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MILITARY

26 NOV 82

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26 CIA  
TO: DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, TREASURY DEPT,  
ZEN/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ZEN/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
STAFF, ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS,  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI, COMUSKOREA SEOUL//BJ, COMUSFKSA.

EZ1:

SERIAL:

EZ2:

DIST: 26 NOV 82  
PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK 00 DLS DE (FOR NSOC); STATE FOR INR;  
CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC, COMIPAC, POLAD ONLY); COMUSKOREA  
(FOR COMMANDER ONLY).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.  
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY: VIETNAM/CHINA/NORTH KOREA/SOUTHEAST ASIA/INTERNATIONAL

SUBJ: COMMENTS  
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND ON THE MIA  
ISSUE, ON SINO-U.S. RELATIONS, AND ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN  
RELATIONS

DOI: MID-NOVEMBER 1982, EXCEPT AS STATED.

SUMMARY:

TEXT:  
COMMENTED IN MID-NOVEMBER 1982 ON U.S. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CON-  
SIDERATIONS WHICH, IN THE OFFICIAL'S VIEW, CONTINUE TO BLOCK

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: OCT 2001

[REDACTED]

NORMALIZATION OF SRV-U.S. RELATIONS. WHILE U.S. AID AND ASSISTANCE WOULD BE DESIRABLE, THE SRV HOLDS OUT LITTLE HOPE AT THE MOMENT THAT IT WILL BE FORTHCOMING. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BASICALLY HAS AGREED TO SRV CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION BY RECOGNIZING THE SRV'S INDEPENDENCE AND RIGHT TO U.N. MEMBERSHIP. REMAINING OBSTACLES INCLUDE APPARENT CONFLICTS OF OPINION AND OTHER CONTRADICTIONS IN THE U.S. THE MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE PERCEIVED AS FAVORING NORMALIZED RELATIONS, BUT THE U.S. "RULING CIRCLE" REMAINS OPPOSED. [REDACTED] IF U.S. AID IS NEVER RENDERED, IT WILL NOT MATTER IN THE LONG RUN.

2. CONCERNING ONE ISSUE, [REDACTED] SAID THAT HIS NATION DOES NOT HOLD EVEN ONE AMERICAN CITIZEN. THE U.S. HAS ASKED AND RECEIVED SINCERE SRV COOPERATION WITH REGARD TO A LISTING OF AMERICANS STILL BELIEVED TO BE MISSING. [REDACTED] DESCRIBED IT AS QUITE REGRETTABLE THAT THE U.S. STILL DOUBTS THE SRV RESPONSE AND MAINTAINS THAT THE SRV STILL HOLDS SOME AMERICANS FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER. THE SRV GOVERNMENT IS CONTINUING AT PRESENT ITS EFFORTS TO GAIN U.S. UNDERSTANDING AND CONFIDENCE ON THIS QUESTION.

3. IT CANNOT BE DENIED, [REDACTED] THAT THE U.S. MUST PROTECT CHINA FROM A LOSS OF FACE IN ANY CONSIDERATION OF RESTORING NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE SRV. CHINA CERTAINLY HAS NO DESIRE TO SEE NORMAL SRV-U.S. RELATIONS BECAUSE OF THE FEAR THAT SUCH RELATIONS WOULD RESULT IN A STRONGER VIETNAM. THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THIS PERFECTLY AND, THEREFORE, PURPOSELY IS DELAYING A SOLUTION TO THE NORMALIZATION PROBLEM.

4. AS PART OF ITS GLOBAL STRATEGY, CHINA IS COLLABORATING WITH THE U.S. AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE U.S. IS INVOLVED WITH CHINA IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTERBALANCE THE SOVIET UNION. FOR ITS PART, CHINA HAS COMMITTED MUCH THE SAME POLICY MISTAKE IN THE PAST BY OPENING ITS DOORS FOR A PERIOD IN THE 1950'S AND SUDDENLY FOLLOWING WITH THE "GREAT LEAP" FIASCO. CHINA'S ((DENG)) XIAOPING IS REPEATING SUCH A MISTAKE AT PRESENT AND PROVOKING VARIOUS DOMESTIC CONTRADICTIONS. HE HAS CONVICTED THE "GANG OF FOUR" BUT HAS YET TO SUCCEED IN BURYING THEIR IDEOLOGY, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARMED FORCES. THE SRV BELIEVES THAT DENG'S PRIMARY TARGETS ARE THE AGING HARDLINERS ((YE)) JIANYING AND ((LI)) XIANNIAN, WHO HAVE TO BE REMOVED AS OBSTACLES TO CONSOLIDATION OF HIS POWER. STILL HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET RID OF THEM BECAUSE OF THE ESTEEM HELD FOR THEM BY CHINA'S MILITARY. SO, WHILE DENG HAS WON TO A CERTAIN EXTENT IN HIS ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER AND POSITION IN THE PARTY, HE HAS NOT DONE SO IN THE ARMY. IT THEREFORE MAY BE CONCLUDED THAT THE PRIMARY CONTRADICTIONS IN CHINA NOW ARE CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE ARMY. IT ALSO MAY BE SEEN THAT THE SITUATION IN CHINA IS UNSTABLE BECAUSE DENG'S OPEN-DOOR POLICY HAS PRODUCED NO FRUITS EXCEPT THE INFILTRATION OF WESTERN CULTURE AND LIFE-STYLE, ESPECIALLY AMONG YOUTHS, WHICH HAS BECOME A DIFFICULT ISSUE FOR DENG AND HIS FOLLOWERS.

5. SIMILARITIES ARE ALSO EVIDENT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. AND CHINA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, [REDACTED]

A. THE U.S. HAS ALWAYS ATTEMPTED TO BREED TWO DISCIPLES AT ONCE. THIS WAS THE CASE WHEN THE U.S. WAS GOING ALL OUT TO ASSIST THE NGUYEN VAN ((THIEU)) REGIME IN SAIGON, WHILE ALL THE TIME BEING PREPARED TO INSTALL, IF NECESSARY, A PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN TAY NINH PROVINCE. BECAUSE THE U.S. LACKS SUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING OF ASIA AND ASIANS, IT HAS ASSISTED THE WRONG MEN--THOSE WITH SELF-SERVING INTERESTS. THIS IS THE MAIN WEAKNESS NOT ONLY OF THE U.S. BUT ALSO OF MOST OF WESTERN EUROPE.

B. AS IS THE CASE WITH THE U.S., CHINA HAS ALSO MAINTAINED NORMAL RELATIONS WITH MOST SOUTHEAST ASIAN GOVERNMENTS, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY FOSTERING POTENTIAL OPPOSITION ELEMENTS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IN KAMPUCHEA, CHINA RENDERED ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE (POL) POT REGIME WHICH WAS CONDEMNED BY PRINCE NORODOM (SIHANOUK). NOW CHINA IS RENDERING ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR THE COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMED BY POL POT, SIHANOUK AND (SON) SANN. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IS MUCH THE SAME, WITH CHINA NOW SHELTERING AND ASSISTING VARIOUS HILL TRIBE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS WHICH IT ONCE CONDEMNED AS LACKEYS OF U.S. IMPERIALISM AND TRAITORS TO THE NATION. CHINA HAS FOR YEARS BEEN PURSUING THE SAME TACTICS IN RELATIONS WITH THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIGENOUS COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS IS THE WAY IN WHICH CHINA ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE SMALL COUNTRIES BY WEAKENING THEM, BUT THESE CHINESE DESIGNS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED WITH REGARD TO THE SRV AND THE REMAINDER OF INDOCHINA. CHINA HAS NOT DARED TO TRY AGAIN TO PUNISH THE SRV, AS THREATENED BY DENG XIAOPING, BECAUSE CHINA SUFFERED HEAVILY IN THE FIRST ATTEMPT, AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE REALIZED THE FUTILITY OF WAR AGAINST VIETNAM. THE CHINESE AS WELL AS OTHER PEOPLE HAVE COME TO REALIZE DENG'S ERROR.

6. THERE ARE MANY ISSUES AND CONTRADICTIONS EMERGING FROM THE SINO-U.S. RELATIONSHIP WHICH BENEFIT THE SOVIET UNION. THIS HAS BEEN SHOWN, [REDACTED] IN SOME IMPORTANT CONTRADICTIONS ARISING BETWEEN CHINA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK). THERE ARE CONTRADICTIONS OF A STRATEGIC AND NOT OF A TACTICAL NATURE, PRIMARILY CHINA'S "ALLIANCE" WITH THE DPRK'S JAPANESE AND AMERICAN ENEMIES, PLUS CHINA'S SUPPORT OF U.S.-INSPIRED EFFORTS OF JAPAN TO STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY POSTURE. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER CONTRADICTIONS, SUCH AS CHINA'S COMMERCIAL CONTACTS THROUGH HONG KONG WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND CHINA'S RELUCTANCE TO SHOW ENTHUSIASM OVER THE CHOICE OF SON ((KIM)) CHONG-IL TO SUCCEED PRESIDENT ((KIM)) IL-SONG. IN TERMS OF OVERALL IMPACT, THOUGH, THE STRATEGIC CONTRADICTIONS ARE THE ONES WHICH WEIGH MOST HEAVILY ON SINO-DPRK RELATIONS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]