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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 January 1959

## SOVIET TACTICS AT THE GENEVA TALKS

Test-Cessation Talks

The Soviet delegate to the Geneva talks on a nuclear test-

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

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not deviated from the basic position taken on 25 December by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko--that "invalid conditions" sought by the West were blocking agreement. Moscow may believe that ostensible agreement to all points except those "conditions" would further the Soviet effort to place on the West the onus for any stalemate.

Moscow probably hopes to avoid a breakdown in the negotiations over this issue, at least until it has established a more complete record of its desire for agreement -- in the form of conference-approved draft articles on noncontroversial issues. The Western delegations on 13 January rejected a Soviet suggestion, intended to create the false impression of progress, which would transfer to a subsequent portion of the treaty those parts of a Western-proposed article with which Moscow disagreed, thereby stripping the article of any real substance.

The Soviet delegate on 12 January presented a "compromise" draft article which would obligate the parties to allow an agreed number of control posts on their territories and inspection, including overflights, of events suspected of being nuclear explosions. In listing specific elements of the control commission to be allowed in the territories of treaty members, however, the Soviet draft omits components in the Western concept of such a system with which Moscow takes exception. Moscow was apparently trying to commit the

West to the Soviet version of the control-commission composition before the issue is discussed in detail.

## Surprise-Attack Talks

The Soviet call of 10 January to reconvene the technical conference in Geneva on measures to prevent surprise attack is intended to underline Moscow's claim that the West is responsible for the stalemate in the pre-Christmas sessions. The note charges that, by rejecting the original Soviet proposal to reconvene on 5 January, the West had delayed the search for a mutually satisfactory solution. Moscow on 13 January published the text of the note, probably believing that its bid to resume negotiations would contrast favorably with Western insistence that the results of previous sessions be evaluated before a specific date is set for reconvening.

The Soviet Union has not changed its views on the scope of these talks. The note reaffirms its determination to introduce political considerations and states specifically that the Soviet "declaration" on 28 November still applies. Reaffirmation of this position—an omnibus plan linking the surprise—attack problem to Soviet—conceived disarmament measures—indicates that Moscow still does not desire serious negotiations on this topic.

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