

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

24 March 1960

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST



Nuclear Test Talks

The Soviet proposal of 19 March for a permanent ban on all tests except small underground explosions--the latter would be covered by a moratorium pending the results of joint research to improve detection techniques--climaxes a long series of Soviet maneuvers to draw the Western powers into a comprehensive ban on all testing. This is the second time that the USSR, at a critical point in the long negotiations, has adopted a proposal favored by Britain as a means of compromising differences between the Soviet and American positions.

The moratorium proposal, based on a concept first advanced last October by [redacted] is designed to force the States either to accept what is in effect a comprehensive ban on all tests, or to risk an open break with [redacted] by rejecting the moratorium on small tests.

Moscow is also seeking by this move to strengthen Khrushchev's advocacy at the summit conference of a compromise treaty incorporating the Soviet proposal for an annual quota of on-site inspections of suspected nuclear explosions--a concept first advanced by [redacted]

Before introducing the proposal, Tsarapkin listed "numerous Soviet concessions" which have preceded this move: the quota concept for on-site in-

spections; the package proposal of 14 December for the composition and voting procedures of the control system; the "temporary criteria" proposal introduced on 16 February, in effect accepting American criteria for dispatching inspection teams during the period required for installing the control system; and the agreement to begin joint research for improving the control system immediately upon signing the treaty.

Each of these proposals was intended to press for a total ban without requiring Moscow to yield to any great extent in its insistence on maintaining control over the day-to-day operation on Soviet territory of the proposed inspection system.

Tsarapkin's public and private interpretations of the moratorium proposal suggest a desire to blur the line between tests prohibited by the treaty and those banned by the temporary moratorium. On 21 March he asserted that the inspection quota should apply to all underground events regardless of yield, therefore making the question of magnitude "irrelevant." On 19 March he told the [redacted] privately that [redacted] envisaged a "full control system," to be installed after the treaty was signed.

In agreeing to a joint research program, the Soviet proposal moves beyond the 16 February proposal to adopt "temporary

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criteria" for determining when to send out on-site inspection teams. While part of any research program would be devoted to refining these criteria, the principal effort of the experts under the latest proposal would be devoted to studies and experiments for developing adequate techniques for detecting and identifying possible underground explosions. The joint research would include underground explosions intended to improve available data on seismic disturbances.

On 21 March, however, Tsarapkin repeated the assertion he made earlier to the press that the joint program should be limited to non-nuclear chemical explosions, thereby supporting the longstanding criticism of Western efforts to include nuclear explosions in any technical program.

Since introducing its 19 March proposal, the Soviet delegation has sought to create the impression of flexibility in working out a satisfactory compromise. Tsarapkin asserted on 21 March that the moratorium should remain in force for four or five years, although he implied that this would be subject to negotiation. He suggested that during this time the joint research program should stress the specific problem of detection and identification of underground tremors, with a view toward extending the limited treaty to include all testing.

Tsarapkin stated that if the experts were unable to solve the problem within the time limit, the three powers would have to work out a new

arrangement for the future. He had told the press earlier that in this case he presumed the moratorium would be extended.

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