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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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27 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: David D. Gries  
National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics

SUBJECT: Your Attendance at a Wednesday Meeting of the  
Executive Board of the National Narcotics Border  
Interdiction System (NNBIS)

1. Normally, DDCI or I attend Executive Board meetings. On this occasion they specifically asked for you. This suggests that the Vice President wants Cabinet officers to hear his request for more support for NNBIS, though the only issue currently on the agenda is a dispute between Customs and others over who has responsibility for aerial surveillance--for interdiction purposes--of US borders. The Vice President backs Customs. Others in attendance will probably include Bud Mullen, administrator of DEA; Judge Webster of the FBI; Attorney General Smith; Customs Commissioner Von Raab; Admiral James S. Gracey, Commandant, US Coast Guard; Secretary Regan; senior officials from DOD and perhaps the services; Admiral Murphy and staff members from the Vice President's Office. The Vice President will chair.

2. The Executive Board manages NNBIS under the direction of the Vice President. The Board meets every few months to hear progress reports from NNBIS regional directors and to receive a pat on the back, push, or kick in the pants from Murphy, as the case may be. Under the Executive Board is a Coordinating Board, which meets irregularly at my level to consider nuts and bolts problems. Although everyone who sits in on Executive Board and Coordinating Board meetings supports the NNBIS concept, some of the agencies, such as DEA, are in fact opposed to it and fight it at the working level. The Intelligence Community has tried to be as supportive as possible without running afoul of the provisions of Executive Order 12333 that prevent direct involvement in active law enforcement cases. At Annex A are memos on past meetings.

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3. The Vice President's Office is not entirely satisfied with the performance of the Intelligence Community. Murphy seems to believe that we hold the key to border interdiction. If only we would analyze all the intelligence properly, we could provide NNBIS with information about ships and planes that are bringing narcotics to our shores. This runs up against CIA's longstanding policy decision to collect and analyze strategic narcotics intelligence, while leaving the tactical field to DEA and other law enforcement organizations. NNBIS needs more tactical intelligence and analysis, but it has only a limited need for our strategic product.

4. Last month Murphy wrote the DDCI a letter asking that CIA second a CIA officer to his office who could act as intelligence coordinator for the NNBIS Centers. In the past CIA has declined on Executive Order grounds to second CIA officers to the individual Centers; in response to this new request for an officer for the Washington staff of NNBIS, the DDCI has asked Fred Hutchinson to make a study of operational and legal problems and recommend a solution to him. Hutchinson is proposing that CIA send Murphy an officer with DDO LA Division experience or DDI OGI/Strategic Narcotics Branch experience. At Annex B is Murphy's letter and a draft of Hutchinson's reply.

5. Several months ago, Murphy's office asked permission to send CIA [redacted] intelligence to the NNBIS Center in Miami--and later to other Centers. Since local law enforcement personnel work in the Centers, not to mention representatives of many national law enforcement organizations, [redacted] CIA were initially reluctant to comply. We feared not only probable loose security arrangements in the Centers, but also the problem of pre-trial discovery in the event a specific piece of intelligence led to an arrest and a trial. However, these problems have been for the most part solved, and CIA information is just now beginning to flow electronically--properly sanitized--to Miami. When [redacted] expands beyond Miami to other Centers, we will probably follow suit.

6. Murphy also asked CIA to provide training to the intelligence components of the six NNBIS Centers. This has been done, but with a somewhat different result than expected. Our training team--two senior annuitants, one from the DDO and one from the DDI--found that there was no audience for training. The Centers received such a small amount of tactical intelligence from the law enforcement community that there was no need to train them up in analytical techniques. Thus the team used its time to study the Centers and write reports on each of them. As I understand it, these have proved valuable to the Vice President's Office. At Annex C are two of these reports.

7. Regarding Executive Order 12333, CIA among members of the Intelligence Community is in a unique position. [redacted]

[redacted] INR, as an arm of the State Department, is not inhibited in its analytical work from trespassing on domestic US terrain. This leaves CIA in a unique position, and as a consequence we have been uniquely careful not to mingle too closely with law enforcement, especially when a particular narcotics case is moving towards arrest or trial. Most of the members of the Executive Board are unaware of this distinction between CIA's situation and the situation of Community members covered by posse comitatus.

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8. Attached as Annex D is a group of charts prepared for my use at a recent narcotics conference in Costa Rica. They attest in impressive fashion to the rapid, sustained growth of the narcotics effort in the Intelligence Community.

9. Annex E is an exchange of letters between you and the Vice President from last summer.



David D. Gries