



Director of
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Nicaragua: Soviet Bloc and Radical Support for the Sandinista Regime

Special National Intelligence Estimate

~~Top Secret~~

SNIE 83.3-3-85

March 1985

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NICARAGUA: SOVIET BLOC AND RADICAL
SUPPORT FOR THE SANDINISTA REGIME

Information available as of 8 March 1985 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 15 March 1985.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

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
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SCOPE NOTE

[] concluded that the Sandinistas—with the assistance of the Soviet Bloc and radical regimes—are intent on consolidating a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua and building up the largest military force in the region. [] This Estimate provides additional information on the full extent of Soviet Bloc and radical support for Nicaragua over the past year.

Nicaraguan Installations With Soviet Bloc and Other Foreign Presence



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KEY JUDGMENTS

Military and economic support to Nicaragua from the Soviet Bloc and radical regimes increased dramatically in 1984. The value of military aid deliveries last year reached an estimated \$250 million, [Communist economic aid totaled some \$220 million, compared to \$160 million in 1983. As a result of this aid, Nicaragua has further expanded what already is the largest and best equipped military force in Central America, further upsetting the regional military balance. Soviet Bloc and other radical-regime economic aid partially offset a sharp decline in Western commerce and assistance. The Sandinistas appear likely to become increasingly dependent on such support.¹

Complementing military deliveries and financial assistance are continuing infrastructure construction, including both military and commercial projects. The construction of the largest military airbase in the region at Punta Huete, for example, is being done with Cuban assistance. Improvements to the port at El Bluff, undertaken primarily with Bulgarian aid, will provide Nicaragua with an improved Caribbean shipping facility. Several major road and rail projects also are under way, principally with Cuban help.

The development of the military and commercial infrastructure is being carried out with the assistance of a large number of Communist and radical Arab military and civilian advisers and technicians. These include some 6,000 to 7,500 Cubans and several hundred other Communist and radical Arab personnel. Despite some drawdown on the Cuban civilian presence, they still play a key military support role, and there are reliable reports of Cuban involvement in actual fighting against the anti-Sandinista insurgents.

The escalation of foreign support has allowed the Sandinistas to develop and equip the largest armed force in Central America, with an active-duty strength of some 65,000 and a potential strength of some 120,000 if fully mobilized. The armor inventory has more than doubled in the past year, the addition of MI-24 helicopter gunships has strengthened counterinsurgency capabilities, and the air defense system continues to improve with the addition of new radars. Four signal intelligence collection sites also have been established with Soviet

electronic gear. The most immediate threat posed to Nicaragua's neighbors by its military buildup is the Sandinista capability to support leftist insurgent groups behind a strong conventional shield. Nevertheless, Nicaragua's growing offensive capabilities also represent a potential threat to its immediate neighbors.

The recent Sandinista offer to send home 100 Cuban advisers and declare an indefinite moratorium on the acquisition of new armament systems, including interceptor aircraft, is consistent with Nicaragua's negotiating tactics. The token Cuban withdrawal would have little impact on Sandinista capabilities, and, so far, the Soviets have refused to provide the MIG-21 aircraft desired by Managua because of concern about a US response. While the arms moratorium probably will prevent the introduction in the near term of new weapon systems such as surface-to-air missiles, it will meanwhile provide the Sandinistas with an opportunity to absorb the large quantity of weapons delivered over the past year. In the longer run, Managua may believe that, should the peace process show little progress, it will have a good excuse to resume deliveries of new weapons.

DISCUSSION

Expanded Military Commitments to the Regime in 1984

1. During 1984, military support of the Sandinista regime, mainly by Communist countries, expanded considerably. The estimated value of weapons and other military-associated materiel deliveries rose to some \$250 million. Most of these deliveries were made by Bulgaria and the USSR.

The hardware included significantly more advanced equipment than previously observed in Nicaraguan inventories, such as MI-24 assault helicopters, minesweepers, and radar-controlled air defense guns. Furthermore, the delivery of T-55 medium tanks and other armored vehicles more than doubled the Sandinista armor inventory, while the delivery of trucks and jeeps augmented these stocks to some 4,000. Nicaragua also received additional MI-8 helicopters, more patrol boats, and considerable combat support equipment.

(see figure 2). The upsurge in materiel support was accompanied by the first direct Soviet seaborne shipment of combat arms to Nicaragua in November 1984, when additional MI-24s and other weapons were delivered to Corinto.


2. Completed shipments and those en route—mainly by the USSR and East Germany—so far in 1985 indicate a continued Communist effort to bolster Sandinista capabilities.

3. Significantly, Nicaragua probably is not paying for most of its military materiel. The Sandinistas have publicly stated that weapons have been provided as grant aid.

Greater Soviet Bloc and Radical Involvement

4. Not only has the volume and value of Soviet Bloc military aid to Nicaragua increased over the past year, but more countries, including radical Arab states, are

Figure 2
Nicaragua: Identified Deliveries of Selected Military Hardware
by Communist States and Libya, 1980-1 March 1985



^a Tanks and other armored vehicles.

^b 57-mm and larger; excludes mortars.

^c 23-mm and above.

Number of Items

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getting involved. The USSR, which made its first identified military delivery to Nicaragua in 1981, nearly doubled the value of its deliveries last year. At least as significant was Moscow's first direct shipment of combat arms,

The delivery included MI-24 helicopter gunships, minesweeping boats, and coastal defense guns. A high-level Nicaraguan delegation visited Moscow in mid-1984 and this probably led to the Soviet decision to supply the MI-24s directly. This action represents a decision to play a more direct role in strengthening the regime.

5. Other Soviet shipments in 1984 and thus far in 1985 have consisted of the same types of hardware Moscow traditionally has supplied, including:

- MI-8 helicopters
- Trucks, jeeps, and other vehicles.
- Electronics equipment, such as radars and signals intercept systems.

6. Bulgaria's responsibility for delivering weapons began in November 1982.

Last year, the value of Bulgarian deliveries, consisting mainly of combat arms and radars, escalated to nearly triple the shipments in 1983.

Moreover, Sofia delivered an increasingly wide array of weapons and support equipment to Nicaragua,

including MI-24 helicopter gunships and 57-mm radar-controlled air defense artillery—the first of both items.

Bulgaria also delivered large numbers of other materiel, mainly for the ground forces, including:

- T-55 medium tanks.
- PT-76 light amphibious tanks, suitable for both counterinsurgency and conventional operations.
- Other armored vehicles, including BTR-60 and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers and BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles.

Probably some of the radars newly identified in Nicaragua last year, including early warning and height-finder types, which provide ground-controlled-intercept capability.

7. A Bulgarian pledge to the United States to cease further arms shipments to Nicaragua, made last December, apparently has been fulfilled so far.

8. East Germany, which made its first offer of military materiel to the Sandinistas soon after the July

1979 revolution, has continued to supply large numbers of support items. In 1984, this consisted of [] trucks and jeeps and [] Moreover, an agreement concluded in January provides for [] trucks, communications equipment, and other items to be delivered this year. Although East German materiel assistance apparently has been confined to nonlethal hardware, there are indications of a broadening in support.

9. Cuba, which has long supplied the Sandinistas with military weapons, primarily small arms, delivered two inshore minesweepers and a patrol boat to El Bluff last year. Frequent flights between Havana and Managua (averaging four times weekly) and regular transits by Cuban vessels to Nicaragua afford Castro the opportunity to deliver large quantities of other materiel covertly. [] indicated that Cuban flights have carried small arms, rocket launchers, and ammunition.

10. Several other Communist countries recently either emerged as military suppliers to Nicaragua or expanded their roles. Potentially most significant is Czechoslovakia, which we believe has been pressured by Moscow to assume a greater share of the burden. Early this year, Prague—which previously had supplied only small amounts of light weapons and similar

items—extended an additional [] credit to Nicaragua. [] This commitment followed a pledge late last year to “provide full support to Nicaragua’s efforts to consolidate the revolution.”

11. Poland, undoubtedly at Soviet behest, also shows signs of expanded activity. []

12. North Korea supplied [] patrol boats last year and may be constructing similar craft for delivery this year. []

13. The Sandinistas also have attempted to broaden military supply relationships with radical non-Communist states. Libya tried to send L-39s and other arms to Nicaragua clandestinely via Brazil in 1983, but the effort was aborted when discovered by Brazilian authorities. []


14. Iran pledged arms almost a year ago to a Nicaraguan delegation, but delivery still has not occurred. [

Training and Advisory Support

15. The continuing influx of arms and other materiel—especially relatively sophisticated equipment like MI-24s and radars—has deepened the Sandinistas' dependence on Cuban, Soviet, and other foreign military advisers and technicians. Although their overall number—estimated at 2,500 to 3,500 Cubans (see figure 3 and table 3) and probably about 200 others—did not change significantly last year, these experts are intimately involved in keeping the Sandinista military establishment functioning (see table 4 and figure 4):

— The Soviets and Cubans have helped Managua assemble and test-fly the recently delivered

Figure 3
Nicaragua: Cuban Presence, 1979-85



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Table 3
Cuban Military and Civilian Personnel
Estimated To Be in Nicaragua, January 1985

Military and security personnel	
General Staff (including 120-man VIP security company)	600-900
High command reserve	120-200
Military zones	20-25
Military regions	80-100
Operating brigades (15)	80-125
Active battalions (70-80)	700-900
Inactive battalions (50)	60-100
Air Force and air defense	100-200
Navy	40-50
Ministry of Interior and special troops	700-900
Total military and security (rounded)	2,500-3,500
Civilian personnel	
Construction workers	2,000
Government advisers	1,000-1,500
Medical personnel	300
Teachers	0*
Total civilian (rounded)	3,500-4,000
Total of all Cubans (rounded)	6,000-7,500

* About 1,500 Cuban civilian teachers stationed in Nicaragua returned home as part of their annual rotation in November 1984. It is still unclear whether they will return to Nicaragua for the 1985 school year. If they do, the estimate of the total Cuban presence would rise to 7,500-9,000.

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
Table 4
Military/Security Personnel From Communist or Radical Regimes Estimated To Be in Nicaragua, 1 March 1985

Supplier	Number	Function
Total	2,665-3,750	
Communist states	2,625-3,670	
USSR	50-75	Advisers with the general staff, other advisers, helicopter technicians
Eastern Europe*	60-80	Security/intelligence technicians
Cuba	2,500-3,500	See table 3
North Korea	15	Weapons instructors
Radicals	40-80	
Libya	25-50	Pilot instructors
PLO	15-30	Pilots

* Primarily East Germans.

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Figure 4
Nicaragua: Foreign Military/Security
Advisers, 1 March 1985



^a Minimum.

^b Midpoint of 2,500-3,500 range.

^c East Germans and possibly a few Bulgarians.

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MI-24 helicopters, and Cuban pilots have flown MI-8 helicopters in combat support missions.

— Cubans train the Sandinista Army and paramilitary personnel at basic and advanced levels at numerous installations. About a dozen Cuban instructors with combat experience in Angola, for example, were assigned to an irregular battalion training camp in central Nicaragua last September to teach tactics, politics, and engineering.

— They probably are instrumental in maintaining the four Nicaraguan radar sites.

— They are closely involved in the collection and analysis of signals intelligence.

— They also participate in actual combat operations.

Such advisers are present in Sandinista counterinsurgency battalions down to the company level, and 50 Cubans reportedly were killed in combat last

year

16. The Soviets, who thus far have maintained a low profile in Nicaragua, are estimated to have a military presence of about 50 to 75 men. Soviet advisers are assigned to the Nicaraguan General Staff, and Soviet technicians helped assemble the recently delivered MI-8 and probably the MI-24 helicopters. Other Soviets have been sent to areas of insurgent activity, presumably as observers or to evaluate Sandinista field performance.

17. Additional Communist and radical entities have maintained or expanded their military/security presence in Nicaragua in recent months, according to various reports:

— East Germans still probably number 60 to 80 persons. Late last year a group of East German workers was sent to the airfield at Esteli, and earlier other East Germans had been sent to work with the Nicaraguan Military Intelligence Service.

Bulgarians also were reported in northern Nicaragua last October, although their specific responsibilities are unknown.

— North Korean weapons instructors, probably about 15 in number, arrived at Corinto in late 1984. North Koreans have been reported sporadically in Nicaragua since late 1982.

— Some 25 to 50 Libyan military personnel currently are estimated to be in Nicaragua.

One group of Libyan instructors is stationed at the Montelimar airbase. Libyans, associated mainly with the Sandinista Air Force, have been reported in Nicaragua since 1982.

— Some 15 to 30 PLO pilots were in Nicaragua as of last December.

18. We estimate that several hundred Nicaraguan trainees are currently receiving a wide variety of military training overseas. Most are probably in Cuba, receiving pilot training or instruction on ground and air defense weapons and taking security/intelligence courses, according to various sources. Others are receiving training on naval craft and weapons, including a possible shipboard missile system.

Elsewhere, Nicaraguan trainees have been observed in the USSR (pilot and naval training), East Germany (police and communications instruction), Bulgaria (purpose unspecified, but possibly pilot

training), and Libya (at an insurgent training camp).

19. Cuba is providing the bulk of the over 4,000 foreign economic advisers and technicians now estimated to be in Nicaragua (see figure 5). Most of these are government advisers or construction workers (see table 6). Some of the latter, however, have participated on projects such as roads and airfield improvements which have dual military-economic applications. Last year, Havana improved the capability of its civilians in Nicaragua to respond to military contingencies by replacing females and older males with military-age males who had received military training. Many of the estimated 350 Warsaw Pact economic advisers, mainly Soviets and Bulgarians, are assigned to government ministries and supervise construction projects.

20. We estimate that some 6,000 Nicaraguans are abroad (mainly in Cuba) for nonmilitary training for a variety of academic and practical instruction. Many, if not most, of these Nicaraguans probably received a healthy dose of political indoctrination as well.

Military and Commercial Construction

Garrisons and Training Areas

21. The Sandinistas have constructed or improved over 20 major military garrisons and training areas and at least an equal number of smaller ones since 1979 (see annex). Many of the major facilities are built on a Cuban model, with well-organized barracks, vehicle sheds, and exercise facilities. The training areas include a facility at La Paz in central Nicaragua for combined armor and artillery maneuvers.

Airfields


22. The Nicaraguans currently have construction projects under way at four airfields—Punta Huete, Puerto Cabezas, Bluefields, and La Rosita. When completed, all will have runways long enough to permit use by jet aircraft. These facilities will complement the two airfields already capable of providing some accommodations to jet aircraft—Sandino and Montelimar. Punta Huete, which will be the largest military airfield in Central America, has been under

Table 5
Nicaraguan Military Trainees Abroad, 1979-85

Supplier	Estimated Number *	Type of Training	Completion Date
USSR	NA	MI-24 pilot	Unknown
	90	L-39 MIG flight training	Half by February 1983
	35	Naval training	Scheduled mid-1985
	2	Intelligence training	Scheduled mid-1985
Bulgaria	100	MIG pilot training	1982
	NA	Police and security	Unknown
East Germany	10	Police, security training	1986
	10	Unspecified military	Unknown
Poland	40	Fixed-wing, helicopter pilot training	Possibly 1981
Unspecified East European country (most probably Bulgaria)	120	Unspecified military training	Most probably 1981-82
North Korea	NA	Naval training	Unknown
Cuba	At least several hundred	L-39, MIG, transport pilot and maintenance training; armor, artillery, naval, missile training	Beginning in 1980

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Figure 5
Nicaragua: Economic Advisers, 1 March 1985*



* Estimated.
^b Primarily Bulgarians.
^c Midpoint of 3,500-4,000 range.

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Table 6
Civilian Technicians From Communist States in Nicaragua, March 1985

Supplier	Estimated Number	Functions
Total	3,850-4,350	
USSR	150	Agriculture, fishing, communications teaching
Eastern Europe	200	Mining, port development, agriculture
Cuba	3,500-4,000	See table 3

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construction since July 1982. [its main runway, with a length of about 3,050 meters, is complete. Other parts of the airfield necessary for full operational status, such as fuel storage facilities, probably will be completed later this year. Aside from serving as a base for the fighter aircraft the Sandinistas hope to acquire, Punta Huete will be able to accommodate heavy transport aircraft and thus could facilitate the flow of military supplies

to Nicaragua. Cubans have been heavily involved in the construction of Punta Huete—which, according to US State Department reporting, had cost an estimated \$30 million as of last August.

23. The paving of the 490-meter extension to the existing 1,950-meter runway at Puerto Cabezas, the Sandinistas' major base in the northeast, is almost complete. [Like Punta Huete and Sandino, Puerto Cabezas will be able to handle transports and jet fighters. The Sandinistas may install an early warning/ground-controlled-intercept (EW/GCI) radar site there to improve air defense of the airfield.

24. Bluefields, near the port of El Bluff on the Caribbean, is the fifth airfield that could be capable of jet operations in the near future. Paving of the new 2,040-meter runway is half done, and underground fuel tanks have been installed. An EW/GCI site may also be established here to provide coverage of south-eastern Nicaragua.

25. Other airfield projects also are under way, although they are of lower priority than the construction noted above. The runway at La Rosita, in the northeast, has been extended to 2,000 meters and, [eventually may be almost 3,050 meters long. The airfield at Esteli, headquarters of the 1st Military Region, has been lengthened to 1,430 meters. One of Nicaragua's four permanent EW/GCI sites is located near Esteli.

Port Improvements

26. The Sandinistas' major port construction project is on the east coast at El Bluff, where a \$125 million effort is under way with Bulgarian and, to a lesser extent, Soviet and Dutch assistance. When the port is finished, possibly by 1987, vessels up to 35,000 dead-weight tons will be able to upload their cargo directly, eliminating the lightering method now being used. Although the project has been plagued by slowdowns, the arrival of dredging equipment last September could signal the onset of construction of a proposed new wharf and breakwater. Only superficial improvements are under way or contemplated at the other four major Nicaraguan ports (Corinto, Puerto Sandino, Puerto Cabezas, and San Juan del Sur). Of these, only Corinto on the Pacific has deepwater berths for large merchant ships at quayside and continues to be the major port facility. At all other ports, cargo must be transported by lighters or barges to the docks.

Roads and Railroads

27. There are two major transportation projects currently under way in Nicaragua. Both are contracted to the Cuban Ministry of Construction. A road has been built to link the city of Matagalpa in central Nicaragua with the northeastern port town of Puerto Cabezas. Improvements are continuing on bridges and sections subject to erosion during the rainy season.

28. The second project is a wide gauge railroad to connect Corinto, on the Pacific, with Managua and, eventually, El Bluff. The railbed of an old, 22-kilometer narrow gauge rail line linking Corinto to Chinandega has been graded and widened and trestle construction begun. A causeway across the Paso Caballos Estuary, about 8 kilometers north of Corinto, is three-fourths complete. The Corinto-Chinandega section of the railroad should be operational in 1985, and will aid significantly in clearing the port. Other sections of the rail line in western and central Nicaragua can be constructed at a rapid pace because of favorable construction conditions.

Radar and COMINT Sites

29. Nicaragua now has four EW/GCI sites. Those at Esteli, Masaya, and Toro Blanco became operational in 1984. More recently a fourth site was added near San Juan del Sur on the southeastern coast. These sites

protect key strategic targets in western Nicaragua.

30. The Sandinistas, aided by Cuban and possibly Soviet advisers, have established four high-frequency/direction-finding (HF/DF) sites in Nicaragua


All four locations use the Soviet-made HF/DF equipment.

Foreign Economic Support

31. During 1984, increased Communist funding partially offset lower disbursement of nonmilitary loans and grants from Latin American, West European, and multinational sources. We estimate that this kept net foreign financial flows roughly in the \$500 million to \$600 million per year range (see figure 6):

- Mexico, the multilateral banks, and Western Europe sharply reduced funding because of Sandinista failure to meet debt obligations.

Figure 6
Nicaragua: Net New Foreign Financing*



* Excludes military grants and loans.

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- Communist countries hiked financial support by about 40 percent. The increase was largely in the form of new oil credits.

- Other donors—most important Libya, Algeria, and Iran—kept financing flows at earlier levels of some \$100 million per year. This includes the value of petroleum made available to the Sandinistas for resale as well as preferential purchases of Nicaraguan commodities.

32. Over the past five years, Communist and radical countries have extended a total of about \$1.3 billion in economic credits and grants to Nicaragua, although thus far not all has been dispersed. These include:

- A \$148 million East German credit for agricultural equipment and commodities.

- A \$74 million Soviet trade credit for vehicles, a communications facility, and schools.
- A \$40 million credit from Bulgaria for the El Bluff project, port development at Bluefields, and other projects.
- About \$190 million in Cuban grants for Puerto Cabezas, road and railroad improvements, and the showcase Timal sugar refinery, which was dedicated in January 1985. (See figure 7.)


33. The USSR also has been instrumental in meeting Nicaragua's oil needs, making up for a cutback in Mexican deliveries. Petroleum deliveries by the USSR averaged about 6,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1984, as compared with less than 1,000 b/d the previous year. To ease the high cost of shipping oil from the Soviet Union, Moscow has tried to strike swap deals with Mexico, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Moscow has also signed an agreement to construct a pipeline between Managua and Puerto Sandino, the main Nicaraguan oil import terminal.

Regional Implications

34. The escalation of foreign military and economic support has aided Sandinista consolidation, and it has enabled the regime to develop and equip the largest armed force in Central America. The active-duty strength of the Sandinista armed forces is some 65,000 men, and, if all reserve and militia units are fully mobilized, total strength would be 120,000. Furthermore, the inventory of major combat equipment in its ground and air defense forces is unmatched in the region (see figure 8). Its naval and air forces are relatively weak by comparison. The Navy has been growing rapidly in the last year or so, however, and the Air Force would be greatly strengthened should Managua eventually obtain jet fighter aircraft.

35. The most immediate threat posed to Nicaragua's neighbors by its military buildup is the Sandinista capability to support leftist insurgent groups behind a strong conventional shield. Nevertheless, Nicaragua's growing offensive capabilities also represent a potential threat to its immediate neighbors. Although there is little likelihood of a concerted Nicaraguan attack on its neighbors given the fear of a US response, the buildup has important psychological implications for regional relations. Furthermore, the Sandinistas may be tempted to escalate their attacks against Contra bases inside Honduras, possibly with helicopter gunships. Managua may feel that Honduras would be

Figure 7
Nicaragua: Estimated Economic Extensions From Communist and Radical Countries, 1979-84



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
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unable to protest such an attack effectively without acknowledging the sizable insurgent presence on its soil.

36. The recent Sandinista offer to send home 100 Cuban military advisers and declare an indefinite moratorium on the acquisition of new weapon systems, including fighter aircraft, is consistent with Nicaragua's negotiating tactics. The greatly accelerated military buildup of the last year probably is causing the Sandinistas some difficulty in absorbing the new weaponry, and a pause in deliveries will give them some breathing room. Furthermore, the token Cuban withdrawal will have little effect on their capabilities, and the Soviets have so far refused to supply MIG-21s because of concern about a US response.

37. Thus a halt in new weapons deliveries probably will cost the Sandinistas little in the near term. In the longer run, Managua may believe that, should the peace process show little progress, it will have a good excuse to resume deliveries of new weapons.

Figure 8
Central America: Comparison of Selected
Major Weapons Inventories, 1 March 1985




* Includes antitank guns.
^b Fighters and trainers.

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ANNEX

Status of Military Construction and Facilities Improvements at Selected Sites

Ports and Naval Facilities

Corinto Pacific coast arms transshipment point. Ten buildings under construction at nearby naval facility. Corinto area defended by three antiaircraft sites.

El Bluff Arms transshipment point on Caribbean coast. Expanded port facilities under construction. Harbor dredging beginning.

Rama Arms transfer point on Rio Escondido. Additional warehouse constructed.

Puerto Sandino Major POL delivery point. Pipeline runs from port area to refinery in Managua. Defensive walls under construction around oil storage tanks at nearby Punta Tiscuco power plant. No improvements to port facilities. Two antiaircraft sites in area.

San Juan del Sur Small commercial port. No improvements to port facilities.

Airfields

Sandino Dispersal area and POL storage facility with capacity of approximately 1,000 cubic meters added to Air Force section of airfield. Defended by three antiaircraft sites.

Punta Huete Paving complete on runway (approximately 3,000 meters long) and taxiway. Four groups of four revetments each under construction. Support facilities not yet constructed. Defended by three antiaircraft sites.

Puerto Cabezas Construction of 645-meter extension to existing 1,800-meter runway begun in early 1981. Drainage culvert across extension complete. Final grading and asphaltting of extension should begin in near future. POL storage facility with approximate capacity of 900 cubic meters completed. Defended by one antiaircraft site.

Bluefields New 2,033-meter runway under construction since mid-1979. POL storage facility with approximate capacity of 300 cubic meters completed.

Esteli Runway extended from 870 to 1,440 meters in late 1984. POL storage facility with capacity of approximately 700 cubic meters under construction near airfield. Defended by one antiaircraft site.

Montelimar Parking apron expanded. POL storage facility with capacity of approximately 900 cubic meters completed.

La Rosita Two-thousand-meter runway under construction since early 1982. No support facilities or defenses have been added.

Major Military Garrisons and Training Facilities

Military Zone I

Villanueva Barracks Area Completed Cuban-style garrison. Probably houses a mechanized infantry battalion.

La Laguna Armor Deployment Area Completed armor dispersal area 22 kilometers south of Honduran border. Houses one medium tank battalion.

El Regate Military Camp Converted from an estate to a military garrison with Soviet-style training facilities.

La Paz Military Training Facility Converted from a farm to a site for training armor and artillery units.

Military Zone II

German Pomares EPS Hq Former National Guard headquarters in Managua. Now headquarters for Sandinista People's Army (EPS).

La Quebradita Military Barracks Completed Cuban-style garrison in Managua. Houses armor brigade headquarters and two tank battalions.

Cuajachillo Military Barracks Completed Cuban-style garrison in Managua. Houses one artillery brigade equipped with heavy artillery, armored personnel carriers, and multiple rocket launchers.

El Tempisque Military Barracks Completed Cuban-style garrison northwest of Managua. Houses one medium tank battalion and serves as transient storage for newly delivered military equipment.

Jiloa Special Troop School Completed facility serving as special-purpose training site.

San Isidro Training Facility Partially completed facility houses one engineering battalion.

Managua Army Barracks El Canton Facility under construction in eastern Managua.

Diriamba Military Barracks Former National Guard garrison converted to EPS facility. Probably serves as headquarters for fourth militia region.

Oscar Turcios Military Facility Recently completed Cuban-style garrison. Houses one infantry battalion.

Juigalpa Military Facility Completed Cuban-style garrison. Houses one infantry battalion.

Military Zone III

- Matagalpa Military Facility Completed Cuban-style garrison. Probably houses one mechanized infantry battalion.
- Jinotega Military Barracks Completed facility constructed next to airfield. Probably used as training site for personnel conducting military operations in area. May also provide logistic support; mobile medical unit deployed there in January 1985.
- Ocotal Military Facility Converted facility probably providing support for personnel and equipment conducting operations in the area.
- Condega Military Barracks Completed garrison probably serving as a training site for special forces personnel.

Military Region VII

- Guadalupe Moreno Barracks Former militia school probably providing support to personnel and equipment operating in area.
- Puerto Cabezas Military Camp Former National Guard facility converted to EPS garrison. Two vehicle sheds constructed. Adjacent to Puerto Cabezas airfield.
- La Tronquera Military Barracks Completed facility probably housing one infantry battalion. Constructed adjacent to airfield.
- Military Hospitals
- Managua EPS Mobile Medical Hq [Field hospital established in Managua in early 1985.]
- Chinandega Medical Facility Soviet mobile field hospital established in 1982. Staffed by Soviet personnel. Construction of additional permanent buildings in progress.
- Radar Sites
- Masaya Constructed in late 1983. One Bar Lock and one Odd Pair currently present.
- Toro Blanco Constructed in mid-1984. One Bar Lock and one Spoon Rest currently present.
- Esteli Constructed in mid-1984. One Bar Lock, one Odd Pair, and one Flat Face currently present.
- El Polvon Constructed in late 1984. Sheet Bend coastal surveillance radar and Square Head IFF radar present.
- Los Mercados Constructed in early 1985. One Flat Face, one Bar Lock, and one Thin Skin currently present.

COMINT Sites

- Santa Maria Constructed in late 1982. Full House set present.

Puerto Cabezas	Constructed in mid-1983. Two Full House sets present.
San Francisco	Constructed in mid-1984. Tall Rods array present.
Santa Rosa	Constructed in late 1984. Full House set present.
POL Storage Facilities	
La Union	Completed storage facility with capacity of approximately 5,500 cubic meters.
Catarina	Storage facility under construction. When complete will have approximate capacity of 4,800 cubic meters. Support facility under construction nearby.
Bajo del Zapote	Storage facility under construction. When complete will have capacity of approximately 1,600 cubic meters.
Tierra Blanca	Construction of possible new crude oil storage facility near Puerto Sandino just beginning.
Lines of Communication	
Puerto Cabezas-Matagalpa Road	All-weather unpaved highway across northeastern Nicaragua essentially complete. Some construction continuing on bridges.
Corinto-Chinandega Railroad	Construction under way on railroad between Corinto and Chinandega. Railroad between Chinandega and Managua in disrepair.

~~The foregoing annex is Secret.~~

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