rank and file, and place ANC supporters in key positions. In our judgment, although internal leaders will continue to pay some homage (such as by traveling to Lusaka to meet with ANC leaders) to the principles espoused by the ANC, they recognize that closer ties probably are a greater short-term liability rather than an asset. In particular, as long as the ANC remains a banned organization, closer association with the ANC runs the risk of providing Pretoria with "justification" for cracking down harder on groups such as the UDF and COSATU.

The South African Response

76. All signs point to the government continuing its campaign to discredit the ANC by claiming that it is a Communist-controlled organization dedicated to terrorism, and that it enjoys little support among black South Africans. Although unlikely in our judgment to have much success, we also expect that the government will continue with efforts to build an alternative "moderate" black leadership willing to accept Pretoria's reforms and challenge the ANC on its own ground.

77. At the same time, we expect that South African security authorities are increasingly likely to move toward a strategy designed to break the back of the organization in exile. Past limited military and paramilitary raids in neighboring countries, which have netted internal ANC documents, compromised ANC networks, and intimidated neighboring states into at least temporarily disrupting activities, are likely to be supplanted by more destructive cross-border attacks. Pretoria also may authorize selective assassinations of ANC officials. Inside South Africa, we expect that security services will continue to have some success rounding up ANC military units that infiltrate the country. At the same time, we expect the security services to become more aggressive in targeting groups such as the UDF.


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78. On balance, we believe South African security forces are capable of keeping ANC-sponsored violence within, from Pretoria's perspective, tolerable limits. We do not believe, however, that Pretoria is capable within the next two years of meeting its stated objective of "restoring order" to black townships, or of creating a black leadership strong enough to overcome opposition from the ANC and other groups opposed to negotiating with the government.

Prospects for Negotiation

79. We believe the ANC and the government will not agree to negotiate during the period of this Estimate. Both sides appear determined to gird themselves for the long struggle rather than compromise now. The Eminent Persons Group of the Commonwealth unsuccessfully attempted to promote talks earlier this year. Although the ANC was not out to the test of formally responding to the proposal, there appeared to be some interest in the concept on the part of the ANC "old guard."

80.



Key Variables

81. There are two key variables that would affect and possibly alter these projected outcomes, both related to South African Government action.

Conciliation Versus Repression

82. Should the South African Government fundamentally change its policy toward internal nonwhite opposition groups and seek to conciliate these groups by undertaking new reforms and allowing concessions

by white establishment entities to community action groups and trade unions, there would likely be a positive response on the part of some opposition groups. Such new conciliatory dialogues would inhibit ANC prospects to influence, penetrate, and control these groups, as well as work against the ANC's broad interests by dampening antigovernment fervor. The current trends of government suppression and consequent radicalization of the legal opposition groups makes such a development unlikely over the next two years.

Release of Nelson Mandela

83. Pretoria would like to release Nelson Mandela⁴ primarily to avoid the repercussions of his dying in jail. However, given the immense domestic and international popularity of Mandela, he poses a real threat to Pretoria and it is unlikely, in our judgment, that he will be released over the next two years. Should he be released, the most likely scenario would have Mandela moving immediately and smoothly into the top leadership. He would likely accept and support extant ANC policies and the prominent SACP presence as he did in the 1950s, and he would serve as an important new ambassador for the ANC internationally.

Implications for the Soviet Union

84. Given the anticipated improvement in ANC fortunes over the next two years, Moscow is likely to continue without major change its present mix of low-cost and low-risk support to the ANC: supplying arms, advisers, and limited funds; lending propaganda and diplomatic support; and other efforts designed to sustain SACP influence within the ANC and advance ANC fortunes.

85. The Soviets are probably confident that this long-term effort of support to the ANC and SACP will ultimately result in an outcome favorable to the USSR—a pro-Soviet regime in South Africa. One of Moscow's major concerns has been that a peaceful reform and gradual elimination of apartheid would reduce the ANC and SACP chances of seizing power. The Soviets likely are encouraged by Pretoria's shift toward greater repression of black dissidents, which isolates it internationally and, in their view, increases the long-term chances of a violent overthrow of the

⁴Mandela no longer holds an official ANC position, but he is widely regarded both internationally and in South Africa as the ANC's "leader." His perceived ANC standing is the result of his having become the most visible symbol of black opposition to Pretoria.

white government. Statements by Soviet officials suggest that they do not expect this to happen soon but are content with the progress their program is showing, although exhibiting a continuing nervousness about social democracy and backsliding tendencies within the ANC.

Implications for the United States

86. The ANC presents a dilemma for the United States—and ANC is the most popular organization in South Africa, but it is an organization with considerable Communist influence and has extensive and longstanding ties to the Soviet Union, a pro-Soviet posture, and it promotes revolutionary violence. This is not likely to change over the next two years.

87. The ANC's membership is small, its vision of a future South Africa vague, and its leadership is in exile or imprisoned. But the ANC's broad popularity tends to support its claim to be the leading representative of blacks. The likely future South African developments—inadequate reforms, black resistance, government suppression—will reinforce the ANC's hold on the symbols of "liberation".

Without significant action on black political rights from the government, it is difficult to see how the ANC can be divorced from the growing number of internal black opposition groups.

88. The leading role of the ANC makes it essential in any foreseeable peaceful negotiated outcome. Yet the ANC's tactics of revolutionary violence are not consonant with the US preference for evolutionary change. Most troubling are the Communists' strong position in the ANC's exiled leadership and the Congress' pro-Soviet, anti-US posture.

89. Efforts by third parties to deal with the ANC by first seeking to separate it from internal black opposition, under the ANC-SACP alliance, or reduce Soviet influence, would likely fail. ANC resistance to such efforts could jeopardize efforts to improve contacts with the ANC and increase ANC suspicion of Western complicity with the Botha government.

90. Over the longer term the ANC character would change were it to expand its role in domestic politics. Even if operating from exile, ANC attempts to spread its influence are likely to include stronger links to internal organizations that are relatively democratic and mostly anti-Communist. If allowed to operate legally inside South Africa, the ANC could become a mass-based party, a transformation that would greatly reduce the role of the SACP. These two factors—the existence of legal internal democratic opposition and the legalization of the ANC—will remain dependent on South African Government policy.

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ANNEX A
ANC Organization

The ANC, then a mass organization, was banned in 1960 and its organizational structure virtually eliminated in a series of arrests and detentions in 1962-63. A handful of ANC National Executive Committee leaders who were out of the country, joined by other ANC officials who had fled before arrest, jumped bail, or been released from detention, slowly re-formed the ANC as an exile organization from bases in London and Dar es Salaam. The ANC was organizationally reconstituted as a semiclandestine movement in 1969. All ANC leadership positions were assumed by these exiles, some of whom had held senior ANC positions. Subsequent appointments were made by this self-proclaimed leadership, which ultimately gained acceptance and legitimacy both internationally and within South Africa. The ANC constitution, designed for a legal democratic mass organization, is in fact moribund.

The highest titular authority of the ANC is its National Consultative Conference, of which there have been two (1969 and 1985). All delegates were handpicked by the leadership.

The most senior policy organization of the ANC is the National Executive Council (NEC), currently composed of 30 members. The 1969 and 1985 National Consultative Congresses not surprisingly elected the incumbent NECs, but appointments to and dismissals from the NEC regularly occur and appear on the basis of a consensus among the majority of NEC members. The NEC reportedly only meets two or three times a year and rarely with full membership.

The three top positions in the ANC are, in theory, the president, secretary general, and treasurer general. President Tambo sits ex officio on all substantive committees of the ANC where decisions are made.


The three substantive committees of the ANC are: the Politico-Military Council (and its subordinate Political and Military Committees), which plans and directs all ANC activity inside South Africa; the External Coordinating Committee, which directs all ANC external activity; and the Working Committee, which provides day-to-day, largely housekeeping, management for external ANC activities.

A fourth locus of substantive authority is the Military High Command, which in theory reports to the Military Committee but apparently runs Umkhonto we Sizwe.

There are [REDACTED] of ANC departments that manage functional areas of ANC external activity: Information and Propaganda, Education, Health, International Affairs, Youth League, Women's League, Arts and Culture, and Intelligence and Security. Although information is skimpy, it would seem that the department heads have considerable freedom to manage their departments.

The ANC periodically changes the names of its committees. See the organizational chart of the ANC which is believed to be reasonably accurate.

Organization of the ANC



ANNEX B

Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), The ANC Military

The military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation or MK) was formed in 1961 to organize a guerrilla war against the South African Government. Its initial campaign of bombings collapsed when its entire high command was captured in a police raid in 1963 and subsequently convicted at the famous Rivonia trial.

attacks against South African targets within the past 18 months. It is also attempting to broaden the conflict into a "people's war" by taking advantage of the current unrest in South Africa's black townships. At a conference at Kabwe, Zambia, last year, the ANC decided to broaden the target of its attacks, to carry the fight outside the cities, and to recognize that death of civilians of all races is unavoidable. Ultimately, the "people's war" is meant to establish control over the unrest and to deny the townships to the authorities. The townships could then provide secure bases from which the ANC would be able to fight government forces from inside South Africa and spread the struggle to the country at large.

Organization

Joe Modise, commander of the ANC's military wing, serves as chairman of the military subcommittee that oversees MK's activities and operations in South Africa. The MK high command oversees infiltration and operations. There are probably several regional commands, most likely located in Lusaka, Maputo, and Luanda. The Luanda command may oversee military training, while Lusaka and Maputo most likely have operational elements assigned, although the Maputo regional command became ineffective for all practical purposes after Pretoria and Maputo signed the Nkomati Accord in March 1984.

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In 1977, about 4,000 militant, young blacks left South Africa following the Soweto uprising and joined the ANC and MK, reinvigorating the organization. ANC President Tambo reportedly received pledges from Soviet President Podgorniy and Cuban President Castro that year for more support to MK. Later in 1977, MK training camps were established in Angola, and Cuban and East German advisers and Soviet arms were provided.


The "Class of 1976" revitalized an ineffective and dormant organization but also sowed the seeds of the current tension in the ANC. The young militants are eager to dismantle apartheid, even if they have to destroy South Africa's economic base and alienate the white population in the process. The "old guard," by contrast, wants to safeguard the economy to ensure a powerful state after they take over. Senior ANC members resist broad antiwhite tactics.

With only approximately 5,000 trained insurgents located mostly outside South Africa, MK does not aspire to a short-term military victory against the South African security establishment. Despite the refusal of South Africa's neighbors to allow the MK to operate from within their borders, the MK has succeeded in markedly increasing the number of its

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

Basing and Infiltration Routes

The MK's military camps appear to be colocated with, albeit in areas separate from, other ANC facilities in Tanzania, Angola, and Zambia. In Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Mozambique, facilities are limited to safehouses and arms caches. An estimated

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
4,000 MK personnel may be present in Angola and several hundred in both Tanzania and Zambia. Others may be abroad for training or in transit to or inside South Africa. We estimate that the number of trained MK guerrillas inside South Africa at any one time is less than 200.



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ANNEX C

A Chronology of Ties Between the ANC and
the South African Communist Party

- 1912 South African Native National Congress is established and later renamed (in 1923) the African National Congress (ANC).
- 1915 Leftists split with South African Labor Party and form International Socialist League (ISL).
- 1921 ISL members, many of whom had a special interest in the black labor movement, and other leftists, form the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The CPSA joins the Comintern and complies with Soviet orders to concentrate on gaining control of white trade unions.
- 1922 Mine owners, trying to offset declining gold prices, precipitate a violent strike by announcing plans to lay off more highly paid white employees and replace them with blacks. The CPSA initially supports the miners' campaign, over which it has little direct control, but becomes disaffected after white miners attack black workers who remain on the job.
- 1924 Pact by the Labor and Nationalist Parties gains them an electoral victory. New government enacts a series of discriminatory laws, some of which entrench white labor privilege, CPSA subsequently shifts its attention to recruiting black members and infiltrating black organizations. Main target is the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU). Begun as a trade union of black dockworkers in 1919, the ICU grows in the 1920s and becomes a mass political movement with well over 100,000 members, eclipsing the ANC during this period.
- 1926 CPSA's four members on the ICU's National Executive Committee lead the left wing of the ICU in calls for a more militant program. The remainder of the ICU leadership responds to expelling all CPSA members from the ICU. CPSA focuses on the ANC as a result.
- 1927 ANC President Josiah Gumede attends the Brussels Conference of the League Against Imperialism and visits the USSR. When he returns, he unsuccessfully lobbies for a new ANC strategy of demonstrations, strikes, tax boycotts, pass burnings, and close ties to the Soviets.
- 1928 New directive from Comintern states that, in response to the "united white front arrayed against the nonwhites," the CPSA must work toward establishing "an independent native republic—with full guarantees for minority groups—as a stage toward a workers' and peasants' government." Many in the CPSA (especially former ISL members) object to the Soviet line because they prefer to regard blacks as an "exploited class of workers" rather than as a "persecuted race." A pro-Moscow group of ultraleftists, however, eventually gains control and purges the CPSA of black members and whites with ties to trade unions. The purge is sparked by a Comintern directive that accuses all socialists of not being "true revolutionaries."
- 1930s CPSA is virtually moribund despite abandonment of its ultraleft line; ANC continues to follow a slow-moving reformist campaign after Gumede loses reelection bid in 1930. A number of nonwhite Communists, including black trade unionists, receive training in the USSR, including future party leaders Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks, P. J. Mkhize, and David Bopepe.
- 1941 CPSA membership increases after Hitler invades the Soviet Union. Black Communists gain new foothold in the ANC.
- 1943 A new ANC constitution is drafted, in part by lawyer Abram Fischer, and promulgated. The new constitution eliminated ex officio representation of native chiefs, contained numerous antidiscrimination and political-social reform objectives. Fischer is later revealed as a longtime CPSA leader.

- 1944 A group of young black nationalists—disgusted with the lack of progress resulting from the ANC's moderate tactics—form the ANC Youth League. Most Youth Leaguers are initially anti-Communist and believe that there is no role for whites in the struggle for black rights. ANC Youth League leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo unsuccessfully attempt to force CPSA members from the ANC in 1945-46.
- 1946 J. B. Marks, a Colored Communist in the ANC, leads a major strike by the African Mineworkers' Union.
- 1946 The Xuma-Dadoo-Naiker agreement formed between the ANC's President Xuma and the Communist-led South African Indian Council (SAIC), and its leaders Dadoo and Naiker, in which the ANC and SAIC agreed to closely cooperate. SAIC leaders gain influence with ANC leaders.
- 1948 Afrikaner-based National Party comes to power.
- 1949 Youth Leaguers dominate ANC National Conference and push through a new "Program of Action" that calls for civil disobedience, strikes, and boycotts.
- 1950 Suppression of Communism Act bans the CPSA and also gives the government wide powers to counter extraparliamentary opposition groups. CPSA announces its dissolution one month before passage of the act. Portions of the organization continue to operate underground; three years later the South African Communist Party (SACP) is formed. Many nonwhite CPSA members quickly join the ANC and assume significant positions in the organization—Moses Kotane, Govan Mbeki, Phillip Vundla, Alfred Nzo, and Alex La Guma being the best known.
- 1950-52 The veteran Communist J. B. Marks assumes the presidency of the Transvaal Province ANC and staffs the province leadership with several Communists.
- 1951 Veteran ANC leader R. V. Selope-Thema resigns from the ANC in protest against Communist influence in the ANC and unsuccessfully attempts to form a rival organization.
- 1952 The ANC and the Communist-led SAIC join in a Defiance Campaign of passive resistance, planned by Communists J. B. Marks, Yusuf Dadoo, and M. P. Naiker, as well as Nelson Mandela, which reflects the growing influence of Communists and Youth Leaguers in the ANC. Defiance Campaign is aimed at changing six "unjust" laws, including the Suppression of Communism Act.
- 1954 Five prominent "Africanist" (antiwhite, anti-Indian, and anti-Communist) officials of the Transvaal ANC are expelled as "divisionists" by the ANC's National Executive Committee.
- 1952-56 Congress Alliance is formed between the ANC and the following Communist-controlled organizations: the South African Colored Peoples Organization, the SAIC, the Congress of Democrats, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. A Congress of the People is held in 1955 and a Freedom Charter, reportedly drafted by SACP leaders Joe Slovo and Moses Kotane, is adopted by the ANC in 1956 that lists the basic aims of the movement. Later that year, the government arrests 156 Congress Alliance leaders on treason charges. The defendants eventually gain acquittals, but the six-year trial consumes the energy of the Congress Alliance, which loses its momentum.
- 1955-62 A 15-man National Consultative Committee (NCC) formed to coordinate policy between the ANC and the five other organizations of the Congress Alliance. Twelve members of the NCC are SACP members. The NCC, led by SACP member Joe Slovo (head of the Congress of Democrats), strongly influences all major ANC policies.
- 1958-59 Black nationalists, angered by the influence of white Communists on the ANC, split with the ANC and form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).
- 1960 The government bans both the ANC and the PAC in a security crackdown following the Sharpeville shooting incident.

- 1961 Following a recommendation of the Central Executive Committee of the SACP, the ANC forms a military wing—Spear of the Nation—and launches a campaign of sabotage bombings. SACP leaders, led by Joe Slovo, form the majority of the "National High Command" of Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe).
- 1962 The SACP draws up a new Party Program and adopts as short-term objectives the goals listed in the Congress Alliance's Freedom Charter.
- 1963-65 A series of mass arrests cripples the ANC and weakens the SACP. Among those captured and sentenced to life imprisonment are ANC President Nelson Mandela and SACP Chairman Bram Fischer. ANC and SACP leaders who escape the dragnet go into exile to rebuild their organizations.
- 1967 ANC National Executive member James Hadebe resigns in protest against Communist domination of the ANC, unsuccessfully attempts to form a rival organization.
- 1969 The ANC holds its First Consultative Congress at Morogoro, Tanzania. Nonblacks become authorized to hold positions within the ANC except on the NEC. The revolutionary alliance of the ANC, SACP, and SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions, an SACP front) is proclaimed. The ANC redefines its strategic objective as the military overthrow of the apartheid regime. Several white, Colored, and Indian SACP members, newly accepted within the ANC, form and dominate for 14 years the ANC Revolutionary Council, which controls all ANC activity within South Africa.
- 1969-75 Several senior ANC leaders, known as the "group of eight," rebel against Communist, white, and Indian domination of the ANC leadership. Despite quiet encouragement from ANC President Tambo, they are purged from the ANC in 1975.
- 1976-77 ANC recruits thousands of young blacks fleeing South Africa in the wake of the Soweto riots and trains them for service in the military wing.
- 1977 Soviet President Podgorniy and Cuban President Castro pledged increased Soviet and Cuban military support to the ANC. Umkhonto we Sizwe's training camps are quickly established in Angola with Cuban and East German trainers and Soviet arms provided.
- 1980-83 The reinvigorated military wing of the ANC renews its "armed propaganda" campaign by attacking government buildings and security personnel and facilities, and by sabotaging power and transportation equipment and facilities.
- 1985 The ANC's second Consultative Conference is held in Kabwe, Zambia, in June. Nonblacks are authorized to join the National Executive Committee, and five nonblacks, all SACP members, join the NEC. The congress proclaims a "people's war" strategy. Subsequently, the ANC leadership apparently broadens the mandate for Umkhonto we Sizwe to allow for attacks on "soft targets."

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