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THE PROBABLE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF  
THE INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES

Submitted by the  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.*

Concurred in by the  
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

*on 31 August 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

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## THE PROBABLE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate the present situation and likely trends in the interrelationships of the independent African states and the effect of outside influences on the regional politics of the area.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The newly independent African states have not yet developed consistent patterns of relationships among themselves. The problems of political survival and of the maintenance of law and order have kept African leaders from concentrating on their interrelationships. Pan-Africanism, disagreements between "radicals" and "conservative" leaders, and the external influences of the Communist Bloc, the former Metropoles and the US add conflicting and complicating factors to the situation. (Paras. 7-10, 12)


2. Pan-Africanism is a mystical concept, glorifying racial kinship and the African personality and culture. Its chief target is "neo-colonialism," its eventual goal is African unity. No black African leader can afford to reject these concepts and all of them to some degree assert Pan-Africanist ideals. But the more radical leaders, such as Nkrumah and Touré, have found the slogans of Pan-Africanism

especially useful in their efforts to extend their influence and build up their followings. (Paras. 14-17)

3. "Conservative" leaders, such as Balewa, Houphouet-Boigny and Youlou, prefer postponing the issue of political integration. In addition, they wish to gain the material benefits which the maintenance of close ties with the former Metropoles have so far assured them. (Paras. 19-20)

4. Neither the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union nor the *Conseil de l'Entente* is likely to develop into a real federation. Broader groupings such as the Casablanca powers (mainly radical) and the Monrovia group (mainly conservative) have yet to show any basic cohesion. It is possible that the African states may be able to create some functional organs for economic co-operation. It is also possible that some efforts will be initiated to create broad regional machinery to enable African





states to settle their own disputes (Paras. 40-44)

5. On the whole, African regional relationships are likely to remain fluid over the next several years. During this period, we believe opportunism is likely to prove more compelling to African leaders than ideology, and that there will almost certainly be frequent shifts and recombination of coalitions as African leaders vie for power and international status. Nevertheless, we anticipate that Pan-Africanism will gain support, at least as a visionary proposition, and that the militant anticolonialism of the Pan-Africanists will induce more moderate leaders to adopt neutralist foreign policies. (Paras. 37-39, 45)

6. Western European cultural and economic influence in Africa will probably remain at a relatively high level over the next several years, but Africans will increasingly look elsewhere for aid. The US is regarded as an alternate source of foreign assistance, but one which does not fully understand Africa's problems or fully support African aspirations. The Bloc will probably have considerable success in increasing its influence with African states and in promoting neutralist foreign policies, and it will encourage the emergence of additional radical regimes. African leaders will try to play East and West against the other and to extract the maximum amount of aid and assistance from both sides. (Paras. 24-30)

## DISCUSSION

### I. INTRODUCTION


7. The pace of political change in Africa has accelerated rapidly over the past five years. While only seven states were independent in 1956, there are 27 African nations today, and it is anticipated that the number of new units will have increased to at least 35 by 1964.<sup>1</sup> By and large, these states are too young (17 became independent in 1960) and their leaders are too preoccupied with the problems of their own internal political positions to have undertaken any but the most tentative efforts to establish a network of links with each other and with the non-African world. This concern with pressing domestic problems is shared by virtually all the area's leaders and decreases both their interest in and their ability to follow a consistent policy on problems of inter-African relations.

8. While Africa's new states differ widely in economic and political viability, they share

a number of difficulties in common. The withdrawal of Western political controls has produced potentially unstable situations in the emergent states, and the maintenance of law and order is an overwhelming problem in most of these countries. Although European influence has produced modern African political elites, it has not been sufficient in most cases to overcome traditional tribal cleavages and rivalries. Now that the new African elite has come to power, its members find that these divisions still exist and consequently that their base of popular support is too subject to fluctuation and change to reduce these divisions appreciably. There is very little sense of national identity among most Africans in the new states. In addition, Africa's leaders are faced with severe shortages of skilled personnel for all activities. They are desperately in need of civil servants capable of rising above the nepotism and petty corruption which family and clan loyalties impose upon the average African.

9. The independent African states face numerous obstacles in trying to achieve economic de-

<sup>1</sup>See NIE 60/70-61, "Probable Developments in Colonial Africa," dated 11 April 1961, SECRET.



velopment. Rapid population growth, absence of large internal markets, lack of African entrepreneurs and trained personnel, and balance of payments difficulties all impede such development. In addition, more than 85 percent of Africans still reside in rural areas and an overwhelming proportion of these remain rooted in a subsistence economy—even those Africans employed in the modern money economy are able to save only very small sums. As a result, African leaders are confronted with limited tax bases and low revenues at the same time that popular demands for education, and social welfare benefits are mounting. They also find private foreign investment is slow to move in and that the nongovernmental sectors of their national economies are too weak and ill-formed to provide the necessary thrust for economic growth.

10. The range of problems confronting Africa's leaders varies greatly, however, and geographic location is a highly significant factor. Thus, the leaders of coastal West Africa share a number of advantages over their colleagues in the more remote interior. European penetration has been most intense in the coastal areas, and has provided the greatest impetus for socio-political change. Hence, when compared with the interior Sudanic states, the coastal nations have come to independence with relatively more advanced political systems; their governmental leadership has more sophistication and experience; and their economies often have at least the rudimentary infrastructure necessary for advanced development planning. The relative superiority in this respect of states such as Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria—as well as the strategic access to the Atlantic Ocean which they can afford or deny to the interior states<sup>2</sup>—also accords the coastal states a major advantage in their relations with Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, and the Chad. Most moves for unification have come from the coast rather than the interior.

<sup>2</sup> Even within the ocean-facing states themselves the peoples of coastal regions tend to be more advanced and politically conscious than those of the interior.


11. An additional indigenous factor, and perhaps of particular significance, is the existence of large ethnic, tribal, and religious communities sprawling across national boundaries. These communities often have no fixed national loyalties, and sometimes provide the basis for irredentist claims. In addition, they provide a cause for intervention in local affairs by neighboring states. The problem of overlapping ethnic and tribal communities already has assumed serious dimensions in the Horn of Africa (between the Somalis and Ethiopian Amharas), along the Ghana-Togo frontier (over the unification of the divided Ewe tribe), and in Mauritania, where Moroccan annexationist claims extend as far southward as the Senegal River. Comparable difficulties are looming in many other regions which could violently affect the politics of West Africa over at least the next several years. Islam, which is spreading rapidly in Africa, is a significant political factor in some areas. On the whole, it tends to be a divisive rather than a unifying force.

## II. MAJOR FORCES SHAPING POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

12. The initial efforts by the leaders of Africa's new states to define a relationship with one another have thrown into sharp relief some of the primary forces which shape African politics. These involve Pan-Africanism, "radicalism," "conservatism," the personal ambitions of individual leaders, and such external influences as the Communist Bloc, the former Metropoles, and the US.

### Pan-Africanism

13. Pan-African aspirations are neither of recent origin nor entirely African in inspiration. Efforts to unite the divided African peoples and to advance the African colonial areas towards independence were initially inspired by Negro organizations in the US and Western Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. It was only at the 1945 Fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester, England, that Africans began to play a prominent role. Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, and Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya were the



prime movers among the Africans, with the first subsequently appointed to the position of secretary for a West African National Secretariat based in London. When Ghana acquired independence in 1957, Nkrumah quickly tried to establish himself as political herald, chief protagonist, and charismatic leader of contemporary Pan-Africanism. He has been joined since 1957 by Guinea's Sekou Touré and Mali's Modibo Keita who, after breaking with France, have set themselves up as leading exponents of anticolonialism and Pan-Africanism.

14. Pan-Africanism has some resemblances to the idea of Arab unity. It is a mystical concept which has strong emotional appeal, but little in the way of a concrete program. Based on Negro racial kinship and a feeling that Africans have been undeservedly humiliated and scorned, it glorifies the African personality and culture. It holds that all Africans are brothers and that only through eventual unity can Africans play the role to which they are entitled in the world. No black African leader can afford to reject these concepts and all of them to some degree assert Pan-Africanist ideals. But the more radical leaders have found the slogans of Pan-Africanism especially useful in their efforts to extend their influence and build up their followings.

15. Aside from their professed desire for forming larger political units and enhancing the status of Africa in international affairs, the Pan-Africanists—until recently—have had no precise doctrinal position. However, the Congo crisis, the continuing Algerian conflict, French atomic tests in the Sahara, and growing Communist Bloc competition with the West in Africa, have broadened the geographic area envisaged by Pan-Africanism to include Arab North Africa and fostered a clearer definition of Pan-Africanist goals.


16. These goals frequently are couched in rather negative terms—e.g., to eliminate what the Africans refer to as Western neo-colonial influence. Such influence is reflected in a client relationship, according to Nkrumah, in which the metropolitan power grants the outward attributes of independence to African

territories but retains effective controls through "nonpolitical devices." The inability of Congolese factions to agree and the resulting threat of fragmentation in the Congo are explained away on this basis, as is the refusal of conservative African leaders to devote themselves wholeheartedly to Pan-Africanist goals. In order to combat the threat of further Balkanization and ultimate recolonization of Africa, the Pan-Africanists urge that each nation diversify its sources of foreign aid, adopt "positive neutralism," eliminate Western military bases on African soil, and remove African spokesmen who are alleged to be pawns of the West.

17. Pan-African doctrines are affected by the personal ambitions and schemes for aggrandizement of individual leaders. Thus, Nkrumah's interests and ambitions seem truly continental in scope and he appears committed to the idea of a political union which he would dominate. For the present at least, Touré and Keita center their ambitions on French-speaking West Africa and seem less attracted to Ghanaian schemes for political merger. Morocco's conservative leadership supports Pan-African goals primarily because it is trying to outmaneuver a radical internal opposition. The UAR is less concerned with ideology at home or Pan-Africanist doctrine abroad than it is with the opportunities offered by Pan-Africanism for enhancing the UAR's own power, prestige, and security.

#### "Radicalism"

18. The most aggressive Pan-Africanists are usually radicals, although this term, like most other African political labels, is often easier to use than to define. African radicals such as Nkrumah, Touré, and Keita tend to be more strenuous in trying to impose authoritarian discipline and revolutionary zeal. For them, freedom requires the elimination of all special ties to the West as the only guarantee against "neo-colonialism." They appear to be somewhat more willing than the "conservatives" to follow Communist models and to establish close relations with Communist states. The radicals feel that their position will not be secure unless all African leaders share their views and follow their policies.



### "Conservatism"

19. African conservatism is an equally elusive and tenuous term, and its adherents are even more varied than the radicals. Some are conservatives in the old fashioned sense, but many of them are in their own ways socialists and reformers. Their essential difference with the radicals is one of temperament. They are less doctrinaire and more pragmatic, inclined to build on the past rather than break violently with it.

20. While most conservatives cannot openly oppose proposals for mutual agreement and regional solidarity, they prefer to emphasize the establishment of "fraternal" ties based upon economic and cultural cooperation, leaving until later consideration the issue of political integration. In addition, leaders of the French-speaking conservative states—Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Youlou of the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) and Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic—prefer the material benefits which close ties with the former Metropoles have so far assured to the uncertain rewards of positive neutralism. The leaders of Nigeria and Sierra Leone are equally interested in maintaining some connections with the UK although their economic ties are looser. At the heart of the disagreements which exist between the radicals and the conservatives, however, are differences in personality and political style, as well as jealousies fostered by conflicting aspirations.

### Personal Rivalries

21. The mixed backgrounds, sources of strength, and divergent goals of Africa's leaders help to explain the tangled relationships which exist among them. Varied in levels of Western education, intelligence, and political sophistication, the bulk of Africa's leaders are still affected by tribal loyalties and animistic religious beliefs. Many are volatile and flamboyant; some are given to exaggerated political postures and styles which are somewhat confusing to Westerners. On the whole, they are strong individualists and are present or potential rivals, however ardent they may be in their professions of Pan-Africanism.

22. Until recently a few West African leaders had wide power and influence outside their small territories. Houphouët-Boigny, as head of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), wielded considerable political power in most of the former French West African territories, as well as several Equatorial African areas, until 1960. Similarly, Touré, both as leader of RDA and French Africa's once dominant labor federation—*Union Générale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique Noir*—proved a powerful and influential figure. In the former British areas, Nkrumah of Ghana and Azikiwe of Eastern Nigeria have commanded prestige and political power which far exceeds their small territorial domains.

23. At the opposite end of the spectrum have been Olympio of Togo, Yameogo of Upper Volta, and Diori of Niger, who are less leaders of meaningful national entities than spokesmen for powerful tribal or ethnic groups. Once willing to follow the lead of their more ambitious and powerful African colleagues, these leaders are no longer willing to accept the dictates of Houphouët-Boigny, Nkrumah, Touré, and others. They see in personal independence a greater opportunity to consolidate their own position at home, to command broader respect in international councils, and to acquire more substantial technical and other assistance abroad. As a result, the attraction which three or four African statesmen once had for their lesser fellows is fading, and African regional politics is taking on the characteristics of a formless political society in which personal relationships are fluid and subject to frequent change.

### External Influences

24. The ending of the colonial period has not only removed some of the restraints upon conflict and dissension among emerging African states, but has also permitted new pressures by external forces to build up within the continent. This is in part a natural concomitant of the fissures and wrangling which are becoming apparent among Africans, since their disagreements are bound to attract Cold War competition. Moreover, in spite of protestations to the contrary, African leaders often

invite outside involvement by increasingly seeking the aid of non-African powers to support their own positions in the continent.

#### A. Western European Influence

25. The UK and France, despite their relinquishment of controls in much of Africa, continue to maintain a significant presence through their treaty rights, their economic and financial interests, expatriate civil servants, and teachers. In most instances, the new states also remain linked with the sterling and franc zones, are heavily dependent upon the erstwhile Metropoles for continuing economic and technical assistance and markets, and look to Western Europe for arms and other aid. Nevertheless, the West is burdened by a number of liabilities in its relations with the Africans. The memory of the harsher aspects of Western colonial rule is too fresh to be easily erased, and even where there were few real grievances it is convenient to blame the former occupying powers for any deficiencies which may now exist. Moreover, colonial and racial issues in North Africa, the Portuguese areas, East and Central Africa, and the Republic of South Africa are likely to be major impediments to cooperation during the period of this estimate. Even conservative Africans are nagged by the fear that too heavy a reliance upon the former Metropoles could result in a revival of Western imperialism or, at a minimum, impotence in international councils.

26. We believe that Western European cultural and economic influence in Africa will remain at a relatively high level over the next several years, but that Africans increasingly will attempt to limit their dependence by looking elsewhere for aid and markets. The West European nations, nevertheless, will be under mounting pressure from conservative Africans to extend arms and other military support against the machinations of the more radical leaders

#### B. Communist Bloc Penetration

27. Communist Bloc influence in Africa has grown from negligible levels in 1958-1959 to substantial proportions today. The Bloc has made serious inroads with diplomatic missions, arms aid, and economic assistance in Guinea, Mali, and Ghana, and an important start has been made in Morocco and Ethiopia. The Bloc has recently offered aid to Tunisia, the Sudan, and the Somali Republic, and is attempting to rebuild its position in the Congo. In addition, growing numbers of students, technicians, and economic specialists are enrolled in Bloc schools. While these ties may be regarded as part of Africa's period of post-independence reorientation and adjustment, we believe that the Soviet Union regards the continent as particularly vulnerable and feels that the Bloc has the potential to alienate Africa from the West.

28. The Communists probably will enjoy a number of advantages in their competition with the West. In addition to exploiting the colonial and racial tensions and disturbances in the southern quarter of the continent, the Bloc: (a) retains greater ability to identify itself with African socialists, who are deeply committed to governmental direction of the economy; and (b) is willing to provide arms and other aid to radical African leaders. Its greatest advantage, however, will be that it shares with most African leaders the objective of curtailing Western influence in Africa. While we believe that the Bloc sees its greatest opportunities in the radical leaders and movements in Africa, it will establish economic and political relations with conservative states as well. Over the next two or three years, the Bloc will probably have considerable success in increasing its influence with African states and in promoting neutralist foreign policies, even in countries now aligned with the West. Because the Communist movement in Africa

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is in an embryonic stage, and the African leaders have aspirations that are in the long run incompatible with Communist goals, we do not envisage the establishment of a full-fledged Communist regime in Africa in the period of this estimate. However, we do not rule out the possible emergence of additional radical national regimes in Africa which, because of their anti-Western outlook, would have close affinities with the Communist Bloc.

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*D. Peripheral Complicating Influences*

31. Frequent conferences and official state visits have produced a growing realization by African leaders that they share a number of interests in common. States such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Ethiopia, which considered themselves as culturally distinct from black Africa 10 years ago, now seek a major role amongst the expanding group of African nations. However, this expansion of Pan-Africanism from its originally narrow racial base to a broader geographical framework has further complicated the task of establishing a balanced network of international relationships among the new African nations. For example, closer relations with North Africa and the Horn have involved black Africans in such unwanted disputes as the Ethiopian-Somali boundary question, Morocco's territorial claims in the Western Sahara, and, to some extent, even the Algerian question.

32. While the many divisions among the tropical African states theoretically should enhance the tactical and bargaining position of the North at Pan-African gatherings, these divisions are paralleled by comparable cleavages among the North Africans themselves. As a result, the latter often have split at conferences, with Morocco and the UAR aligning themselves with the more radical leaders, and Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia joining the so-called conservatives. Further complicating efforts at unity are the aspirations of the UAR's Nasser and Morocco's Hassan II for a preferential position among Africa's leaders—ambitions which are greatly resented by black Africa's militant nationalists and conservatives alike.

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33. Over the next several years, Nasser in particular is likely to seek an even greater role for himself in Africa through: (a) the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and related organs; (b) subsidization of exiled colonial African nationalist groups; and (c) diplomatic and arms support for extremist parties in states controlled by conservative pro-Western leaders. We believe, however, that Nasser's intervention in such a manner will irritate not only conservative African leaders but even radicals such as Nkrumah and Touré, who are themselves anxious to become the rallying points for political militants in black Africa. However, it is likely that Nasser can continue to work with the African radicals on specific issues.

### III. INTERVENTION AND SUBVERSION

34. The intervention of African leaders in the affairs of neighboring areas is not a new phenomenon induced by the Congo crisis. The breakdown of authority and resultant strife in the Congo have merely accentuated a political process which has been endemic to black Africa since World War II. Particularly in French-speaking tropical Africa, political parties often were transterritorial prior to independence. This pattern was accepted as normal since, until the past several years, indigenous leaders in former French West and Equatorial Africa were uncertain whether their territories would come to independence as separate entities or as members of a broad federation. Since independence, however, attempts to export influence abroad in the form of international political organizations such as the erstwhile Mali Federation's *Parti de la Fédération Africaine*, which sought to establish branches in several adjoining African states, foundered on the resistance of local leaders who themselves were developing authoritarian one-party regimes. Nevertheless, Houphouët-Boigny continues to wield considerable influence in Dahomey and Niger and probably is capable of making and unseating leaders in these two states.

35. The frailty and internal divisions of most of the new African states makes intervention in their affairs by neighboring leaders thirst-


ing for broader influence extremely tempting. Disturbed by their failure to attract larger scale support for their Pan-Africanist goals, and the clustering of a conservative constellation of African states in opposition to them, radical leaders are likely to recoup by seeking to unseat some of their more vulnerable neighbors. The game of intervention can be played by conservatives as well as radical leaders, as has been demonstrated by Youlou, who involved himself in the neighboring Congo crisis as well as in the nationalist uprising in Angola and Cabinda. Nevertheless, we believe that over the next several years the most provocative attempts at meddling and subversion will emanate from the UAR, Guinea, Ghana, and possibly Mali.

36. The emergence of a new generation of African youths over the next several years is likely to enhance the opportunities available to radical leaders to topple their conservative rivals. Largely university-educated or the products of labor union training, these youths are attracted to Pan-African ideals, and are impatient with the lack of dynamic leadership in their nations. However, while willing to accept assistance from Africa's radicals against local conservative leaders, we believe that most of this new generation will prove equally cautious in surrendering power and prestige once they gain control of their national governments.

### IV. SIGNIFICANT PATTERNS AND TRENDS

#### Federations and Alliances

37. Despite sporadic efforts on the part of African leaders to fashion federal links in 1959-1960, they have failed to find the necessary formula to reduce the petty jealousies and hydra-headed rivalries which thus far have thwarted all attempts at political union. For example, efforts to form a Union of Central African Republics out of the four former French Equatorial African territories of Gabon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and the Central African Republic foundered in 1960 over the refusal of the wealthiest partner, Gabon, to make any substantial contribution to the proposed federal treasury. Similarly, the Mali Federation, which was planned as a



grouping of Senegal, the Soudan (now Mali), Upper Volta, and Niger, suffered the early defection of the latter two states when Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast gave them financial inducements. The uneasy union between Senegal and Soudan broke up in August 1960 when the Soudanese leaders attempted to secure greater control by turning the federal arrangement into a unitary system, a power grab which was strongly resisted by Senegal's Leopold Senghor.

38. While proposals are frequently made for the formation of regional federations in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) and in British East Africa once the states in these areas all acquire independence, the chances for their early implementation are considerably less than even. As was the case in the Union of Central African Republics and the Mali Federation, once independence is attained most African leaders are reluctant to sacrifice their own political power in order to achieve political union. Close ties also are impeded by basic differences in political philosophy, outlook, and aspiration on the part of most leaders, as well as the type of domestic opposition confronting them. Thus, the Arab ruling minority of Zanzibar would think twice about submerging itself in an East African federation dominated by mainland black Africans. Similarly, political consensus among North Africans is likely to be retarded by disagreements over issues such as the future roles of political parties and monarchical institutions, control of the Sahara, and so forth.

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[ Some already find that by refusing to commit themselves to any one neighbor they have a greater potential for: (a) playing off neighbors competing for their loyalty; (b) gaining material and financial advantages from the resulting competition; and (c) reducing the risk of political absorption. After the collapse of the Mali Federation, for example, the Soudan (which became the Re-


public of Mali) found that it could establish alternative (though inferior) access routes to the sea via Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and even Ghana, all of whose leaders have proved anxious to urge their financial and other favors upon Mali in exchange for some expression of loyalty. Yameogo of Upper Volta has taken the Mali example to heart and apparently is now prepared to cut back his dependence upon the Ivory Coast by developing complementary economic and other ties with Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The resultant impact of such maneuvers upon African regional relations, however, is to accentuate the already prevailing impression of extreme fluidity and instability, with alliances crumbling as new issues and opportunities for personal aggrandizement arise.

#### General Groupings and Coalitions

40. Thus far, only two very loose groupings of states, sometimes called the Casablanca powers and the Monrovia group, have emerged from this welter of confusion. The Casablanca powers—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR—claim that they have a common interest in Pan-African political unification and the need to eliminate colonialist influence. In pursuing these objectives, they have shown a tendency to cooperate with the Communist Bloc. The considerable number of African states which fall into the so-called Monrovia group,\* form a loose coalition which is primarily concerned with social and economic cooperation. By and large aligned with the West, the Monrovia group tends to be more relaxed on such issues as Balkanization, colonialist threats to the newly independent states, and the maintenance of heavy reliance upon the former Metropoles for economic aid.

41. Two coalitions are at the core of these groupings—the *Conseil de l'Entente* for the Monrovia conferees and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union for the Casablanca powers. Con-

\*The participants in the May 1961 Monrovia Conference included: Liberia; all French speaking African states south of the Sahara, with the exception of Mali and Guinea; Nigeria; Sierra Leone; the Sudan; Ethiopia; the Somali Republic; Tunisia; and Libya. The Monrovia meeting has been only the latest in a growing series of African conferences.



sisting of the Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey and Upper Volta, the *Entente* is a consultative body inspired and subsidized by Houphouët-Boigny which has no institutional framework beyond the periodic meetings of its members' Presidents and Chief Ministers. While the vigor and cohesiveness of this grouping initially was almost entirely dependent upon the strength of personality and financial assets of Houphouët-Boigny—together with the backing he could command in the French Government—he appears to be declining in vigor as a result of ill health and probably will not be able to hold the *Entente* together for more than three or four years. Indeed, Zameogo has repeatedly threatened to lead Upper Volta out of the *Entente*.

42. We also believe the chances are considerably less than even that the leaders of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union will fashion a federation out of their present loose arrangement. They are hampered by significant differences of language and culture. They will probably be unable to resist the centrifugal forces typical of African regional politics. Largely the product of Nkrumah's financial subventions, the Union has failed to take on any real substance and is essentially an alliance which reflects common views on some foreign policy issues. The leaders of both Mali and Guinea have resisted Nkrumah's proddings to strengthen their ties through the creation of a joint Parliament and the issuance of a common currency. In many respects, Nkrumah clearly attributes more substance to the Union as a nucleus for Pan-African unity than do the leaders of either Guinea or Mali, who continue to manifest considerable interest in resurrecting some of their former connections with neighboring French-speaking nations.

43. Despite their failure to register any significant advances in creating political unions or federations, the African states are making some gains in forming regional institutions for mutual cooperation. Twelve states from former French tropical Africa already are in process of negotiating agreements for what is to be called the Union of African States and

Malagasy (UAW), for which a specialized agency, the Organization for Afro-Malagasy Economic Cooperation (OAMEC), has already been created. These agreements are supposed to cover foreign policy coordination, customs and tariffs, mutual defense, and cultural institutions. A common air carrier, *Air Afrique*, already has been established. The broader grouping of French and English speaking states which subsequently convened at Monrovia in May 1961 agreed to work out details for cooperation in similar fields, at the same time creating a representative commission for attachment to the OAMEC.

44. African leaders are cognizant of the dangers of other Congos and the likelihood of serious disputes erupting in their midst which could lead to armed clashes and intervention in one another's affairs. They feel the need to bolster existing internal security forces. They also hope to establish regional institutions for international conciliation and arbitration, as well as initiate defense and other arrangements patterned possibly along the lines of the Organization of American States. The main problem is likely to be whether this awareness of common interests can span the present cleavage between radicals and conservatives and overshadow the personal rivalry of leaders.

## V. GENERAL OUTLOOK

45. We believe that efforts to foster Pan-African unity will continue to find expression in numerous conferences and meetings among black African leaders. However, we do not expect many concrete achievements to emerge from these conclaves, at least over the next three or four years. Schemes for functional organization probably have the best prospects for success. In general, African leaders probably will remain as divided as at present, and intervention, subversion, and irredentism will characterize regional relationships. During this period, we believe outside involvement in African disagreements will grow and further accentuate the differences already existing between Africans.

