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ANNEX I: The Cuban-Soviet Presence in Africa*

1. The current Cuban-Soviet involvement in Africa is a divisive issue on the continent. Several countries such as Chad, Gabon, and the Ivory Coast strongly oppose any African appeal for Soviet military assistance and view the Cubans as a tool of Moscow without their own separate goals and objectives. Ethiopia and Angola, on the other hand, will continue to be militarily dependent on Soviet assistance and Cuban troops, and in return are prepared to offer access, to air and naval facilities, as well as diplomatic and political backing for Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa which do not adversely affect their national interests. The majority of African nations probably subscribe to the Nigerian view that Moscow's presence in Africa introduces the risk of Soviet-American confrontation on the continent, but that the risk is acceptable as long as the Soviet presence is not too large and is perceived to be on the side of the "progressive" forces in Angola, Ethiopia, Namibia, and South Africa.

2. There are 16,000 to 17,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia. The vast majority of these are combat troops; the remainder are support personnel, advisers, and medical personnel. A Cuban economic delegation has recently arrived in Ethiopia and is probably laying the groundwork for a large-scale economic assistance program similar to the one being carried out in Angola.

3. The Soviets now have 1,200 military advisers and technicians in Ethiopia who are responsible for directing logistics, communications, and the maintenance of most Soviet-supplied equipment. This equipment includes more than \$500 million in modern heavy weapons such as T-54 and T-55 tanks, MIG-21s, MIG-23s, SA-2s, and SA-3s. Outstanding orders are valued at \$300 million, which assures a moderate to heavy volume of deliveries for the next year or so even if no new agreements are signed. The Soviets are also expanding and modernizing Ethiopian facilities and are developing a naval

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facility of their own north of Assab. A floating dry dock that was previously located at Berbera and Aden is now in Ethiopian waters for Moscow's use.

4. Ethiopia's military dependence on the USSR and Cuba gives the Soviets and the Cubans considerable leverage in Addis Ababa, but their influence falls short of political control. Chairman Mengistu and most of his governing colleagues are nationalists and unwilling to compromise Ethiopia's sovereignty. They have shown a willingness to reject Soviet or Cuban policy that runs counter to Ethiopia's national interest and are particularly determined to maintain control of Ethiopia's domestic affairs. The Cuban ambassador reportedly was ousted recently largely because of a Cuban effort to rehabilitate a Marxist-Leninist group at odds with the government. A Soviet effort to get Mengistu to move faster in the creation of a "vanguard" communist party has not succeeded.

5. CIA estimates that there are now about 19,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola; recent reporting suggests that this number may soon increase somewhat. In addition, there are 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers in Angola with another 5,000--mostly teachers and construction workers--expected to arrive by the end of the year.

6. At least 600 Cubans serve as advisers in the various government ministries. They are most numerous in the Ministries of Construction and Housing, followed by Defense, Education, Health, Finance, Transport, and Foreign Trade. About 600 are said to work as mechanics and drivers and another 600 as technicians in the construction industry. There are at least 500 medical personnel, 100 agricultural specialists, and over 1,000 teachers. Cubans also have been involved in training ZAPU, SWAPO, and Katangan forces inside Angola.

7. The Cubans are said virtually to run some government ministries. They have filled much of the vacuum left by the departure of Portuguese managerial and technical personnel.

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8. The Cubans have also played a critical role in countering the guerrilla threat to the Neto regime. They provide important armor, air, and artillery support for Angolan troops. Sometimes they launch independent operations against the guerrillas. Neto is almost totally dependent on Cuban military assistance to remain in power.

9. There are about 1,000 Soviet military advisers in Angola, which has become Moscow's second largest arms client in sub-Saharan Africa. More than \$500 million in Soviet weapons and related equipment has arrived from the USSR, Cuba, and several East European countries, particularly the GDR, to create an arsenal that includes MIG-21 fighters, MI-8 combat helicopters, and several naval craft. No major new arms agreements have been recorded thus far in 1978, but support and resupply requirements for Angolan and Cuban engagements with UNITA forces should push delivery levels higher. An increased flow of equipment into Luanda is also expected for SWAPO units in Southern Angola and ZAPU forces in Zambia.

10. The Soviets now have access to naval and air facilities in Luanda and may be developing port facilities elsewhere. Several hundred economic personnel hold key positions in most government ministries. Soviets are moving into important financial and commercial positions, and are replacing Cubans in the ministries of transport, fisheries, and trade.

11. A Cuban fishing fleet operates out of Angola, providing Cuba with at least a modest economic return on its Angolan investment.

12. The substantial Cuban--as well as Soviet--involvement in Angola, however, has provoked much popular resentment. While we have seen no signs of major strains in relations among the three governments, popular antipathy toward both Soviets and Cubans is likely to pose an increasingly serious problem.

13. Neto continues to push cautiously for greater Western involvement in Angola, perhaps to balance increased Cuban and Soviet influence in the government and party. Neto wants

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to attract much-needed Western technical expertise and economic assistance, in part to gain a measure of flexibility vis-a-vis Moscow. He has told Westerners on several occasions that the Soviets were involved in last year's coup attempt; presumably he continues to harbor suspicions that Moscow may want to depose him. Nevertheless, Neto currently has no alternative to seeking additional Soviet advisers and Cuban forces given the enormity and immediacy of his problems.

14. Elsewhere in Africa the Cuban presence is as follows:

Algeria: 50 to 55 (about 35 medical personnel, 10 VIP security personnel, and 8 sports instructors)

Benin: 75 to 100 (15 security advisers, about 40 military advisers, 20 medical personnel, and 15 technicians)

Cape Verde: There are possibly 10 to 15 medical personnel.

Congo: About 500 (about 300 are military advisers)

Equatorial Guinea: Total Cuban presence 100 to 400 (approximately half are military advisers and security personnel)

Guinea: Total Cuban presence 400 to 600 (200 are military personnel)

Guinea-Bissau: About 250 (140 are military)

Libya: Possibly 100 to 125 (all military)

Mozambique: 800 to 850 (300 to 350 civilians; about 500 military)

Sao Tome & Principe: 100 to 250 (almost all civilian, most are medical)

Sierra Leone: 15 (security advisers)

Tanzania: 120 to 275 (most are civilian technicians; possibly 30 are military)

Zambia: 75 to 90 (military advisers; 65 to 70 are training ZAPU guerrillas; possibly 10 are training SWAPO forces)

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15. The estimated Soviet presence in Africa, including Angola and Ethiopia, is shown in the table.

16. Over the past year, the Soviets have also greatly increased their arms deliveries and technical services to three of the front-line states--Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia--and through them to liberation groups targeted against Rhodesia and Namibia. The Soviets delivered more than \$85 million in military equipment to these governments and insurgent forces in 1977 with approximately one-third of this amount destined for the Patriotic Front. The USSR has assisted in expanding training facilities in the area and contributed to strengthened border defenses in Mozambique; inventories have been significantly upgraded with heavier, more advanced weapons. Sufficient equipment is now in place for an expanded Cuban presence.

17. Mozambique has become important to the Soviets who are helping President Machel transform the Mozambique Army from a guerrilla to a conventional force. Soviet-built facilities to accommodate these trainees now include a tank-driving course as well as SA-7 missile, heavy artillery, and small arms ranges. More than 150 Soviet advisers support these camps and perform other military maintenance operations. Deliveries have included medium tanks, helicopters; plus large quantities of small arms and ammunition that are destined for the guerrillas. Some 500 Cuban military advisers are believed to be training the FRELIMO forces and may, in consequence, also be working with Rhodesian guerrilla forces which are in certain locations with the Mozambique Army.

18. President Machel shares Kaunda, Khama, and Nyerere's suspicion of Soviet and Cuban motives in southern Africa, but views his acceptance of equipment and advisers as a practical necessity. Machel's recent trip to China and his role in promoting the US-UK proposals for Rhodesia are designed in part to balance relations with Moscow and Havana. A breakdown in the Rhodesian settlement effort and an escalation of Rhodesian attacks is likely to lead, however, to a greater Soviet and Cuban presence in Mozambique.

Table

Estimated Soviet Presence in Africa

Country	Total	Military	Civilian	Remarks
<u>Total</u>	<u>11,340-11,740</u>	<u>4,795-5,195</u>	<u>6,545</u>	
<u>North Africa (Total)</u>	<u>4,460-4,860</u>	<u>1,510-1,910</u>	<u>2,950</u>	
Algeria	3,250-3,650	600-1,000	2,650	Military: equipment instruction, maintenance and training. Civilian: 800 teachers, 400 medical, 250 geology, steel industry.
Libya	1,000	900	100	Military: equipment instruction, maintenance and troop training. Civilian: nuclear techs and doctors.
Mauritania	50	..	50	Civilian: doctors, geologists, fishing.
Morocco	160	10	150	Military: equipment maintenance support. Civilian: geologists, electric power mechanics and engineers.
Tunisia	170	..	170	Teachers, doctors, irrigation technicians.
<u>Sub-Saharan Africa (Total)</u>	<u>6,880</u>	<u>3,285</u>	<u>3,595</u>	
Angola	1,200	1,000	200	Military: full range of advisory and technical support functions. Civilian: doctors and fisheries, petroleum, agriculture specialists. Geologists.
Benin	25	15	10	
Burundi	35	5	30	Military: training and maintenance of armored cars. Civilian: doctors and teachers.
Cameroon	15	..	15	Teachers, doctors.
Central African Empire	145	25	120	Military: military instruction, trucks and helicopters maintenance teams. Civilian doctors and teachers.
Chad	120	20	100	Military: military equipment instruction and equipment maintenance. Civilian: doctors, teachers.

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Estimated Soviet Presence in Africa
(Continued)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Congo	200	50	150	Military: military equipment instruction and maintenance. Civilian: prospecting, agriculture, teachers, doctors.
Equatorial Guinea	265	40	225	Military: aircraft and ground weapons instruction and maintenance. Civilian: fishery technicians.
Ethiopia	1,350	1,200	150	Military: includes several general officers. Contingent reforms full range of advisory and technical duties. Civilian: doctors, professors, vets, oil refinery and agriculture technicians.
Ghana	80	..	80	Fishing, concrete plant, and pilot crew.
Guinea	630	130	500	Military: pilot instruction, naval support and air defense training. Civilian: teachers, engineers, medical, bauxite plant, others.
Guinea-Bissau	215	65	150	Military: pilot and armored vehicle instruction. Civilian: fishing, doctors, education, planning of mineral surveys.
Kenya	10	..	10	Doctors.
Madagascar	60	10	50	Military: MI-8 helicopter pilots and maintenance personnel. Civilian: teachers, communications and survey specialists.
Mali	525	175	350	Military: 5 SA-3 missile specialists, 65 air force and radar technicians, training advisers. Civilian: teachers, doctors, gold mine and cement plant techs.

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Estimated Soviet Presence in Africa
(Continued)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Mauritius	5	--	5	Fishing.
Mozambique	380	230	250	Military: armor, infantry and guerrilla training maintenance support techs. Civilian: doctors, teachers, harbor personnel and survey techs.
Niger	5	--	5	Doctors.
Nigeria	875	50	825	Military: air defense missile experts, and air force instructors and maintenance personnel. Civilian: oil pipeline specialists, doctors, teachers.
Rwanda	10	--	10	Professors, doctors.
Senegal	35	--	35	Language teachers, fishing.
Sierre Leone	10	--	10	Medical specialist.
Somalia	--	--	--	
Sudan	25	--	25	Vets, geologists.
Tanzania	310	210	100	Military: missile air defense, air force and heavy weapons instructors and maintenance techs. Civilian: teachers, doctors.
Togo		--	5	Teachers, sport coach.
Uganda	80	50	30	Military: pilot training and aircraft maintenance personnel. Civilian: doctors, textile plant techs.
Upper Volta	15	--	15	Doctors.
Zaire	15	--	15	Teachers, doctors.
Zambia	135	10	125	Military: ground equipment training, maintenance support and several guerrilla instructors for ZAPU. Civilian: teachers doctors, mechanics.

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19. Soviet military deliveries to Tanzania will jump this year if recent arms agreements for \$200 million in ground arms, missile air defense, and communications equipment remain unchanged. The arrival last month of mobile SA-6 missile launchers marked the first such delivery to a sub-Saharan country and will probably require an increase in the Soviet advisory presence that now numbers 200. A large share of Soviet deliveries is channeled to Rhodesian and SWAPO insurgents, including for the first time artillery. To date, Cubans have not been involved in military matters, but a small group may soon begin training Rhodesian guerrillas at a Tanzanian camp.

20. Zambia accepted \$10 million in new Soviet arms assistance last fall because of mounting concern over the defense of its borders against Rhodesian incursions. Under growing pressure due to domestic problems and the lack of a resolution of the Rhodesian situation, President Kaunda has warned repeatedly that he may be forced to agree to a greater Soviet and Cuban role. He has thus far kept his distance from both Moscow and Havana and resisted, for example, Soviet pressure to cancel his trip to the US and UK. In part because of the Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war, Kaunda believes that the Soviets are primarily interested in expanding their own power and influence in southern Africa and has thus far limited Moscow's role in the Rhodesian conflict to providing arms and training for the Patriotic Front. There are 65 to 70 Cubans and 6 to 10 Soviet military advisers with Rhodesian guerrillas in Zambia. Moscow, however, believes that Kaunda's present attachment to Nkomo will work in its favor and will ensure Kaunda's continual support for ZAPU.

Drafter:

Coordinator:

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